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# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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## HEARINGS BEFORE A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H. Res. 282

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TO INVESTIGATE (1) THE EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND OBJECTS OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, (2) THE DIFFUSION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OF SUBVERSIVE AND UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA THAT IS INSTIGATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OR OF A DOMESTIC ORIGIN AND ATTACKS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AS GUARANTEED BY OUR CONSTITUTION, AND (3) ALL OTHER QUESTIONS IN RELATION THERETO THAT WOULD AID CONGRESS IN ANY NECESSARY REMEDIAL LEGISLATION

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### VOLUME 15

JUNE 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, JULY 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 1943

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Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities





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# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met in room 1543, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, and Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

For the purpose of the record, in order to verify the investigations which have been undertaken by representatives of the Dies committee, the committee has had some investigators in the field visiting the various relocation centers at which the Japanese have been gathered, and as a result of their investigations they found conditions which do not seem to be very satisfactory, and we are endeavoring at the present time to substantiate the evidence which they have uncovered in the course of their investigations.

It is the purpose of the committee to call in the heads of some of the camps and obtain their testimony regarding their conditions at those camps and the method of operating the war relocation camps.

We have brought in today a witness from the camp at Poston, Ariz., and I am going to ask Mr. Gelvin to stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. GELVIN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF RALPH M. GELVIN, ASSISTANT PROJECT MANAGER,  
COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT, POSTON, ARIZ.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. GELVIN. Ralph M. Gelvin.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman, will you proceed with the questioning?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, since the subject of this hearing is the Japanese war relocation centers, I should like to have marked as an exhibit at this point, a copy of the Executive Order No. 9102, entitled: "Establishing the War Relocation Authority in the Executive Office of the President and Defining Its Functions and Duties."

This order was signed by the President on March 18, 1942.

Mr. COSTELLO. It will be so ordered and made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Committee Exhibit No. 1," and received in evidence.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Also, Mr. Chairman, this hearing will bring forth some Japanese terms which I would like to explain before I start examining the witness.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The Japanese in the United States are divided into four classes, namely, the Issei, Nisei, Kibei, and San Sai.

A Japanese living in the United States but born in Japan is known as an Issei, which means first generation.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you spell those terms?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Issei is spelled I-s-s-e-i.

A Japanese born in the United States of parents born in Japan is called a Nisei, which means second generation.

Nisei is spelled N-i-s-e-i.

A Japanese born and living in the United States but educated in Japan is known as a Kibei—K-i-b-e-i.

A child of Nisei parents is called a San Sai, which means third generation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Gelvin, will you please give the reporter your full name?

Mr. GELVIN. Ralph M. Gelvin.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How do you spell your last name?

Mr. GELVIN. G-e-l-v-i-n.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. GELVIN. Poston, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you live inside the Poston relocation center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you an American citizen?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. GELVIN. Louisiana, Mo.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. GELVIN. December 25, 1904.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever served in the armed forces of the United States?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state briefly your education and training?

Mr. GELVIN. How far back do you want that to go?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to know whether or not you went to high school.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you speak a little louder, please.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I want to know how far you went through school?

Mr. GELVIN. My first 2 years in high school were in St. Louis, Mo., at the Soldan High School. My last 2 years were at a country high school at Monument, Colo.

I attended the Colorado Agricultural College for three and a half years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you graduate from the Colorado Agricultural College?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please give the committee an outline of the most important positions you have held since your graduation and since you began working?

Mr. GELVIN. After leaving college I worked for the State extension service for 5 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And for which State was that?

Mr. GELVIN. Colorado; dairy extension work.

I then went into the Indian Service in extension work—agricultural extension agent was the title of the position.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you go with the Indian Service; what year?

Mr. GELVIN. 1939.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your title?

Mr. GELVIN. Agricultural extension agent.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what was your salary?

Mr. GELVIN. \$2,600 a year. I served as agricultural extension agent until December 1940.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And where did you perform those duties?

Mr. GELVIN. Hickory Apache Indian Reservation in New Mexico for 6 years and Sells Indian Agency at Sells, Ariz., for a little less than 3 years.

I was then appointed as reservation superintendent of the Truxton Canyon Indian Agency in northern Arizona.

In April—April 17, 1942, I was placed in my present position in the War Relocation project at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And your last position with the Indian Service was that of superintendent at Truxton, is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your salary there?

Mr. GELVIN. \$3,500 per year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did that include quarters and subsistence?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, no. It didn't include subsistence. A charge was made for quarters. It was deducted from that salary.

Mr. STEEDMAN. \$3,500 was your full salary for a year?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; that was the gross salary.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated you accepted a position as assistant project manager at the war relocation center at Poston in April 1942, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What are your duties and responsibilities at the Poston Relocation Center?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, as assistant to Mr. Head, the project director, I am responsible for assisting him in the management of the project. That covers so many duties it would be hard to outline them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In short, you are the director of the project when Mr. Head is away, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does all the administrative correspondence go over your desk?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no; it does not.



Mr. STEEDMAN. What part of the administrative correspondence goes over your desk?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, when Mr. Head is on the project very little of it goes over my desk. When he is away from the project most of it goes over my desk.

May I further explain that by stating that Mr. Empie, our chief administrative officer, generally sends out correspondence over his own signature.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What I am getting at is what your duties are when Mr. Head is at the project?

Mr. GELVIN. (No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. What phase of the work do you carry on? Do you administer anything?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we do not have a direct line of division in our work—that is, Mr. Head and I, but in general I work more with the appointed personnel—that is the Caucasian personnel, and the operations of the project such as development of land, the public-works projects, while Mr. Head deals more with the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have anything to do with employing the people who are employed at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. In some cases I would approve employment, acting on the recommendation of the branch chief who might be doing the employing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the branch chief submit a requisition to you for a certain type of person and then you submit that to the Civil Service Commission?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; any application for employment is handled through regular civil-service channels and I act on the recommendation, generally, of the branch chief.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are all the white personnel at Poston civil-service employees?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I believe they are. I don't know of any exceptions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Let me see if I understand you. It is brought to your attention that a man is needed in the agricultural department?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Mathieson, who is the head of the Agricultural Department, advises you he needs a man, then do you request the Civil Service Commission to furnish you with a man who has the qualifications that Mr. Mathieson asks for?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I believe that is the general procedure of the personnel officer who handles that. He asks for an eligible list.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is under your general supervision?

Mr. GELVIN. That is under my general supervision; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you directly responsible for that?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I would be responsible under Mr. Head for that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At the present time you are responsible because Mr. Head is not at the project?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did Mr. Head go to Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. He has been gone about 3 weeks.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why did he go to Washington, do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. He went for a conference called by the Director of the W. R. A., Mr. Myers.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the purpose of that conference?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the order requiring Mr. Head to go to Washington state the purpose of the conference?

Mr. GELVIN. I didn't see the order.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether other heads of centers were also called to Washington for this conference? Was this a general conference or was just Mr. Head ordered to Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. It is my understanding that all of the project directors were called.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present salary?

Mr. GELVIN. \$5,600 a year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Indian Service loan you to the W. R. A.?

Mr. GELVIN. I am still employed by the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are still employed by the Indian Service?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you paid from Indian Service funds?

Mr. GELVIN. I am paid from funds that are transferred from the War Relocation Authority to the Indian Service for this particular project. Now, as to saying if that is Indian Service funds, why, I would rather you would ask Mr. Empie that when he comes in, because he is the chief administrative officer and, of course, is much more familiar with the details of the accounting than I am.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you consider you are working for the War Relocation Authority or are you working for the Indian Service?

Mr. GELVIN. We have a dual responsibility. We work under the policies laid down by the War Relocation Authority but we still have a responsibility to the Indian Service inasmuch as we are still Indian Service employees in a technical sense of the word.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does your present position carry more responsibility than the position you had as superintendent of the Indian project at Truxton?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that the reason for the \$2,100-a-year increase in your salary?

Mr. GELVIN. I assume that is it.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Gelvin, is this \$5,600 net or are your quarters deducted from that?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I am charged for quarters.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever lived in the State of California?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I lived in the State of California when I was a boy for about 5 months.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the approximate date?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were quite young?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, it was a good many years ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any actual experience with the Japanese people?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; not until I went to Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made any study of the Japanese language?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Or Japanese customs?

Mr. GELVIN. I have tried to make a study in this way, attempting to learn as much about Japanese customs as I could from talking with the Japanese people on the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But prior to going to Poston you knew nothing about the Japanese people nor their customs?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, the Japanese people and their customs and activities were strange to you?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please describe the physical set-up of the war relocation project or center at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. The project was originally built to accommodate 20,000 people. It is divided into 3 units—3 camps.

Camp No. 1 was built to accommodate 10,000 people and the other 2 camps 5,000 people each.

It is built on what we term the "block system." In each block there are 14 barracks and most of them are divided into 4 rooms. That would make 56 rooms which are the rooms that the evacuees live in. In these blocks, in addition to the barracks, there are also mess halls where all the people in that particular block eat.

There is a 20- by 100-foot building that is called a recreation hall which is an open barracks—that is there are no partitions in it.

In the center of the block there is a men's latrine, a women's latrine, a laundry room, and an ironing room.

In camp No. 1 there are 36 of these blocks. In camps 2 and 3 there are 18 in each camp.

We get our water from deep wells which average around 220 feet deep. In camp No. 1 we have four such wells and deliver a capacity of about 800 gallons per minute each.

At the other two camps we have two in each camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who laid out the project?

Mr. GELVIN. I understand the United States Army engineers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the camp built under the jurisdiction and control of the Army engineers?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it built by contract?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the buildings of permanent construction?

Mr. GELVIN. I have had our construction man tell me they would last approximately 4 years—possibly 5.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are referring now to the barracks or to all the buildings?

Mr. GELVIN. All of the buildings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does that include the administration buildings?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I am afraid it wouldn't. That is a little better type of building.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is of more permanent construction?

Mr. GELVIN. I think so; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the cost of building the war relocation center at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I have never been told the exact cost of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who would have that information?

Mr. GELVIN. The United States Engineers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much lumber was used in building the project at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I wouldn't have any idea.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there any surplus lumber left when the Army engineers finished building the project?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; but I couldn't tell you how much. There was a little left that we purchased from them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did you do with it?

Mr. GELVIN. We used it—let me see a minute. There were some features of the project which needed additional work, such as shelving in the warehouses, some of the warehouses; partitions in the administration buildings, in the offices.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any of this lumber destroyed by fire?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you heard any of it was burned?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't a report in your files to the effect that this lumber was burned, or any part of it?

Mr. GELVIN. I have never seen such a report; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Such a report has never come to your attention?

Mr. GELVIN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I say that has never come to your attention?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many of the buildings at Poston are air-conditioned?

Mr. GELVIN. The administration buildings have desert coolers. The personnel quarters have desert coolers. We purchased one blower for each of the kitchens due to the terrific heat. We mounted them right over the stoves so as to blow away a part of that heat.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much the air-conditioning equipment at Poston cost the Government?

Mr. GELVIN. I could not tell you the total cost; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the present total population of Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. 15,916, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That represents a deduction in numbers from the high point, doesn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the maximum number of people that were located at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. 17,800, I believe was the maximum number.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please describe the administrative set-up of the camp, and I have in mind the Caucasian or white personnel?

Mr. GELVIN. We have the administration divided into what we call branches. There is the engineering or public works branch, community services branch—community services includes such things as health, education, family welfare—such things as that.

There is a branch of agriculture and industry headed by Mr. Mathieson.

The administrative branch is headed by Mr. Empie.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of food and the mess at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Snelson.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is Mr. Snelson's first name?

Mr. GELVIN. C. E. Snelson. That is in the administrative branch.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of work was Mr. Snelson engaged in prior to his employment at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. He was chief steward at one of the assembly centers at Fresno, I believe—the Fresno assembly center.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Japanese assembly center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that while the center at Fresno was under the control of the Army and being operated by the W. P. A.?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe that was operated by the W. C. C. A.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there some discussion at the present time as to whether or not it was operated by the W. P. A.?

Mr. GELVIN. I have heard no discussion of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the W. P. A. ever operated the assembly centers?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What does W. C. C. A. stand for?

Mr. GELVIN. Western Civilian Control Administration. I believe that is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that a voluntary set-up or a California set-up, or what was that?

Mr. GELVIN. That was a project—not a project but a division set up under the Western Defense Command for the handling of evacuations.

Mr. COSTELLO. Under direct Army supervision and control, was it not?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Control of the military authorities?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether it was military personnel or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, from the best information we can obtain with reference to the evacuation of the Japanese, I think that the Army ordered the Japanese out of the west coast area and the Army had the job of moving the Japanese from this area. We understand also that it was the Army's job to police the grounds enclosed and the W. P. A. was given the job of internal management inside of the reception centers such as Santa Anita and Fresno and the other assembly centers throughout this area.

The W. R. A. took over from the War Department on April 17, 1942.

Returning to Mr. Snelson—did Mr. Snelson have any experience with Japanese prior to his present position?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he did or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he ever lived in California?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, of course, he lived in California at the time he was with the Fresno assembly center. I couldn't say—I wouldn't know what his past has been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see his personnel papers when they came over your desk?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You did not see them?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the educational department at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Dr. Miles Carey.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you have anything to do with employing Dr. Carey?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know where he came from to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; he came from Honolulu.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know why he came here from Honolulu?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I do not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he had previous experience with Japanese there?

Mr. GELVIN. He was principal of the McKinley High School.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He was employed due to the fact that he had been in the islands and had experience with Japanese, isn't that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; and on his reputation as an educator.

Mr. MUNDT. Where did he get his Doctor's degree?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know, sir. He is a Ph. D.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of medical care at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Dr. Pressman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What are his initials; do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. Abraham.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know where he went to school?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he had any experience with the Japanese prior to coming to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I think not. He was an Indian Service employee transferred.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of relocation at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Explain that question a little further. Just what do you mean by that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I mean who is taking charge at the present time of relocating evacuees in the middle west and on the east coast?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Giles Zimmerman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about Mr. Zimmerman's background?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Zimmerman came to us from the American Friends' Service Committee. I understand that he has had considerable experience with what is termed—what is the term used for people coming over from other countries?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you mean refugees?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, refugees. While he was with this Service Committee he had experience, but as to whether he has any direct experience with Japanese, I couldn't say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see his personnel papers when they came over your desk?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you had nothing to do with selecting Mr. Zimmerman?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Zimmerman is from St. Louis, isn't he?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't think he is?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he is or not; I couldn't tell you.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know whether he went to Washington University in St. Louis?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would his personnel record indicate that fact?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think it would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the personnel records at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. C. H. Smith.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he been employed by the Indian Service prior to going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Smith?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Returning again to Mr. Zimmerman, you say he was associated with the Friends' Service; is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the background of the organization known as Friends' Service?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is a Quaker organization, is it not?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe it is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it a pacifist organization?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't say whether it is or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, do you investigate the organizations which operate inside of the center and who are in contact with the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. The War Relocation Authority in Washington does that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you do not do that at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Such committees as the American Friends' Service Committee does not operate in the camp unless they have the approval of the War Relocation Authority office in Washington.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the local administrator at Poston has nothing to say about who shall come into the center? I mean from the standpoint of issuing passes and permits.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; all the passes to go into the camp are issued by the project director.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But occasionally in such a case as the American Friends' Service, you get an order from Washington to give a representative of that organization permission to enter the center, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. If we had any reason to feel that that organization should not be on the project, we would voice our objection with the Washington office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you investigate all the organizations that come to you for admittance to the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. We don't do it personally, no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who does?

Mr. GELVIN. The War Relocation Authority office in Washington.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Mr. Zimmerman setting up so-called hostels throughout the Middle West?

Mr. GELVIN. No; he isn't doing it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is doing it?

Mr. GELVIN. The American Friends' Service Committee, I understand, have some. I couldn't tell you how many. And I believe another church organization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the purpose of these hostels?



Mr. GELVIN. It is one of the steps in relocation. For instance, they will take a person in one of these hostels, one of the evacuees, one of the Japanese and help him find a job; help him or her find a job. The theory is that to get the evacuee and the prospective employer together and arrange for the employment of the evacuee.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What really happens is this, isn't it, that the Japanese are released in care of the hostels in the various cities throughout the Middle West, and then they live in these hostels until such time as they find employment?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But they are released without having first secured employment?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are they released in charge of the hostels?

Mr. GELVIN. They are released to the hostel and the fact is reported to the nearest relocation officer. This relocation officer is an employee of the War Relocation Authority. They have relocation officers in many of the cities throughout the Middle West and East.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Whose idea was that, do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I couldn't tell you whose idea it was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Japanese have been released from Poston to date?

Mr. GELVIN. In the neighborhood of 2,000.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I ask a question there? Who finances these hotels? Are they financed by the churches or does the War Relocation Authority pay the expenses of the Japanese while they are in the hostel?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you. I believe they are financed by the church organization.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you pay the expenses of the Japanese when they leave the center and go to these hostels?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you give them \$50 each when they leave the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. If he applies for it and states he has no money of his own.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he have to pay that back?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is a gift from the Government?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Together with a railroad ticket to wherever he wants to go?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any Japanese who have gone out and received \$50, return to the center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we have had returns. We haven't had any returns that I know of of people to whom this cash grant has been given.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If there were returns of Japanese to whom cash grants had been given, would you give them another cash grant?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Just one cash grant is all that any one Japanese is entitled to?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What are the mechanics for releasing an evacuee? What I mean by that is, How does a Japanese in the center at Poston go about getting out?

Mr. GELVIN. He makes application to the leave office. His application is investigated to determine whether he is eligible to leave.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Right at that point I would like to ask you a question: Who conducts the investigation of the evacuee who makes application for leave?

Mr. GELVIN. The personnel in the leave office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The personnel in the leave office?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many people are employed in your leave office at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. In the leave and employment office there are six appointed personnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And do these six appointed personnel investigate the propriety of releasing the individual Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct, to a certain point.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many employees are in the leave office?

Mr. GELVIN. They have four men and two women.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you name these people?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Giles Zimmerman is the chief of that division, Mr. Ed Nossoff.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his title and salary?

Mr. GELVIN. His title is assistant chief of employment; his salary is \$3,200.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had Mr. Nossoff had any experience with the Japanese prior to going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe Mr. Nossoff had had experience.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. GELVIN. Let me finish.

Mr. STEEDMAN. All right.

Mr. GELVIN. Had had some experience with Japanese in the Salt River Valley around Phoenix.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you finished?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; pardon me.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all right. Had Mr. Nossoff had any investigative experience, before going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what there is in his background that would qualify him to pass on these Japanese who want to be relocated in the Middle West and on the east coast?

Mr. GELVIN. Information that we have assembled at the project. We have what we call a stop list of people who are not eligible to leave.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that stop list prepared by Mr. Zimmerman's office?

Mr. GELVIN. Not altogether; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is a compilation of information?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And evidence?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you make up your stop list from that information?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You said that Mr. Zimmerman was in charge and Mr. Nossoff was second in charge. Will you name the next man in line?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Ralph Drennan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his title and salary?

Mr. GELVIN. Leave officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Salary?

Mr. GELVIN. \$3,200, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where had he worked prior to going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. He was recruited through the civil service. He was personnel officer for some large company in Cairo, Egypt, for several years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he had any experience with Japanese before going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now, who is the No. 4 man?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. John Hunter.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And his title and salary?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't give you his correct title.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he had any experience in the investigative field before going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No; he came out of the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And had had no experience with the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. No. 5 would be a woman, wouldn't it? You said there were four men and two women?

Mr. GELVIN. Let me do a little checking here to make sure I am giving you absolutely accurate information. Mr. Hunter is assistant leave officer at \$2,300 a year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about his background?

Mr. GELVIN. He was transferred to us from the Indian Service. He has been in the Indian Service a great many years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What age man is Mr. Hunter?

Mr. GELVIN. He must be about 45.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please name the other two employees in the leave office or in that section?

Mr. GELVIN. Dorothy M. Stevick. Her title is assistant director of employment, \$2,900. May I make a correction there in Mr. Nossoff's title. His title is senior administrative assistant.

Mr. MUNDT. While you are on Nossoff again, will you explain what he was doing in the Salt River Valley prior to going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I think he was with the United States Employment Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He had possibly seen some Japanese down in the Salt River Valley?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. And Mary M. Ataloe, assistant leave officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What nationality is she?

Mr. GELVIN. She is part Indian.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is her title?

Mr. GELVIN. She is assistant leave officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And salary?

Mr. GELVIN. \$2,300.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There are six people in this section who handle the investigation of evacuees who are to be released?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you have already stated that 2,000 had been released since the project started; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Over what period of time have those 2,000 been released?

Mr. GELVIN. That is since the project started—since the project was started.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many are you releasing—

Mr. GELVIN. Let me explain that a little bit further. That 2,000 is the number that is out at the present time. There have been more than that released on what we call "seasonal work leave" who have returned; so altogether there have probably been 3,500 that have been released and the difference between the 2,000 and the 3,500 are those who have returned from seasonal work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, the 2,000 are what you call permanently away from the camp on permanent leave; isn't that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. No; the 2,000 includes those on permanent leave and those who are out on seasonal leave at the present time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At this time?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many are out on permanent leave for relocation in the Middle West and the East?

Mr. GELVIN. There are about 900 on permanent leave and about 1,100 on seasonal leave.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Over what period of time have these 900 been released permanently?

Mr. GELVIN. That is since the start of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact these people on permanent leave have been released lately; isn't that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. The most of them have, I would say, in the last 3 or 4 months.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And these six people, four men and two women, have handled all the investigations and cleared the 900 who have been released over the last 6 months; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is true; they have handled the leave section there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That keeps them pretty busy, doesn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. They handle other work in that particular branch too.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They handle other work in addition to that?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they handle all the investigations of these evacuees who make application for leave?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I wouldn't say that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who does make those investigations then?

Mr. GELVIN. We have an internal security officer who handles investigative work and he turns in any information that he might gather.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the internal security officer?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Miller.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his full name?

Mr. GELVIN. E. L. Miller.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his title?

Mr. GELVIN. Chief internal security.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And his salary?



Mr. GELVIN. \$3,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he have any previous experience with the Japanese before going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. He was with the San Francisco police force before coming to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then he had some experience with the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. He must have had some, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who actually takes the responsibility for releasing the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. In the final analysis the project director approves the release permit.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the project director is responsible for the investigation of each evacuee, isn't that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. The project director is responsible for all the work on the project—all of the functions of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he assumes the responsibility for the release of the evacuees and the investigation of each evacuee; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. He assumes the responsibility insofar as the investigation that is included on the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you please explain to the committee just how you go about investigating each case?

Mr. GELVIN. First, as I said awhile ago, an individual hands in his application for leave. That is checked with the stop list which we have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does this stop list contain information that you have gathered on the Japanese since they went to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Most of it is—some of it. Some of the names there have been placed there on advice of the Washington office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Washington office?

Mr. GELVIN. Washington office of the W. R. A.; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you obtained information from the various Japanese about other Japanese, is that right, about their loyalty and their attitude toward the United States?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we have gotten some information from them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that information is entered on your so-called stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. If the evidence is such that the project director feels it should be placed on the stop list it is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the project director passes on that, does he?

Mr. GELVIN. Not altogether; on the stop list, you mean?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. There are certain qualifications—certain regulations that we have. If a person has, for instance, applied for repatriation to Japan, we automatically place him on the stop list.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That should automatically place him on the stop list; don't you think?

Mr. GELVIN. I should think so.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you list five or six other characteristics that will place a man's name on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. When we had our general registration of all the people on the project over 17 years old, those who did not give an unqualified affirmative answer to what we speak of as question "28" which was the loyalty question, those are automatically placed on the stop list.

These questionnaires have all gone into Washington and through their investigation in Washington if they find evidence against an individual, through various sources of information that they might have, why, they have notified us to place that individual on the stop list.

If an individual has had difficulty with—if he has violated the law or committed some crime, why, he is placed on the stop list.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean since he has been in the center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; he is placed on the stop list. Then if we get a report from a hospital, for instance, that a person was mentally unbalanced and they didn't feel he should go out into the normal channels, he would be placed on the stop list.

Those are the main things.

Mr. MUNDT. May I pursue this a little further? About how many people do you have on your stop list all together, of the fifteen or seventeen thousand Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. We must have close to ———.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. MUNDT. Are those ———<sup>1</sup> kept in separate barracks some place?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Or do they intermingle with the rest of the people in the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. They are not segregated in any way?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You know they are bad but still you don't segregate them; is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't know that they are bad.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have them on the stop list.

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I interrupt at this point? I think it might be well if the press withheld any publication as to the number that appear on the stop list. I will request the number ———<sup>1</sup> be off the record.

Mr. GELVIN. I prefer to give you an accurate figure on that. I am making an estimate now about the number.

Mr. COSTELLO. I feel it would not be well to publish that figure.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean the figure ———<sup>1</sup> is not definitely accurate? (No answer.)

Mr. COSTELLO. That is an approximate figure?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. But you are sure about the fact that they are not segregated?

Mr. GELVIN. I am sure about that; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. To what extent do they check on the past history of the individual cases?

(No answer.)

Mr. COSTELLO. You have a record, I suppose, of the prior history of the Japanese before they were brought to the camp. Is there any investigation made of their prior history?

Mr. GELVIN. We have no records of that. Any investigation that is carried on with regard to that is carried on in the Washington office.

As I say, all these questionnaires have been submitted to the Washington office.

<sup>1</sup> Number stricken from the record, as requested by Chairman Costello.



Mr. COSTELLO. So far as you know or so far as the camp is concerned, no attempt is made to determine the past history of the individual prior to his being evacuated from his original home?

Mr. GELVIN. Not from our standpoint in the camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Japanese may be released regardless of what their history was or what they may have been doing prior to being assembled in the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. If they do not fit into any of the categories which would automatically eliminate them, such as application for repatriation and things like that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Take for instance a person who may have been employed in a consular office or engaged in some definitely pro-Japanese activity here on the Pacific coast prior to Pearl Harbor, you would have no record of that in the center or in your notes regarding these people?

Mr. GELVIN. I would assume that if he was employed in a consular office, he would be in an internment camp.

Of course, we had access to these forms when they were filled out and I am quite sure that if they had been employed in that category, and it came to our attention, it would have been further investigated and reported to the Washington office.

Mr. COSTELLO. A girl might have been employed as a stenographer or secretary or something of that kind in a consular office.

Mr. GELVIN. That is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you would have no specific record of that activity?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we would have that on our census form. We conducted a census there and we would have that information.

Mr. COSTELLO. The census form?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that give information regarding the prior activities of the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Past employment.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the principal source of your information is the census form and the questionnaire, both of which were filled out voluntarily by the Japanese, concerning themselves?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed with the questioning, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the census form indicate the organizations to which the particular Japanese belonged before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GELVIN. I am not sure whether the census form includes that or not; the registration forms which we use do include that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would that indicate to you that a certain Japanese was an official in the Central Japanese Association prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GELVIN. Now, will you give me that question again?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The question was this: Does the form indicate whether or not an individual Japanese was an official in the Central Japanese Association prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GELVIN. The form asks that question. I can't remember just what the exact wording is, but it asks whether or not they belonged—what organizations they have belonged to. Maybe you have a copy of that form; it is No. 304-A.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any exofficial of the Japanese Association at Poston at the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe we have two.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know who they are?

Mr. GELVIN. From a list that was left there by the two investigators who were at the project recently. We found two members on that. Whether they were officers or not, I couldn't tell you.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Going back again to the release of the evacuees. Do you know where the evacuees who have been released are at the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. The evacuees? We have their address of where they went to. That is in the hands—that is in the files of the relocation officer in whichever area they have gone to and any changes of address are supposed to be reported to the relocation officer who in turn reports it to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And when the evacuee leaves the center at Poston, he is no longer a responsibility of the Poston relocation center; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He becomes then a responsibility of the relocation officer in the area to which he is going?

Mr. GELVIN. Now, just how far does the term "responsibility" go?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I mean he is free and able to do whatever he wants to do after he leaves Poston.

Mr. GELVIN. A person going out on an indefinite leave is obligated to accept the job that he has gone to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is only a moral obligation; isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. If he doesn't accept the job, the relocation officer investigates and finds out why. However, that doesn't make it binding, that he stay with that job. He is free to take another job if he wants to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the only obligation of the evacuee is that he notify the relocation center or relocation officer of a change of address; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe that is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that the W. R. A. can put its hands on each individual Japanese that has been released from the relocation center?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether they can or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any information regarding the manner in which the Japanese are complying with your instructions to keep the Employment Office informed of their whereabouts?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you receive a copy of the address of the evacuee from the Employment Office when he sends in a change of address?

Mr. GELVIN. Do you mean does the project get a change of address?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; that comes into our employment office if there is any change of address.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where do you maintain these employment offices?

Mr. GELVIN. You mean the project employment office?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No, the employment offices throughout the country?

Mr. GELVIN. The relocation offices?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, I can name you quite a few. I don't know whether I can name all of them or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Name the ones that you can recall.

Mr. GELVIN. Salt Lake City, Denver, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Kansas City, St. Louis, Lincoln, Nebr. I believe those are all I can call offhand. However, I am quite sure there are more than that—Billings, Mont.—I believe there is one there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what percentage of the evacuees who have been released are aliens?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I can't give you that figure.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are releasing aliens though, aren't you?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And in the same manner in which you are releasing citizens?

Mr. GELVIN. No; not exactly in the same manner. There are more restrictions in this way: When an alien is released it is reported to the United States attorney in whichever area they have gone into, and they have to conform to the regulations concerning any aliens in this country. During wartime they are more strict than at other times.

Mr. MUNDT. Aside from that, providing the man is not on the stop list, it is just as easy for an alien to be released as it is a citizen, so far as getting out of the camp is concerned?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think so.

Mr. MUNDT. Does he get the same \$50 from the relocation center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir. That was the reason I hesitated. I was trying to think of any additional regulations concerning aliens.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the community government at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I assume you mean employed personnel who work with the community government?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right.

Mr. GELVIN. In each of the three units we have a camp manager or a unit administrator, as they call them, and he works with the community government in whichever camp it happens to be.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in actual charge of the community welfare and recreation department for the entire center?

Mr. GELVIN. That is under the community service branch. Miss Nell Findley was the branch chief but she has resigned.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did she resign?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe it was effective the 1st of June.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The 1st of June this year?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; recently.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were her duties?

Mr. GELVIN. She had under her, in her department, the family welfare, community activities, recreation, health, education.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where had she been employed prior to coming to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Honolulu.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did she come over to the mainland with Dr. Carey?

Mr. GELVIN. No; she came over prior to Dr. Carey.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had she been associated with Dr. Carey in Honolulu?

Mr. GELVIN. Not in an official capacity. I think they were acquainted with each other's work there—the nature of their work. They had contacts with each other.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has Miss Findley been in social welfare work for some time?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, she has.

Mr. COSTELLO. What work did she do in Honolulu?

Mr. GELVIN. At the time she came over she was in charge of a phase of the U. S. O. work in Honolulu. Now, whether she was in complete charge of the U. S. O. there or not, I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long had she lived in Honolulu, do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. She had been there a number of years; I wouldn't say.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know what her activities were prior to her connection with the U. S. O.?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did she have any particular vocation?

(No answer.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Was she a teacher or something of that sort?

Mr. GELVIN. She was a social welfare worker; that is her background.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. She had had some experience with the Japanese over in the islands?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; she had.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know why she resigned from the project?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, she resigned for personal reasons; to go back to Honolulu.

Mr. COSTELLO. Returning to Honolulu?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has she returned yet, do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't say. I believe that she has, though, but I wouldn't—I haven't heard for sure whether she has left or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see her personnel papers when they came into the project?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know who recommended her for employment there?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I think she was recommended by Mr. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a list of the employees of the Poston Relocation Center with you today?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you furnish the committee a copy of that list?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. [Handing paper to Mr. Steedman.]

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have marked as an exhibit a list of the personnel at the Poston Relocation Center, which includes the title of the positions, the name of the employee, grade, and salary.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the date of that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The date of the list is June 1, 1943.



Mr. COSTELLO. It will be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Gelvin Exhibit No. 1," and received in evidence.)

Mr. MUNDT. Now, that you have mentioned Mr. Collier, I wonder if you will elaborate a little more as to the nature of the dual responsibilities which you have in your capacity, with the War Relocation Authority and the Indian Service? You said earlier you had a "dual responsibility."

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we, as I stated, are employed by the Indian Service. This particular project was worked out with an agreement with the Indian Service and the War Relocation Authority.

Due to the fact that this was located right in the center of land that the Indian Service had established long-time plans for to develop this Colorado River irrigation project, the policies regarding the development of the project—that is the development of the land, were worked out between Mr. Collier—that is Mr. Collier representing the Interior Department, and Mr. Eisenhower, who was at that time Director of the War Relocation Authority, so it was felt that the two services working together in that particular project would be advantageous.

However, we have not been able to develop the land as had been originally planned—that is in the quantities that had been planned. However, with regard to the actual operation of the camp itself, why, of course, we work under the rules and regulations and the policies laid down by the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MUNDT. Aside from the development of the land and possibly to advise as to physical equipment that was put on it, does the Indian Service exercise any other authority over the camp or do you have any other responsibilities to the Indian Service?

Mr. GELVIN. We are working under the general Indian Service accounting regulations; as for the general policies, no. I would say no.

There are certain features like I mentioned, the accounting, fiscal and accounting divisions.

Mr. MUNDT. There is no dual responsibility or division of authority insofar as policies, for example, in letting these Japanese out of the camp, or whether they are going to be segregated in separate barracks?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. It deals only with accounting and agricultural practices and possibly the physical equipment?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right. The Indian Service has given us assistance in setting up the school program and such things as that.

Mr. MUNDT. This land used to be part of an Indian reservation?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; it is right in the center of the Colorado Indian Reservation.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the actual direction of the center and the control of the people there is entirely under the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the Indian Service is only interested in how the ground is employed that belongs to the reservation?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right. The Indian Service is more or less, I guess you would use the term, "a cooperating agency."

Mr. COSTELLO. They have no direction or control over how you will operate the center?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return for a moment to the chief steward. Did you investigate the background of Mr. Snelson?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we didn't. He was recommended to us by the W. C. C. A. and by the War Relocation Authority offices in San Francisco at the time we employed him. Upon receiving their recommendation, we approved their recommendation and employed him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I notice you have his name entered on your personnel chart here as Clifton E. Snelson.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what his middle name is?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether it is Earle?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know whether this is Earle Snelson or not?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have his personnel record at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you furnish us the information as to whether or not his middle name is "Earle"?

Mr. GELVIN. Could I furnish that information?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the total monthly salaries paid the administrative personnel at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I haven't it. I think Mr. Empie can probably give you that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Empie will be able to testify as to the cost of the administration?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As far as salaries are concerned?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir. And you wanted also the middle name of Mr. Snelson?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right. And I also want to know whether or not you carried on an investigation into his background prior to his going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we didn't do it there on the project; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Civil Service carry on an investigation into his background?

Mr. GELVIN. You would have to check with the Civil Service Commission on that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Civil Service Commission furnish you with a result of their investigation of each employee that you employed there?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they furnish us, I believe, with a form showing their past employment and information of that kind.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you have never asked the Civil Service Commission to conduct an investigation on Mr. Snelson, have you?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge; not to run a specific investigation on him.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you asked it as to any of the other employees?

Mr. GELVIN. No; not to my knowledge.

Mr. EBERHARTER. May I ask a question?

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was he interviewed by anybody at Poston before he was employed, or did he just come in cold?

Mr. GELVIN. He came in subject to our approval. That is, we were without a chief steward and the W. R. A. office in San Francisco arranged for his services and sent him right down to us, subject to our approval as to his efficiency on the job.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And at that time did somebody interview him before he was put to work?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, yes; Mr. Enmpie, the chief administrative officer, interviewed him.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please explain the set-up of the Japanese community government inside the center?

Mr. GELVIN. The council—that is the term used for it—the community council is elected by the people, by the evacuees. They elect one representative from each block and that representative can be either Issei or Nisei.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the percentages of the leaders—and I am speaking of the block leaders—who are Nisei?

Mr. GELVIN. It is about half and half.

Mr. STEEDMAN. About half are alien and about half are citizens?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Does that mean he cannot be a Sonsei, or don't you have any Sonsei in the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, a Sonsei—there wouldn't be any old enough.

Mr. MUNDT. They are children?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. And of course, the term "Kibei" that Mr. Steedman referred to, technically he is a Nisei.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say they are divided about half and half, Issei and Nisei?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you include the Kibei in the Nisei group when you made the answer?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I don't know just how many of the Nisei are Kibei though, in that group. We just had a recent election and, in fact, I just gave them the oath of office just prior to coming over here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many block leaders do you have?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, there are 36 in unit 1, 15 in unit 2, and 17 in unit 3.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you furnish the committee with a list of the Kibei who are block leaders?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Can a man become a block leader and be on your stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. If he has not given an unqualified affirmative answer of loyalty to question 28 on his Selective Service form, Form No. 304-A, he will not be approved as a block leader by the project director.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But he could be on your stop list and still be a block leader, couldn't he?

Mr. GELVIN. He could, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If he was elected to that position?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right. He might have applied for repatriation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any block leaders who have applied for repatriation?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge; I would have to check that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you furnish the committee with that information?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. Will this information that you request, will it be in the record or do you want me to keep a record of it?

Mr. STEEDMAN. You can furnish the committee that information in the form of a letter.

Mr. GELVIN. What I mean is, do you want me to keep track of the information that you want?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I wish you would.

Mr. GELVIN. Now, so far you would like the middle name of Mr. Snelson; you would like a list of the Kibei who are on the council, is that correct?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes. Is the War Relocation Authority center at Poston near adequate water supply?

Mr. GELVIN. What kind of water supply do you mean?

Mr. STEEDMAN. How do you obtain water at the Poston center?

Mr. GELVIN. Domestic water or irrigation water?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Irrigation.

Mr. GELVIN. Comes from the Colorado River.

Mr. MUNDT. The list of matters about which you are going to inform the committee, have you included the names of the block leaders who have asked for repatriation?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you put that down?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese inside the center have a swimming pool?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many swimming pools do they have?

Mr. GELVIN. Two—no, wait a minute—two in unit 1 and one in unit 2, which are just wide places in the canal that goes through the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There is one swimming pool that you built for the Japanese, isn't there?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we have—let me go ahead and explain that a little further.

Mr. STEEDMAN. All right, go ahead and explain it.

Mr. GELVIN. The two pools that are referred to as "swimming pools" in unit 1 are wide ponds, you might call them, in the canal. The canal comes down and it is widened out and it goes on—flows through the two pools. In unit 2 they have a more elaborate swimming pool which was constructed, mostly with volunteer labor. The people wanted the swimming pool and pitched in and dug it out and the canal flows through it the same as it does the other two, but it is a much better type of pool than the other ones.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are those swimming pools used exclusively by the evacuees?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, the appointed personnel can swim there if they want to. It is not restricted.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they?

Mr. GELVIN. I have never seen them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was this irrigation system that you have referred to, built to serve the center at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. It is part of the long range plan of development that the Indian Service had for the development of that entire valley down through there—that is of the land on the reservation. Most of it has been built since the project was established there, however.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say it is part of the long-range plan?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had the plans been made prior to the evacuation of the Japanese from this coast?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had you seen the plans prior to that?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I have not seen the plans. I have discussed them with several.

Our chief engineer, Mr. Rupkey, is thoroughly familiar with it because he was the irrigation engineer at the Colorado River Indian irrigation project prior to the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Indians of this reservation are there at Parker?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, I don't know—I could give you a guess.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, approximately.

Mr. GELVIN. Around 700.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the Indian Service had planned to build this large irrigation system for those 700 Indians?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was it planned for?

Mr. GELVIN. The plan was to move Indians into that reservation after the project had been developed, from the other reservations of the Southwest, which are overpopulated and cannot adequately support themselves on the other reservations where they were.

Those reservations included the Pima Reservation, the Pago, the San Carlos Apache Reservation, the White River Apache Reservation, the Navajo Reservation, the United Pueblos, Hopi Reservation, the Truxton Canyon Reservation. I believe that is about all.

Mr. COSTELLO. The program of development then was a part of the Indian Bureau's own program to build up a big Indian development in this area?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; it was a colonization project.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the irrigation system had not been completed nor put in at the time the Japanese were placed there?

Mr. GELVIN. A portion of it was; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have the Japanese been employed in developing that irrigation system?

Mr. GELVIN. The irrigation system—well, let me explain a little further. The upper end of the reservation has already been developed and is occupied by the present Colorado River Indians. Now, that irrigation system is complete up there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then this is an extension that the Japanese put in?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; this is an extension from where they left off.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the purpose of that was so they could cultivate the land adjacent to their camp?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are any of those lands now under actual cultivation?

Mr. GELVIN. We have crops or, we have about 300 acres of crops at the present time. We have approximately 1,000 acres which are ready for crops.

The crops are not in because it is too late now to put them in. We are just in the process of finishing up the development on that, and we plan on having about thirteen or fourteen hundred acres ready by fall to put in fall crops.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are those 300 acres sufficient to supply vegetables and things of that sort for the Japanese themselves?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; they don't supply all of the vegetables.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it your intention ultimately that the crops produced there will be sold in the market?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, our first intention is to try and make the project as near self-supporting as possible and then any surplus crops that we have after we reach the point where we are self-supporting, then it will be determined whether the Army shall have it, but I assume that will be dealt with by the War Relocation Authority in Washington as to the policy regarding surplus crops.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is paying for that extension? Who is paying for the extension of the irrigation system? The Indian Office or the W. R. A.?

Mr. GELVIN. The W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask, Do the Indian tribes which own this land get a rental or something for the use of it by the W. R. A.? In the first place are they tribal lands that are being occupied?

Mr. GELVIN. They are tribal lands, yes. No; I don't believe they get any rent. I think the development of the land was figured to offset that.

Mr. MUNDT. The development of the land is supposed to be their compensation?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you submit figures to Mr. Dillon Myer in Washington, stating that you would plant 706 acres in vegetables this year?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I expect we did. We were making estimates along earlier in the year what our possible acreage might be and I believe that is the figure.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you actually planted 300 acres?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why did you not plant the 706 acres that you reported would be planted?

Mr. GELVIN. We didn't have that—have it ready for water and ready to farm.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it due to any labor difficulties?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no; I don't think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then it was the responsibility of the project administration rather than the fault of the Japanese; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. It was mostly due to the fact that we had a breakdown in the various types of equipment—tractors, and we experienced difficulty in getting repair parts. That is the reason we have not been able to progress as rapidly as we planned.



Mr. STEEDMAN. What did the irrigation system that is the extension to the original irrigation system cost? I have reference to the extension you are building now.

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't give you the figures on that. It is not complete.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much money has been spent up to date?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I would prefer you ask Mr. Empie that question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will he have those figures?

Mr. GELVIN. I think he will, yes. Of course, when we came over we didn't know just what to bring over. We tried to make a guess on the information that you would want.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let us take a 5-minute recess.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated you didn't know what the extension to the irrigation system cost. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Congress appropriated any funds for the extension of the irrigation system?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, of course, Congress appropriated all the funds that have to do with any part of the project. As to the nature of the appropriation, I could not say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know whether they appropriated money for this project or not?

Mr. GELVIN. If they appropriated money specifically for that purpose, I think Mr. Empie can give you that information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you use Japanese labor in constructing the extension to the irrigation system?

Mr. GELVIN. We have used some Japanese labor and some white labor.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the work on the extension of the irrigation system been done under a contract?

Mr. GELVIN. No, not up to now. It has been done—no, there has been no contract work on the canal.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You did use some Japanese labor and some white labor, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What do you pay the Japanese for that type of work?

Mr. GELVIN. Some of it was \$16 and some \$19 a month.

Mr. MUNDT. How long a day do they work?

Mr. GELVIN. They are supposed to work 8 hours.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say "supposed to work 8 hours." How many hours a day do they actually work?

Mr. GELVIN. Some are very good workers and some are not so good. They put in their time.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do the 8 hours include? From the time they leave the camp and arrive on the job or the time actually spent on the job?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, most of the work is right there close.

Mr. COSTELLO. Adjacent to the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; and they are expected to be there from 8 to 5. On that part of the project which is constructed away from the camp, so traveling is required to get there, it is generally customary that they go one way on Government time and one way on their own time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you visited the operations and watched the Japanese while they are actually on the job?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you spent any considerable time watching them during any one day?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, I have been there, oh, probably an hour at a time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do they go to work promptly at 8 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. GELVIN. Some do and some don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have no means of control over them to see that they actually put in a good day's work?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they are paid for what they do. If they only work a half day, they are only given time for a half day.

Mr. COSTELLO. If they get out there at 8 o'clock in the morning but do not start to work until 10, do they have 2 hours deducted from their pay?

Mr. GELVIN. That is up to the foreman—whatever he turns in the time for.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are the foremen all white men or are there some Japanese foremen?

Mr. GELVIN. Most all the foremen are white.

Mr. COSTELLO. There are some who are Japanese however?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. How much time do they have for lunch?

Mr. GELVIN. One hour.

Mr. COSTELLO. One hour?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that from 12 to 1?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they work from 8 to 12 and 1 to 5.

Mr. MUNDT. What happens to the money that they earn? Do you have a sort of camp bank, or do they take the money home and keep it in their own homes or rooms? Or do you know what happens to it? Can they spend it for anything they want to?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we don't have a bank there. That is their own to do with as they want. If they want to maintain a bank account somewhere else and send their money out, why, they can, or if they want to spend it there they can.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any difficulty with the Japanese about work assignments?

Mr. GELVIN. What kind of difficulty do you mean?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Refusing to work after they have been assigned to a certain job?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we have had several cases of that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any who refused to work on the irrigation project?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't say now. Just how do you mean by "refusing." No one there—it is not mandatory that they work. If they have got money enough and don't have to work, why, they don't have to.



Mr. COSTELLO. They don't have to work at all, do they?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they would still be able to secure their meals and quarters which were assigned to them, without having to earn them in any way, isn't that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no obligation on their part to work? If they don't work they will still eat and sleep?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And is their clothing also provided them?

Mr. GELVIN. Not if they do not work; if they are not on the job—excepting welfare cases. For instance, as an example, there might be a woman with several small children and she has no means of working. She can't go away and leave the children and work. In a case of that kind an investigation is made by the family welfare group and they can issue a clothing allowance to her.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have had a large turn-over of Japanese labor on the irrigation project, have you not?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Could you give us some idea about what that turn-over has been on the project at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I could not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who would have those figures?

Mr. GELVIN. I think Mr. Rupkey could probably give those better than anybody.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many Japanese are working on the irrigation project at the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't know what the total is on that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If you could use the Japanese to construct the irrigation project, it would save the Government from employing white men, would it not?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where do you obtain your white labor that is used on that project?

Mr. GELVIN. We have obtained some of it from the unions in Phoenix.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no city immediately adjacent to the reservation, is there?

Mr. GELVIN. There is just a small town of Parker.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is about how far away?

Mr. GELVIN. That is 16 miles from the project.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't provide any living quarters for labor, do you? They live in Parker, do they not?

Mr. GELVIN. We have an old C. C. C. camp there that we moved down and set up for laborer's quarters.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you pay the white workers?

Mr. GELVIN. There are various ranges.

Mr. MUNDT. For doing the kind of work that you pay the Japanese \$16 or \$19 a month?

Mr. GELVIN. I think around \$8 a day.

Mr. MUNDT. Plus sustenance?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Does the white laborer pay for his quarters in the C. C. C. camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, I understand the Japanese workers are volunteers. You send out word to the camp that you want workers and they volunteer. You say it is not mandatory?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. If it is not mandatory, then what do you mean by saying they refuse to work. After they have started to work they quit; is that what you mean?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. We have had—I assume that that is what Mr. Steedman meant; that they didn't want to work on that particular job and just quit.

Mr. MUNDT. They started out and then they quit?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that because of the difference in the wage level between the white and the Japanese workers?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, I think there are probably various reasons. I imagine that is probably one of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do they seem willing to work for that small amount of money per month?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they are not very well satisfied with that small amount of money, but inasmuch as it is all they can get it is pretty much a case of that or nothing.

Mr. COSTELLO. They don't feel because they are also getting their quarters and food supplied to them, that they are getting additional compensation?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I am sure some of them do look at it that way and some of them don't consider it.

Some feel that the Government placed them there and the Government is obligated to provide them with their food and housing.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those who do work on the irrigation project receive all of their wages; none of it is taken away and put in a community fund or anything of that nature?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they receive all of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is their individual money?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, that is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you intermingle the Japanese workers with the white workers, or do they have certain assignments to certain jobs or certain portions of the ditch to work on?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, at first we intermingled them and that didn't work out so good so now we try to keep them separate.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact some of the Japanese made more than \$16 or \$19 a month by reason of their work on the irrigation project, by renting trucks and equipment to the project?

Mr. GELVIN. We have rented some trucks from the Japanese; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any idea about how many trucks you have rented?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a list of truck rentals that the project at Poston has made up, showing the trucks that have been rented from the Japanese. I am not prepared at this time to lay the foundation for entering it in evidence, but I would like to read this just to indicate——

Mr. COSTELLO. Where was that information obtained?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to defer answering that question until a later date so I may lay a proper foundation and enter it into the record, but I would like to question Mr. Gelvin regarding the facts contained in this statement at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the project rented a truck from Mack Nishimoto at the rate of \$150 a month for a period of 9 months?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I think we have rented a truck from Mack Nishimoto. As to the rental rate, I couldn't tell you that. Mr. Empie will be able to supply that information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not this truck was used in building the irrigation system?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't. I believe that was a stake body truck and it was used for general hauling. Now, some of the hauling may have been for the irrigation system, but I am sure it was for general hauling.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who fixed the figure of \$150 a month as the rental rate for this truck?

Mr. GELVIN. That would have been set by, probably, the Supply and Transportation Officer with Mr. Empie's approval, inasmuch as that is part of his responsibility.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the project furnish the Japanese gasoline, oil, and tires for the trucks while rented?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you the nature of the rental agreement on that. I think Mr. Empie will be able to give you that information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Empie can testify regarding that matter?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe he could; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact some of the Japanese who are actually working on the irrigation project, received more money than \$16 or \$19 a month because of the equipment they rented to the Government?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. We have rented some equipment from the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to next develop the food situation at Poston. How well are the Japanese fed at the Poston project?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, that is kind of a broad question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say they are well fed?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I would say they are adequately fed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you have already testified that Mr. Clifton E. Snelson is the chief steward?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he have full responsibility for all food at the Poston project?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, now, I don't know just how to answer that question. How far would you extend that responsibility?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I mean does he determine how much food is necessary to feed the evacuees?

Mr. GELVIN. He makes up the menus on the basis of basic menus which have been supplied by the Quartermaster Corps along in the early stages of the project, and a basic menu which has been prepared by the W. R. A. From those two basic menus, why, he makes up the menus that are used there in the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he also determine the quality of the food?

Mr. GELVIN. He determines the quality to some extent. In his requisitions to the quartermaster, he would probably specify certain types or kinds of food and they would supply it if possible and if not they would have to make substitutions.

He receives certain instructions with regard to policies on quality of food from the W. R. A. in Washington.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the W. R. A. in Washington work out the menus?

Mr. GELVIN. No. I previously stated Mr. Snelson prepares the menus from the basic menus which have been submitted.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They send you sample menus from Washington and he orients it to what he has, is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many mess halls do you have at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we have 72 blocks and 3 camps. That would be 72 mess halls. However, there are 4 of those that are not in operation. Actually about 68, I believe, would be the total.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Mr. Snelson in actual charge of the operation of the mess halls?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; that is his responsibility.

Mr. MUNDT. How many do you feed at each mess hall?

Mr. GELVIN. The population of that particular block and the populations vary from, probably, 150 to 275 per block, may be 300 in some blocks.

Mr. MUNDT. Are they cafeterias or do you feed them country style; put the food on the table?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, in some of the mess halls they have a kind of cafeteria and they pass up by the counter and they are given their plate of food and some of the mess halls feed on a family style—they put the food on the table and help themselves.

Mr. MUNDT. In the cafeteria style mess halls do the customers pick out their food or is the food handed to them?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it is dished out on a plate to him.

Mr. MUNDT. That is just to facilitate serving; is that it?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is a fixed meal, in other words, that is served to them?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no cooking by the Japanese at their barracks? They all eat at the mess halls?

Mr. GELVIN. Prior to point rationing, some did order food that they kept in their barracks, because some of them probably could afford better food than they were getting in the mess halls and were willing to go to that extra expense.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they would still be able to do that with non-rationed foods?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they could with nonrationed foods if they could get it.

Mr. COSTELLO. If they wanted to buy food at Parker it would be possible to purchase the food and have it in their quarters?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they could do that or send away to Phoenix for it.



Mr. COSTELLO. While they are at the camp the Japanese are not given ration books, are they?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; but they are given ration stamps for shoes. Those who came in and needed shoes they were given ration stamps so they could buy a pair of shoes, but they are not given a regular ration card.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they were limited to one pair of shoes per person up to June 17?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say they were given shoe stamps. Could they go downtown and buy those shoes?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we have camp stores there at the camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you sell those shoes at cost or at what percentage of mark-up?

Mr. GELVIN. No. They are sold at a mark-up which I am told averages about what the mark-up would be in a normal outside business. Some of the mark-ups are less and some more, but they are not sold at cost.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is designed to make a little profit for the camp; is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. What happens to any profits that are made in the commissary stores?

Mr. GELVIN. We are right in the process now of establishing a cooperative. That hasn't been completely worked out, but when that is established, why, those who hold shares in the cooperative will receive a portion of the profits on the patronage basis.

Up to date the profits have been kept in a special fund and could be termed as "community property." Those funds, however, are handled by a bonded officer.

Mr. COSTELLO. How are the funds used; for the general welfare of the camp, such as putting on programs or entertainment or things of that character?

Mr. GELVIN. There have been some used for recreation, buying baseballs and baseball bats and equipment of that kind.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say you are going to establish these cooperatives. What does a person do to obtain a share or interest in a cooperative?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, the bylaws of the cooperative, I believe, state that the shares shall be available to any evacuee at \$1 per share and no more than one share to a person.

Mr. COSTELLO. They will be able to purchase an interest in the cooperative for a dollar and interest?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And then they would each take their pro rata share of any profits that might be made?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the necessity for establishing such an organization?

(No answer.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Isn't the present system functioning satisfactorily or is there some dissatisfaction with it?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, it was the desire on the part of the evacuees to establish a cooperative.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that desire expressed by them or was it expressed by social welfare workers suggesting such a program to them?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I believe that was pretty——

Mr. COSTELLO. It was their own suggestion?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; their own suggestion. Inasmuch as it is mostly their own funds that are involved, why, as long as the method of business meets with the regulations of the W. R. A. and the law, why——

Mr. COSTELLO. Do the bylaws prohibit a person from acquiring more than one share or interest in the cooperative? In other words, could one Japanese buy the interest of another Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. No. I believe the bylaws state that only one share may go to an individual.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no way in which the individual can transfer his title in that share other than to sell it back to the cooperative?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese have any voice in the kind of food that is served in the mess halls?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they do in this way: The chief steward has several Japanese who are his immediate helpers; his immediate assistants, and they help him with setting up these menus and in that way, why, I would say yes, they do have some voice in establishing a menu, within certain limits—within the limits of available foods—point rationing and our limit on how much a ration can cost.

We have a limit of 45 cents—that no ration shall cost more than that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Forty-five cents per person per day?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the community government inside of the camp have a committee on food?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is a committee composed of Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does that committee serve as an advisory committee to the chief steward?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they advise the chief steward and take whatever part they can in helping the steward work out better rations, more satisfactory rations from all standpoints.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have one type of menu for the Japanese mess halls and another type of menu for the Caucasian mess halls?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact, they have two menus for the Japanese mess halls; isn't that right?

(No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. One American food and one Japanese food?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't believe so. That has been a very difficult problem with us in trying to feed people in a common mess hall where some have been used to oriental food and some have been used to occidental food and the menu is prepared to try and take care of both types of food—both occidental and oriental.

There are a great many Japanese dishes used and prepared but, no, we don't have two separate menus for the different types of people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How is your food purchased?



Mr. GELVIN. It is purchased through the Quartermaster Corps. Requisitions are prepared and submitted to the quartermaster 45 days in advance.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who prepares the requisitions?

Mr. GELVIN. The chief steward.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the requisitions routed through the director of the project's office?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; they are not. Copies of the requisitions go into the Washington office; and as I have previously stated, the chief steward is bound by whatever existing laws or regulations there are concerning the food. He cannot exceed 45 cents per ration of food nor can he exceed the rationed foods—more than what his ration points would permit him to purchase.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The chief steward prepares a requisition and submits it to the Quartermaster Corps?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is the procedure for obtaining food?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has that always been the procedure at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, yes; I think so. I can't think of any other method that has been used.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you always had sufficient food for the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, there were times along in the early start of the project when there were days that kept us scratching a little bit to have enough food.

There were delayed deliveries and all of the procedures had not been worked out definitely with the quartermaster.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any shortage of food in the last 6 months?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't think there have been any shortages. I haven't heard of any.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't heard any complaints about it?

Mr. GELVIN. It hasn't come to my attention and if there had been a shortage, I probably would have heard about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese as a rule eat much bread?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they are not very heavy bread eaters.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They don't eat much bread?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know about how much bread is consumed every day at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you how much is consumed every day, but I might be able to tell you how much has been consumed from the start of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say there is consumed at the Poston center about 3,750 pounds per day?

Mr. GELVIN. That seems like an awful lot of bread to me. From July 1, 1942, to May 31, 1943, we purchased 1,268,159 loaves of bread.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Pound loaves?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, this is in pounds and a loaf generally weighs 16 ounces.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't the figure of the daily consumption, do you?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that G. I. bread?

Mr. GELVIN. Sir?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that Government issue bread?

Mr. GELVIN. No; that is the quartermaster's. The quartermaster makes those contracts and it is regular bakery bread.

Chairman COSTELLO. There is considerable difference between Government issue bread and the regular commercial bread; is there not? A difference in the weight of the loaf and a difference in the content also?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact who is your bread contract with at the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know. That contract changes every quarter.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever had a contract with the Olson Bakery in Los Angeles?

Mr. GELVIN. I think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did that contract call for white bread enriched with vitamin B, sliced, 1½ pounds net weight. Do you recall that?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't recall that. It might have been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You also serve whole wheat bread to the Japanese at the project, do you not?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't recall that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the Japanese hoarding any of the bread that is issued to them?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't heard anything about that at all?

Mr. GELVIN. No. Bread is something that doesn't keep very long.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the Japanese drying the bread and hoarding it?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you conducted any investigation into that?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, the chief steward is continually checking food and the mess halls and he only issues the food from the subsistence warehouses according to the population of the block that it is going to. A block of 150 people would get half as much food as a block of 300.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you bake any bread or muffins or biscuits or anything of that kind in your kitchens?

Mr. GELVIN. Some of the kitchens do some baking. There isn't so very much baking because bread is not a big item of diet with the Japanese, as I understand.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those figures of one million some hundred thousand loaves of bread, do they include the bread baked in the kitchens?

Mr. GELVIN. No; that was the bread that was purchased.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever made an investigation of the barracks to see if they had any cellars underneath the barracks where they are hoarding food?

Mr. GELVIN. They have some cellars underneath the barracks.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they constructed at the time the barracks were constructed?

Mr. GELVIN. No. They have been dug out by the Japanese since the camp was constructed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The Japanese have cut holes in the floors and dug cellars under the barracks, haven't they?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; some of them have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what they keep in the cellars?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't. Our chief steward has told me that he has gone down into several of the cellars looking for surplus food that has been stored there. Our internal security officer has had occasion to go into several of the cellars and the cellars were, so it has been explained to me, mostly constructed for the purpose of a cooler place to sleep. When you get a temperature around there of 130 it is pretty hot sleeping in the barracks and I know some of them tell me they do sleep in the cellars. And I have been also told that by the internal security officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you instructed the internal security officer to make a check of all the cellars in the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you recently institute a search for hoarded foodstuffs at the Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. I did not institute one. The steward may have made a search for it but I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the results of his search?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he report to you that he obtained about 7 tons of hoarded foodstuffs?

Mr. GELVIN. No; he didn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever seen a report to that effect?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the steward tell you that he obtained hoarded bread from these cellars?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you go so far as to say the Japanese are not hoarding rationed foodstuffs at the Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge they are not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the administration has made no check on that matter at all, has it?

Mr. GELVIN. We have not ordered—have not ordered a general search of the entire camp, if that is what you have reference to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you turned up any isolated cases of food hoarding?

Mr. GELVIN. It hasn't come to my attention if they have. I couldn't say "No," because I don't know whether they have or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Gelvin, is there any liquor sold to the Japanese in camp?

Mr. GELVIN. No. In what way do you mean? Do the stores handle liquor?

Mr. MUNDT. Any way. Are they issued liquor or do they buy liquor or have access to liquor?

Mr. GELVIN. It is against the law to have liquor, of course, on the Project, and it is doubly so—in fact we are located right in the middle of an Indian reservation.

We found one individual who brought in two cases of liquor, a white man, apparently, a bootlegger, and he was turned over to the United States attorney in Phoenix. That is the only case that we have had.

Mr. MUNDT. The camp generally is under the same liquor regulations as an Indian reservation?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will declare a recess of the hearing until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened, pursuant to the noon recess, at 2 p. m.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Steedman, you will proceed with your questioning.

#### TESTIMONY OF RALPH M. GELVIN—Resumed

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to continue and develop the food situation at Poston. How often does the chef serve ice cream at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't remember of him ever serving ice cream.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The camp doesn't buy ice cream as a regular thing?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you serve milk?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we serve milk to children and mothers with babies.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But milk isn't on the regular menu?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, no, only for those people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the name of the milk company from whom you buy the milk?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe we are getting our milk from the Golden State Dairy Co. at the present time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much milk is delivered daily?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe our contract calls for 6,000 quarts a day. However, the steward told me recently that he was having difficulty in getting that amount of milk. Some days the deliveries were down to around 4,000 quarts. I believe the contract is for 6,000 quarts.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the Golden State Dairy Co. that is located here in Los Angeles?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they have several places around over the State. I think they have one in El Centro. I don't know whether ours is coming directly from Los Angeles or El Centro. It is a California concern.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the steward serve fresh fruit?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think he does. I think they do get some fresh fruit. How much I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Canned fruit?

Mr. GELVIN. I think the only canned fruit and canned juices that are served are served in the hospital to patients.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It wouldn't be necessary for them to have much of the various canned fruits and vegetables on hand if they only serve it to patients in the hospital?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I shouldn't think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And does the steward determine the quality and the grade of the canned goods purchased?



Mr. GELVIN. Well, he orders the canned goods and I assume that he specifies certain grades. That is purchased by the quartermaster and he would get what they have, I presume.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you would say on the requisition which is written up by the steward, that he specifies the grade and type of canned goods that he wants at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe he does. You might ask Mr. Empie when he comes in. He can probably answer that question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How often is meat served at the Poston center at the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know. I haven't that figure with me. I don't have the menus with me. I know we serve at least three times a week.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The steward serves meat at least three times a week?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; whether we serve it more than that, I couldn't tell you without looking over the menu.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you serve ham?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, we have served ham. That includes all types of meat, ham or beef.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Steaks and bacon?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we don't buy any bacon.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long has it been since you bought bacon, do you recall?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I wouldn't recall but I do recall the steward saying that he wasn't buying bacon any more.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That refers to the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But bacon has been purchased there?

Mr. GELVIN. I would assume that that is so. That is since point rationing went into effect.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you observe any meatless days at the Poston center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we observe Tuesdays as a meatless day, and there are generally several other meatless days during the week.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the steward determine the type or grade of beef that is bought at the Poston center?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe he is buying what is known as No. 3—grade 3 beef. I believe he has had instructions to that effect.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he receive those instructions from Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And were those instructions received only recently?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you how recent.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the food shortage that occurred in Los Angeles during the last few days in December?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I remember reading the papers about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the meat shortage that was taking place in Los Angeles during the Christmas season?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the center at Poston have a sufficient quantity of meat on hand during that food shortage?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe we did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that had been ordered in advance?



Mr. GELVIN. Yes. As I previously stated this morning, we submit our requisitions 45 days in advance.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There wasn't a meat shortage at the Poston center during the time of the meat shortage in Los Angeles, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't answer that truthfully to be sure about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the chef at the Poston center serve what we commonly call left-overs?

Mr. GELVIN. Do you mean take the left-overs from one meal—

Mr. STEEDMAN (interposing). And serve them at another meal?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I understand they do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You understand that; have you ever seen it?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you checked into that?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know of any occasions since you have been at Poston where the chef has wasted food?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they may have. I can't quote you any specific instances other than the chef—the steward has told me that he was training a green bunch of cooks and that he would be very glad when he got them broke in because they were not making the best use of the food in its preparation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Left-overs? Do you mean by that what is left over on the individual plate; the individual serving?

Mr. GELVIN. No; what would be left over in the kitchen, I would assume.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That which was prepared and left over and not served. Is that what you mean by "left-over"?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much garbage you have had at the Center each day?

Mr. GELVIN. (No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any idea as to the number of tons?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't other than this: We have had men from the Quartermaster working with us on that and they have estimated that there is approximately enough garbage to feed about 2,000 head of hogs with a population of that size. They recommended to us that we establish a herd of hogs of about 2,000 head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever seen the figure of about nine tons of garbage a day for the Center?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say that would be an excessive amount of garbage?

Mr. GELVIN. I really don't know whether it would or not. It seems like a lot of garbage to me.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there ever a time at Poston when you dug trenches and buried the garbage in those trenches?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There was a time at Poston when you did that?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that was the manner in which you disposed of the garbage?

Mr. GELVIN. We did at that time, before we got any hogs; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you decided to quit disposing of the garbage in that manner and bought some hogs, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you buy the hogs?

Mr. GELVIN. Our first hogs were bought some time last fall.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't recall the approximate date?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't recall the approximate date.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who suggested that you buy the hogs?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you who brought out the suggestion. That had been in our earlier plans for the project, to establish a hog farm just as quickly as we could, in which every one was in agreement with the administration and others.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall receiving a directive from Washington to obtain some hogs?

Mr. GELVIN. We may have received it. I don't recall just off-hand of seeing it, though.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many hogs did you buy first?

Mr. GELVIN. I think our first purchase was around 300 head.

Mr. COSTELLO. Don't you remember what date that was; whether it was October or November of last year?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't. It would be along in the fall, though.

Mr. COSTELLO. From the time of establishing the center in April, up until the time the hogs were purchased, nothing was done about the disposition of garbage other than to bury it in trenches?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated 300 hogs were purchased to begin with?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall whom you bought the hogs from?

Mr. GELVIN. They were bought here, I believe, on the Los Angeles market. Bids were issued for the purchase, and just who the low bidder was I don't know offhand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what you paid per pound for the hogs?

Mr. GELVIN. The first bunch of hogs we paid 25 cents a pound for.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Twenty-five cents a pound?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the ceiling price on hogs at that time 16 cents?

Mr. GELVIN. Might be now; I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the average weight of these hogs per hog?

Mr. GELVIN. I think it was something over 100 pounds.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Didn't they weigh about 200 pounds each?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't think they were that heavy.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They weren't?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They were fat, anyway, weren't they, when you bought them?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we bought them as feeders.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you killed any hogs yet?

Mr. GELVIN. No; not yet.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In your opinion, was buying feeder hogs at the rate of 25 cents a pound good business practice?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, no; a farmer probably wouldn't go out and pay that much for hogs. However, when these hogs are ready to butcher, if it is shown that there has been a profit made or money saved, why, I would assume that it was good business.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It would be very difficult to make a profit on the hogs that you paid 25 cents a pound for when the ceiling price is now around 16 cents, wouldn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, that depends on how much gain you put on your hogs and how much it cost you to put the gain on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, I think if you will check that you will find those hogs averaged about 200 pounds per hog. I wish you would check on that and let me have the information with reference to the average weight of the hogs.

Mr. GELVIN. All right.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't have the detail as to exactly where the hogs were purchased or whether they were hogs being sold on the market here for slaughter?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they did take bids generally before they purchased the hogs?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For the first 300 hogs you purchased you paid 25 cents a pound. How many hogs have you purchased subsequent to the original purchase of 300?

Mr. GELVIN. We have about, something over 600 head. I think it is 620 head; something like that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the average price for the last 300 hogs that were purchased?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who would have that information?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Empie would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Empie would have that information?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he would have that with him or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many warehouses do you have at the war relocation project at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. We have 80 at the project itself and then there are 6, I believe it is, at the rail head at Parker.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Could you give the committee any idea as to the size of the warehouses—and I mean by that their floor space?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe they are 20 by 100—20 feet wide and 100 feet long.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Wickersham is the chief warehouseman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his first name?

Mr. GELVIN. Ernest.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his salary?

Mr. GELVIN. \$2,900, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he had previous experience before going to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I can check on that list.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has Mr. Wickersham had previous experience as a warehouseman?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; he was warehouseman with the Soil Conservation Service, I think, before he came to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he a native of California?

Mr. GELVIN. No. I think he is a native of Arizona. He used to live here in California but I think he spent most of his life in Arizona.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has Mr. Wickersham had any experience in working Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he has or not. I don't believe he has.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the second man in charge of the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Hugh Felsted.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not he had any experience with Japanese people?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't believe he has had.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the third man in the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. Bert Vatcher.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his title?

Mr. GELVIN. Warehouseman, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And his salary?

Mr. GELVIN. It is either \$2,300 or \$2,600. I am not sure.

Mr. STEEDMAN. \$2,000, according to this list which you have given me. Have you lost any goods from trucks while en route from the railhead at Parker to the warehouses at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge, no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't any record of any loss of goods, materials or food?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you have that information if any such goods or materials had been lost?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, it might be reported to me and it might not be. Mr. Wickersham, I believe, would have that information. I am not sure he would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How would a loss be handled in your accounting department?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe you had better ask Mr. Empie that. You are getting into accounting regulations there.

Mr. COSTELLO. You haven't any check up yourself directly over the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. No. I go down through the warehouses occasionally but the warehousing is under Mr. Wickersham who is responsible directly to Mr. Empie, the chief administrative officer.

Mr. COSTELLO. If any shortages occur it is Mr. Empie's responsibility to check with Mr. Wickersham and make certain Mr. Wickersham is properly administering the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Neither you nor Mr. Head would have direct supervision of that?

Mr. GELVIN. No. Of course Mr. Empie reports directly to Mr. Head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you received any reports that goods and materials were being stolen from the warehouses at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No. No; I haven't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether Mr. Head has received any reports of that nature?

Mr. GELVIN. He has never discussed that with me. I don't know whether he has or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not Mr. Empie has received any reports of anything being stolen from the warehouses?



Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has he discussed the warehouse conditions with you?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think in the normal course of your work that you would hear about it if goods were being stolen from the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I am sure I would if there was any actual stealing where such a matter should be brought to the attention of the project director or the police.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say that the warehouses are being operated in an efficient manner?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I believe they are.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you able to distinguish one Japanese from another if you don't know them personally?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, yes, to some extent.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is quite difficult to do, isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they have definite features the same as anybody else. They don't all look alike. They are not like a bunch of peas in a pod, but there is probably more similarity between those people than in other races of people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a system of passes that you use at Poston which permit the Japanese to go out of the project?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does each individual Japanese have a pass who is working?

Mr. GELVIN. There are some workers who do have what we call "work passes."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the workers who are entitled to leave the project have a pass which permits them to leave at any time?

Mr. GELVIN. There are some workers who do have what we call "work passes" that are issued for a specified length of time. I am thinking now of fellows who work—workers who handle some of the hauling and handle express. Those passes, though, are for specified time that they are to be off of the project and they are generally limited to a short period of time. It isn't a blanket pass that is good until revoked or something of that sort.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the passes have a photograph of the bearer of the pass upon it?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There is no identification on them at all?

Mr. GELVIN. They don't, no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the Japanese able to transfer the passes back and forth between themselves?

Mr. GELVIN. I have heard that that has been done in one or two cases. We haven't been able to trace it down and find out for sure, but it has been said to me that there have been some cases of that kind.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in direct charge of issuing the passes?

Mr. GELVIN. Those going out on work leaves—that is that go outside the camp to work, they are issued daily work passes. Those are issued by the project director or myself upon the recommendation of the foreman, by the foreman whoever they are working for.



If there are any special passes for any purpose that are needed, say to go to Phoenix, those are issued on the recommendation of the doctor at the hospital if they need to go there for medical attention—something that can't be given to them there at the project.

If there are any other special passes that need to be issued the camp managers, that I mentioned this morning, of each of the three camps, clear through them and they are issued on their recommendations.

MR. STEEDMAN. There are a number of people inside of the project who have the authority to sign passes, is that correct?

MR. GELVIN. No; there are only just Mr. Head and myself who sign the passes, but there are several people whose word we would accept that they wished those passes issued.

MR. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many dump trucks you have purchased at Poston since the project started?

MR. GELVIN. I might say that we have 65 dump trucks. I couldn't tell you just how many of those have been purchased outright. Some of those we have borrowed from the Indian Service; some of them were transferred to us from W. P. A. in Phoenix.

MR. STEEDMAN. Did you buy any trucks from a salvage company in Los Angeles?

MR. GELVIN. We bought some dump trucks here in Los Angeles.

MR. STEEDMAN. Do you recall approximately how many?

MR. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

MR. STEEDMAN. Would you say 20 or 30 or 40?

MR. GELVIN. I think we have bought probably 30—as many as 30. I think they have been purchased from several different outfits. I don't think they have all been purchased from one outfit.

MR. STEEDMAN. Do you recall which company you purchased the majority of the trucks from?

MR. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

MR. STEEDMAN. In purchasing these trucks, from the salvage companies in Los Angeles, did Mr. Empie first refuse to authorize the purchase of these trucks?

MR. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you whether he did or not. He would depend on all of the matters surrounding the purchase of the trucks.

MR. STEEDMAN. Did you discuss the purchase of the trucks with Mr. Empie?

MR. GELVIN. No; I did not.

MR. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the purchase of the trucks?

MR. GELVIN. No; only that I know the trucks were purchased.

MR. STEEDMAN. Did the trucks that were purchased from the salvage companies in Los Angeles, go to Poston under their own power?

MR. GELVIN. I don't think we would accept them unless they did go to Poston under their own power.

MR. STEEDMAN. I mean by that, were any of these trucks towed into the center at Poston?

MR. GELVIN. Not that I know of. They wouldn't do us any good if they wouldn't run.

MR. STEEDMAN. Can you testify that these trucks went to Poston under their own power?

MR. GELVIN. I think you had better ask Mr. Empie about that.

MR. STEEDMAN. I have reference to the trucks that were purchased from the salvage companies in Los Angeles, or any of them?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Empie can give you the exact details of that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in actual direct charge of procurement at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, that is in Mr. Empie's division.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he have a procurement man under him?

Mr. GELVIN. There has been a change there recently. Mr. Palmer is the procurement officer. His assistant, Mr. Schoenhaut would probably be closer to the actual procurement and handling all the details.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does Mr. L. L. Nelson have anything to do with the procurement department?

Mr. GELVIN. No, he doesn't now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has he had at any time?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; in the early part of the project he helped purchase some of the equipment and supplies.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not Mr. Nelson had anything to do with the purchase of dump trucks from the salvage companies in Los Angeles?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't believe he did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the center at Poston been investigated to your knowledge?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, there was an investigator for Senator Chandler's committee who was there; and two investigators, I understand, were there from your office here.

A representative of the quartermaster comes out. I think they made four or five inspections since the project has started. That is, they are mostly interested in subsistence supplies.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know of any other investigations?

Mr. GELVIN. I understand that we expect a committee from the W. R. A. out very shortly to make an inspection.

Mr. STEEDMAN. From the Washington office of the W. R. A.?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to the investigations that you have testified were conducted, did you know that the investigators were going to visit the project?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we knew that Mr. Malone, Mr. George Malone from Senator Chandler's committee was scheduled to come there. We didn't know just what date until the morning that he was to come in.

When the men from the quartermaster come sometimes they notify us and sometimes they don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had you made any preparations for the investigators that came out to conduct an investigation?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Head call the Japanese together and advise them that investigators were coming to the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he call the staff together and advise them of the approaching visit of investigators?

Mr. GELVIN. To what extent he notified the staff on those things I don't recall. I don't recall having had a meeting where he advised us that there was to be an investigation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He told you though, didn't he?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. We have also been investigated by the Spanish consul.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How often does the Spanish consul come to the project?

Mr. GELVIN. He has been there once.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When he visited the project, did he confer a medal on some of the young Japanese in recognition of their proficiency in kendo and judo?

Mr. GELVIN. No; he didn't give medals. They were going to have a judo tournament and as an expression of good friendship and all, he sent a cup down to be awarded to the person that won the judo tournament. That has been some time ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you feel that was an unusual thing for the Spanish consul to do?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I guess not. That is something that was pretty much his own business, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He makes inspections of the center as a representative of the Japanese Government, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The same as the Swiss representative in Japan makes inspections, ostensibly, for our Government, of their internment camps?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the background of judo?

Mr. GELVIN. No. I have had it explained to me. That is all the background I know.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask what it was explained to be?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, there has been a conflict in explanations. Some have told me that it is part of the militaristic training of Japan. Others have told me that it is a Japanese sport which has nothing to do with the military; that it is a sport in Japan like our wrestling would be here or our football or any other sport.

Mr. MUNDT. Is it something like our wrestling matches? Is a judo tournament similar to a wrestling match?

Mr. COSTELLO. Jujitsu?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; it is kind of a wrestling match.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that all it consists of, just a sporting activity such as wrestling or a jujitsu performance?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I have seen several matches and they get pretty wicked with one and another.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you think it is purely a sport?

Mr. GELVIN. We felt not and so Mr. Head took steps to disband the judo classes and judo tournaments that they were having.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When was that done?

Mr. GELVIN. That was some time during the early spring.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Early spring?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Is this game of judo done with sticks or swords or guns or bayonets?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; it is barehanded wrestling. They don't use anything else. There seems to be some ceremony in connection with it. They come out and bow to one another and then proceed to try to throw each other on the mat.

Mr. MUNDT. How is victory exemplified? When they are thrown?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Do they knock them out or what?

Mr. GELVIN. They throw them similar to what our wrestlers do.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who conducted the classes in judo that were held?

Mr. GELVIN. The Japanese judo instructors.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were they some of the Japanese who had been trained in Japan and returned back to this country?

Mr. GELVIN. I think in most cases they were the Kibei.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there any alien Japanese among them?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't say offhand whether there were or not. There were a number of judo instructors but whether some of them were alien or not, I couldn't say.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the classes or instructions conducted in the English language or Japanese language?

Mr. GELVIN. They were instructed in the Japanese language, I believe.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, if judo was used as a form of military training, unless a person understood Japanese he wouldn't know what they were giving in the way of instructions to the Japanese while they were in these classes?

Mr. GELVIN. No; no more than if we heard some people talking to one another in Japanese. We wouldn't know what they were saying.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. How many white members of your staff do you have who speak Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Two that I know of.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you name them?

Mr. GELVIN. Miss Cheney. I can't tell you the other lady's name. There is another lady there that is working with Miss Cheney.

Mr. MUNDT. Haven't you any men at all on your white staff that speak Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. None that I can think of right now. I can't recall any that speak Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What positions do these two ladies whom you just mentioned as speaking Japanese have in the project?

Mr. GELVIN. Family welfare work. They were in Japan for some years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Returning to the judo practice at the center at Poston. Has anyone told you that the ceremony preceding the actual bouts had anything to do with Shinto practice?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they haven't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. No one has told you that?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In connection with the judo classes, did they also have kendo classes or swordsmanship classes?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they have had no kendo there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They have had no kendo matches?

Mr. GELVIN. No kendo matches; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you found that the gangster element in the center was centered around the judo classes?

Mr. GELVIN. No. We had thought that at one time and Mr. Head went into it quite thoroughly and I think he felt satisfied when he got through that there was not a direct connection between the gangsters, so-called gangsters, and the people who were giving us difficulty and the judo.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Then why did he eliminate judo?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Head eliminated that prior to his making a pretty complete investigation of it. He directed the check and I think later it turned out there wasn't any connection that he previously thought there was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He eliminated it and then later made an investigation and determined it was all right? Is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he still considers it all right or not. I think there is a question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you investigated it yourself?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I haven't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the background of judo?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you heard of an organization called the Butoku-Kai?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not Mr. Head has checked an organization known as Butoku-Kai?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you be aware of the fact if you had any members of the Butoku-Kai at the Poston center?

Mr. GELVIN. No; but if we had a list of the members of the Butoku-Kai we could check to see.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you haven't made an independent check yourself?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of. In fact, I don't even know what "Butoku-Kai" is.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What was the answer?

(Answer read.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. If you were to learn that the Butoku-Kai was subversive, don't you think it would be proper for you to have a list of the Butoku-Kai members who are at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, if it was subversive and we had any members there, why, I think they should be taken out and segregated.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who determines whether or not Japanese organizations are subversive?

Mr. GELVIN. We would be, I believe, informed by our Washington office and given a list to check from, of any they considered dangerous.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the W. R. A. have a board in Washington which determines all the questions of loyalty or disloyalty on the part of the evacuees?

Mr. GELVIN. The questionnaires that were sent in that I mentioned this morning on the Form 304-A, I understand are checked by a joint board in Washington.

I have been informed that that joint board is made up of representatives from—a representative rather, from G-2, a representative from the office of Naval Intelligence, a representative from the F. B. I., the Provost Marshal General's office and then the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And this board sits in Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But there isn't such a board at the Poston center, is there?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How often does the director of the center at Poston confer with the F. B. I.?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know. We have an agent from the F. B. I. who comes into the project quite often.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the officials of the Poston Center discuss the question of each individual evacuee with the F. B. I. before he is released?

Mr. GELVIN. No. When the F. B. I. deem it necessary, why, they come in to get a man. They don't ask our opinion or discuss it with us. In most cases they come in and take the man and go out. In fact, there have been times when they have taken a man and gone before I knew about it or before Mr. Head knew about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the administrative officials at the Poston Center have an F. B. I. report on each evacuee before he is released from the center?

Mr. GELVIN. We don't at the project. I assume that the—or, I have been told that the—that the War Relocation Authority in Washington is given what material the F. B. I. has on the evacuees and use that in some of their determinations as to whether individuals should go out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the name of the official newspaper at the Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. At Poston, it is the Chronicle.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you a Poston Chronicle dated Saturday, January 9, 1943. Is that the paper that you published at the Poston Center?

(Handing paper to the witness.)

Mr. GELVIN. I believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have already seen this, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to read into the record a short article from the Poston Chronicle, dated Saturday, January 9, 1943, and I am quoting from an article entitled:

Relocation Work Set-up in Washington Told by V. Kennedy

And I quote the second paragraph:

Mr. Kennedy asserted that the F. B. I. does not clear the evacuees but they are cleared by the W. R. A. through information gathered by the F. B. I.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that is a clear and correct statement of what the situation is there at the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, he is referring there to the Washington set-up on that. He is not referring to the set-up at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He is not referring to the set-up at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Didn't I understand you to say, Mr. Gelvin, that at Poston you do not confer with the F. B. I. about a Japanese who is about to be released; that that conference, if any, takes place in Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. No, not necessarily. If the F. B. I. have reasons or evidence to pick up a person, why, generally, the local representative of the F. B. I. from the Phoenix office comes in and takes the person out.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not referring to that. I am referring to the men that you release to private life.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Before you release them I understand you to say that you do not check with the F. B. I. to see whether they were eligible for release, but that if any check were made it was made in Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. I noticed an article in the Los Angeles Examiner this morning bearing a Washington date line, dated June 7, quoting the California State Legislative Committee which is apparently investigating the same thing, and this story says that Lee R. Pennington, "an F. B. I. official"—by the way, has he ever been to your camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. MUNDT. Says that Pennington told the delegation, according to Sewell that his statement—Senator J. L. Sewell, Pennington told the delegation, according to Sewell, that the F. B. I. had never been requested to investigate Japs being released and have not conducted any, which would seem to indicate that the Washington office also does not check with the F. B. I.

Do you have reason to believe Mr. Sewell was wrong in his statement?

Mr. GELVIN. Now, we have—let me give you the information we have and, of course, I wouldn't contradict the statement there. He should know what he is talking about. But we receive telegrams from time to time from the Washington office stating:

"Do not release—do not issue permit" to such and such an individual. "His file is awaiting further F. B. I. check."

I was in Washington in January and I talked with the lady there who was handling some of the mechanics of the thing there—leaves, and she showed me several cases that had been referred back to them by the F. B. I. as having—the F. B. I. had some information on them, so, therefore, they were refusing to clear them and were putting them on the stop list.

I believe there must be a little conflict there.

Mr. MUNDT. It is quite possible that we are talking about different things. As I gathered from what you said those are the cases where the F. B. I. had obtained a clue that there was a subversive Japanese some place, and they had taken the initiative in notifying whichever camp held that man and advising that he should be on the stop list.

Now, this other situation originates in your camp and in all camps, as I understand it, and you prepare a list of men and women who have been tentatively approved for release to private life and you send that list to Washington, don't you?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't release them until Washington has approved them, or do you?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. We can release them without prior Washington approval if they do not fall into certain categories which would automatically hold them back.

Mr. MUNDT. All right. If you have a list then that does not contain any names from your stop list, you can release them without submitting that list to Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. No, we submit the list to Washington but we can release them and advise Washington——

Mr. MUNDT. That they are out?

Mr. GELVIN. That these individuals are being released.

Mr. MUNDT. Is that the general practice? Are you releasing them first and then standing by to see whether Washington wires back that you have let the wrong men out?

Mr. GELVIN. In the last month or two that has developed because of the fact that they have had time now to go over all of the questionnaires which went in on each individual over 17 years old, and those whom they had information on they would put them on the stop list.

We have already been advised of some. Theoretically the ones now that we have and have not been advised of, are clean so far as the various intelligence agencies are concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. Is it your feeling then that the fifteen thousand-and-some-odd Japanese which you now have in your camp have all been adequately investigated by the F. B. I. in Washington and cleared unless you were notified they were on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. I would assume that they have gone through the complete investigation in Washington. Just exactly what the procedure is there, why——

Mr. MUNDT. You are not sure whether the F. B. I. investigates them or not at that end, are you?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I am not; although any file that the F. B. I. has on an individual, I understand is submitted to the W. R. A. which would—it would make the difference of whether the file was sent over to the F. B. I. for investigation or whether the F. B. I. sent their information over and the decision was made there in the W. R. A. office.

Now, as to the exact technique of how that is handled, the procedure, I wouldn't say.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you think the F. B. I. has an individual file on each one of those 17,000 Japanese in the camp at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether they have a file on each individual or not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You don't think there is any possibility that they have investigated each individual of those 17,000?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know how complete their file was prior to the evacuation of them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You don't think that they have investigated 17,000 individuals since the evacuation?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't think they have come out on the project and investigated each individual. I don't know of them having done that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, what you really think, as I get it, is that they have compiled, perhaps, a file from the questionnaires that the Japanese voluntarily made out. Is that what you think the F. B. I. has done?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I couldn't say as to that—just what their procedure is there. Those forms were submitted to Washington in triplicate, I believe.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You don't even know whether the W. R. A. submitted those questionnaires to the F. B. I., do you?



Mr. GELVIN. No; other than I have been told that this joint board that I mentioned awhile ago of the various representatives, which passes on each individual—has passed on each individual questionnaire.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have you ever received a communication from that so-called joint board?

Mr. GELVIN. No. They wouldn't communicate directly with us. They would communicate directly with the main office in Washington—the W. R. A. office in Washington, and any communication that we would receive would come directly from the W. R. A. office to us.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did any statement that you received from them make a statement to the effect that the joint board was issuing an order with respect to any individual?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I have never seen any correspondence to that effect.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Has your superior in Washington told you that the joint board acts on the individual cases?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we were told at the time of Mr. Myer's last visit to the project that—

Mr. EBERHARTER. When was that?

Mr. GELVIN. That was in April, I believe it was.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In the spring?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. The joint board had been set up, and also when I was in Washington in January we were having a conference there with the military authorities, at that time, in preparation for handling this registration. I was told at that time that there was to be such a board established.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just being established then?

Mr. GELVIN. Just being established; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But that never appeared in any communication that you received at the Poston center or that was delivered to you officially?

Mr. GELVIN. No; not that I have seen in the way of a communication. That could have come to Mr. Head, though, and I would not have seen it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. GELVIN. So I would hesitate to say it hasn't because it might have come and I wouldn't have seen it.

Mr. MUNDT. A little while ago, in speaking about this Japanese organization, Mr. Steedman asked you whether it was subversive or not and you said you didn't know what the organization was, but that you got your list of subversive Japanese organizations from the Washington office. Is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. I said that if we received any information concerning subversive organizations it would come from the Washington office.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you received any list of organizations from the Washington office of such subversive Japanese outfits?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. How do you determine then, when you look at the questionnaire after a man makes application for release and says: "I belong to XYZ organization," how do you determine whether or not that is a subversive organization?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we don't determine that there. These questionnaires that I mentioned have all been submitted to Washington

and the determination has been made there. If they see something in the questionnaire that they feel a man should not be released because of, why, we are advised to put that individual on the stop list.

Mr. MUNDT. But you are not advised as to the reason why he is on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no; we are not. We probably could get the reasons by writing for a detailed statement.

Mr. MUNDT. It may be, so far as you know, either because he asked to be repatriated or because he belongs to a subversive organization or because he is out of balance mentally. You have no way of knowing what the reason is for the Washington office putting him on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we have the list of those who applied for repatriation, so we would know whether it was that or not. However, it could be one of probably several things that we might not know about.

I might just add a point that this whole development has been so rapid since its inception—the whole inception of the W. R. A. has been so rapid—that many of the details of the relationship between the projects and the Washington office have not been completely worked out. On so many things it is necessary that we depend on what information we get from the Washington office, and as yet it hasn't been completely worked out—the relationship between the two.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you ever reject any applications for release on information which you have in your own files without waiting for the Washington office to send you a stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we have placed all of the people on the stop list who did not give an unqualified affirmative answer to the loyalty question that was contained in this questionnaire. We have automatically placed all of the people on the stop list who have applied for repatriation.

There have been a few individuals who have violated regulations or laws whom we placed on the stop list, so we have established or placed quite a number of names on the stop list without prior advice from Washington, and the names we get from Washington now more or less supplement the names that we have on the stop list at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you released any of those folks who have been on your stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. MUNDT. None of those have been released?

Mr. GELVIN. Those that have been on our stop list? No; we haven't released them.

Mr. COSTELLO. You made one statement that those who had failed to answer the loyalty question affirmatively are put on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there any check made on those who did answer the question in the proper manner as to whether they really meant what they said when they said they would be loyal to this country?

Mr. GELVIN. No. We have had no way of checking that at the project. We would have to depend on whatever checking was done in Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, the unfavorable answer to question No. 28 is an indication a person would be disloyal and therefore you put him on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we have put him on the stop list until something can be worked out to determine whether he is disloyal or not.

The reason I mention that is because we have some 17- or 18-year-old boys, for instance, who said, "No" to question 28.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you remember the phrasing of that question?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have it here.

Mr. GELVIN. Question 28.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am reading from the form entitled: "War Relocation Authority application for leave clearance" and the so-called question 28 is as follows:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor or any other foreign government, power or organization?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that question 28?

Mr. GELVIN. That is the same question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the original question, isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. That is the same question that is on the Selective Service form.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right, but didn't you modify the question later on so the Japanese would sign it?

Mr. GELVIN. That was modified, yes; for the aliens.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to read into the record the modification of that question. As I understand it the question was modified in order to get the Japanese to sign the questionnaire, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it was modified before the questionnaire was ever submitted to the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why was it modified?

(No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. After this form was prepared, there must have been some reason for the modification, after they had gone to the trouble and expense of printing this form and issuing it.

Mr. GELVIN. I assume that the W. R. A. felt that that wasn't a fair question to ask an alien whom they were not prepared—whom the United States was not prepared to give citizenship to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, was the modification which I am about to read into the record at this point, made before the questionnaires were given to the Japanese to fill out?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it attached as a rider?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; it was a mimeographed slip pasted on the questionnaire.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to read the modification into the record:

I swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States.

Is that the modification?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words the Japanese agreed to sign the modified statement which states they would agree to abide by the laws of the United States; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That was the form submitted to the Japanese aliens.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Aliens?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you have questionnaires then?

Mr. GELVIN. (No response)

Mr. COSTELLO. Just the one question was different, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. There were two different questionnaires.

There was one questionnaire which was 304-A, which we speak of, which was the selective-service form, which all of the male citizens above 18 years old or above 17 years old—that is 17 and above, filled out. This form here is a W. R. A. form, Form 126 revised, which was used for the aliens, and the female citizens, and the modified question was used for the aliens, so actually we had three different forms.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many answered "No" to question 28 at Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. You mean in all the classes—women and otherwise?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, you just said that question 28 was only submitted to the Nisei males?

Mr. GELVIN. No; that same questionnaire—this same question was contained in both of the forms, the 304-A and this form here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes?

Mr. GELVIN. And the female citizens and the male citizens were the only ones that were asked that question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words only the Nisei were requested to answer question 28 and to swear allegiance to the United States?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Nisei are there at the Poston center who answered "No" to question 28?

Mr. GELVIN. We had about 450.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Those were citizens?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Male and female?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct. Now, just let me go one step further. There were about 630 who did not give an unqualified affirmative answer to that question, but who modified it. The difference between 450 and 630 would be modifications of the question. For instance, they might say—might have written on there "I am neutral," but we considered that as far as the stop list was concerned; that was the same as a "no" answer because they did not give an unqualified "yes."

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact, after you printed the original form you received word from the Japanese aliens that they would refuse to sign question 28 and you made this rider up with the modified question?

Mr. GELVIN. We were advised by the Washington office to make the change.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But didn't the Washington office receive that information from the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. They may have—I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't that information?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. The forms that came to you from Washington did not have the rider on them?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we were advised to place the rider on them.



Mr. COSTELLO. Are those statements sworn to by the Japanese or merely signed by them?

Mr. GELVIN. They are merely signed by them.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no oath taken at the time of filling them out?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Are they advised before they sign them as to your reason for asking these questions? Do they know they will go on the stop list if they say "No" to that question?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they didn't know it before they signed it.

Mr. MUNDT. They did not know it had anything to do with the possibility of their release?

Mr. GELVIN. They know it now. They didn't know it unless they might have guessed that it would keep them from going out. In fact we know nothing was said beforehand because we were very much surprised that we had as many answer "No" as did. We thought there would be only isolated cases, but there were many more than we anticipated.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a recess for 5 minutes.

(Thereupon a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order and Mr. Steedman, you may proceed with your questioning.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that 630 Nisei answered "No" on question 28; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Or qualified their answers?

Mr. GELVIN. Qualified their answers, that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Nisei do you have at the Poston center?

Mr. GELVIN. Of all ages about 11,000, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 11,000 Nisei?

Mr. GELVIN. That would include babies and on up.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Most of the Nisei are under 30 years of age, isn't that true?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you believe that the Japanese gave frank answers on these questionnaires that you refer to?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether they did or not.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say there are about 11,000 Nisei in the camp. That would include all ages?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But all of them, of course, were not asked to sign questionnaires. I should imagine a large percentage of that number was under 17 years of age.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; all those who were 17 years of age on February 1, 1943, or over, were given questionnaires.

Mr. COSTELLO. They were given questionnaires to fill in?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many of those were there?

Mr. GELVIN. Of the males there were, I think, about 3,600 who were registered. I don't have a break-down on the females because the females and the aliens registered together. That is the female citizens and the aliens registered at the same time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your figure of 630 would refer to both male and female answering that question?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many actually answered question 28?

Mr. GELVIN. We registered right close to between—11,500, I believe, was the total number that registered and——

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is including Issei and Nisei?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; that is including everybody.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Nisei answered?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, there were no—well, that is the figure I just gave to the chairman, that there were about 3,600 of the male citizens and I do not have a break-down with me of the number—of the difference between the females, female citizens and the aliens. You would have to have that break-down before you could establish the total Nisei, but I don't have that figure with me.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you believe a dangerous Japanese would hesitate to answer "Yes" to question 28 for the purpose of serving his own purpose?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think you can place any confidence or reliance on these questionnaires?

Mr. GELVIN. That I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you place any reliance on the questionnaires?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I believe I would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, if you asked a Japanese citizen, "Are you loyal" and he said, "Yes," you would be willing to take his word for it?

Mr. GELVIN. Not in all cases; the way you ask the question there is whether I would just abolish the questionnaire. The answer is for all of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask a question at that point about the real purpose or benefit of these questionnaires. It does serve as a means of having the Japanese incriminate themselves as to their disloyalty if they answer these questions in the negative; isn't that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; it is a basis for gathering information on each individual.

Mr. COSTELLO. Point out those Japanese who only do not want to be loyal but don't mind telling you so?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it would not in any way tend to prove that the remaining Japanese are loyal or want to be loyal and will be loyal. You can't determine anything from the questionnaires, can you?

Mr. GELVIN. I think it gives a basis of considerable information for investigating agencies or intelligence agencies to study.

For instance there are questions as to their education, whether it was in this country or in Japan; how much of it was in Japan or how much in this country; the number of trips they made back to Japan and the number of relatives that they have in Japan, and so forth.

Mr. COSTELLO. It sort of gives you a card index of each Japanese—some of his personal history data?

Mr. GELVIN. That is true; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I judge from your remarks or the information that you have, apparently, there is no thorough check-up as to the accuracy of the answers to those questions, and of course when a Jap is about to be released from the camp no thorough investigation of the activities of that Jap prior to his coming to the camp was made?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it is assumed that any prior information that any of the intelligence agencies would have, has been submitted to the W. R. A. and they can use that as a basis for determining whether an individual should be released or not.

We do not make any—on the project we do not make any past investigation or investigation of his past.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is, the officials of the camps themselves do not make any investigation?

Mr. GELVIN. We have no facilities for that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe that the W. R. A. in Washington do make a thorough check into the background of the evacuees, through the Army Intelligence or Navy Intelligence and the F. B. I.?

Mr. GELVIN. That is a question you would have to ask Mr. Myers, the Director.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have no information as to the nature of that investigation?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Gelvin some questions off the record.

(Off the record.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have any of these people who have been reporting to the F. B. I. been beaten up by Japanese thugs in the camp?

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you ready to go back on the record so far as the press is concerned?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; I will go on the record now.

Mr. GELVIN. We have had two or three beatings. Whether or not they were reporting to the F. B. I., I don't know. One of them declared openly that he had worked for the F. B. I. and he waved a Government check around one day and stated that it was from the Department of Justice and he got clipped in a couple of days.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was he?

Mr. GELVIN. Kay Nishamura.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did that happen?

Mr. GELVIN. That was last November, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that attack investigated by the project directly?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you determine who the people were that beat him up?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we have never found out for sure who beat him up.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were not able to secure any witnesses?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the party that was assaulted know who beat him up?

Mr. GELVIN. He claims he doesn't know. He said he didn't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he attacked in a dark place?

Mr. GELVIN. He was attacked right in his apartment—in his room.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At night?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he seriously injured?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; he was pretty badly beaten up. He was in the hospital a couple of weeks, I think.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he still at Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. No; he is in Salt Lake City.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Evacuated from the center by the center management?

Mr. GELVIN. He was given an indefinite leave and went to Salt Lake.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was his life threatened if he stayed at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I don't know whether it would have been or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you verify the fact that this was a check he had received from the F. B. I. that he was waving around?

Mr. GELVIN. No; that came back to me later from various ones who thought it was a foolish stunt for him to pull.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever talk to him about it and ask him whether he waved such a check or had such a check?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Head did. I didn't talk to him.

Mr. MUNDT. What did Mr. Head find out?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know; he didn't tell me about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is rather unhealthy to cooperate with the F. B. I. at Poston, is it not, having reference to the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether it is or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many others have been beaten up there for cooperating with the authorities?

Mr. GELVIN. We have had, I believe, three beatings, but as to whether those were beatings because they were cooperating with the authorities or not, I don't know.

I understand that the explanation that has come to me was that it was a carry-over from a feud that existed prior to evacuation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the beating up of Saburo Kido?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is he?

Mr. GELVIN. He was the president of the J. A. C. L.—Japanese-American Citizens League.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the Japanese-American Citizens League had been cooperating with the F. B. I. and other Government authorities?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Kido have a reputation for cooperating with the Government authorities?

Mr. GELVIN. We felt that he was cooperating with us—with the administration.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he assailed and beaten by a gang of thugs who entered his apartment at night?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And was he hospitalized?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he badly beaten?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, he wasn't nearly as badly beaten as Nishamura. It wasn't serious, I don't believe, although he was hospitalized.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the project director investigate that case?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What happened?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, the people who beat him up were caught and given prison sentences.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They were tried?



Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they tried in Parker?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they were turned over to the Yuma County authorities and tried in the State court.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. GELVIN. At Phoenix.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are they now serving a prison term?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is two instances of beatings——

Mr. EBERHARTER. You were able to get witnesses in that case?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, no, they didn't get witnesses. The boys confessed that did it. The Japanese police caught them or had a tip that they were going to do this and they were waiting for them and caught them and they confessed to it.

Mr. MUNDT. In the course of the trial did they give any reason as to why they were beating Kido up?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether they did or not. I wasn't at the trial and I have no record of the trial.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Don't you think that was a matter of importance? Don't you feel you should have a transcript of the trial and the proceedings there?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think it would be good.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In other words neither the director nor you know why this beating took place?

Mr. GELVIN. Unless the director satisfied himself through the questioning. I was away from the project at the time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think the director might know about it?

Mr. GELVIN. I think that he would know; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Where is Kido now?

Mr. GELVIN. He is in Salt Lake City. That is where the national offices of this J. A. C. L. organization are located.

Mr. MUNDT. He is on indefinite leave?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he working for the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe he is.

Mr. COSTELLO. Employed and paid by them?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the other one that was beaten up?

Mr. GELVIN. I can't give you his name. He was a young fellow working on the fire department. I don't believe he was ever—he might have been hospitalized for a day or two, but it wasn't a serious beating.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he cooperating with the F. B. I.?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he was or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Or the camp authorities?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, he was cooperating to the extent that he was working. He wasn't a well-known figure or anything like that. That is, I mean, we had no occasion to know him directly as we had the others.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you investigate that case?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you find that he was beaten up because he was cooperating with the camp officials?

Mr. GELVIN. No. We couldn't find out any reason at all. He wouldn't talk at all. He wouldn't give us any information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he beaten up by a gang?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The same type of beatings as administered to the other two Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has anyone been brought to justice for the last beating that you mentioned?

Mr. GELVIN. This one of this young fellow?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The last one; yes; the one you don't recall the name of the party who was assailed?

Mr. GELVIN. No; there hasn't. We have never been able to get any information as to who did beat him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What term do the Japanese have for another Japanese who informs the authorities or the F. B. I. of things going on in the center?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, they—I see a lady present over there. I wouldn't want to divulge the term but “yellow dogs” and “rats” and “informers.”

Mr. STEEDMAN. They call them dogs, don't they?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Anyone who cooperates with the officials to the extent of giving them information are called dogs?

Mr. GELVIN. Anyone that they consider in the class of a stool-pigeon, as we refer to them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But aren't you dependent upon those people, who are patriotic enough to give you information, in order to know what is going on inside the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; we do depend upon them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You do depend upon them for intelligence as to what is going on?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. We depend upon them to quite a large extent.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made any preparations to protect these people who are cooperating with you now?

Mr. GELVIN. It hasn't seemed necessary since the last beating we had because the people got pretty much disturbed about it and they are; I think, taking the matters into their own hands to keep from having a recurrence of those things, because the general bulk of the population there, the majority of them, do not approve of such methods as was used by some of them, whom we think were Kibei, and we feel they have straightened the situation out pretty well themselves.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The Kibei make up the gangsters or the Ronin groups, don't they?

Mr. GELVIN. Those that we have had trouble with, yes, have been mostly Kibei.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has a fence been built around the Poston Center since you arrived?

Mr. GELVIN. The United States engineers built a fence on three sides of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When was it built?

Mr. GELVIN. It was completed along in the winter sometime.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The winter of 1942?

Mr. GELVIN. This past winter.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 1942-43?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think along in November or December.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what that fence cost?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I haven't any idea. It is a three-wire fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was a fence built around Camp No. 3?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; there was, but it was later changed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The fence was later changed?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there a fence built around Camp No. 3?

Mr. GELVIN. Preparations have been started to build a fence around Camp No. 2 but never completed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The fence was not completed around Camp No. 2?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese object to the fence around Camp No. 2? And the proposed fence to be built around Camp No. 2?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they objected to it very much.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese tear down the fence around Camp No. 3?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they didn't tear it down.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, what happened?

Mr. GELVIN. The engineers received orders to change the location of the fence and the contractor tore it down and used it to rebuild the other fence, or build the other fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese inside the camp help the contractor in tearing down the fence?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't think so—not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you there when the fence was being torn down?

Mr. GELVIN. I was on the project; yes. I wasn't right at the spot as the contractors took it down.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you receive reports that the Japanese were tearing the fences down piece by piece?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I hadn't received any reports they were tearing it down. I received some reports that they had pulled the staples out of some of the fence and laid it on the ground so you could cross it with tractors that were leveling some land there at the time, but I don't know of any destruction of the materials.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall whether or not Miss Findley, of the social welfare department at Poston Center, backed up the Japanese in their objection to the fence?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, yes; I think she was in agreement with them. She thought the fence should be changed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. She stated at an open meeting that she did not think they should build a fence around the camp; is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. She may have said that at open meetings. I didn't hear it. I would guess that she probably did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Dr. Powell also have the same attitude toward the fence that Miss Findley had?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. He was in disagreement with the location of the fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the fence built for security reasons?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether it was or not. It wasn't a man-tight fence that was built.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, because of the fact that the Japanese disapproved of the fence it was necessary to remove it, is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I think that could not be confined entirely to the Japanese. The War Relocation Authority was objecting to the location of the fence also.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that Mr. Head?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether Mr. Head took any action in the matter or not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the objection to the location of the fence in relation to the camp or was it an objection to having a fence around the camp at all?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no. There was no objection to having a fence around the camp. It was the location of the fence. It was placed right against the buildings and it was difficult for the development work that we wanted to do there. There were administrative problems there that made it difficult, so later the fence was built to take in all of the area around the three camps rather than a tight fence around the three individual camps.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the purpose of the fence? What were they fencing in or fencing out?

Mr. GELVIN. (No answer.)

Mr. MUNDT. You say it wasn't a "man-tight fence."

Mr. GELVIN. Well, the fence wasn't a man-tight fence and I couldn't say what was the definite purpose other than probably to designate the area of the Center itself.

Mr. MUNDT. There was no stock that they were fencing in or out?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I don't think the engineers would have fenced against stock. Yes; there is stock there but I don't think it was put there for that purpose.

Mr. MUNDT. Just as a marker of the camp site?

Mr. GELVIN. I think so.

Mr. MUNDT. And you say it was a 3-strand fence?

Mr. GELVIN. There are three strands in the present fence; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that true also of the original fence?

Mr. GELVIN. No; the original fence had four or five strands.

Mr. MUNDT. That is a lot of wire just for a marker—a four or five strand fence. That was ordered built by the Army?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And ordered out by the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it would have to be ordered out through higher channels to the Army engineers. I assumed their orders came from the Army—Western Defense Command.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Isn't this what happened: Didn't the Japanese notify the project director that they were tearing the fence down and that they would appreciate it if the contractor would help them tear the fence down?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I don't believe they notified the project director of that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you any reports in your files indicating that the Japanese were tearing the fence down?

Mr. GELVIN. We might have. I wouldn't say that we haven't, but I don't recall off-hand of seeing any reports to that effect.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much money did it cost to tear the original fence down and build the second fence?

Mr. GELVIN. Gosh, I don't have any idea.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It was quite a sum of money, was it not?



Mr. GELVIN. Well, there was quite a lot of fence involved. Probably did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say it cost \$100,000?

Mr. GELVIN. There was probably 15 miles of fence—there is now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At a cost of around \$100,000?

Mr. GELVIN. I wouldn't make any statement on that.

Mr. MUNDT. I believe you did state that you saw the fence that the Japanese had taken down—the fence from which the Japanese had taken the staples so they could drive trucks over it?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; so they could drive small trucks—small tractors over it in leveling the land.

Mr. MUNDT. You saw that yourself?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you see several instances of that?

Mr. GELVIN. No; just one place in the camp there where they were leveling.

Mr. MUNDT. And when they brought the tractor back, did they put the staples back in the fence and put the wire up against the posts?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What happened to the fence posts from the original fence?

Mr. GELVIN. They were taken up and reset for the new fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any of the original posts burned?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you any reports to that effect?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I recall.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that had the Japanese not objected to the fence, the War Relocation Authority would have ordered it taken down?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the original causation was the objection of the Japanese to the fence, isn't that right?

Mr. GELVIN. It might have been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you received any reports that the Japanese were stealing Government property at the Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. I haven't received any reports that I can recall. I believe you asked me that question this morning.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I asked you that question in connection with the warehouses. I am talking now about property, generally, in connection with the project.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. It has been reported that they have taken some lumber in several instances. I would like to correct that denial that I made this morning.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The question I asked you this morning was with reference to the warehouses.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But now I am asking you about the project property in general.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; it has been reported that some lumber has been taken.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much lumber has been stolen?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I couldn't say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't recall anything else that has been stolen?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't recall anything right at the moment.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the nature of the lumber that was stolen? Was it short ends or planking or fencing or what?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, it would be various kinds of lumber that they had taken home to try to improve their quarters.

Mr. COSTELLO. Lumber that they took was used for improving their own living quarters?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And used around their barracks?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. It wasn't stolen for the purpose of selling it outside of the camp or something of that sort?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have there been any riots at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have there been any strikes?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did the strike or strikes occur?

Mr. GELVIN. November 18, 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please tell the committee just what happened?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Head and I had left the project to go to Salt Lake City to attend a meeting called by Director Myer. While we were gone—in fact the day we left the people went on a strike in unit No. 1 of the project.

The strike lasted for about 6 or 7 days in which all work was stopped with the exception of the essential services, such as the mess-hall workers and firemen and policemen and hospital crews.

The people all gathered together in front of the police station. They did not barricade themselves inside of the police station as some reports have had it.

It is difficult to say exactly what the cause of the strike was. It might have been in protest against the administration. We also had a fellow in jail who had been picked up because the internal security officer thought that he had participated in one of these previous beatings. That was given as the reason for the strike.

We don't think that that was the reason. We think that was the excuse for the strike. We think the reasons were many because very few of the people seemed to know what they were striking about. They were well organized. That is, some of the strike leaders had organized the thing pretty well.

Mr. MUNDT. How many people were on strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, at that time we had about 9,000 people in unit No. 1 and the only work that was going on was as I mentioned, just the essential services. All the other people who were working or had been working quit.

Mr. MUNDT. Pretty much of the entire 9,000 were on strike or in sympathy with the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. They were participating in the strike. Of course many have said that they were opposed to it but were forced to participate in it. How true that is, I have no way of knowing.

We felt that it was due largely to a rather boiling over point—that they had reached a boiling point as an aftermath of the evacuation.

Mr. Head and I, as quick as word could be gotten to us, returned immediately to the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What date did you return to the project?

Mr. GELVIN. We left on Wednesday and returned Saturday night.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the strike started November 18. Do you recall the date you returned to the project?

Mr. GELVIN. It was Saturday when we returned.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That would be November 21; the riot or strike had been going on then for 4 days before you returned?

Mr. GELVIN. 18, 19, 20, 21—about three days and a half. It started after we left.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the strike spread to units 2 and 3?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There were no demonstrations in units 2 and 3?

Mr. GELVIN. No. And Mr. Head met with the committee which had been selected by the people, I believe, on Monday—Monday afternoon, and after, I think, two meetings, why, the whole thing was settled pretty well and the people went back to work starting the 25th, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The strike continued from November 18 to November 25?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was in charge of the project while the strike was in progress?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. John Evans.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is he now?

Mr. GELVIN. He is in Washington, D. C.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his title at the time of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. He was the unit administrator in camp No. 1.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his present position in Washington?

Mr. GELVIN. He is Director of the Alaska Division, in the Division of Territories and Island Possessions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is a division within the Department of the Interior, isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Will you give us Mr. Evans' title again?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe that his title is Director of the Alaska Division of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the Department of the Interior.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know what salary that position carries?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. During the strike were the military police called into the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What company of military police are located at Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. The Three hundred and Twenty-third Military Police Company.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the officer in charge of that company of military police?

Mr. GELVIN. At the present time?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. Captain Holm.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was the officer in charge of that company of military police at the time of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Lieutenant Young, I believe. Their captain had just recently been transferred east and they hadn't received a new commanding officer and during the time he was gone Lieutenant Young, I believe, was the commanding officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Lieutenant Young was in actual command from the period of November 18 through November 25?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is during the duration of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know about Sunday which would have been November 22. Another military police company was brought in from Boulder City with Major Dykes, who is commanding officer of that area of military police, and he assumed command at the time when he came in.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who ordered the additional company of military police to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I assume that was ordered from the western defense command.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not Mr. Head requested additional companies of police?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't believe he did. It might have been Lieutenant Young who made the request. I don't know. That was an Army function and not a W. R. A. function.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you in conference with Lieutenant Young during the strike after you and Mr. Head returned?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. He was in the meeting with Mr. Head and I.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Every day?

Mr. GELVIN. Either Lieutenant Young or Major Dykes was meeting with us regularly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there a Captain Daugherty on the scene at the time of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No. Captain Daugherty was the commanding officer that had been transferred east.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Captain Daugherty wasn't actually on the scene at the time of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the military police have authority to go into the center at the time of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would it have been necessary for the camp officials to have requested the military police to enter the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the responsibility of requesting the military police to enter the center was on the project director?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. There are only two conditions under which the project director can request the military police to come into the camp, and that is for a fire which has gotten out of control or a riot.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Or a riot?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the project director determine that there wasn't a riot at the Poston Center between November 18 and November 25, 1942?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right. There was no indication of violence; no damage done so he didn't think it necessary to call the military police in.



Mr. MUNDT. Was there any destruction of property during that strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Any throwing away of food or wasting of food?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that we know of.

Mr. MUNDT. It was just sort of a sit-down strike; just refused to work?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Were there any inflammatory meetings of any kind?

Mr. GELVIN. They were meeting all the time. It was just one big meeting, but it was all in an orderly manner. I mean there wasn't any gangs out of control or anything like that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the American flag lowered during the course of this strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Not while you were there?

Mr. GELVIN. No. Now, we have an American flag at the office that wasn't disturbed at all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a flagpole at the administration building in unit No. 1?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the flag on the administration building at unit No. 1 was lowered during the course of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it wasn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know of your own knowledge it was not?

Mr. GELVIN. I would swear to that, I believe, because if that had been lowered we would have certainly been informed of it when we came back.

It was not lowered while we were there and if it had been lowered prior to our coming back, why, I am sure we would have been notified.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There were no reports submitted to the effect that the American flag had been lowered during the days of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And no reports to indicate any such thing?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I have ever seen.

Mr. MUNDT. Was a Japanese flag raised?

Mr. GELVIN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MUNDT. Was a Japanese flag raised over their quarters?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no, there was not. I might further add that an officer came to the project from the western defense command from San Francisco, a Captain McFadden, who stayed on the project for the purpose of assembling a complete report on the strike.

He stayed there until after the strike was settled and he interviewed some of the personnel. He interviewed many of the Japanese and prepared his report from that, and I assume that a copy of that report would be made available through that office if you care to have it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Colonel Main of the United States Army also make an investigation of the riot or strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Colonel Main?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; M-a-i-n.

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know Colonel Main?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't.

Mr. MUNDT. So far as you know he was never at the camp at all?

Mr. GELVIN. So far as I know he wasn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any threats made against the Caucasian personnel by the Japanese during the course of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I think there was a threat made against our transportation and supply officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his name?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Townsend.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the nature of the threat?

Mr. GELVIN. He told me afterward that he went down and attempted to drive a car through the crowd in front of the jail and they threatened him if he didn't get out of there and go back. They said something might happen to him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese cover the license plates of the truck and other motor vehicles also under their control during the course of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Isn't it a matter of fact——

Mr. GELVIN. The reason I don't think they did was because I was down among the strikers. I walked through there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But that was after you returned to the camp from your trip to Salt Lake City?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you cannot testify of your own knowledge to anything that happened the first three and a half days of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Therefore, anything that you testify as happening at the center in the first three and a half days of the strike is hearsay?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now, as a matter of fact didn't you cancel the lease on some of the Japanese motor equipment inside the camp because of the fact you were not able to control this equipment during the course of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. We may have but I don't know that was the case.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you did have considerable trouble in controlling the motor equipment during the strike, didn't you?

Mr. GELVIN. We did the first day or two. Mr. Townsend attempted to get the equipment together. He didn't have very much success, and Mr. Empie sent another one of his men out and informed the police to round up the equipment and bring it in, and they did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long was Mr. Townsend employed at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I think about 2 or 3 months.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his title there?

Mr. GELVIN. Transportation and supply officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his salary, do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. \$3,800, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was the transportation and supply officer that preceded Mr. Townsend?

Mr. GELVIN. A man by the name of Roy Potter.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what was his salary?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe it was \$3,500.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he resign his position at the Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. He left. He was transferred from Poston to the project up in Utah.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why?

Mr. GELVIN. He was offered a transfer and he took it because that position up there, I think, paid \$3,800 and he was getting \$3,500 where he was at.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When you employed Mr. Townsend you agreed to give him a salary of \$3,800, I believe you said?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. At that time we were able to get—you see, at that time all of our positions were more or less in a state of flux. They hadn't been cleared through the classification office in Washington and we had received tentative approval of \$3,500 for this position, but at about the same time that the change took place there, why, they approved the \$3,800, so I believe Mr. Townsend went in at \$3,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the approximate time when Mr. Townsend assumed his duties at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No. It was along in the early fall. I think he was there not to exceed probably, 3 months.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did he leave Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. In December, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why?

Mr. GELVIN. He was discharged.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why?

Mr. GELVIN. Inefficiency and for the misuse of Government equipment. He went out of the camp on unauthorized trips and he was also having difficulty in handling the evacuees.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He was having trouble with the Japanese, isn't that right?

Mr. GELVIN. He was having trouble getting his work done because he couldn't get along with the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many other white Caucasian persons have been dismissed from Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I can't tell you for sure because there might be some cases that I wouldn't know about.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the information you have just furnished us regarding Mr. Townsend indicated on his personnel record which is in the administration office at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I assume that it is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you don't know?

Mr. GELVIN. No; but I wonder if you would mind asking Mr. Empie that question because I think he has a file with him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who did Mr. Townsend work for?

Mr. GELVIN. He worked for Mr. Empie.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you know Mr. Townsend personally?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I knew him while he was there on the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who determined that his work was unsatisfactory?

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Empie. And I will go further than that. I don't believe the project director was at all satisfied with his work because there seemed to be a continual upheaval in his division all the time and since the change was made, why, that division has straightened out in fairly good shape.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had Mr. Townsend been an employee of the Indian Service prior to his going to work at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. So far as I know he has never worked for the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the authorities at the Poston project give Mr. Townsend a letter when he resigned?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall what was stated in the letter?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I don't. There was a letter advising him of his—that he would be taken from the pay roll. I don't recall just the contents of the letter. I saw the letter, however.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You did see the letter?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The letter stated that he had been very diligent in carrying out his duties, did it not?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't remember whether it did or not. It has been quite a while since I have seen that letter.

Mr. MUNDT. Was it a letter of recommendation or a letter of dismissal?

Mr. GELVIN. It was a letter of dismissal. It wasn't a letter of recommendation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return once more to the strike.

Mr. MUNDT. Before you do that, I would like to know more about Townsend's background. Where did he come from? You say you gave him \$3,800 when he first went to work for you. Where did you get him? Was he a Government employee prior to that time?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't think he had been a Government employee before he was recommended to us, I believe, by the—well, Mr. Empie employed him here in Los Angeles. I think he is a Los Angeles man. I think they contacted him through the O. E. M. I don't know whether the O. E. M. recommended him or not, but Mr. Empie interviewed him and they needed a man right quick and he hired him.

Mr. MUNDT. He found him and employed him here in Los Angeles?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. All right, we will have to ask him about that.

Mr. GELVIN. Mr. Empie employed him and Mr. Empie wrote the letter of dismissal.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the military police permitted in the center at Poston while in uniform?

Mr. GELVIN. I understand that their orders are such that they are not supposed to go inside of the center. However, they do have occasion to come directly to the administrative office once in a while.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They are stationed at the main gate, aren't they?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And their function is more that of directing traffic than anything else, isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they are responsible for the outside guarding of the area while we are responsible for the inside area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated awhile ago that the strike was well organized. Did your investigation of the strike indicate who the leaders of the strike were?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who were they?

Mr. GELVIN. A fellow by the name of Omori. I don't know his first name.



Mr. STEEDMAN. How do you spell his last name?

Mr. GELVIN. O-m-o-r-i, I believe, and a fellow by the name of T-a-c-h-i-b-a-n-a, I believe the way it is spelled. From Mr. Head's investigation he felt they were the leaders of the strike.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you go into the background of the first one you named?

Mr. GELVIN. Omori?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I think Mr. Head did. He handled that himself.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he an Issei?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. One of the older Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he been connected with the Central Japanese Association prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he was or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about his background at all?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is he now?

Mr. GELVIN. He is in a detention camp; I don't know which one.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He was segregated after this instance, is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; he was taken out. I don't know just where he is at.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he taken out immediately after the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it was awhile before Mr. Head was able to get all of the information and feel satisfied.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the background of Tachibana?

Mr. GELVIN. Tachibana—only by hearsay. I think he was a Japanese language school teacher over here prior to the evacuation. That is what I have been told.

Mr. STEEDMAN. By the way, is the Japanese language being taught in the camp at Poston at the present time?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they have regular Japanese language schools?

Mr. GELVIN. They have not schools—they have one school where they are using the Harvard prescribed course of instruction and there are about 200 enrolled in it. It is being given for the purpose of training men for the military intelligence school at Camp Savage, Minn.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who are the teachers of the school?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't give you the names; they are Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Japanese teachers?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is this school watched fairly closely by the project managers?

Mr. GELVIN. It is under the immediate supervision of Dr. Powell.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does Dr. Powell speak Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. No; he does not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you know that Japanese language schools in California were engaged in subversive activities prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GELVIN. I have heard that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Teaching the students Emperor worship and so forth?

Mr. GELVIN. I have heard that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you feel that is going on in this school?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't believe it is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many students there are in this Japanese language school?

Mr. GELVIN. Approximately 200.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Male?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think they are all male.

Mr. MUNDT. What did you say was the purpose of that? You said something about Minnesota.

Mr. GELVIN. There is a military intelligence school at Camp Savage, Minn., in which quite a few of the young Nisei from the camp have volunteered in the Army, and this school is having difficulty in getting enough men who can talk the kind of Japanese that they want, so W. R. A. cleared the way to have this language school at the camp. They are not, however—I would like to make this point—they are not carrying on this school in cooperation with the Army or with the Camp Savage school. This course of instruction is given so as to let them pass the test to go into the school.

Mr. MUNDT. What are the entrance qualifications or examination to get into the Japanese language school at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know. I would have to check that.

Mr. MUNDT. Do they have to meet a higher standard than simply not being on the stop list?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't believe there are any in there who are on the stop list because if they are on the stop list, why, I don't think they would get into the Army.

Mr. MUNDT. But isn't there any higher entrance qualifications than simply not being on the stop list? Don't they pick them pretty carefully if they are going into the military intelligence service?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know what the Army qualifications are.

Mr. MUNDT. Does the Army pick them from your school?

Mr. GELVIN. No, no; they don't; but Dr. Powell, who has this school under his wing, has familiarized himself with the qualifications that an individual has to meet in order to go into the military intelligence school, and I assume that those who are—whom he has selected to go into that school can pass their requirements.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you seen a list of the people who are studying in that school?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I haven't. It has only been recently started.

Mr. MUNDT. Are there any Kibeis in that school?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether there are or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you include in your letter to the committee a statement as to the exact manner in which students in this school are selected and what qualifications they have to meet?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I will.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would being a member of the Communist Party bar a Japanese from entering this school?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether it would or not. Pardon me, will you repeat the question?

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to have you include in your letter a complete statement of the entrance qualifications which a candidate for this school has to meet before he can enter this Japanese language

school, and you can include the answer to Mr. Steedman's last question in the same letter.

And while we are on the subject of schools, will you include a general statement about what is being done with the Japanese boys and girls of school age there at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. We are maintaining schools in the barracks buildings at the present time, and we have all grades up through high school.

There are approximately 5,000 children in the schools at the present time. Schools are under construction. We are making them out of adobe bricks.

We are building a school in each one of the three units. We are building a high school building and grade schools in unit 1, and just high schools in units 2 and 3.

We plan to carry on a full 180-day schedule, which is going to run up to the last of June, I think, because we were late getting started last fall with the schools.

About half of the teachers are Japanese and about half are Caucasian.

Mr. MUNDT. Are all classes taught in English?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. No Japanese is taught there?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge; no. There is not supposed to be. It is supposed to be all in English.

We were faced with quite a problem because we wanted to establish accredited schools, but our budget limitation would permit us to only employ about half enough teachers from regular teaching people, so last summer we established a summer school—a teacher-training school—and selected the Japanese who were graduates of universities and in other ways, with the exception of experience, were qualified as teachers. We gave them this summer school and then they started out.

About half the teachers are, as I say, Japanese and about half are Caucasian.

Mr. MUNDT. Does the curriculum conform to that of the State of Arizona or State of California or where?

Mr. GELVIN. The curriculum is designed so that the schools will be accredited in the State of California and in the State of Arizona because many of the teachers we have, or at least some of the teachers we have, are retired California teachers—old ladies, and many of the—of course most of the Japanese we have were evacuated from California, so being located in the State of Arizona, we tried to establish a curriculum that would be acceptable to the State Education Departments of both States.

Mr. MUNDT. Do the officials of the Office of Education of Arizona check your school?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I think they have been in. I only recall of them having been in once. I didn't meet them. They meet with Dr. Carey, the director of the schools.

Mr. COSTELLO. How are the teachers selected? From the civil service list?

Mr. GELVIN. No. We had to recruit teachers wherever we could get them and the civil service list of teachers—they just didn't have any eligibility list left and we had to gather up the teachers wherever we could find them.

Many of the teachers who had been retired here in California made application and we received many of them that way.

Mr. COSTELLO. What check up is made on the history and background of the individuals who are applying for teaching positions?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, their personal history statements would have to be made for the benefit of the Civil Service because that is in accordance with Civil Service rules pertaining to appointment and, of course, every individual who is appointed under Civil Service has to declare an oath of allegiance to the United States.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You stated, I believe, that the project is building a school at Poston center?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Building a number of school buildings?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they are divided up into buildings—four classrooms to the building.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are these school buildings of permanent construction?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they are pretty permanent construction.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the cost of these buildings?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't. They are being built out of adobe brick. We are manufacturing the adobe brick right there at the school sites.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you do assume those buildings are of a permanent construction or character?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return for a moment to the strike that occurred on November 18 and continued up until November 25. Did the military police guard the Caucasian personnel?

Mr. GELVIN. No; they guarded the outside boundaries of the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the quarters of the Caucasian personnel located inside of the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Part of them are; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the military police enter the camp and drive up in back of the Caucasian quarters at night so the Caucasian personnel could sleep during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did your office receive any reports of such a thing?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you live there at the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you live inside of the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you living inside of the camp at the time of the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I live just across the street from the evacuee barracks.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And if such a thing had happened, you would have heard about it, wouldn't you?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you feel there was any cause for alarm after you returned from Salt Lake City?

Mr. GELVIN. My wife and boy were on the project and I didn't remove them from the project.

Mr. MUNDT. I didn't hear the answer.



Mr. GELVIN. My wife and 10-year-old boy were on the project and I didn't remove them from the project.

Mr. MUNDT. Was your wife and son there the first 3½ days?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; and she did not feel any cause for alarm; and she circulated among the women there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any of the other men and women and children alarmed because of what was going on?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, I feel sure some of them might have been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any of the women and children evacuated from the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. Some of the wives were. Their husbands did take them out but just how many I can't say. There was very few. I would like to stress the point "very few."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a jail inside at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, we have a place we use for a jail. It is a barracks room back of the police station.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you have already testified that no Japanese flag was raised at Poston during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And does that include the Japanese flag over the so called jail?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right. I was shown the flag that was reported was a Japanese flag which was raised. All of the blocks were gathered in groups and they had—each block had a banner with their block number on it. It is kind of a camp affair thing, and this flag which was supposed to have been a Japanese flag was a block number and it was raised to indicate the block.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, there was no Japanese flag raised but some people reported that it was a Japanese flag, is that right?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right. And I think the flag could have been, from a distance, it could have been mistaken for a Japanese flag.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How do you know that the flag in question was the one that was raised?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't swear to that, no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Can you swear that the flag we are discussing here was not the Japanese flag?

Mr. GELVIN. This flag I saw?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No; the one that was raised.

Mr. GELVIN. Well, I couldn't swear to it because I didn't see it when it was raised.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were not there?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I wasn't there at the camp, but there was—the statement was made and circulated that there was a Japanese flag raised and there was such a storm of protest from the evacuees that I feel certain in my own mind it was not a Japanese flag.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you describe the flag? Will you describe what it looked like? Was it a white flag or what was it?

Mr. GELVIN. It was a white flag.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was written on it?

Mr. GELVIN. The block number. I believe that number was 30.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the figure 30 in Japanese characters?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; it was in English numerals. However, it was placed in the center of this white flag and from a distance because of the way it was drawn—the numerals were drawn.

Mr. COSTELLO. Rounded in shape?

Mr. GELVIN. Rounded in shape, yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the numerals in red ink or red paint or whatever they used?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, it was red.

Mr. COSTELLO. A red and white flag?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. A red circle on a white background, is that it?

Mr. GELVIN. That is what it would look like from a distance, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Where was this flag raised?

Mr. GELVIN. Down at the police station. It was raised and immediately the people forced them to take it down because they were afraid it would be mistaken for a Japanese flag, and probably the individual that raised it wanted to give that impression, as far as that is concerned—some "smartie" tried to show off.

Mr. MUNDT. Was it raised on the flag pole there?

Mr. GELVIN. They have a flag pole down at the police station.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you customarily fly an American flag from that pole?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, but it is taken down in the evening.

Mr. MUNDT. When did the strike break out? In the evening or in the daytime?

Mr. GELVIN. No. The strike broke out about noon and as I understand it this flag was run up at night.

Mr. MUNDT. Who took down the American flag that night? The regular authorities?

Mr. GELVIN. The regular authorities did it. Now, I am not positive in my statement there as to whether we were flying an American flag there at that time or not. Since then I know we do fly an American flag out there. We do now but I am not sure whether we were at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. I was wondering whether the same people didn't run it up the next morning.

Mr. GELVIN. No. There was just the one case that I know of when they run it up and that was at night.

Mr. STEEDMAN. May we have a recess for a moment?

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a short recess.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever investigated to determine who raised the flag that we have been discussing, which you say was mistaken for the Japanese flag?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether Mr. Head has that information or not. I know I talked to a considerable number about the strike and whether he has the information as to the exact individual, I couldn't say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, were flags similar to the one you have described flown in other parts of the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. The only flags that were flown were banners, more or less, with the block numbers, at this central gathering.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese sing the Japanese national anthem during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. I wouldn't know the Japanese national anthem if I heard it; but I am told that the Japanese national anthem was not played during the strike.

There was Japanese music but not the national anthem.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the name of the Japanese national anthem?

Mr. GELVIN. (No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you recognize the national anthem if you heard it played?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was an investigation made on this particular point by Mr. Head?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the results of his investigation?

Mr. GELVIN. He says that the national anthem was not played.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you recognize the music that was played if you heard it again?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe I would.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, there were pieces that were apparently repeated constantly?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they played it over and over again and every once in a while they put in—they would put in an American piece.

Mr. COSTELLO. For variety?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; there was quite a variety.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They commandeered the public address system and played these pieces over the public address system, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, the public address system at that time was not the property of the Government. I believe a church organization had brought it in and it was the evacuees themselves who were taking care of the public address system and they used it at the strike; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. What church organization installed the public address system?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you just which one brought it in. It was one of the Protestant organizations.

Mr. COSTELLO. It wasn't one of the Buddhist or Shinto organizations?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are not familiar with the Japanese national anthem and therefore you are not prepared to testify whether it was played or not, are you?

Mr. GELVIN. Only from what I have heard; what I have been told by Mr. Head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any Government property destroyed during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any milk destroyed?

Mr. GELVIN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What about the Golden State Dairy truck that was attacked during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. I didn't hear that the truck was attacked.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't been advised of that?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the military police fire over the heads of a group of rioting Japanese during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. They fired but it wasn't over the head of a group of rioting Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then please explain why they fired?

Mr. GELVIN. The internal security officer sent one of his Japanese policemen over to the truck pool to get a truck and the military police on guard told him to halt, and in place of that he turned and ran back into the camp and the M. P. fired over his head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Fired at one of the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; that is the story that has been told to me.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you were not there?

Mr. GELVIN. No. That happened while Mr. Head and I were gone.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But that was reported to you as having occurred?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did that report come to you through Army channels or through the channels of the Caucasian personnel or through the Japanese themselves?

Mr. GELVIN. That report came to me from Mr. Head. He investigated it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How did he receive that report, do you know?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is in command of the company of military police to which the young man that did the firing belongs?

Mr. GELVIN. At that time?

Mr. MUNDT. At that time, yes.

Mr. GELVIN. I believe it was Lieutenant Young. I believe he was in command. I believe it was before Major Dykes arrived.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any of the Japanese injured during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Not that I know of. I don't remember of any.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you recall it if there had been?

Mr. GELVIN. I think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Or would your hospital records at Poston indicate anyone that was injured during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall whether or not a goon squad beat up the mother and father of a young Japanese who had been working with the F. B. I. during the strike?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't know of that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You did not hear of that?

Mr. GELVIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you have known about it had it happened?

Mr. GELVIN. I think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And your hospital records would reveal whether or not an elderly Japanese man and woman were severely beaten one night?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; if they were beaten enough to be hospitalized, but I am sure our internal security officer would have received such a report.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now, how are burials handled at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they don't have any burials—they cremate all of their dead.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Government build a crematory at Poston?



Mr. GELVIN. No. The mortician at Yuma—there is an arrangement worked out with the mortician at Yuma and he built a crematory and handles cremations on contract with the Government.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the crematory in one of the warehouses?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; it is in one end of the warehouse.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the name of the mortician at Yuma who has the contract to handle the cremations?

Mr. GELVIN. I can't think of his name right now. I know him too.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the project keep a record of the cremations?

Mr. GELVIN. They keep a record of all deaths and they have to keep a record of the cremations so payment can be made for them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What does the mortician charge the Government for the cremations?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you what that contract is right now. You can check that with Mr. Empie.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the crematory used exclusively by personnel of the camp?

Mr. GELVIN. I think there was one other case other than Japanese that has been cremated. It was in the case of an employee who, I believe, died of heart failure—yes, it was one of the teachers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are these death records recorded in the county in which the project is located or in any other official record?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where are they recorded?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, they are recorded in Yuma. We fill out a regular death certificate and it is submitted to Yuma County.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return to the strike for a moment. I believe you stated that Mr. Head conferred with a committee of the strikers and a settlement was reached. Is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the basis of the settlement?

Mr. GELVIN. The basis of the settlement covered two main points, I believe. One was that the prisoner in the jail would be released to stand trial in the manner prescribed by the project director, realizing that any change that the F. B. I. had would of course receive precedence. If they wanted to make an arrest—arrest a man they could and take him away for hearing; and that they, the Japanese, would select a committee to work with the administration in working out a satisfactory employment procedure.

We had had difficulty with employment and Mr. Head asked that of the committee—to see if we couldn't get more people working in constructive work of some kind.

As I recall that is the two main issues that were settled at the meeting.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the young Japanese who was confined in jail released?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; he was released and he was later taken to Yuma and turned over to the United States marshal for trial and released.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his name?

Mr. GELVIN. Isamu Uchida.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the result of the trial at Yuma?

Mr. GELVIN. There was found insufficient evidence and he was released and came back to the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he at the camp now?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What were the original charges against him?

Mr. GELVIN. He was picked up on suspicion of being one of those of a gang that performed one of these beatings.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the beating in November?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think that was the beating of the one I referred to earlier.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that committee of Japanese still operating?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, yes; it is still operating but there have been changes in it. Some have dropped out and others have taken their place.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Sort of a management-labor committee?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, it is not—no; it is not a labor management committee. It is kind of an intermediary committee between the administration and the evacuees.

We found it worked better in that way in explaining what we wanted done, by working through a third person.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A somewhat similar arrangement as they have between management and labor in a good many of the industrial plants, isn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. After this strike did you receive a memorandum from Mr. Myer in Washington, regarding the handling of the Japanese relocation center and in this memorandum was there a statement that the relocation centers were "their camps" with the word "their" underscored and the word "their" referring to the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't recall the circular or instructions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever received a memorandum from Washington in which the words "their camp" were underscored and the words "their camp" meaning the camps belonging to the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't recall having seen one. However, that could be checked by checking through the administrative instructions at the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is being done now to segregate the admitted disloyal Japanese from the Japanese who profess to be loyal?

Mr. GELVIN. The W. R. A. has established a camp at Luppe, Ariz., to handle trouble makers who are citizens. As yet I don't believe they have their segregation policy completely worked out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How far is Luppe, Ariz., from Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Oh, it is 300 miles, I guess.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that camp established to take care of trouble-makers at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No; it is for all the W. R. A. camps.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have any of the troublemakers at Poston gone to this camp?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. No segregations have been made so far?

Mr. GELVIN. It has only been recently set up. I think it is only very recently that it has been ready for occupation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you at the present time have authority to put troublemakers in separate camps?

Mr. GELVIN. Our procedure on that is to submit a document on the individual to Washington for approval to remove him to this center.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many have you removed in this fashion?

Mr. GELVIN. We haven't taken any to Luppe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't removed any so-called troublemakers from the center at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. The F. B. I. have taken troublemakers out and have them in detention camps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many?

Mr. GELVIN. About 18 have been removed since we were down there.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the basis on which the F. B. I. removed those individuals?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't tell you because we don't have access to the information that they have.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do they do? Do they merely notify the camp head that they wish to have certain individuals placed in their custody?

Mr. GELVIN. No. They come in and notify us that they are taking out an individual. They might tell us why and they might not. Mostly all the officer has is just a warrant and it doesn't state the causes or reasons.

Prior to very recently, why, they came in without notification—that is without contacting us, because they didn't have to. They have full access to go wherever they want to, but we kind of like to know it when they take somebody out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The 18 they have removed are not and were not all the troublemakers in the camp, are they?

Mr. GELVIN. I am afraid I would be rather optimistic if I said they were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Because there are, undoubtedly, a large number who should be removed from the camp at Poston if you are going to have peaceful operations there and have no disloyal activities.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think so. I think some more should be removed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you care to state your own personal opinion as to the percentage of the Japanese whom you believe to be loyal and disloyal?

Mr. GELVIN. I would rather not give that percentage because it is so difficult to establish a formula to determine loyalty among any people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you believe there are definite subversive movements on the part of some of the Japanese to alienate the loyal Japanese from their position of loyalty to the United States?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think there is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There are certain efforts on the part of at least some of the Japanese to do that?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; I think there are attempts to do that thing; yes, sir. How successful it is, I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the Department of Justice returned any paroled aliens from the Department of Justice detention centers to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they have returned quite a few.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many?

Mr. GELVIN. I couldn't give you the exact figure.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have these paroled aliens caused you any trouble since returning to the relocation center at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No; as a rule they seem to be pretty peaceable.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions I have. I will ask Mr. Empie the other questions that I have but which Mr. Gelvin is not able to answer.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you any questions, Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. You say the temperature at Poston was around 130°. It gets much cooler than that at night, doesn't it?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes; there is quite a wide range of temperature. I think the top temperature last summer was around 140°.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And at night—

Mr. GELVIN. Of course, when you have that extreme heat you have very little relief at night. But if you have a temperature of, say 100, it might drop down to 70 or 65 at night, but during the middle of the summer when the heat is so severe, why, it is pretty hot at night.

I know we have a desert cooler in our quarters and many nights during the summer we kept it on all night. We don't like to have it on at night, however.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you happen to know what the allowances are for soldier's rations in the Army?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You say 45 cents is allowed the Japanese?

Mr. GELVIN. I believe it is 65 cents for soldiers. Our ration allowance is 45 cents but our average to date has been 38 cents. The cost is decreasing steadily as we get better organized and more efficient management.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Has this food committee since being organized, made many complaints about the food and the way the food is served, and about the quality of the food or any other matters in that connection?

Mr. GELVIN. We had quite a little trouble with food up until early last fall, but since that time I have heard very few complaints—that is, what I would consider serious complaints of a population of that size. You get, naturally, complaints on whatever was served.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But the food committee as a group has not complained very often about the type of food that is being served or the amount of food?

Mr. GELVIN. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They seem to be pretty well satisfied?

Mr. GELVIN. Seem to be pretty well-satisfied; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. GELVIN. I might add at that point, for the most of February and March, the average food cost was 32 cents per day and the average since the project started has been 38 cents.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a consorship of outgoing or incoming mail at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is baggage searched as it comes in?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As it goes out?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But not coming in?

Mr. GELVIN. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then Japanese could ship in most anything they wanted to, could they not?



Mr. GELVIN. Yes; they could ship in anything that they could get someone to ship them, with the exception of radios.

We have had the express office—everything that comes in comes in through the express office and any short-wave radios which come in, why, they are called to our attention and we have the short wave attachment removed. We are not radio technicians and the list of contraband prohibits short-wave radios, with the exception of a wave band between 540 kilocycles and 1700. We are not radio technicians and we cut out the whole short-wave measure.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are Isseis allowed to have radios?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, standard wave band.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Any person in the camp can have a radio?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes. I would like to add at that point that the F. B. I. has made two checks with locators and have found no evidence of short wave—either of short-wave receiving or sending sets.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Can the F. B. I. with those locators determine whether or not a short-wave receiving set is in a neighborhood?

Mr. GELVIN. I have been told that they can.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I understood they could only determine whether or not there were transmitting sets?

Mr. GELVIN. No, I have been told that. However, I am not a radio technician and I couldn't swear to that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt, do you have any questions?

Mr. MUNDT. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any statement you wish to make on your own accord before this committee, before we adjourn tonight and before you return to Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. Well, there is only one statement that I care to make. I have tried here to give information to the best of my knowledge.

We are a Government project operating under policies established by higher authorities than ourselves. I believe that is all I have to say.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have any complaint of any kind about the manner in which these hearings have been conducted?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel that counsel or any member of the committee has in any way tried to prejudice your testimony at any time?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You feel the committee and counsel have been absolutely fair?

Mr. GELVIN. I think they have.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. If there were in the camp any short wave radios, there wouldn't be much prospect of your running across them, or locating them, would there?

Mr. GELVIN. Not unless we were told that they were there. The F. B. I. picked up one man who ordered a short wave radio from a company. That company reported it to the F. B. I. and they picked him up and took him out for 3 months and then released him and he came back to the camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would it be possible for any of the younger Japanese who might be familiar with radio, to build a short wave set or

to adjust an existing set over to a short wave set capable of receiving short wave messages?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you would have no means of directly knowing that?

Mr. GELVIN. No; we wouldn't directly know that until it had been told to us by some of the people in the camp, because we don't search the barracks.

Mr. COSTELLO. With reference to the publication of the camp newspaper: Is there any censorship of the articles before they are printed?

Mr. GELVIN. We had a reports officer, who was a former newspaperman, who handled that. However, he has left the project and we do not have a reports officer at the present time.

We have placed that under the community activity department for them to handle the censorship; the reading of the articles, and so forth.

Mr. COSTELLO. And who is at the head of that?

Mr. GELVIN. Dr. Powell.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he is an employee of the W. R. A.?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there anyone who reads the Japanese articles which appear in that paper prior to publication?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. No translation is made and submitted to Dr. Powell before it is published?

Mr. GELVIN. No; only that copies of the paper are submitted to the W. R. A. in Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. But subsequent to their publication?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. After they have been printed?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, sir; so if there is anything out of line it could be checked there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether or not they attempt to translate Japanese articles that are printed?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The paper that is printed in Salt Lake City, I believe under the auspices of the J. A. C. L., has no connection with the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is an independent Japanese newspaper and is completely removed from W. R. A. control, is that correct?

Mr. GELVIN. That is correct. I am not familiar with the management of it although I do see the paper each time it comes out, but to my knowledge there is no connection with the W. R. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. It has been filled with numerous criticisms of General DeWitt and other persons, with regard to the Japanese in these camps. The W. R. A. has no control over that situation?

Mr. GELVIN. No, sir. We feel General DeWitt is above criticism in time of war.

Mr. COSTELLO. That particular paper in Salt Lake City has, I know, on several occasions contained numerous criticisms of General DeWitt and the regulations regarding the Japanese.

Mr. GELVIN. Yes, I have seen those.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there anything further?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask one more question. Who was the press intelligence officer at the Poston Center?

Mr. GELVIN. We didn't have a "press intelligence officer." It was a "reports officer." That was his title. His name was Norris James.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did he resign?

Mr. GELVIN. It was about the middle of May, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 1943?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why did he resign?

Mr. GELVIN. He was going into the Navy.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was his work at Poston satisfactory?

Mr. GELVIN. His resignation was accepted without prejudice.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he given a letter of recommendation when he left?

Mr. GELVIN. I don't know whether he was or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Could you answer my question yes or no? Was his work satisfactory?

Mr. GELVIN. I would rather not answer the question yes or no. I would rather say that his resignation was accepted without prejudice.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long was he employed at Poston?

Mr. GELVIN. He came there about the 1st of May a year ago. He was there about a — he was there—

Mr. STEEDMAN. He was there a year?

Mr. GELVIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your testimony today, Mr. Gelvin. I think we have given you sort of an ordeal by starting at 10 o'clock this morning and winding up here at 6 o'clock in the evening. But we appreciate the frankness of your testimony and your efforts to cooperate with the committee.

That will conclude the hearings for today and we shall adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 6 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, June 9, 1943.)





# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., in room 1543, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, and Hon. Karl E. Mundt.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. You may call your next witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Empie, will you be sworn?

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. EMPIE. I do.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed with the questioning of the witness, Mr. Steedman.

**TESTIMONY OF AUGUSTUS W. EMPIE, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT, POSTON, ARIZ.**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state your full name for the record?

Mr. EMPIE. Augustus W. Empie.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And will you state your present address?

Mr. EMPIE. Box 326, Parker, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you live inside the Poston relocation center?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I live at what is known as Silver City, the Irrigation Division headquarters of the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you married?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. EMPIE. Safford, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When were you born?

Mr. EMPIE. June 1, 1906.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you served in the armed forces of the United States?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state briefly where you went to school?

Mr. EMPIE. I went to school through grammar school and high school at Safford. The only work that I had in university was a special accounting course at the American University in Washington, D. C.; a correspondence course in accounting from the International Accountant Society.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you passed any C. P. A. examinations?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please give the committee an outline of the places you have worked?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir. My work began in 1923 during the summer-school vacation period when I was employed as a clerk and bookkeeper by the Soloman Co. at Safford, Ariz.

The next employment that I had was as a clerk-stenographer for the county agricultural agent of Graham County, Ariz. I served there during a school term for a 6-month period and out of school hours.

My next employment began in September 1924 and ran through February 1925. I was employed as clerk-stenographer with the Bank of Safford at Safford, Ariz.

At that time I took a civil-service examination and was selected from an eligible list submitted to the irrigation No. 4 district headquarters at Los Angeles for a position of timekeeper, to be employed at Coolidge Dam project on the Gila River, Ariz.

I reported for duty on June 1, 1925, and was employed in progressively more important positions in the Indian Service from that date until now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you leave the Indian Service?

Mr. EMPIE. I never left the Indian Service since I was employed 18 years ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you at the present time employed by the Indian Service?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what is your present position?

Mr. EMPIE. Chief administrative officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At the Poston relocation center?

Mr. EMPIE. Colorado River war relocation project is the official title of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For the purpose of this record in order to speed up the testimony, we refer to that as "Poston."

Mr. EMPIE. All right, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you are paid from the Indian Service funds?

Mr. EMPIE. We are paid from War Relocation Authority funds transferred to us on the books of the Treasury from the O. E. M. to the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your last position when you were actually working with the Indian Service itself?

Mr. EMPIE. My title was senior accountant and auditor in charge of installation of accounting procedures and personnel organization throughout the Indian field service—approximately 100 field offices.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were your headquarters?

Mr. EMPIE. Washington, D. C.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long did you have that position?

Mr. EMPIE. Approximately 7 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your salary at the time you left?

Mr. EMPIE. \$3,700.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present salary?

Mr. EMPIE. \$5,600.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you leave the position that you have referred to in the actual Indian Service?

Mr. EMPIE. I was told to report to San Francisco on the 30th of March 1942, and report to the then project director at Poston, Mr. E. R. Fryer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you arrive at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. On the 19th of April 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was 3 days after the W. R. A. was set up by Executive order of the President, wasn't it?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; that was approximately 1 month after it was set up in March.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many times have you been away from Poston since you were there last year?

Mr. EMPIE. You mean on official business or otherwise?

Mr. STEEDMAN. On official business first.

Mr. EMPIE. Let me see. Oh, I would say roughly a half dozen times—one trip to Washington and probably three trips to Phoenix and as many to Los Angeles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you away from Poston last November, if you recall?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't believe I was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were at the project all during the month of November?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you at the project during all of the month of December?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I was over here in December.

Mr. STEEDMAN. "Over here?"

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; for a few days.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the day you left Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. No; I don't know exactly. My recollection is about the 16th, somewhere along there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the purpose of your trip to Los Angeles?

Mr. EMPIE. To confer with the Office for Emergency Management, Central Administrative Services, in connection with procurement work and selection of personnel to man certain positions in my organization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you over here during the Christmas season last year?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I presume that would be called the Christmas season or about that time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You went back to Poston just after Christmas of last year; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. No; I was there at Christmas time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were at Poston at Christmas time?

Mr. EMPIE. I didn't stay over here but just a few days. I think probably 3 or 4 days.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you taken your annual leave this year?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have had no annual leave this year?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had you had any actual experience with Japanese prior to going to Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you always lived in Arizona?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, not——

Mr. STEEDMAN. Except for the period you were in Washington?

Mr. EMPIE. I lived here at one time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long did you live in Arizona?

Mr. EMPIE. I lived there from September 1928 through December 1929.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever made a study of the Japanese language?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you speak Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would first like to take up the irrigation system at Poston with you. Mr. Gelvin advised the committee that you would probably be able to testify to the estimated cost of the extension of the irrigation system. Could you give us any idea what that is going to cost?

Mr. EMPIE. You mean the over-all project cost?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. The long-range program?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. My estimate would be \$10,000,000, just offhand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that extension is being built for the use of the relocation center; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. The part that is to be used for the relocation center and for the benefit of the evacuees is a very small portion of the total project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What proportion of the total project would you say is being built for the exclusive use of the evacuees?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to exceed 5,000 acres.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What would you estimate the cost of that improvement to be?

Mr. EMPIE. For this particular work?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. Oh, I would say \$3,000,000 offhand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This relocation program is a temporary expedient, isn't it, on the part of the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then why are they spending \$3,000,000 to build an irrigation system for the Japanese if it is only a temporary program?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, it might be explained in this manner. In casting about for a place to locate the project, the Director of the War Relocation Authority contacted the Indian Office and the Secretary of the Interior and discussed the location at Poston. The Indian Service explained to the Director of W. R. A.—outlined the long-range program which had been presented to the Bureau of the Budget before and they mutually agreed it would be to the benefit of both parties concerned to locate there and on that basis money was allotted to the Indian Service, with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget, to



establish the camp there, with the understanding that a portion of the money would be allotted to construct the main canal and a small part of the lateral system, to the extent necessary to serve this immediate area around the camp, and thus kill two birds with one stone, so to speak.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the Indian Service plan to use this irrigation system after the Japanese have been relocated in the Middle West?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; the over-all program calls for the construction of all irrigation facilities and project work to serve approximately 110,000 acres of land.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Hasn't the Bureau of Reclamation been having some difficulty in securing settlers to settle on lands that have been reclaimed?

Mr. EMPIE. Are you speaking of the Bureau of Reclamation?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am speaking of the Bureau of Reclamation. You are familiar with their program; are you not?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I am. I think probably that is true; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, don't you think—

Mr. EMPIE. But that is just hearsay.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Don't you think that the Indian Service will have the same difficulty if they build this tremendous project? Don't you feel they will likewise be unable to get settlers on that land?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, of course, all the work and all the efforts of the Indian Service to develop land is primarily for the benefit of the Indians, and their long-range plan was to subjugate this land for the benefit of the southwestern tribes and locate them on that basis.

In other words it would be supplementing their resources of the other reservations.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But this improvement is a permanent improvement; isn't that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that your present salary is \$5,600 a year?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you pay subsistence out of that?

Mr. EMPIE. Surely.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the project furnish you with an automobile?

Mr. EMPIE. For my official business; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What kind of an automobile is it?

Mr. EMPIE. A 4-door Buick sedan, about a 1940 model, I believe it is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they furnish you with gasoline and oil and tires?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many so-called pleasure cars are there at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Do you mean by that—

Mr. STEEDMAN. Automobiles?

Mr. EMPIE. Passenger cars?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. Do you mind if I refer to my notes?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No, go right ahead.

Mr. EMPIE. We have 13 coupes and 42 sedans and 7 station wagons. I might say that these automobiles, some of them, were transferred to

us from the Army and other branches of the Government. These sedans were purchased, as I understand it, by the Army from the evacuees and sent to many of the projects for project use.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How did it happen that Miss Findley rated a Packard when she was there?

Mr. EMPIE. The assignment of the automotive equipment was all made under the direction of the—the general direction of the supply and transportation officer and the immediate direction of the dispatcher. And if you could have seen the Packard and the trouble she had keeping it going, you wouldn't think much about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. She had some bad tires too, didn't she?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, she did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a curfew at Poston now?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are not able to answer whether you have curfew there?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, I am not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not any of the automotive equipment has been used after hours at Poston by the Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; it has.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For what purpose?

Mr. EMPIE. Some for official business in caring for the maintenance of utilities by the police department and fire department, and in some instances, before we were able to exercise the right kind of control over it, for general purposes—just moving about the camp area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Pleasure driving?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, it might be considered that, yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the evacuees go on picnics with the automotive equipment?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They did?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. To what extent?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, on week ends and after hours. The river is nearby and there is very very little recreation there and they took the automobiles and went down there.

Gradually we are tightening up on that more and more all the time;

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it official Government equipment that was used?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are the Japanese allowed to have their own personal cars in the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; those cars, when they come in, are checked in by the dispatcher. The equipment in the car is listed so there will be no question about whose property moves out of the camp, and their cars are confined to the motor pool until they get ready to leave the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. Who gives them permission to use the cars to go to picnics?

Mr. EMPIE. For picnics?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. That is the responsibility of the division heads—the people in charge of the work of the various divisions of the project being accountable officers as I am, under bond. It has been my sincere

effort to solicit the cooperation of all the division heads on the project to successfully control the use of the equipment.

Mr. MUNDT. Are the division heads white people or Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. White.

Mr. MUNDT. Shouldn't have very much difficulty getting their cooperation, should you, inasmuch as you are their immediate superior officer, aren't you?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I can't say that I am. I am not the project director.

Mr. MUNDT. Doesn't somebody in the camp have authority to send out a memorandum to the division heads and say: "These cars shall not be used for certain purposes—period."

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. But that has not been done?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; it has been done.

Mr. MUNDT. I understood you to say you were gradually tightening up on it.

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, trying to, as I said, put forth every effort to get them to comply with the regulations that I have issued.

Mr. MUNDT. And you are speaking of the white heads?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. But some of them are disinclined to follow the instructions issuing from the heads of the project?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe so, yes, sir. That is the impression I get from where I sit.

Mr. MUNDT. What means have you taken to get a little better cooperation on the part of the division heads when they show such insubordination?

Mr. EMPIE. I have to look to the man in charge of the automotive equipment under my general direction. And I ask him to contact the division heads and discuss the problem together with the project director, and ask him to impound all the equipment that is used abusively, or what I consider ill-gally.

Mr. MUNDT. It would be a correct statement of the case then, that the fact these cars are used by the Japanese for picnic purposes is really due to a lack of diligence on the part of the division heads and not the Japanese appropriating the equipment and using it?

Mr. EMPIE. Absolutely.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When was this memorandum issued with respect to the use of this equipment for these purposes?

Mr. EMPIE. In July 1942.

Mr. EBERHARTER. July 1942?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you state just briefly what your duties and responsibilities are at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I have charge of, what is known in the project, organization of the administrative branch, which consists of the following divisions: Mails, Files, and Communications; Personnel, Supply and Transportation, Procurement, Fiscal.

In addition to those which are ordinarily considered administrative services, I have general supervision over the chief steward's office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you directly responsible for the heads of the departments you have named?

Mr. EMPIE. I am, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me ask this question: Is there anybody between you and Mr. Head; any official, or are you responsible directly to Mr. Head?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, except Mr. Gelvin. I work through him in Mr. Head's absence.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you write the memorandums directly to Mr. Head or do you route them through Mr. Gelvin?

Mr. EMPIE. When Mr. Head is there I address them to him.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words you don't have to go through Mr. Gelvin to reach Mr. Head?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return for a few moments again to the use of automotive equipment. Have any of the Japanese at Poston made automobile trips to visit their relatives and friends in the Middle West or in the East?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge—I don't know.

Mr. STEADMAN. Would your records indicate whether or not such trips have been made?

Mr. EMPIE. If they were in Government cars they would. Is that what you mean? You mean Government cars?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is what I mean. They would have to use Government cars if they were going to travel by automobile from Poston, wouldn't they?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I guess they would now. They can't get any gasoline in Arizona.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they would also have to have an escort, wouldn't they?

Mr. EMPIE. Unless they had an official pass from the Western Defense Command to travel in the zone.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This committee would like to have that information. Will you make a note on your memorandum to furnish the committee with the number of trips made by Japanese in Government-owned cars, to the Middle West and east coast, the date of the trips and the reasons, and the number of passengers, and whether there were Caucasian escorts?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Would your records also show when these cars are used for picnicking?

Mr. EMPIE. I am afraid not; no, sir. It is only within the knowledge of the people who are trying to look after it.

Mr. MUNDT. No reports are made of that unless you accidentally discover the fact that they went on a picnic?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you be able to estimate how many of those picnics have taken place since the memorandum was issued to stop that practice? That memorandum was issued in July, I believe you said.

Mr. EMPIE. Oh, it would be pretty hard to estimate it, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you say there has just been one or two or three isolated instances?

Mr. EMPIE. Oh, no; it is a regular occurrence.

Mr. MUNDT. Going back to the division heads again, who failed to follow out this memorandum: You are in charge of them, aren't you?



Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I am not in charge of them.

Mr. MUNDT. Your chief of transportation under you is in charge of them?

Mr. EMPIE. It can't be said that he is in charge of the other division heads; no, sir. You see—let me explain it this way, if you please.

Mr. MUNDT. All right.

Mr. EMPIE. These divisions that I am in charge of are established and maintained as facilitating divisions for all the other project operations.

When the project director establishes a program he lines up all his division heads and says that so and so is a part of the program which we are responsible for. "Do you need any equipment, need any supplies, need any personnel? The materials will go to Mr. Empie's branch and he will try and help you out—establish the set-up to facilitate your work."

And when they call on us for cars, we assign them the cars and we tell them what the requirements are. Our work after that, so far as control of the equipment is concerned, is police work, you might call it.

Mr. MUNDT. The memorandum stopping the pleasure use of these cars was issued by Mr. Head, is that right?

Mr. EMPIE. I issued it and Mr. Head approved it.

Mr. MUNDT. And the responsibility of enforcing it, at least over those divisions which don't come under you, would flow from Mr. Head's office?

Mr. EMPIE. I consider it that way, yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether or not any disciplinary measures were taken by Mr. Head against the division chiefs who failed to follow out the purport of his order?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Were any men disciplined for violating that order?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. It is just a matter of general persuasion from him?

Mr. EMPIE. I think it could be said that it is an educational program. We have a big job to do and they overlook the little details—what they consider little details, without a sense of responsibility or accountability for Government property.

That has been my experience in the Indian Service for 18 years. It is a program that every administrative officer is up against to impress upon the officials of the Government in charge of various programs—the importance of keeping track of Government property after funds have been converted from cash into property.

Mr. MUNDT. You might say that is a Nation-wide difficulty?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I consider it so, yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do your records indicate how much money has been spent at Poston since the camp was first started?

Mr. EMPIE. I can give that to you in approximate figures.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That will be all right.

Mr. EMPIE. \$9,600,000. That is including an estimate to June 30, for the month of June.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the project completed at this time?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, it isn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much more money is intended to be spent there?

Mr. EMPIE. As far as construction is concerned, enough to complete the clearing of 5,000 acres of land.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will any more money be spent for buildings—administrative buildings and barracks?

Mr. EMPIE. We have a program now to construct 20 4-family apartments for the administrative personnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If it is the policy of the W. R. A. to relocate the evacuees in the Middle West and East, why are more barracks being built and more money being spent?

Mr. EMPIE. If you will allow me to I will explain it in this way: When this program was undertaken we drained the Indian Service personnel resources to man the project. To get the job done we called on these people from every part of the country and all over the various Indian reservations.

They came in there leaving their families at home because they were told that there was no place for them to live; that they would have to come in there and leave their families unless they were willing to put up with one-room barrack-type quarters.

Some of them came and brought their families; some have children that have lived for the last year in very close quarters, and it is really remarkable to me that they have remained with us. It has been a very trying situation as far as living conditions are concerned, because of the lack of facilities we have had at our disposal.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The proposed buildings are to house the Caucasian personnel; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; the 20 4-family units.

Mr. MUNDT. In that connection, when Mr. Gelvin left the Indian Service and went to the relocation center he received a substantial increase in pay?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And you did likewise?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Is that general of all these Indian Service employees, or was that primarily just for you two?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, that is general.

Mr. MUNDT. Most of those who went to Poston received a substantial increase in pay?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; and I would like to add that that is a classification of all those positions which was approved first, in the Indian Office—first, I should say, by the Bureau of the Budget who gave us the allotment, and next by the Indian Office through the Classification Division of the Secretary of the Interior's Office and the Civil Service Commission.

These positions were all filled in that manner.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They would have to be approved in that manner or you couldn't receive your salary check; isn't that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Speaking about the \$9,600,000 cost, does that refer merely to the buildings and improvements that have been put in the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; that is the total expenditures for all purposes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that includes food and living expenses and things of that character?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. As well as the salaries of the employees, and wages paid out?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Could you break that up between project cost per se, the building project, and the operating costs?

Mr. EMPIE. I might quote some figures here if that would be helpful to you. That would indicate some of the details.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to have that.

Mr. EMPIE. I won't guarantee them—I won't guarantee that they will all tie together when I get through.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just give us an estimate so we can have some idea of the picture.

Mr. EMPIE. We have our allotment ledgers broken down by budget objective classes for the various branches of the project, and if you would like to have me I will read these off that make up that total [reading]:

What we consider as administrative expenses, \$480,000.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that per month?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, that is for a 12 months' period. This is for the year 1943 [reading]:

Agriculture and industry.....	\$390, 000
Education.....	296, 000
Health and sanitation.....	153, 000
Welfare and recreation.....	10, 000
Employment and placement.....	26, 000
Fire protection.....	22, 000
Internal security.....	74, 000
Japanese labor or subsistence, public assistance grants, unemployment compensation, clothing allowances, and leave assistance.....	5, 608, 000
Public Work total.....	2, 571, 000

That is broken down as follows:

Buildings and grounds.....	\$725, 000
Drainage.....	130, 000
Flood control.....	3, 000
Irrigation.....	533, 000
Roads.....	184, 000
Subjugation.....	154, 000
Additions to electric plant.....	30, 000
Operation and maintenance (that is, utilities and ground, and so forth) ..	801, 000

That is the total of \$9,600,000 in round figures.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the figure for a camp of how many people during that period?

Mr. EMPIE. An average population since its inception of approximately 17,000.

Mr. MUNDT. Could you tell us how much there was for leave assistance alone? You have that grouped with quite a few other items. Do you have it broken down further?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; leave assistance, an average for the 12 months' period, \$14,600 a month. However, that figure——

Mr. MUNDT. \$14,600 per month?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; that figure, however, might be misleading because those leave grants were not authorized prior to March 24 of this year.

Mr. MUNDT. That includes what? Does that include the \$50 cash allotment that an evacuee gets if he needs it?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. What else; railroad tickets? Do you pay for that?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there anything else? Is there a clothing allotment of any kind?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, that is made up of the coach fare for each member of the family. The applicant and each member of his family receive the following: \$50 for himself—

Mr. MUNDT. And not for the rest of the family?

Mr. EMPIE. For himself, \$25 for the first dependent, and \$25 for all additional dependents, whether it is one or five.

Mr. MUNDT. And that is all that enters into that figure of \$14,600?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes. Would you like to have some of the figures on payments to the evacuees?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. I might refer again to the—to refresh your memory, to the \$5,608,000. That is an average expenditure of \$467,000 made up as follows: Approximately \$107,000 for labor; clothing, \$71,000; unemployment compensation, \$420,000; food, \$203,000; and the leave grants of \$14,600; public assistance, \$203,000; and all other miscellaneous operating expenses chargeable to the feeding, housing, and clothing of the evacuees, including fuel oil to operate the kitchens, and block manager supplies such as, for the community buildings, such as disinfectants, toilet paper, and things of that nature, miscellaneous supplies and equipment for operating the mess halls—that is, replacements and so forth—\$69,000.

That makes up the \$467,000 per month.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the estimated cost of the subjugation of the 5,000 acres of land which you intend to put into cultivation in the near future?

Mr. EMPIE. It is averaging roughly \$125 an acre to subjugate the land—that is, clearing it and leveling it and bordering it in making it ready for irrigation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who will work this land after you get it subjugated?

Mr. EMPIE. During the operation of the relocation project, it will be operated by the evacuees from a subsistence standpoint.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The program of the W. R. A. is to relocate the evacuees in the Middle West; isn't that right?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; that is their program, but it is not taking effect as fast as they thought it would. There are going to be a lot of Japanese on the project for a long time after they estimated they would be gone.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, most of the Japanese who are being evacuated at the present time into the Middle West are young Japanese, are they not?

Mr. EMPIE. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They are the ones who could work this land; isn't that right?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, not necessarily. We have a great many older Japanese who are experienced farmers and really want to work the land. They are the boys that get out and work the land.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, you will be left with the older people there at Poston to work these 5,000 acres of land that you subjugate. Isn't that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't think many of them can be considered "old." They are older than the younger ones that go out, but they are not decrepit by any means.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the average age of the Issei? Do you have any estimate of that?

Mr. EMPIE. It would be just an estimate on my part, but I imagine 50 years old.

Mr. MUNDT. And they are mostly people who were farming some place along the west coast before they were evacuated; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. I understand that, and this again is an estimate on my part, but approximately 60 percent of our people were associated with farming activities before they went there.

Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke of the plan of the War Relocation Authority to relocate these people in the Midwest. It isn't any part of their plan to locate any of these Japanese evacuees here on the Pacific coast again, is it?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it ever a part of their program to do that?

Mr. EMPIE. Are you speaking from our project standpoint or from the national standpoint?

Mr. COSTELLO. From the national standpoint of the W. R. A., if you have any information on that.

Mr. EMPIE. I have never heard it mentioned myself, that they were actually planning to try to get them moved back until after the war was over.

Mr. COSTELLO. And as far as you are concerned locally at Poston, that has not been your program?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, it has not.

Mr. MUNDT. Does the W. R. A. have any plan or tentative plan for what is to be done with these Japanese after the war is over?

Mr. EMPIE. The W. R. A.?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. I think that is a problem that we have all got to face. I think they are groping for the answer to that problem. As you and I know, the Californians do not seem to want them and Arizona doesn't want them, and that is about the size of it.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know of anybody who does want them?

Mr. EMPIE. Not until they become acquainted with them. Never having been acquainted with them or associated with them before, they don't know who they are dealing with and, consequently, it is natural for them to be suspicious of them.

I think the people, the Japanese people, who are sincere and trying to demonstrate their understanding of the principles of democracy, there is a tendency, I will say, on the part of the people with whom they become associated to give them some credit for the work that they try to do. In other words I think it is a fact that the—if I might go on just a little more?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. EMPIE. That the Japanese people have been confined so long in California and have never gone anywhere else in the United States, it is just something that we are up against.

Now, we had to move them out of here for the prosecution of the war, which I think was a good thing, and now what to do with them is a big problem.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that the people of Arizona don't want the Japanese to relocate in the State of Arizona?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that the attitude of the people around Phoenix?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Generally?

Mr. EMPIE. From the reports that I get; yes, sir. I have never talked to any of them over there. I attended a hearing, however, at Phoenix that Senator Chandler conducted, at which it was very forcibly expressed they didn't want them there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the project have at this time a contract with a man by the name of Mr. McIntyre?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is Mr. McIntyre's first name?

Mr. EMPIE. I can't say, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of business or occupation is Mr. McIntyre engaged in?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know, except that I understand he deals in rental of equipment and sale of various kinds of construction machinery and so forth.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he rent certain equipment to the project at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; we have on rental from him, as I remember, about three tank trucks that we use on road maintenance.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Sprinkler trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the rate of pay per hour that Mr. McIntyre receives for those three trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. \$2.75.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many hours per day do you guarantee him to use the trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't remember, Mr. Steedman. I would have to refer to the contract for that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that you guarantee him as many as 16 hours a day?

Mr. EMPIE. I am sorry, I don't recall, but it is entirely possible because we have to run two or three shifts to keep the road wet down enough to maintain it. It is a desert road—well, you wouldn't call it a "desert road" but it is a gravel road and that country is very arid and it takes a lot of water to keep it wet.

Mr. STEEDMAN. \$2.75. Does that include the pay of the driver of the truck?

Mr. EMPIE. If you don't mind me taking a little time here, I think I have a note on that somewhere. No, I don't. I don't know whether it does or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that the usual rental for trucks around Parker?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't know as you would say "around Parker" but this contract was entered into after circulating advertisements for bids for that type of equipment and the low bid was accepted and under the terms of the contract the rate charged by the contractor is guaranteed not to exceed the ceiling price set by the Office of Price Administration.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You mean the per hour ceiling price on the rental of trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; including all the services or expense that that is supposed to cover.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is an unusual service and probably no other service in that area would be comparable to that?

Mr. EMPIE. I think that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So the \$2.75 an hour wouldn't be a yardstick or any criterion to go by?

Mr. EMPIE. Except the estimates that the engineers give us. They considered that a fair basis.

I might say for your information that these trucks are rented from Mr. McIntyre and operated under the direct supervision of the road engineer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the project furnish gasoline for the trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. I am not sure about that. I could give you a copy of the contract if you would like to have it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We would like to have it and will appreciate your furnishing it for the benefit of the committee.

Mr. EMPIE. All right, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why don't you use your own equipment for this work?

Mr. EMPIE. I have asked that same question of the road engineer many times in checking up on this equipment, and he has assured me that he had more work of that nature than he can handle with our equipment. He needs this additional equipment to complete the job and he has assumed the responsibility for that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't want to assume responsibility for that contract yourself, do you?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I am the contracting officer and I signed the contract but it was for the benefit of the road engineer, whom I have to rely upon.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is your road engineer?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Lyle Wormock.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he an Army engineer or is he with the Army engineers?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; he is an Indian Service employee, employed under the Public Works Division, and is under the general supervision of the chief engineer for the project.

In other words, he is a part of the public works program.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you hesitate to sign the contract for these three tank trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes sir; on my own judgment. But we have to discuss those things together and arrive at a mutual understanding about the prosecution of the program.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You thought it was extravagant, didn't you?

Mr. EMPIE. I think I did; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In furnishing the information about the contract, the committee would like also to have the amount of money that you have paid Mr. McIntyre since the beginning of the project, and we would like to have those figures broken down by months.

Mr. EMPIE. All right, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have the authorities at Poston had much trouble because of the Japanese speeding in Government-owned motor equipment in and around the project?

Mr. EMPIE. I would say not; no, sir. We have had a normal amount of that, I would say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have had some?

Mr. EMPIE. Some, yes. Not any more than the white personnel, I would say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then the white personnel is equally guilty of speeding with Government equipment in and around the project?

Mr. EMPIE. I have checked it up on several of them personally and have found they were exceeding the national speed limit of 35 miles an hour in two or three instances, and I have called it to their attention and explained that disciplinary action would be taken unless they fell in line with that policy, not only from a compliance from a national standpoint, but for the preservation of the equipment, which is scarce and hard to get and hard to maintain.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many new tires have been received at Poston since the project started?

Mr. EMPIE. I couldn't say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have an approximate figure of the new tires received at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. It would be a guess.

Mr. STEEDMAN. All right.

Mr. EMPIE. I would say maybe 400.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are those tires obtained through the O. P. A. rationing board at Parker?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. All of our tires come from the Ordnance Department, the Motor Maintenance Division of the United States Army.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At Phoenix?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is not necessary for you to go through the usual routine of obtaining tires through the rationing boards?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; not now. We did at the start of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At one time you did have to go through the rationing boards in order to secure tires?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you find that to be a rather difficult procedure?

Mr. EMPIE. Not very; no, sir. They were cooperative. They inspected the vehicles exactly in the same manner as any private automobile would be inspected. The tire numbers were all recorded.

The supply and transportation officer under the authority issued by the local board, made the inspections and I approved each one of them individually myself.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why was the procedure for procuring new tires changed?

Mr. EMPIE. Through the efforts of the W. R. A. in Washington, the assistance of the Army was solicited and secured in getting rubber for our use.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did it develop that there was too much routine for each and every official of the project at Poston to go through the rationing board at Parker?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I wouldn't say it was. We worked that out then on a systematic basis in line with their requirements. As far as we were concerned, we were getting along all right.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall a Japanese truck driver by the name of Hasagawa being reported as driving a project truck at 55 miles an hour between Poston and Parker?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; that never came to my attention.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If such an instance had come to your attention, what disciplinary action would you have taken against Mr. Hasagawa?

Mr. EMPIE. I would have reported it to his division supervisor and ask that he be laid off and removed from the pay roll. That has been done in many instances.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall a strike at Poston that started last November 18?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you there during the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were there at all times during the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. All the time, yes; except for the time I am away in the evening at home.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese police during the strike commandeer the project automobiles without proper explanation to the dispatcher?

Mr. EMPIE. The police department was instructed after a 2- or 3-day period to commandeer the equipment and return it to the motor pool, where it belonged, which they did forthwith.

Mr. MUNDT. What had happened up to that time that led to the order to commandeer the equipment?

Mr. EMPIE. I left that up to my supply and transportation officer who was supposed to take care of that, and since he was unable to do it, I took charge of it myself. In fact he left about that time when I needed him the most.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he resign?

Mr. EMPIE. Sir?

Mr. MUNDT. You mean he quit the job?

Mr. EMPIE. No; he asked for a leave from the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And who was that?

Mr. EMPIE. Harold H. Townsend.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He asked for annual leave?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; he did. He came to me and told me that his wife was ill and he wanted to know if I had any objection to his leaving the project so he might take her home, and I told him——

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that at the time of the strike or before the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. That was during the strike.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall what day of the strike Mr. Townsend made that request of you?

Mr. EMPIE. It was either the 20th or 21st of November.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the strike had been going on for 2 or 3 days?

Mr. EMPIE. It started the 18th.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you give Mr. Townsend permission to go to Los Angeles at that time?

Mr. EMPIE. He told me that he wanted to leave the project to bring his wife home.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where was his home?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know. I don't know; I assumed at the time, and thinking back over it later, I assumed his home was here in Los

Angeles because I interviewed him here for the job. I didn't know where he was going until then.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he leave then on the 20th or 21st?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; and in connection with that I would like to bring that point out now.

At about that same time I received a long-distance telephone call from one of our truck drivers who had been dispatched on a mission away from the project to haul lumber from one of our Indian reservations. He said that he was broken down at a little town called Seligman, Ariz., and needed a head gasket for his car.

I reported that to Mr. Townsend and it developed later that his trip away from the project to Seligman and return was covered by an official travel order issued to him for that purpose.

Now, when he came back—do you want me to go into this?

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did Mr. Townsend return?

Mr. EMPIE. He got back about the 25th, as I remember it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. After the strike was over?

Mr. EMPIE. At about the time it was over. It lasted about a week and he got back about that time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then he was away from the project from the 21st to the 25th?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do your records indicate the time he was away from Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; they do. He showed the time he was away.

Mr. STEEDMAN. On the official records?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I think they do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you approve a leave card for him when he left?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't recall that I signed a leave card, but he had a certain amount of leave on record about that time. I have looked it up since.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The regular Government leave system obtains there, does it not?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; it does. When he returned from this trip he turned in a travel log that we issue to all employees who leave the project on official business, from which a travel voucher for reimbursement of traveling expenses is prepared by the voucher clerk in the office.

This log was incomplete to the extent that a voucher could not be prepared. There was some information missing. The girl in charge of that work or in charge of writing the vouchers, had such a volume of work to do she just laid it to one side until she could get some information about it, and it wasn't until after Mr. Townsend left the project that it came to my attention that there was something wrong with that travel log.

When it did come to my attention, it came through the efforts of the new Supply and Transportation Office, in attempting to get information to help prepare the voucher.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the new Supply and Transportation officer? What is his name?

Mr. EMPIE. F. M. Haverland.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his salary?

Mr. EMPIE. \$3,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. By the way, what was Mr. Townsend's salary when he went to work at Poston? Do you recall that?

Mr. EMPIE. As I recall it was \$3,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his salary when he left Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. The same.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the final date of the departure of Mr. Townsend from the project?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Townsend's last day of service, including a terminal leave that he had coming, was January 2, 1943. When we began to check into this trip that he made to Seligman, it came to our attention, by going through the credit slips that were issued by the oil companies from whom we get gasoline on the service station delivery contract, that he had been other places than to Seligman and back.

Now, we began to trace his trip then through the use and reference to these credit slips and found where he had wound up in Oklahoma City with this Government car. We traced his trip back from there down to the project or near the project. The last slip, I think, that we have a record of, was at Gallup, on his way back—Gallup, N. Mex.

Naturally, that being the case, he had apparently seen fit not to complete his travel log. I don't know whether he thought we were going to guess at what happened in order to prepare it and present it to him for signature. I have never had a chance to talk to him about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he submit the travel log under his own signature?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Requesting payment?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; turned it in for payment.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it ever paid?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did Mr. Townsend travel to Oklahoma City in a Government-owned automobile?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you have records to substantiate that statement?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are there similar instances at Poston where other personnel have traveled to other points in Government-owned cars?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know anything about that?

Mr. EMPIE. Not on private business, that is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made any investigation to determine whether or not that is the situation?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you are pretty certain there has been none of that at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. You mean by other employees?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. I think it is pretty safe; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the voucher submitted by Mr. Townsend in connection with that trip paid?

Mr. EMPIE. It couldn't be certified because the facts could not be stated in voucher form; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have any Japanese been allowed to leave the reservation in that manner, and taking a Government car and going some distance and return?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Ordinarily the only time they would leave the project in a Government car would be when accompanied by some white overseer with them?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; on official business some place covered by a travel log.

Mr. COSTELLO. They would not be able to take a car out of the camp on their own personal business?

Mr. EMPIE. No.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the point of importance about this long-distance telephone call from the fellow who had the broken head gasket? Was that Townsend?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; it was a man by the name of Max Chavich, who operated one of our big trucks and trailers. He had gone after lumber. He was operating under Mr. Townsend's direction. He had gone after the lumber and he called the project and asked for somebody to bring him the gasket. That part of the trip from Poston to Seligman and return was official, as far as Mr. Townsend was concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. It was on that trip that Townsend went to Oklahoma City?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I understand now; I didn't get the connection.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long did this trip to Oklahoma by Mr. Townsend require?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, he was gone from the 22d. He got back about the 25th—about 3 days, I guess, there and back.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that on the occasion when he told you his wife was ill and he wanted to take her home?

Mr. EMPIE. That was the same time; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And when he left you knew he was taking his wife home, didn't you?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I did. That is what he told me he was going to do. I didn't ask him, "Are you going to use a Government car, and be sure you don't now, because it is against the law." I assumed that he had his own means of conveyance to take his wife wherever his home was. I assumed that. I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you did give him permission to take his wife home?

Mr. EMPIE. I gave him permission to leave the project on leave. He told me that he wanted to take his wife home.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you drive a Government-owned car between the project and your home?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You do?

Mr. EMPIE. Many of us do that because there are not sufficient quarters in Poston in which to be housed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And how far is Parker from the relocation center at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Sixteen miles.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Then you drive 32 miles a day back and forth from your home to the center at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Did this man Townsend take the head gasket from Poston over to this other town in Arizona?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; he did.

Mr. MUNDT. On his way out of the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And you knew he was going to do that?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Your understanding was——

Mr. EMPIE. Excuse me, but I would like to make it clear that at the time he came in to see me about leaving, I didn't know that he was going by the way of Seligman to take this gasket. It wasn't until afterward that it came out that that was what had happened.

What actually took place was, to be perfectly frank about it and tell you the sequence of events, when he came back he presented me with the travel order to cover his official trip from Poston to Seligman and return, having a knowledge of this man up there broken down and needing a gasket, that part of his travel was approved. I thought it was all legal.

Mr. MUNDT. And you paid for that part of it?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; it hasn't been paid because it is mixed up in the other trip.

Mr. MUNDT. At any other time during Mr. Townsend's employment, did you have any reason to question his veracity?

Mr. EMPIE. He was always very evasive in response to questions that I would put to him about various parts of his work. He seemed to have that manner about him. He was a man that had had no Government experience before and he was in charge of a responsible part of my organization and I had to look to him for a lot of work.

Mr. MUNDT. Tell the committee how you happened to hire him. You say you interviewed him here in Los Angeles?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir, I contacted the recruitment office of the Office for Emergency Management, 1031 South Broadway, and asked them to assist me in selecting various people for positions out there that we hadn't been able to fill by selecting them from the Indian Service ranks and transferring them there.

Mr. Townsend was interviewed by myself to fill this position. He seemed to have a good record. I couldn't find a thing wrong with it. He had worked for the Indian Service years ago in Oklahoma, around the 1900's. I don't remember the date. I suppose being an old Indian Service man myself——

Mr. MUNDT. He didn't show any evasiveness when you interviewed him the first time?

Mr. EMPIE. No, he didn't. I was well impressed with him, and Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin were well impressed with him.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you suppose he got that way from contacting the Japanese out there?

Mr. EMPIE. I couldn't say.

Mr. MUNDT. Why did you discharge him? Was it because of this trip he made?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I didn't know anything about that at the time.

Mr. MUNDT. What motivated you to discharge him?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin both asked me several times to dismiss Mr. Townsend.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they give any reason for their request?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; they did. He had a very peculiar way of dealing with the evacuees. Everything he said to them seemed to stir them up. He made a lot of flowery talks to them and they had no respect for him. He couldn't tell them to do anything and rely on them doing it, because they had no confidence in him, I think, as near as I could judge.

And during the strike Mr. Townsend was fomenting unrest among the ranks of the appointed personnel, to use W. R. A. jargon.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What personnel? W. R. A. personnel?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, yes; the white people living there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what way was he fomenting unrest?

Mr. EMPIE. He seemed to have an idea that the Japanese people were going to swoop down on us and going to scalp all of us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was during the time the Japanese were striking and walking up and down in front of the administrative buildings?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see any marching up and down during the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. None at all?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It was a very peaceful strike?

Mr. EMPIE. I think so, yes; as near as I could make out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any pictures that were taken during the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I haven't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does anyone at the center have such pictures?

Mr. EMPIE. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any Government property destroyed during the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. With the exception of about a case of milk, I think that is all we lost in the whole show.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you explain how that happened?

Mr. EMPIE. It would be just second-hand reports that came to me through Mr. Townsend, so you can see how I would feel about that. He said that some of these boys on the delivery trucks got rambunctious and started throwing milk around.

I did have it reported to me by one of the boys over in the dispatcher's office that one of them threw a carton of milk into the side of the building. That is the only thing I remember.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any explanation as to why the milk truck was interrupted? Did they want to direct the delivery of the milk to some other location other than the commissary?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; except the truck happened to be coming in about that time. That would be the only explanation that I could have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Wasn't it because the Japanese were trying to take over the running of the truck?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or commandeer the load?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. Who was driving the truck? Was it the regular dairy company driver or was it some camp employee?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know, Mr. Congressman. I wasn't there.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the customary practice in the delivery of the milk? Is it delivered by the drivers of the milk company?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; they bring the loads into the camp and it is unloaded either onto our delivery trucks or into the reefers until we can get the trucks up to the reefers and then delivered.

Mr. MUNDT. Then the milk company would probably know who the driver was?

Mr. EMPIE. I think so.

Mr. MUNDT. Whether such an event actually took place or not.

Mr. EMPIE. I have an idea they would.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was any violence shown toward the driver of the truck?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge. I don't know—I don't believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated Mr. Townsend was evasive in discussing his work with you?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that was due to the fact that he had difficulty expressing himself?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he evasive in the memorandums that he wrote to you?

Mr. EMPIE. No; he wrote some pretty good memorandums.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He was pretty direct and frank in writing to you in his memorandums, was he not?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; he called my attention to many things that my attention should have been called to and together we tried to do something about it. I will say this for Mr. Townsend, I thought all along that he was a very conscientious employee and was trying to do the best job he could, but I have a feeling yet that he was, in many respects, very conscientious in his work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He had been in private business and did not understand Government routine very well; isn't that a fact?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he wanted these Japanese to work?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And respect Government property and so on?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right; he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a recess for a few minutes.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, we were discussing the incident on November 18, 1942, when the Japanese chief of police at Camp No. 1 had some trouble with the dispatcher regarding Government automobiles at Poston, and since the question has come into the testimony regarding Mr. Townsend's ability to express himself, I would like to offer into evidence at this time a copy of a memorandum dated November 17, 1942, addressed Mr. A. W. Empie, and signed by Mr. H. H. Townsend.

I would like to read that into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is an actual copy of the original memorandum?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am so informed, yes, sir. Can you identify this memorandum, or the substance of it? [Handing document to the witness.]

Mr. COSTELLO. You might read it into the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

On the night of November 16, as an aftermath of the bulletin No. 1, the Japanese chief of police of Camp 1 accompanied by a number of officers, again reported at the impounding lot and in his discussion with the Caucasian dispatcher, among other unwholesome comments, made the statement that he was not taking any orders from any \* \* \* white trash.

This matter was also reported to me by one or more of our employees.

That is signed, "H. H. Townsend, supply and transportation officer."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall such a memorandum?

Mr. EMPIE. I wouldn't say I didn't get it. I don't remember it. I remember the instance, however.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You remember the incident?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; he told me that or I received that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the Japanese chief of police in the habit of talking to the administrative personnel in such a fashion?

Mr. EMPIE. He never talked to me that way; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know of any other instances when the Japanese chief of police talked to the dispatcher in such manner?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge; sir. I can't say because I don't know exactly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say you recall this incident. Did you take any action against the Japanese chief of police?

Mr. EMPIE. In this way: That I wondered from time to time whether he should be the chief of police or not and I had several discussions with Mr. Head about it to try to find out why he thought he was the man for the job.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the name of the Japanese chief of police?

Mr. EMPIE. Shigakawa.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Shigakawa still chief of police?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is he now?

Mr. EMPIE. He is out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why isn't he the present chief of police?

Mr. EMPIE. In a reorganization of the police department in unit 1, he was—I can't say whether he was dismissed or not. That is not my department, but I understand he is working at some other work now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he an Issei?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But on this occasion no direct disciplinary action was taken against the chief of police for talking to one of the white administrative employees in the manner I have described?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It was your information that the chief of police made this statement to the Caucasian dispatcher, is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. I am not sure whether he was supposed to have made this statement to the dispatcher or to Mr. Townsend.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend reported to you in the memorandum that I read, that he had made the statement to the dispatcher.



Mr. EMPIE. I am sorry.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you accept his account of what happened?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I think I would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the project lease trucks from the Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many have you leased?

Mr. EMPIE. I think we have leased 15 so far; 2 of them have been released leaving 13 now on the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have or did you have any trucks leased from the Japanese at the time of the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Approximately how many?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I would say approximately 10.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you have trouble controlling the Japanese leased trucks during the strike?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, until we had the police department bring every truck in including the leased equipment, we did; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you later cancel the leases of Japanese equipment due to the trouble that you had with them?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; the trucks were put back in operation after they were returned to the pool and there was no disturbance about it at all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the average monthly rental of the Japanese trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I would say approximately the average would be \$125 a month. We had one truck that we paid \$175 a month for. The lowest rental was, I believe, \$75 for a three-quarter ton pick-up, and I would like to say too, that these contracts were not signed until the rates and the terms of the contracts were inspected and approved by the Office of Price Administration as to price and terms.

Mr. MUNDT. Does that rate include the services of the Japanese driver?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; that is in addition.

Mr. MUNDT. Sometimes a different man drives a truck from the fellow who owns the truck?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And he gets about \$19 a month for driving the truck?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; they got \$16—some of them get \$16 and some \$19.

Mr. MUNDT. Never over \$19?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In some of the lease agreements it has been stipulated by the Japanese owners that they shall be the drivers of their truck?

Mr. EMPIE. The plan was to have the evacuee who owned the truck, or some person whom he could trust, to take good care of it during its service with the Government, would drive the truck.

We explained to them that in case that didn't work out that they would have to expect the trucks to be driven by the Caucasian personnel, the same as any other truck on the property. In other words that the Government was going to lease the trucks for project business and they would be used only for project business by anybody whom we might put on it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But a contract or agreement was signed to that effect with some of them; that is right?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That they would drive their own truck?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; with that provision in case anything didn't work out just like it should that we would take control of the truck and use it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At night are these trucks that the Japanese have leased to the Government and the trucks that they drive, housed in the pool?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; they are brought into the pool.

Mr. STEEDMAN. All trucks go into the pool every night?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who conceived the pooling arrangement at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. The pool arrangement at Poston was originally a part of the W. R. A. over-all plan for each project. They provided in their organization a motor pool supervisor, and the term "pooling of motor equipment" was a W. R. A. term.

The first attempt to pool automotive equipment was made by our first supply and transportation officer, Mr. Roy Potter. And I might say there that we weren't altogether successful in establishing a pool.

The division head felt that they should have the equipment at their disposal without going through a pool operator. But it is working out better now and gradually getting it in operation as it should be.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the average salary of the division heads?

Mr. EMPIE. Of a division head?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. I would say \$3,800.

Mr. MUNDT. They seem to be a sort of independent class.

Mr. EMPIE. Sir?

Mr. MUNDT. I say they seem to be sort of an independent class. You have difficulty with them quite often in getting them to carry out your camp regulations?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; well, it is because they have a program to do and they are intent on accomplishing it and they want all the facilities they can get to get the job done.

Mr. MUNDT. They are mostly ex-Indian Service employees?

Mr. EMPIE. The greater percentage; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We were discussing the speeding of Government automobiles at Poston, and particularly with reference to the Japanese who was driving a Government truck between Poston and Parker at 55 miles per hour?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And I believe you stated that there wasn't very much speeding there; is that right?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I did say that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I will hand you a memorandum written on the stationery of the United States Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, field service, Colorado River War Relocation project, Poston, Ariz., dated August 28, 1942, and addressed to Roy Potter, supply and transportation officer, from A. W. Empie, chief administrative officer, and purportedly signed by you as chief administrative officer, "Copy to Mr. Head."

Is this your memorandum? [Handing document to the witness.]

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I can tell by the signature it is without reading it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This is your signature?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this memorandum into the record or read it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection you may read it into the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

Reference is made to memorandum dated August 19 from George R. Dougherty, captain, military police headquarters, 323 military police escort, relative to speeding by Japanese driver of truck No. 72059, going between 70 and 75 miles per hour from Camp 2 to Camp 3.

I am wondering what steps you have taken to penalize persons who have been caught speeding or traveling in excess of the 40-mile rate which you established in instructions issued to drivers of all motor vehicles.

As a suggestion I would like to recommend the establishment of a position to be filled by a person qualified to patrol access highways and highways within the project area who would be deputized and authorized to arrest anyone found breaking the speed limit. Such an officer could be equipped with a motorcycle or a suitable automobile for the purpose of patrolling the highways.

Something must be done to stop the abuse of motor equipment. I have observed from time to time, in fact almost every day, cars and trucks being driven in excess of 40 miles per hour.

I believe a speed limit on trucks should be less than 40 miles an hour—probably not to exceed 30 at the most.

Please give me your reaction to this matter and what your plan includes.

A. W. EMPIE,  
*Administrative Officer.*

Mr. EMPIE. Might I make a statement there, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. EMPIE. For the benefit of the record, I would like to say that in reviewing what has taken place at Poston during the past year, and Mr. Steedman's question as to whether evacuees had driven automotive equipment at excessive speeds, the thought immediately came into my mind that he had reference to driving between Poston and Parker.

I don't say that I would have recalled this particular instance because I don't know whether I would or not if he had said, "within the camp area or between the three camps," but I do know that we had trouble at that time with those conditions as that indicates.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you having the same kind of trouble now?

Mr. EMPIE. Very little. That has been curtailed and I would say as I said before, that it is down to a minimum.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the military police controlling traffic between the various camps now?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they control the traffic between Parker and Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who does?

Mr. EMPIE. Our own personnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What power do they have to control it?

Mr. EMPIE. Reporting it to the supply and transportation office, and to me, to decide what disciplinary action shall be taken in case of excess speed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What authority do you have to mete out disciplinary action?



Mr. EMPIE. The administrative determination that a man is guilty of the offense and a determination as to what the best thing is to do in the interests of the Government, whether to lay him off, overlook the fine work that he does for the Government in accomplishing his duties, or whether he should be summarily dismissed and penalized in that manner.

Mr. STEEDMAN. All he has to lose is \$19 a month; isn't that right?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; that is right. I was thinking primarily of the white personnel when I said "disciplinary action."

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were referring then to the white personnel?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; but the same thing, of source, would be true with the evacuees; and you are right, he would only lose \$19 a month so you don't really—I don't have very much leverage on him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Eddie Yamamoto?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he an expressman there at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Not now, no; he was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has he been transferred from Poston to another relocation center?

Mr. EMPIE. I couldn't tell you; I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall any trouble which Eddie Yamamoto had last November with Mrs. Edwards at the Caucasian mess hall at the Parker Indian Agency?

Mr. EMPIE. No; I don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I interrupt for just a moment. I have an appointment and I am going to ask Mr. Eberharter to take the chair. (Thereupon, Congressman Eberharter was the acting chairman during the balance of the morning session.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't recall Eddie Yamamoto having trouble with Mrs. Edwards at the Indian agency in Parker?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I do not recall it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall that Eddie Yamamoto, who was under suspicion at that time by the project, leaving the project in an unauthorized manner, with six other Japanese, and going to the Indian agency and forcing Mrs. Edwards to feed them?

Mr. EMPIE. Now, since you speak of the six others it seems to me that Mr. Townsend told me about it one time, but I don't remember any of the details.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you take any action against Eddie Yamamoto after this matter was reported to you?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I thought nothing of it—I mean as far as disciplinary action against him. I thought that would be up to the project director and it never occurred to me that I should. In other words—

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at this point a memorandum dated November 9, 1942, and addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie, and signed by H. H. Townsend, a copy of which was sent to Mr. Gelvin, Mr. Head, Mr. Evans, and Mr. Kennedy.

This document was furnished to me by Mr. Townsend and I would like to read it into the record for the purpose of refreshing Mr. Empie's recollection on this matter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Without objection, that may be done.

Do you have any objection to it being read into the record, Mr. Empie?



Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I haven't any objection.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am reading from the memorandum dated November 9, 1942:

I would like to make a report on an irregularity that I discovered in the city of Parker on the 7th, created by and through Eddie Yamamoto, our express representative.

While engaged in a hearing with the gasoline and tire rationing board in the theater building in Parker, I observed truck No. 12 carrying a group of evacuees idling in front of the theater.

On completion of the meeting I interviewed these men and found that they had come into the city of Parker with Eddie Yamamoto under his express pass which provides for himself and express crew. None of these men, however, were employed with or had been engaged in the express department, and had merely come to the city of Parker on a shopping tour and other matters which indicated to me that they had planned to go into the theater when it opened.

They had been in the hardware store making purchases, and the woman there advised me that she felt under the circumstances compelled to wait on them as they were operating a commercial institution, but the behavior of the men would have indicated that they were rather out of line and in a sense created a little disorderly activity in the store.

When I was advised by these men that Eddie Yamamoto had gone to the express office and to the Western Truck Lines office, in going there both offices said that they had not heard of him during the day. I waited at the truck until he returned, and he advised me that he had brought a box of bread to the Caucasian mess hall at the Parker Indian Agency.

I checked with the mess hall to determine whether this was an accurate statement, and in talking with Mrs. Edwards, the checker there, she informed me that they had intimidated her by demanding that they be given their lunch there, and in a very nervous state of mind she took their names and did not know what else to do but to let them eat at the dining room with the other Caucasians without any pay for their meal. She said that she feared from their actions that there might be fight in the dining room, and as there were only two men present, one being a cripple, she thought she had done the right thing in feeding them. She states that they told her they had been stranded on a broken down bread wagon and had no other means of getting their lunch. This happened at 12 o'clock.

In checking with the truck dispatcher's office, they stated that Eddie Yamamoto had requested a truck for express purposes, and as the regular express trucks were in use, they assigned him truck No. 12 to take care of this work. This, of course, was a subterfuge as Eddie Yamamoto was on a suspended basis for a period of 1 week pending a hearing whether his resignation should be accepted.

This hearing has been prepared by Mr. Kennedy under the late employment regulations. However, his resignation had been accepted by Mr. Evans and set aside by myself subject to the employment procedure. After the above infractions of our regulations, I accepted the resignation of Eddie Yamamoto and at this time am arranging with Mr. Kennedy for the selection of a new manager of our express work. Therefore, I wish that you would cooperate in refusing any further permits or passes to Eddie Yamamoto.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the instance now?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you made no investigation of Eddie Yamamoto's conduct over at the Indian agency in Parker or why he was away from the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. I discussed that with Mr. Head and asked him if he had received this memorandum and asked him to cooperate with our department in restraining the issuance of permits to leave the project for Parker.

That is trouble that we have had there for sometime and something that I always thought should be controlled—the movement of the evacuees from Poston to Parker, because we are in wartime, and I don't think they had any business up there. I thought they ought to stay where the project was made for them and avoid creating any

dissension between the white residents of Parker and the people at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the white residents of Parker object to the Japanese going to Parker?

Mr. EMPIE. By and large I think that is right; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Were any corrective measures taken as a result of this memorandum submitted to you by Mr. Townsend, in your subsequent conferences with Mr. Head?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. No corrective measures were taken at all?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Didn't Mr. Townsend incur the enmity of the Japanese by reporting such instances as the one which I have just read?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't know whether you could say it was through that. It might be said that that was a contributing factor. I am not able to say. I don't know what they were thinking about him, but I could see where they would feel that way about him.

Mr. MUNDT. That would be a natural reaction, wouldn't it?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; it would.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did the six men who accompanied Yamamoto to Parker have passes?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know, sir; not being familiar with the issuance of the passes to the evacuees. I never had anything to do with it and I just couldn't say about that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think it would be important to know whether or not they were a. w. o. l.—the six men who were on this express truck. You would consider that important, wouldn't you, Mr. Empie?

Mr. EMPIE. I considered it so; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Who has charge of those passes?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Head.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Head directly?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has there been any trouble between the soldiers who are stationed close to Parker and the evacuees?

Mr. EMPIE. Do you mean the military police escort near by the camp?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No. I am referring to the United States Army soldiers who go into Parker, and the evacuees who have gone into Parker shopping or to go to the theater?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know whether there was any occurrence or not. There might have been one instance. I will tell you this much about it, that Mr. Townsend often reported to me and tried to impress upon the administration, I will say, including Mr. Head, the importance of keeping the evacuees out of Parker on account, as he pointed out many times, of the soldiers being in town. He thought there might be some incident come up there that would lead into trouble and he did stress that.

Mr. MUNDT. You thought those recommendations were sound and well advised?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I do. I felt that way myself.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record a memorandum which was furnished me by Mr. Townsend, dated November 7, 1942, which was addressed to Mr. Wade Head,

from Mr. H. H. Townsend, supply and transportation officer, a copy having been sent to Captain Dougherty of the 323 military police.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Without objection it may be read into the record. Do you have any objection, Mr. Empie?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

This is to inform you that six of the afternoon crew of the Parker warehouse left the warehouse area between the hours of 6 and 8 o'clock, drove to Parker, parked their truck in the area across from the business houses, and were kept in the truck by the soldiers who stood in the road and threw rocks at them.

They were not allowed to leave their truck as has been their habits previously.

There was one man left at the warehouse for the escort to bring to Poston until the other members of this crew were picked up under these conditions.

That is signed:

H. H. TOWNSEND,  
*Supply and Transportation Officer.*

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall that instance?

Mr. EMPIE. No, I don't. I am not saying it didn't happen because we had reports, similar reports from time to time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know a Japanese named Shingo Yoshida?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; how do you pronounce his last name?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yoshida—Y-o-s-h-i-d-a.

Mr. EMPIE. It seems to me that there was a Yoshida—it may be a different name. I can't get along with the Japanese names so well. It seems to me that there was a Yoshida who was confined in the jail during the strike. It might have been him but I don't know. I thought his name was Uchida. I am not certain.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Uchida was the Japanese that was involved in one of the beatings?

Mr. EMPIE. That is a different one then.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. That is my understanding.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am referring to a Shingo Yoshida. You don't recall him?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know him. I wouldn't know him if I saw him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at this point a memorandum addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie, dated November 17, 1942, from Mr. H. H. Townsend, which was furnished me by Mr. Townsend.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If there is no objection it may be read into the record.

Mr. EMPIE. I have no objection.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

On November 11, 1942, one of our sanitation drivers under Mr. Connor, named Shingo Yoshida, was not successful in receiving the truck or equipment he felt had been promised to him at the time he expected it, and he told Mr. Connor that he was a G. D. liar, that the whole outfit were damned liars and informed another of the drivers of the sanitation trucks that if he didn't quit, they would beat him up.

Mr. Connor took Mr. Shingo Yoshida to the employment office and in the presence of the Japanese employment officer who was preparing a release, called Mr. Connor a G. D. liar and made such other statements as caused the employment officer to ask him to leave.

This matter was reported to me by Mr. Connor and confirmed by others.

That memorandum is signed, "H. H. Townsend, supply and transportation officer."



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall this incident?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know Mr. Connor?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I do.

Mr. MUNDT. And who is he?

Mr. EMPIE. There were two Mr. Connors there that Mr. Townsend got from Los Angeles—somewhere up here, some people that he knew formerly. One of them was employed as one of the escorts to escort the trucks between Poston and Parker, and the other one, his father, he put in charge of the rubbish-disposal crew.

Mr. MUNDT. Are both the Connors still with you?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Neither one of them?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they quit when Townsend left?

Mr. EMPIE. Soon after, yes. Mr. Townsend had people there that I gave him authority to employ on his O. K. We had success after Mr. Townsend left in employing evacuees to do the work that we thought appointed personnel should do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you advocated that Caucasian employees be replaced by Japanese employees at the Poston Center?

Mr. EMPIE. I think I have at times; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You gave a statement to the Poston Chronicle to that effect; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't remember whether I did or not. I probably did. Am I expected to remember all these things as they occurred back over the year? There has been a lot of things happen there, you know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If you don't recall, you can say that you don't recall.

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't recall, but it is a little bit misleading, I think, to put me on the spot like that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Empie, we have no disposition whatever to put you on the spot. We are merely asking if you received these memoranda and when you seem to be in doubt, have asked permission to refresh your recollection by reading them to you.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In that connection I might say to the witness that it will be up to the committee to determine whether or not these incidents are of such importance as you should or should not remember them. You do not need to feel any embarrassment, but we would like for you to remember, of course, everything that you possibly can.

Mr. EMPIE. All right, sir. I would like to say in that connection that I have a complete record at the project office of all the memorandums I wrote; and it is open to inspection, the same as any other Government office is, and I hope it shows I was trying to do my best to carry out the duties and responsibilities assigned to me.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If there is anything that you want the committee to put into the record from your records, if you will just indicate it, we will determine whether or not it shall go in the record, and I think we will be very liberal in allowing you to put in anything you care to from the records in your office. You will have the opportunity of presenting everything you care to.

Mr. EMPIE. Thank you.



Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you page 3 of the Poston Chronicle, dated Sunday, December 13, 1942, and ask you if that is a copy of the paper that is published by the Japanese at Poston?

(Handing document to the witness.)

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I think that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am quoting from the Poston Chronicle, dated December 13, 1942, in regard to the question I have just asked Mr. Empie with reference to the replacing of Caucasian personnel by the Japanese.

I quote:

QUALIFIED EVACUEES MAY REPLACE CAUCASIAN PERSONNEL

Mr. Empie told the block managers that he sees no reason why evacuees cannot replace Caucasians in positions where colonists are qualified.

The managers cited examples where Caucasian personnel could be replaced, conducive to efficiency in operation of the project. They recommended qualified men for some of the positions which could be replaced by evacuees.

Mr. EMPIE. Might I have an opportunity to explain in what manner that was?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, go right ahead.

Mr. EMPIE. In keeping with a W. R. A. policy, the policy of the Bureau of the Budget in allotting this money to us, we were under instructions to employ as many Japanese people in these positions as possible.

We have been criticized many times by representatives of the Indian Office, under whose direction we work directly, for having too many appointed personnel on the pay roll, and they have thought that we should be able to staff more of our positions with the Japanese people.

It has been very difficult for me to draw a line of demarcation between whether a particular position should be filled by an evacuee or a white person. You have to determine that as you go along, but where we can find qualified evacuees, we reduce the expenditures of the Government when we put him in charge of the work rather than employ some white person at high salary.

So, naturally, it is our aim to do that in keeping with our budget requirements. There have been instances where I felt that for successful and economic operation of the project the position should be staffed by an appointed personnel or employee, because of his general knowledge that maybe the evacuee didn't have of that particular line of work; but that was the aim, to employ as many evacuees in these positions as possible.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you care to tell us how much progress you have made in the replacement of Caucasian personnel by the Japanese? Has that been accelerated in the last month or two?

Mr. EMPIE. No, it has not. It has more or less stabilized. A few positions, I would say, probably, 15 or 20 positions altogether during the course of operating the project—during the year—have been filled by evacuees.

Mr. MUNDT. I think you said those suggestions came from the Indian administration. Did you misspeak yourself? Did they come from the W. R. A.?

Mr. EMPIE. It is the basic policy of the W. R. A. and Bureau of the Budget and, naturally, has to be a basic policy of the Indian Service.

Mr. MUNDT. Just how far into the detail of the administration of the Center does the Indian Office reach?

Mr. EMPIE. The Indian Office is our immediate central office. We are all Indian Service employees and we deal through the Indian Service central office for all our money and our regulations as to the operation of all of our project features—that is, including accounting system, procurement procedure, and all of those things.

Mr. MUNDT. Who approves the menus? The Indian Office or the W. R. A.?

Mr. EMPIE. No, the W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there any evidence of confusion as a result of this divided responsibility between W. R. A. and the Indian Office?

Mr. EMPIE. I think so; yes, sir. The way I have tried to operate it in my particular office is to, since I was charged with the responsibility of getting things done in a hurry, which, by the way, I have attempted to do, in accordance—strictly in accordance—with the Government regulations governing appointment, procurement, and accounting procedure, was to take advantage insofar as possible of the sources of supply that W. R. A. had to offer as well as the Indian Service, to get the over-all job completed as quickly as possible.

Mr. MUNDT. Don't you think that you could operate a little better if you had just one boss in Washington, regardless of whether it was the Indian Office or the W. R. A.? That would be immaterial, but wouldn't it be better if there was a focusing of authority in one office?

Mr. EMPIE. No question about it. I have felt it more keenly than in any other office on account of all the Budget work being handled in my office.

Mr. MUNDT. It would be easier for you to know that you are doing the thing Washington wanted if you had just one set of employers, wouldn't it?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If this is a good place to stop, I think we may as well take our luncheon recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(Thereupon, at 2 p. m., the committee reconvened, pursuant to the noon recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will please be in order, and you will proceed with the questioning, Mr. Steedman.

#### TESTIMONY OF AUGUSTUS W. EMPIE—Resumed

Mr. STEEDMAN. When the committee recessed for lunch, we were discussing the possibility of the Japanese stealing gasoline from Government automobiles. Have you investigated that possibility?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know of any instances where the Japanese were stealing gasoline from Government-owned automobiles?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please cite to the committee any instances of that sort?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir. Mr. Townsend reported to me that an automobile operated by the Community Enterprise Division of the project—one of the evacuees was seen taking gasoline from one of the Government-owned cars and putting it into a 5-gallon bottle.

He, Mr. Townsend, and the fire-protection officer, Mr. Joe Fein, followed the evacuees to their barracks and took possession of the gasoline. He reported that to me in person; whereupon I brought this to the attention of the Chief of Agriculture and Industry Division, Mr. H. A. Mathieson, and also to Mr. R. G. Fister, who is in immediate charge of the Community Enterprise Division.

I also discussed this later with Mr. Gelvin and brought to his attention at that time that this was one of the frequent incidents that were coming to our attention that we felt we should do something about. We needed more assistance from all the divisions to control the use of the equipment and the use of gasoline and so forth.

After reporting it to Mr. Gelvin I considered my part of the work done. As to the net result as to what was accomplished, I don't know in that particular case whether they brought that up before the local police officers or not.

I have often felt that there was plenty of opportunity for the evacuees to take gasoline if they wanted to, and if we had all the equipment in the pool there would be no opportunity for them to do that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made a check recently with reference to the Japanese stealing gasoline?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir. I think it can be said that Mr. Haverland, the present supply and transportation officer, has been patrolling that very carefully and Mr. Barrett, his assistant, has been working with him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have records of the amount of gasoline that has been stolen from project cars?

Mr. EMPIE. Not the cars themselves, but we do have a record of tampering with the tanks where gasoline is dispensed. We kept a very careful check on daily gallonage taken out of those pumps to be sure we would get down to the source of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much gasoline has been taken out of the pumps?

Mr. EMPIE. It would be an estimate on my part. Offhand I don't know. Probably 100 gallons in small quantities.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It has been taken only in small quantities?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has any effort been made to apprehend the persons who were stealing gasoline?

Mr. EMPIE. I think it can be said yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who made the effort to apprehend them?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Haverland and Mr. Barrett.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has anybody been apprehended and brought before the camp officials as yet?

Mr. EMPIE. Except in this way—not any particular person, no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do any of the Japanese at Poston have sugar ration books?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't believe they do now. I think we collected all those.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they at one time have sugar ration books?

Mr. EMPIE. It is my understanding at one time they did; yes.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the camp authorities collect those?

Mr. EMPIE. I didn't; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who did?

Mr. EMPIE. I think the management did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many Japanese had sugar-rationing books?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know who would have that information?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. L. L. Nelson, executive assistant to Mr. Head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it your information that they were using the sugar-ration books and at the same time taking their meals at the camp cafeterias?

Mr. EMPIE. Were the evacuees doing that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right.

Mr. EMPIE. I suppose that was true if they had them because they have always eaten at the project mess halls.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have discussed here today a number of instances where Japanese have been guilty of irregularities and you have stated that on a number of occasions no disciplinary action had been taken with regard to irregularities committed by Japanese. Why is that?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, if you will permit me to say so, I believe the record will show that in many instances in the abuse of equipment, we have laid them off on that account.

That is about the only disciplinary action we have—laying them off the job.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a laxity in discipline at the center insofar as the Japanese are concerned?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, if you want my personal opinion, I believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You believe so?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I believe that with a little firmer control, a little firmer and decisive action in directing it, that it would be a lot different.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is at fault?

Mr. EMPIE. I think that is a matter for someone else to decide.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the social-welfare department enter into that picture?

Mr. EMPIE. Insofar as delinquencies are concerned.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am referring now to the lack of discipline at the center.

Mr. EMPIE. Well, from my personal viewpoint, I believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think the activities of Dr. Powell and Miss Findley interfere with the discipline at the center?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what way?

Mr. EMPIE. I have had occasion to believe that, while there were many things that the community services branch of our organization had charge of and needed to do to protect the welfare of the community, that there were many things that persons in that branch advocated that didn't accrue to the benefit of the Government nor in the end to the benefit of the evacuees themselves.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For instance?

Mr. EMPIE. It is difficult for me to cite just how or in what way that could culminate in that end result, but I think it can best be expressed by saying that they were in many instances, carrying the torch for the evacuees.



Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the social-service department was carrying the torch for the evacuees?

Mr. EBERHARTER. What is that?

Mr. EMPIE. Carrying the torch for the evacuees. I think, however, it is very sincere on their part; a sincere feeling that as representatives of the Government, having been assigned the responsibility to help look after these people during this period of crisis, it is up to them to make the tenure as pleasant for them as possible and to as adequately as possible provide for them.

They point out that these people were evacuated from their homes and the Government owes them the food, clothing, and shelter and as good treatment as they can possibly give them, and since they didn't have recreation facilities within the camp area, they felt perfectly free to use equipment to take them on picnics. And they have petitioned the project director to let them go to nearby towns and benefit from the opportunity to shop there. That is their side of their picture.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the head of the social service branch of the center?

Mr. EMPIE. Until very recently Miss Nell Findley was the chief of the community services branch.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what was her salary?

Mr. EMPIE. \$5,600.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see her personnel papers when she came to work at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. No; I didn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever examined her personnel papers?

Mr. EMPIE. No; I didn't. That appointment was made under the immediate direction of Mr. Collier himself, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. She was sent to the project at Poston from Washington, was she not, as a special case?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; she came from Honolulu.

Mr. MUNDT. Was Dr. Powell also picked by Mr. Collier?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know, Mr. Congressman, whether he was or not. I don't believe so.

Mr. MUNDT. Dr. Powell has the educational responsibility and Miss Findley had the social responsibility, is that right?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; Dr. Powell was in immediate charge of what is called the welfare and recreation division. Dr. Miles Carey was the director of education.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Miss Findley was sort of a special case insofar as her personnel records were concerned, is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you have the personnel records of the other project employees in your office?

Mr. EMPIE. I think the greater percentage of them; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Is Miss Findley still at the project?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; she has gone back to Honolulu.

Mr. MUNDT. Did she resign voluntarily?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Recently?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. How recently?

Mr. EMPIE. Effective May 20, I believe.

Mr. MUNDT. Last May?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. In line with our discussion this morning about this dual responsibility between the W. R. A. and the Indian Office, was Miss Findley primarily responsible to the Indian Office in her activities?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; well, pardon me, through the project director.

Mr. MUNDT. She was carrying out the policies of the Indian Office. Would it be a fair statement to say that her policies were primarily the policies of the Indian Office rather than the policies of the W. R. A.?

Mr. EMPIE. It can be said that the policy which she attempted to carry out was in strict conformity with the policies of the Indian Office.

Mr. MUNDT. And what would happen if her policies ran into conflict, as they apparently did, with some of the policies of the W. R. A.? Whose policies would predominate?

Mr. EMPIE. Those of the Indian Office.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you familiar with any of the other relocation camps other than the one at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Not so very familiar. I visited the Gila project one time but aside from that all I have is second-hand knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. Do they have social-welfare workers at the other camp also?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. In all other camps the social-welfare workers are under the direction of the W. R. A.?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. But this is an exception at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, that is true in the operation of the whole project; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Miss Findley consider herself as being under the administrative jurisdiction of Mr. Head?

Mr. EMPIE. Absolutely.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know of any occasions when Miss Findley overruled instructions issued by Mr. Head?

Mr. EMPIE. I know at various times when she disagreed with his policy. How they worked it out together, I am not aware.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But her ideas prevailed, did they not?

Mr. EMPIE. I wouldn't say altogether; no, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Was Mr. Head selected by Mr. Collier also?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you be sufficiently familiar with the operation of the other camps to be able to define the manner in which the social-welfare work at your camp deviates from the work being conducted at the other camps?

Mr. EMPIE. It would be an opinion based on just my feeling about it.

Mr. MUNDT. If you care to I would be happy to have you express your opinion.

Mr. EMPIE. I believe it was operated much in the same manner as we have operated ours—along the same general over-all policy, since we are following the administrative instructions that are supposed to be followed at all other camps.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, do you think the social-welfare workers in all these camps carry the torch for the evacuees to the extent that, apparently, Miss Findley at Poston did?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I wouldn't be able to say on that. I don't know. I have never had any information to that effect.

Mr. MUNDT. Has anybody replaced Miss Findley in the camp at Poston since she resigned?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. To my understanding the plan is not to fill that position but have Dr. Powell look after the whole thing.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was Miss Findley allowed to resign?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were her services satisfactory?

Mr. EMPIE. As far as I know. I have no reason to believe otherwise, so far as the general over-all requirements of the Director were concerned.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend had a little difficulty with Miss Findley, did he not?

Mr. EMPIE. I think he did; yes. He told me that he had at one time about the use of some equipment that she thought should be used to take the evacuees on an outing, but he didn't agree with her.

Mr. MUNDT. By the way, going back to Townsend again: After you discovered that he had apparently misused Government property and filing a false claim for expenses because he had gone to Oklahoma City instead of somewhere else, were any steps taken to take legal action against Mr. Townsend for that violation of the Federal law?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the status of the case now?

Mr. EMPIE. I reported it first to a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and he advised me to discuss it with the United States attorney for Arizona, which I did.

After discussing the matter at considerable length with him, he told me that inasmuch as I couldn't prove the nature of the files that Mr. Townsend had taken from our office and the fact that only recently Congress had attempted to pass a law making it a misdemeanor to use Government equipment on personal business, that he didn't think he could convict him and he told me to proceed on the basis that it was an administrative matter. And I am still trying to do that.

That is the present status. I might add there that due to the press of business I have yet to inform Mr. Townsend of what the records indicate and why some of these vouchers can't be paid, and due to the fact that he turned in these tickets charged back that he turned in—these tickets charged against our account and the Government has paid for that, that he is considered, from an accountable officer's standpoint, a certifying officer's standpoint, to be in arrears to the United States, and until that account is offset, it will be impossible for him to get money which he can now consider due him.

That is made up of two salary checks and the amount of several travel vouchers that are being held.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact haven't all the employees who had any difficulty with Miss Findley at Poston, been subsequently dismissed from their positions?

Mr. EMPIE. I can't say that that is true.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know of any other instance where an employee, who had trouble with Miss Findley, was later dismissed from his position?

Mr. EMPIE. I might know it but I don't recall offhand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a memorandum into the record, dated December 10, 1942, addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie. This memorandum was furnished me by Mr. Townsend.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there any objection to that, Mr. Empie?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is so ordered.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am quoting:

For the sake of the record, a résumé of facts covering Miss Findley's request for additional car for two evacuees to go to Kingman. On December 8, 1942, at 4:15 p. m. a representative of Miss Findley's office called and stated that Miss Findley wanted a car to take two evacuees to Kingman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How far is Kingman from Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe it is about 110 miles, I am not sure.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

I advised him that two trucks had left during the early morning with 15 evacuees and their baggage and asked why they had not been included in this shipment.

The facts covering that trip were that Miss Findley had requested from me the previous day to arrange to have two trucks available at 5:30 a. m. on December 8 to move 15 evacuees and their baggage to Kingman, Ariz. I was compelled to take Mr. Mosley and Mr. Collins, two of our night dispatchers, from their positions to drive these trucks. These men collected the baggage and left here in the early morning hours for this assignment.

I told the representative that I felt that it would be impossible to secure additional transportation or a driver and that I would be unable to authorize the additional trip without some authority, as I felt it was a mistake to run additional equipment on the same mission so few hours between. He left the office and in a few minutes Miss Findley returned somewhat perturbed over being opposed on the issue. She stated that it was our duty to move the evacuees regardless of how or where or when or under what circumstances and I advised her that the trip would cost us probably \$50, and she stated that it didn't make any difference if it cost twice as much.

I asked her why these people weren't included in the trip and she stated that their permits had not arrived. I stated that I felt that the others should have been held a few hours until the permits had arrived.

She said she would take the matter up with Mr. Head and I said it was perfectly all right and stated that it would be necessary to receive authorization from Mr. Head or yourself before I would feel at liberty to send another car due to the shortage of gasoline and the attempt to save rubber.

She left the office to go to Mr. Head's office and I left to give you the information regarding the matter. When I went in your office Miss Findley was there and I told her that I was glad she was there as it was a matter that you should decide upon.

She made the statement that she would go to Mr. Head and tell him that I refused to obey his orders. I stated that that was not the truth, that I had not refused to obey his orders, that I did not feel under the circumstances that any of us were justified in view of the shortage of gasoline to take trips of this nature without using every precaution and I didn't believe that the administration would feel otherwise.

I also stated that it was only a matter of time until our allotment of gasoline was consumed and that most of us would have to walk and whereas at this time we had plenty, most of us felt that it wasn't necessary to use any care or discretion in how it was used.

She parted by saying that she expected to get the authorization to leave and I said that I was sure that she would and that I was glad to be relieved of the responsibility of the seemingly unnecessary additional trip when they should have all gone together.

That is signed: "H. H. Townsend, Supply and Transportation Officer."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Miss Findley get the authorization for the evacuees to make the trip from Poston to Kingman?

Mr. EMPIE. She got that from Mr. Head.



Mr. STEEDMAN. But she did not get it from you?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. I felt the same way Mr. Townsend did about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the warehouses at Poston come under your jurisdiction?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. E. S. Wickersham, under the supervision of the Supply and Transportation Officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have articles been removed from the warehouses in an improper manner by the Japanese and the Caucasian employees?

Mr. EMPIE. Our records show that in dollar value not to exceed, approximately, \$200 in goods have been removed without requisition from the warehouses.

We have a record of that which is on file and which is to be disposed of in accordance with our property regulations.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are referring to individual cases of \$200 worth of materials missing?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; all told.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have had a total of \$200 worth of missing materials?

Mr. EMPIE. Except for lumber. We have had a lot of lumber taken down there. That is a part of our warehouse stock. I will say that everybody has tried to control that in some manner or another. This amount that I speak of is aside from the lumber.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you estimate would be the dollar value of lumber which has been stolen?

Mr. EMPIE. Approximately \$15,000 on the basis of \$50 a thousand—300,000 board feet. And I would like to bring out at this point for the record, that the conception of the evacuees about taking this lumber is that inasmuch as the Government didn't furnish the barracks with anything at all in the way of furniture, that they have a perfect right to go and get this lumber and use it to build shelves and cupboards and chairs and tables and things of that kind, and that is what it has all been used for, so far as I know.

Mr. MUNDT. That was all stolen by the Japanese and not by the whites?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you think perhaps, Miss Findley may have supported this conception on the part of the Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You think she did?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir, because she always maintained that as long as they didn't remove it from the project, they weren't stealing it. I disagreed with her openly and before.

Mr. MUNDT. There might be an extenuating situation there from the standpoint of the Japanese since they were getting that kind of advice from one of the project employees—white employees.

Mr. EMPIE. I think so, yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I quite agree with you if somebody on the project was winking at it and even encouraging it that there should not be too much blame held against the Japanese for doing that.

Mr. EMPIE. That is the way I felt about it.

Mr. MUNDT. And I am also sort of glad that Miss Findley has gone back to Honolulu.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did Miss Findley leave the project voluntarily or was she dismissed?

Mr. EMPIE. She left voluntarily.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Miss Findley leave the project after this investigation started?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't know when it started, Mr. Steedman. She left about the 15th of May. Now, you would know what the dates are—I don't. I can check that date for you if you would like to have it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I wish you would.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask whether any of the other white personnel supported this position of the Japanese, that since the lumber was there and they needed it to furnish their houses, they were entitled to steal it?

Mr. EMPIE. That is putting it pretty bluntly but I think there were others, yes, that felt that way about it.

Mr. MUNDT. Was Dr. Powell among those?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Was Mr. Head among those?

Mr. EMPIE. I have never heard him express himself on that.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you hear him condemn the practice or didn't you hear him express himself either way?

Mr. EMPIE. I can't say that I have heard him condemn the practice, no, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. No effort was made to punish the Japanese, was there? I mean you would not have any difficulty finding out who did take the lumber because there would be a new shelf or a new table and so it wouldn't be very hard even for an inexperienced investigator to find out who did it, but no attempt was made to punish them?

Mr. EMPIE. They have been seen carrying the lumber.

Mr. MUNDT. And no attempt was made to stop them?

Mr. EMPIE. By various people who had brought the lumber for other purposes and was trying to preserve it for those purposes.

Mr. MUNDT. And there has been no punishment of any kind?

Mr. EMPIE. No.

Mr. MUNDT. And no deductions from the wages of those who worked?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Or curtailed rations?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Or a day in the camp jail or anything of that kind?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what manner are the records of the warehouses kept?

Mr. EMPIE. The first warehouse records begin with the preparation of a receiving document and they are numbered consecutively from the inception of the project to date.

From these receiving documents stores record cards are posted and show the quantities and the totals received—of the total quantity received and the dollar value.

The receiving document then goes into the unpaid bill file awaiting the submission by the vendor of his invoice and execution of the voucher in payment thereof.

Material and supplies issued from the warehouse are issued on the basis of approved requisitions, initiated by the person responsible in the division desiring the materials for his use, approved by the division head or someone whom the division head has authorized to sign for him, and presentation to the warehouse office for filling.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are Japanese employed in the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Caucasian employees are employed in the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. A total of seven.

Mr. STEEDMAN. White employees?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And how many Japanese employees are employed in the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Including those engaged in the maintenance of subsistence warehouses, 73.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are Japanese in charge of keeping the records in the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Not in charge; no, sir. That is all supervised by white persons who direct the work of the evacuees.

I might add there for your information, that in connection with the W. R. A. policy to use evacuees on all this work, we attempt to do that, and diametrically opposed to that policy is their policy to relocate the evacuees and, consequently, we find ourselves in a cross-fire trying to get the job done with people that we are supposed to use and still they are supposed to go out. We can't do both and it is a continual turn-over. It is a program which is really strenuous to say the least.

Mr. STEEDMAN. About the time you get a man trained to do the work, he is then released to go out into the Middle West?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, yes. That has happened in many instances.

Mr. MUNDT. Don't the same officials at the camp who select these men for service in the camp, also pass upon who is to be evacuated and who is not?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, I don't believe it can be said that that is true entirely. The greater percentage of the evacuees have applied for indefinite leave. They don't know when they are going out. Many of them have applied for indefinite leave so that when the right opportunity comes they will be ready to go, but they don't know whether they want to go or not. They are watching the newspapers to see whether they are going out or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have anything to do with determining when they leave the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Or who goes from the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You have nothing whatsoever to do with that?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You have nothing to do with the leave-taking aspects of it?

Mr. EMPIE. Absolutely nothing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese take the inventories in the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. That is done—except to assist in it, that is all done under the direct supervision of the white personnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever called in any outsiders to take an inventory of the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Such as public accountants, for instance?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

(No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you called in any of the other project employees who were not employed in the warehouses to inventory the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, we have in some instances. We find ourselves in this position: At the end of the month we have such a volume of work to do we gather up various members of the organization, some representatives from the steward's office, and others, to go in and help take the inventory so that as of midnight on the 31st of the month we will be able to figure our quantities on hand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of a memorandum dated December 16, 1942, addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie, from H. H. Townsend. This memorandum was furnished me by Mr. Townsend and I would like to read it into the record at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you familiar with this memorandum, Mr. Empie?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know; I suppose I am.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have no objection to it, have you?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may read it into the record at this point.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It has reference to the inventory being taken at the warehouses, and is as follows:

Reference to the inventory being taken at the warehouse. For the sake of the record, I am anxious to make a definite protest against the plan, procedure, and conditions of this inventory.

I am, of course, aware of the fact that you have a definite purpose in mind. However, it is not my idea to have anything to do whatsoever nor let the records show that I have been responsible for the present type of inventory.

So that you will know my feelings in the matter, the present plan is more or less of the same nature of having a banker examine his own bank and report it to his superior, State, or Federal authorities.

In the first place, an inventory cannot be accurately expected from employees within the warehouse where we know that more than \$100 a day is being misappropriated. It is natural that the warehouse management would like to have the records developed to comply with numerous flagrant errors that were created during the rush of the installation of the camp.

It is now being generally discussed among the Japanese warehouse people that they will be able to cover up their records and in many instances they have already discussed the manner of hiding out various types of supplies and equipment so that they could not be compelled to show them on their inventory.

If you are not familiar with the past procedure of handling the requisitions in many instances it has run as follows: The requisition appears to the warehouse for proper initialing. Then it is taken to the warehouse where the supplies are located and frequently, as has been shown to me, the request has been changed from a few items to a number of items to cover up other shortages.

In many cases it has been proved that the requisition has been completely destroyed and not returned to the warehouse at all.

This is not an unusual condition, due to the vast amount of business conducted under no definite business plan, but it is an unusual business condition to expect to get an accurate inventory from several hundred employees in charge of their stocks of goods.

My recommendation, therefore, would be to have a business inventory taken by disinterested parties so that when a final accounting is made or a corps of Federal officers come into this camp to take an accurate inventory that this department would be cleared of any of the final actions that will be taken.



And that memorandum is signed: "H. H. Townsend, Supply and Transportation Officer."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall this memorandum?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I do, and I would like to say that I am in complete agreement with Mr. Townsend's feelings about the matter, and that at a number of conferences held in Washington, D. C., in 1940 between members of the General Accounting Office and various bureaus of the Department of the Interior, I advocated that this type of inventory be provided for in the regulations under which we were operating at Poston.

The resulting regulations, however, after the work of the committee appointed by the Secretary, finished its work, was to provide a system of taking inventories by the person who was responsible for the items.

I have never agreed with it. I don't think it is sound accounting practices or principles, and if I were to prescribe a set of regulations to follow I would provide an inventory to be taken by disinterested officials. That is my firm conviction and the records of the Indian Service, I believe, will bear that out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask you a question on that point. Mr. Townsend states in this memorandum, and I quote:

In the first place an inventory cannot be accurately expected from employees within the warehouses where we know that more than a \$100 a day is being misappropriated.

Is that statement correct?

Mr. EMPIE. I can't say that it is, no, sir. I don't believe that that is right to say that, and to support my point there I would like to say this, that I do know in many instances where a head of a division or somebody under his direction will appear at the warehouse to get his requisition filled and get it approved by the chief warehouseman or one of his assistants, and go down to one of the warehouses and see things in stock. In the first place he has no business in the warehouse. He should present his requisition at the door and they should say:

You can drive around to the gate and pick up your stuff on the truck.

But the way we are set up there he goes into the warehouse with the fellow in charge of the warehouse and he is very apt to see things that he thinks he needs in addition to what has been approved, and will add those and, copies, of course, of the requisitions finally go back to the file and it is my firm conviction and it is my sincere belief all of the items shown on the requisitions—I wouldn't say all of them, but the greater percentage of the items shown on the requisitions, have been used for the purposes stated on the requisitions.

Mr. COSTELLO. But items have been taken out of the warehouses and used in the camp, items that went beyond the requisitions?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I am in thorough accord, too, with you about what would constitute wise warehousing and inventory procedure. You are in charge of the accounting in the warehousing division, but you have not set up the type of system in which you believe?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Why not? There must be some reason for that.

Mr. EMPIE. Because I do not have the facilities to do it with nor the backing to do it. By "facilities" I mean personnel, adequate

personnel to man these organizations and keep them running on a business-like basis.

Mr. MUNDT. If you had the backing would you get the personnel?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know whether the Bureau of the Budget would consent to that or not. They are pretty tight on money.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the lack of support emanating from the camp or from Washington?

Mr. EMPIE. Both.

Mr. MUNDT. Insofar as it does not come from Washington, does the failure lie with the W. R. A. or with the Indian Office to provide the proper background and support? Who is in charge of that aspect of it in Washington?

Mr. EMPIE. May I answer it in this way?

Mr. MUNDT. Any way you choose, just so I get the answer.

Mr. EMPIE. The administrative supervisors—I will say it this way if you don't mind: The supervisors of the administrative services in the Indian Service, and I understand in many other services, are staffed with personnel who have grown up from an accountant's viewpoint. They know what it means to try to keep track of equipment and property; but when you go to the trouble to get all the detailed records in the right form, that is the only solid foundation upon which to build your final records, and I have always felt, as I do now, that until we get the officials of the Government who are actually saying to the supervisors of administrative services: "Do thus and so" and "Let us get this job done," until we can convince them that they have got to share some of the responsibility and give support to people that are trying to get these regulations complied with, we are just not getting anywhere.

Now, that is an auditor's viewpoint. I served as an auditor in the Indian Service for many years.

Mr. MUNDT. That is one of the results which might develop from this committee hearing. We might be in a position to help impress that on the program in Washington.

Mr. EMPIE. I certainly would be glad if you would.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to know whether we should approach the W. R. A. on that or the Indian Office?

Mr. EMPIE. It is my opinion that you would find a fertile field in either place.

Mr. MUNDT. We might try both; but which do you think we should concentrate on?

Mr. EMPIE. Inasmuch as we are operating directly under the Indian Office, I will have to say the Indian Office.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Empie, you would not have authority to change the procedure of inventory and so on at this camp?

Mr. EMPIE. I would not be complying with the regulations that I have been told to comply with.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have to follow the directions that emanate from Washington?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Even though you know they are not adequate in dealing with and keeping a check on the contents of the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, there is nothing to prevent me from reporting what I think about it, but they still will come back and say: "Do this or that or the other thing."

Mr. MUNDT. Is it your feeling growing out of the experience you have had now for a year or 18 months at the camp, that if the proper regulations were issued from Washington that, as far as the personnel is concerned, you could conduct an accurate inventory with the Japanese personnel doing the work?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe so, under the right supervision, yes, sir. We have many evacuees who are good accountants and if you handled them properly they will do what you tell them.

Mr. MUNDT. That would pretty well take care of one of the difficulties which you said was the difficulty with personnel?

Mr. EMPIE. Certainly would.

Mr. MUNDT. That is not an insurmountable obstacle.

Mr. EMPIE. That would relieve my load 100 percent if we could get some action on that.

Mr. MUNDT. And if you could save \$15,000 in the course of a year, that would amply pay a man's salary to look after it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether similar conditions exist in the other camps?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, I can't say, and it would be just a personal opinion.

Mr. MUNDT. As an accountant with 18 years of credible service behind you in the Federal Government, would it be your guess, as long as they use the same accounting systems in other camps as they use in yours, which of course is true, that similar discrepancies would quite probably occur in the other camps.

Mr. EMPIE. It is quite possible, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. There is no reason to assume that the warehouse officials and personnel are any the less ethical or honest in your camp than they would be some place else?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't want to brag, but I believe that is true.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, the difficulty is with the system?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. If the system doesn't work in Poston it isn't going to work in Tule Lake or some of these other places?

Mr. EMPIE. I will put it this way: Unless W. R. A. has been more successful than we have in getting people to carry out the instructions, the same conditions exist there. Now, I don't know what exists there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return to the reference made by Mr. Townsend of the \$100 a day in goods being misappropriated from the warehouses.

He refers in his sentence:

We know that more than \$100 a day is being misappropriated.

And the memorandum is addressed to you. Do you agree with that?

Mr. EMPIE. I will answer it in this way: That so far to date I have never had an accounting, an actual dollar value presented to me to show what anybody estimated on it. I can't dispute it and still I don't think it is right. I think it is exaggerated.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, he was in charge of the warehouses under you at that time; was he not?

Mr. EMPIE. General supervision; yes. You will have an opportunity to question Mr. Wickersham on that point. I believe he can tell you more of the details about it and very sincerely too.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have a loss from the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. There is no question but what we have a reasonable loss, a normal loss, I would say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you don't know how much that loss is?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever endeavored to find out?

Mr. EMPIE. Except in this way: That the chief warehouseman and people operating under his direction know that they must report any shortages. That is a part of our procedure and they are familiar with it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How is that handled in your accounting records?

Mr. EMPIE. That is acted upon by a board of survey, property board of survey appointed by me as accountable officers, to act in review of those cases—any cases of loss or damage or disposal of property.

Mr. COSTELLO. That loss then would actually be shown in the records? There would be no covering up of them by juggling the figures?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir, it wouldn't—not if I had anything to do with it and I would have something to do with it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You received this memorandum on December 16, 1942, with that statement:

We know that more than \$100 a day is being misappropriated.

Did you reply to this memorandum?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't recall whether I did or not. My records would show that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to call your attention to this additional statement:

It is now being generally discussed among the Japanese warehouse people that they will be able to cover up their records and in many instances they have already discussed the manner of hiding out various types of supplies and equipment so that they could not be compelled to show them on their inventory.

Do you think that statement is correct?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't know whether it is or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you investigate that statement?

Mr. EMPIE. I may have by calling it to the attention of the chief warehouseman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is Mr. Wickersham?

Mr. EMPIE. If I did he will remember it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He states further:

In many cases it has been proven that the requisitions have been completely destroyed and not returned to the warehouse at all.

Did you make any investigation of that point in the memorandum?

Mr. EMPIE. Again if I did I referred it to Mr. Wickersham. I didn't personally that I recall.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any labor difficulties in the warehouses?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; we have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you state what those difficulties were?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, in my opinion the most outstanding difficulty was our inability to convince the evacuees that they should unload and handle heavy construction materials that were being shipped into the project, and arriving at the railhead at Parker.



They had the impression, whether due to the project's inability to properly explain it to them, I don't know, that when they unloaded construction material consisting of lumber, steel, cement, and so forth, that they were doing that for the benefit of some contractor whom they thought had charge of building the public works facilities—irrigation and roads and subjugation, and so forth, and they refused to unload or handle any heavy equipment.

I say "refused." They objected very strenuously and we were always in a conference with them about it to try to convince them that it was a part of the project—a part of the project work and inasmuch as it was a part of the policy to employ the evacuees in all jobs, that they must take their responsibility in that work as well as any other.

However, I am inclined to believe from later discussions with various evacuees that they considered the thing from the standpoint of an actual subsistence basis. They were willing to participate in any work that contributed directly to their immediate welfare on the project, but when it came to taking on this over-all picture that we spoke of this morning, taking any active part in working hard for the benefit of the Indians in the future, why, they couldn't see it, and on that basis we later on eliminated all of the evacuees at the Parker warehouses and have since handled all of the incoming shipments at the railhead with Indian employees—with very few Indian employees who kept the tracks clear and the merchandise in transit.

Mr. MUNDT. Do the Japanese volunteer their labor around the camp for which they are not paid?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; they do.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you elaborate on that a little?

Mr. EMPIE. Quite often they are called in to do things voluntarily and they will get a crew from various blocks and do certain types of work. It is my understanding that in those instances they are not on the pay-roll.

Mr. MUNDT. Those are just incidental jobs?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you a letter on the letterhead of the United States Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, Field Service, Colorado River war relocation project, Poston, Ariz., dated May 28, 1942:

Memorandum to Mr. Roy Potter, acting supply and transportation officer. and signed by you.

Do you recognize your signature?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you write this letter?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this in evidence and read it into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Mr. STEEDMAN [reading]:

We have been facing labor difficulties in connection with the employment of Japanese in various capacities, but I think in particular in connection with the operation of the warehouses.

In some instances, according to verbal reports which have been made, many Japanese have failed to report for duty after having been assigned to specific jobs.

In order that an intelligent report may be made to the project director with respect to this matter, it is requested that a daily report be made citing each instance involving the failure of Japanese to report for duty or to carry out assignments given them.

Were the reports that you requested furnished you?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have copies of those reports at your Poston office?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In your files there?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe so, but if not in my immediate file in the file of the chief warehouseman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have a memorandum dated July 11, 1942, which is addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie, submitted by Mr. Roy Potter, the transportation and supply officer, with reference to labor difficulties, which was furnished me by Mr. Townsend and I would like to read this memorandum into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEEDMAN [reading]:

We continue to experience considerable difficulty in obtaining sufficient labor to operate properly the warehouse and handle the equipment and materials as it arrives.

It appears to me that around 100 willing workers are doing all the work for the entire camp. The large percentage of the men whom we have employed at the shop and warehouse are competent and willing to go to extremes in their effort to get the job done. We have assigned one of our assistant warehousemen to supervise an extra crew which goes on duty at 1 p. m., working through until 9 p. m., but this crew has dwindled down until yesterday only two appeared for duty, and although we have a request with the employment office for from 15 to 25 men for the past 10 days, none have reported for work, and they inform us that they are unable to obtain the necessary labor. The consequence of this, freight which arrives in the evening is unloaded by volunteers from the group who have been on duty the entire day; when a truck arrives after 6 o'clock, Mr. Campbell, who is held in high regard by his employees, contacts some of these day crews and they report to help him out in the emergency. It is reported to me that numerous Japanese who are idle, harass these willing workers reminding them that they could get by without working the same as they, the idlers, have been doing.

Another concrete evidence of the labor difficulties is with the roads division. On the 9th it was necessary that a bridge which would carry a semitrailer truck loaded with stove oil be constructed across the ditch running through the north end of camp. They notified the employment office that a certain amount of labor would be needed and brought their equipment and men the morning of the 10th to do the job, but they were unable to obtain anyone to help get the bridge in. At noon I learned of this condition and knowing that it was necessary to get the stove oil to the north end of the camp, I went to a crew which was working for the irrigation and got them to loan their men to the road division for completion of the bridge.

Another incident which occurred at the warehouse last week was when an entire group sent out on a job demanded that they be assigned easier tasks. When this became known to Mr. Campbell, he remarked to them that the usual procedure for anyone who wasn't satisfied with the job on which he was working was to quit, and that that was their privilege. They immediately availed themselves of this privilege. The majority of this group, I believe, were from Salinas. Continually during the operations at the warehouse, men have quit the job because the task was too difficult and Mr. Campbell has kept the list of all these men and we have decided that they will not be given another opportunity to work in any of the warehouse activities.

Numerous other instances could be related as evidence of this labor situation. I am of the opinion that projects should be originated which would put every man to work. There is now an abundance of hand tools such as shovels, picks, et cetera, in the warehouse which would be available for constructing by hand the

numerous ditches which would be needed within the area and also streets and roads could be improved and graded with hand tools.

If the time should arrive when this sort of work could be started, then I am certain they would have no difficulty in obtaining the labor needed to do the necessary work and building within the project area.

And that is signed—

ROY POTTER,  
*Transportation and Supply Officer.*

MR. STEEDMAN. Do you recall that memorandum?

MR. EMPIE. Yes, very well. Do you want me to make a statement in regard to it?

MR. STEEDMAN. Go right ahead.

MR. EMPIE. That, I might say, is the kind of evidence which has been placed from time to time on file in my office to show the difficulty that members of our organization were having in accomplishing the work assigned to them.

It has been a fight from the beginning—evacuees you could depend on who would stay on the job and do the work assigned to them. A great many of them are deserving of recognition. They have stayed by their posts in spite of the harassing from others. Nevertheless, from the over-all picture there has developed, in my opinion, a laxity in work habits among the evacuees that is going to be hard for them to correct in later years when they go outside the project and go back to normal life and this experience is over.

And again in my opinion I believe that the right kind of action could be taken to correct it. I believe that the right kind of instructions from the W. R. A. central office, strictly enforced all down the line, would correct all that monkey business.

MR. MUNDT. At that point, would you be willing to state some of the constructive ideas which you have, for the enlightenment of the committee?

MR. EMPIE. I will do my best.

MR. MUNDT. We would appreciate it.

MR. EMPIE. It has been our experience and the experience of those people I am speaking of, the ones in my immediate organization, that when you outline an assignment to an evacuee he understands what you mean but he is watching you to see if you are going to make him do it. If he thinks he can get away with it, he is not going to do it unless he has some inherent incentive and will to do it for the good of himself and of the community; the welfare of his fellow men.

On the other hand, as I say, if you set up a policy and you make them see that you mean business, that you are not going to tolerate any monkey business at all, it is my firm conviction that they will do the job, and as disciplinary action in case they don't, I believe that measures could be instituted that would be effective and I believe some of the measures would be to simply say, for instance, "If you don't put out the work here on this job, you are going to be laid off—there is going to be no opportunity given you to work any place else on the project until you prove to us that you are going to mend your ways."

As it has been now on our particular project where we are supposed to have an employment division, and a director of employment in charge of all that, there should be a following up under the project director's direction and see that there is no interbidding for jobs—no transfer from one job to another just on a fellow's personal ideas, and a strict system established for controlling it.



In other words, if I lay a man off and tell him he is through, it should be fixed so he can't go over to somebody else and get on and pull the same thing over there. I believe it can be done.

I have always felt it could be done and I think if the project had been set up on that basis to start with and that firm control was exercised, there wouldn't have been any trouble.

I would like to bring in here, however, that the whole crux of this situation, in my opinion, is the question of segregation.

Mr. MUNDT. That was the next thing I was going to ask you about. I was going to ask you if you didn't feel that the fact you haven't segregated the bad fellows from the goods one has had a bad effect on the Japanese who might be inclined to work?

Mr. EMPIE. Absolutely. I think that is the first and foremost problem the W. R. A. should have attacked and solved immediately—they should have arranged immediately to get these people out.

Mr. MUNDT. But you don't feel that that can be solved? You feel that that would be very difficult. Do you feel there is a way you can distinguish between the loyal and disloyal Japanese or the ambitious and indolent Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know whether there is any way you can read a man's mind to determine whether deep down in his heart he is loyal to the United States. All you can judge him by is his actions. If he gives you any indication whatsoever that he is not, he should be disposed of in the described manner. Somebody has to figure that out. We have internment camps and the W. R. A. is trying to set up an isolation camp for certain classes and I have asked Mr. Head many times what was being done to segregate people that were considered out of line with the project requirements, and out of line with the welfare of the community. His answer, in general, without going into the details which I might have forgotten, was that in cooperation with G-2, Military Intelligence, O. N. I., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that those matters are being taken care of and not being in contact with it myself, I assume that is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is the kind of an answer we got yesterday from Mr. Gelvin. He understood when the camp was being established and nearly ready for use, that they had been working on that for a long time and would soon be ready to open the camp. Isn't that what he said yesterday?

Mr. MUNDT. At Luppe, Ariz.

Mr. EMPIE. At Luppe, Ariz., I understand; yes. I understand there are several families there now, several inmates.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have any gone to that camp from Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. I couldn't say that. That would not come to my attention.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only ones taken from Poston were the ones definitely subversive whom the F. B. I. removed?

Mr. EMPIE. So far as I know; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And there is no doubt that agitators have been left in the camp. Has any penalty been meted out for those agitators, or some sort of punishment?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know in what way.

Mr. COSTELLO. Hasn't anybody even attempted to punish those who are causing trouble or agitation in the camp?



Mr. EMPIE. I will say in this way—through the efforts of the internal-security division and the police and legal procedure that has been established on the part of the camp organization, manned principally by evacuees under the supervision of a Caucasian project attorney and Caucasian police officer.

Mr. COSTELLO. The internal-security division is made up, however, largely of evacuees?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; it is only supervised by the appointed personnel.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do we have a record or anything that shows how the internal-security division operates—its procedure and how it is manned and what results it has been getting?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I feel we had better develop that at this point.

Who is in charge of the internal-security division at the present time at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. It is in the immediate charge of Mr. Ernest L. Miller, who operates under the direction of the project director.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his title?

Mr. EMPIE. This will be misleading because it is a pay-roll title. It was assigned by our classification division in the secretary's office in order to, in their opinion, give it the grade which the W. R. A. paid on other projects of \$3,800. It is chief welfare officer, I believe. I will check that on the pay roll if you want me to, but the title we use in the other W. R. A. projects is "chief of internal security."

We refer to it that way on our project except for pay-roll purposes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has Mr. Miller had any police experience?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; he had.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to going to Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. EMPIE. On the San Francisco police force.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How is your internal-security division set up?

Mr. EMPIE. Under the, as I said, under the supervision of police squads or police organizations for each unit, composed of evacuee members. Police officers and subordinates on down the line, with which I am not familiar, are established and operated the same as any other city police operate.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are there any Caucasians working with Mr. Miller?

Mr. EMPIE. Until recently one assistant, Mr. Robert Scott.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is Mr. Scott now?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know. He left the project a short time ago. I don't know where he went.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he resign?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know that. In fact it just came to my attention a few days ago that he had left the project and I haven't inquired about the reason.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And under Mr. Miller, you have a Japanese chief of police; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. For each unit; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So the internal-security division is dependent upon the Japanese policemen to keep law and order inside of the camp; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. We might take a brief recess for a few minutes.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will please come to order. You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any wealthy Japanese at the Poston center?

Mr. EMPIE. It is my understanding we do. I don't know them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made any check upon the amount of wealth they might have?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the amount of property that each evacuee owns?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have kept no statistics on that at all?

Mr. EMPIE. Not in my part of the organization. We have recently established what is known as the evacuee property office. They may have that information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of that office?

Mr. EMPIE. A man that the W. R. A. sent into the project by the name of Schmitt.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And who is the project attorney whom you mentioned?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Theodore Haas.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see Mr. Haas' personnel papers when he came to work at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. No; I didn't. He was formerly an employee of the Solicitor's office in the Department of the Interior. He was assigned to the project through the efforts of the Indian Office and as I remember later on went over to the W. R. A.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much money each evacuee has on deposit in the various banks in southern California or throughout the United States?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you exercise any control over the evacuees' personal funds?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they handle their financial affairs through the project attorney?

Mr. EMPIE. I am not familiar with that; I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not any of the evacuees are drawing \$500 a month from the Federal Reserve bank and at the same time living on the Government at Government expense?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know that; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is possible, is it not?

Mr. EMPIE. (No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is possible, is it not, for an alien to have his funds impounded and permitted to draw a maximum of \$500 a month and still live at the expense of the Government at the project?

Mr. EMPIE. I am not familiar with those regulations, Mr. Steedman. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think if the project had control over the funds of the evacuees that the project would be in a better position to get the evacuees to work?

Mr. EMPIE. It might be a contributing factor. I don't know. I never thought of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to go back again to Mr. Potter. Do you think the fact that Mr. Potter suggested that they should organize a pick and shovel gang at Poston, contributed to his transfer away from the center?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You think that had nothing to do with it?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. To what extent do you think the wage scale at Poston prevents getting satisfactory work out of the Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. I think it has all to do with it.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think the wage scale should be increased in order to effectively get the Japanese work?

Mr. EMPIE. I couldn't say that. It just occurs to me it wouldn't be in keeping with good business to do that. I feel this way about it, that after working various evacuees at various types of positions in my organization, that some of them, even at \$19 a month, do more work than you could get for \$200 a month on the outside by some other person. They are just good workers when they want to work. When they do want to work they really shell it out.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those Japs who are industrious are willing to work, at that low figure?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir. I think it would be an additional incentive and it has often been expressed by them, if they could be paid at the going wages, instead of having their efforts exploited at \$19 a month, that they would work.

Mr. COSTELLO. If they do work they only get \$19 a month and if they don't work they still get food and clothing, and naturally they don't consider their housing and food as a part payment for the work being done?

Mr. EMPIE. The way they express it is that the Government took them from their former abodes and transplanted them and that it is the obligation of the Government to furnish them with food and clothing and shelter and other facilities. When we begin to negotiate with them about working harder or more efficiently, they say: "Well, where is the incentive?"

I have tried to point out in dealing with the people in my organization that they have got to look beyond this \$19 a month, not only for the purpose of their own good inwardly but by reason of the fact that in actually doing the work they are building up an experience record that will be recognized in the future when they apply for jobs some place else.

If they have that experience, I explain to them, they can say: "Yes, I worked as an accountant at Poston."

And that I did thus and so, and if somebody will swear to that and it is recognized by the Civil Service Commission in later years—I believe it should be taken into consideration by them, and I have tried to point that out to them. A good many of them are working on that basis.

We have one person in particular who just came to my attention a short time ago. I asked why he was moving from one section of my office to another section and his reply was that he had gotten all the experience that he thought he needed in that line of work and wanted to move to something else so as to round out his experience at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are those exceptional cases?

Mr. EMPIE. I would say that those are in the minority, yes, but it is the class of work—I believe those in the accounting field and clerical field are more inclined to do that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a camouflage net factory operating in the center at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. We did have; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who built that net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. It was built by the Army engineers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Under contract?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what it cost?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese at first refuse to work in the net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. There was a great deal of discussion about whether they would work or not and, as I viewed it, it was a matter of labor relations. In other words, "What was the percentage." After they found out that they could go in there and work on a piece basis and be paid on the work that they turned out, they put out more work than they put out anywhere else on the job. They exceeded all the estimates that had been submitted for accomplishing the manufacture of nets.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They were paid on a piece work basis in the net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But at first they voted on whether or not they would work in the net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And on the first vote they voted against working in the net factory; is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that vote on the basis that they did not wish to do anything that would contribute to our war effort?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't believe it was. I am not in position to say because I don't know all the ramifications of that thing, but I have a feeling, as I said before, that it was a labor relations point. They were looking to the Director of Employment to negotiate with the contractor for a little better pay. That is my inclination.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was in direct charge of the net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. The contractor operating under the supervision of the United States Engineers who furnished inspectors for it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And who was the contractor?

Mr. EMPIE. A man by the name of John Stahl.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he paid by the project?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; paid by the engineers under an agreement between himself and his organization and the United States Engineers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he receive a percentage on the nets produced in the factory?

Mr. EMPIE. I am not familiar at all with the provisions of the contract. A copy of the contract has never been furnished our office, to my knowledge.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he have an office in the net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. He did have; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he stay at the net factory most of the time?

Mr. EMPIE. He had representatives there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many?

Mr. EMPIE. Two that I know of; a man by the name of Rosenbloom, his auditor, and a man by the name of Billicke.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know their first names?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know the percentage that Mr. Stahl received for supervising the work at the net factory, do you?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many nets the factory turned out?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who would have information regarding the net factory?

Mr. EMPIE. The United States Engineers' office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. EMPIE. 751 South Figueroa Street.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Los Angeles?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes. If they don't have the information, they can get it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you purchased any materials from salvage firms in Los Angeles?

Mr. MUNDT. Pardon me. Before you leave the net factory, what was the average monthly income of the Japanese working on piece work in that factory?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't have any information on that except a verbal report that I heard one time, that they were making about \$15 a day—as much as \$15 a day on a piece-work basis. They were all busy. You ought to visit one of those places and watch them make nets.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the basis on which they were assigned to the net factory? It would seem there would be a big scramble for those jobs.

Mr. EMPIE. Everybody who wanted to could apply for a job. Many of them moved out of our offices to take jobs there on the basis that the W. R. A. originally planned to provide private employment in places adjacent to the project or could contribute to the war effort in that manner.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the project at Poston, through your office, purchased any materials from salvage companies in Los Angeles?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What materials have been purchased from such companies?

Mr. EMPIE. You say "salvage companies." I am not familiar with whether they are considered salvage companies or not, but we have bought a lot of material here in Los Angeles. It is one of our chief sources of supply.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the project buy some trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; we bought some trucks here from the Industrial Equipment Co.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many trucks were purchased?

Mr. EMPIE. As I recall, 12.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who are the owners of the Industrial Equipment Co?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know a man by the name of Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. EMPIE. He is not with the Industrial Equipment Co.—Finkelstein? We bought a lot of stuff from Finkelstein who was contacted by a representative of the Indian Irrigation Service at 751 South Figueroa Street, who acted for the project in assisting us to secure construction materials, orders for which were placed by the chief engineer of our project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Rupkey?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the officer of the Indian Service that put you in touch with Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe, as I recall, that stuff was bought by Mr. Henderson—Paul Henderson.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were some trucks purchased from Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. EMPIE. Not that I remember of; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was purchased from him?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, we bought a lot of scrap material such as old iron and pipe and plumbing fittings and things of that kind.

This material was ordered by Mr. Rupkey on the basis that it would have to be substituted in lieu of steel, which could not be procured except on high priority. It was needed, he thought, and we all thought, somewhere else worse than we needed it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ever prorest against any of these purchases from Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I did. I didn't think that we had any use for it. I spoke to Mr. Rupkey about it several times and asked him what he intended to do with it, and he said he was going to use it in the construction of irrigation features, and I left it to his judgment.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much material was purchased from Mr. Finkelstein in terms of dollars?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; but I can report it to you.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I wish you would give the committee that information.

Mr. MUNDT. Who proved to be right? You or Mr. Rupkey? Was the material used that he purchased?

Mr. EMPIE. I think some of it has been used, and I think some of it is still in stock. I can give you a report on that, too.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you do that, please.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who were the 12 trucks purchased from?

Mr. EMPIE. Bought those from the Industrial Equipment Co.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And who owns that company?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know who owns it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you inspect the trucks before they were purchased?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did you agree to the purchase of those trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the trucks in good order when they were purchased?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; I think it can be said that they were in good order. They needed working on from that standpoint. They didn't have tail lights; the batteries were run down; and there had to be some work done on them to put them in road condition.

I came over here and looked the trucks over and told the officials of the company that we would accept delivery at the time they notified me that they had been placed in road condition.

By that I mean that these trucks had been operated as dump trucks under a power shovel and they, like any other trucks utilized in that manner, had gotten some knocks.

Some of the radiator grills had been broken and some of the lights were gone and some of the glass out of the windows, but those trucks were bought at a time when we were making every attempt to get the largest amount of work done over there in the shortest period of time.

We advertised for bids and I don't recall how many bids we received, but these bids were the low bids and after discussing it with various members of the organization, including Mr. Rupkey, we decided to go ahead and make the purchase.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have any trucks been purchased that had to be towed into Poston from Los Angeles?

Mr. EMPIE. Not to my knowledge. These particular trucks—I have a recent report from the supply and transportation officer on them, because I was interested myself in how they worked out, because, not being mechanically minded myself, I wouldn't know whether a motor was bad or a transmission had gone out or a differential needed adjustment or something, and I asked them to give me a report on them and he assured me that they have given very satisfactory service.

They have been put in service there on the road work and other parts of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Can you cite any other instances where you protested against buying certain materials for the project?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, that would be pretty hard to enumerate because of this fact: I have always taken the attitude in reviewing purchase requests that the best policy is to say "No" right off the bat. You might be able to talk them out of it. And working on that basis you finally jew them down, and if they can convince you and put something in the record that will show that they are willing to take the responsibility, we go ahead and make the purchase. Otherwise, we don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were those the only trucks that were purchased for the camp?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean those 12 trucks?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. I think we purchased some others. I could give you a complete record of all the purchases of trucks if you would like to have it.

Mr. COSTELLO. It would be interesting because we did have a report to the effect that some of the trucks were not in good condition and were not used at the camp.

Do you know of any trucks that were purchased for Poston that were actually not put into service after they were purchased?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know but I will get a report for you and make it complete, of all the trucks we have purchased.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will appreciate it if you will.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Gelvin said that you could give the committee the estimated cost of the schools that are being build at Poston. Do you have those figures with you?

Mr. EMPIE. In round figures only. They would be from my memory.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That will be satisfactory.

Mr. EMPIE. About \$470,000.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is a considerable expenditure for a temporary project such as this relocation center, is it not?

Mr. EMPIE. On the basis that the relocation program is going forward and they are going to move away from the camp, and on the basis that it is a temporary establishment; yes.

On another basis, that is that they are apt to be there for some time, and that the Indians will benefit from them in the future, that is the justification.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But there was no plan to build such a school system prior to the establishment of the center at Poston, was there?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir; that is my understanding, there wasn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of keeping the vital statistics at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. The director of health and sanitation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that under your department?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the mortician in charge of the crematory at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Mr. Ray E. Bower.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where does Mr. Bower reside?

Mr. EMPIE. He lives on the project but his regular establishment is at Yuma.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he at the center at Poston most of his time?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir. Would you like to know something about the cost of burials?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; if you have that information the committee would like to have it.

Mr. EMPIE. When we first went there we solicited bids from various undertaking establishments. That was one of the first things we had to face—the disposition of the bodies.

After soliciting bids Mr. Bower of the Yuma mortuary at Yuma, put in the low bid and a contract was entered into for those services.

For a few burials we had to do it on the open-market basis. He was the first or the nearest source that we could look to. He came up and we transacted several—completed several transactions on the basis of the open market without a contract. After we got the contract prepared it was on this basis.

This, as you may know already, is on the basis of cremating the bodies. This crematory service includes embalming, all undertaking services, casket, cremation and an urn for the ashes, and all incidental funeral services?

Infants up to 1 year, \$75.

Children from 1 to 12 years, \$100.

Adults of 13 and up, \$125, or an average, on the theory that an equal number of each class of people will pass on, of \$100 per burial

We did have, before we got the crematory established, two or three deaths that involved the use of the cemetery. A cemetery site was selected for that but those bodies were exhumed later and cremated.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Does this mortician maintain records of all cremations at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe he does.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Those records are in his custody?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe so, but I believe Dr. Pressman would have that too.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Dr. Pressman is in charge of the hospital, is that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What, if any, arrangements are made at the project for the religious inclinations of the evacuees?

Mr. EMPIE. That would be out of my line but I understand they are allowed to conduct services in their own churches the same as they would anywhere else.

Mr. MUNDT. They have their own preachers or whatever they call them?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Who are interned there as well as the others?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Are there any other outside religious influences brought into them?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I believe to some extent. There are visits made to the project by various religious organizations who are interested in a number of people there. To what extent they operate within the area I haven't any knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Dr. Frank H. Smith who is connected with the Protestant Ministers' Association of San Francisco?

Mr. EMPIE. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Dr. Chapman of the same organization?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Mr. Norris James?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he have a position at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. He occupied what is known as the position of reports officer. However, he was carried on the W. R. A. pay roll——

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his entrance salary?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his salary when he resigned?

Mr. EMPIE. This would be a guess on my part because I don't know what it was, but I believe it was \$3,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did he resign?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe around the 1st of May. I am not sure about that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he under your supervision?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the term "Kibei"?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have the Kibei at Poston caused you any trouble?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know a Kibei from an Issei.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are most of the trouble makers at Poston Issei?

Mr. EMPIE. I am not prepared to say. I don't know. In other words I don't have any way of knowing whether they are Issei or Kibei or Nisei. I have never checked it through myself and I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made a study or investigation of subversive practices inside the project?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. I think the project director does in company with the chief of internal security and I understand that they have records of clearances and the reasons so far as they are able to determine.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the project director would have a report on that?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have at Poston a man employed in the commissary department by the name of Best?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; we did have.

Mr. MUNDT. What was his position?

Mr. EMPIE. He was chief steward at the time the project first started.

I was in San Francisco, as I explained, on the 31st of March and met Mr. Fyrer there and he was helping trying to get lined up to go to Poston and Mr. Fyrer hired Mr. Best to go to Poston and set up the kitchens and begin operating the mess halls.

In order to accomplish that in the most efficient manner, he dispatched Mr. Best to Los Angeles for the purpose of interviewing Japanese who were expected to be the first ones at the camp area, on the basis if we could go to the Army officials and say: "We have interviewed these people, experienced in this type of work and we would like to have them evacuated first so we can set up our organization and begin operations in a normal manner."

Mr. Best proceeded to Los Angeles and interviewed many evacuees looking toward taking positions such as stewards, cooks, headwaiters and waitresses; kitchen help, storeroom keepers and that kind of people which are required to run a mess establishment.

He then proceeded to Poston and I don't know of an evacuee that he interviewed that came there first. He had a raw recruiting job to do as they came in and he selected them to the best of his ability off the busses as they arrived, and as they finished their induction process they were told: "Now, here is the mess hall; if you people can cook you had better get busy; we have got food in here."

And it was about 130° F. at the time and those evacuees who had been experienced cooks forgot a lot about cooking very quickly.

Mr. MUNDT. Were the services of Mr. Best satisfactory?

Mr. EMPIE. I didn't consider them so; no, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you think that might have been due to the difficulties under which he was laboring or was he unfit for the job?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, we have tried to view the services of many of our employees in this light: That they have been working under extreme difficulties in that situation and where they might be very efficient some other place some of them didn't work out so good there.

That is one of the reasons we have tried to be just as lenient as possible in dismissing them from the project. Otherwise they would have a good record and that is a point that I believe should be kept in mind.

Mr. MUNDT. No question about the honesty or veracity of Mr. Best?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't believe so. I had several difficulties with Mr. Best. I was assigned the responsibility of looking after the steward department, but I couldn't keep him from going directly to the project director or somebody else with his troubles. He would do things that I didn't know anything about until sometime later. I never could get him rounded up and get him in line; and on top of that, I don't believe that he was equipped, by lack of experience we will say or some other reason, to manage a thing of that magnitude. He never convinced me that he was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Didn't Mr. Best leave the project at Poston and take a position at Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming?

Mr. EMPIE. I understand that he did; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words he left Poston and went directly to the Heart Mountain Relocation Center and took a position over there?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. A similar position, didn't he?

Mr. EMPIE. Not on our recommendation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you advise the W. R. A. at Heart Mountain that Mr. Best was inefficient and incapable of doing the work assigned to him at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe we did. I can check on that point if you would like to have it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I wish you would. How long did Mr. Best work at Heart Mountain?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long was he at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. He arrived there about, oh, I would say the 10th of April 1942 and he left—I will have to check that record, but it seems to me it was along in the latter part of September.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he still employed at Heart Mountain?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir. In fact, I saw him in the hallway here today. That is my understanding. He may be on leave; I can't say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact, isn't it just routine Government practice to ask another project if a former employee is satisfactory?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; it is, and they asked us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you advised them that he wasn't satisfactory?

Mr. EMPIE. I am sure we did. I will check it though and give you copies of the correspondence if you would like to have it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it unusual for another organization to employ someone whom you have recommended to them as being unsatisfactory and inefficient?

Mr. EMPIE. It is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, that is all the questions I have.

Mr. Empie has a statement he would like to make to the committee.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to ask him one or two questions before he makes his statement.

How many Caucasian employees do you have in the camp altogether?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, we have approximately, including the irrigation laborers out on the irrigation construction work, approximately 600. Two hundred and twenty-four of those are what might be considered as regularly established positions.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Two hundred and twenty-four?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And of those 224 how many are males?

Mr. EMPIE. Males?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes; men.

Mr. EMPIE. Well, the greater percentage. I don't have the statistics on that. Would you like to have it?

Mr. EBERHARTER. And of those males I would like to have you advise the committee those between the ages of 18 and 38 and those over the age of 38.

Mr. EMPIE. All right, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And would your records show whether or not deferment has been requested for any of the male employees who are of draftable age?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you supply the committee with that information?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. How many of the 224 can speak Japanese?

Mr. EMPIE. One to my knowledge. There may be others.

Mr. MUNDT. And that one is a woman?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you tried to get white employees who can speak the Japanese language?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know that we have.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you found it difficult to find them?

Mr. EMPIE. I don't know that we have tried to do that.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have a statement, I understand, Mr. Empie, that you want to make at this time.

Mr. EMPIE. I would like to if it is agreeable with the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. We are very happy to hear you on that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Your statement may cause us to ask you more questions.

Mr. EMPIE. That is all right, if it does.

If you will bear with me on this I will attempt to read from short-hand notes that I have prepared, because I did not want to attempt to express myself extemporaneously, which might be misleading.

I would like to also say that in making this statement I want to be as sincere as possible and express myself in the way in which will best interpret to you my sincere beliefs about this situation.

I have reason to believe that in carrying out the hearing this morning, in answer to certain questions which have been asked me, that my replies might have proved, from a standpoint of the record, to be misleading. I may be wrong about that but I would like to correct those impressions if I made them, and I would like to attempt to do that in the following manner:

First, as chief administrative officer in charge of administrative services at Poston, I established my part of the organization from the standpoint of economical operation, including full protection to all Government property.

I have personally appeared many times before the project director in company with members of my organization, to report conditions



existing in the operation of the project which I did not believe in and which I thought should be stopped.

These persons have included the following employees by title: The property custodian, the supply and transportation officer——

Mr. MUNDT. May I interrupt you there? Could you give us the names as well as the title?

Mr. EMPIE. All right, sir. Property custodian, J. F. Reinhardt; supply and transportation officer, Mr. Roy Potter and Mr. Harold H. Townsend and Mr. F. M. Haverland; the fiscal officer Mr. H. W. Smith, the chief warehouseman, E. S. Wickersham. Those I know for sure, and there may have been others.

I would like to say also that at numerous staff meetings held on the project I consistently brought out the fact that my organization needed greater support in the control of the equipment and the preservation and conservation of Government property, and that the evacuees as well as others should be dealt with in a manner designed to bring about the desired results that myself and members of my organization have advocated from the beginning—that no evacuees should be allowed in the nearby town of Parker, and that I have personally reported to the project director the fact that evacuees were seen in Parker on other than official business, that after many months of such reports the project director asked me to report to him in writing a list of any evacuees found in Parker without a proper pass or permit.

This was done for a period of one week. Reports were transmitted to the director. Insofar as I was able to observe there was no net result or desirable result.

That in demonstration of the fact that good control could have been exercised very few evacuees have left the camp area during the past few weeks—not having been seen at Parker.

I was also of the opinion that a much better relationship between the people of Parker and the farmers of the Parker Valley could be built up by seeing to it that the evacuees stayed within the immediate project vicinity, in transacting our business between each other on that basis.

It is my opinion that the fact that they have visited Parker from time to time has served to cause antagonism to be expressed by the townspeople which could have otherwise been avoided.

The project director, since he did not carry out the recommendations along these lines made by myself and members of my organization, no doubt has some very good reasons which I am in hopes will satisfy the requirements of the people who are in the end responsible for the proper expenditure of Government funds, the proper relationship between the public and the Government in the operation of the project.

I have tried to view it from this manner, that it was not for me to decide, being a member of his organization, but after I reported the conditions to him if he saw fit to act in accordance with his considered judgment that was up to him.

The point there that I would like to bring out also is the fact that I have not only felt a sense of loyalty to the project director, being a part of his organization, but a sense of loyalty to the Office of Indian Affairs, Mr. Collier, Mr. Zimmerman, Mr. Greenwood, and the people charged with the responsibility of successfully operating the Indian Service.

They placed a great deal of confidence in me in sending me on what they considered an important post. In dealing with budget matters particularly, I have always felt that I was operating under the direction of Mr. Greenwood, the finance officer for the Indian Service. He was the one that first interviewed me and asked me whether I would go to Poston, and my reply to him was, since I was a native of Arizona, "I am just fool enough to ask for that job," and I landed at Poston; and I have been attempting to carry out my duties in a manner satisfactory to the Indian Service and at the same time protect the interests of the Government in properly accounting for all moneys expended and all property acquired through the expenditure of Government funds.

I would like also to say for the record that insofar as Mr. Townsend is concerned, I have no ill feeling toward him. It has been difficult for me to understand why he expressed so many ideas that were constructive with regard to the preservation of Government property and was instrumental, in my opinion, of being able to establish some constructive procedures, and still later on learn that he did what is now shown in the record he did.

I still have that to work out with Mr. Townsend as the administrative man having reported it to the proper officials and as far as I am concerned, why, I believe it can be settled amicably and to the advantage and interest of the Government.

I would like to also say, if it is all right with the committee, I would like to make a statement in regard to Miss Findley. Miss Findley has come in for some very severe criticism. I would like to have it known and like to have you gentlemen know that I came to know Miss Findley during her tour of duty on the project, and while I could not see the project's operations from her viewpoint, I have reason to believe that she is one of the most sincere persons that I have ever met. She is—in her mind, she is honest, straightforward, and she will give you the best justification that you ever heard in response to some of your questions with regard to her ideas and actions. I don't think there is any question but what she is very sincere and I think I should also reiterate, possibly, or strengthen the point that in my opinion that same thing is true of Mr. Collier and Mr. Head and others who have been charged with the responsibility of the operation of this project.

I have worked with them for a long period of time and I think that they are very sincere in their efforts and I would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation and gratitude for the opportunity to appear before the committee and give you gentlemen some of my viewpoints and an opportunity to let you have the other side of the picture.

You have the files that I thought Mr. Townsend had taken without permission. He told me in correspondence later that they would be presented to me in the future and they would still be in Government hands and in good hands, and I don't have any reason to question that and on that basis I haven't been worried about it. I felt that way about it; that if Mr. Townsend, even though I have reason now not to employ him again in my organization, could bring about any good results from the use of any files of a Government office and on that basis that there must be some good could come from it, and I am in

hopes that is true, and as I say I hold no ill feeling against Mr. Townsend; and I thank you very much.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate your statement and the balance of your testimony before the committee.

Mr. MUNDT. You do feel, do you not, Mr. Empie, there are possibly some extenuating circumstances from Mr. Townsend's point of view concerning this one rather black mark on his escutcheon with regard to this trip to Oklahoma City?

Mr. EMPIE. Not having any opportunity to discuss it with Mr. Townsend, I don't question but what he has a very good reason and that he could write a volume on it, but whether he is sincere in it I am at this moment open to conviction.

Mr. MUNDT. As I understand it he did not make a claim to the Government for his expenses all the way to Oklahoma City? He left that, I think you said, vacant in his claim.

Mr. EMPIE. He did not make a claim for reimbursement of per diem but he charged all the gasoline and oil to us, which we didn't like.

Mr. MUNDT. I don't blame you for that. I have one other question. You said you did not have anything to do with deciding whether or not an applicant for indefinite leave has his application granted. That responsibility is the responsibility of Mr. Head, as I understand it.

Mr. EMPIE. In the end, yes. That goes through the legal office and is approved by his office.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask one more question about the Townsend matter.

As a matter of fact didn't Mrs. Townsend break her ankle at Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. No, I understood she had trouble with her knee—she had trouble with her knee and she was confined in the hospital.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At Poston?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; she was in the hospital for several days and we have a bill against Mr. Townsend for \$16 for that service that he didn't pay.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And there was a strike on at the time?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I don't know whether the strike was on at the time she hurt her knee or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But at the time Mr. Townsend and his wife left Poston there was a strike in progress?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And some of the other Caucasian women and children were leaving the project at that time; isn't that correct?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, I believe that is true. I believe he influenced them to leave.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But in any event they were leaving, weren't they?

Mr. EMPIE. Well, in one instance. The man that worked under his direct supervision walked out on me and I had to take charge of that work myself. I dispatched the truck service for several days myself personally and I issued slips for each man to use the trucks because Townsend and Barrett both left during the strike.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But Townsend requested permission to take his wife home, didn't he?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right, he did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you gave him that permission, did you not?

Mr. EMPIE. Isn't it clear in the record that I gave him permission to leave the project because he told me that he had personal business to attend to?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. During the strike you handled the trucks in Mr. Townsend's absence?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, I did, and I handled them for a day or two after he got back, until I convinced myself that he was going to take them over and do the right thing.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I have one more question. Are you happy now that you have had an opportunity to appear before this committee, and do you feel that the questions asked of you were asked with open minds and simply in an attempt to get at the real facts?

Mr. EMPIE. I believe so, yes, sir. I am firmly convinced that the attitude of the committee and your very efficient interviewer has been with the sincere desire to get at the foundation of the problem. I think we all recognize it is a problem.

I like to recall the statement that Senator Chandler made in Phoenix. He said:

It is a problem that none of us have the answer for. I don't know what the answer is.

That was his statement.

I would like to think of myself as a citizen of the United States taking my part in it on the basis of working it out to our mutual advantage. I don't know what the solution is but I am willing to do my part in trying to work it out if I can do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. We want to thank you very much for having appeared before the committee, Mr. Empie. I think you have been very frank in your testimony and in replying to the questions that have been put to you.

I think the testimony you have given here will be helpful to us and I trust that as a result of our hearing we may be able to be of some service in trying to clean up the problems that do confront the War Relocation Authority and to bring about a satisfactory handling of this particular problem that does confront us.

Mr. EMPIE. I will be very gratified if that is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you for having come here today. The committee will stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10 a. m., Thursday, June 10, 1943.)



# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., in room 1543, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, and Hon. Karl E. Mundt.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

The witness this morning is Mayor Bowron, mayor of the city of Los Angeles, who has consented to appear before the committee.

We appreciate very much your coming here, Mayor, because we understand how busy you are with the many problems of running a city of this size, and more particularly when you have added problems thrown upon you during the present time. But we are grateful to you for coming here and appearing as a witness on behalf of the people of Los Angeles.

Will you stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BOWRON. I do.

## TESTIMONY OF FLETCHER BOWRON, MAYOR OF LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your name for the record?

Mr. BOWRON. Fletcher Bowron.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand, Mayor, that you might like to make a statement to the committee regarding the Japanese relocation camps and the attitude, generally, of the city of Los Angeles toward the Japanese and their return to the Pacific coast.

Mr. BOWRON. Well, I would be very glad to. Congressman Costello and members of the committee, the statements that I might give are my own views. I think, however, that I reflect fairly accurately the opinion of the big majority of the people of this community.

Speaking for myself I feel that it would be very dangerous for the Japanese or any of them, to be returned to the Pacific coast area and

particularly to the Los Angeles metropolitan section, during the continuance of the war.

I do not profess to have any information of a military character or as indicative of what their operations might be if returned as reflecting upon the safety of the community from a military point of view. But I do believe that the people here are thoroughly aroused; that it would be very unsafe for the Japanese themselves; and, of course, what would be the natural inference if any unfortunate occurrence should be recorded and relayed across the Pacific, naturally we would fear for the safety of those who are in custody of the Japanese Government.

With reference to those in the relocation centers I have made no investigation. I have not personally visited any of the relocation centers. I know nothing of my own knowledge as to conditions or treatment. Such opinions as I have are merely those of a citizen who has secured his information from second-hand sources.

I believe, however, from such communications as I have received from many people in this locality that it is the opinion and belief of the big majority of the citizens of southern California that the Japanese, whether they be born in this country or otherwise, should be under guard, should be watched and should be retained either in a relocation center, or if they are put out to do some work that might assist in the production of food or other production, should be supervised and not scattered among the civilian population.

We here in Los Angeles have had our own experiences and know from our own knowledge that many that we thought very friendly were given the opportunity to enter homes of our citizens; converse with people of this locality and who appeared very courteous and friendly and seemingly inoffensive, later turned out to be representatives of the Japanese Government, undoubtedly in search of information of military value.

We also feel from our knowledge and association of years with Japanese that no one can tell who is loyal and who is not loyal. I think the people of this locality feel that the big majority of Japanese wherever they may be located, in concentration camps or whether they have been released to work or perform some occupation, are probably loyal to this country and would do nothing, but I challenge anyone—any one at all to pick out the one who is loyal and who is potentially dangerous. I do not think there is any known test.

Certainly right here in this locality we have had our experiences and coming closer to my own official position, we had a number of employees within the city government, most of whom are probably loyal to this country and some of whom we believed to be loyal up until the time and even after the Pearl Harbor episode, but our own investigation convinced us otherwise and we know that some of those whom we believed to be actively engaged in behalf of the Japanese Government has since been released from relocation centers and we have not been consulted. No one told us that they were being released. No one consulted their employers to see if we have any information concerning them, but by devious methods and routes we have learned that they have been released.

I believe that so far as the economy of this locality is concerned, while prior to the war we depended very largely upon the Japanese population for food supply, particularly on the Japanese fishing fleet and truck gardeners and those engaged in the retail distribution of

fruits and produce, but we have largely adjusted ourselves to the changed conditions and we do not need the Japanese. We are paying more for our produce, more for our vegetables and fruit and fish but I believe the people of this locality are very glad to pay the difference in the price in money for the security that we feel is a result of the absence of the Japanese from this locality.

If you would direct my attention to matters that the committee would like to have me refer to, we probably can save the time of the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. One thought I have; you mentioned the matter of never having been consulted regarding the release of any of the Japanese from the camps. Has there been no single instance where anyone in the city administration has been interrogated about a former city employee of Japanese ancestry before he was released?

Mr. BOWRON. Not to my knowledge. I know that no inquiry has come to me and I think I am pretty close in touch with those officials and departments of the city government that would ordinarily be consulted if that was thought advisable or necessary by those who are in charge of releasing Japanese from relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. It has been indicated to the committee that in releasing the Japanese they are relying entirely upon their records established by the Japanese themselves at the relocation camps and a cursory check, possibly, of their past police records, but that no effort has been made to check with former employees or employers as to what their attitude might be regarding such individuals.

Mr. BOWRON. Let me say a police record is not indicative of anything so far as I can see. Generally speaking the Japanese in this locality have been law abiding. We have had very little trouble with them over the years so far as violating the statutes are concerned, and by reason of that fact we have not been very inquisitive to find out what they have been doing and much to our amazement after the beginning of the war we apparently learned that nobody else was inquisitive as to what they were doing; that there was no agency that was actually making an investigation.

So far as I am aware this committee has made greater strides in finding out what had been going on during times of peace than any other agency of the Federal Government or elsewhere.

It was not the function of the State government, of course, to make any such inquiry.

Mr. COSTELLO. About the only direct investigation of Japanese activities was that of the fishing fleet; isn't that correct?

Mr. BOWRON. So far as I know.

Mr. COSTELLO. No one was concerned about those engaged in agricultural pursuits as to what they were doing or their activities when not on the farm or anything of that character.

Regarding agricultural production, Mayor, has there been any decrease in the amount of foodstuffs available in the city because of the lack of Japanese in the farm areas?

Mr. BOWRON. I cannot give you accurate information relative to that because I have made no investigation. I believe that there has been quite a considerable decrease in available foods in the nature of fresh vegetables and berries and fruit, but I have already indicated that I think the people of this locality are willing to adjust themselves.



Mr. COSTELLO. I have heard the report since I have been home that the total amount of products produced is greater than when the Japanese were here but that certain truck garden products have diminished, such as celery and head lettuce and things of that character.

Mr. BOWRON. That may be true, but I want to emphasize the fact that that is a matter that I have not inquired into and it is merely an impression.

Mr. COSTELLO. Another question: Don't you feel it is rather bad economy to allow any group of people of alien ancestry to gain control of some particular item in our economy such as was the condition here in Los Angeles County where people of Japanese ancestry had almost complete control of agricultural production?

Mr. BOWRON. Well, our retrospection, of course, is better than our realization at the time. Now, we realize that is true but it was merely natural, because there have been few others that would adapt themselves to the kind of work on the truck farms that the Japanese so readily adjusted themselves to and everyone was content to let them pursue those occupations that required long hours and squatting and digging and gathering strawberries and celery and similar articles that are produced on the truck farms.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those are all the questions I have; Mr. Eberharter, do you have any questions?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mayor Bowron, the very fact that the Japanese are law abiding insofar as city or municipal ordinances are concerned, as well as State laws, in your opinion does that make them potentially more dangerous in that no suspicion is ever created that they would do anything wrong or that would be detrimental to the Government?

Mr. BOWRON. They are potentially more dangerous for the reason that you have no basis to form a suspicion. It is my belief and possibly not formed upon sufficient experience or information, that those who are potentially the most dangerous have seen to it that they have avoided suspicion by their conduct.

I am, of course, not at liberty to quote my authority but I know that it is believed that the very fact that there has been or was not before the relocation of the Japanese, any individual acts of sabotage was indicative that the entire population was controlled directly, and the system was here for such direction through the various organizations which interlocked, leading up to the consulate and fanning out to every man or woman or child on the truck farms, so that they could be readily reached and directed. And it is reasonable to believe that they were instructed that they should do nothing but just bide their time until they received instructions so that whatever they did could be effective and en masse.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have the Japanese a peculiar quality insofar as gaining the confidence of their employer is concerned?

Mr. BOWRON. Yes, I believe that is true; and let me illustrate by our own experience in the city government.

In a report of your own committee you will find that back in 1936 I believe it was, an inquiry was made for detailed information relative to our water system through the Japanese consulate. After Pearl Harbor I thought that it was a good idea to find out how many



Japanese we had, what they were doing and the character of their work and the availability of information of military value.

We found that we had, as I recall, something over 40 employed—some in rather strategic positions. We had several in our civil-service department who could be of great assistance in not only the employment of other Japanese, but in seeing that they were placed in a position where they could secure very valuable information.

We found that we had a number of them in our department of water and power where they not only had available to them—I do not know and have no information, of course, whether they made use of their opportunity, but they had available to them not only all of the information that had been requested through the consulate in 1936 and which the chief engineer of the water department refused to give, but they could have sabotaged our entire electric distribution system in the city of Los Angeles.

We found that they were located in various other departments and I called their immediate superiors together and suggested that it probably would be a good idea for the safety of the city and for the protection of the people in the community, to discontinue the work of these employees—all of them.

I found among very good Americans a resentment because these employees were trusted employees. They had ingratiated themselves with their superiors and they said:

We can't discharge these men, they are some of the best, most faithful employees we have.

I think it is generally true that the Japanese are good workers. They give every appearance of faithfulness in their work, and having those qualities necessarily they are disarming.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mayor, in spite of what happened at Pearl Harbor, in spite of the history of the Japanese people, do you think that if they were thrown in contact with persons who had had no experience with them before, those persons would be more liable to succumb to the mannerisms and the ingratiating qualities of the Japanese and thereby tend to have more confidence in them than they should have? In other words we have had some testimony to the effect that many of the Caucasian people who are working in a supervisory capacity in some of the camps had no previous experience whatsoever with the Japanese people. Do you think that those supervisors would be more likely to be fooled, say, by the Japanese than those who have had some actual experience with them?

Mr. BOWRON. I think very decidedly they could be easily fooled and probably have been because we have been fooled right here in Los Angeles and been fooled for a great many years when we thought we knew them from our experience of constant association.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you think any Japanese could be trusted? To trust him would be very much of a speculation even in isolated cases.

Mr. BOWRON. No; I don't believe that. I think that the big majority of them, if we only knew—if we could separate the sheep from the goats, I think that the big majority of them would be good American citizens, but I just challenge anybody to apply the test.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Those who have had experience with the Japanese, you feel, would not even be able to separate the good from the bad?

Mr. BOWRON. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Let alone those who had no experience?

Mr. BOWRON. I think their experience and their philosophy has perfected them in deceit and those that are the most dangerous are entirely disarming.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you say, Mayor Bowron, the F. B. I. never consulted you or the responsible heads of your departments about the possibility of releasing these men from these relocation centers before they were released?

Mr. BOWRON. I cannot make that statement because I do not know. There is a very close working relationship between our police department and the F. B. I. They may have consulted the police department but if that was done they probably merely referred to police reports and went no further.

Mr. MUNDT. From your experience with the Japanese it seems to be indicated that even if the F. B. I. were to go further than the police department they would more or less be following blind alleys because the Japanese didn't do anything of an overt nature which they could look upon to detect their loyalty or disloyalty; isn't that right?

Mr. BOWRON. That is right, exactly.

Mr. MUNDT. We were told by some of the earlier witnesses that in the Poston project they thought—they weren't sure—but they thought that the F. B. I., perhaps, was checking into the background of these men before they were released. This committee expects to find out whether that is a reality or just a hope expressed by those witnesses. But even though it is a reality, would you feel that that is sufficient to clear a man for release from the projects simply because the F. B. I. said:

We find nothing in our records to indicate disloyalty on the part of some specific Japanese.

Mr. BOWRON. I decidedly do not; and let me illustrate by again coming to some of our own employees. No investigation was made as to certain of those employees, I am sure, by anyone. We felt we had gone as far as we could when we separated them from their employment.

Since the military acted—and let me say that I feel that Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt has performed a very great service to the people of California and the Pacific coast by his timely and intelligent action. We were so relieved that we just dropped all investigation as soon as the Japanese were away and we went no further.

But since that time much information has come to us about some of our employees that we didn't even suspect, which has convinced us that they were potentially very dangerous.

Now, we haven't felt that it was necessary to pass on that information to the F. B. I. because we thought, naturally enough, the Japanese were in a position of security so far as the rest of the population was concerned, but had we been advised that there was any possibility of their being released and going about peaceful pursuits among the civilian population, of course, we would have been very glad to have supplied whatever information that we could dig up.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have in your files or in your mind the names of some specific Japanese who were formerly in the employ of the city and about whom you have subsequently received fairly unimpeachable information as to their disloyalty?

Mr. BOWRON. I don't think any information is "unimpeachable."

Mr. MUNDT. Fairly accurate information.

Mr. BOWRON. Because we just can't afford to wait until we get information that would support a conviction, let us say, in a court of law when we are thinking of the safety of our population.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me put the question another way: Do you have in your mind or in your files the names of former Japanese employees upon whom you feel there is a considerable cloud of suspicion at the present time?

Mr. BOWRON. Yes, yes; we have.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder if those names could be made available to the committee, either for public or private record as you prefer, so that our investigators might check up and see where they went from your employ and whether or not they have been released and if they have been released where they have gone.

I feel we should get our procedure down as specifically as we can because if we have a dangerous Japanese by the name of "Tojo," or whatever is a good Japanese name, we ought to be after the rascal now. Don't you agree with me?

Mr. BOWRON. Yes. I may say that we have been in rather close touch with Mr. Steedman. I think he knows practically everything that we do, but we would be glad to give to him, or directly to the committee, any additional information that we have.

Mr. MUNDT. For example, I want to know whether any of those Japanese upon whom you feel there is a considerable suspicion are among those that the Army has been recruiting and putting in uniform.

We now have a considerable number of Japanese in the Army. Some of them, as I understand, were recruited from the relocation centers and I think it would be interesting to know whether they are there or whether they are working out in the South Dakota beet patches, which interests me, or where they are.

Mr. BOWRON. Personally I think they would be a whole lot safer in the Army than they would be acting as domestics in private homes.

Mr. MUNDT. That interests me. Why do you think they would be safer in the Army and in uniform if they have a subversive background?

Mr. BOWRON. Because they would be under discipline and under constant watch and under military command.

Mr. MUNDT. How about during their off hours when they are walking up and down the streets in a uniform? Wouldn't they have access to a lot of places that a civilian couldn't go? It seems to me they would be more dangerous in the Army than out of it.

Mr. BOWRON. I just assume the military would not permit that.

Mr. MUNDT. Give them a little special treatment, you mean?

Mr. BOWRON. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, I dislike very much to reply upon the Japanese forming any part of our Army.

Mr. BOWRON. I am not advocating it but I am just suggesting that I think it is very dangerous indeed to have these Japanese scattered



throughout the country where they can promote propaganda and where they can come in closer contact with enemy agents, if there be such, and supply them with information, and particularly so in the vicinity of production areas.

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I interrupt? In other words, it was your thought if the Japanese should be released from these camps for the purpose of working they should be assembled in large numbers in some segregated area where they could be watched in that area rather than scattered throughout, say, as domestics in homes and all over the country?

Mr. BOWRON. That would be my idea; my opinion.

Mr. COSTELLO. The same situation then would apply to those in the Army where, as I understand it, the Japanese are being retained in separate units in the Army, and being in those large groups in the military organization if they were in some particular location their activities off the post could be watched more closely than if they were scattered likewise in the Army, individually all through the Army?

Mr. BOWRON. Yes. And I realize that what I advocate is probably an injustice to a big part of the Japanese because I really believe that the big majority of them are proper Americans, but the difficulty is, the big chance we are running in saying that this man can be relied upon because he has never proclaimed his loyalty to the Mikado—that is outwardly in such a way that we would set him aside as a potentially dangerous Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. When the Japanese were located here in California they were given complete access to all strategic installations such as pipe lines and oil fields and refineries and things of that kind.

Mr. BOWRON. I think the Japanese who lived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area knew infinitely more about the physical facts than the average American citizen.

Mr. COSTELLO. However, the number of Japanese elsewhere in the country was rather limited and for that reason they possibly have much less information concerning the country generally. However, don't you feel that by scattering the Japanese now throughout the country that that creates a great new field of strategic information available to the Japanese, particularly those who wish to obtain information for military purposes?

Mr. BOWRON. That would be my fear as just an ordinary citizen who knows nothing about the military value of their information or the means of transmitting it, but I do know that we are in a war and the object is to win it and not take any chances.

Mr. COSTELLO. During peacetime when we had the Japanese consular agents throughout the State, there was a very close tie, was there not, between those consular agents and the Japanese people?

Mr. BOWRON. Very close. I know that of my own knowledge and from my own observation. And that close tie was not limited to the subjects of the Japanese Government but apparently it was just as close and just as direct with the second generation who were born here in California.

Mr. COSTELLO. And all these Japanese societies and organizations had a very close affiliation with those consular officers, isn't that correct?

Mr. BOWRON. Very close.



Mr. COSTELLO. In other words the local consul actually was the leading figure of the Japanese people in the community and exerted a very direct influence through the societies and things of that kind over all the Japanese people here?

Mr. BOWRON. I cannot speak for other locations but that was true in the Los Angeles area.

Mr. COSTELLO. From investigations the committee has previously made, it is indicated there is an extremely close tie between the consular agents and both the foreign-born and American-born Japanese.

I wonder if it would be possible, Mayor, to make a direct check with the head of the police department subversive bureau, and particularly with the department of water and power, to inquire whether any requests have come to those departments concerning individual Japanese, concerning whom it was proposed to release from the relocation centers.

Mr. BOWRON. I shall be glad to do that.

Mr. COSTELLO. You might send a letter to Mr. Steedman indicating the response you receive from those departments.

Mr. BOWRON. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any further questions by members of the committee?

Mr. MUNDT. One other question.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. I have received some letters and others have told me in conversations privately, that they have tried to do the thing that we have all tried to do with great futility so far, and that is to distinguish between a loyal and disloyal Japanese. I quite agree with you the whole group probably is not bad, but the difficulty is to find those who are.

It has been suggested that the Christian Japanese can be counted upon for their loyalty whereas those who have maintained their aboriginal religions, which I think we know as Buddhism or Shintoism, would be more inclined to be disloyal. Is there anything in your experience which would either verify or disprove that theory?

Mr. BOWRON. No. As a matter of fact, those here whom we suspect the most profess the Christian religion.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Mayor, I have one question I would like to ask before you conclude your testimony.

I would like to direct your attention particularly to a Japanese known as Kiyoshi P. Okura, who was an examiner in the Civil Service Commission of Los Angeles.

Is it your information that Kiyoshi P. Okura has been released from a relocation center?

Mr. BOWRON. It is my information that he has been released and is now in a place where he is influencing the philosophy of the future citizens of this country, in an institution that cares for boys.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think it is a dangerous place for Mr. Okura to be?

Mr. BOWRON. I think it is very dangerous; possibly not immediately for the purposes of the war but certainly we are not interested in

molding the thoughts of our future citizens along the lines that we believe his philosophy to be.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the War Relocation Authority communicate with you regarding the release of Mr. Okura?

Mr. BOWRON. I have had no communication from any source relative to him. My information was merely incidental and came to me from some friends of mine.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The reason for the question is that we have had assurances from the officials at the Relocation Center at Poston, that they communicated with the former employers of all Japanese before releasing them.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your having come before us this morning, Mayor. I do know you are quite busy and I want to thank you for your testimony. We believe it has been quite helpful in giving us the general picture as to the local attitude toward the Japanese, and also your beliefs concerning the danger and the menace the Japanese might be if allowed to return to either the Pacific coast area or to be scattered even generally throughout the country.

We thank you very much.

Mr. BOWRON. And I thank you for this opportunity.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a short recess.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

In view of the testimony which was presented to the committee just as the mayor was leaving, I think it might be well for Mr. Steedman to elaborate somewhat upon that information. For that reason I am going to ask Mr. Steedman to be sworn.

### TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. STEEDMAN, INVESTIGATOR, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman, in the process of questioning Mayor Bowron, the matter of the employment of this man Okura came up.

Do you know the name of the institution at which Okura is now employed? Have you received any definite information as to where he went from the relocation camp?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I haven't checked on that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. You personally do not know the name of the institution? For the purposes of the record, it is my understanding that the school is Father Flannagan's Boys Town in Nebraska.

I am quite sure that there won't be much opportunity for Mr. Okura to indulge in any subversive or un-American activities at Boys Town, and I am quite confident, and I am sure the people of the country realize that Father Flannagan conducts a very American institution there, and if any subversive activities were attempted Father Flannagan would know about it and immediately release Mr. Okura from his employment.

You don't know what type of work he might be doing there, do you?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No; I do not, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I judge from the statement of the mayor that the War Relocation authorities did not consult with the mayor concerning Okura's background and, therefore, did not release that information

to Father Flannagan at the time that he was released to him for employment.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe that is the testimony of the mayor; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I wonder if you would read into the record the testimony before the Dies committee which has been previously printed, concerning Mr. Okura.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am reading from appendix VI, Report on Japanese Activities entitled "Hearings Before a Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, First Session on House Resolution 282, page 1782:

However, in the operation of their espionage system, the Japanese were not easily discouraged. Working through the Civil Service Commission, Japanese were able to infiltrate Japanese-Americans into the department of water and power. Kiyoshi P. Okura has for some time past been the chief examiner of the Los Angeles Civil Service Commission. He is the son of Momota Okura, who was the commandant of the Southern California Imperial Veterans Association (Japanese) and an adviser for the Central Japanese Association. Momota Okura was an alien Japanese, and being a Japanese war veteran, was under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Government. Momota Okura has been arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is now being detained. So much for the background of Kiyoshi P. Okura's father, Momota Okura.

Kiyoshi P. Okura was a director of social relations in the Southern California Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a Japanese governmental agency. In his official position as chief examiner of the Los Angeles Civil Service Commission, he was helpful to Japanese-Americans desirous of obtaining positions with the Los Angeles city government, and this was especially true with reference to the Los Angeles City Water and Power Department.

It is significant that prior to the Japanese consulate's request, only one Japanese-American was on the pay roll of the department of water and power in Los Angeles, whereas subsequent to his request, 12 additional Japanese-Americans were placed on the pay roll of that department. A list of those employees, together with information as to residence, birthplace, birth date, class, status, division, and location, and length of service, is given below at the end of this subsection.

While it is true that these Japanese-American employees of the department of water and power complied with the legal requirements of the civil service commission and they were the ones duly certified to the department of water and power when that branch of the city government requested technical help, investigation has revealed that Kiyoshi P. Okura made it a point to help Japanese-Americans secure employment with the department of water and power.

Since the committee's exposure of the number of Japanese employed in the department of water and power, the Honorable Fletcher T. Bowron, mayor of the city of Los Angeles, has taken prompt action and has suspended not only the 13 Japanese working in that department but all other Japanese employed by the city. The Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County has taken similar action and has suspended all Japanese in the county's employ.

That is the end of the quotation, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUNDT. I think we might also add for the record right there, as an indication of the possible far-reaching implications of releasing a man like Okura from the relocation center without providing his prospective employer with a full and faithful record of his past activities, that it should be added that at this particular school where it is alleged he is located, he is close to one of the vital nerve centers of the defense industries of America, because Omaha is a great transportation center. It is near a tremendous development in aviation and is close to a number of power centers and power plants in Nebraska.

The emphasis is the importance of protecting prospective employers by giving them, from the relocation centers, a complete report and it is highly unfortunate that those reports are not being made available now.



Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman, in view of the location of the city of Los Angeles perhaps there is nothing more vital here than the supply of water and power, is that not correct?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, being a semiarid country the city depends very largely upon its water supply which comes from a great distance.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is my information.

Mr. COSTELLO. And these Japanese who had been employed by the department of water and power were therefore in a position to obtain very accurate and definite information as to the location of the dams, the city reservoirs, the aqueducts, as well as the power stations and the power lines leading from the sources of water supply into the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe the mayor so testified this morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those persons being in that particular agency of the city government had access to very accurate, detailed information concerning the most vital thing in southern California, namely, water and power supply to this great metropolitan area and if there was any desire to commit sabotage that one vital thing would be the most practical thing to assault and if they were at all successful in destroying the supply of water to this city it would mean the stoppage of the industrial production that is now taking place here in this county am I correct?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think your statement is correct. I think in order to answer it fully it would be necessary to go into the job classifications of the Japanese who were employed in the city's department of water and power.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is published in a public document of the committee, is it not?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right; on page 1783 of appendix VI, the report from which I read a moment ago, on Japanese activities.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the fact it is already published, I don't think it is necessary for us to incorporate it in this record, but it is your understanding that those Japanese were employed in very key positions which made very accurate and valuable information available to them; is that not true?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would say they had access to the various records compiled by the department of water and power.

Mr. COSTELLO. Maps and so forth?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes. In connection with their positions I will be glad to read into the record the job classifications if the committee would like to have that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman, do you have the date on which they were discharged from service, or were they all released from service at the same time?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I can't answer that question just at this time, Mr. Chairman. I am not prepared to give you that information.

Mr. COSTELLO. The suggestion has been made that the list of names as tabulated in the former report be incorporated into this record. If there is no objection on the part of the committee that table will be reproduced in the report at this point.

(The public document referred to was made a part of the record by reference and is as follows:)



*Japanese employed in the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power*

Name and address	Birthplace and birth date	Class	Status	Division and location	Length of service
Fukuda, Ernest T., 2040 West 30th St., Hamaji, Roy S., 1940 West El Segundo, Inouye, Kikuyo L., 121 S. Soto St., Itou, Masaki D., 1021 Towne Ave	Territory of Hawaii, July 14, 1903. Olney, Colo., May 20, 1922 Los Angeles. Fresno, Calif.	Junior civil engineer "A," Junior clerk Junior clerk-typist Electrical tester	Civil service do do do	Water distribution system, 410 Ducommun St. Commercial division, 302 Broad- Accounting division, room 430, 2d St. Bldg. Test laboratories, 1630 N. Main St.	Since Apr. 23, 1928. Since Nov. 24, 1941. Since Mar. 1, 1940. Since Sept. 19, 1935.
Kataoka, Takio, 2637 East 24 St. Katow, Takeyuki, 2630 East 1st St. Kingi, Inomata, 857 East 43d St	Los Angeles, Oct. 8, 1915. Los Angeles, Feb. 27, 1918. Kashiwazaki, Japan, Dec. 10, 1898. Naturalization papers No. 890216 Pensacola, Fla., Jan. 29, 1919. Los Angeles, Feb. 24, 1915.	Junior clerk Structural draftsman Janitor	do do do	Commercial division, Civic Center Bldg. Power drafting, room 1228, 2d St. Bldg. Test laboratories, 1630 North Main St.	Feb. 5, 1940, to July 15, 1940. Since Mar. 17, 1941. Since July 1, 1940. Since Apr. 14, 1937.
Kinoshita, Robert, 1524 West 36th Pl. Kimura, Harold H., 3816 Oakwood St. Narabara, Shizuko, 1507 West 25th Pl. Okabe, Thomas M., 804 East 3d St	Fresno, Calif., Mar. 8, 1914. Fresno, Calif., June 17, 1917 Los Angeles, Dec. 29, 1918. Oakland, Calif., Jan. 1, 1916.	Structural draftsman do Junior clerk-typist Junior clerk	Emergency Civil service do do	Power drafting, room 1228, 2d St. Bldg. do Accounting division, room 430, 2d St. Bldg. Test laboratories, 1630 North Main St.	Since Aug. 11, 1941. Since May 1, 1939. Since Jan. 29, 1940. Since Jan. 16, 1940.
Ueyehara, Hiroshi, 1007 South Soto St. Yoshida, Akira G., 1610 East 1st St	Los Angeles, Sept. 29, 1913.	Electrical draftsman Junior mechanical engineer "A."	Emergency Civil service	Power drafting, room 1228, 2d St. Bldg.	Since Aug. 11, 1941. Since Apr. 14, 1941.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you call your next witness?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The next witness is Mr. Jesse L. Elliott, who is the sheriff of Orange County. Orange County adjoins Los Angeles County on the south.

Mr. COSTELLO. We are very glad to have you with us, Mr. Elliott. Will you stand and be sworn.

**TESTIMONY OF JESSE L. ELLIOTT, SHERIFF OF ORANGE COUNTY,  
CALIF.**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your name to the reporter, Mr. Elliott?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Jesse L. Elliott.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may question the witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I requested Sheriff Elliott to come to Los Angeles this morning to give the committee the benefit of his testimony regarding the attitude of the citizens of Orange County toward the Japanese and what their reaction would be were the Japanese to return to the Pacific coast.

I believe Sheriff Elliott has a statement he would like to make to the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. We are very happy to hear you, Sheriff, and appreciate any statement you feel would be appropriate.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Orange County, as you gentlemen know, is an agricultural section of the State.

There were a number of Japanese people living in Orange County prior to the evacuation, being occupied mostly in agricultural pursuits and in the various phases of agriculture.

The people of Orange County do not feel that they want the Japanese returned to their former homes or places occupied by them, particularly during the existing emergency.

I have conferred with a number of our citizens, old-time farmers as we would term them, and in no uncertain way do they express themselves that they will not tolerate the return of the Japanese people during this emergency.

I have conferred with many of the marines and soldiers who have had service in the south Pacific area and we are fearful if the Japanese are returned as to what will happen.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have a considerable number of returned marines and soldiers who are located in Orange County?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you feel that their attitude toward all Japanese would be extremely hostile because of the things that they witnessed in the course of warfare?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; and the experiences that they have had.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you care to state briefly some of those instances as they may have related them to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We have in Orange County many military placements at the present time. We have a large Marine Corps place-

ment. There are many men there from the south Pacific sector being reconditioned.

Is this for the press now?

Mr. COSTELLO. At the moment it is on the record but if there is anything you feel should not be made public, we can direct it be off the record and it will not be repeated. We have that understanding and assurance from all the press representatives here today.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The expression of the majority of these servicemen is:<sup>2</sup>

Mr. COSTELLO. Have any of the men stated to you any particular instance in the south seas that led up to their expression of hostility toward the Japanese soldiers?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; they have related what they have been through; the experiences of having their buddies killed, blown to pieces beside them; the treatment received by their buddies when captured by the Japanese; the way they treated wounded men, and the general conditions existing over in the south Pacific-Guadalcanal and the other islands on which they have had service.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I think in view of the fact we have a large number of American boys who are prisoners of the Japanese, that the sheriff's statement about the killing of the Japanese should be off the record. It can do no good and might do harm.

Mr. ELLIOTT. What we want to do is enforce the law. If we are going to protect the people who are held as hostages over there, it is necessary to protect these people here and we feel by returning them to the coastal area should something unfortunate happen to one of the Japanese people, no doubt retaliatory measures would immediately be taken on the other section of the front and that is the thing we are interested in.

Mr. COSTELLO. In talking with some of these returned servicemen, you find they verified the many stories that have been published from time to time regarding the treachery on the part of the Japanese?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. For example, a wounded Japanese having a hand grenade under him and when they go to pick him up and bring him in, the hand grenade would discharge, and things of that character.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have they told you of a large number of such instances?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you any questions, Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any further statement you wish to make, Mr. Sheriff?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not at this time, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have another witness from Orange County whom I would like to have sworn next. His name is Mr. Frank C. Latham who is with the Farm Bureau of Orange County.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well, Mr. Latham, will you please stand and be sworn?

<sup>2</sup> The expression of the servicemen ordered stricken from the record by Mr. Mundt.

**TESTIMONY OF FRANK C. LATHAM, IMMEDIATE AND PAST  
PRESIDENT OF ORANGE COUNTY, CALIF., FARM BUREAU**

The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your name for the record?

Mr. LATHAM. Frank C. Latham.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what is your occupation, Mr. Latham?

Mr. LATHAM. I am a rancher—farmer, citrus grower rather, the immediate and past president of the Orange County Farm Bureau.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you proceed with your questions, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many members does the Orange County Farm Bureau have among the ranchers, farmers, and orange growers in Orange County?

Mr. LATHAM. At the present time we have about 1,740.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was a large number of Japanese employed on the ranches and in various other agricultural enterprises in Orange County prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. LATHAM. No. A Japanese refuses to work for white people. They do their own farming and work for each other.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is in regard to agricultural activities?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they do work as domestics?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; but in agricultural pursuits they work among their own people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the general attitude of the farmers and ranchers of Orange County toward the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast?

Mr. LATHAM. The general opinion, with a very few and rare exceptions, is that during this emergency it would be a big mistake to return them to the coast.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are farming operations in Orange County continuing as usual with the Japanese gone?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes. I have here if you care for a copy of it, the acreage and the crops that were grown by the Japanese in Orange County; the amount of acreage that was owned by the Japanese, and I wish to say that that land is all being farmed now. We are not growing some of the crops that they did. We are stressing the more essential crops. It is harder to get your strawberries and a few things like that than in the past but the land is being farmed and farmed efficiently—as efficiently as it can be with the present labor situation.

Mr. COSTELLO. The change in the type of crops is due, possibly, to a shortage of manpower and so you are putting in crops that do not require as much labor, is that correct?

Mr. LATHAM. That is correct; and also there are some crops that we list as nonessential to the war effort that we are discontinuing and we are trying to grow crops that are necessary to help win the war.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is your opinion that the people of Orange County do not want the Japanese returned to that locality?

Mr. LATHAM. I know very definitely that they will not allow them to be their neighbors like they were in the past during this emergency. There are too many of them that have boys who are in the service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And it is your belief their return would complicate law enforcement?



Mr. LATHAM. Very definitely.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have the statement you referred to?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; I have a statement. I wish to clarify this statement. This was taken shortly after Pearl Harbor and some of these crops and acreages may be off one way or the other. We found when we were taking this inventory that the Japanese were such liars you could not depend on them. This gives the number of acres that are owned. The Japanese in Orange County are mostly just small farmers; it would be a family unit or two or three families and that is equally true regarding acreage that they leased and also the acreage that they owned. There were no large holdings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you discussed with any of the white Americans who have taken over the lands formerly farmed by the Japanese, the manner in which such transfers was accomplished?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir; I have. I was very much interested in that at the time and the Japanese got the best of the deal.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they misrepresent the condition of the soil?

Mr. LATHAM. That is true.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they misrepresent to those acquiring the land from them that growing crops had been properly fertilized when such was not the fact?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; there were very few of the crops that were fertilized during the year of 1942—that is spring fertilizer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese assure the white Americans who bought these places that the lands had been fertilized?

Mr. LATHAM. In some cases they did—that is true.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has that been reported to you?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Were there any Japanese members of the Farm Bureau?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; we had a small membership in the Farm Bureau. I think there were 30 or 40 or something like that. We gave them quite a bit of service—that is personal service. We were trying to help them on their labor situation. They were always low on the price that they would pay labor.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the Farm Bureau solicit those memberships or did they sort of push themselves into the organization?

Mr. LATHAM. They were solicited in most cases.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they make, apparently, good cooperative farmers or did they form a clique or bloc within the organization?

Mr. LATHAM. No. They took very little part in the activities of the Farm Bureau while obtaining a good many services that the Farm Bureau provides.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the nature of the arrangement which has been made with the Japanese owners by the white farmer? Have they bought the Japanese farms in each case or do they rent them from the Japanese?

Mr. LATHAM. The Japanese refused to sell. In fact, the last few days or the last month before the Japanese left Orange County, they bought as much acreage as they possibly could.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Japanese actually increased their holdings at the time they were being evacuated?

Mr. LATHAM. That is correct. In the months of March and April of 1942 they increased their holdings wherever they could, in Orange County.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that indicated on the statement that you have?

Mr. LATHAM. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. The statement would be indicative of the holdings of Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. LATHAM. That statement is the acreage which was taken immediately after the Japanese were evacuated.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would that indicate the increased buyings on the part of the Japanese?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; that is true. Now, that acreage, I would say, is possibly 95 percent accurate. There have been a few changes.

Mr. COSTELLO. The statement indicates that 10,000 acres were farmed by the Japanese?

Mr. LATHAM. That is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. And of that amount 1,175 acres were actually owned by the Japanese?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. What percentage of that Japanese-owned acreage was purchased during the last few months or few weeks before evacuation?

Mr. LATHAM. I would be unable to answer that accurately, but they purchased wherever they were able to.

Mr. COSTELLO. If they had the funds they immediately endeavored to acquire title to the property?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has any of this Japanese-owned land been sold that you know of?

Mr. LATHAM. I am under the impression that the Excelsior Ranch Co. bought one piece.

Mr. COSTELLO. Other than that you know of no other?

Mr. LATHAM. I don't know of any other. I know of people who have written to them asking if they would sell or place it on the market but they have been unable to buy any. We have had very poor cooperation with them as far as their farm implements go.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they have a large amount of farm machinery?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; there was a large amount of farm implements and they were asked to sell their lease and in most cases they even refused to answer the correspondence and where they did they absolutely refused.

I have a fairly accurate list of the machinery here. I would kind of like to keep it due to the fact that we have a law now that we will be able to acquire title to this farm machinery.

Mr. MUNDT. A State law?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Can you briefly tell for the record the provisions of that law? I am not familiar with it.

Mr. LATHAM. Well, the procedure is the Japanese will be contacted and asked if he will sell at a fair price. Now, that price will be through an appraisal board. If he doesn't answer that communication the U. S. D. A. War Board will have the authority to acquire that machinery through legal procedure.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that will be through the process of eminent domain in the name of the State?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, and sell it. Now, the sales of that will be made upon the need. In other words the farmer purchasing it will have to show need for it before he will be allowed to purchase it.

Mr. COSTELLO. The title to the farm implements would be acquired by the State and then subsequently sold by the State to the farmers?

Mr. LATHAM. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where is this farm machinery stored at the present time?

Mr. LATHAM. In various places.

Mr. COSTELLO. No one spot?

Mr. LATHAM. On different ranches throughout the country.

Mr. MUNDT. Big machinery like trucks and tractors?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; there are many heavy tractors and lots of small truck gardening tractors.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would it take much time to read that?

Mr. COSTELLO. How long is the statement regarding the machinery?

Mr. LATHAM. It is quite long.

Mr. MUNDT. Just read it as far as it applies to the bigger machinery like trucks and tractors and motor-driven machinery.

Mr. LATHAM. On one ranch just west of Santa Ana, about 3 miles, one International tractor, one Oliver road tractor—

Mr. MUNDT. You don't have those totaled, do you, by classification?

Mr. LATHAM. But this gives a complete list of all the farming equipment.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it has not been totaled?

Mr. LATHAM. No. We have here the different tractors and so forth.

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean do you have the total number?

Mr. LATHAM. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me ask you a question about this law. Is this a new law?

Mr. LATHAM. That is a new law that was passed during the last session of the legislature.

Mr. MUNDT. Have any of the constitutional lawyers of California expressed some skepticism of the constitutionality of a law like that or do they seem to be fairly well agreed it is going to be okay?

Mr. LATHAM. The attorney general—

Mr. COSTELLO. It is my understanding that the Governor signed that bill.

Mr. LATHAM. That is correct; the Governor signed it.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the Governor was previously the attorney general of the State?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes. And the attorney general is working with the district attorneys in the various counties so there will be a uniform procedure throughout the State in acquiring this machinery.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it would be your belief the Governor would not have signed the bill, in view of his legal background, unless he felt reasonably sure the law would be constitutional?

Mr. LATHAM. That is my opinion; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Regarding the leases of acreage by the Japanese: Are those long-term leases? Do they run over a period of 2 or 3 years from the time of evacuation?

Mr. LATHAM. You mean the leases of the farmers that have taken over the Japanese lands?

Mr. COSTELLO. No; the leases which the Japanese themselves held.

Mr. LATHAM. Most of their leases were long-time leases, but they were quitclaimed at the time the Japanese left.

Mr. COSTELLO. The leases were actually turned over to other persons?

Mr. LATHAM. Either to other persons or turned back to the owner of the land.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that the Japs do not continue to hold leased land and keep it out of production in any way?

Mr. LATHAM. No; the Japs, to the best of my knowledge, have no leases in Orange County at the present time.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the land which they own and which they refuse to sell, have they made leases of their lands to white farmers?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; to white farmers or Mexicans. The land is being farmed—the land that was sold to the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that all the 10,000 acres formerly farmed by the Japanese are still being cultivated?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; all except what the United States Government has taken over for military purposes.

Mr. COSTELLO. If there is no objection, the statement regarding the Japanese farming in Orange County will be received as an exhibit and made a part of the record.

**(The document referred to was marked "Latham Exhibit No. 1".)**

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Latham, what would you say as to agricultural production this year without the Japanese as compared with what it was when the Japanese were there?

Mr. LATHAM. I would say in our essential crops that it will be greater; that is, the acreage will be greater.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What will be the final result? Will there be more essential crops produced without the Japanese than if they were here?

Mr. LATHAM. I will answer that in this way: Some of the acreage that was in nonessential crops is in essential crops now and I believe it would be reasonable to assume that there will be more produced.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You say in many instances the Japanese farmers did not fertilize their land in 1942. Was that unusual?

Mr. LATHAM. That was very unusual.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When does the fertilizing usually take place?

Mr. LATHAM. I might say in order to give you a little background on that, they raise several crops a year. As soon as one crop is harvested another is immediately planted, so fertilizing is a continuous program throughout the year with each crop, but commercial fertilizers are generally applied in the spring—January, February, and March.

They were unable to obtain credit in 1942 due to the fact that the people that controlled the credit felt that they would be evacuated.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In 1942?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes; 1942, and they were unable to obtain credit to purchase the fertilizer.



Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have one question.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the farm machinery which belonged to the Japanese been properly cared for since their evacuation?

Mr. LATHAM. In some cases it has been stored in good shape. In other cases it has just been run up in the corner and weeds are higher than the tractors. There are many of the tractors that the motors are frozen on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has there been considerable deterioration in the automotive equipment that was formerly used by the Japanese?

Mr. LATHAM. That is correct. There are a good many of the trucks and cars that they own that the tires were allowed to deteriorate on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Some of them are setting out in the weather?

Mr. LATHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do I understand that a native Californian like you is saying it is cold enough out here to freeze the motors of a lot of tractors during the winter time?

Mr. COSTELLO. That is entirely off the record.

Mr. MUNDT. That is really news.

Mr. LATHAM. I don't happen to be a native but I know the difference between the two freezings.

Mr. COSTELLO. "California freezes" are very temporary things. They don't last but a short time?

Mr. LATHAM. That is correct. They last just a few hours.

Mr. MUNDT. Very unusual.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate, Mr. Latham and Mr. Elliott, your coming up from Orange County. We appreciate it is quite a trip and we feel your testimony will be helpful.

Mr. ELLIOTT. And thank you for the opportunity to come up here.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a 5-minute recess at this time.

(Thereupon a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Will you call the next witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Wickersham is our next witness. He is the chief warehouseman at Poston Center.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please stand and be sworn.

**TESTIMONY OF ERNEST S. WICKERSHAM, CHIEF WAREHOUSEMAN, COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT, POSTON, ARIZ.**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your name for the record and your occupation?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Ernest S. Wickersham; chief warehouseman at Poston, Ariz.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you proceed with the interrogation of the witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Do you mean my personal address?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; your personal address.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Parker, Ariz., box 1633.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you live inside the center at Poston or in the town of Parker?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I live in Parker.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where do you live, Mr. Wickersham?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I live in what they call Silver City irrigation headquarters at Parker.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you travel back and forth by automobile every day to the center?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born, Mr. Wickersham?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Bowie, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I will have to do some figuring; 56 years ago.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What is your birthday?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. April 15.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever served in the United States Army?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. From, I think it was June 6, 1916, to, I think, back in 1919. Just about 6 days less than 3 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you serve overseas?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you a member of any organizations?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. The American Legion.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you state briefly for the committee what your educational training has been?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Most of my schooling was in Los Angeles up to about the tenth grade.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You attended school to the tenth grade?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of work have you been engaged in during your life?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Cattle business, banking mostly, wholesale grocery.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where have you lived during your life?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I spent most of my life in Safford, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you take your present position at the Poston Center?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. April 8, a year ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. April 8, 1942?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that was just after the project went under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority, is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, the project wasn't completed at that time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But it was under the jurisdiction of the W. R. A?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to going to Poston had you had any Government experience?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Worked for the Soil Conservation Service at Safford and was transferred from there to the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you first go to work for the Soil Conservation Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I think it was about 8 years ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you been working for the Government continuously since that time?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your starting salary with the Soil Conservation Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I think it was \$1,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your title at that time?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Principal clerk.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And were you stationed at Safford, Ariz?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you were later transferred to the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When were you transferred?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't remember the exact date. It was when the reorganization took place.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Can you give us the approximate date?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. July about—I don't remember the exact date. It was when the relocation took place—when the Indian Service took over so many of the Soil Conservation employees.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of work were you engaged in while with the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Warehousing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what was your starting salary with the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. \$1,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And how long were you employed by the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. About 4 years, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you resign from the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you transferred?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you transfer from the Indian Service over to the W. R. A.?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your salary with the Indian Service at the time you transferred to the W. R. A.?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. \$1,800.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your starting salary with the W. R. A.?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. \$2,600.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present salary?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I mean \$2,900.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When you went from the Indian Service to the W. R. A. your salary was increased from \$1,800 a year to \$2,900 a year?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir. I only been at \$1,800 for 7 months. Prior to that it was \$2,300.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You had a reduction in salary?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Back to \$1,800?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir. And then when I went——

Mr. STEEDMAN. When you went with the W. R. A. your salary was increased to \$2,900?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were your duties more important to the W. R. A. than they were in the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. More responsibility?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir. Only had one warehouse in the Indian Service and I have got 90 with the W. R. A.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What are your duties and responsibilities at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I am receiving agent for all supplies that are shipped into the war relocation project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the responsibility of supervising the Caucasian employees?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; in the warehouse department.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the responsibility of supervising the Japanese employees?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is your immediate superior?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Mr. Fred M. Haverland, transportation and supply officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And his immediate superior is Mr. A. W. Empie, is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Caucasian employees are working for you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Seven.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then 8 Caucasian employees supervise, I believe you said, 90 warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Japanese employees are working under you in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. At the present I have 42. I have had as high as 130.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you able to accomplish as much with the 42 as you were with 130?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not quite.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How does it happen that you have only 42 at the present time?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I couldn't answer that. Just doesn't seem to be available. I think it is due to the fact that the majority of the workers have went to the net factories.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you requested the Employment Office to send you additional employees?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Numerous times.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any success?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese like to work in the warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I think they do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had you had any actual experience working Japanese prior to going to Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had you lived in any communities where Japanese resided?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I spent vacations where they resided.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Twenty-five miles out of Fresno at Orange Cove.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You had seen some Japanese prior to going to Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you speak the Japanese language?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Didn't you say you went to school in Los Angeles?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Until the tenth grade?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Were there Japanese in Los Angeles at that time?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Some at the Polytechnic High School when I went there.

Mr. MUNDT. Some of them attended the same school you attended?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any trouble with the Japanese under your supervision in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I wouldn't call it trouble; I would say there is friction.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Between you and the Japanese employees?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please explain to the committee the nature of the friction?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, when I would tell them to do something they would tell me that they didn't do that. I will give you just exactly how it happened.

At the Parker warehouses at the railhead, we had 41 cars on the track to unload, including steel, cement, lumber, subsistence—in fact everything.

I had about 60 Japanese there so I told the foreman to put a crew to unloading steel. He said: "We don't unload that damn junk."

I said: "All right, go unload lumber."

He said: "No; we unloaded lumber yesterday."

I said: "All right, go unload cement."

He said: "We don't unload cement."

Mr. MUNDT. Then what happened?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Nothing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese return to the project following that?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did they do?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Just sat around and finally decided to do something that they wanted to do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they paid for the time they were sitting around?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I assume they were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you in charge of making up the pay rolls for the employees at the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. It is under my supervision; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you approve the hourly pay for these workers who refused to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes. They didn't absolutely quit all day. They sat around and talked for awhile and then picked out the job they wanted to do and proceeded to do it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They wanted to select the type of work that they did?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that the condition generally at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, all I can speak about is my own department.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that generally true in your department?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the situation that exists generally in your department?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is difficult to secure the cooperation of the Japanese?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why is that true?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, I couldn't tell you the reason.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it due to a lack of discipline on the part of the project administration?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, it might be—it might be due to a misunderstanding upon the part of the Japanese. They seem to think all they have to handle is subsistence; anything that is not subsistence they think somebody else should handle.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, all they want to handle is their own food?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And sanitary service, is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That is the conclusion I have arrived at.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In connection with your supervision of the warehouses, have you had any personal difficulty with any of the Japanese?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Do you mean physical?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Any physical encounters?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have the Japanese threatened you at any time?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Oh, they muttered threats and that is about all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of threats?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Oh, I have had a habit of smoking a cigar all the time and they said they were going to ram a cigar down my throat.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the occasion for these threats?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. We happened to get in a load of lumber that day and they were not stacking it the way they should and I went out to correct them and one of them made the remark that, "That was all damn foolishness." I told him it didn't make any difference whether it was damn foolishness or not, that I wanted it stacked my way and he made the remark to the other Japs that, "Some day he would ram a cigar down my throat."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that the only instance of threats having been made to you or about you by the Japanese?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That is the only one that I actually know about—that I heard.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you ever had a Jap at any time lay a hand on you physically?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Have they ever thrown anything at you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you laid hand on a Japanese, physically?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What happened at the railhead when they wouldn't unload steel and wouldn't unload lumber and wouldn't unload cement and they sat down? What did you do? Did you go to them and try individually to urge them to do the work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I only spoke to the foreman of the crew.

Mr. MUNDT. How long did they engage in the sit-down strike?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. From 20 to 30 minutes.

Mr. MUNDT. During that interval you were talking to the foreman?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; the foreman walked off and I went on about my business.

Mr. MUNDT. But of their own volition they gradually started to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the nature of the work they undertook there?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They were unloading some subsistence. I don't recall just exactly what they unloaded.

Mr. MUNDT. And that is not an isolated case; that happened several times in your department?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; it happened several times.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you ever tried telling those fellows, "Either you are going to unload steel or else you are going to get off the pay roll"?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I haven't because I didn't figure that was my part of the job. I report the happenings to my superior and what action he took I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he ever tell them that?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you think it is good policy to determine what kind of stuff they are going to unload and what they are not going to do?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; I do not.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you so advised your superior?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And that is as far as you can go with your authority?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That is as far as I can go.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you advised him of this in writing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever receive a written reply?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't recall that I did.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe there is a warehouse at the railhead at Parker, is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; we have six of them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And in those warehouses material belonging to the center is stored?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Everything.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had so much trouble with the Japanese at the warehouse at Parker that you had to substitute Indians for the Japanese?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are Indians handling the material going into the warehouses at Parker in an efficient manner?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you are not having any trouble with the Indians?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have any goods or materials been lost in transit from Parker to Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your estimate of the amount of material that has been lost?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. One crate of oranges but that wasn't by a Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How was the crate of oranges lost?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. One of the Indian drivers took that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he take it without permission?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What action was taken against him?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. He was tried before the justice of the peace and fined \$50.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There have been no other losses of goods between Parker and Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not that I know of.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is stored in the warehouses at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. What is stored in the warehouses at Poston?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. May I answer it this way?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. You take a town of say 20,000 people and what is required to run those 20,000 people, the small articles are stored in the warehouses—toilet paper, subsistence, pencils, books—everything.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is furniture stored in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of furniture?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Japanese household furniture and also furniture for personnel quarters and office furniture.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is furniture stored there for the personnel quarters that are being built at the present time?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; not at the present time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are any refrigerators stored in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. We have some, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Frigidaires?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I think there are some Frigidaires—all types.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There are all types of electric refrigerators stored in the warehouses at Parker?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they belong to the Japanese?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. To whom do they belong?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. In the Japanese household goods departments there are some refrigerators.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the project purchased any furniture for the homes of the white personnel at the project?



Mr. WICKERSHAM. Do you mean the new homes that have been built?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. There hasn't any come in yet.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the project recently purchased rugs or carpets?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have any shipments of furniture been received from Barker Bros. of Los Angeles in the last 3 or 4 months?

(No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Barker Bros. furniture store here in Los Angeles?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't recall any.

Mr. MUNDT. Would your records show all receipts into the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; and all issues.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you receive a carload of groceries from the Heart Mountain project?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. About when?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. About 3 weeks ago, I think it would be.

Mr. MUNDT. That would be in May?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; I have the date here somewhere—28th of last month.

Mr. MUNDT. 28th of May?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir. Do you want the car number?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. P. F. E. 42844.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to go back for just a minute to the reports you made to your superior about the sit-down strike at the rail head.

To whom were those reports made? What was the name of the superior officer?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That was to Mr. Townsend.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you ever made any similar reports to his successor, Mr. Potter?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; excuse me. The first one was to Mr. Potter and the second one was to Mr. Townsend.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Potter follow Townsend?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Potter was the original chief of supply and transportation and Mr. Townsend was the second and the present—

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Mr. Haverland.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you had occasion to make any such reports to Mr. Haverland?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; but we don't have the Japs up at Parker now.

Mr. MUNDT. You quit using them altogether?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long did you work under Mr. Townsend?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Just the short time he was there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how long he was there?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Townsend attempt to do anything about disciplining the Japanese who refused to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. If he did I never saw any effects of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he ask you to tighten up on discipline in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't recall that he did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What kind of system do you have for keeping records in the warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. We have the regular Indian Service system—store cards which is a perpetual inventory.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that system satisfactory?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you able to keep accurate records with the Indian Service system of accounting for the warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes; fairly so. I was taking into consideration the type—that is taking into consideration the type of employees we have got.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you referring now to the Caucasian employees or to the Japanese employees?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No. The Japanese do all the clerical work; the Caucasians are only supervisors.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The implication of your reply is that you are dependent upon the Japanese to keep up with the details of what is in the warehouses, is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes; under our supervision.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you feel you can trust the Japanese to maintain the records in an honest manner?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Some of them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Not all of them?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there any record of any articles or materials or goods, or anything of any nature whatsoever being removed from the warehouses by the Japanese in an unauthorized manner?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you please state to the committee just what was removed?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. It is impossible to do that because there are numerous little items and the written reports have all been submitted to the Department heads.

For instance, there will be little pieces of fly screen and push switches outlet boxes—small things that they can use in fixing up their quarters, and also stuff they can eat.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you say things they can eat?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Food?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, such as pineapple juice and food that they don't have to cook; oranges and apples and cheese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you kept records of the amount of materials that have been stolen from the warehouses at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Only in memorandums in reporting them to the division head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then your records do not indicate the amount of missing material from the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. You mean in dollars and cents?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Dollars and cents; yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever submitted a statement to your superiors as to the amount of material that you thought was missing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That you determined was missing daily from the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have never made any statement that you thought about \$100 per day was missing from the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any record of the Japanese truck drivers attempting to steal mattresses from the Government?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I have no record of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How often have you ordered an inventory of the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That is continuous, my system is. When posting or deducting an article I will instruct the supervisor to take that amount and go out and check what is in the warehouse.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has that always been the system employed at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And at Parker?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Since the inception of the project?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. How often do you audit that system to see whether it is working accurately or not?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, since we began there hasn't been any real audit of it, but that is going on all the time in all three camps. We just pick out a card at random and have it checked and then we will go to camp 2 and do the same thing and at camp 3, or in my inspection I count the number of articles and go back and check the card.

Mr. MUNDT. You have never had an over-all audit of the entire warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; we have had a partial audit by two investigators, going way back to the time at the beginning, and they had all the records and all the receipts at their disposal.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they find any discrepancies?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; not in our records.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those auditors of the Indian Service?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; they were auditors—they were investigators.

Mr. MUNDT. From where?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I think they were from G-2.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you report on the condition of the inventory to Mr. Townsend during the time he was handling the project?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Report on an inventory? Why?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you keep him advised as to what you had in the warehouses while he was at the project?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No one ever submitted an inventory; he never asked for it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What kind of reports do you submit to your immediate superior regarding the condition of the warehouses and the amount of material and goods stored in them?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. To my immediate superior?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. There is none except all the papers we prepare flow to the main office. The only time we submit an inventory is when they ask for it—a special inventory of certain items or all the items when they ask for it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, we introduced in the record yesterday a memorandum dated December 16, 1942, addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie from H. H. Townsend. I would like to quote today from that memorandum which has already been received in the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I quote:

In the first place an inventory cannot be accurately expected from employees within the warehouse where we know that more than \$100 a day is being misappropriated.

That statement was made by Mr. Townsend in a memorandum to Mr. Empie, dated December 16, 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Townsend receive that information from you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how Mr. Townsend obtained that information?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Townsend discuss that loss with you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You never discussed the loss of Government material from the warehouses with Mr. H. H. Townsend?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you discuss the loss of material from Government warehouses with any other project official?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes; with Mr. Potter and Mr. Haverland and Mr. Empie.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But never with Mr. Townsend?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That question was never brought up?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to quote again from this memorandum:

It is now being generally discussed among the Japanese warehouse people that they will be able to cover up their records and in many instances they have already discussed the matter of hiding out various types of supplies and equipment so that they could not be compelled to show them on their inventory.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that statement is correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; it is not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is an incorrect statement?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where do you think Mr. Townsend received his information?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know, sir. I don't know where he would—how he would arrive, the first place, at the value of the stuff.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He could arrive at an approximate value, couldn't he?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. It would have been very difficult unless he knew just exactly what was stolen and the cost of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there any way you have to ascertain the amount of material that has been improperly removed from the Government warehouses at Poston?



Mr. WICKERSHAM. By checking our perpetual inventory and taking a physical check.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But that has not been done?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it customary to take an inventory of Government property once a year?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then why hasn't that been done at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has Mr. Head instructed you to take an inventory?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Instructions were issued when Mr. Townsend was there. I think what prevented it was the disturbance and that came on shortly afterward.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are referring to the so-called strike or riot; is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Disturbance.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was during November of 1942?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that a strike?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know—I don't think—I don't know what it was.

Mr. MUNDT. I can't hear you.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know what it was. You see here is my position in that, gentlemen: I spend my time between the railhead and camps 1, 2, and 3. I didn't know there was any disturbance or strike or riot or whatever you want to call it until I arrived at Poston camp 1 about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I walked in and nothing was doing and I asked what was the matter and they said: "Well, there is a strike on."

That is the first I knew of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had the Japanese taken a strike vote?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't any information regarding that?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you heard that the Japanese took a strike vote?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you would have heard about it had they taken one, wouldn't you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, rumors would be all. The warehouse department don't get that information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You said on the 18th of November you returned to Poston from Parker and you went to camp No. 1 and no one was working. Will you describe to the committee just what happened at that time?

(No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was going on at camp No. 1 when you arrived there?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Wasn't anything going on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the people congregated before the administration building?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not that I recall; I didn't stop there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any groups marching any place in the camp?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I didn't see any.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see any flags raised or after they had been raised?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you hear any music being played?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was everything in an orderly manner at the camp?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. It was in the warehouse area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the situation at the administration building?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Seemed to be all right. After I heard the news I went up there and it seemed to be very quiet.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did that quietness prevail during the entire 7 days of the strike or riot?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know for this reason: When the strike took place I had to spend my time at the railhead, so I spent 90 percent of my time there and then I returned to Parker or to Poston for a short time and then go back to Parker.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you inside unit No. 1 during the course of the strike?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. In and out of it; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You describe the condition there as being quiet and orderly; is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. All I can answer for on that is, I didn't go over to where the disturbance was; I confined my activities to the warehouse area which is on the outside of the main camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You heard a disturbance and you stayed away; is that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I attended to my own business.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Didn't you feel a curiosity as to what was going on over at unit No. 1?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you later hear what happened at unit No. 1?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you tell the committee what you heard?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I heard they were playing the Japanese national anthem. Whether it was or not I don't know. And they said they put up a Japanese flag but I didn't see it. I never looked for it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many people told you they were playing the Japanese national anthem?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I judge five or six.

Mr. MUNDT. White people or Japanese people?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. White.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It was general knowledge at Poston that they were playing the Japanese national anthem; isn't that correct?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That was the general rumor and discussion and talk.

Mr. MUNDT. How many told you they saw the Japanese flag flying?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I should say about two.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that also the general rumor and talk?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you have any reason to disbelieve the information given you to the effect that the Japanese were playing the Japanese national anthem and flying the Japanese flag inside the center at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't place much confidence in any general conversations in such times as that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you inclined to believe that the Japanese flag was flying?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not know, sir. I don't think so myself.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't think so?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think they were playing the Japanese national anthem?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't think so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't think they were?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Japanese have phonograph records or transcriptions of the Japanese national anthem, the piece known as the Kimagowa, in their homes?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever made a search of their homes?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you at any time been instructed to search the barracks of the Japanese since you went to work at Poston?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I am a warehouseman.

Mr. COSTELLO. If it is all right to break off here, we will take a recess until 20 minutes after 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., the hearing recessed until 2:20 p. m. of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(Whereupon the hearing was resumed at 2:20 p. m., pursuant to the taking of the noon recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Steedman, will you proceed with the interrogation of the witness.

#### TESTIMONY OF ERNEST S. WICKERSHAM—Resumed

Mr. STEEDMAN. In connection with your duties as warehouseman, have you had any occasion to observe the Japanese workers in the warehouses harassing other Japanese workers who were attempting to carry out their duties as prescribed by you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not in the warehouse.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you noticed that at any other places at the project?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have never heard idle Japanese harassing those Japanese who were attempting to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you have never seen any Japanese try to keep other Japanese from working?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has such conduct been reported to you by any of the other Caucasian employees working under you in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In your opinion are the Japanese who are keeping the records in the warehouses honest?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I believe the present force I have—I think they are. You see that has been shifted numerous times until we got what we think are efficient people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any instances of Japanese making incorrect records in the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't know of any such instances?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return for a moment to the occasion at Parker when the Japanese told you they would not work unless they were assigned to some lighter task.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They didn't tell me they wouldn't work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But they told you they wouldn't unload the steel?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they told you they wouldn't unload lumber?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, that was a job you were engaged in at the time, was it not?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there any other work to be done there?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was it?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. As I recall there were about 20 or 25 cars on the track at the time loaded with various things.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you put them to unloading that material?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That I asked them to unload?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did you do?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I just walked over and they talked among themselves and then they went to work unloading subsistence as I recall.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that is the way to maintain discipline?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't think it is; I know it isn't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, what authority do you have over the Japanese who are working for you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. None whatever. The only way that I can punish them is to fire them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a record of how many you have fired?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say you have discharged 10 or 15 or 20?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, I have fired 20 at one time and they put them back to work again.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did you discharge them for?

Mr. COSTELLO. Who put them back to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Some of the higher officials.

Mr. COSTELLO. The white officials of the camp reassigned the same Japanese whom you had fired, to the same job again?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; Mr. Townsend did that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't recall the exact date.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall why you fired them?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the reason?



Mr. WICKERSHAM. I caught five of them stealing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were they stealing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Oranges and groceries.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much did they steal?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They stole about 5 or 6 dozen oranges and 10 or 15 cans of groceries.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you report that back to Mr. Townsend?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you say he returned them to the job immediately?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; it was 3 or 4 days later.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you in mind any other instances that you can relate to the committee wherein Japanese have been guilty of stealing materials out of the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the only instance that has come to your attention?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you took summary action as soon as you learned of the fact that they had stolen groceries?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the stolen goods returned to the warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not all the oranges were returned because they had eaten some of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the canned goods returned?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is the only instance of stealing that you know of that took place in the warehouses over which you had charge?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. At Parker; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a committee composed of Japanese working in the warehouses which you consult with regarding the operation of the warehouses?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has there ever been such a Japanese committee?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not in the warehouses; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How often do the Japanese call upon you, as a committee, regarding the operation of the warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They haven't called recently but they did before about, I should judge, about twice a month.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the nature of these calls?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Oh, it seemed—they seemed to be just seeking general information and the method of handling the materials and supplies.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would they request an interview prior to coming to see you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; they would come in the office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a committee representing the Japanese warehousemen?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, not representing the Japanese warehousemen—representing other departments.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have any other information as to whether Mr. Townsend returned those Japanese to your employment of his own volition or was he asked to do that by someone higher up?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I couldn't say. All I know is he told me that they were down on their knees begging for the job back and I told him that I didn't want them but he returned them just the same.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't know whether that was his idea or the idea of somebody higher up?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say there were 20 men involved in that case?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say they only stole a couple dozen oranges and about 10 or 15 cans of food?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. How were the 20 involved in that stealing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. There was only five of them that did the actual stealing.

Mr. COSTELLO. How were the other 15 implicated in the stealing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They wouldn't work.

Mr. COSTELLO. Wouldn't work because the other five were being discharged?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The other 15 just refused to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they were not involved in the stealing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they didn't give you any reason as to why they didn't want to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; they never do.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they sit down at the time of the stealing or was it after the 5 had been discharged or were all 20 discharged at once?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. After the five were taken to the Japanese police court.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then the other 15 refused to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they the only Japanese that you ever fired from the job?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. Just those 20?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you fire any more after that?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Fire any more?

Mr. MUNDT. After they were returned to you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I would have fired some before that.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that the first offense you had detected?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. That was the only one I ever actually caught myself.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you have any reports from others as to stealing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you take action in those cases?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; I didn't because I didn't have, as you might say, the goods on them.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many other reports did you have regarding stealing?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I would judge about four or five.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there large amounts of foodstuff involved in those stealings?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; small, petty amounts.

Mr. MUNDT. You have had other Japanese refuse to work besides those 20, have you not?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; I have had them refuse to work twice—two different gangs.

Mr. MUNDT. Just that gang and the one at Parker?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, both of these were at Parker. I never had any refuse to work down in camp.

Mr. MUNDT. How far apart were those two instances—the one of the fruit stealing and the one that wouldn't move the cement and lumber?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I judge about a month or 6 weeks apart.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who actually unloaded the steel and lumber?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. On Sundays they would call in all the Caucasians and the Indians and all the machines that were available and we would work as high as 38 men and 3 machines and unload the stuff.

Mr. COSTELLO. But none of the Japanese participated in that unloading?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact weren't these 20 who were involved in the episode you have just related, good workers?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They were when they first started.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they good workers at the time of this occurrence?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; they had slacked off for some reason.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum dated September 18, 1942, addressed to Mr. A. W. Empie:

"Subject: Warehouse unloading situation at Parker," signed by Mr. H. H. Townsend, transportation and supply officer. This memorandum was furnished to me by Mr. Townsend and I would like to read it into the record at this point.

Mr. COSTELLO. You might read the memorandum.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

Unless there is some reason it should not be done, I am attempting to reorganize and install the old crew that was dismissed a few weeks ago due to a similar condition that exists at this time.

Do you recall this memorandum?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what Mr. Townsend was referring to when he refers to "a similar condition?" Did you have another incident like the first one you have mentioned to the committee?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Does he mean he is referring to the first strike or sit-down?

Mr. STEEDMAN. This is dated September 18—before the strike.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. You see there were two strikes at the Parker warehouse before the big disturbance.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were the dates of those strikes?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't recall—about a month or 6 weeks apart.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to November 18, 1942?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were the causes of the two strikes you have just mentioned?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the Japanese who struck under your jurisdiction?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you attempt to ascertain the cause of the strikes?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, for instance, they would get in their trucks at 9:30 and they—they had arrived at 9—one crew would get in the truck and 20 or 30 men drive away. Nothing was said about what was the matter.

The next day they come back and they were asked, "What did you go home for yesterday?"

"Only had eggs for breakfast."

"What else was on the table?"

"Well, that—there was a lot of cereal but we don't eat that junk."

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they just drove off the job?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you report that to the management?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what action did the camp officials take?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't know, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you speak more loudly?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not know what they did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you receive a memorandum in reply to your memorandum advising them of the situation at the warehouse at Parker?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't recall whether I did or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are referring now to the first strike when you say they drove up in their trucks and said they had only had eggs for breakfast?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, no; that was the second strike.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you tell the committee what happened during the first strike?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. We had the men working and I had them split into two crews and I noticed one crew was working very nicely and the other crew was all setting down, so I walked down to the crew that was setting down and I said, "What is the matter?"

Nobody answered. I said, "What in hell is the matter with you?"

They said, "We don't know what we are going to get paid."

So I said, "What has that got to do with working?"

And they said, "We don't want to work until we find out the pay."

So, I proceeded to the office and rang up the main office and they said, "Bring them in."

So, I proceeded to bring them in and they talked to them and sent them back.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And was that Mr. Head?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. At this particular time it was Mr. Evans.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Evans?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Evans give the Japanese any satisfaction?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. He went into some detail to explain to them at that particular time it wasn't decided whether it would be \$16 or \$19 a month.



Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the center paying the workers who were doing the work that you are referring to now?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. They were supposed to be getting \$16.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Evans raise their pay to \$19 a month?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not at that time; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he later?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; it hasn't been raised until just recently.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is \$19 now?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I will continue with the reading of the memorandum:

In checking their records I find that they handled more than 3,000,000 pounds of freight during August under adverse conditions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does that refer to the crew that you discharged because they were stealing Government property?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I would judge that is the crew that set down and was wanting to know what they were going to be paid and also the five members that were caught stealing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That refers to both crews?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; that was the one crew.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

This crew feels that they have been given a bad break and are now willing to take over the job and promise to do a better job of work than they did before. I am convinced that in this instance the Japanese boys are not entirely at fault. The Caucasian management is responsible for the existing conditions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What does he mean by that?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not know, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

It is my intention to work the crew that is now on from 7 to 3 p. m. and the second from 2 to 10 p. m. This will allow the men travel time between their camp and the warehouse. This has been one of the conditions that they have found fault with. They were asked to travel on their own time making their working hours 10 hours instead of 8. We have at this time 30 carloads of freight to be unloaded and I am sure that this emergency can be handled properly from now on.

That is signed "H. H. Townsend."

Mr. STEEDMAN. This is the order directing the men to be put back to work, is it not?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did any of the Caucasian employees at Poston sympathize with those Japanese? \*

Mr. WICKERSHAM. You mean in the warehouse department?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I don't think so, and I don't think they condemn them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the attitude of other employees, employees outside of the warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I couldn't say about those. I am not in close touch with them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you experienced any interference in your work from the community welfare service department?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Not directly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I did not hear your answer.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I said not directly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you indirectly?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what way?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, take for instance they say: "Well, now if these people want to work 2 hours and go home it is all right."

So they work 2 hours and go home.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you give them credit on their time cards for an 8-hour day if they work only 2 hours and go home?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I try to see that their time is cut down to 2 hours or the time they actually worked, but our timekeepers are Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The timekeepers who compile the records for these employees in the warehouse are Japanese also?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you instruct the timekeepers to cut down the number of hours to the actual number of hours that they work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they comply with your instructions?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. In some cases—where I have checked them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What about the situation in cases where you haven't checked them?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, I don't know—I haven't checked them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Don't you check the records each time you tell a timekeeper a certain man has worked only 2 hours?

(No answer.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Don't you ascertain whether or not the timekeeper has complied with your instructions?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. If I tell him that, yes; I check on that. I don't check him every day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you trust the Japanese timekeepers?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Somewhat.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one question.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. As I get it, Mr. Wickersham, the reason you took no disciplinary action at the time these Japanese refused to unload this steel and lumber and cement, was because when you had disciplined them before by dismissing them from the pay roll, they had been put back and you felt it wouldn't be of any use to dismiss these men for refusing to unload this cement and steel and lumber?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the history of the 20 men who were put back to work by the memorandum read by Mr. Steedman a few moments ago? Are they still working in your warehouse?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you fire them again?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, they put in their time riding back and forth and loafing around the warehouse and then the disturbance came along and they never did put Japs back at the Parker warehouse.

Mr. MUNDT. They never went back to work?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No; they never did go back to work.

Mr. MUNDT. You said, with regard to the social welfare workers, that they said if they want to work 2 hours, let them work 2 hours and call it enough. Whom do you mean by "they"?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. The Japanese people.

Mr. MUNDT. You said: "They said it," referring to some social welfare workers. Whom did you mean by "they"? You said they interfered indirectly at times with the Japanese working there.

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Whom did you mean by "they?"

Mr. WICKERSHAM. The social workers.

Mr. COSTELLO. We can't hear you. Will you please speak louder?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. The social workers, as we classify them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who are the social workers? What are the names of those people?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. At that particular time I think it was Miss Findley who was the head of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Anyone else?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I do not know who the rest of them were.

Mr. MUNDT. Is Dr. Powell a social worker there?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. He is now. I don't know whether he was there at that time or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you ever go to Mr. Head and suggest to him that you be given more authority to exercise disciplinary action against these striking Japanese?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir; I have had several conferences with him.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the outcome of those conferences?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Nothing that I could see.

Mr. MUNDT. What would he say about it? How did he think the Japs should be treated? Did he think they should be entitled to strike like that?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Well, he didn't express himself on that particular point.

Mr. MUNDT. You went to him and you said substantially: "Mr. Head, this is what has happened and I think I should be given more authority so we can get more work out of the Japanese," didn't you?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir; I didn't say it in that way. I went to him and explained the difficulties I had doing the work—difficulty in unloading the amount of cars I had—the tonnage that I had to move. I put the facts before him and let him use his own judgment as to what means he was going to use.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you make any recommendations as to improving conditions or increased authority for yourself?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You made no recommendations at all?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Simply set before him the facts?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What did he state to you? Did he make any offer to improve the conditions or improve the situation?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I recall each one would end up: "Well, we will see what can be done."

Mr. COSTELLO. You were satisfied with that and didn't press him any further?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I had to be.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was anything actually done then?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. I couldn't see any results.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as you know Mr. Head took no action whatsoever in spite of the fact that he was notified by you as to the conditions existing there at Parker?

Mr. WICKERSHAM. As far as my knowledge goes I would say yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. That will be all, Mr. Wickersham. We appreciate your coming here.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Wickersham left the stand he handed me a memorandum entitled "Warehouse, July 1, 1942, to May 31, 1943, tonnage unloaded at Parker," and he asked that this memorandum be inserted in the record at the conclusion of his testimony.

Mr. COSTELLO. That shows the tonnage handled through the warehouse at Parker between those dates?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, the memorandum will be submitted for the record.

(The memorandum referred to is as follows:)

	<i>Tons</i>		<i>Tons</i>
Lumber-----	6, 806	Other by truck:	
Dry subsistence-----	4, 358	Milk-----	1, 757
Produce-----	3, 616	Stove oil (gallons	
Meat and eggs-----	655	1,873,755)-----	6, 558
Machinery (tanks, trucks, etc.)..	606	Bread-----	634
Cement, sand, rock-----	3, 703	Miscellaneous (food and	
Japanese household goods-----	574	all other type)-----	8, 000
Pipe, steel, tools, etc-----	1, 161		
Miscellaneous-----	2, 954		
		Total (82,808,398	
		pounds)-----	<sup>1</sup> 41, 404
Total (48,909,646		Monthly tonnage, Parker-----	2, 446
pounds)-----	<sup>1</sup> 24, 460	Total monthly tonnage, Parker--	4, 140

<sup>1</sup> Approximate.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you call your next witness, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Odeмар.

### TESTIMONY OF WALTER H. ODEMAR, GRAND TRUSTEE, NATIVE SONS OF THE GOLDEN WEST

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Odeмар, will you give the reporter your name and address?

Mr. ODEMAR. Walter H. Odeмар. My offices are 820 Rowan Building in the city of Los Angeles.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, and Mr. Steedman, I am grand trustee of the Native Sons of the Golden West. In behalf of the Native Sons of the Golden West and of the board of grand officers, as well as individually as a citizen, I wish to state that it is the opinion of the group whom I represent that they are unequivocally opposed to the return of the Japanese to the areas from which they were taken and placed in the relocation centers—more particularly, of course, to California.

We are in favor and have made many appropriate resolutions which have been sent to the various members of the various delegations in the House of Representatives from California.



We favor the placing of the relocation centers in the hands of the United States Army.

In taking that position and being opposed to the return of the Japanese to the areas from which they were taken, we are being consistent with the policy of our organization for all of this century.

If I may I will illustrate that consistency by working backward from the present date.

At the last two sessions of the California Legislature, prior to the session that has just adjourned, among other things we were desirous of having passed in California for the protection of our coast, the so-called alien fishing bills.

By appropriate resolutions we asked the California Legislature to pass those bills, bills which would make it mandatory that fishing boats leaving the harbors in California, be wholly manned as well as wholly owned by American citizens.

We had representatives appear before the committees hearing those bills. We were very greatly disappointed when at each of those two sessions the bill was not passed out of the committee but withheld in committee and allowed to die there.

In 1942, along with the American Legion in California, the State Grange of California and the A. F. of L. of California, we appeared before the Senate immigration committee through an organization they helped create and of which we were a member with those other three organizations, known as the California Joint Immigration Committee, with offices in San Francisco.

Three of the members of that committee appeared before the senate committee. Two of those members were illustrious members of our organization—ex-Senator James Phelan and Valentine S. McClatchey—and I would like to refer the members of this committee to the report of the hearings before the Committee on Immigration in the United States Senate, of the Sixty-eighth Congress, first session on Senate bill 2756, and particularly the testimony of those gentlemen, the two whom I have mentioned, together with U. S. Webb until recently the attorney general of the State of California, on the dates of March 11, 12, 13, and 15, 1924.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What is the date?

Mr. ODEMAR. 1924.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What session of Congress was that?

Mr. ODEMAR. Sixty-eighth. That was when the committee was considering the five bills before the Senate on immigration and finally passed the oriental exclusion provisions of the Immigration Act.

If the committee would have the time I would like to refer that report to the committee for it contains by the three gentlemen I have mentioned, testimony which is equally true today for the problem before this committee.

The statements made there, some of which were prognostications, are actually the facts today.

Before that we were instrumental and pride ourselves in the work which our members at that time, in 1920, performed in having the initiative proposition No. 1, in 1920, in California, the alien land law put over by an overwhelming majority—six-hundred-odd thousand to 24,000, which was an amendment attempting to put teeth in the California alien land law, for the alien land law of 1913, which had

been passed by the legislature of that year, and was found to be wanting in its provisions.

We were very instrumental in having that first alien land bill in 1913 passed.

In 1910 when there were a number of bills before the State legislature at Sacramento on broad Japanese questions, many members of our order were members of that legislature and we, of course, bowed to the request of President Theodore Roosevelt and none of those acts were passed by the legislature at that time; and I am speaking of the State legislature now.

In 1908 and 1909 we were attempting to tell the people on the Pacific coast of the problem that would some day arise but yielded again to the request from the State Department in Washington to go easy on the question.

So you can see we are not "Johnnie come late" with our facts, but relate back to the time when the Japanese were not nearly as numerous and the problem could have been prevented had a committee such as this made a study of the problem.

If I may, and I know this committee does not have the problem before it, state that we are also unequivocally opposed to the amendment of any immigration law or naturalization law, such as is before the House and which I have read lately was tabled in committee by a vote of 9 to 8, just 2 or 3 days ago.

We sincerely hope that the Members of the House of Representatives here today if they ever have an opportunity—if the opportunity comes to them to vote on those bills, that the immigration laws and the naturalization laws be not amended at least during the duration and until a time when the problem can be seen more broadly than it can at present.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that complete your statement?

Mr. ODEMAR. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You felt the passage of the fishing acts, to which you have had reference, would have been beneficial in handling the Japanese situation, particularly in our harbors?

Mr. ODEMAR. We did definitely and in that regard we assisted in having available the head of the Navy Intelligence of this district appear before the committee and give his views thereon.

Mr. COSTELLO. Because of evidence that had been uncovered regarding the activities and the knowledge of the Japanese fishermen of our harbors, he felt it was necessary that a restraint be placed upon them?

Mr. ODEMAR. That is true, together with the construction of their boats and the size of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. The indication was that the fishing boats might have been used for military purposes and that the Japanese engaged in fishing were actually engaged in subversive activities?

Mr. ODEMAR. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think that is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask one question for the sake of the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many members are there in the organization you represent here today?

Mr. ODEMAR. Approximately 20,000 from San Diego to Eureka.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When was the organization founded or first established?

Mr. ODEMAR. On the 11th of July 1875.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you call your next witness, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Meyer.

**TESTIMONY OF ELDRED L. MEYER, PAST GRAND PRESIDENT,  
NATIVE SONS OF THE GOLDEN WEST**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your name for the record?

Mr. MEYER. Eldred L. Meyer, I am a past grand president of the Native Sons of the Golden West and I am an inheritance-tax appraiser.

Mr. Chairman, and Congressmen, my remarks will be quite brief but I would like to read, with your permission, two paragraphs or so from the story of Japanese immigration, which was compiled by the California Joint Immigration Committee, and published on November 15, 1938:

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is a report of what committee?

Mr. MEYER. California Joint Immigration Committee studying the oriental question.

Mr. COSTELLO. Composed of private citizens?

Mr. MEYER. Composed of the four groups that Mr. Odemar referred to, the American Legion, the American Federation of Labor, the Grange, and the Native Sons of the Golden West.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I simply wanted that clarified in the record.

Mr. MEYER. And I will say in advance why I would like to read these two paragraphs; by reason of the fact that since Pearl Harbor you know our stand and on the opposite side of the picture there is another group and that is the purpose of wanting to bring this to the attention of this committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may read the two paragraphs.

Mr. MEYER (reading):

In California the Japanese established a state withing a state. Every Japanese whether alien or American citizen was forced to register in a minor association subject to control of the Japanese Association of America, which in turn acted under the direction of the consul general of Japan, and to obey the orders of Japan.

And the footnote there is No. 12, referring to the Japan secret policy, Senate Document No. 55, 1921, page 63:

In 1915 the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, hoping thereby to win Japan to Christianity, promised to obtain immigration and naturalization privileges for her nationals in the United States.

A campaign was organized by the consul for this purpose and in 1919 two bills therefor were actively advocated in congressional committee hearings—

The footnote there is 13—

quota or exclusion for Japanese immigrants, cited page 313, House Immigration Committee, 1919; House Immigration hearing, 1919, 1920, and 1922; Senate Committee hearing, March 24.

And then it refers to the Japanese conquest of American opinion by Flowers.



The other paragraph that I referred to above is as follows:

The enactment of the exclusion measure was not the unexpected and unobserved blow to Japanese pride she claims. It was the results of 24 years of evasion by her of her agreement to keep Japanese laborers out of the United States.

In the final hearing before the Senate Immigration Committee in March 1924, the Japanese cause was presented by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, under the direction of Dr. Sidney L. Gullick, born in the Orient, a missionary professor in a Japanese university on leave to propagandize Japan's cause in this country.

And there is a footnote here numbered 15:

Japanese conquest of American opinion, by Flowers, pages 78 to 88.

California's case for exclusion was presented for the California Joint Immigration Committee under the authority of its then four constituting bodies: American Legion, American Federation of Labor, the Grange, and the Native Sons of the Golden West, by Hon. U. S. Webb, State attorney general of California; Hon. James D. Phelan, former United States Senator from California; and V. K. McClatchey.

I believe those paragraphs more or less speak for themselves and as I originally stated, it is the purpose of bringing this before the committee if they desire to, during the investigation or any further investigation, to see if such be the case now that a pressure group by these churches and other churches are not still active in the cause of Japan regardless of the fact that we are in a war against Japan.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any information indicating as to whether there are any pressure groups of any kind operating here in California, urging the release of the Japanese to the Pacific coast?

Mr. MEYER. Well, not that I could point my finger to outside of the fact that these various debates or forums where we take our position against the Japanese. The majority of the times those that are in favor of the Japanese are members of church groups and such was the case last Sunday night when there was a forum over radio station KFC, at which time Mr. Odemar and Mr. Shoemaker, of the American Legion, stated our case regarding the Japanese situation and the opposite side, as I stated, was taken by Dr. Fisher and Dr. Hunter of the church groups.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are both of those ministers in church organizations?

Mr. MEYER. Of this city and county; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are those forums held frequently or are they just an occasional program?

Mr. MEYER. Well, I would say the answer would be occasional.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is not a consistent program of trying to create radio forums every week?

Mr. MEYER. No; I couldn't say that that is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know whether the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, for example, are at the present time taking any action in the matter of the release of the Japanese evacuees from the camps?

Mr. MEYER. Well, I believe Mr. Odemar could answer that better than I, Mr. Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any information regarding that matter, Mr. Odemar?

Mr. ODEMAR. I do not. I have no information as to whether the Federal Churches of Christ in America have definitely gone on record to do it, but many of their officers and members are advocating that.



And if I may make one further correction—Dr. Fisher on the radio with us last Sunday night is not a minister of the gospel. He is a professor of Biblical history at the U. S. C.

I think Mr. Meyer inadvertently stated he was a minister.

Mr. MEYER. I stand corrected.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether any of the pastors of the Churches of Christ in California have openly advocated the release of Japanese to the coast?

Mr. ODEMAR. Dr. Allen Hunter, who is pastor of the Congregational Church of West Hollywood, was the gentleman—was one of the gentlemen on the opposite side last Sunday night over the radio and he mentioned and he definitely advocates the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast.

Some month or two ago Mr. Clyde Shoemaker and myself had a forum before a group of high-school and junior-college students in West Los Angeles, at which time the opposite position—and it was definitely on this question, whereas last Sunday was the question:

Shall the American-born Japanese be denied citizenship?

That was last Sunday's subject. But 2 months ago, approximately, our question then was the return of the Japs from relocation centers and Mr. Hugh McBeth, an officer of the American Colored Group organization of some type, which I understand is national in its scope—

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that the National Association for the Protection of Colored People?

Mr. MEYER. I believe that is the name, thank you. If it isn't the name it is a name quite similar to that.

He is a Los Angeles attorney and was with a man representing the Reconciliation Fellowship and they actually debated in favor of the return of the Japanese.

If the committee wishes the exact names, I have them in my office. I haven't them with me.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know whether the organizations to which these people belong have urged that by resolution?

Mr. ODEMAR. I have no such information.

Mr. COSTELLO. But individuals belonging to the various groups have taken an individual stand on the matter?

Mr. MEYER. That was my statement.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you feel the majority of the people of California do not follow that stand and are opposed to the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast until after the period of the war?

Mr. ODEMAR. I am happy you asked that question because it is my observation that usually after an appearance on the radio, and I have been to a number of radio stations and a number of service clubs wherein I have been advocating against the return of the Japanese from relocation centers, and the enthusiasm has been spontaneous. They have thanked me very profusely for it and have stated: "Why don't we go further? We are not going far enough in our opposition to the Japanese."

And my observation is that 7 out of 10, at least with those people with whom I have talked, are of that opinion and they do call me up and present their opinions.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have had occasion to travel up and down the State quite a bit and you have found a similar situation in other sections of the State?

Mr. ODEMAR. Yes, sir. I do know—and I am going to San Francisco again tomorrow—I have traveled up and down throughout the State of California, having made seven trips to San Francisco and the bay region last year, and it has been my observation that that opinion is the same there as it is here.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does the committee have any questions?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.

Mr. ODEMAR. And that goes for San Diego and Orange County, also. Orange County, I feel, is 9 out of 10 for the exclusion of the Japanese. I feel 9 out of 10 are of that opinion.

If I may make one brief statement: I do not believe that I have received any opposition in my conversations with persons when I have explained to them the situation of the so-called Kibei Shiman, and that is one of the major grounds—just one of the major grounds on which we base our contention.

Now, I am quite sure the committee is familiar with the Kibei Shiman, and when that is explained to the public, a number of whom are not familiar with it, they say:

Well, then, how can we expect them to be true to the United States even though they are born here, and while under the decisions of the court they are technically citizens of the United States, when they are taught the things that they are taught in Japan during that formative period of their lives, how can they be good Americans.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No questions.

Mr. MEYER. May I add just one line to your question regarding the feelings of the people of the State of California on the return from relocation centers to California and the Pacific coast—to your question that you put to Mr. Odemar?

It is my understanding that each of the county boards of supervisors of the 58 counties have gone on record opposing, by resolution, opposing their return to California.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think they have so indicated to the committee, by sending us telegrams during the last 2 or 3 days.

The committee thanks you gentlemen very much for appearing here today.

Mr. ODEMAR. And we thank you for the opportunity.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Call your next witness.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Beery.

#### TESTIMONY OF BEN S. BEERY, ATTORNEY, LOS ANGELES, CALIF., REPRESENTING LOS ANGELES COUNTY COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

(The witness was duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you kindly state your full name and occupation to the reporter?

Mr. BEERY. Ben S. Beery. I am an attorney at 912 Rown Building, Los Angeles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I asked Mr. Beery to come here today as a representative of the American Legion and he is going to make a statement on behalf of that organization.

Mr. COSTELLO. We are very happy to have you appear before the committee, Mr. Beery.

Mr. BEERY. Thank you. I am appearing on behalf of the Los Angeles County Council of the American Legion, which consists of something over 26,000 members.

I am also appearing on behalf of the war advisory council of the Los Angeles County Council.

The Los Angeles County Council of the American Legion is absolutely opposed to the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast area during the period of the war. And I am likewise, the same as Mr. Odemar, advocating the control of the Japanese by the Army.

We do so and we take that position for two very distinct reasons:

In the first place, it is the opinion of the American Legion, and I am satisfied a well-founded opinion from experience, that some of the Japanese are absolutely disloyal.

Because of the peculiar Japanese psychology it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine. You cannot tell whether they are loyal or disloyal.

If they return to this area it will simply mean an invitation to trouble. This is an active combat zone, and it is a terrifically large zone. The return of a large number of Japanese to this area would make the job of surveillance of these Japanese practically a physical impossibility.

I think it is a well known fact that the Army and the Navy and the F. B. I. have their hands full at the present time and it would simply be adding to their burdens to carry on a surveillance of all the Japanese that might be returned to this area.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would that apply to Japanese soldiers who are serving in the American Army as well as civilians?

Mr. BEERY. In our opinion it would and the reason we have that opinion is this:

We have considered with some seriousness, the possibility of landing of Japanese on the Pacific shores from submarines. We know that Germans have been able to land saboteurs on the east coast from submarines, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that they could land Japanese on the west coast.

With that in view if there were any Japanese here it would be a simple matter for the Japanese to land from their own submarines in United States Army uniforms, and I am satisfied that from their espionage work they know what our uniforms are like. It would be no difficulty at all. We feel it would be a simple matter—a simpler matter to keep them all out rather than to complicate the issues.

Mr. COSTELLO. If we release Japanese from the relocation camps it would probably relieve the Japanese military from the necessity of sending the Japs over in submarines?

Mr. BEERY. If we do release them we will not only be diminishing the need of their sending saboteurs over, but we will have them on our own shores and behind the backs of our Army which is charged with the defense of this shore. The country would be full of potential saboteurs and spies.

The people of the Pacific coast as well as the people of the United States have placed wholeheartedly the responsibility of the defense of these shores in the military authorities. They feel that it would be a terrific responsibility on the part of any command to have to defend these shores and also protect those shores from an enemy at its back.



In addition to that the hazards would become greater at a time of crisis if you assume that the Japanese do what we know they would like to do, namely, attack the Pacific coast.

That would be a terrific time of crisis when all the military and naval forces should be directed toward the defense of our country and at the same time that their energies should be directed toward our shores the activity of potential saboteurs and spies would be increased.

We feel that the return of the Japanese would be a terrific hazard from that standpoint.

There is another separate and entirely distinct reason why we oppose the return of the Japanese.

The treachery of the attack on America at Pearl Harbor certainly aroused the righteous indignation of all people. That indignation has been intensified by the subsequent conduct of the Japanese military.

The stories of sailors and soldiers and marines coming back from Guadalcanal and other places hasn't done anything to increase the affection of the American people toward the Japanese.

The execution of our aviators over Tokyo, and I know this from conversations that I have had, excited a terrific resentment in California and I am afraid if the Japanese were returned to this coast, it would be simply an invitation to unrest and violence.

Now, I want the record to be clear that the American Legion opposes any kind of violence but it is a serious hazard.

I have heard law enforcement officers talk. As a matter of fact I had luncheon at the Clark Hotel where I heard law enforcement officers from southern California talk, and one after another of them commented upon their serious concern over what might happen if the Japanese are brought back to this area.

I have heard comments from many other sources. People are enraged and it would be an invitation to violence.

Now, we all abhor mob violence and it might have very serious results if that should happen. In the first place it would simply be an invitation to the German propaganda machine to carry on propaganda on the theory, as they have always carried on, on the theory that this country is disunited; that there are minority groups in this country; that the American people are opposing the minority groups, and that is the very fact that the German propagandists would take. They would circulate that not only among their own people but it would very shortly reach China and they would endeavor to persuade the Chinese that our affection and regard for the excellent stand they have taken against the Japanese, is a mere sham. They would try to make the Japanese believe that our whole feeling of hatred was toward everybody that might have slant eyes and that isn't true.

But it would be a weapon in their hands.

Adolf Hitler has said:

Dissension, confusion, and panic are my weapons.

And, gentlemen, I am satisfied that the return of the Japanese would create the very thing that he desires.

The people of California would not have their minds 100 percent on winning the war but would have their minds on possible trouble with the Japanese locally.



The next thing that that would result in, and I think it is a most serious thing, is, it would result, and it would be an excuse for reprisals on the part of the Japanese. Just imagine some little riot. It wouldn't have to amount to much—some little riot develop in which some unthinking person would attack a Japanese and a Japanese would attack in turn an American. We have our zoot suit difficulties today. A Japanese would attack an American then the next thing that you would hear would be that the Japanese were going to use that as an excuse for reprisals, and if the public press is correct, and I believe it is, the Japanese have more of our nationals in their possession than we have of theirs.

I am satisfied that the opinion is practically unanimous. I have never talked to a member of the county council that is in favor of the return of the Japanese. They are wholeheartedly opposed to it.

I think that their feeling might very well be summed up in a story from Tony Slocum, who is of Japanese ancestry, and who is a member of the American Legion and a veteran of the last war. At the time of the evacuation I met him on the street and he said they were being evacuated, and he said:

As far as the loyal Japanese were concerned, that if they could serve America by being evacuated that that was the place they wanted to serve.

And, gentlemen, I can tell you as to the disloyal Japanese we of the American Legion have no consideration for them whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe, Mr. Beery, that the return of the servicemen from the Pacific fighting theaters has tended to intensify public sentiment against the Japanese on the west coast?

Mr. BEERY. I am satisfied it has. They come back and tell of the horrors they have seen and the atrocities that were being perpetrated by the Japanese and the American people are righteously indignant.

Mr. COSTELLO. The largest number of servicemen who have been actively engaged in the Pacific theater have been brought back to the west coast for hospitalization, have they not?

Mr. BEERY. I am not able to state the percentage. I know a large number have. How big the number is, I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. But there are men who are recuperating here and who are on leave on the Pacific coast?

Mr. BEERY. Yes, sir; and they have friends in California and many of them are members of the Legion and they appear at the Legion meetings and they tell of the conditions that they had to face. I don't mean to say they disclose military information because they are careful not to.

Mr. COSTELLO. They have related instances of treachery on the part of the Japanese engaged in fighting in order to bring about the death of American troops?

Mr. BEERY. Yes, sir. I remember one occasion a man was discussing an incident wherein the Japanese said they wanted to surrender and sent word to the American troops that they wanted to surrender. The American troops went over to pick them up and all of the Americans, with the exception of two were slaughtered.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those acts of treachery being related back here, has greatly inflamed the people up and down this coast?

Mr. BEERY. Yes, sir; and the execution of our aviators that bombed Tokyo has been one of the greatest factors increasing the feeling of bitterness and hatred on the part of Americans in California.

Mr. COSTELLO. Don't you feel also that in view of the fact that we have recognized that there are spies in the country, as evidenced by the fact they put out so many posters warning us against careless talking, that to release any large number of Japanese throughout the country would be releasing undoubtedly a few spies who would be able to obtain some information and communicate it to the enemy?

Mr. BEERY. In my opinion a few spies is an under statement. Frankly, I can't find a logical reason for their return at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. You understand that a system of espionage is in effect all over the country?

Mr. BEERY. That is right. We wouldn't need the Army Intelligence and Navy Intelligence, who are doing such a wonderful job if there wasn't espionage going on. They are catching espionage agents all the time.

Mr. COSTELLO. And if we scatter the Japanese by releasing them individually to various parts of the country we are only intensifying their problem and endangering our security in wartime.

Mr. BEERY. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are there any questions?

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Beery, do you feel that it is equally undesirable to release the Japanese from these relocation centers to the midpart of America and Midwest and central America as it is on the Pacific coast?

Mr. BEERY. The feeling of the Legionnaires is not as strong in regard to the release to the Midwest for agricultural purposes as it is to the Pacific coast. It is very intense on the Pacific coast.

There is this, however, that they do fear that the release of the Japanese—we will take Iowa and Kansas, for example, in the middle part of the country, in small numbers where they would be spread out all over the central part of the United States would make surveillance an impossible task and would put enemy spies and saboteurs in a position where they could commit acts of depredation in the Midwest.

The opinion, I believe, insofar as releasing them to the Midwest is that if they are released they should be released in large numbers in a very concentrated area—that is where they would be in one area and would be subject to complete control and surveillance by the F. B. I. and the other constituted authorities.

Mr. MUNDT. You said earlier in your statement that you felt the control of the Japanese should be put under the War Department?

Mr. BEERY. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you tell the committee some of your reasons for feeling that the present control under the W. R. A. is unsatisfactory?

Mr. BEERY. Yes, sir. The W. R. A., as we understand it, has control of the relocation centers where the Japanese are now being kept. We have had committees go up to the relocation centers and we hear from all sides that the Japanese are being taught by conscientious objectors, by pacifists and by those who are attempting to have the Japanese believe that they are a persecuted minority.

I wrote to the War Relocation Authority myself sometime ago and asked for some source information in regard to the Japanese. I received back—I believe it was entitled, "A Bibliography." It may have been just a list and not have that title. The shocking thing to me in that was that the source information that they gave was the same source information that I have found in pacifists' literature and Fellowship of Reconciliation literature, people who were obviously in favor of the Japanese.

I received one piece of literature that talked about the Japanese refugees as if we were treating the Japanese the way the Germans treated the Poles and I don't think that is proper and I am sure the Legion doesn't.

The Legion does not desire any harsh or brutal treatment of the Japanese, and in advocating that they be handled by the Army the Legion knows that the Army would not be a party to any harsh or brutal treatment. They would receive fair and considerate treatment but there would be no danger of what I call subversive activities among the Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. That is one reason—you feel that they are being treated from the standpoint of social workers and so forth, as a persecuted minority. Do you have any other reasons for wanting them to be under the control of the Army?

Mr. BEERY. Yes, sir. I didn't amplify sufficiently probably. It is our feeling also that subversive activities are being carried on within the Japanese relocation centers and that those subversive activities are not being properly curbed and controlled by the persons in charge.

When I say that I don't want to point my finger to any individual. The riot at Manzanar created deep concern and the people on the Pacific coast are not quite yet able to understand how that thing could have happened and why it hasn't been more rigidly controlled.

Subversive activities in the relocation centers we believe would be of serious concern, particularly if there was any release of the Japanese to the Midwest or any other place.

Mr. MUNDT. Those are two reasons; have you got any more?

Mr. BEERY. Nothing other than amplification of those particular things.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me ask you whether you and the group you represent, the American Legion, whether you are satisfied with the method whereby they failed to segregate in these relocation centers the Kibei from the Issei and the Nisei? In other words, no attempt was made to segregate the bad Japanese from what I hope are the good Japanese. I imagine that you feel they are all bad?

Mr. BEERY. No; I certainly do not. I am satisfied there are good Japanese. I can't put my finger on them.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel the failure to segregate those into camps is a bad policy?

Mr. BEERY. We certainly do.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel that the relocation centers are wise in the method by which they are currently releasing these Japanese at the rate of 600 or 800 or a thousand a week? And whereby they pay them certain sums of money and buy them a railroad ticket and start them off for some destination?

Mr. BEERY. We feel that that is bad for two reasons: Some of those that are leaving are going to various universities. They were released, so we are advised, after an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. MUNDT. Who advised you as to that? We haven't been able to verify that or disprove it?

Mr. BEERY. I think I can give you the place to get accurate information. Clyde Shoemaker, who is a member and was formerly with the district attorney's office, communicated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He told me that he had received a letter from them advising that they had not made a detailed investigation of these



Japanese; that in many cases an inquiry had been made as to whether they had any record on any particular Japanese, and a check was made of that, but that they had not investigated.

Mr. Shoemaker can be reached—I think he is in the Lincoln Building at the present time. He is an attorney. Mr. Steedman knows him and I am sure he would be glad to give you the details on that.

The other group who are being released apparently are being released without a proper method of checking after they have been released. This is purely hearsay but we are advised that they are required to report to the local F. B. I. agent when they arrive at their destination. Whether that is true or false, I don't know, but gentlemen, if you have 1,000 Japanese a week going to 1,000 different places in the United States you are going to pretty near need 1,000 new agents in the various governmental agencies.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no question.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your appearing here today, Mr. Beery, and to have the Legion represented.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, on May 26, 1943, you heard in executive session Mr. H. H. Townsend, formerly chief supply and transportation officer at the Poston relocation center.

I have Mr. Townsend's testimony before me at the present time and I would like to introduce his testimony into the record merely for the purpose of making it available to the press. Will the committee accept it for that purpose?

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, this is the transcript of the testimony that was given at an executive session before this committee?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you wish to make that a part of the public record of the hearings?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And this H. H. Townsend is the same individual to whom reference has been made from time to time during the course of the testimony before the committee?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. If there is no objection, the testimony given by Mr. Townsend on the 26th of May will be made a part of the public records of the committee.

Mr. MUNDT. No objection.

Mr. EBERHARTER. No objection.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is so ordered.

(The testimony of H. H. Townsend was made a part of this record by reference, as follows:)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif., May 26, 1943.*

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m. in room 1405, Federal Building, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.



TESTIMONY OF HAROLD HALDEMAN TOWNSEND, FORMERLY CHIEF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT, POSTON, ARIZ.

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. State your full name.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Harold Haldeman Townsend.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where do you live?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 2402 North Highland Avenue, Hollywood.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you an American citizen?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Merrill, Wis.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. TOWNSEND. August 31, 1885.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever served in the United States Army?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 1918.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you serve in France?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Six months in France.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present occupation?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I am working for the Government.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In a confidential capacity?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state briefly your educational training?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I went through grade school and high school in Merrill and Madison, Wis., and in Madison went to the University of Wisconsin; and I have taken a few courses, night courses, and I spent 2 months at Columbia, and 3 months in Paris.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Just after the war?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please give a brief outline of the most important job or jobs that you have held?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, I was juvenile officer in Indian Territory in Oklahoma before statehood. I was chief of police in Tulsa, and became special agent of the Standard Oil Co. in the Mid-Continent field for 7 years, having charge of their secret-service work in Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, and Louisiana.

I then went overseas, and then came to California as an independent oil producer, and got into the real-estate business and developed three major communities. Then I became the western district representative of the Independent Petroleum Association of America, during which time I served 5 years on the pension board, the police and fire pension commission of Los Angeles. Then was the assistant State director for the Government on defense training, and was the State director for the Government on the in-plant training for defense purposes. Then I went to the war relocation camp at Poston, Ariz. as the chief supply and transportation officer; then did some special work on the Indian reservation at Parker, Ariz., and that brings me up to the present time, at which time I am prepared to leave for South America.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When are you leaving for South America?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Tomorrow night at 10 o'clock on the Pan-American Clipper.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, when did you accept a position with the W. R. A. at Poston, Ariz.?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Approximately July 25 through the O. E. M.

Mr. STEEDMAN. July 25, 1942?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your title?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Chief supply and transportation officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you recite briefly what your duties and your responsibilities were?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I had charge of the purchasing for the quartermaster, and otherwise, of all foods, supplies, and equipment used in the entire project. I had charge of all of the motor equipment, trucks, cars, tractors, dredges, draglines, every type and character, and in addition to that I was in charge of the 180 warehouses that were filled to capacity with the surplus supplies needed for the camps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your salary?

Mr. TOWNSEND. \$3,800 when I started, and \$4,200 when I left.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the director of the W. R. A.? I mean nationally.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Dillon S. Myer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the project director at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Wade Head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please name some of his principal assistants?

Mr. TOWNSEND. His assistant director is Mr. Ralph Gelvin. Mr. John Evans is third in command. Mr. Nelson, whose initials I have forgotten, is a roving assistant. He is a field man who assists Mr. Head. Mr. Gus Empie is the chief administrative officer representing the W. R. A. and the Indian Service, whose department I was directly under. I was under Mr. Empie and not Mr. Head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Empie was your immediate superior?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is Poston, Ariz., located?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 18 miles south of Parker, Ariz., on the Colorado River Indian Reservation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Bureau of Indian Affairs furnish the land for the Poston camp site?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the Bureau of Indian Affairs in any way supervise the activities of the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what way?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Having read the agreement made between the W. R. A. and the Indian Department, I am a little bit familiar with the arrangements made.

It was the understanding—from my observation of this contract, it was my understanding that the Indian Department would have complete and total charge of the camps and the W. R. A. was to supply the money for the agriculture and irrigation; and that the Indian Department was to make the appointments of the camp management, and it was to be run under Indian personnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact, this isn't what happened, is it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Partly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Partly?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How far is the Poston camp from Los Angeles?

Mr. TOWNSEND. About 320 miles down to the first camp. You see, there are three camps at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please describe the physical set-up of the Poston relocation camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 18 miles south of Parker, 5 miles east of the Colorado River, camp No. 1 was constructed, consisting of 800 buildings; 5 miles farther south, camp No. 2 was constructed with 400 buildings; and 3 miles farther south, camp No. 3, with 400 buildings. All three camps have had modern utilities of all types installed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the barracks air-conditioned?

Mr. TOWNSEND. A part of them. All of the administration barracks, and a part of the other barracks are air-conditioned.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many persons can the three camps at Poston accommodate?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 20,000 is the capacity.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the camp at Poston near adequate water supply?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They have excellent water supply. They have their own drinking water high pressure system in each camp, in addition to the major canals being supplied irrigation water from a very expensive dam on the Colorado River, 3 miles north of Parker.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that the so-called Parker irrigation dam?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The Parker Indian Reservation Dam, and north of there we have the major large Parker Dam.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I see. Does the camp have water for swimming pools?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. They have swimming pools in each camp, supplied by the irrigation ditches.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are these pools in use by the Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; constantly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the camp have water for lawns?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. The lawn water is used from the irrigation ditches, when the ditches are filled. Otherwise, the other water is used for lawns and some agriculture between the barracks.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there enough water available for shrubs and vegetables?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There is an abundance of water for everything.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is a new irrigation system being built at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What Government agency is building that system?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The Indian Service has complete charge of the irrigation system. There are some portions of it being put in by contract; bridges, culverts, and some dredging or some dragline work has been handled under contract.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what the estimated cost of this project is?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The total camps?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The estimated cost of the irrigation project.

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; I don't think they do. I don't think they have completely estimated it, because the engineering department, when I was attempting to get the figures on the size of it, they were still in a quandry just how far they would extend the ditches. It would run into many millions of dollars.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This project is being built to service the camp at Poston where the Japanese live; is that correct?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The irrigation system wouldn't be necessary if the Japanese weren't located at Poston, would it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Not except that they are planning to irrigate the agricultural land that the Japanese are expected to handle.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In building the irrigation system, are they using Japanese labor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Very little. The majority is being put in by Indians under the Indian engineer, Rupkey. The land is being cleared partly by the Japanese labor.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the rate of pay for the Japanese labor?

Mr. TOWNSEND. \$19 a month.

Mr. STEEDMAN. From your observation, are the Japanese good and conscientious workers?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They are not. They are very poor labor. They will not work more than 2 or 3 hours a day, and loaf during that period of time, and they very frankly state that they don't intend to work, as it is a benefit to their country by holding up all progress.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, do you know how much it cost to build the camps at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The construction of the camps, the lumber cost?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. TOWNSEND. The cost of the lumber, according to our records, was \$8,300,000, using 34,000,000 feet. But that was only a very small portion of the cost, because in addition to that we had the plumbing utilities, and roads, and various other things added to that cost.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the camp have streets?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; all beautifully graded and partly hard-surfaced streets.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And sewers?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Sewers, electric lights, water, party telephone.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they have a hospital at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They have a very fine hospital, a very large hospital, modern in every respect; large enough to handle approximately 600 people, and it is usually filled.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are there doctors and nurses?

Mr. TOWNSEND. A complete staff of doctors and nurses. There is the Caucasian doctor and partly Caucasian nurses, and the balance are Japanese doctors and Japanese nurses.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In summing up the three camps at Poston, have all of them modern conveniences?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Complete in every detail, with every modern convenience that we could put into such a development, and very superior to many of our modern Army camps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, were the mess halls under your jurisdiction?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. There were 78 mess halls, complete in every detail.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall how much food was consumed daily?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We, by actual count, supplied 58 tons of subsistence per day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Fifty-eight tons of food?

Mr. TOWNSEND. In 78 mess halls, using 58 tons of food daily.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you mind giving us that in detail?

Mr. TOWNSEND. In the 3 camps there are 78 mess halls, using 58 tons of food daily, the finest quality that money can buy, all grade A, top brands.



Mr. STEEDMAN. How is the food purchased?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Part of it is purchased through the Quartermaster's Department under contract, and part of it is purchased on the open market.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You were in charge of the actual supply of the food to the various mess halls; is that correct?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you able to obtain sufficient food to feed the Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We obtained sufficient food in wasteful quantities, but could not satisfy the Japanese. And by "wasteful quantities," I mean this: that we were expected to comply with the menus furnished us by the W. R. A., and the quartermaster's contracts were made on that basis, and the food was sent to us constantly on the basis of the contracts, and our chief steward checked the personnel and added to or deducted from the amount of food needed. And, of course, the food bought on the open market was bought where the quartermaster couldn't fill the needed orders.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The amount of the food and the type of food was determined by the W. R. A. in Washington; is that correct?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Largely so, yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there any plan at the camp as to the amount and type of food that you would serve the Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We made plans according to Japanese requests. Frequently it would be contrary to W. R. A. menus, but the W. R. A. did not take into consideration the fact that we were feeding two types of people, the Japanese people, who would eat nothing but the Japanese food, and the American Japanese, who would eat nothing but American food, and being compelled to have the two types of food complicated our supply program to the point where we had considerable leeway in making orders other than those called for under the W. R. A. menus.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it necessary to cook for two different types of individuals?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Absolutely.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall about how much bread was consumed daily at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We purchased 3,750 pounds of bread daily.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese, as a rule, eat much bread?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They are not great bread eaters. The majority of this bread was dried and stored away.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the purpose of the Japanese hoarding the bread?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They stated that they were hoarding food, bread and other supplies, for parachute troops and for invasion forces.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I will ask you this question, Mr. Townsend: How was this food hoarded or stored?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The information that was furnished me by certain friendly groups was that they had placed different types of emergency food in secret cellars under the mess halls for the invasion armies and parachute troopers. But in addition to that that they had large caches of food throughout the desert, buried, that could be used for similar purposes. And this information was furnished by friendly Japanese who were endeavoring to get special favors, and we were constantly trying to find out what was happening to certain supplies, and we always had a number of Japanese that would give us information for an exchange of favors.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I will ask you this question, How did you obtain your information?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We developed a corps of younger Japanese boys, through their ambitious desire to drive equipment, to furnish information on the theft and loss of supplies, particularly between the Parker rail head and the camps, and through these informants we developed a number of older Japanese people who would, for special favors, give us information relative to thefts and activities that were coming up in the camp area. We constantly had probably 15 or 20 informants that kept us advised as to certain storages within the camp area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, was any attempt made to stop this practice by the camp authorities?

Mr. TOWNSEND. At numerous times we had these thieves caught, and produced evidence and information about the process of the entire thieving ring. The matter was placed before Mr. Empie, and Mr. Head, and Mr. Gelvin, and the M. P. authorities, and it was always stopped, because there was no way that they could see that we would be benefited by trying to prosecute them. We then established a daily loss of approximately \$500 through the thefts within



the camp, which was agreed upon by all of us, and even at that they would not take any action toward prosecution.

Now, then, pardon me. Off the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. I will ask you this question, Mr. Townsend: What was happening to the stolen goods?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, through the informants we checked on many of the thefts, and we found that there were two systems. One was to unload certain portions of the trucks between the warehouse or the railhead at Parker and the camps, which stuff would be picked up later by some cooperating theft group, and the other system was to unload it from the warehouse and take it out of the camps through the irrigation ditch program, past the guards on the highway.

The only guards around the camp were two guards at the north gate of the camp on the main highway, and two guards on the south of the camp on the main highway. That left some 15 or 20 gates out of the camp which the construction workers were using, particularly the irrigation ditch people; and the Japanese having complete charge of the warehouses and supplies and the subsistence movement to the mess halls, they would load out of the warehouse more than they expected to take to the mess halls. They would have an overload, and would pile it up at certain spots, and then one of the other trucks would take it to the waiting truck, and would move it outside the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There was collusion then between the Japanese at the warehouses and the Japanese on the trucks?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They were all the same. They were exchanging all the time. Another unfortunate thing was that we never had a system of knowing one Jap from another. They passed the guards under the same pass. We would pass the warehouse truckers going up to Parker, and there would be one group today and another group tomorrow, and they interchanged through the whole system. That was true in all of our work down there. We had no way of checking except only the ones we knew personally.

Mr. COSTELLO. The pass didn't have a photograph of the individual or any identification of him on it?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They had no permit of any kind, except just writing their names on a piece of paper, say, 25 down in a line, and you wouldn't know 25 Japs that went out today from 25 others that went out tomorrow, except the ones that we knew as our personal assistants.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, turning to the supervision of the mess halls, I believe you have stated that the W. R. A. in Washington sent out the menus for you to follow at Poston; is that correct?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were these menus followed to the letter?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, they were not; due to the fact that the menu only set up food for one group of people, and the Nisei or the American-born Japanese would not eat the Japanese-prepared food, and the Japanese-born people would not eat the American food. So we had to build two menus, and the American-born Japanese had to have American food, and the Japanese people had to have Japanese food.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the food being served in the Army at the present time?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the food that you served to the Japanese at Poston as good or better than that being served to the Army?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It was superior in every way, and I can make that statement from this standpoint: Prior to going to Poston, for 2 months I was working on supplies for Army camps, both Navy and the Army, and I contacted every camp and every naval base in southern California from the supply and food standpoint. And I make that statement for this reason: I was associated with the Associated Dairies and had contact with a group of men who are developing a \$25,000,000 corporation to raise supplies and produce for the Army and Navy, and I am the one who made the contracts between the Army and the Navy and these people, and therefore visited every supply representative in southern California for the Army and Navy before I went to Poston.

Then I found that there was a very great difference between the food supplied to the Army and the Japanese. I estimated that the Japanese food was about 25 percent better than that to the Army.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much cash allowance was allowed per day, per Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Forty-five cents per person, including all the infants.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the Japanese served ice cream at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. We had ice cream brought to us every day from the Golden State Creamery Co.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And milk?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Our milk orders ran from 8,000 to 12,000 quarts of homogenized milk every day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you obtain the milk from?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Golden State Creamery Co.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And butter?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We had the finest grade of Challenge butter, and other high-grade butter that we could buy.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Fruit?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Fruit was the finest type, individually wrapped; the finest packed fruit that the markets would provide.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there plenty of meat and sausage of all kinds supplied?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The finest cuts and grade A meats; quarters and full carcasses of lambs and pork, and the best cuts of beef were brought in; on an average of one refrigerator car a day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that all of it was of the very best grade?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The finest grade that we could get.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the grade of food better than that obtained by our own citizens in the markets and stores?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Very much better than you can buy in the open market.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they ever have any shortages at Poston of any commodities, while you were there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir. Mr. Costello, we ordered 60 to 90 days ahead, and we did once in a while have some mishap that threw us a little short on something, but we always had supplies in the warehouse. On some of the perishable things—for instance, I condemned a carload. We were in the habit of receiving large quantities of bad order vegetables. Each carload had a number of cases of rotten stuff in it, and I put a man specially to check the cars, and he found out that they were all pushing it too strong, and I condemned the whole carload. And when we condemn a carload of fresh vegetables, it would set us back a little bit, until we got straightened out, but we always had an ample supply in the warehouse.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you never did have, like we had in California, an actual meat shortage, where you didn't have enough to go around?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There never was a shortage. We have two big refrigerators, refrigerator warehouses, and each warehouse will take two or three carloads of meats, and then at the Parker rail head we have an enormous refrigerator warehouse system, where we can handle two or three carloads, so we always had plenty of fresh meat ahead. And then we got carloads, every week we had several carloads of fine wrapped hams and cases of sausages, and all of the various kinds of meat, that we kept for emergency purposes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, did you keep any rough figures on the number of tons of food wasted daily at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. We were working on the agricultural supplies, and in checking up the number of hogs that we might put in, we estimated the amount of garbage that could be used, set up a salvage plant where we would keep garbage, and for that reason had to know the amount of garbage we had and the size of the plant we needed to build, so we made a very careful check for a period of a month, 30 days, and we estimated that we were averaging approximately 10 tons of garbage per day. We figured there was—after going into it very carefully, we figured that there was approximately 7 tons of that food that could be used.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Didn't the chef ever serve any left-overs?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The Japanese chefs did not serve left-overs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was done with the garbage?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Sir?

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was done with the garbage?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It was taken—we would load it onto equipment and dig ditches and throw it into the ditches and cover it up.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What happened with reference to the idea of feeding it to the hogs?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Up until January 30 there was nothing done at all. About January 30, Washington wrote the director and asked him how many hogs they had to use the 9 or 10 tons of garbage that we had in the camp, and we had been out trying to buy hogs, and we had every hog in southern California—through

this same group that was building this \$25,000,000 corporation, we had every hog farm and every cattle farm tabulated, and we knew all the hogs available, so he had this hog man check the hogs, and at the time the letter was received there wasn't a hog in the camp. They then, without any knowledge on the part of the supply department, ordered in two hundred 200-pound hogs, and they answered Washington by telling them that we had 200 hogs.

I would like to enlarge a little bit upon that. If you know anything about hogs, you know you wouldn't want to start feeding 200-pound hogs. They are ready for the market. They bought two hundred 200-pound hogs and paid 25 cents a pound for them. The same herd of hogs, as listed in the market, could have been bought for 17 cents a pound, and they were hogs that we were considering buying for butchering for pork. They were too old to be handled for feeders, and that order should have been for hogs that would have cost \$10 or \$15, to feed the garbage to, instead of paying 25 cents a pound. Now they have this number of hogs down there, weighing 300 or 400 pounds, and they are not fit for anything except lard.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was responsible for that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, Mr. Mathieson is in charge of the stores and the agriculture.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have his full name?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think it is H. A. I don't know. I couldn't tell you offhand. Under Mr. Mathieson is Mr. Sharp, handling the agriculture, and in collusion with Mr. Nelson, Mr. Sharp and Mr. Mathieson, by orders from Mr. Head, were told to get the hogs in there, so he could answer that letter from Washington, and somehow they got hold of this unusual purchase, paying 25 cents a pound. And the warehouse record will show that, that there are 200 hogs, weighing 200 pounds apiece, for which they paid 25 cents a pound. That is the most ridiculous purchase of hogs I ever heard of, for garbage consumption.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, how many warehouses did you say were under your jurisdiction at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 180.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 180?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 180 warehouses.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you in direct charge of the warehouses?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Japanese were employed in the warehouses?

Mr. TOWNSEND. 2,700, I believe, in the—now, wait a minute. In the warehouses, no. I think there were—

Mr. STEEDMAN. An approximation will be all right.

Mr. TOWNSEND. There were 680 Japanese and 4 white supervisors in the warehouses.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In addition to the food stored in the warehouses, what else was stored there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There were supplies and equipment of every conceivable type in the numerous warehouses. The C. C. C. had sent in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment, and before I arrived, a third of the warehouses were filled with miscellaneous food supplies, canned goods and otherwise, and there were shipments of furniture, the finest upholstered furniture, ice boxes, electric ice boxes, air conditioners, supplies, and all sorts of machinery; tractors, trucks, miscellaneous equipment, far too numerous to mention, for every purpose under the sun. We had warehouses that we moved the stuff into and locked up, and they hadn't been opened for months, because it was just miscellaneous equipment. We didn't know what it was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why was it stored at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It was assigned to the W. R. A., and for purposes that we didn't know.

Now, as for the furniture, of course, the Poston development includes a very marvelous Caucasian personnel center. The plan showed 54 modern bungalows, and 2 dormitories, 3 stories, one for women and one for men, and the administration houses, which would cost somewhere between fifteen and twenty thousand dollars. There were to be 4 of them, and a beautiful park area, with swimming pools, and so forth. And this furniture was purchased for that purpose, to furnish those. It was all bought from Barker Bros., and the prices on it were not reasonable. They were very, very high in consideration of the many, many carloads. We must have had, oh, at least 20 carloads of that type of furniture.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When was that received?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, it was received at intervals, all the way from before I arrived, and it was coming in up until September, including rugs. We had one



or two cases of rugs, large rugs, beautiful rugs, 40 feet by 20 feet, and dozens and dozens of very fine rugs of smaller dimensions; a whole warehouse filled with beautiful rugs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They plan to be comfortable down there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Very comfortable. They have the finest furniture I have ever been used to, and I had some pretty good furniture.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who is responsible for that furniture?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, the camp director ordered it, of course, but he must have had the approval from someone higher than that. And there were other things. However, it wasn't necessary to get the approval, and if you will let me divert a little bit, I will do so.

Somebody came into Los Angeles and ordered some 20 or 30 dump trucks through a Jewish firm down here on Alameda. I inspected the dump trucks, because they were strictly under my department, and I told them that I wouldn't pay them one-third of the price of the trucks, that the trucks were a fleet that had been sent up in some shipment from some big construction firm that had worn them out, and they had been given a coat of black paint, and that they wouldn't be any good at all for our road work. We had an order to put the military highway through, and these trucks were to be used on that. The trucks were charged to us at \$2,400 apiece. They were not worth \$400 apiece, so I refused to approve the order.

Mr. Empie refused to approve the order on my suggestion, and they then sent someone else over here, and they looked at the trucks, and this man refused to accept them at that price. Somehow later on the purchase order was issued through the procurement department for the trucks, and the trucks were tried to be delivered over there. They had to be towed in, and they paid \$80,000 for the worthless trucks, and they are sitting in the junk yard over there. So it isn't always a need for Washington approval of major purchases. That fleet of trucks was purchased without it.

Then there is another thing that occurs to me. We were very anxious to get school busses. We brought in—we had 400 teachers, and we had a big school program under way, so I lined up school busses through the Fred Harvey program, the only busses available at the Grand Canyon. They had beautiful equipment up there, Pierce-Arrow equipment, that we were to get at \$3,000 a bus; large, fine, de luxe equipment. After I left there, they bought a bus in Phoenix and paid \$3,700 for it, that had been sitting on a lot for 2 years.

I looked up the transportation man, the Government transportation man, I have forgotten his name, but I was trying to buy the busses through Los Angeles, and I went to Phoenix, and he referred me to all of the equipment in that district. This bus had been sitting there for 2 years, and it was just a wreck, and was a piece of junk. So we did as we pleased, and we didn't need to have approval. That is why I am merely mentioning these items, and there are hundreds of other items.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Going back to the fleet of dump trucks bought in Los Angeles, do you recall the name of the firm those trucks were purchased from?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think it was Finkelstein. Finkelstein is another one of the swindlers that we bought hundreds of thousands of dollars of equipment from—this firm of Finkelstein, and always there was a kick-back to the procurement representative.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Finkelstein located in Los Angeles?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He is here; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that his firm name?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Finkelstein & Co., one of these big salvage companies.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He sold a lot of material to the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth. He furnished the water pipe, and all of the metal and steel work, and all of that stuff. We bought a lot of stuff from him, and the records show before I got there that he had been supplying everything, and his prices were terrific for old junk, and much of it is over there as junk, although much of it has been used.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Whom did he deal with directly?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He went through the procurement department, Mr. Palmer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He is at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Palmer have authority to deal directly with Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes. And Mr. Nelson, I believe, was the contact man with Mr. Fred Finkelstein.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Mr. Nelson's first name?



Mr. TOWNSEND. I do not. I can't be sure of that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Going back to the supervision of the warehouses, the four white men that were supervisors under you, did you consider them to be honest and reliable?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Not all of them. There was one man that was wholly dependable and reliable, but he didn't have very much authority.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his name?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Bert Vatcher. He is 100 percent. The fact is, he was my warehouse informant.

Mr. Wickersham was the chief warehouse officer, and is a nice, fine man, but he didn't have any authority at all. They stripped him of every bit of authority, and he is merely holding his job because he is safe, and he is very afraid to talk.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say "they." You are referring to Mr. Head and Mr. Empie?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. He just hasn't any say at all, yet he is in charge, he is the chief warehouseman. Then the other men are not responsible men at all, and they are not honest. While I was there, I lost one man, who went into the service, and we employed other men; that is, I didn't. Mr. Head employed other men, and they are not reliable men at all. In other words, the men can't be reliable when the thefts and the conditions are as they are in the warehouse, and these men have to close their eyes to it; and when they don't say anything about it, we know they are in collusion with the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You said there were 680 Japanese working in the warehouses?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; there had been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they control the warehouses?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Everything.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And distribute all of the material?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The system is this: We have a card system, and when goods are received, they are supposed to be requisitioned out, and the requisition system is a farce. There was no way of correcting it, because it was the policy to let the old system continue.

For instance, if you wanted from Warehouse 1, 10 mattresses or 100 mattresses, or 1,000, whatever it was, you would go down and get the mattresses. Then if you happened to think about it, there would be a requisition put through. The requisition should be approved by the proper authorities; if they were available, they approved it. If they were not available, they didn't approve it. If they wanted to make a requisition, they made it. If they didn't want to make it they didn't make it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the material was all in the hands of the Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. You would see 10 trucks leaving the warehouse loaded, and at the beginning I wasn't concerned a great deal about it. I presumed when I went down there that everything was in good order. It took me 30 days to find out there was no system, and it took me several months to try to break in some system, and they wouldn't tolerate it. I insisted on an inventory being taken, and I wanted a perpetual inventory for the entire camp, and they overrode me on that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is "they"?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mr. Empie, Mr. Head, Mr. Gelvin, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Evans. I wanted to import some expert warehouseman and take an inventory of the entire warehouse system, and I came in and got hold of Mr. Green of the O. E. M. and started getting warehousemen lined up. I went back and found out that Mr. Empie and Mr. Head had given orders to the warehousemen to start the inventory, and have the inventory taken by the Japanese, and it was a big joke. The Japanese themselves came to me and laughed about it, and told me what they were doing. Then is when Mr. Vatcher came in, and for your information, if you want a good, clean-cut man, and, of course, he wants to hold his job, but if you want a good, clean-cut man, Bert Vatcher will give you the information. Mr. Wickersham won't, because he is afraid; he doesn't want to lose his job.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Perhaps we had better recess for a minute. We have been going rather steadily.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, how were supplies shipped to Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We received a major part by rail and part by truck.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall how many carloads of supplies were received daily?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. We received approximately 10 cars, railroad cars, and 2 trucks and trailers a day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were these supplies received?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The railroad supplies were received at the warehouse at Parker, and the trucks were received at the warehouse at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There is a rail head at Parker; is that right?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are there warehouses located at the rail head?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. We have a system of eight warehouses, 40 by 100, at the rail head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, did you see such things stored at the terminal as grade A beef, whole hogs, lambs, ham, bacon, iced lettuce, carloads of 1-pound packs of butter, carloads of cheese, and so forth?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; constantly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was this shipped in to feed the Japanese who were located at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ever hear the Japanese at Poston make a statement that they received better food inside the camp than they did when they went out?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. We shipped out several hundred Japanese for agricultural purposes into the Central and Northern States, and when these men would come back, they would come in and they would tell us that they were very happy to get back into the camp, because their treatment on the outside and their food and accommodations were so inferior that they were anxious to get back and stay, and they would not leave the camp any more.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the term, Kibei?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. That is the American-born Japanese educated——

Mr. STEEDMAN. Educated in Japan, and who came back here?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many of those there were down at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, I wouldn't know exactly. We figured that we had about, between four and five hundred of those Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ever hear any of the Kibei boast that the Japanese educational system was a better system than ours?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. All of them would tell you very definitely that the men who went to Japan and who were educated there were far superior to the men who were educated in America.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were many of these Kibei on the internal police force?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I didn't get that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I asked you, were many of the Kibei on the internal police force?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; a large number of them were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They composed the so-called goon squads that you have referred to?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir. The police force was largely built up of the gestapo, as I have called them, because they tell you that they have trained under the German agents, and they were, in my estimation, the men that were guilty of the malicious beating up and all the malicious agitation in the camp, because the police force would not permit any decent American-born Japanese to take part, because he might expose some of their under-cover work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. These so-called strong-arm squads visited the various camp officials from time to time, did they?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They were in their offices all the time. In fact, they controlled and domineered them all the time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they ever visit you?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; they visited me and made demands that were never met, particularly during the strike.

Mr. STEEDMAN. While you were at Poston, was there any official investigation made of the conditions at the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't know that I understand what you mean, but there were lots of different delegations, from your Department and from different sources, would come into the camp for the purpose of looking the camp over.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Head know when the delegations were to come?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; he would be notified in advance either by wire or telephone, or they would write him a letter.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he confer with the staff regarding the coming investigations?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Very frequently. He would call us together and state that certain delegations were coming in and asked us to prepare for the procedure.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So the investigators only saw what Mr. Head and the camp officials wanted to show them?

Mr. TOWNSEND. That is what he did. He would take charge of them, and when they came to the gate, he would be notified by the guards and usually got in the car with them and stayed with them while they were there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think it is possible for an investigator to obtain the full and complete facts of what is going on at Poston if Mr. Head and the officials knows he is there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He will not get the facts, either from the Japanese or from any of the Caucasians, unless they go in as employees unknown to Mr. Head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, are you familiar with the school system inside Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Very well, yes, sir. I helped set it up and had much to do with the equipping of all of the buildings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is the head of the educational department at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mr. Cary.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about Mr. Cary's background?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. Mr. Cary and most of the Caucasian staff were imported from Honolulu, and he was the principal of the McKinley High School there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why were they brought in, do you know?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Sir?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know why they were brought here from Honolulu?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I only have my own personal ideas why. I never did hear definitely why they were brought in, but he told me frequently that he was one of the few men that understood the Japanese and got along with them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that Mr. Cary who said that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mr. Cary. Dr. Miles Cary is his title, and Miss Findley, who is the head of the welfare department, has some very definite pull in Washington, and she wields a very heavy stick, and is a very vicious Japanese supporter. Dr. Miles Cary and Miss Findley were friends in Honolulu, and they came over together and brought over most of the staff from the McKinley High School.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many teachers are there at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There are 100 Caucasians, and 200 or more Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the teachers at Poston had to be passed on by the Arizona Board of Education?

Mr. TOWNSEND. At any time?

Mr. STEEDMAN. At any time.

Mr. TOWNSEND. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the curriculum in the school follow the same curriculum they have in the public schools in the State of Arizona?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; it is a little different. It is entirely set up in the camp under Dr. Cary, and doesn't follow even the textbooks. I had to get the textbooks and have them delivered. The textbooks were not the Arizona textbooks. Most of them were shipped in, and part of them were secured through the Los Angeles school authorities.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were textbooks bought through the purchasing office?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, do you know anything about the purchase of the textbooks?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I know about the purchase of them. I don't know what they were. I know how they were purchased, and under what system they were purchased.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state that for the record?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, Dr. Cary and his assistant, Miss—her name has slipped my mind—they drew up the plan of education and put it into effect, and the textbooks were ordered—part of them were shipped in from Honolulu and part of them were ordered through the school board in Los Angeles, and then a number of them were secured from various other schools throughout southern California. They were discarded school books that we were asked to go out and pick up, and I had a letter from Dr. Cary asking me to pick up textbooks from at least 8 or 10 different communities around California.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many hours a day did the Japanese children go to school?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Six.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the schools go through the high school?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They were laying the foundation for the high school. There was a high school to be built, but there is no high school there yet.



Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that the teachers tried to curry favor with the Japanese; is that correct?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes. The teachers are all very, very friendly, and the Japanese people are highly educated or instructed in Japanese doctrines. Many of them are Japanese teachers and Japanese professors, and I have attended many meetings—in fact, I have spoken at 8 or 10 meetings—where they were discussing problems within the camp, and I have heard Japanese professors make talks that were far superior to Dr. Cary's. And then we had about 600 university men in the camp, and many of those men have taken post-graduate courses in Japan, and they are nearly all on the school staff, either supervisory or otherwise, and many of them are teachers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, do you happen to know whether the Japanese language is taught in the schools?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I know that they do teach the Japanese language. When we started over there we would not permit the paper to be printed in Japanese, but after the schools started under Dr. Cary, he made some effort to get a part of the paper printed in the Japanese language, and it is now part English and part Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the name of the newspaper?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, it is the Poston—it started out as the Poston News. Now it is the Poston Chronicle, and I have a complete file of that paper, and in that paper in many instances they definitely challenge the American ideas, and very often I have had the Japanese part of it read to me when somebody would say, "Did you hear what is in Japanese in the paper?" And I would have it read, and they would discount American ideas and American standards, and usually that part was in Japanese. I have a complete file of that paper.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was responsible for the paper? Was it a Caucasian employee?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. Mr. James—what the dickens is his first name? He is the American man, but he didn't have anything to do with it. I will tell you why I say that. Mr. James is supposed to have served as the intelligence officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For what?

Mr. TOWNSEND. For the property or for the camps, or I don't know who. They call him and he signs himself as intelligence officer. I don't know whether he is under the Intelligence Department or not, but he is also carried in the heading of the paper as the editor-in-chief. But he has little to do with it and it is totally handled by the Japanese. In other words, if something comes up, James will say immediately, "Well, I don't have anything to do with the paper."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you furnish the committee with copies of the paper?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes. Many of them are very worthwhile. They are in stories, but there are many cases in there, many articles where they tell the camp director what he is going to have to do, and so forth and so on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the agriculture at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mr. Sharp, under Mr. Mathieson.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many men does he have working under him?

Mr. TOWNSEND. If any Caucasians at all, he had 1 or 2, but he probably had 200 or 300 Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was his department run efficiently?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Run what?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it run efficiently?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No. His department was really not run. They were just trying to get it in order. They had spent 8 months and had about 10,000 agricultural men, and there was nothing done except for the little agriculture between the barracks. So we felt that the agricultural department was rather a farce. I don't think Mr. Sharp was much of an organizer. He was a pretty good farmer, but he wasn't an organizer, didn't know how to handle that type of men. And Mr. Mathieson is a political product who is far removed from having any knowledge at all upon that subject. I don't know where he hails from, but I don't think he would know a potato from an apple. He is that kind of a fellow. He has no idea of agriculture. And this man Sharp is just a good, common farmer that has no idea of putting into force any program or policy. The land is cleared, the water is there, and the equipment, several hundred pieces of equipment. That is perhaps in use now, I don't know, but it was sitting there for months, tractors, and everything else.

By the way, that story in the paper up in Denver about the kids using the tractors to play with—did you see that article?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No, I didn't.



Mr. TOWNSEND. It is true. They used the tractors until we impounded them for playthings. We finally took all the equipment away from them, and pretty nearly blew up the camp in doing so, because all the fine equipment was just being used as a medium of playing around the camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there any produce raised around the camp and used there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There wasn't when I left there. If there was, it was put in there since. There should have been. The water was there and the land was there, but Sharp didn't have any push at all, and Mr. Mathieson didn't seem to care. The other men were not agricultural men and didn't give a darn. The camp should be self-supporting from an agricultural standpoint.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, do you think that the camp is adequately policed?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I didn't get that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I mean by that is there a sufficient police force there to keep order?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They have no Caucasian police force at all. Mr. Miller is serving as the chief of the internal security department.

Mr. STEEDMAN.- Did they ever build a fence around the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, they did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the purpose of the fence?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The War Department ordered the camps fenced, and they built a very elaborate fence around camp 3, and around camp 2, which was contrary to the Japanese ideas.

Through Mrs. Findley and Mr. Powell of the Social Service Department, they created a great deal of agitation among the Japanese and circulated petitions to stop the fence being put in, but the War Department ordered the fence, and they continued to put it in under contract. Then as the fence was being built the Japanese started tearing it down. Then the paper came out with a full page editorial asking the Japanese not to tear the fence down, that they were sure they would have it removed.

The fence was built primarily for a stockade. It was built with 10- or 12-foot posts and 4 or 6 wires were put on, so that it could easily be made into a concentration camp, which was the thought, I think. After the fence was up about a month the Japanese started pulling the posts out and cutting the wire down, and inside of 6 months the entire fence was removed around both camps. Then the engineers went in and put in a 3-wire fence along the highway to keep the Indian stock out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what it cost to build that fence?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The engineers told me they had put \$100,000 into the contract, in addition to 15,000 or 20,000 posts, and when they built the fence along the highway, they built a different type of fence.

The fence was completed, however, under a sort of a lull, or, the fences around the two camps were finished, and then they were completely taken out, every single post and the wire, and now there is no fence around either camp. The engineers themselves finished the job by cleaning up the scrap wire, and they strung a new fence down the highway.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that done by private contract?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; the fence was put in by contract.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know who the contractor was?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think it was the Caldwell Construction Co. that built it. I am pretty sure they had the fence contract. They built the two factories on those camps, I think.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they have offices in Los Angeles?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think they are either in Los Angeles or Phoenix. They are contractors.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Did any officials of the camp try to stop the destruction of the Government property?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The only official objection that I knew anything about, and I was much disturbed about it, because it involved my department, and I was anxious to stop the miscellaneous handling, the promiscuous handling of the equipment, because the equipment would not have been used if they were confined to the camps, and it was used on these wild trips in getting out of the camps on the various roads. So when the fence was being torn down I talked with Mr. Head, to see if there wasn't a way of guarding every roadway where the fences were cut down, and he said, "Mrs. Findley has overstepped her rights." And he called Mrs. Findley and Mr. Powell in and gave them the dickens for agitating such a move with the Japs. And he told me that he was completely out of sorts

with her. I was in his office when he called them down for interfering with the other departments of the camps, but even after that they were tearing the fences down until this appeal came out in the paper, and then for about 2 weeks the fences were left alone. They were all cut to pieces, but they were left alone, and then after that they started taking them down and the engineers came out and started to pull the wires out, and finally they removed the fence. Now there is a three-wire fence on one side of the highway, and that is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there any salvage to the wire fence?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't know what happened to it. I know that they burned most of the posts. When they put the last fence in they brought in other posts, 4 by 4 by 10 or 12.

Mr. COSTELLO. And where is the wire? Was it used?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No. They didn't use the same posts because they put in a 4-foot post and they used a different type of wire. I don't know what happened to the wire. I don't know whether the fence company took it back, or what.

I might say that while they were building the fence they were putting in gates at different places, and the Japanese would follow right along, and as they would put in the posts, they would pull them out. In other words, the Japanese made up their minds they should not be fenced in, and that is exactly the condition.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, doesn't Mr. Head have any control over the department heads at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The Caucasian heads?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. TOWNSEND. He is in control, he employs them, but they have no say over their departments. He overrides any orders or regulations that they put in effect. The Japanese will make a demand contrary to the ruling of a department head, and it is always recognized, so the heads of the departments, the Caucasian heads, are not actually heads. They are merely filling a place.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I was referring to Mrs. Findley and the fence episode. How did she get away with that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Miss Findley controls Mr. Head. Miss Findley is supposed to be one of the personnel under Mr. Head, but the actual fact is that Miss Findley tells Mr. Head what to do, and when to do it, and how to do it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How often did you have a conference of the section heads when you were there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. When I was first there we had a meeting every morning. That was a meeting of the heads of the department, a staff meeting, but that played out, and then we had one every week, and that played out, and then just a few, three or four, would get together, unless something would come up, and then they would call in a department head.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was this situation discussed at the meetings, the staff meetings?

Mr. TOWNSEND. At the beginning, when I first went down there, I was not familiar with many of these irregularities and they were never discussed. The irregularity was not discussed, but they were formulating plans, and just generalities were discussed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you know a Mr. Ed Hass?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his position?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He is the chief counsel, and his barracks were right next to mine. I almost slept with him for 6 months.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did he do as chief counsel?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He was supposed to have had complete charge of all legal matters within the camp area and would set the policies up for the Japs and the Government, and at the beginning he had some very excellent ideas. But Mr. Hass was so completely dominated by the intelligent Japanese attorneys that he soon was not the head of the department.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were Japanese attorneys assigned to his department?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As assistants?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; and some very brilliant men.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were they paid, do you know?

Mr. TOWNSEND. What were they paid?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. TOWNSEND. All Jap employees under the Government regulations received \$19. The top was \$19 a month.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, going back to the stealing of the Government property at Poston while you were there, about how much would you say that the Japanese were stealing daily?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We estimated repeatedly, and finally concluded that our daily loss would estimate about \$500. That would include lumber, equipment and supplies, and subsistence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much would you say was missing since the project was started?

Mr. TOWNSEND. We estimated about \$100,000 worth of supplies had been taken out of the stock.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has this loss been covered up through bookkeeping?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I often talked to Mr. Empie and the accounting department, how they were going to write off the losses, and a man was sent there to approve the condemnation of a lot of broken equipment, and so forth, and so on, and while he was there I asked if he was going to be able to write off the losses. But he said "No," that he didn't have anything to do with the thefts; that it would have to be shown how it was lost, and if it was a theft, there was no way of proving it.

So I took it to the accounting department and to Mr. Empie, as to what they were going to do, and Mr. Empie said that was one of the problems he had to solve, he didn't know what he was going to do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did he tell you that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. When?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes. When did he tell you that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, among the numerous conversations I have had with him, all through and during the months of November and December, when we were getting very much disturbed over the losses, and it culminated after the riot. It was no doubt in December.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was Mr. Empie bonded?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He is supposed to be bonded to have charge of all of the finances and all of the supplies and equipment in the entire area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much is his bond, do you know?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have never learned.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are any of the other employees at Poston bonded?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; the paymaster; and I think the chief accountant is bonded.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now, did you witness a riot at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It started on November 18.

Now, this that I am giving you is merely the high lights of the riot.

I think, before I read this, with your permission, I would like to make the statement that as the riot progressed I dictated to Mr. Empie's secretary, Mrs. Palmer, an hour-by-hour condition, and she was the only one in the personnel staff left there, because we all had Japanese secretaries, and she was the only one available. With Mr. Empie's permission I used her to keep a constant record of the statements made by the Japanese, and the malicious activities, and the thefts, and the fire, and numerous unusual things that I knew I couldn't remember. I dictated to her for 2 or 3 days on the situation, and she filled up two or three notebooks. But those notebooks have disappeared, and that record was not transcribed, so this record that I am referring to now was written after the riot, and covers, as best I can recall, a few of the incidents.

The riot started on the afternoon of November 18, 1942, and as far as being over, they have received all of their demands and have temporarily subsided until other demands are denied, and then probably a real riot will begin. In the words of Project Director Wade Head, "The disturbance arose following a protest over the arrest of two evacuees with the deadly assault of a third evacuee. A small but well organized pro-Axis group took advantage of this situation to seize control of the larger of the three Poston units and create a general strike."

That statement was made in my presence and was written down by Mr. Head and supplied to the press.

Now, following that, off the record, and not written down here, the reason this riot was permitted to continue, and, if you wish it to go on the record—

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think it had better go in the record.

Mr. TOWNSEND. The reason the riot continued was due to the fact that the W. R. A., the War Department, the Department of Justice, and the Indian Service would not assume responsibility, and it put the camp management and the



Caucasian personnel in a very grave situation, because the riot had grown to such proportions that they were threatening to eliminate the Caucasian force, and the management of no department would ask the M. P.'s the M. P. company 323, which was on the other side of the boulevard or roadway, stationed there with bayonets fixed and machine guns, but they couldn't get authority to come across the highway, and the Japanese thought, of course, that they were afraid to cross the border, and that heightened the fever a bit, and the Japanese got pretty bold, because the Army was standing on the opposite side of the highway and nobody would give them authority to come over, and they interpreted that as being a matter of fear.

This riot and seizure of Government supplies and equipment is one of the most shameful events within America during this war.

Do you want all of this?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. TOWNSEND (continuing). Shameful because within the confines of the United States in the State of Arizona, under any department, within a stone's throw of the largest military training center for desert troops, an enemy could get away with the seizure, use, damaging, under mob rule, of Government property, taking complete control away from Government appointees, belittling and lowering our flag, cursing the Government, its representatives, and holding under siege and riot, under threat of death, for more than a week one of the largest semimilitary posts; with the poor simpleton, cowering Caucasian employees standing around like whipped children, lucky to be spared and allowed to live from hour to hour, with ambulances filled with disguised soldiers with machine guns guarding their sleep, so they would not be slaughtered or burned, as hourly threatened.

Now, that would require an explanation. The M. P.'s were not allowed to be in uniform on our side of the highway, so Captain Dougherty took the hospital ambulance and mounted machine guns on it, and set the ambulance at the rear of our Caucasian sleeping quarters, with soldiers in civilian clothes to keep the Japanese from approaching the barracks and burning them up, as they said they would. And we were only comfortable when those ambulances were sitting out there. But they were not in uniform.

Now, would you rather have this read or just have it copied?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think we had better have it read, so as to get the full import of it.

Mr. TOWNSEND. This is probably a new condition to most of you within this fine land, where this violence could happen to the Government without prosecution either in the civil or military or Federal courts. It seems the Japs can do no wrong; or, are we still continuing the purchasing of peace-at-any-price policy we have pursued for years? Soldiers near our camps have been held 30 days in stockade confinement and fined because they have visited their wives 20 miles away without permission. No Japanese has ever been punished for anything since these camps opened.

If this is democracy we have so far degenerated in our conception of democratic government that it has become impossible to delegate authority; and we must admit shamefully to the accusation of only having the potentialities of an immense power. I rather surmise Commissioner Collier of the Indian Service is not wholly content with the behavior of his wayward adopted children and would welcome a way out.

By the way, that statement was made by the Japanese, that we didn't have any power, and we only had the potentialities of a powerful nation, that we don't even have the "guts" to put a group of men in charge so that they could control even that situation, and so how could we expect to control a national situation, such as the Japanese country, and they would state they would have our country before long. I have been told that 20 times, at least; in other words, that camp is 100 percent of the idea that Japan will have the United States in a few months. In talking to them, they are very frank about it. They don't cover it up at all, particularly the more intelligent Japanese and the military Japanese.

Now, I don't know that I mentioned it in here, but there are over 1,000 Japanese soldiers and Japanese officers in that camp and I have talked to them and have been told very definitely about their program, that this group of men on Terminal Island were in that category. And they will tell you if you ask them. They are the most indifferent fellows. If you ask them, "Were you fellows organizing on the west coast?" they will say, "Yes; we had our program all set up." I have asked them, "What were you going to do?" And the answer was: "As soon as our soldiers came over, we were going to help them." They tell you right off



that they were going to win the war. And that is the type of man that is drilling over there almost daily in military tactics, right under our noses in that camp. They drill them in various ways, but still drill them, and they are making soldiers out of them, and they are not kidding about it. They don't even presume to hide it.

For instance, I can take you down to an admiral down there. He was our chef in camp 3. I can't quite recall his name. I talked to him. I know he was an admiral in the Japanese Navy, and he was running a fishing boat at San Pedro. I said to him, "Is it a fact that your boats were equipped for military purposes?"

He said, "Yes; all of our boats were equipped so we could convert them." He said that all the Japanese fishermen are military men. He is a fine Jap, if you can stomach that sort of stuff.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now, go ahead and give us the details about the riot.

Mr. TOWNSEND. If you want the matter referring only to the riot, I can give you that. I make a lot of personal comments here and so forth. If you want to get to the riot in detail, I have that back here some place.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Just give us the details with reference to it.

Mr. TOWNSEND. We were informed on the morning of November 18, 1942, that all work would be stopped at noon. That, however, was nothing, as they would go on a sit-down, or a real strike whenever a whim struck them. By noon the whole camp had taken on a holiday air, yet a seething mass of curious Japs paraded past the administration offices. All of the regular work was without workers and several thousand had gathered around the main store and jail area. This was not unusual, as many of the most important events were held there. Soon after a gradual beginning cheers and cat-calls and loud statements of defiance and against the administration could be heard. Then the Japanese flag appeared and the American flag was absent from many places.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Pardon me. Where was the Japanese flag?

Mr. TOWNSEND. It was put on a flagpole right in front of the jail, over the main assembly center of this riot. That was in front of the jail. The jail was near the big commissary, and in front of the commissary across the road was an open area between the irrigation ditch and the jail, covering, oh, approximately 2 or 3 acres, and they surrounded the jail and congregated in that open space.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there a flagpole there?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The flagpole was on the commissary, and they put up their own flagpole in the center of their activities.

Mr. STEEDMAN. They put up a Japanese flag?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. The Japanese flag flew there for 2 weeks, and our flag—all the flags at the camp were taken down. The big flag was located at the administration center. That flag was under the control of the chief janitor of the administration offices.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he take it down?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't know who took it down. I don't know that. Then we Caucasians in the administration offices decided that the flag was going to be flown at the administration offices and they said that if we put it up, they would take it down. We wanted to see them do it, and we put the flag up. Every morning we fellows at the office put our flag up and took it down at night. But the Japanese flag, of course, was flown at other places in the camp. The administration flag was the only one that stayed up, and we insisted that it stay up. We put it out on a wire, and it looked like we were going to lose, because Mr. Evans said he didn't believe it was worth the battle to keep it up. And I said, and some of the other fellows said, "That flag is going to continue to fly as long as we are on the job."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continue.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Wood and supplies for a night rally were being assembled. Beds, blankets, food and all manner of supplies gradually piled up. Then thousands joined in the Japanese anthem. In the early afternoon it was apparent we were in for trouble. It was learned that the F. B. I. was about to remove two evacuees held on a felony charge of an attempt to murder. They were part of the goon squad or Hitler's gestapo that had put more than a dozen in the hospital for helping the F. B. I.

By midafternoon we began to take an inventory of just what the conditions were and made arrangements for an assault. Just a few days prior to the mob taking over we had ordered all trucks impounded during the night on the military side of the highway. As we had been informed they would keep the trucks during

this siege, I made a tour through the mob with my dispatcher and took the numbers of the trucks, as far as it was possible, as they soon started to cover the numbers and otherwise made it very difficult. There were 52 trucks there then and more coming. During this tour I was threatened and called everything in the calendar. Upon three occasions threats and attempts were made to turn over my car and several groups made passes to fulfill threats of every nature. They were then violent but had not found a good leader. The spirit of the mob spread through the administration offices. All help walked out. Caucasian mess halls were without cooks or supplies. Schools closed, the hospital was ordered to close by the mob, but remained open against orders. They had taken over warehouses, supplies, office records they wanted, and, in fact, everything but the Caucasian sleeping barracks, without linens or service, and at times the private offices.

The head of our local internal security department, or the infernal impurities department, as we called it, Mr. Miller, chief of police to you, was more useless and helpless than ever and had greater respect for his gangster policemen than ever. These Jap policemen were part of the city trained gangsters that helped enforce the rough stuff around camp, creating a large part of the bad government.

On the morning of the second day a committee came to my office with the daily orders to obey, or else. The spokesman, one of the always present recognized leaders that kept the trail busy into the director's office, stated, "Beginning today we will permit the garbage trucks, mail trucks, milk trucks, and under our handling, the subsistence trucks, to operate."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Gosh, one of the Japanese. One Japanese name is the same as another. I know him very well and have his name in the records some place, but I couldn't tell you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Could you obtain it from your records?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes. I know him very well. He was one of my most difficult men, and he is one of the army officers that I have referred to. I was in the offices and he was there with his steward. He had 8 or 10 men that just stayed in the administration offices all the time, and he was one of the men that we thought was loyal up until this time, and he was one of the leaders of the riot. As a matter of fact, the most loyal men were the agitators and leaders of the riot.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You mean, loyal up until the riot?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Up until the riot. They were the ones we considered our loyal people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. From your experience with the Japanese at Poston, do you think there is any way of telling a loyal Japanese from one that is disloyal?

Mr. TOWNSEND. There are no loyal Japanese when there is an emergency on. As long as it is convenient and profitable and proper, they are loyal Japanese, but when an emergency arises and Japan is taken into consideration, there are no loyal Japanese, so far as I have been able to determine. And I can go farther: If you find one that you think is loyal, and they are intelligent enough to continue with their loyalty, when you dig into their background, you find they are Japanese agents. And we found that to be true in many instances over there, after we got started finding out who was who.

I will continue with this statement, the statement of this committee spokesman: "All others—all other trucks can not move. We will take care of supplies from the warehouses, as we have taken them over and are in possession now. We have also taken over the gasoline for the cars and trucks in our possession. There will be no railroad cars unloaded, no office work, part of the mess halls and crews will work, but only under our orders. If you have any requests, we will be glad to consider them."

I had plenty to say, but could not get the support of the project director or his associate in charge at this time. Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin had gone to Salt Lake City. The responsibility had fallen to John Evans, third in command.

I appeared in Mr. Evans' office and told him I had been told what was to happen within the camp with the supplies and equipment, and asked him what he thought I should do in the matter.

And he said, "What can you do in the matter, but let them do as they want to do? There is nothing we can do, unless we start a battle, and we don't want to do that now."

I informed this committee that 35 cars of freight had accumulated at Parker, and unless it was unloaded our supplies would have to be diverted elsewhere. They asked how many men I wanted, and I stated 100. They called for 100 from the mob, and I took them in trucks to the railroad.

Just at this point, when this group of 100 men started up from the main body of the mob, and I started across from the administration building to the motor pool, which was opposite the administration building, east, everybody thought that they were after me, and the M. P.'s thought that I was being trailed, because these Japanese were following me. These boys are all military boys, and when they came after me, they came in a wedge-shape, and there were 100 in the gang, and I was at the head of the wedge, and the M. P.'s thought I was being driven by this mob when I was headed toward the motor pool. And, of course, the M. P.'s fixed their bayonets and prepared for a fight. And I got over where the guards were, because the M. P.'s were guarding the motor pool, and I told them it was all right because we were taking these men over to the warehouse and then attention ceased. But at that moment the whole camp thought something was doing, because you will remember that the supplies and equipment in my position were in a vital spot during this seizure, and I was pretty much disturbed over the fact they had taken possession of my stuff. I considered the warehouses and equipment and everything else as under my department, but I couldn't get any cooperation to do a darn thing. They wouldn't give me the authority to move, because they said if they did there would be bloodshed, and they wouldn't start it, and I didn't like it.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long were Mr. Gelvin and Mr. Head absent during this period?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They came back immediately after they got them on the telephone. They were out about 3 days. But when they came back, it didn't make any difference, and they didn't stop the strike. The strike continued for a week or 10 days after they got there.

Now, after arriving—that is at the railhead—they said they would unload only food and subsistence. They then returned to the camp—they wouldn't unload anything else; they refused—they then returned to the camp and I issued a bulletin then and there to the effect, "No work, no eats." This bulletin also covered a guard around the warehouses, but I was overruled by Mr. Empie and severely criticized by the administration for being so harsh and not conferring with them before putting out such a bulletin.

Earlier in the day a car of delicious apples had been unloaded by Indian workers, but trucked to the Camp by Jap drivers. Now, those Jap drivers were our Indian mess hall drivers. They didn't go out the first day or two. Those Japs were our loyal Japs. They served the Indian mess hall that was in the city of Parker for the Indian Service, which is right at Parker, just a mile from the heart of the city. These Japs got these apples out and the Japs said they would take them down to the warehouse. That is how these Japs happened to be driving.

One load of 75 boxes were delivered direct to the mob, and later the entire carload, with all other fruits, were taken from the refrigerator in the warehouse district. Cases of milk were dumped and cartons of milk thrown at everyone on the highway and around the camp.

Now that condition came about because the milk truck came in, and the Japanese met the milk truck. It was driven in by truck and trailer from the Golden State Dairy, and the driver was in the habit of taking the milk directly to the warehouses. They met the milk truck and jumped on the truck and diverted it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there a white man driving the truck?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; the Golden State Dairy delivery man, driving a refrigerator truck. He refused to drive the truck over to the group, so they started to unload the truck, and did unload the truck and started to throw it out. I went into the dispatcher's office, and there was a carton of milk thrown through the window.

Why, gentlemen, they were just in a frenzy, but they didn't have a leader. If they had had a leader, there would have been a lot of bloodshed. They were just a miscellaneous group, a wild, unorganized group, doing anything they wanted to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not this milk later was paid for?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes; because it was delivered to the camp. That matter came up, but we were wrong to question it, because the milk was delivered through the guard, and it was our duty to see that this man was properly protected, and if we couldn't control our angle, he couldn't help it. He was lucky to get out of there with his truck.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The Golden State Dairies were reimbursed for the milk?



Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes. We paid the regular milk price for the regular shipment, you bet. We had to, due to the fact that they had delivered the milk into the camp, which was on their contract. If it had been taken outside, we probably would not have had to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When the milk came into the confines of Poston, it became Government property?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. And that was not the only occasion. The milk came in every night during this riot, and the rioters took the trucks, and the ice cream, and other supplies that came into camp, took them right over to their lines.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Head ever instigate any investigation to determine who destroyed the Government property in this case?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No. They asked me to sign some sheets in blank, that they were going to fill in showing certain property was destroyed. I said, "I won't sign anything of that kind at all." He said, "Somebody has got to sign it." I think the Government has a form, a destruction form, or whatever the title may be, that shows—a form showing that certain property was destroyed under certain conditions.

I said, "You have no way of determining the amount of what you are going to fill in and I am not going to sign anything until we have taken an inventory and are going to determine what will be put in the form." So I don't know what happened to it. But there was no effort made, other than the gasoline report, and Mr. Head now even denies there was a riot, by the way.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continue.

Mr. TOWNSEND. As a matter of fact, Mr. Don Eddy, the representative of a very well-established concern in the Nation—you may know him—made a call upon Mr. Head to make some inquiries about the riot only about 3 weeks ago, and Mr. Head, Mr. Gelvin, and Mr. Evans sat in the office and told Mr. Eddy that there never had been a riot, that there never had been any disturbance in that camp. And Eddy came up to me in the Indian reservation and said, "Will you tell me what kind of blankety-blank cusses they are? We have the records in the office, and those three men looked me square in the eye and told me there had never been a disturbance in that camp, and no riot."

Mr. STEEDMAN. At that time, may I ask who was the commanding officer of the M. P.'s at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Captain Dougherty.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his full name? Do you know?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; I don't think I ever heard his first name; and the M. P.'s were not at fault in any respect. They were ready, willing, and able to corral that thing. When Colonel Main and other military officers came in, they were ready, and they ran a machine gun company up and stationed them up at Parker to help settle this riot, but they were never given orders, and after Mr. Head came in and met the demands that the Japs made, and it isn't over with yet—the strike is over, but they still have control, and the Japs are giving orders. That is the reason I am not there now. I wouldn't take orders from them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You may continue.

Mr. TOWNSEND. During the next few days things were wild and one thing after another took place with no effort to prevent these dangerous and irregular happenings. One of the most disturbing things was the removal of our flags from all parts of the camp and the need of our Caucasians putting up the large flag at the office, under threats it would be removed, with all replaced by the "Rising Sun."

Loudspeakers, stolen from the warehouse, had been installed, and during day and night the Japanese national anthem was heard through the length and breadth of the camp, with wild cheers and loud demonstrations toward setting fire to the whole camp, which they had threatened to do if the military forces were brought in, or crossed the highway. That is the way they put it.

I had succeeded in getting an M. P. guard on the motor pool in the military zone where more than 200 additional pieces of equipment had been assembled.

At 9 o'clock, in front of the Caucasian barracks, the chief of the fire department and his assistant—the chief of the fire department, Mr. Fein, and his assistant, Mr. Woodhouse, were accosted by a group of Japanese policemen, and a fight started because the fire department car had been driven into a part of the camp. It was necessary for more than a dozen Caucasians with pea shooters to go out and stop the attempt made by the police department to beat up the fire chief and his first assistant. This created a considerable disturbance, and it was thought it would be necessary to move the Caucasian personnel over to the military quarters.



About 12 o'clock midnight on the third day of mob control about 200 of the mob advanced to this motor pool, where they reached the highway across from the pool. They were halted by the M. P., and advised they were not allowed to cross the highway. They started to move forward, and the M. P. fired over their heads. His orders were to fire over their heads and then into them. He was at once supported by another M. P. with a machine gun. The mob that had advanced in regular military wedge formation stopped, and in a few minutes the entire M. P. company was there in trucks with fixed bayonets ready for action. The Japs retreated.

That shot had more to do with the advancement of good government than anything else that had ever been done in this camp. Standing behind the M. P., seeing the determined look and the immediate response of his buddies, all heavily armed, and the angry mob facing their first set-back, defiant and ugly but still without a leader, made things look pretty near a crisis.

This is off the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. TOWNSEND (continuing). The shot was the alarm for the M. P. company to appear, and they put the highway under solid guard, and the Japs reluctantly backed up.

I would like to say too: That the Japs are not cowards and I was surprised that they did not advance and be killed for their cause. I have been asked numbers of times there, "Why don't you kill us? It is easier than to convince us."

This 323d Military Police Company deserves a great deal of credit, although they were not permitted to do a great deal. They were alert and more than willing to settle this riot from the minute it started. Under Captain Dougherty and an able corps of officers they had the matter well in hand and if any fault exists, it is with their superiors, who should have had an arrangement with the War Relocation Authority. That mob or riot out of hand was their baby and not left to a few inexperienced, frightened men up against their first real problem.

About the fifth day we were all beginning to become alarmed over the safety of our families, and they were getting pretty nervous and threadbare. No arrangements had been made to evacuate them, even though things got to that stage. Threat after threat of violence kept coming from one source after another. I had received 15 oral and written threats. Many of the Caucasians had left with their families, who had been confined to their barracks.

On the fourth day, in conversation with the F. B. I. agents, they advised me they were leaving, as it was useless for them to remain and risk their necks, as they were getting nowhere and the idea seemed to be to give the Japs everything they wanted, regardless.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the names of the F. B. I. agents who told you that?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; I haven't those names. I knew those two fellows quite well. They were in the next barracks to me. Those men were there, and the sheriff was there, and other F. B. I. men had been there. Oh, I omitted something that might be of interest to you. We might be off the record for a minute.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Let's put it on the record.

Mr. TOWNSEND. All right.

Prior to the breaking out of the mob, a delegation of eight F. B. I. men had been in the camp, working on certain violence that had caused a number of Japanese to be put in the hospital. Their car left the guard gate at 8 o'clock, and at 8:15 the goon squad went into the barracks of one of the Japanese informants that had been working with the F. B. I. and the young man being absent, this goon squad beat up his mother and father to a point where they were not expected to live, breaking the arm and ankles of the father, and breaking both arms and fracturing the skull of the mother, and bruising her in nearly every portion of her body.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have the names of those Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have in the records some place.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long did they remain in the hospital?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I went in to see them the following morning after this had happened, or, I went in the next evening, and the next morning or about midday the following day there were other victims put in the hospital, and these people had disappeared.

Mr. COSTELLO. In 2 days they had disappeared from the hospital?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Disappeared from the hospital.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you ever see them afterward at the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; I never saw them, and the riot followed soon after that, because this squad, this goon squad, went out and wanted to beat up everybody that had given any information to these F. B. I. men.

Mr. COSTELLO. If there was a death at the camp, then how would the burials be handled?

Mr. TOWNSEND. The doctor signs the death certificate, and the undertaker is from Yuma. I can't recall his name, but he takes the body and takes it down to the crematory, unless the bodies are shipped out. Very frequently the Japs have shipped them out.

Mr. COSTELLO. The undertaker handles the cremation?

Mr. TOWNSEND. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. In a Government-build crematory?

Mr. TOWNSEND. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does he keep a record or does the camp keep a record of the cremations?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; he keeps the records. He bills the project director every month. He was complaining to me once about being several thousands of dollars in arrears and wondering what in the heck he could do to get his money.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he allowed to conduct any cremations of persons other than those from the camps?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have never heard of any; only just the Japanese within the camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. The crematory is exclusively used for the personnel in the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continue with your story of the riot, please.

Mr. TOWNSEND (continuing). On the fourth day in conversation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, they advised me they were leaving, as it was useless for them to remain and risk their necks, and getting no where, and the idea seemed to be to give the Japs everything they wanted, regardless.

I stated to these two F. B. I. operators that they need not kid me, that they were not going to leave the camp, and they informed me they were definitely on their way out, and they left. I know they left, because I saw them get in their car and go.

As tension increased, and everyone was at the breaking point, I made a demand upon the Jap leaders to produce the keys to the gasoline pumps. My car and others had been drained. I received them and put the pumps under Caucasian guard and operation, keeping the keys to one 1,000-gallon tank for emergency purposes, releasing two 2,000-gallon tanks for normal uses. The mob had used 5,000 gallons of gasoline the first 2 days.

It required considerable persuasion and trouble to get these keys. Later in the day, the acting director, John Evans, through fear of further arousing the Japs, instructed chief administrative officer, Mr. Empie, whom I was directly under, to order me to surrender these other keys to be turned back to the Japs. They had already taken charge of the pumps again. I told them both to go to hell, as I felt a certain responsibility toward the women and children and would hold the tank of gasoline for their evacuation if it came to that point.

In attendance at this stormy session was Colonel Main of the United States Army, who had been sent there to settle the riot. He was denied this right, or was not given any opportunity to take any action with the angry Japs. He asked the officials assembled why we did not at once recover the seized Government property being illegally held, and stated if he could get orders he would take it, but would expect to leave around 600 dead Japs on the ground in so doing. When told to let things take their course—

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Mr. Head or Mr. Gelvin at the camp at that time?

Mr. TOWNSEND. No; they hadn't arrived. This was around the third or fourth day. But Colonel Main had his staff there, and, boy, was he boiling.

In this report I didn't want to state many of the things that took place, because some of these fellows were just as hot about it as I was. We had a pretty near battle there. I told Evans—or, first, I told Mr. Empie to go to hell.

He said, "Well, do you mean to tell me you can tell me to go to hell?" I said, "Yes." He said, "Why don't you tell Evans he can go to hell too?" I said, "That is exactly what I will do." So he said, "Come on."

So they had the meeting with Colonel Main, and Empie walked in, and he was boiling, and he didn't know whether to go in or not, but he said, "Mr. Evans, Mr. Townsend has some things to tell you."

I said, "I told Mr. Empie to tell you to go to hell. I was going to, and I told Mr. Empie to tell you, and now I am telling you myself, that you can't have the

key to the other 1,000 gallons of gasoline." I said, "You may not feel any responsibility toward the Caucasian people in this administration center, but I do, and I am going to keep enough gasoline to evacuate these white people in these camps if it is necessary."

And Evans is a big Indian type of guy, and he got out of his chair and walked to the window, and we had quite a little session, and finally he sat down. I said, "That is the way it stands, and I don't have any right to turn those pumps over to the Japanese."

He said, "Mr. Townsend, we are trying to avoid bloodshed, and we think we are doing the best we can until things take place."

Then Colonel Main spoke up—oh, by the way, Mr. Empie's assistant spoke up, Mr. Smith. He was the assistant under Mr. Empie that took care of the business, and he said, "Townsend is right." He said, "There has got to be somebody here that will try to take care of this situation, and that is his department, and I am for him." And Colonel Main said, "Townsend, why in the world don't you go down and do something?"

I said, "All right, Colonel, if you have the authority to tell me, I will be the first man to go."

And Colonel Main said to Evans, "What about it?" He said, "This has reached a point where I am disgusted. I had just as well leave." He said, "If I go down to take it over," he said, "well, there will be five or six hundred Japs on the ground dead, and that is what ought to be done." And Main got up disgusted, and his staff got up and went out with him, and I didn't see him after that. When told to let things take their course to save bloodshed, he left the meeting with his staff in disgust, and said, "If he could get no cooperation from the local management he could see no reason for hanging around, but, by the looks of things, he or someone would have to be called back to settle things."

After another night of hell, the loud belling of the Japanese national anthem and the cheering and threats, my wife with others agreed to leave for their homes, so about noon I left with a carload. We were informed when leaving that if I returned that I would regret it, as I was on the top of the blacklist of Caucasians that had to go. I returned in a few days, finding things wearing out, but not settled in any measure, other than finding the Japs in a stronger position, having won most of their demands. Many near clashes occurred over the transportation that was being used by special permit from the chief administrator, under guard.

The mob continued with almost entire control for another week, while the F. B. I., the Indian Department, and the War Department, who were in constant contact by special through wire from Washington, wrangled over jurisdiction and who was to assume responsibility.

Finally, after added numerous victories and vicious demands, the release of both prisoners was ordered by the camp director. He had agreed to release one of them, and, of course, at this period Mr. Head and all of them were back—they were back long before this, however—he had agreed to release one of them, but that would not satisfy the mob, so as a means of satisfying them and in an effort to avoid bloodshed, he released the two, thereby compounding a felony. If they were not guilty, they should not have been arrested and held, and if they were guilty, nothing under the sun should have released them without trial and regular legal procedure. The sheriff of Yuma County, T. H. Newman, had arrived, but he did not care to remove the prisoners. Up to date there has been no prosecution for any offense or for any outlawry or crime in any of the camps. On the Poston battle fronts the Japs have won all battles up to January 1943.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, I would like to develop at this point something about your handling of the automobiles and trucks at Poston. You were to have had charge of all of the automobiles and trucks at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes, sir; all motor equipment.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then the project manager ordered you to leave the trucks and tractors in the custody of the Japs for 24 hours a day?

Mr. TOWNSEND. When I went to the camp the procedure was that all equipment was in the hands of the Japanese 24 hours a day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that later changed?

Mr. TOWNSEND. At a later date. I fought for 2 months to get a written consent, and when I got the written consent—I might say it was customary for Mr. Head, Mr. Gelvin, and Mr. Evans to give verbal orders and then countermand them, and all of my requests were made in writing, and I finally got the signatures of Mr. Head, Mr. Gelvin, Mr. Empie, and Mr. Evans to impound the equipment, and as soon as the equipment was impounded, certain demands



were made upon them and they tried to lift the order, and I refused to release the equipment unless we all agreed upon it, to countermand the other arrangement.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many so-called pleasure cars did you have at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. About 70 or 80.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they all owned by the Government?

Mr. TOWNSEND. All Government sedans.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Government sedans. Were these automobiles used by the Japanese at night?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Exclusively.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did they use them for?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Pleasure, running around the camp in the remote areas, for scooters, and playing around, as would be expected.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there a curfew at the camp?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Never has been a curfew at the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What percentage of the equipment was used after working hours.

Mr. TOWNSEND. More than 50 percent.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the director finally agree to a pooling arrangement of the equipment?

Mr. TOWNSEND. He did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was after about 2 months?

Mr. TOWNSEND. After about 2 months we got the equipment pooled on the military side of the highway.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You may continue.

Mr. TOWNSEND. By pooling the trucks, we saved 1,775 gallons of gasoline in the first weekend, Saturday night, Sunday, and Sunday night, and continued to save 1,000 gallons per day, by actual pump records. That is by the trucks that were impounded. Then later on, if you want to bring in the cars, we did the same thing and saved 300 gallons a day by taking the cars away from them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. While you were at Poston did the Japanese who were interned there make automobile trips to visit their relatives and friends in the Midwest and East?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They did, with written orders by Mr. Head, to supply them with transportation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the reason for these trips?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Any excuse. Sickness in the families or for the purpose of looking after a sold automobile that payments had not been made on, being unable to make collections on crop sales or various agricultural ideas, and for any miscellaneous excuse the Japanese were allowed to take Government equipment and make trips up to 2,500 miles, using Government credit cards.

Mr. COSTELLO. All their own cars had been left at their homes by the evacuees?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Oh, yes. They didn't have their own cars, except those which we leased from them, you see.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they used the Government equipment?

Mr. TOWNSEND. They used to use them, these big sedans, and drive them into these metropolitan centers out there, with soldiers sitting out there in the desert and seeing a load of Japanese going by in the big Government cars and giving the boys a big horselaugh. It was terrible, and is still going on, but not quite so viciously, because the camp has been under quarantine.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say that some of the cars traveled as high as 2,500 miles. Did the speedometers indicate that when they returned?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes. In starting them on the trip it was usual to give them a credit card and to keep a complete record, so we took the speedometer reading upon their leaving and upon their returning.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that the records at Poston will show or indicate these trips that were made back into the Midwest and East?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I have in my possession a great many of the records, particularly the authorizations issued by Mr. Head or his associates for these trips.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you furnish those records to the committee?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Be very glad to, and other records there should be complete, showing all of the miscellaneous travel, both by Caucasians and others.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would those records be in the dispatcher's office?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Supposed to be.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Townsend, how do you explain the control which the Japanese have, or apparently have, over Mr. Head and the various staff members at Poston?



Mr. TOWNSEND. Well, my interpretation was that at the beginning Mr. Head was operating under the W. R. A. orders, and the orders of Mr. Collier of the Indian Agency, that they had started an experiment and that they were endeavoring through the Indian Agency to give the Japanese the same freedom and the kind careful attention that they were giving the Indians, believing that they were a mild group of American citizens.

Later on, Mr. Head had responded to so many unusual demands that the Japanese found that he was easily influenced and it gradually grew to the point where they made ridiculous demands, and Head started complying with them until he got himself so deeply involved with the Japanese that he could not retract. And now there have been so many irregular things happen that Mr. Head and his associates are completely involved in, misconduct, to the point where there is no hope of correction—disloyal misconduct. I think that is the most disloyal set-up that the American Government has ever witnessed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You think that they are sympathetic toward the Japanese?

Mr. TOWNSEND. One-hundred percent, and particularly through the school system. The sympathy toward the Japanese of the social service department is the greatest detriment down there. The school system is allied with the social service, and the two together are a fearful influence, and Mr. Head—well, he is not a man capable of standing up against it. His stamina is lacking, and he has never had any experience in the line of handling this vicious type of people, although it is true that he is a very fine, polished gentleman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What recommendation would you make to improve the conditions at Poston?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Put it entirely under military control, and when the Japanese are told to do something, see that they do it, instead of laughing at the instructor, the management, and the Government.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please recite, briefly, the circumstances surrounding your resignation?

Mr. TOWNSEND. On December 20 a meeting was called by Mr. Empie's personnel, stating that the Japanese were to take over the control of the camp. At that meeting Mr. Palmer, the timekeeper and not the procurement officer, asked if he meant that we were to take orders from the Japanese.

Mr. Empie said he did not expect to take orders from the Japanese, and if any of the rest of us were worried, it would be a good plan for us to leave.

After the meeting, I asked Mr. Empie if it was his understanding that we were to accept orders and the entire department were to go under the leadership of the Japanese. He said, "It looks that way."

I asked him if that was the W. R. A. policy, or what made him think that we were to be under their direction.

He said, "Well, that is the project director's orders."

And I said, "Mr. Empie, I can never take orders from the Japanese, and you know it."

And he said, "I can't either."

So in 2 or 3 days—I had been licensing the drivers under the W. R. A. order, I had been issuing licenses, and we agreed to qualify only certain members, and I had to go into many battles with the Japanese over not issuing drivers' licenses, and inasmuch as my entire staff had gone, due to the riot, I was left in complete charge of the motor equipment, and during the search of trying to get drivers for the equipment and adjusting the riot conditions, we were constantly in a turmoil in my office. On the 23d of December Mr. Gelvin called me in and said that he realized that I was not willing to comply with the orders of putting my department under the Japanese control and taking orders from them. And I said, "No; I am not."

So he said, "Well, we are going to have to make a change."

I said, "Well, that is perfectly proper." So he gave me a very nice letter, and my time continued until January 15, and in the letter, which you may have, he stated that my services were very highly appreciated, that he had found that I had worked to the interests of saving all that could be saved for the Government, and the only thing that they found was that my relationship with the Japanese was not friendly. And I assure you now it was not friendly, and I am not the kind of a fellow that can see that sort of thing continue and not be interested in making a correction, because I think it is the most un-American, the most disloyal, the most extravagant thing that we have ever seen in this country, particularly during the war period, and we ought not to take it easily, not only at this time, but in the future. After the war is over, to have to deal

with that arrogant bunch of Japs, who have put it over on every type of a Government agency, well, they are going to be a very difficult people to deal with after the war.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Costello?

Mr. COSTELLO. No. I think that pretty well completes the picture on that situation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think that that is about all.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate very much your giving us your statement, Mr. Townsend. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the hearing in the above entitled matter was adjourned.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing adjourned until 10 a. m., Friday, June 11, 1943.)

# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JUNE 11, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., in room 1543, United States Post Office and Court House, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, and Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. I believe your first witness today is Mr. James.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, sir.

## TESTIMONY OF NORRIS W. JAMES, FORMERLY PRESS AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, COLORADO RIVER WAR RELOCATION PROJECT, POSTON, ARIZONA.

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. JAMES. Norris W. James.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you also state your occupation?

Mr. JAMES. My profession is newspaperman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you wish to proceed with the questioning, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. JAMES. 215 Churchill Avenue, Palo Alto.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. JAMES. San Francisco, Calif.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. JAMES. February 19, 1904.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you attend school?

Mr. JAMES. I attended grade schools in San Francisco, Palo Alto High School, and Stanford University. I hold an A. B. degree from Stanford University, class of 1926. The A. B. is in political science. I also studied law at Stanford and took courses in far eastern history under Prof. Yamato Ichihashi.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please give the committee a résumé of the most important positions that you have held?

Mr. JAMES. Following my graduation from Stanford, I was employed by Peninsular Newspapers, Inc., operators of three daily newspapers on the San Francisco peninsula.

In approximately September of 1928 I accepted a position with the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Honolulu, Hawaii. After serving with the Star-Bulletin for a few months, I was assigned to Hilo, Hawaii, where I was on the staff of the Hilo Daily Tribune-Herald.

I returned to the mainland of the United States in January 1930.

I then accepted a position with the Miller-Freeman Publications of Seattle, Wash., in their San Francisco organization—that is the San Francisco office. This is a business magazine organization, publishing some 18 business magazines on the Pacific coast.

I was editor of their retail publications—editorial director of their retail publications, including Furniture Reporter, a monthly magazine going to the retail home furnishing merchants and the dry-goods stores that handled home furnishings.

In 1933 with Mr. George F. Morrell, I organized the Western Retail News Service, operating in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle, publishers of two semimonthly business magazines—Furniture Retailing and Appliance Retailing.

I operated these in approximately 1936 and then went back to the Peninsular organization, of which Mr. Morrell was president when we disbanded these business magazines.

I served with the Peninsular newspapers practically continuously until February of 1942, when I was approached by the War Relocation Authority to accept a position in the San Francisco office.

I accepted that position on April 18, 1942, and on May 7, having applied for the position at the Colorado River War Relocation Center as press and intelligence officer and I was assigned there and arrived at Poston on approximately May 8.

I served continuously at Poston until May 15, when I resigned to join the armed forces.

Mr. EBERHARTER. May 15, 1943?

Mr. JAMES. May 15, 1943, yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At this point—

Mr. JAMES. Pardon me, may I go into a few other things such as my knowledge of the Japanese people?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I was going to inquire into that at this point.

Mr. JAMES. Would you want to do that by questioning?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes. I would like to ask you when you were in Hawaii did you come into contact with Japanese organizations in the islands?

Mr. JAMES. I did. I met Maj. Joseph Stilwell, who was then in charge of counter-intelligence for the Territory of Hawaii. That was in February—February 29, I am sure it was. And out of a casual friendship with him I learned quite a bit about the overseas organizations that Imperial Japan had maintained in Hawaii and in this country.

Subsequent to my return to the mainland, I attended frequent meetings of the Japan Society of America in San Francisco, the Japanese-American Citizens' League and through contacts with the Office of Naval Intelligence and friends of mine who are employed there, was able to keep up a fairly clear picture of what was going on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made a study of Japanese subversive organizations, such as the Central Japanese Association and the various Ken or Prefectural groups?



Mr. JAMES. I have. I am acquainted with Kenjin Kai, the so-called Prefectural associations which are somewhat like the State associations that you find here in southern California—Iowa Society, Indiana Society, and so forth.

I am also acquainted with the Junior Kenjin Kai, which is a horse of a different color; a group of younger ones who have been, in my estimation, subject to the indoctrination of Imperial Japanese representatives of Imperial Japan.

In the Junior Kenjin Kai you find that many of the Kibei—that is, American-born Japanese who have gone to Japan for their further education—have filled the more important roles.

I am acquainted with Heimusha Kai, which is an organization which existed on the American Pacific coast prior to Pearl Harbor, composed of the veterans of the Russo-Japanese war, whose duties were largely those of collecting money for the Imperial Navy or the Imperial Army.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When you went to work for the W. R. A., had you a good basic knowledge of Japanese psychology and Japanese customs?

Mr. JAMES. I would say an average knowledge of a person interested in this phase of Japanese activities on the coast; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who requested you to apply for a position in the W. R. A.?

Mr. JAMES. Off the record may I state the circumstances?

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state for the benefit of the press that from time to time a witness may want to make some remark off the record and I respectfully request confidence in that regard. We will go off the record for a moment.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. On the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were your duties and responsibilities at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. For the first 4 months I was in charge of the intake center where all arriving Japanese were processed through.

I maintained a staff varying, at times, from 60 to as high as 150 Japanese who assisted me in that work.

Japanese upon arriving at Poston were immediately brought into the intake station where they were processed through, given a preliminary interview as to their work background, and then invited to volunteer to sign W. R. A. Forms Nos. 1 and 2.

Form No. 1 was an affidavit not to engage in sabotage or subversive activities while at the relocation center.

Form No. 2 was enlistment, a voluntary enlistment in the War Relocation Authority work corps, an enlistment to perform work at the project in return for certain cash advances, and in return they were to receive also free medical care, basic housing, and food and education for their children.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When the individual Japanese arrived at the intake station, did you have any information regarding his loyalty?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever, Mr. Steedman. Occasionally we would receive from W. C. C. A.—

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you identify the W. C. C. A.?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; that is the Wartime Civilian Control Administration, set up in the Western Defense Command by Lieutenant General

DeWitt, to handle the problem of moving Japanese from the three Pacific Coast States and Arizona to assembly centers, and from assembly centers to the relocation centers.

Occasionally Japanese were brought directly from their homes to the relocation centers.

In addition to operating the intake station——

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Steedman's question has not been answered. Did you have any information regarding these Japanese when they arrived at the camp?

Mr. JAMES. I had better give you an answer to that. There were dossiers sent in by the W. C. C. A. on the previous address of these Japanese regarding their physical condition, the members of their family, but to my knowledge I have never seen any dossiers containing information on their subversive activities.

The dossiers showed if they had been educated in Japan, which was not necessarily prima facie evidence that they were subversive.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, you didn't know whether they were good or bad Japanese when they arrived at the center?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Shall I go on with my activities, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would prefer to bring them out by questions.

Mr. JAMES. May I add one more sentence on the intake?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. JAMES. In the operation of the intake center, it required a small corps of interpreters, typists, and fingerprint operators.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is a large percentage of the Japanese unable to speak English?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do practically all the Japanese speak English?

Mr. JAMES. No; I would say that, oh, possibly 70 percent can understand English.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those who do not speak English are they the older people?

Mr. JAMES. The older people; yes; and some of the Kibei, those who were born here and then gone back to Japan cannot speak the language.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you understand any Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. I have a fairly good knowledge of conversational Japanese and perhaps——

Mr. MUNDT. Do you speak the language?

Mr. JAMES. That doesn't qualify me as an expert.

Mr. MUNDT. You are one of the few members at Poston that could understand Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. I understand the working of the language and the extreme difficulty of the translations. I might add to my knowledge——perhaps I had better put this off the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. On the record.

Mr. MUNDT. The Japanese at the relocation center corresponded with people on the outside in the Japanese language?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; they do.

Mr. MUNDT. They are permitted to do that?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; they do. There is no mail censorship and as a result, of course, it is quite possible and they do to my knowledge because I have seen actual letters come in between Gila and Poston in Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. In your opinion would it be possible for them to send code messages among themselves in the Japanese language which we would not be able to interpret even though we did have an interpreter?

Mr. JAMES. May I go off the record?

Mr. COSTELLO. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. On the record.

Mr. MUNDT. In view of the fact there is no mail censorship and that the Japanese are permitted to correspond with other Japanese outside of the relocation center at Poston, is it your belief that it would be possible for them to send code messages back and forth which would not be detectable?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the fact there is no censorship?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; in view of the fact there is no censorship.

Mr. COSTELLO. They wouldn't even have to use a code?

Mr. JAMES. All you would have to do is write it in Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. Even without censorship of the letters that you have examined it would take an expert in the Japanese language to detect a code message in the Japanese language?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the date of arrival of the first Japanese at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Approximately May 12. On May 12 two came in from El Centro and on the 13th we received 50 from the Imperial Valley.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At that period in the history of the project were there any project employees who had had previous experience in the handling of Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir; the only one who may have had experience was the project director, Mr. Head, who had lived in the Philippine Islands for several years, but to my knowledge none at that stage had had any dealings with Japanese either in California or in Hawaii.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As I understand it you were employed by the W. R. A. and assigned to Poston?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the other employees or the majority of the other employees were assigned to Poston by the Indian Service?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. After the reception of the evacuees had been completed at the project at Poston, what were your duties then?

Mr. JAMES. The process of processing them through the intake station continued from May to September, but paralleling that my job was to set up the project newspaper which, until October 1, was financed by the War Relocation Authority and Indian Service—that is the paper and the ink was paid for by the Federal agencies.

On October 1 the name of the paper was changed to Poston Daily Chronicle and at my suggestion the Japanese were charged a subscription rate of 30 cents a month for their mimeographed paper, and took over the responsibility for the editorial treatment.



My job then was simply to see that official news coming from the project director's office or from the regional office in San Francisco or from the Washington office, was given the proper break in the publication.

I had no control over the editorial policies and told the staff that they were on their own; that they would have to stand by their own statements.

I believe we are the only project paper that has made its own way.

I felt that it was far better to do that and not have a press censorship there in order to feel or find out exactly how the people were feeling. I felt that it was far better to get them out in the open and let them actually speak for themselves—how they felt about a great many of the problems that came up in relocation.

As far as the Japanese edition of the Chronicle was concerned, the arrangement had to be made to monitor the Japanese part of the paper by the Office of Navy Intelligence of the twelfth district of military intelligence at Phoenix and the Department of Justice in Washington. Copies have gone to each of those three agencies of every edition that has come out.

Mr. COSTELLO. When you say "monitored" you mean simply reviewed?

Mr. JAMES. Reviewed them on the theory, Congressman, that anything that would be said inside the publication at Poston would not affect external problems. I think that has worked out pretty satisfactorily. We have had, I think, only one kick-back from the Department of Justice.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the Poston Chronicle sent to the rapidly growing ranks of the alumni at Poston who have been released from the camp?

Mr. JAMES. Only to those who have put 30 cents on the line.

Mr. MUNDT. If they have gone and are now a part of the alumni living outside of the camp and in the Middle West they can get the newspaper?

Mr. JAMES. If they put the money on the line.

Mr. MUNDT. And receive the Japanese edition, too?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; receive the Japanese edition.

Mr. MUNDT. Then the monitoring system wouldn't be entirely a safeguard against anything that should not be published?

Mr. JAMES. No; and of course the presumption is that if the Department of Justice in Washington or these other Intelligence services would have made their translations and if anything popped up they would be able to handle it. These translators know that somebody is riding herd on them in Washington in the Intelligence service—they know that and I believe that is why they haven't stepped out of line.

Mr. MUNDT. So far as you know there has been nothing in the paper, either in English or Japanese, which would tend to stir up trouble among the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Well, now, maybe I had better back up there. It all depends on what you mean by "trouble." If you mean editorially attacking Lieutenant General DeWitt, I think they can stand on their own feet.

Mr. MUNDT. I wasn't thinking about that so much. I was thinking about something that might tend to stir up subversive action.



Mr. JAMES. Definitely no. I have never seen anything in the Poston Chronicle espousing the cause of Imperial Japan, either in the Japanese or English language.

Mr. MUNDT. But you do accord them the American privilege of griping?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; and many times they have taken on the administration down there.

Mr. MUNDT. I wouldn't object to that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe, Mr. James, the editorial policy as expressed by the editorial writers of the paper is indicative of the sentiment and feeling of the people in the camp?

Mr. JAMES. I do. Many times, as I say, they took on us whom they called "Hakujin," which literally means hairy barbarians.

Mr. MUNDT. Hairy barbarians?

Mr. JAMES. That is the way they refer to us but it was usually in a temperate sort of way and many times they were personally justified in taking us on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was your immediate superior at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. At Poston it was Wade Head, the project director.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So your position was directly under the project director's office?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you reported to the project director?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. In San Francisco my immediate superior was Edwin Bates, who was regional chief of the Reports Section for W. R. A.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you were employed during the period when Mr. Eisenhower was the Director of W. R. A., is that correct?

Mr. JAMES. I was, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you state for the record Mr. Eisenhower's full name?

Mr. JAMES. Milton S. Eisenhower. He is the brother of General Eisenhower.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Immediately following Pearl Harbor, the F. B. I. apprehended and sent to internment camps, Japanese whom they considered dangerous. Were any of those Japanese who had been in internment camps later returned to Poston?

Mr. JAMES. They were, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the approximate number?

Mr. JAMES. Approximately 365 were released from Bismarck, N. Dak. and Sante Fe, N. Mex.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were those Japanese sent to internment camps for?

Mr. JAMES. I am not acquainted with all the dossiers on those men. I happen to know a number of instances. A number of them had made contributions to the Imperial Navy fund or the Imperial Army fund or it had been shown that they had at one time maintained membership in one of the semipatriotic organizations.

In every case I am convinced that there was enough basis that the F. B. I. had—and the O. N. I. had—that they produced sufficient basis for the internment of these men for the duration of the war.

I am not acquainted with the facts as to why they were turned loose on the relocation centers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what occasioned the Government to release the Japanese and send them to the relocation centers?

Mr. JAMES. I believe the Bureau of Immigration or Department of Justice working through local hearing boards at Bismarck or Santa Fe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the F. B. I.'s attitude toward the return of the interned aliens whom we are now discussing, to the relocation centers?

Mr. JAMES. I am, but I am afraid I will have to go off the record on that because I don't want to mention an opinion that friends of mine in the F. B. I. would hear about, and I wouldn't want to put it in the record because it would be a second-hand opinion, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Let me ask you another question at this point: In your opinion, did the F. B. I. approve of the release of the interned Japanese to the W. R. A. relocation centers?

Mr. JAMES. No; judging by their actions in attempting to send these men back to the internment camps as a result of activities conducted at Poston and, I believe, other relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. The F. B. I. did not have control of the courts or anything of that sort or the hearings held at Bismarck or Santa Fe?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir; they had no control over the alien hearing boards that resulted in turning loose these potentially dangerous men.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that a branch of the Department of Immigration?

Mr. JAMES. Either that or the Attorney General's office. I am not familiar with the machinery set up there. I am told it was local boards.

Mr. MUNDT. But you know the F. B. I. had nothing to do with those hearings?

Mr. JAMES. I do.

Mr. COSTELLO. They conducted their own hearings and released them?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were some of those who were returned to Poston ultimately sent back to an internment camp?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; because of activities conducted at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they have to secure additional evidence on them and evidence as to their activities before they could be returned to an internment camp?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know of any of those Japanese who were sent from the internment camps back to Poston, who were subsequently released for indefinite leave by the leave office at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. That I do not, Congressman. I am not familiar with the broad workings of the leave program.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is quite possible that some of them could have been released?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; it is—it is quite possible.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have no personal knowledge of the number?

Mr. JAMES. I have no personal knowledge of that.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know anything about the operation of the so-called stop list at Poston? How a man gets on the stop list?

Mr. JAMES. No. That has been worked out entirely by the leave office at Poston and the leave office in Washington, D. C.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether there is anything in the instructions which automatically puts a man on the stop list if he has come to Poston from an internment camp?

Mr. JAMES. I do not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and the G-2 of the Army evidently had information or evidence on the aliens which justified their internment, is that correct?

Mr. JAMES. That is true. One friend of mine in one of the Intelligence services expressed this as his opinion, and I toss it out to you for what it is worth: After Pearl Harbor although approximately 6,000 Japanese were picked up and held, for every one that had been picked up at least one other slipped through the net—at least one other. That would be the minimum because of the lack of knowledge that we Caucasian or white people had of the character of these extremely reticent people and their fanaticism.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Returning now to the 365 internees who were returned from the internment camps to Poston. After those men returned to Poston, did violence begin inside the project?

Mr. JAMES. It did, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What form did that violence take?

Mr. JAMES. It took the form of a series of beatings, starting September 15, and continuing through the night of November 14, with isolated cases recurring in January of the current year.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I interpose a question there: You say that started on September 15. Had these 365 Japanese been located at Poston prior to that time?

Mr. JAMES. They were coming in gradually, Congressman, starting on—some of them were released to us in June, July, and August. It was pretty hot down there. On July 2d it hit 146—the hottest day of the year. Apparently they were not able to get organized until the fall.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe these interned Japanese were behind the dissension and dissatisfaction that caused the trouble there?

Mr. JAMES. I believe they were a very important contributing factor. I would like the opportunity to develop that if Mr. Steedman cares to have me do that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I had planned to go into that phase of the trouble at Poston, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JAMES. May I make a request at this time, Mr. Steedman? It will probably be necessary from time to time to mention Japanese names and their Poston address. I would like to say off the record in a great many instances these people are being investigated by the proper intelligence services and I think it would be very wise not to use their names publicly because some of them are pretty bad babies.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would it be satisfactory for you to mention the names of the people and request the press not to use those names?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The only thing about that is when these hearings are printed these names will be in the record and whether or not the intelligence services care to have those names printed in the record, I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. They should have completed their investigation by that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was going to suggest as far as the record is concerned, whenever a Japanese name is used we might refer to it simply by the first letter or whatever letter it happens to start with.

Mr. MUNDT. I suggest that we use the names and request the press not to publish them and that Mr. Steedman provide the intelligence service of the F. B. I. and Army and Navy with a list of those names. I think they should be in the record. By the time we get ready to publish the hearings I know the investigations will have been made of those Japs.

Mr. JAMES. They have the names that I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. For the purpose of the record, from this point on the use of any Japanese name under investigation, in printing the hearings, will be noted and the editor will take care not to publish any such names in the printed hearings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Returning to the start of the trouble at Poston: Did you receive any reports that internees, those who were returned from internment camps, were making threats against those Japanese who had participated in their hearings before the immigration boards and before the F. B. I. and other governmental agencies?

Mr. JAMES. I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the nature of those threats?

Mr. JAMES. The threats were these: That at Bismarck and again at Santa Fe these internees, many of them, had pledged themselves to get any of their fellow Japanese who had participated in any way in the hearings at Santa Fe and Bismarck, at El Centro and elsewhere on the coast where hearings were held.

Mr. MUNDT. Had that series of hearings tended to incriminate some of the internees?

Mr. JAMES. Shall I make it clearer?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. JAMES. There were Japanese who were used as interpreters and translators. They were not used as informers, to my knowledge, either prior—

Mr. MUNDT. They wanted to get even because they had cooperated with this country?

Mr. JAMES. That is right; yes—participated in the use of this highly intricate language.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the internees serve notice on those Japanese who had cooperated with the Government authorities that they were going to beat up every one who had helped the Government?

Mr. JAMES. They didn't serve notice on the Government authorities.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am asking if they served such notice on Japanese who cooperated with the Government authorities?

Mr. JAMES. Oh, the individual Japanese? They started to warn them that so and so "has come back in camp; he doesn't like you—you had better watch out—don't be seen too often with the Hakujuin," the white people, "or you are going to get yours."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was the first Japanese beaten up by these gangsters?

Mr. JAMES. On the evening of September 15 it was Saburo Kido, national president of the American—Japanese-American Citizens League. Kido was attacked by a group of eight American-born boys in the second unit at Poston.



Mr. MUNDT. Beaten up by American-born Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; beaten up by American-born Japanese. Kido was a former San Francisco attorney and at the time he was beaten up he was president of the Japanese-American Citizens League.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe that the Japanese-American Citizens League is a patriotic organization of the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. In the years before the war and since the war I have had a number of dealings with them and spoken before them and I think by and large they have done a swell job. I think, unfortunately, they represent only a small proportion of the American-born Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please relate to the committee just what happened to Kido?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. Kido had been active in San Francisco. He had worked with the intelligence services and to my knowledge had appeared at some of these hearings. He was going to his house at about 10:30 at night when he was jumped by this group, who were later identified as American-born Japanese.

The boys, apparently, had been prompted to do this by propaganda which was disseminating from these internees. This was one beating up which did not follow the pattern of other beatings that I am going into later. It was a case where young American boys who had never known Kido had been told by their parents and friends that that was their job to do, to beat him up.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the age of these American boys?

Mr. JAMES. Eighteen, nineteen and twenty.

Mr. MUNDT. Not so young that they couldn't give a man a pretty good beating.

Mr. JAMES. Sure they could.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you make an investigation of this occurrence?

Mr. JAMES. I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you submit a report of what you learned to Mr. Head?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Head made a report of his own paralleling mine.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any of these Japanese boys who beat up Kido apprehended?

Mr. JAMES. One. The other seven had secured seasonal work permits and were working in the beet fields.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is they had been released for seasonal work by the time they found out who they were?

Mr. JAMES. By the time the investigation was completed the eighth boy was all set to leave but happened to be apprehended the very afternoon he was being released.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Which one was apprehended?

Mr. JAMES. I haven't his name here, unfortunately. I can furnish that to you. That is the only one of the cases that I have mentioned whose name I haven't got.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Well, did any of these boys receive disciplinary action for the part they played in this assault?

Mr. JAMES. I believe the ringleader was given a term of probation. He happened to be a member of the Poston No. 2 fire department. He was permitted to keep his job and as I say was put on good behavior for 90 days.

Mr. MUNDT. Was he the one that was caught there?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; he was the one that was caught.

Mr. MUNDT. Were the other seven recalled from their leaves?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. They were permitted to work in the beet fields?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. They subsequently returned to the center after the completion of the beet harvest.

Mr. COSTELLO. But no prosecution was had at that time?

Mr. JAMES. No prosecution was had at that time; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the authorities at Poston would have had the power to have recalled them from their seasonal leaves for trial at the camp if they so desired?

Mr. JAMES. That is quite correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. From your knowledge of the Japanese generally, do you feel that a Japanese boy of 18, 19, or 20, who had participated in beating up a fellow Japanese because he was loyal to the United States Government, and then released on indefinite leave to work in a beet field, was a suitable man to be let run loose like that?

Mr. JAMES. I wouldn't put it on a loyalty basis. I would say the youngsters are emotionally in a position that would make it very dangerous to turn them loose in a white community.

Mr. MUNDT. It would seem that way to me.

Mr. JAMES. I don't think it is a case of loyalty; I think it is a maladjustment in that sort of boy who is suffering from a sort of tunnel vision. The call of race is pretty strong.

Mr. MUNDT. Were these boys raised in Japan?

Mr. JAMES. No. The ringleader was a graduate of the Watsonville High School. He was a member of the track team there and he was a good student. And some of these psychological factors it is hard for white people to understand and because of their strangeness of honor, this youngster and the other seven took it upon themselves to beat up Kido.

The administrator of camp No. 2, James Crawford, has that record.

Mr. MUNDT. After these boys returned from the beet fields, were they disciplined in any way?

Mr. JAMES. Not at all—not to my knowledge, Congressman. They may have been given a parental talking to but I don't think it was any stiffer than that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In your opinion did the weak-kneed policy of the project administration indicate weakness to the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Can I qualify my answer in this respect: That in the 14 months, close to 14 months that I was associated with this largest of all relocation centers, I think, gentlemen, that very, very few of these Japanese can harbor anything but contempt for Caucasians who show so-called "Christian virtues."

After all we must examine their lives on the Pacific coast. They are highly individualistic people. Kindness to most of them as shown in their own families where they are under the domination of their parents, and I am talking about the American born, is the type of kindness which we cannot imagine. It is filial loyalty based upon fear—fear of the old papasan—the old man of the family. There are very, very few—I have seen very, very few instances where I have noted there has been any kindness or the so-called humanitarian virtues such as we white people understand. After all any of the second born generation Japanese are only 30 or 40 years away from the old country.

If it is possible, and I am not going to venture an opinion on that, but if it is possible to thoroughly mix them up in the melting pot of America, certainly it is too soon for us to say these Christian virtues have been absorbed by them.

Mr. COSTELLO. The parents completely dominate the families?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; they are completely dominated.

Mr. MUNDT. They have respect for a strong disciplinarian control?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And a contempt for a relaxation of that control?

Mr. JAMES. They have contempt for anyone who is indecisive; anyone who shows weaknesses. That is a trait of the Yamoto race and it has been intensified as a result of the 12 months these people have spent in the relocation centers. I would make one qualifying statement on that:

I do believe the women, and I want to pay tribute to the Japanese-American women in these camps, they are in a very difficult spot. They have absorbed far more Americanization than the men. They are trying desperately to stand up to the standards of American womanhood because they stand to lose a devil of a lot. They don't want to go back to the period of bondage that the mamasan occupy; they want to be American women. And, as a matter of fact, the best sources of information—as a matter of fact, the only slim sources of information I had at Poston was in the case of Japanese women, and especially the American-born who were married and perhaps had a child or two.

Mr. MUNDT. That is a very interesting observation and it sounds very logical, that the Japanese women would not want to go back to the old life.

Mr. JAMES. They are splendid. They come up every day in the desert heat freshly laundered and they are trying desperately to be Americans, but in many cases they are under the domination of their fathers.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the Japanese wife subject to the domination of the husband's family, too?

Mr. JAMES. Not so much in the case of American born. Very seldom do you run across that but she is under the domination of her father. She can't break away from that.

I saw one case here last fall when a small group of our people were leaving to go on the *Gripsholm* on the exchange of nationals. In that group was an old Japanese doctor and his American-born daughter and that American-born daughter didn't want to go back to Japan. There were tears in her eyes when she left Poston, but she had to go—she had no choice but obey the will of her father.

Mr. COSTELLO. How old was she?

Mr. JAMES. Twenty-one; and she had never been to Japan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know a Japanese by the name of Kay Nishimura?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. Mr. Nishimura worked for me for a period of about 6 months as chief interpreter for me. He came originally from El Centro, Calif., and had been an interpreter for the sheriff's office and also for the Bureau of Federal Investigation at El Centro.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And in those connections he acted as interpreter in a number of cases where Japanese internees were involved?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, sir.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the occasion of Mr. Nishimura being assaulted by a Japanese mob inside of the center at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. I do. He was assaulted on two occasions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you relate to the committee just what happened on the first occasion?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. May I consult my notes just a moment?

Mr. COSTELLO. While you are looking through your notes, we will take a few minutes recess.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. JAMES. On the night of September 12 at approximately 11 o'clock, Mr. Nishimura was coming home from a dance. He was attacked by a group of unidentified persons. He testified there was between 8 and 12 who beat him up and he was hospitalized at the Poston General Hospital. He was released after about 5 days.

Nishimura told me that he had received warnings for at least 2 weeks prior to that that he was going to be beaten up.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you investigate that instance?

Mr. JAMES. I did. Mr. Nishimura wasn't able to disclose to me the identity of the persons who had attacked him in the first beating.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they masked?

Mr. JAMES. Not that group; no.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was any reason given to you for the beating?

Mr. JAMES. Nishimura said he had made enemies because he had been a translator and interpreter and he believed he made these enemies and that they had possibly—it possibly could be traced to these internees.

He did mention the name of one internee, Juro Omori.

It is perfectly all right to use his name because he is now under lock and key at Santa Fe, N. Mex.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He felt that the Japanese whom you have just mentioned was one of the men that assaulted him?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was anything done to protect Mr. Nishimura from further harm after this first beating?

Mr. JAMES. No. As a matter of fact, he didn't ask for protection.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he continue to work for you as an interpreter?

Mr. JAMES. He continued to work for me as chief of the translation service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Tom Ito?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; his name is Tomo.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you leaving Mr. Nishimura now?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Leaving him temporarily. He was beaten up the second time but I wanted to bring in the beatings in a chronological order.

Mr. JAMES. I know Mr. Tomo whose last name is Ito. He is an honor student, graduated from Stanford University and for a number of months was supervisor of block managers in the first unit at Poston.

On the night of September 14, a group of between 8 and 10 men, according to his testimony, garbed in Japanese hoods, traditional Samuri hoods, attempted to break down the door of his apartment.

He previously, according to his testimony given to me, received mysterious warnings from friends of his that he was to be beaten up.



The gang of hooded men were masked, wearing the Samuri hoods and ran away after Ito's yells aroused the neighborhood. Incidentally, he had secured a large and heavy Yale lock for his door and apparently was expecting trouble.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was Ito friendly to the project officials?

Mr. JAMES. Very prominent in the project administration. He had played ball 100 percent with us.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the "Samuri hood"?

Mr. JAMES. Well, it is rather hard to describe. Have you seen pictures of a prince of the old Japanese warriors? They wear a hooded arrangement made of cloth that fits over the head and allows for a mask that drops from here down to about here [indicating].

Mr. COSTELLO. That is, it covers the face from the nose down?

Mr. JAMES. That is right, covers the face from the nose down.

Mr. MUNDT. Is that something that the Japanese had made there at Poston or did they bring them to camp with them?

Mr. JAMES. Made them themselves—made them out of cheap material. They could be made out of burlap or could be made out of cheap cotton goods.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it a part of some ceremonial custom?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; it is part of a ceremonial custom.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Costumes similar to those worn by members of the Butoku-Kai?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; it is a ceremonial headdress.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the attempt to assault Ito follow the same pattern as the first assault that was made upon Nishimura?

Mr. JAMES. Insofar as the warnings were concerned, yes; and in the number of people that were participating; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And both beatings happened at nighttime?

Mr. JAMES. At nighttime; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese police inside the center investigate those cases?

Mr. JAMES. They did. I would like to state for the record that from the period May 1 to October 1 there was no white supervisor of police at Poston. The work was entirely undertaken by Japanese working under the direction of the unit administrators.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the Japanese police diligent in their investigation of these assaults that were taking place?

Mr. JAMES. They were unable to furnish any information as to who was responsible.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they attempt to obtain that information?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Hatsuni Yamada?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. He was director of recreational activities for the first unit at Poston.

He is a candidate for the Military Language School at Camp Savage. He was a former resident of Santa Ana, Calif., where he and his sister acted as interpreters for several years for the United States Immigration Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he friendly to the project administration?

Mr. JAMES. Very friendly and very helpful. He had a good knowledge of the Japanese language and had actually worked for me from time to time as an interpreter. He was an excellent interpreter.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he receive a beating similar to the other two Japanese whom we have been talking about?

Mr. JAMES. He did. During the period from October, approximately October 1 to October 17, he received a series of warnings he was to be beaten up.

On the night of October 17 when he was returning from an affair which was being held in the center at Poston, he was attacked by three men, not hooded. These men were not hooded. He was attacked by these three men but managed to escape by running away from them.

He too received first-aid treatment at the hospital. He was not hospitalized as Nishimura and Kido were. His injuries were not severe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did this mob also attack his sister?

Mr. JAMES. Not on that occasion; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did it on any occasion?

Mr. JAMES. Later they did; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please relate that incident?

Mr. JAMES. That was on the night of November 15 at 11 p. m., 1942. The parents of Hatsumi Yamada and his sister received a slight beating by a group of approximately eight men who broke into their barracks apartment apparently seeking Hatsumi.

Hatsumi had been spirited away because he had received these warnings and was fearful of his life. We had moved him to, I believe, the Poston General Hospital—put him in an isolation ward there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So the gang couldn't find Yamada so they attacked his mother and sister?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, and the Yamada women were only slightly hurt—slightly injured.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was his father in the house at the time?

Mr. JAMES. I am not sure on that point, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you say the women were hospitalized?

Mr. JAMES. No, they received first-aid treatment. They were terrorized so and repeatedly appealed for protection during the period from November 15 to November 25, when we had our trouble at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they able to identify any of their assailants?

Mr. JAMES. No, they were not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were those men hooded?

Mr. JAMES. No, they were not hooded men.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Joseph Francis Seta?

Mr. JAMES. I do. He was a member of the Poston No. 1 fire department. On the night following the beating up of Hatsumi Yamada, Joseph Francis Seta went to his barracks apartment along about 11 o'clock and with him was his uncle. I have not the uncle's name here. They retired and at approximately 11:30 the door of their apartment was smashed down and a group of eight hooded men broke in and administered severe beatings to Seta, to his uncle, and underneath of the bed of Seta was left a sword about 4 feet long, made of wood, and an exact copy of a Samurai sword, with a black ribbon attached to it and that sword, I believe, is now in the possession of Ernest Miller, the head of the internal security department at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had Seta received advance warnings?

Mr. JAMES. Seta had received warnings he was to be beaten up.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was Seta friendly to the administration?

Mr. JAMES. He was very friendly to the administration. He was inspector for the fire department and was doing a good job inspecting fire hazards—the accumulation of rubbish around houses and was insisting that the people clean up their premises.

It is highly possible he made enemies there. He also had received certain—I believe certain correspondence courses in police work and was endeavoring to help the administration by furnishing information, I think, on activities within the camp.

I am not in possession of any information on that but I have been told by other people that that was the case and that that was why he was beaten up.

Seta positively identified his assailants on October 18. He identified that party to me and to Mr. Miller. The name of that person was Uchida—Isamu Uchida. Uchida was head of the judo wrestling organization in Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At that point I would like to ask you if the judo clubs, prior to Pearl Harbor, were part of the organization known as the Butoku-Kai or Military Virtue Society?

Mr. JAMES. May I amplify about the Butoku-Kai according to the information I have on it.

It took various forms: One was Kibei, the name for American-born Japanese educated in Japan. A rough designation would be overseas society—Kibei Shiman—that was the—it was a cultural group.

In the case of judo, there was no direct tie-in with the Butoku-Kai except in one respect: Every 2 years from Imperial Japan, on special visiting permits, came instructors into San Francisco and Seattle and Los Angeles to bring the Japanese on the Pacific coast up-to-date and, presumably, to sort of inspect and see how their standards were being kept up.

Mr. MUNDT. What disciplinary action was taken against the assailant who was positively identified in this case?

Mr. JAMES. At the time none. Mr. Seta was spirited out of the camp to Glendale, Ariz., where he was able to secure a job working in the fields.

Mr. MUNDT. Spirited out?

Mr. JAMES. Not spirited out. Let me qualify that; taken from the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. After the beating that he had been the recipient of?

Mr. JAMES. After he finished his period in the hospital.

Mr. MUNDT. I was asking about what disciplinary action was taken against his assailant?

Mr. JAMES. Oh; Uchida? None at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. None whatsoever?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What subsequent action was taken against him?

Mr. JAMES. The name of Uchida, Congressman, will in a few moments enter into the events of September 14, in the second beating of Nishimura, which resulted in the arrest of Uchida at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. Didn't the project head, or somebody charged with the administration of law and order at the project call in this assailant and talk to him afterwards?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. To be perfectly fair I had better qualify this: The name of Uchida as one of the assailants of Joseph Francis Seta only popped into our files in about the first or second week in November after Seta's period of hospitalization and after he had gotten over his fright period the name came to us. That was after Seta had been moved to Glendale. He talked then.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he still at Glendale?

Mr. JAMES. To my knowledge he is still at Glendale.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you a memorandum entitled "Chronology of Events in Disturbances at Colorado River War Relocation Project, November 15-November 25, 1942," and ask you if you have ever seen the original of this memorandum?

(Handing document to the witness.)

Mr. JAMES. I have, Mr. Steedman. I prepared this myself in collaboration with Capt. D. J. McFadden, who was a representative of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt.

During the disturbances at Poston from November 14 to November 25, this chronology was compiled from my hourly notes that I made during the disturbances there, supplemented by those of Captain McFadden and the two representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who were with us a part of the time, and with Major Dykes, of the Southern Security Command, representing the military police.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So the record may be clear, did Seta go to work at Glendale, Ariz?

Mr. JAMES. What date did he go to work?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No; did he go to work at Glendale, Ariz?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; he did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is not Glendale, Calif?

Mr. JAMES. No; Glendale, Ariz.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is a small town outside of Phoenix?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record by reading this memorandum which I have been discussing with the witness.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it is a memorandum which the witness himself prepared?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, sir; it is; and it is also in the files of the War Relocation Authority in Washington, D. C., presumably.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed to read the memorandum.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am reading from the first paragraph of the page, dated November 14, 10:30 p. m.

Kay Nishimura, 30, Kibei, is severely beaten by unidentified group of between 8 and 10 men in bachelor barracks block 14.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was this the second time that Nishimura was beaten up?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. In this particular case he was attacked by a group of hooded men, armed with pieces of pipe, who went to work on him. They bashed in his face and his nose and his eyes and Nishimura was taken in an unconscious condition, presumably dead, to the Poston General Hospital.

For 2 days we didn't know whether he was going to live or die but he survived after being hospitalized for a month.



It was the most brutal of the succession of beatings that we had.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had he received advance notice of the beating?

Mr. JAMES. He had.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the whole procedure follow the same pattern as the other beatings?

Mr. JAMES. It did, except in this case pieces of pipe were used on him whereas before small pieces of wood or fists were used. This was the first time that they were out to kill anybody.

The other cases they were out to terrorize them and possibly drive them out of camp or drive them away from the administration.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did the second beating of Nishimura occur?

Mr. JAMES. It occurred in his barracks, bachelor barracks in block 14.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any attempt made to find out who participated in that assault?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. That night about 15 or 20 minutes after the report had come in, the new internal security officer, Mr. Miller, who had been on duty since October 1, came to my barracks and aroused me from bed and said Mr. Head had given him orders to send out a dragnet and pick up everybody we thought might be implicated in this case.

Mr. Miller had not been on the job long enough to compile very much of a list. I supplied him with a list of between 10 and 20 names and one of those names was that of Isuma Uchida.

Uchida was picked up that night. The investigation continued all that night and most of the following day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Right at that point I would like to continue with the reading:

November 15, 2 a. m. The internal security office, under Mr. Miller, arrests and places in jail George Fujii, Nishimura's former brother-in-law and Isuma Uchida, judo wrestling instructor.

At that point could you tell the committee whether or not Isuma Uchida was employed by the project as a judo instructor?

Mr. JAMES. He was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And was he paid a salary?

Mr. JAMES. He was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know his rate of pay?

Mr. JAMES. I believe it was \$16 a month.

Mr. MUNDT. Isn't this judo which is something which is taught to members of the Japanese Army?

Mr. JAMES. It is.

Mr. MUNDT. Part of their military training?

Mr. JAMES. It is; that and kendo. We do not permit kendo at the project. Kendo, as you know, is Japanese fencing.

Mr. MUNDT. Insofar as his instructions went, he was being paid with American money to teach Japanese in the same type of techniques they learn in Japan when they become members of the Japanese Army?

Mr. JAMES. Similar tactics, I would say; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As head of the judo organization at Poston, Uchida was a prominent Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. He was very popular with the Kibei group. He was a Kibei. He was educated in the schools of Japan and had come back to this country, I believe, in 1935 or '36.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he speak English?

Mr. JAMES. Brokenly; with a decided Japanese brogue.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I continue to quote from the memorandum:

November 15, 11 a. m. Parents of Hatsumi Yamada receive slight beating by unidentified group of eight men after Yamada had received warning on night of November 14.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have already referred to the beating received by parents of Yamada?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Reading the fourth paragraph:

November 16—morning. Special Agents Rufus Coulter and Edward Smart of Federal Bureau of Investigation arrive at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have already referred to that?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

November 17. Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of War Relocation Authority, and Mr. E. R. Fryer, regional director, spend the day in Poston.

When Mr. Myer and Mr. Fryer were at Poston, did you confer with them?

Mr. JAMES. I did. May I set the picture on that, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Very well.

Mr. JAMES. On Tuesday, November 8 or 9, Mr. John Collier, the Commissioner of the Indian Service—Indian Affairs, visited Poston and made two speeches before the Japanese evacuees.

In those speeches which lasted approximately 1 hour each, Commissioner Collier in a very friendly talk, stressed the fact that the Poston's 18,000 Japanese were there for the duration of the war; that the Indian Service was very optimistic over the possibility of developing Parker Valley and possibly to reach the ultimate base of 45,000 acres of land under cultivation; that he was hopeful that a lease arrangement could be worked out so the Japanese, for the duration of the war, would be actually able to share in any portion of the profits.

The theme of his speech was that this was a permanent deal. At that time, and I should like to have this a part of the record, up to that time I had never heard of a case of a Japanese at Poston applying—Japanese as a group, applying for resettlement in the midlands of America. There have been a few cases of Japanese girls and boys who wanted to go to midwestern schools to continue their educations, but there was no organized effort on the part of the Japanese in Poston to be resettled elsewhere in America.

Mr. MUNDT. That was up to the 8th or 9th of November?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, sir.

On November 17, Mr. Dillon Myer came in from the east and he called a general staff meeting and then had subsequent meetings with the Japanese.

It was at this time that he announced his resettlement program.

At a staff meeting he told us, in the presence of Mr. Head, Mr. Gelvin, Mr. Empie, Mr. Evans, and the other administrators at Poston, that even his Washington office and his San Francisco office had not been informed yet of this drastic change in the original Eisenhower program to resettle the Japanese from the American Pacific coast in the midland area of America.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what was that date again?

Mr. JAMES. On November 17.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was during the trouble at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. During the start of the trouble. Uchida had been arrested, Mr. Costello, and was held in the jail.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Dillon Myer was present at that time?

Mr. JAMES. Dillon Myer was present at that time. He stayed one day at the project developing this tremendous program for resettlement.

I want that in the record to show that less than a week previously Commissioner Collier had come in and set forth this program for the Japanese, that they were to be there for the duration of the war and that steps were being made to assist them in the development of this potentially very fertile Parker Valley; that that was to be their contribution to the war effort.

Five days later Mr. Dillon Myer came in and stated his personal program for the resettlement of the Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. Was the program of John Collier outlined in pretty close conformity with the program Eisenhower followed when administrator?

Mr. JAMES. Very definitely.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did the address of Collier seem to meet with the approval of the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. It did.

Mr. COSTELLO. And when Dillon Myer went to the camp during the time of this trouble, did he make any investigation, to your knowledge, of the troubles that were existing?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he inquire into the beatings that had taken place?

Mr. JAMES. He spent about an hour on the afternoon of November 15, conferring with Mr. Ernest Miller, the new Chief of Internal Security.

I happened to be present at the conversations there and he complimented Mr. Miller upon having called the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, Mr. Smart and Mr. Coulter, in to investigate the Uchida case.

Mr. COSTELLO. The F. B. I. men had arrived just the day before?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; they had arrived on the morning of the 17th.

Mr. COSTELLO. The day before Mr. Myer arrived?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; after being summoned by Mr. Miller over the telephone.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the date of Myer visit?

Mr. JAMES. The following day, the 17th. The F. B. I. men had arrived on the 16th and Myer arrived on the 17th.

He spent the day with Mr. Fryer at Poston and left that night.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there an apparent change in the policy of the W. R. A. between the time of the visit of Mr. Collier and the visit of Mr. Myer?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, a decided change.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there any explanation made by Mr. Myer of this change?

Mr. JAMES. None. He said he had been giving it some thought for quite awhile and he was convinced of several things; first of all the problem of the Japanese, both American-born and aliens was tied in

with what was to be done with them after the war. He said the only solution he could see was to resettle them as quickly as possible.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In the Middle West?

Mr. JAMES. In the Middle West; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Myer impress you as having any knowledge of the Japanese people?

Mr. JAMES. I am not acquainted with Mr. Myer's activities. I have no knowledge of his presence on the Pacific coast prior to Pearl Harbor or of any associations or societies to which he belongs that might be interested in the study of Japanese people.

Mr. COSTELLO. You had never met him before coming to the camp?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. I had not met Mr. Dillon Myer before. I was, however, acquainted with his record in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact, he has been a Government official in Washington for many years, hasn't he?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he has, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And so far as you know he would have to fix his policy with reference to the resettlement of Japanese, on reports received from the relocation centers?

Mr. JAMES. I presume he would, from both the San Francisco regional office and from the various project officials.

Mr. MUNDT. Did I understand you to say that Mr. Myer, in his speech, said the problem of the detention of the Japanese during the war was tied in with the permanent resettlement program?

Mr. JAMES. No; he felt there was a tremendous post-war problem as to what would be done with the people; that if they stayed in the centers that to aid the war effort, this manpower should be released to productive use in areas of the United States where they could be accepted and as a collateral point in connection with that, the post-war problem would be greatly diminished; they would be permanently resettled in small communities throughout the United States.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he indicate to the Japanese that this resettlement would be on a permanent basis and would continue after the war?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; that they would be permanently resettled in the Midwest.

Mr. MUNDT. He indicated that being settled in the Midwest now they would be settled there for all time to come?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. So, so far as the Japanese were concerned they left that meeting with the impression that it was the policy of the United States Government to permit them to reside permanently in the areas to which they were then being resettled?

Mr. JAMES. No; I can't quite make it that simple, Congressman. They left there with complete confusion. They had not known Mr. Myer prior to his visit on November 17. They had rather looked to Mr. Collier as the highest representative of the Government. At least he was the highest Government representative whom they had come in contact with. When once they had been told they were there for the duration of the war they had made the tremendous adjustment to desert living and the abnormal temperatures you have down there and the frontier type of life. They were prepared to meet that change and stay there.



I am not here to question Mr. Myer's policy. I am just stating this as a fact.

Then 5 days later the head of the W. R. A. comes in and proceeded to tell them that they were going to be, as quickly as possible, moved out and resettled.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Myer make a speech to the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. About how many Japanese attended the speech?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know. I believe the Poston paper has an account of that. I am sure the issue of November 18 would give the transcript of his speech.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do they have an assembly place where the Japanese can congregate?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; I would say at least 2,000 heard him.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he make more than one speech to groups there or not?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he made two addresses; one before a group of leaders—block managers and the members of the temporary community councils and then later to the people themselves.

Mr. MUNDT. In announcing his program of resettlement did he also impress upon the Japanese that they were to be settled in the Middle West or did he just say: "Resettled."

Mr. JAMES. I would have to check the speech. I am trying to recall this from memory.

To my knowledge he did not mention the Pacific coast at any time in his speech. Now, whether he made a broad statement somewhere in that speech that they would be resettled throughout the United States, I don't remember.

Mr. MUNDT. I am trying to determine whether he designated the Middle West. That is what I am trying to find out. You are not positive of that?

Mr. JAMES. To the best of my knowledge he did not mention anything except the "midland area," and certainly in his discussions with the staff there he made it quite clear to us that they were to be resettled only in the midwestern area.

Mr. COSTELLO. He announced, did he, that this was a program he had been thinking over for some time?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; he made it quite clear to us that even his Washington office did not know about that nor did the big regional office in San Francisco.

Mr. COSTELLO. He didn't indicate that he had consulted with anybody else before arriving at that conclusion?

Mr. JAMES. No, he assumed the personal responsibility for it. As I recall those were his exact words.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was never indicated before—that the Japs were to be settled in any other area other than Poston—where they were?

Mr. JAMES. Up to November 17, Mr. Costello, they firmly believed that their destiny lay in staying at Poston and pioneering the desert life and developing Parker Valley.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the only occasion they might expect to leave the camp would be for work purposes or educational purposes and that their permanent home would be at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. And insofar as his speech held implications, it implied their homes—permanent homes, were going to be in the area where they were resettled?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. And the first effect was to cause, in a number of families I knew—take in the case of older people, that caused the fear that their children would leave them and settle out and they would have to stay back in Poston—they would not be able to go out because of their age.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words the reaction to the Myer's speech on the part of the Japanese was not as favorable as to the Collier speech?

Mr. JAMES. At the start it was not. Later on their hopes began to rise but at the start it caused fear.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The Japanese just didn't know whom to believe, did they?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. It caused confusion as it necessarily would, such a drastic change in policy.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continuing to read from the memorandum, Mr. Chairman:

November 18, 9 a. m.: Jim Yahiro and a committee of seven called on Project Director Head, requesting the immediate release of Fujii and Uchida and the shelching of all charges.

Mr. Head sends them to Mr. L. L. Nelson, his executive assistant. In the meeting Mr. Nelson is informed that the previous evening a testimonial meeting had been held and it is the unanimous opinion of all the representatives of the Japanese people in camp No. 1, that Fujii and Uchida are innocent of the charges. They further request that they be permitted to interview the F. B. I. agents.

The note made at 10:30 a. m., November 18, reads as follows:

Agents Coulter and Smart meet with this group. Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin leave for Salt Lake City to attend conference of W. R. A. projects directors with Mr. Myer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin know this agitation was going on when they left Poston for Salt Lake City?

Mr. JAMES. They knew the steps that had occurred—the sequence of events, Mr. Steedman, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they were advised that trouble was brewing at Poston before they left?

Mr. JAMES. They were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who did they leave in charge of the center?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. John Evans, the unit administrator of Poston 1.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did Mr. Myer accompany them when they left the camp?

Mr. JAMES. No. Mr. Myer left for Phoenix and from Phoenix he went to Salt Lake City. I believe he made a stop at the Gila River project to announce the same resettlement program that he had announced at Poston. Then he proceeded to Salt Lake City.

Mr. COSTELLO. What date did he leave Poston?

Mr. JAMES. He left Poston on the evening of November 17, as I recall. He was driven by automobile to Phoenix.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether Mr. Myer had requested Mr. Head and Mr. Empie to meet him at Salt Lake City?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin, yes. They were requested in writing to appear at the regional director's meeting.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Mr. Myer to be present at that meeting also?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Before that request was transmitted to Mr. Head and Mr. Empie, did Mr. Myer know about this trouble?

Mr. JAMES. He did.

Mr. MUNDT. At Poston?

Mr. JAMES. He did, but I don't think he saw the implications in it, though.

Mr. MUNDT. Probably not, but he did know that a near murder had been committed there?

Mr. JAMES. He did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who did Mr. Myer leave in charge of the center when he and Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin went to Salt Lake City?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. John Evans, administrator of the first unit at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long had Mr. Evans been employed at the center?

Mr. JAMES. Since, approximately, May 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what Mr. Evans' salary was?

Mr. JAMES. I imagine it was about \$4,800 a year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he go to Poston originally as a dollar-a-year man?

Mr. JAMES. I am under the impression he did. He was a friend of Commissioner Collier. He is a man of considerable wealth himself, Mr. Evans is, and I believe he came out there without either a dollar a year or without any salary at the start of the project, and then he was given a civil-service rating.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had Mr. Evans had any previous experience with Japanese people?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. I have never known him to have been associated with them or having studied Japanese such as is taught in the Institute of Pacific Relations, or any of the qualified groups on the Pacific coast.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact Mr. Evans was an easterner, wasn't he?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; from Maine. I would like to say for the record he was competent—very competent in matters of business administration—the routine things as administrator of unit 1.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continuing to read from the memorandum:

11 a. m.: A crowd starts to form in front of the camp No. 1 jail. Speeches are made urging a general strike in sympathy with the prisoners.

2 p. m.: Mr. John Evans, assistant project director and acting project director in the absence of Project Director Head, makes a speech before the crowd and urges them to disperse and go home. This they refused to do.

Mr. MUNDT. Just a question there to clarify my own information on this. These notes from which you are reading are notes which Mr. James took on the ground at the time?

Mr. JAMES. Exactly. I was there continuously during the time, night and day.

Mr. MUNDT. As intelligence officer?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am continuing to read from the memorandum:

2:30 p. m.: Mr. Evans meets with members of the community council of camp No. 1 and suggests the council get in touch with the crowd and make recommendations.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the community council of camp 1 composed of Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. It was American-born Japanese under the directions issued by the War Relocation Authority from Washington, D. C. At that time only American-born Japanese could serve on the elective council.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was any distinction made between the Japanese educated in this country and the Japanese educated in Japan?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only qualification was that of American-born?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But a Kibei could serve on the council?

Mr. JAMES. Correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there many Kibeis members of the council?

Mr. JAMES. There were some, Mr. Costello. I don't know how many at the time. I could tell if I saw the list.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But they had an Issei advisory board to the council; did they not?

Mr. JAMES. They did; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Made up of alien Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Made up of alien Japanese; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Reading further from the memorandum:

4 p. m.: Mr. Evans meets again with the council. The council makes unanimous recommendation that both Uchida and Fujii be released unconditionally. Mr. Evans refuses to accept this proposal, and as a result both the council and the Issei advisory board resign.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have here a picture of the Issei taking the part of Uchida, the head of the Judo Club; isn't that correct?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. There was pressure, possibly intimidation brought against the council. They had no choice but to resign, which they did.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading again from the memorandum):

6 p. m.: Mr. Evans calls a staff meeting and notifies them of the situation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation agents who were present, recommended that the military police be called in to patrol Poston 1, and told Mr. Evans that they had notified military intelligence and that Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt had been apprised of the situation, and as a result it would not be necessary for the project to send formal notice to General DeWitt. Later Lieutenant Young, in charge of the military police unit assigned to the Poston project, came and sat in with the staff discussion. After weighing the facts, Mr. Evans decides that for the present he would not request the military police to enter camp No. 1, but requests Lieutenant Young to patrol the roads outside the camp and to place a guard at the motor pool.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Evans oppose the other members of the staff in refusing to call in the military police?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; there was a division between the staff.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did some of the members of the staff think an emergency existed and that the military police should be inside the camp to protect the camp and the Caucasian personnel?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. I think Mr. H. W. Smith, the chief fiscal officer, working under Mr. Empie, pointed out at that time that Mr. Evans was unable to protect \$10,000,000 worth of Government property and was unable to protect the lives of the American-born Japanese who had been warned and more or less terrorized within the camp.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What position did you take in that conference?

Mr. JAMES. Under my position as the representative of the W. R. A., I was not given a voice in the project's administrative affairs.



Mr. EBERHARTER. You were not at the conference?

Mr. JAMES. I was at the conference. I merely submitted the facts as I saw them at the camp.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You had no voice in what went on there?

Mr. JAMES. I had no vote because I was not attached to the project administration.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you were not permitted to make recommendations?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there present at that staff meeting a man by the name of Townsend?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. H. H. Townsend? Yes; he was present.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you recall whether he made any recommendations?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know. Mr. Townsend at that time was in a little bit of a pathological condition. When you have 16,000 Japanese people thrown at you it sometimes does strange things to people. I think Mr. Townsend had developed a completely abnormal sense of values as to what was happening. I think he was basically right on some of the positions he took, though.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't recall whether he recommended one thing or the other at the time?

Mr. JAMES. I don't recall. He was in a highly emotional state of mind during all our trouble and during the period that he was there.

He was a very capable man. I happen to know his record. He came to us with a very fine record in civilian life, but after being with us about a month, as I say, the contact with the Japanese probably destroyed his usefulness in being able to handle them.

That quite frequently happens, gentlemen, with people who have had no experience with Japanese. It is very easy to either become Japanese lovers or, on the other hand, to swing to the other point of view.

At the project you have to get work done and do a job as best you can. In Mr. Townsend's case, I feel, with no discredit to him at all, having to see 18,000 of these people every day and do business with them, sort of got him down.

That is purely my personal opinion and I toss it in for what it is worth. I have great respect for his previous record in civilian life and also for some of the things he did at Poston. I got along very well with him in my own capacity.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

Late evening: The block managers of Poston Camp No. 1 resign.

First indications of a de facto committee as two representatives call at staff meeting and arrange for the continued operation of subsistence, police and fire departments and hospital. Mr. Evans approves these arrangements.

November 10, 4 a. m.: Telephone call put in to Director Head and Mr. Gelvin at Hotel Utah, Salt Lake City.

Eleven a. m.: Staff is notified by Mr. Evans that the two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had withdrawn from the case and are not pressing their investigation and do not want the prisoners, Fujii and Uchida, held for them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why did the Federal Bureau of Investigation withdraw in this case?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Smart told me he was unable to complete his case against either of these two men.

In the case of Mr. George Fujii he simply wanted to give him a handwriting test to find out whether he had written an extortion note threatening the life of one Lyle Kurisaki, a former Hoppville, Calif., produce man, who had been arranging the Japanese members of the Poston Département of Agriculture—a man very loyal to the administration.

Mr. Kurisaki, for the sake of the record, had been beaten up back in October—in the latter part of October—both he and his wife and their 18-year-old boy.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were they hospitalized at that time?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; they were hospitalized. I think we should have that in the record to complete the list of beatings.

Mr. MUNDT. Had he received this extortion note prior to the beating?

Mr. JAMES. After the first beating; and the F. B. I. wanted to compare Fujii's handwriting with the handwriting in the note.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they make the comparison?

Mr. JAMES. They were unable to do it.

Mr. MUNDT. Why?

Mr. JAMES. Because the jail was surrounded by this big crowd and neither of the F. B. I. men were going to risk going through the line.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words the milling crowd was a serious enough menace to peace and security so that members of the F. B. I. were reluctant to try to get through the crowd to get to the jail to carry out their duties?

Mr. JAMES. I judge from what they told me that they took that position.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did the mob seize the jail?

Mr. JAMES. Actually the crowd at 11 a. m. on the morning of November 18, the crowd started to form in front of the camp No. 1 jail. Sometime later that evening picket lines were established by a certain number of Japanese from each block.

There were a certain number of Japanese from each block who were required to stand guard duty night and day. Each block had a quota and they had to do it.

Mr. COSTELLO. About how many people did that place in the picket line?

Mr. JAMES. Never less than 500, Congressman Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was more of a mob than a picket line, wasn't it?

Mr. JAMES. It was an army camp. I will put it that way—it was an army camp. They actually needed to camp overnight and it was cooler in November there. The evenings used to get down to around 25 above zero and in the desert that is quite cool. They were improvising blankets with pieces of canvas and they built small pup tents and camped there overnight with their fires.

Mr. COSTELLO. They set up an entirely new housing project of their own encircling the jail?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; that is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the lay-out of the camp such that that jail is visible from the administration building?

Mr. JAMES. Visible at a distance, Congressman. It is a half mile.

Mr. MUNDT. I mean can the jail be seen from the administration building?

Mr. JAMES. No; it couldn't be seen from the administration building. There are barracks in between the administration building. It is only a one-story building.

Mr. MUNDT. Could the crowd surrounding the jail be seen from the headquarters of the warehouses of the camp?

Mr. JAMES. They could be heard. They were making a racket.

Mr. MUNDT. Could they be heard at the administration building?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; they could.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the jail isolated to any degree?

Mr. JAMES. No; the jail is right in the center of the camp—right in the center of it. Only a half a mile away at most. The camp is exactly a mile square and the sounds of a milling mob could be heard quite easily.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact wasn't the camp which you mention as being set up around the jail, set up in military fashion?

Mr. JAMES. In my estimation it was laid out in military fashion; yes. Certainly the tents were in such a way that they were a darn good imitation of pup tents and they were laid out in rows, and discipline was maintained.

Some of our old Isseis have told me that they served in the Russo-Japanese War and I think there was enough military brains to lay out a good military camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was in charge of this camp around the jail?

Mr. JAMES. There was a de facto committee that ran the strike. We don't know to this day who was in charge because of the reticence of these people. We do not know to this day who was the quarterback on the Tojo team. It was very difficult to get behind them because they work by committees.

In other words you might have to knock down six or eight intermediate groups and somewhere in the background maybe some very innocent looking old-timer, or perhaps an American-born Japanese would be the one who did it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> involved?

Mr. JAMES. He was. He was on the picket line. I would like to have that name left out, if you please. That man is being investigated.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Wasn't he in actual charge of the so-called picket line or mob around the camp?

Mr. JAMES. He was in charge of one shift.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Of the picket line?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; of the pickets and helped in the organization of the laying out of the camp.

\_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> is 60 years old. He is a former Russo-Japanese War veteran. You can use that reference but don't use his name.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he have a reputation at the camp as having been a colonel in the Japanese Army?

Mr. JAMES. He went by the title of Rika Gun Sho Tai, which is the Japanese equivalent for colonel, rika means land; gun is army; Sho is commander, and tai is the equivalent of colonel in the Japanese Army.

Mr. MUNDT. In your civilian capacity, Mr. James, as a reporter for newspapers before the war, did you ever see a strike?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, I have.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. MUNDT. From a reportorial standpoint, if you had been assigned to this beat, what would you have reported to have taken place at this camp? Would you have reported it as a "disturbance"?

Mr. JAMES. I covered a launching at one time where I saw a milling crowd. I would call it a "milling crowd."

Maybe these gentlemen will disagree with me. It was a crowd in an angry mood and it developed very definitely into an antiwhite feeling. Let us put it on that basis.

Mr. MUNDT. A belligerent crowd?

Mr. JAMES. Belligerent, yes. I felt at no time any personal danger there. I think most of us felt that way because that is the smarter thing to do. You assume an attitude, knowing darn well it is a question of bluff, that no one is going to do you any harm.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was sufficiently serious, however, that anything might have developed out of it on a moment's notice.

Mr. JAMES. It could have blown up like that. Of course it was just filled with potential dynamite.

Mr. COSTELLO. If the right thing had happened, there would have been destruction of property or violence to persons?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. On November 19, did you see pictures being carried of American soldiers with ropes around their necks?

Mr. JAMES. I saw one picture in front of block 21 mess hall and so did Mr. Evans—a picture made on a torn section of a cardboard carton of an American soldier hung in effigy with a rope around his neck.

I don't know who put it up. We were never able to identify it.

Mr. COSTELLO. A crayon drawing?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; rather crude.

Mr. MUNDT. Was the picture tacked to the wall?

Mr. JAMES. The picture had been tacked to the wall, yes. It was on heavy cardboard such as you would get from a big carton. As I recall it was about this long and about this high [indicating].

Mr. MUNDT. A placard?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; with Japanese expressions on it. I was never able to get those. I tried to get those but the picture was definitely of an American man in uniform, in olive drab khaki of our soldiers, and there were no slant eyes on his face, so I presume it wasn't representing a Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. You had no reason to assume that they were shedding tears over the particular status of that unfortunate American soldier?

Mr. JAMES. None whatever.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed, pursuant to the taking of the noon recess, at 2 p. m.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order, and Mr. Steedman, will you proceed with the questioning of the witness?



## TESTIMONY OF NORRIS W. JAMES—Resumed

Mr. STEEDMAN. Directing your attention to the riot that occurred at Poston beginning on November 18, 1942, was the Japanese language used exclusively by the rioters or strikers during that period?

Mr. JAMES. It was, Mr. Steedman, in the speeches that were given in front of the jail in Poston No. 1. It replaced English entirely on the posters used throughout the camp and all of the official transactions of the de facto government of Poston. English had entirely disappeared.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had the Japanese been using the English language on their posters and on billboards and in their conversations at the project prior to the strike or riot?

Mr. JAMES. To a negligible extent—pardon me—did you say English or Japanese?

Mr. STEEDMAN. English.

Mr. JAMES. English was the predominant language in Poston up to the time of the trouble.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had they used Japanese in preparing their posters prior to that time?

Mr. JAMES. Very, very seldom; perhaps to advertise a show in Japanese but never for public announcements.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has any one translated the posters that were used?

Mr. JAMES. We were unable to secure translations after this trouble was over—the trouble—the posters disappeared.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And no one knows what was on the posters?

Mr. JAMES. No one knows what was on them; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you recognize any of the Japanese characters on the posters?

Mr. JAMES. I recognized a few of them, but because of my limited knowledge of the language itself, I was unable to make any translation.

Captain McFadden was there, and he was not conversant with the language either.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you question the friendly Japanese at Poston regarding the written characters on the posters.

Mr. JAMES. I recall that I had several conversations; yes. The character of most of the posters was directions on the strike—orders as to how many should report from each block.

I think I told you this morning that there was a fixed number of pickets that had to be supplied by each block for each shift. They maintained pickets 24 hours around the clock, around the Poston jail.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were these picketers secured by intimidation and threat of violence?

Mr. JAMES. In certain instances I am sure they were. I can't speak for all instances. I do know that in block 6, according to the testimony given me by a Japanese woman down there, she and her group were locked in the mess hall for a period of—the greater portion of a day while they were receiving instructions from Juro Omori, a strike leader now confined in the Santa Fe, N. Mex., internment camp, and told exactly what they would have to do or else.

If you want the name of the woman I will give it to you off the record. Her name is ————, <sup>3</sup> formerly of Bakersfield, Calif.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state for the press that name is not to be used; it is off the record and I request you do not take down or use the name.

Mr. STEEDMAN. ————<sup>3</sup> had been friendly to the administration of the camp?

Mr. JAMES. She had been one of my interpreters at the intake center which I described this morning. She had been in charge of making the preliminary check on the personnel as they came in to see what immediate jobs they could be placed in. I would like to also put in the record for further reference, that in Bakersfield, Calif., she had acted as an interpreter for the district attorney and also for the F. B. I. officials in Kern County.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated this morning that the Japanese had access to a loudspeaking system or public-address system at the center. How did they obtain that system?

Mr. JAMES. I don't think I testified to that this morning, but in this particular instance—I am not very sure how they got it. It could have been secured in one of two ways. However, that loud-speaker system was brought in for use in recreational work at the project or it was shipped in piecemeal and assembled.

I would like to make clear in the record that during this period of the disturbance, and prior to it, roughly from May, the early part of May, through these disturbances, there was no inspection of parcel-post mail that came in. That came about subsequent to when the military police, acting on orders from General DeWitt, instituted a check of contraband coming through the mail—contraband consisting of such things as short-wave radios or parts thereof, alcoholic liquor, firearms, cameras, and things of that sort.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the items such as you have just mentioned, alcoholic liquors and short-wave radios and weapons, being shipped into the camp prior to that order?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge; they could have been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then why did General DeWitt go to the trouble of putting this order into effect?

Mr. JAMES. As they came in from the coast and were processed through the intake centers, their belongings were searched by the military police. There was a baggage inspection, as they came in, Mr. Steedman, but in that period which I have just described, roughly from the middle of May to the period of the disturbance, there was no check on parcel-post packages.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If any check was made, the Japanese were doing it, were they not?

Mr. JAMES. Not in the post office. The post office was run entirely by Caucasians under the Post Office Department.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But other material coming in by freight or express was handled by Japanese, was it not?

Mr. JAMES. It was being checked by Japanese, that is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is just about the same as having no check at all, isn't it?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now, returning to the public-address system in the center. Was the loudspeaker system used in front of the jail during the period of the riot?

Mr. JAMES. It was.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I inquire there—we had some testimony to the effect that possibly the loudspeaker was brought in there through some church organization.

Mr. JAMES. It might have been, Mr. Costello. I am not sure where that loudspeaker came from. It may possibly have belonged to a church organization. It may have belonged to one of the recreational units.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was not acquired by the project itself for project purposes?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. It was not Government property because at that time to my knowledge we had no Government loudspeaker system within Poston.

On the other hand it was not contraband. I want to make it clear the loudspeaker system was not contraband under the terms of General DeWitt's order.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was set up in the camp and the authorities knew of its existence?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese strikers or rioters take charge of the loudspeaker system?

Mr. JAMES. They produced it and used it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they commandeer it?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did they use the public-address system for?

Mr. JAMES. They used it for speeches in Japanese—speeches of various kinds, instructions to the strikers or oratory of one sort or another and also for playing the records, canned records of Japanese music.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of Japanese music was played over the loudspeaker system?

Mr. JAMES. Some of the most famous marching songs used by the Imperial Japanese Army units.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Japanese marching music?

Mr. JAMES. Japanese marching music; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you recognize the Kimagawa if you were to hear it played?

Mr. JAMES. I would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether the Kimagawa was played during the period of the strike?

Mr. JAMES. I believe it was. I could tell you if I heard it, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If you heard it played on a record you would recognize it?

Mr. JAMES. I would recognize it if it had been played at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. We might insert in the record at this point that that is the Japanese national anthem.

Mr. JAMES. Yes. As I say, I would want to hear it to refresh my memory—hear it played again.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, we will make arrangements to have it played.

Mr. JAMES. I don't want to go on record as saying the Japanese national anthem was played, but I can identify it if it was one of the numbers that was played.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will make arrangements to play it and then you may make a statement at that time as to whether or not it is one of the numbers you heard played during the riot.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But Japanese military music, martial music, was played over the loudspeaker system during the riot at the center?

Mr. JAMES. During the night and days of the trouble I described at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they use the loudspeaker system all night?

Mr. JAMES. Most of the night, too.

Mr. STEEDMAN. To keep the people awake; is that it?

Mr. JAMES. Supposedly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did it keep the people awake?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, we lost some sleep.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there a curfew in force at the camp at that time?

Mr. JAMES. No; we never had a curfew at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to the strike did the project administration permit loud noises during the night?

Mr. JAMES. That, I believe, and again I am expressing an opinion; I believe that was left to the Japanese. I believe in some blocks, individual blocks, they did set up rules and regulations that radios should be turned off or phonographs should be turned off after such and such a time in the evening—along about 11 o'clock so the old-timers could get some sleep, but no curfew was set up by the project director.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were all the self-imposed rules broken during the strike or riot?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. It was complete political and economic chaos in Poston center during the riot.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the Caucasian employees able to secure sleep during the period of this strike?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; we managed to sleep as well as one could under the circumstances.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might inquire here, did you listen to any of the speeches that were being made over the broadcasting system?

Mr. JAMES. I did. In one instance I had a translator or interpreter along with me, ————. <sup>3</sup> Do you want to go into that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to go into that a little later.

Mr. COSTELLO. Can you tell us the nature of the remarks broadcast over the system?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. This speech was made not only during the period of the strike but 2 or 3 days afterward. It was made in block—it was in the 40's. For the sake of the record I will say in block 44. It was made by, I will give the name and then request the name be kept out of the record, it was given by ————. <sup>3</sup>

Mr. COSTELLO. That name is off the record.

Mr. JAMES. ———— <sup>3</sup> is a man 57 years old. He is a bachelor. He arrived in Poston May 23, 1942, from Delano, Calif.

The substance of ————'s <sup>3</sup> talk was this: That Japan was going to win the war; that he officially represented the Imperial Japanese Government in Poston. That all Japanese who sided with him in his program would be rewarded with 10,000 yen after the war

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.



was over, presuming that the Imperial Japanese Government was going to win.

Unknown to me at the time Mr. John Evans had his own interpreter and translator in there and proceeded to get a digest of this talk either when \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> made it from the platform or when he subsequently made the same speech in block 44—a similar version of \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>'s speech.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you hear him give that speech during the strike?

Mr. JAMES. This was given during the strike and also given a few days after the strike and was given a week or so later.

This is important because it ties in with Poston No. 2 by one \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>. And that name is off the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Keep that name off the record.

Mr. JAMES. In Poston No. 2 \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> was subsequently picked up by the F. B. I. and is now in the Santa Fe, N. Mex., internment camp, but he gave practically the same address that \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> gave.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the reaction of the Japanese audience to that speech?

Mr. JAMES. It was rather difficult to tell, Congressman. I think I can best describe it by saying that the emotions of the camp were pretty largely that of an antiwhite attitude. I can't go any farther than that in describing how many people he converted or how well the promise of 10,000 yen reward clicked.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the Japanese cheer and applaud his statements?

Mr. JAMES. They are not great on that. They will yell a few "banzais" and it is difficult to tell what they are cheering for. He got a very good reception.

Mr. MUNDT. And your reaction was what?

Mr. JAMES. I would say in the Issei and Kibei circles—that is first generation and American born and educated in Japan, it was pretty well received. The Nisei, that is those born in this country and can't understand the language, didn't know what the score was all about. They were just drawn into the thing emotionally on this wave of anti-Caucasianism—anti-Hakujin attitude that developed in the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. But some of them could have been coerced into it?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; that is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there many of the Nisei who have been educated in this country who do not understand the Japanese language?

Mr. JAMES. There are a great many who cannot read or write the language.

Mr. COSTELLO. But do they speak it?

Mr. JAMES. They can speak a little of it but not enough to, perhaps, understand a bit of the oratory such as \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> went into.

Mr. MUNDT. Is \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> also in an internment camp now?

Mr. JAMES. \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> is not in an internment camp. He is in Poston.

For the sake of the record I would like to say that at the time, from the period when \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> came in on May 23, 1942, up to the time of the general strike or walk-out or disturbance, \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> was employed at Poston as a goh—that is a Japanese card game, at \$16 a month. I don't know what his present wage is.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was employed to instruct them in the playing of cards?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that a part of the recreational facilities of the camp?

Mr. JAMES. I wouldn't know; that is apparently it.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there any disciplinary action taken against him for his inflammatory speeches?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. And he has not been segregated from the other Japanese up to this time, so far as you know?

Mr. JAMES. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had you completed the substance of the speech he gave?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. As I say, Mr. Evans also had a translation. We compared notes afterward and he, I believe, gave his version of the speech to Mr. Head or reported it to him—the gist of ————'s<sup>3</sup> speech before the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know whether Mr. Evans spoke to him about the speech?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. You wouldn't know whether Mr. Head called him into the office to discuss the matter with him?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know; but I do know ————<sup>3</sup> has been continuously investigated by the F. B. I.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say he repeated that speech in block 44?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many days after?

Mr. JAMES. I should say a week, about a week after that.

Mr. COSTELLO. About a week?

Mr. JAMES. Early in December. It would be the first week in December or the last week in November that ————<sup>3</sup> repeated that speech.

Mr. COSTELLO. That would be after the trouble at Poston had quieted down?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. ————<sup>3</sup> was occupying a position of importance with the de facto government thrown up after the strike.

Mr. COSTELLO. If Mr. Evans or Mr. Head spoke to him about the speech and asked him to refrain from repeating it and so on, it evidently had no effect.

Mr. JAMES. It might have been that ————<sup>3</sup> was called on his speech by Mr. Evans or Mr. Head—I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did any of the other leaders of the strike movement speak over the loudspeaker system?

Mr. JAMES. They did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what the substance of their speeches was?

Mr. JAMES. I do not. I did not want to expose my interpreter to any harm. She is still off the record. It is not known that she worked for me and I have protected her ever since. She is one of the women who knows the highly intricate language and is capable of giving a true version of what went on.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not any of the speeches made over the loudspeaker system were inflammatory?

Mr. JAMES. I judge they were from what I have heard.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is from talking to Japanese who understand the Japanese language?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When I say "inflammatory," were the speeches inflammatory against the project administration?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; inflammatory against the project administration. I know that one speech was made by one ————<sup>3</sup>

Mr. COSTELLO. And that name is off the record?

Mr. JAMES. A farmer formerly from Ontario, Calif., a Kibei, which was inflammatory and criticizing Mr. Head.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there criticism directed merely to the project administration heads and the administration project, or did it go beyond that to other Americans?

Mr. JAMES. No; entirely to the project administration. ————<sup>3</sup> speech, to the best of my recollection, urged the Japanese—that is those who were listening to him and understood Japanese, to side with him and his group; that they were prepared to take over the administration. That was the basis of his speech.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was the gist of his talk to incite the Japanese to take command of the camp and assume control of the camp?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; not necessarily through force. It was not necessarily an implication of force but through showing force they believed they could force the administration to give them much more control—in effect complete control of the camp.

As we get into it later on and as I show you in the minutes of the de facto government, we will see what ————<sup>3</sup> position was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were the Japanese police when this was going on?

Mr. JAMES. The police at Poston No. 1 did not walk out during the strike; they were still on duty but they were of extremely questionable help during the strike. Most of the time they sat in the jail. That is about all they did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they take sides with the strikers?

Mr. JAMES. That is rather hard to say. They were definitely sympathetic to the strikers.

I think the Internal Security Office of Mr. Miller could describe to you two or three episodes where members of the police force showed a very definite anti-Caucasian attitude toward him personally. I know he is in possession of that material. I hesitate to pass it on to you second hand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There has been testimony before the committee that the center at Poston employs one judo instructor?

Mr. JAMES. There are a great many more than that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. More than one?

Mr. JAMES. Oh, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And now we have an instance where the project is employing a goh instructor, which is a Japanese card game.

Do you think the people who employed instructors to teach goh and judo knew what they were doing?

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. JAMES. Well, it isn't my province to stand in judgment of them, Mr. Steedman, but I believe at one time as high as somewhere between 80 and 100 judo instructors were at Poston.

Mr. MUNDT. Between 80 and 100 judo instructors?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Teaching judo to about how many Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. I have no way of knowing.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't know how big the classes were?

Mr. JAMES. No.

Mr. MUNDT. That is between 80 and 100 judo instructors were paid \$16 a month?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. To teach the Japanese a form of military training?

Mr. JAMES. No; I want to qualify that. I say the form of judo that was given at Poston, that is the form of judo, resembles the form of judo that is given in the middle schools of Japan, the middle schools of Japan being those where military training is compulsory.

Mr. MUNDT. Certainly it is not the entire training of Japanese soldiers but it is a part of their training?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, very definitely.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel the teaching of judo at these camps was an ill-advised program and it was not purely for recreational purposes but partially from a military standpoint?

Mr. JAMES. I think it was. Another thing that moved them further and further toward things culturally and spiritually to Imperial Japan.

Mr. COSTELLO. It tended then to keep the Japanese closely allied with the Government of Japan?

Mr. JAMES. With the mother country, sure.

Mr. COSTELLO. To keep the point of view of Japanese people?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Which tended to alienate them from an American attitude?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. According to that we were spending about \$1,500 a month of the taxpayers' money of this country to train these Japanese in the methods of Japanese warfare. That makes leaf raking under the W. P. A. a virtuous expenditure by comparison.

Mr. JAMES. It is difficult to give the number of people that were employed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the project records would indicate the exact number?

Mr. JAMES. They would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it your information that the Indian Service has gone to great lengths to perpetuate or to keep alive Indian culture on the various Indian reservations?

Mr. JAMES. Decidedly. I don't want to pose as an expert on Indian affairs, but having seen a number of their published works on a number of the reservations—Navajo Reservation, for example, that has been one of the things they have been very proud of—perpetuating Indian culture and recording it and encouraging the Indians to keep up their tribal forms.



Mr. STEEDMAN. By reason of that do you think the Indian Service employees who went to Poston thought:

Well, we have another minority group here and they have a culture; let us perpetuate that culture; let us hire these judo experts and goh experts.

Mr. JAMES. Yes; but that is a rather hard question to answer but I think there was a very definite trend on the part of a few of the Indian Service people, both in Washington and at the project, who probably thought it would be a very nice thing to perpetuate some of the things, culturally, Japanese, such as their paintings and judo.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think the center authorities had any idea of what these various things, such as judo and goh, represented to the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. I think they had not the slightest idea of what they represented. I know certainly that is true of judo.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum dated October 6, 1942, addressed to Mr. H. H. Townsend, transportation and supply officer, signed by Dr. Miles Carey, which I would like to offer in evidence and read into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was this memorandum supplied to you by Mr. Townsend?

Mr. STEEDMAN. It was.

Mr. COSTELLO. As a part of the record he has submitted to you?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may introduce it into the record at this point.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I quote:

This afternoon I brought Mr. Nishino into your office for an interview. Mr. Nishino represents the Kabuki Drama Society which is presenting their classical production on the newly erected Shibai stage opposite block No. 4. The organization is requesting the privilege of borrowing 100 folding chairs for this occasion. They would like to get the chairs tomorrow afternoon, keeping them till tomorrow night. They will return the chairs Thursday morning.

I am sure that this is a very worthy undertaking and that the members of the Kabuki Drama Society will appreciate any help that we can render in making this production a success. I am writing this in place of Mr. Nishino.

And that is signed, "Dr. Miles E. Carey by A. M."

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The letter is dated October 6, 1942.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was Dr. Carey's position?

Mr. JAMES. Dr. Carey was superintendent of the Poston schools. He was formerly principal of McKinley High School of Honolulu.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the Kabuki Drama Society?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; I am.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you tell the committee something about it?

Mr. JAMES. The Kabuki Drama Society plays are a series of ancient plays, several hundred years old, tying in with the era of feudal Japan.

Many of them glorify the warrior—the Samuri. In fact all of them have that basis of glorification of men in arms—blood and thunder.

In some cases the glorification of Jimmu Tenno, who is one of the ancestral gods from whom the long line of Emperors trace their lineage.

He was an ancestral god who descended to earth to establish the ancient dynasty from which the present member, Hirohito, traces his lineage.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do these plays have as their central theme Japanese culture?

Mr. JAMES. Japanese culture in the main, Mr. Steedman, but there also again you might make a comparison with Shakespeare. They occupy, with the exception of the militaristic spirit that is usually found in the Kabuki plays, they are regarded by the Japanese as Shakespeare is to us. They are regarded as classics but that is because they are so interwoven with the Japanese law and much of their law is tied in with the warrior tradition of the Yamato race.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Glorifying war?

Mr. JAMES. That is right, glorifying war.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you understand the term Shibai?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you explain it?

Mr. JAMES. Shibai is largely used to indicate a company producing plays in the vernacular; that is, in the Japanese language. A Shibai stage is a particular type of stage for the production of Japanese plays.

"Shibai" can also mean a club, a dramatic club, and if you make a reference to a Shibai play, you have to further define it—is it a Kabuki play or is it one of the modern Japanese plays?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it your understanding that these plays are closely integrated with Shinto worship?

Mr. JAMES. I don't think so, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You don't think it has anything to do with Shinto?

Mr. JAMES. With the organized Shinto worship; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. These plays simply have a tendency to glorify the Japanese race?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that is a worthy undertaking?

Mr. JAMES. Again you are asking a question dealing on project management. In my personal view; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to a reading of the memorandum that was introduced into the record this morning, regarding the strike or riot at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

11:30 a. m.: Mr. H. W. Smith, chief fiscal officer, telephones United States Attorney Flynn in Phoenix, inquires what court the Uchida case should be referred to. Mr. Flynn informs him that the superior court, Yuma County, has proper jurisdiction. Mr. Miller, internal security officer, telephones County Attorney Byrne, Yuma County, has proper jurisdiction. Mr. Miller, internal security officer, telephones County Attorney Byrne, Yuma, apprises him of Poston situation, and was informed Sheriff Norman would arrive in Poston following day.

Mr. JAMES. I would like to point out that at that time, November 19, 1942, Mr. Evans said they had sufficient evidence to hold Uchida.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

At a staff meeting, presided over by Mr. Evans, it is decided to release George Fujii since Mr. Miller did not have sufficient evidence to warrant holding him. In the case of Uchida, it is decided that sufficient evidence has been disclosed to warrant holding him.

3:30 p. m.: Mr. Evans meets with a committee of 12 evacuees from camp No. 2 and camp No. 3, who had been elected to act as intermediaries between the administration and a committee of 72, elected by the residents of Poston 1. It is disclosed that this committee of 72 is composed of 2 residents from each block. Mr. Evans tells the committee he proposed to release Mr. Fujii and to

turn Mr. Uchida over to the county of Yuma. The committee of 12 then passes this information to the committee of 72, and then meets with Mr. Evans to tell him why they do not think this would be acceptable to the people of Poston. Mr. Evans then goes before the committee of 72 and reads a prepared statement concerning the disposition of Fujii and Uchida. Immediately afterward he ordered the Poston No. 1 police force to release Fujii. The reaction of individual members of the committee of 72 indicated they did not approve the holding of Uchida and that great resistance would be put up to any attempt to move him from the community.

4:45 p. m.: Duncan Mills, regional administrative officer of War Relocation Authority, San Francisco, called at the request of Col. Karl Bendetson, regarding the situation at Poston. Mr. Mills was informed by Mr. Nelson of the situation as it existed. Mr. Nelson also told Mr. Mills that the reason Mr. Evans had not advised either General DeWitt or Colonel Bendetson was due to the fact that Mr. Evans had been informed by the two Federal Bureau of Investigation investigators that full details of the Poston disturbances had been sent to the Western Defense Command through the offices of G-2, Phoenix.

November 20, 9 a. m.: Sheriff Norman, of Yuma County, arrived. There was sufficient evidence to warrant holding Uchida by the county officials but he would not take further action unless requested by the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Before reading the paragraph "9:30 a. m., November 20," I would like to ask you if you know Dr. Alexander Leighton?

Mr. JAMES. I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his position at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Well, Dr. Alexander Leighton was a lieutenant in the United States Navy—that is he has a ranking of lieutenant in the United States Navy.

He was assigned to the project, apparently by the Navy Department, at the request of the Indian Service to act as head of the bureau of sociological research.

He is an anthropologist, I believe, of national reputation and has been, I believe, making studies of the Japanese at Poston; and he is still there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he a doctor of medicine or science?

Mr. JAMES. Science—no, I will take that back. I think he also has an M. D. degree too—I am sure he has.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is his commission in the Navy a regular commission or is he a Reserve Officer?

Mr. JAMES. He wears a regular uniform in Poston. He wears his uniform and is on active duty. I believe he is a close friend of Rear Admiral Ross McIntire.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you seen him wearing an Army uniform?

Mr. JAMES. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The first time you saw him he was wearing a Navy uniform?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And has always worn a Navy uniform?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Just where does he fit into the administrative picture at Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. I am not sure but I believe he is probably the unofficial representative of Commissioner Collier of the Indian Service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. A liaison man between the project and Commissioner Collier?

Mr. JAMES. That would be about as close a definition as I could give; and also engaged in collecting data on the Japanese. He had made similar studies of the Indians.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he compiling a book?



Mr. JAMES. I don't know, Mr. Steedman. He is gathering data and presumably it goes to the Navy Department as well as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mr. Collier.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the attitude of the Japanese toward Dr. Leighton?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN (Continuing reading from the memorandum, the item under November 20):

9:30 a. m.: Dr. Alexander Leighton, in a long-distance telephone call, described the situation to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, Washington, D. C. As his personal opinion, Dr. Leighton said he believed one of the important elements in the Poston disturbances was that the people looked upon this as a test case as to whether or not they were going to be permitted to settle their own internal affairs. He recommended that Uchida be released to the community on the understanding that he be tried there. Mr. Collier said he would consider the matter and call back later.

10:30 a. m.: Telephone call to Mr. Head in Salt Lake City is completed and project director and Mr. Gelvin start return trip to Poston.

11 a. m.: Commissioner Collier calls Mr. Leighton from Washington, says he has talked with Secretary Ickes who has discussed Poston disturbances with the War Department. Commissioner Collier instructs Poston administration to maintain status quo until further advised.

2 p. m.: Commissioner Collier and Mr. McKaskell, in telephonic conversations with Mr. Evans and Dr. Leighton, report that Secretary Ickes has spoken with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, and that it is Mr. Ickes' opinion that Uchida be released to the community with the understanding that a formal trial be held. Commissioner Collier said Secretary Ickes did not make this in the form of an order to the Poston administration because he felt the matter should be left to the judgment of the acting project director. Mr. Evans pointed out to Mr. McKaskell and Mr. Collier some of the serious consequences likely to arise from turning Uchida back to the community, but he said he approved it providing Mr. Collier and Mr. McKaskell understood these possible consequences. Mr. Collier wanted to impress upon the Poston evacuees that if they did not keep their end of the bargain in regard to a formal trial it would be the last time the Department of the Interior would be able to intercede with the War Department in their behalf.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is Mr. McKaskell?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Joseph McKaskell is Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D. C.

Mr. COSTELLO. While you are on that, the Department of the Interior, through Mr. Ickes, was appealing to the War Department on behalf of the release of Uchida to the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. I think there were consultations between Mr. Ickes and the Assistant Secretary of War.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know whether Mr. Myer was consulted at all regarding this situation?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know. I presume he was advised of it through Commissioner Collier.

Mr. COSTELLO. But he had left Poston and was possibly up in Salt Lake City at the time?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know whether anyone at the camp endeavored to contact him as head of the W. R. A. to determine what was to be done in the situation?

Mr. JAMES. I believe it was impossible to get in touch with Mr. Myer. Telephonic contact was only made with Mr. Gelvin. They were on the train on the date that was mentioned in that chronology. That was the first time we had a telephone call to them.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it was for that reason they went directly to Mr. Collier?



Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is the assistant to Mr. Myer in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. JAMES. I am trying to think who was at that time. I am not sure at all.

Mr. MUNDT. The name isn't so important. Was he with Mr. Myer?

Mr. JAMES. I am not sure.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading the balance of the paragraph dated "November 20, 2 p. m.):

He—

meaning Dr. Leighton—

also mentioned the matter of the fence around the project and reported that the matter had been taken up with Secretary McCloy and as a result an order has been issued to the Army engineers to stop construction work pending new arrangements concerning the location of said fence. Mr. McKaskell said they would clear with W. R. A., Washington, regarding procedure. Both Mr. Collier and Mr. McKaskell endorsed all previous steps taken by the project administration in dealing with the Poston disturbances.

2:30 p. m.: Mr. Evans called a staff meeting to discuss ways and means of starting negotiations with the evacuees. Mr. John Meano, of camp No. 2, attended this meeting and was told of the conversations with Washington. He said that without telling the recommendation of the Indian Office in Washington, he would endeavor to get the evacuees to begin negotiations with the administration on the basis of a trial in the community. He strongly advised against any general announcement to the evacuees. This was approved by Mr. Evans and Mr. Meano left to begin negotiations.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Army engineers contemplate building a fence around the center at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; the erection of a fence at Poston and at all other relocation projects. It was entirely a problem of the Army, tying in with the external security problems that the military police units were confronted with.

At Poston, as I understand it, there has been discussions during the month of May and right up to the time of the disturbance, as to just what was to be the boundaries of the Colorado River project and they had not been defined.

The Army wanted them close to the camps and the project administration and the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington, wanted a great deal more space included and there was this series of consultations, apparently going on in Washington, as to the location of the fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese at the center object to the location of the fence as planned by the Army engineers?

Mr. JAMES. The Japanese didn't know where the fence was going to be. The objections came from members of the staff.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Members of the Poston staff?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Japanese objected to the fence that was being built around No. 1?

Mr. JAMES. As the fences were being built there were a number of objections; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What form did the objections take?

Mr. JAMES. Largely by word of mouth, committees calling on Mr. Head, committees protesting. I don't recall any petitions put out by

the Japanese not to have any fences, for example, or to move the boundaries or move the location of the fence, but I do recall there were delegations that called on the project director in protest of the particular location of the fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Army engineers have trouble with the evacuees about tearing down the fence that they were building?

Mr. JAMES. They did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please describe the nature of that trouble?

Mr. JAMES. In Poston No. 3, the fence was being erected early in November, and after it had been up 2 or 3 days, in certain locations the wire would be down and paths would be cut out into the desert wilderness. It was a matter of convenience with them. And in some cases I imagine it was an attempt on their part to show their disapproval of the fence and what to them meant, apparently, further confinement.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there any particular place outside the fence to which the Japs might want to go, such as down to the river, or something of that kind?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; there were locations like that.

Mr. COSTELLO. And for that reason the fence might have been inconvenient for them?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; I would place it on two bases: Convenience, and secondly, disapproval of the fence because the fence represented a symbol to them.

Mr. COSTELLO. The paths cut there were because a large number of Japanese might have been going to the river?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. I don't think it was the work of an organized group. My presumption would be that it was largely the work of American-born youngsters.

Mr. MUNDT. Were there any gates in the fence?

Mr. JAMES. Very few. Now, there was one, as they were originally lined up there were just two entrances to the camp. Each camp was to be enclosed and as I recall there were just two entrances to the camps.

Mr. MUNDT. It involved considerable inconvenience?

Mr. JAMES. These fences by no stretch of the imagination could be regarded as detention fences. They could be called "cattle fences." They were only about this high [indicating], with three or four strands of barb wire. I believe originally it was to be five strands but it was cut down to four, but as far as keeping an able-bodied man or woman or youngster in the boundary, it would be ridiculous. But we do have trouble with Indian cattle. There are ranches only 2 or 3 miles away and cattle wander in and eat up the vegetable patches and there is a need for a fence there, but as far as this type of fence actually affording a measure of confinement, that is ridiculous.

Mr. MUNDT. From the standpoint of—

Mr. JAMES. Psychological confinement; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. From the standpoint of your experience of over a year at the relocation center, and in view of the fact of a particular time like this, it was necessary to confer with so many different officials in Washington, I wonder if you think it is conducive to good management to have at least three different agencies of the Government in Washington dividing responsibility for the administration of the relocation center?

Mr. JAMES. It would certainly seem to me to be the wrong thing. Common, ordinary horse sense would dictate that a centralized administration is necessary if we want humane treatment of these people. Humane treatment dictates quick, strong answers and quick action.

Mr. MUNDT. I might say for your information that previous witnesses, men employed at the center and on the staff at Poston, have given the same suggestion.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there any reason why the Department of the Interior should have anything to say with reference to this center?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, there is; because under the terms and agreement signed by Secretary of the Interior Ickes and Milton S. Eisenhower, in February of 1942, the Poston project was set up under the terms of that agreement. This vast area of land in the potentially fertile Parker Valley was to be set aside as a relocation center and the land was to be leased from the Indians and the Indians in turn were not to receive any actual cash for the rental of their land, but after the war they are to receive, under the terms of this agreement, the buildings and the appurtenances upon this land.

Mr. COSTELLO. Before Mr. Collier could take any action with the War Department, he would have to go through Mr. Ickes?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

To continue with this agreement: It provides, as I recall, that the affairs at Poston shall be administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, following the policies of the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that same situation apply to other camps not located on Indian reservations?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir; this is the only one where there is a dual control.

Mr. MUNDT. There is nothing in such a lease which seems to convey to Commissioner Collier the authority to determine whether a Japanese should be in jail or out of jail?

Mr. JAMES. It wouldn't seem so to me.

Mr. MUNDT. I would assume that he would be interested only in the physical equipment and the land.

Mr. JAMES. That would seem to be the case.

Mr. MUNDT. It is a far cry because, assuming you want a building in a certain location, because the irrigation project is to be put in a certain place, to determine whether a man who had been incarcerated should be pardoned?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. Mind you, the evidence shows, I believe the evidence showed to the best of my knowledge, that Uchida had been guilty of a felony—an assault with a deadly weapon so, automatically under the law, that man could not be tried in Poston.

According to my understanding of the law of this country there are no courts capable of handling such a case in Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the type of offense, however, that was set up in the regulations as governing the camp which provided that offenders of that character should be turned over to the regular State authorities outside the camp?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; automatically he should have been turned over to the sheriff—Sheriff Norman, and Sheriff Norman, according to the chronology I have presented here, was perfectly

ready to take him to the Yuma County Court at Yuma if released by the authorities at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. According to all their own rules and regulations governing the camp that is the procedure that should have been had and Uchida should have been turned over to the county authorities in that locality?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is also true with respect to Indians on Indian reservations, is it not? That is, if they commit a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth they are to be tried in the county court?

Mr. JAMES. I believe it is, Congressman; yes. The Indian Service law does not subordinate the law of the Commonwealth.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much it cost the Government to change the fence from its original location to the location that the Japanese desired?

Mr. JAMES. I do not, Mr. Steedman. As a matter of fact, I don't know that the fence was located where the Japanese wanted it. I rather question that. I think it was where the project administration wanted it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the Japanese objected to the first fence and it was moved?

Mr. JAMES. Well, whether it was the Japanese that did it, or persuaded them to move it, I don't know. I think Mr. Head originally—way back as we were just receiving our Japanese—that was way back in May last year and Mr. Head was having these discussions with the Army and the Army engineers as to the location of that fence.

And I happen to know that from conversations. The Japanese had very little to say about the location of the fence. It was a disagreement between the Indian Service officials and the Army as to the location of the fence.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you at any time discuss the location of the fence with Miss Nell Findley?

Mr. JAMES. No. I was present at a meeting of staff members when Miss Findley circulated a petition to be forwarded to Commissioner Collier and to Mr. Dillon Myer and to the President of the United States, requesting that the fence not be built.

That petition never left Poston to my knowledge. It was signed and got no further than the project director's office.

It was signed by a good portion of the personnel there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ever discuss with Miss Findley the evacuation of the Japanese from the west coast?

Mr. JAMES. Never personally. I have heard her in many talks.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was her attitude toward the evacuation?

Mr. JAMES. I think she very sincerely believed—we were very good friends there, I think Miss Findley sincerely believed relocation was wrong. I remember very well in some of her talks she made statements such as:

This is my country right or wrong, my country is wrong in this particular and I am going to try to correct this wrong.

I may say for the record Miss Findley is a very sincere, warm-hearted lady.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Whenever a question of discipline arose, did Miss Findley always take the side of the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, she did. She is a maiden lady, an Irish woman with a great big heart and she looked upon them as individuals instead of looking upon them as a mass.

Obviously, gentlemen, in a situation as tough as Poston, out there on the desert, a lusty booming frontier town, you are going to see a lot of hardships but you will lose respect if you become sympathetic with individual cases. There are 18,000 Japanese there and if you start commiserating with a dozen or so, you are going to lose the respect of the other 18,000.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you feel proper management of centers of this character requires rather stern discipline at the top in order to keep order and discipline in the center?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. For simple, human decency's sake, I think you have to have that type of administration. Humane rules, yes, but rules that really mean what they say.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You feel that whoever administers the project should be an administrator and should be forceful in giving his commands and see that they are carried out?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. I think the personnel at Poston have attempted to do that, but I think they have been greatly hampered by the confusion that has existed in Washington, D. C.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you feel that very often the head of the project was unable to carry out his own orders because they might have been countermanded by officials in Washington?

Mr. JAMES. I think they have tried to do the best job of which they are capable. Many of them are untrained in the ways of these people but after all I think they are good Americans. I think some of them have lost perspective and some of them have reacted in a psychopathic way after being in contact with the people.

I think the biggest handicap has been the direction that they have received from the top, however.

Mr. STEEDMAN. From the testimony previously given by you, you indicate the Japanese people themselves expect stern discipline?

Mr. JAMES. They do. It is reflected in their own lives. The project director is looked upon as the father of that community and if he doesn't react with the sternness, the benign sternness, if you please, as the papasan of the family, he loses the respect of the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He should give orders directing their lives and the conduct of the entire community and, as you say, they expect him to do that, and if he does not he loses face?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And then all the administration loses face by reason of that?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You feel also the Japanese live a perfectly happy and normal life under such a stern directorship?

Mr. JAMES. If given a chance to work out their own economic salvation so as to be free from the taxpayers' money, their pride will be restored. They are a very proud people. They are very competent to carve out their own destiny.

Even out there on the desert I feel they would be reasonably content and happy under wartime restrictions. They are a simple people

when it comes to the necessities of life, and if given a chance to make them economically self-supporting they would be happy at Poston and every other relocation center where there is a chance for a large agricultural project, because most of our Japanese have their roots in the soil or in processing food.

Mr. COSTELLO. We might have a 5-minute recess for the sake of the reporter.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading again from the memorandum):

2:30 p. m.: Mr. Evans called a staff meeting to discuss ways and means of starting negotiations with the evacuees. Mr. John Maeno of camp No. 2 attended this meeting and was told of the conversations with Washington. He said, that without telling the recommendation of the Indian Office in Washington, he would endeavor to get the evacuees to begin negotiations with the administration on the basis of a trial in the community. He strongly advised against any general announcement to the evacuees. This was approved by Mr. Evans and Mr. Maeno left to begin negotiations.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is Mr. Maeno?

Mr. JAMES. John Maeno is a former Japanese from Los Angeles, an attorney, and at that time was chairman of the community congress of Poston No. 2.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

A committee was formed to keep the staff of Caucasian personnel adequately informed concerning the development of events.

6 p. m.: John Maeno reported back that though there was a good deal of argument for and against having a trial in the community, it was his opinion that the people would come around to this. He said that the Committee of Seventy-two (of which about 60 members had assembled to hear him), decided to take the matter back to their blocks for evening discussions and agreed to reassemble at 10 a. m. tomorrow to discuss it.

November 21, 9 a. m.: In a telephone conversation with Commissioner Collier, Dr. Leighton inquired if procedures had been cleared with War Relocation Authority, Washington. He was informed this had not been possible, due to Mr. Myer's absence in Salt Lake City but that the project director should proceed as instructed by the Commissioner and if any subsequent controversy should develop between War Relocation Authority and the Office of Indian Affairs, Mr. Collier and Mr. McKaskell would assume responsibility.

11:30 a. m.: John Maeno reported to Mr. Evans that Poston No. 1 was holding a plebiscite concerning whether the people should negotiate for a trial for Uchida to be held in Poston.

Sometime Saturday morning: The Parker warehouse dock crew of 100 volunteer evacuee workers, assigned to unload freight cars, is turned back because of the tense situation in Parker. Railroad men say a switch engine is not available to move cars from a spur track to the unloading platform.

5:30 p. m.: John Maeno phones Mr. Evans that conditions are now serious in Poston No. 2; that he fears that unit may go on a sympathy strike with No. 1; that he is disappointed in the attitude of the people, and that he has no response from his fellow evacuees for an attitude on the proposals for a settlement, and that he requests another meeting with Mr. Evans.

7:30 p. m.: James Crawford, administrator of Poston No. 2, phones Mr. Evans that trouble is increasing in this unit. Mr. Evans sends a personal message to a mass meeting in Poston No. 2 asking the people to stand pat. Mr. Crawford reports that most of the dissension in Poston No. 2 is confined to block 211 and that the leader is Mr. Tachibana. John Maeno reports he cannot keep his appointment with Mr. Evans.

8 p. m.: The community council of Poston No. 3 meets with Mr. Evans who tells them he is hopeful of arriving at a satisfactory solution.

8:15 p. m.: Arrival of Captain McFadden, a representative of Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt.

8:30 p. m.: Summary of events given by Mr. Evans to staff meeting.

9:15 to 11 p. m.: Meeting between Mr. Evans, Dr. Leighton, administrators, and the \_\_\_\_\_,<sup>3</sup> Andrew Sugimoto, and the two other evacuees accompanied by three stenographers. \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> opens discussion with presentation of Japanese psychology. He says the disturbances in Poston No. 1 have resulted in a mob, that this mob is now trying to establish leaders, that two such leaders have been elected from every block and that they have affected an over-all emergency organization. \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> further says that he and his associates are members of a Committee of Twelve, that 9 members of this committee represent the quads of Poston No. 1 and that the other members are temporary chairman, vice chairman, and secretary. He explains that this Committee of Twelve and the 72 elected block representatives are endeavoring to gain control of the mob in order to once again have a peaceful and happy community. He further says that if they can establish themselves as leaders by securing what the mob wants, that is the relief of Uchida, then they can unify this mob movement into a more formal organization which can collaborate with the administration in establishing law and order.

At the request of Sugimoto, Dr. Leighton explains the administration's position on law and order, that the matter of the trial of Uchida is in the hands of the authorities of Yuma County, that he had telephoned Mr. Collier and it might be possible to try Uchida in the community of Poston, but that if this were done it must be clearly understood: (1) That there would be a trial according to strict lawful procedure, (2) that there must be improved collaboration with the administration in project work, an end to strikes and stoppages, an end to the beatings and terrorism, and (3) if these latter conditions were not fulfilled the Department of the Interior would no longer intercede with the War Department, but that if they were fulfilled the people of Poston would be assured of continued improvements.

\_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> reply was that this was a fine plan but that he and his associates did not believe they could secure an acceptance from the mob.

It was suggested by Mr. Evans and Dr. Leighton that the secondary proposals embodied in category (3) be reduced to writing and presented to the project administration for further discussion.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Since the name of \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> has appeared several times, will you give the committee the background of \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>?

Mr. JAMES. Very glad to. May I ask the newspaper people to delete his name from the records.

\_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> is suspected of being one of the larger-fry leaders who were not picked up after Pearl Harbor. He came into Poston from Bakersfield. He is an alien born in Japan. His roommate in Poston is \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long has he been in this country?

Mr. JAMES. \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> has been here about 3 years.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has been here just as a visitor?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> is 50 years old—the Nori food king of Japan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You might explain that "Nori" is a specialized food made of seaweed.

Mr. JAMES. Yes. I have talked with \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> a good many times with an interpreter.

Perhaps I had better give you a little bit of his fabulous record.

He came to this country in 1941 to establish it, according to his testimony, an overseas market for Nori, which has been sold in the big department stores of Japan and the larger food stores of Japan—department stores like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, in Tokio.

\_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> is worth about 17,000,000 yen, a wealthy man—a very wealthy man according to Japanese estimates of wealth.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.



He maintains a personnel training school in Nagoya, one of the larger cities of Japan, where, he told me, he constantly trains 300 people to work in his organization.

He has factories in Nagoya and other cities of Japan. He has a monopoly on this type of seaweed. He came to this country in 1941 to establish an overseas market here in North America.

According to his own testimony he sent his eldest son in the same year to Europe to visit Germany, Russia, and Central Europe to similarly try to develop a Nori market.

His son went back to Japan.

\_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> and \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> work as a team at Poston. \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>, prior to his appearance in the strike or in the riot as one of the ringleaders, for a number of months had been endeavoring to get control of the cooperative system at Poston.

Shall I go into that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I prefer we take the cooperative angle up at a later time. I would like to proceed along with the strike now.

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And we will develop that testimony later.

Mr. JAMES. May I introduce a piece of poetry that \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> wrote?

Mr. MUNDT. Are you still talking about the wealthy Japanese merchant?

Mr. JAMES. This is by way of background so you can picture who \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> was or is. May I add one further thing: The testimony of the district attorney of Kern County—

Mr. STEEDMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. JAMES. In February 1942, prior to the evacuation, the \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> acted as an interpreter for the district attorney of Kern County, Calif., and for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The F. B. I. agents who came in on several of these cases began to be a little suspicious of \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> interpreting. They called Mrs. \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> whom I have previously mentioned in this testimony, to check \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> interpretation.

Mr. COSTELLO. Her name is off the record?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. There were sufficient discrepancies to cause \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> to be thrown out. He was one of the first to come into Poston. He came in as a volunteer evacuee, presumably to act as a Methodist minister. Fully 90 percent of his time at Poston is spent in other activities or activities other than preaching.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the same man who is a merchant also a minister?

Mr. JAMES. No. The \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> is the minister. Living with him in his apartment is this old, elderly alien Japanese, \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>, who is incredibly wealthy, and who, by his own admissions, is a rugged individualist. He secured his monopoly of the Nori product in various ways—

Mr. MUNDT. Is the minister also an alien?

Mr. JAMES. \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> is also an alien; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you happen to know whether any effort has been made to exchange \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> for some American national in Japan?

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.



Mr. JAMES. I don't know. The State Department will know about that because they are in charge of repatriation.

Mr. MUNDT. You say you have a poem that the minister wrote?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; and later on I will read it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. (Reading again from the memorandum):

12 midnight: Project Director Head and Mr. Gelvin arrive from War Relocation Authority regional conference in Salt Lake City.

November 22, 10 a. m.: A staff meeting is called by Director Head who says he has a plan for the solution of the strike; that he personally examined all the facts; that he will not meet with any evacuee committee until he is convinced they are representative and that the plan he is evolving will require the full support of the staff and outside agencies.

Mid-afternoon. Representatives of the Committee of Seventy-two make frequent attempts to open negotiations with Mr. Head but all such meetings he holds in abeyance, while compiling data on the membership of these committees. Frequent consultations are held with staff members to discuss future strategy.

8 p. m.: Military police patrols now guard the mile square boundaries of Poston No. 1, under orders to turn back all evacuees endeavoring to enter or leave the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had the evacuees been going in and out of the camp at Poston during the course of this strike?

Mr. JAMES. Going where, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Leaving the boundaries of the center from camps No. 1, 2, or 3?

Mr. JAMES. Going between camps?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. JAMES. They were not permitted to go by road between the two camps. The military police were blocking that. It was quite possible and as a matter of fact they did go through on trails that they had beaten between the two camps. It was only a matter of 3 miles and they held meetings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There are many ways to move back and forth between the camps without using the regular road?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct: yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading again from the memorandum):

November 23, 1:45 p. m.: Project Attorney Haas, at Mr. Head's request, confers with Andrew Sugimoto and Mr. Kawashima, spokesmen for the evacuee committees, and arranges a meeting between Mr. Head and members of the Committee of Twelve.

3:30 p. m.: Mr. Head meets with the Committee of Twelve in the Red Cross Hall. The first half hour of the meeting finds the administration represented by Mr. Head and Mr. Haas. They are then joined by Dr. Leighton, Mr. Evans, Mr. Gelvin, and Vernon Kennedy, employment director.

Verbatim minutes of the entire meeting are recorded by Miss Frances Cushmen. These deliberations which continued until 9 p. m., involved discussions in these three categories: (1) Employment, (2) law and order, (3) proper organization for better collaboration between the evacuees and the administration.

The Committee of Twelve states its position in the Uchida case: A demand for the unconditional release of the prisoner, and the dropping of all charges.

Mr. Head states the official project position, that both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the officials of Yuma County have jurisdiction which is higher than project law. He further states that the United States Government is free at any time to investigate pro-Axis activities; that he expects the full cooperation of all residents of Poston if Federal, State, and county officials exercise their powers under their higher jurisdiction.

The committee restates its position, that it is checking mob action, that it can only accomplish this through the unconditional release of Uchida. It further states that speed is essential in the settlement.

The meeting ends with Mr. Head giving assurances he will give his answer tomorrow and the committee likewise agrees to take under advisement the administration position and to report at the same time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It states here that Mr. Vernon Kennedy was the employment director. What were his duties at Poston, if you know?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Kennedy was in charge of local employment, Mr. Steedman—that is the employment of people on various projects within the project itself.

He also was in charge of the leave program. His title was changed later on to "Leave and employment officer."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he occupy that position at the present time?

Mr. JAMES. He does not, Mr. Steedman. He is in charge of the leave office at Kansas City.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you know Mr. Kennedy prior to going to Poston?

Mr. JAMES. No, I didn't. I knew him quite well at Poston. We were very good friends and we had an occasion, as in the case of the strike, to collaborate on the keeping of notes and things of that sort.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Mr. Kennedy a native of San Francisco?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he was born in Lassen County. He lived in San Francisco a long time. He went to St. Marys College, I believe.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what position Mr. Kennedy held prior to going to Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Well, Mr. Kennedy was a labor expert, I believe, and at one time he worked for the Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and later he was an organizer for the C. I. O. I am not sure of that but I believe he was an organizer for the C. I. O.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he a close associate of Harry Bridges in San Francisco?

Mr. JAMES. That I wouldn't know. I never heard him mention that but it is quite reasonable to believe if he worked for the C. I. O. that he knew Mr. Harry Bridges.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And now he is in charge of the leave office at Kansas City?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. I would like, for the sake of the record, to say Mr. Kennedy was a very competent employee—a very competent employment director at Poston. His records were in very good shape.

Mr. STEEDMAN (going on with the memorandum):

November 24, 9 a. m.: Project attorney Haas is informed in telephone contact with Andrew Sugimoto that he is acceptable as an intermediary between Mr. Head and the evacuee committees.

9:30 a. m.: Mr. Haas meets with Sugimoto, Kawashimi, and Omori. Sugimoto, as spokesman, says he has assurances that the Committee of Twelve will accept Mr. Head's proposals and that the Committee of Seventy-two will meet at 10 a. m.

Sugimoto presents in behalf of the Committee of Twelve, and indicates complete support from the Committee of Seventy-two, the following demands: (1) That Uchida be released in the custody of the Committee of Seventy-two and tried in Poston, and that this release be in written form; (2) that the Committee of Seventy-two will sign an agreement to produce Uchida when asked for; (3) that the procedure for such trial would be worked out by Director Head.

Gom Masuda was present at this conference and indicated that he had already agreed to act as counsel for Uchida.

Mr. Haas again reiterated any final agreement on the trial and disposition of Uchida at Poston would not affect possible action by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Yuma County.

10 a. m.: Staff meeting is held with the Army representatives present. Mr. Head explains the status of the strike and brings the division chiefs up to date. With Major Dykes and Lieutenant Young he is able to present the position of the Army.

3 p. m.: Sugimoto comes to the administration building for a reply from Mr. Haas and Mr. Head. He is informed that Mr. Head will see the committee at 3:30. The meeting time is changed to 4 p. m.

4 p. m. through to 8:30 p. m.: Meeting with the Committee of Twelve. Present in behalf of the administration: Director Head, Dr. Leighton, and Messrs. Haas, Evans, Gelvin, Powell, and later Kennedy. For the evacuees: The Committee of Twelve, and three Niseis, Henry Ogadawa, Frank Tanaka, and Smoot Katow. For Uchida, Tom Masuda and Kay Tamura, attorneys. Verbatim minutes of the proceedings are taken by Miss Cushman. A basic formula for a settlement is agreed upon:

(1) Uchida is to be released to the custody of his two attorneys, Masuda and Tamura, to stand trial in Poston under procedures prescribed by Mr. Head.

(2) The evacuees are to accept a reemployment program, drawn up by Mr. Kenneday with the approval of Mr. Head. Mr. Haas explains that all War Relocation Authority rules are to be followed in all respects.

(3) All evacuees are to be required to sign affidavits guaranteeing law and order.

(4) A city planning board is to be elected by the people of Poston to collaborate with them and to assist the administration in the functioning of the administrative, legislative, and economic life of the community.

Uchida is released upon a signed order by Mr. Head.

Midnight: Picket lines are withdrawn and the people of Poston No. 1 go home.

November 25, 8:30 a. m.: Some workers report for duties and the reemployment program commences. Projects which have been overstaffed prepare to eliminate personnel.

10 a. m.: The military police cordon is withdrawn from the boundaries of Poston No. 1.

10 a. m.: Commissioner Collier is informed by telephone that the strike is over and that work projects and reemployment will get under way tomorrow.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is an account of the strike at Poston as kept by you?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. I would like to add one thing to it. I just happened to notice a sentence on the gist of the Army position as presented at 10 a. m. on November 24.

At that meeting Major Dykes and Lieutenant Young and Captain McFadden explained to Mr. Head that the Army would, and this was in answer to a hypothetical question put to them by Mr. Head, that the Army would enter Poston only in case of riots or in the case of a fire that was out of control.

That position was stated at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 24th.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that position was taken on the basis of a memorandum agreement between the Army and the W. R. A.?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who was Major Dykes?

Mr. JAMES. Major Dykes is attached to the southern security zone of the military police.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was not regularly stationed at the post adjacent to Poston?

Mr. JAMES. No; Lieutenant Young in the absence of Captain Dougherty, who the day before had been assigned to The Adjutant General's school in Washington, D. C. Captain Dougherty had left Poston and Young was in charge.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Major Dykes came there because of the trouble?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. During the course of the riot, did you see a Japanese flag displayed anywhere inside the center at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where was it displayed?

Mr. JAMES. It was displayed on the front of the police station for a period of 15 minutes. Mr. Evans went up to Mr. Andrew Sugimoto, I believe one of the strike leaders, and apparently suggested to Mr. Sugimoto that it be taken down and it was taken down.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that flag made of cloth?

Mr. JAMES. It was made of cloth. It was about this size [indicating], I should say 44 inches long and in the center was a rising sun with a white field.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there any question in your mind about it having been the Japanese flag?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have seen the Japanese flag before?

Mr. JAMES. I have. It is not to be confused with the block banners which were displayed almost continuously during the strike. They were similarly made. They were on a white field and the numerals, very often, in red such as block 30, and in the shape of a rising sun, but nevertheless it was not a rising sun because they did not have it solidly red. But in the case of the flag that was put up on the front of the jail, that was the rising sun flag. It was only up 15 minutes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the block banners designed to resemble the Japanese flag?

Mr. JAMES. Some of them very definitely, whether by chance or by design I leave to you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did the Japanese flag fly at any other place in the camp?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. I should like to say this for the record. The American flag was flown continuously from the big flagpole by the administration building and it was taken down and put up each night and morning by an alien by the name of Teshima, whose two sons are in the American Army.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had he done that prior to the time of the strike?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; and that was the one place in the camp where the American flag was flying all the time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Under normal conditions is the American flag flown at other places about the camp?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir; just at the administration building. That is the only place where it is flown.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you witness any threats by the Japanese to take down the American flag at the administration building?

Mr. JAMES. To my knowledge there were no such threats made.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have no knowledge of any incident of that kind?

Mr. JAMES. I have no knowledge and I was there all the time and if there was such an incident I would know about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. We had testimony indicating that some Japanese Boy Scouts stood around the flag—no, that was at Manzanar.

Mr. JAMES. There was no incident regarding the American flag at Poston.

Mr. MUNDT. During the strike did the Japanese occupy the gasoline pumps at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. I believe they did. The gasoline pumps at that time were located a full half-mile away from the administration building; and I believe they did.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they also occupy some of the warehouses?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. The transcript, Congressman, shows that a committee called earlier during the strike, on Mr. Evans, to set up procedures for getting food; but as to actually occupying the warehouses, to the best of my knowledge they did not occupy them.



Mr. MUNDT. They worked out an agreement with the administration in some way to get food each day?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. No attempt was made to steal food or any of the property of the United States during that time?

Mr. JAMES. None during that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as you know, there was no destruction of property?

Mr. JAMES. There was no destruction of property during the period of the strike.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there any suggestion on the part of the administration that if they didn't quit striking they would have to stop eating?

Mr. JAMES. None to my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. They didn't use that persuasive device?

Mr. JAMES. I am sure I would have known it if there had been that type of persuasive tactics used.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. JAMES. I would like to say for the purpose of the record, however, that there were several occasions, notably those involving \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> and \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>, American-born Japanese women, who came to us for protection.

They lived within the camp and we were unable to provide protection for them.

In the case of \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> I believe a request was made to the chief of police at Poston No. 1 to place a guard in front of her house. Whether that was done, I don't know.

I do know neither \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> or \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> received any bodily harm during the period of trouble.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese seize the automotive equipment of the center during the course of the strike?

Mr. JAMES. They did. On the first 2 or 3 days there was equipment that was loose inside of the camp. From the first day of the trouble they maintained control over it for several days before we were able to get it back.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that the fact Mr. Townsend had the responsibility of all this automotive equipment, which was, after all, Government property, caused him to become concerned over the fact that the Japanese had taken control of that property and refused to return it to his control?

Mr. JAMES. I think Mr. Townsend very definitely was under tremendous strain and responsibility in the care of that equipment.

I do think, collaterally, that there are other circumstances that created the rather unusual mood he was in. I think worry over his wife, who had been an invalid, had something to do with it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And was he concerned about her safety?

Mr. JAMES. Very definitely, and her physical condition, too.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any concern demonstrated by other Caucasian people who were living inside the center?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. The only people who actually left the project were Mr. and Mrs. Townsend and Mr. Townsend's assistant, Mr. Barrett with Mrs. Barrett.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

I don't know the reason why Mr. and Mrs. Barrett left during the strike.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did Mr. Barrett return?

Mr. JAMES. He returned subsequently and is now employed at Poston. I believe he is chief of transportation under Mr. Haverland, who is chief of transportation and supply.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the equipment of the Government normally stored in garages or is it left in any particular place?

Mr. JAMES. Originally the equipment was stored outside in the central warehouse area, which is approximately in the middle of the camp. During the period of the strike a motor pool—just prior, incidentally, to the disturbances—a motor pool had been set up across the road immediately adjacent to the military police camp, and within three or four hundred yards of the military police camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. Normally, then, all the motor equipment should have been placed in that pool overnight?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. But at the time of the strike much of that equipment was not actually in the motor pool; it was scattered around the camp in different locations?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the Japanese defied Mr. Townsend to obtain possession of that equipment, didn't they?

Mr. JAMES. I wasn't present when that happened. I know Mr. Townsend's story on that, however, and I am not in position to give you any opinion as to the validity of the story.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Dr. John Powell?

Mr. JAMES. I do, quite well.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his position at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Dr. Powell, during the time of the strike, was director of recreation and adult education.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his present position?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he has succeeded Miss Nell Findley as chief of community services since, approximately, May 24.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Dr. Powell is concerned with community welfare at Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is Dr. Powell's background as a social worker?

Mr. JAMES. Dr. Powell, I believe, holds a Ph. D. from one—from a northern California university. I believe he comes from San Francisco. I understand that prior to joining W. R. A. he had engaged in social service work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was his attitude during his entire connection with the Poston center one of sympathetic understanding toward the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, I would say so—I would say that of all social workers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And has he always taken the side of the Japanese in their discussions with the project administration?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, I would say he would—that he would be inclined to look upon the broad values of the Japanese—social values of the Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But by no stretch of the imagination could Dr. Powell be called anti-Japanese, could he?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you a memorandum entitled, "Attitudes of a Project Official by John Powell, Director of Recreation," and dated, "November 21, 1942," and ask you if you have seen this memorandum before? [Handing document to the witness.]

Mr. JAMES. I have. I included it in my official report to Mr. Dillon Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority at Washington, D. C.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see the original of this memorandum?

Mr. JAMES. I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it signed by Dr. Powell?

Mr. JAMES. It was. Copies of it were also distributed to other project officials.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to place this memorandum in evidence and read it into the record at this point, it having been identified by the witness.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the identification which has been made it will be so ordered.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am quoting:

As the project administration moves toward a settlement of the present dispute with the residents, there are a few factors of which I have been especially conscious which seem to me vital in looking for a long-term solution of the situation out of which this crisis arose.

1. There is an obvious, powerful, and continued state of terror among loyal Nisei who have been among the friends and coworkers of the administration.

There have been many threats of violence to those who are openly loyal to the United States and to this administration.

The present picket lines are being maintained by personal check-up, search of homes, and threats to persons.

Several of the most active, intelligent, and unquestionable young people, including one Issei returned from internment and leading programs of Americanization, have announced with genuine despair their intention of leaving Poston at any price.

None of these phenomena are explained by the administration's confident description of the responsible and trustworthy group through whom negotiations are now being carried on.

2. The negotiating group is described as "representative." The bivouac around the jail is not genuinely so. Its flags are described as having the red circle on the white ground. Its music is Japanese, as is its language.

True, many of the watchers are Nisei. They are there under compulsion, as many of them have frankly said: They do not dare not to be there, and are checked on almost hourly. The Nisei are delegated to that duty.

Similarly, it is possible that the familiar members of the negotiating body were ordered to join it, and dared not refuse. Their presence is not a guarantee of the good faith of those who stand behind them.

There have been repeated statements that the real background group is openly pro-Japan; but that the American group does not feel strong enough, in their position within the whole family ribbed structure of this people, to openly resist them. They look to the Administration to do that.

3. The whole technique of these incidents is too familiar to require analogies. The first move is to create hatred against some people within the group, as friendly to the Government. The next is to terrorize by a few beatings and many threats. The beatings get worse, but the perpetrators are protected by the people's loyalty and fear, and by the fact the victims were unpopular.

When a suspect is caught, after particularly brutal assaults, (a) he is made the occasion for a hero festival, around which is built up a glittering and specious structure of demands for "the people's rights." If the legal right is granted, the demands are advanced beyond right, to political gains. The "people" are kept in line behind these demands.



Finally, the demanding group offers to "keep the peace," guarantees to prevent any renewal of violence. By this time, this is not a genuine offer; it is a threat. "No more violence if you \* \* \*" or "until you. \* \* \*"

4. Within the cultural and population picture of Poston are an unusually complex set of factors. They include the Issei, who kept the laws of the land pretty well while they were adding hundreds of millions of dollars of wealth to that land; who were dispossessed and concentrated in alien camps, where self-government was promised; and were then explicitly excluded from any overt legal share in that government. There are also the Nisei, who were in full centrifugal flight from the old folks, until they too were dispossessed from schools and jobs and thrown into the arms of the Issei again. There are the Kibei, friends of neither and divided among themselves; young people without a country.

Politically, there are four groups here:

(a) Those openly and enthusiastically American, consciously and emotionally so.

(b) Those who were born and raised here and take America for granted, like us.

(c) Those who, without being favorable to Axis fascism, deeply resent their treatment under relocation, and are antagonistic to the Government and this administration.

(d) Those who are heartily in favor of Axis policies and aims, and seek to further them.

The (a) and (b) groups are discouraged and frightened; they feel their cause is losing, and themselves under threat. The (c) group easily joins with (d) in action, though without the same ultimate ends.

In relation to "informers," (a) and (b) dislike them, and regard them as traitors to the group. Only (d) has reason to fear them, actually; but (c) also suffers from their activity, or might so suffer. (c) and (d), therefore, would plan and carry out attacks; (a) and (b) would be in sympathy sufficiently not to interfere; and would not inform, both out of sympathy and for fear of being in turn beaten as informers.

5. Many honest and earnest citizens of Poston believe Uchida innocent. Even if he were guilty, however, most of them would want him released: "Punishing informers is our own internal affairs."

Not less than eight people were active in the assaults; hundreds were sympathetic and the rest dare not tell. But if the community cannot handle its law-breakers and terrorists, it cannot govern itself in any sense which this administration can accept.

Uchida is an incident; perhaps an accident. The basic fact is that slander and terror and violence have reached ends that are pleasing to the enemy, and paralyzing to the project.

A genuine desire to accomplish as much self-government as the administered situation can permit should be furthered. But there are elements in this situation that demand extra and unusual safeguards before the administration can give the power over law and order to a self-announced ruling body.

The "informers" have been accused without evidence and without hearing or defense, in a cowardly and unfair way; and then have been brutally beaten, and their fate used to terrorize others.

The town cannot ask unusual consideration in terms of rights when its hands are not clean. The administration should, I think, demand and receive guaranties that the Axis and terrorist elements will be eliminated; and these guaranties should be accompanied by sanctions under which summary military of police action may be taken, without protest, if evidence of terror of subversion recurs. The American young people must be given the chance to develop themselves and their programs without fear or false face. All acts of town government must be carried on in full view of the people and the administration. The "informers" must be given a hearing on the evidence, and apologies rendered to those unjustly persecuted and slandered.

I wanted to read that memorandum into the record for the purpose of providing a picture of what the situation was at Poston, written by a party or an administration official who is pro-Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who wrote the memorandum?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Dr. John Powell.

In connection with the settlement of the strike and after Uchida was released, was he removed from Poston to trial by the county authorities in Yuma?

Mr. JAMES. Not by the county authorities; no.



Mr. STEEDMAN. By what authorities was he removed?

Mr. JAMES. Somewhere late in December, when I was in San Francisco, he was summoned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Yuma to be tried or to be given a hearing on the old extortion note charge. That was the extortion note which was supposed to have been written to Lyle Kurisaki. The hearing in Yuma was never consummated. He was taken to Yuma, so I have been told, in custody of the project attorney, Mr. Haas, and a Japanese attorney by the name of Mr. Tom Masuda. They appeared in Yuma but the F. B. I. agent did not appear for the hearing and Uchida was subsequently brought back to Poston.

He has remained at Poston and to the best of my knowledge there has never been a trial of Mr. Isuma Uchida in Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say the F. B. I. agent did not appear for the trial?

Mr. JAMES. The F. B. I. agent did not appear for the trial and there was no trial—no hearing.

Mr. COSTELLO. Didn't anybody from the F. B. I. office appear at the proceeding?

Mr. JAMES. None appeared.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you hear of any explanation in regard to that?

Mr. JAMES. No. They went there and immediately came back.

I want to emphasize that point on the basis of the extortion note and not in the case of these beatings—implication in the beatings.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether there was any protest on the part of the Japanese in the camp to his being removed at that time to Yuma for trial?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. He went out freely without interference?

Mr. JAMES. I was not there and I am again retelling second-hand information.

On my return I checked that very closely and there was no disturbance whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the time he was released from the jail to the Japanese people, was there any trial held at that time for his assailing the other two victims?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever. There has never been a trial of him to my knowledge under the terms of the final settlement of the strike. There has never been a formal trial in Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was a part of the settlement terms that there should be a trial by the Japanese of Uchida?

Mr. JAMES. That is quite right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But no trial was actually held?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is Uchida now?

Mr. JAMES. He is a member of Poston No. 1 Fire Department.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any disciplinary action taken against any of the people who participated in the riot or strike at the Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. Not by the project itself. I have here a list of the Committee of Seventy-two and of this list Juro Omori—

Mr. COSTELLO. And his name is already in the record?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; who was returned from the Bismarck internment camp on August 10, 1942 was picked up by the Federal Bureau

of Investigation representatives from Phoenix; and he now reposes in the Santa Fe, N. Mex., concentration camp. He had been returned to us from Bismarck and he went back to Santa Fe.

On this list of the Committee of Seventy-two there are a number of former internees who were returned to us from Bismarck or from Santa Fe.

I am turning the list over to Mr. Steedman.

Mr. COSTELLO. The group that was released from internment camps were active as leaders of the Japanese at the Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; and occasionally you will see in the list of names nephews of men who were returned.

Mr. COSTELLO. Indicating their immediate relatives were also quite active in the Japanese leadership?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, will you accept for the record the personal data of the Committee of Seventy-two who were active during the recent disturbances at Poston?

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that a list which you prepared?

Mr. JAMES. This is a list which I prepared, yes. I would ask that the names be kept confidential since many of them are being investigated.

Mr. COSTELLO. The list will be made a part of the record and it will be noted here at the head of the list of names, it is confidential and is not to be released.

**(The list of names referred to was marked "James Exhibit No. 1." and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. EBERHARTER. Where did you get the data to compile this list?

Mr. JAMES. I got that list through my own organization down there. It is an accurate list.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It is a result of your own studies and own investigation?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And whatever information you could gather yourself and through your organization?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the majority of the membership of the Committee of Seventy-two composed of former internees?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Steedman, I haven't counted the list. I meant to do it this noon; but all of those who were internees are designated here. We can count them now. It wouldn't take more than a minute if you would like for me to, but they are all designated, those who were returned from internment camps.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it shown which ones are Kibeis and which are not?

Mr. JAMES. They are not identified as Kibeis.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact, in going over the list, I note the greater portion of the members of the Committee of Seventy-two are the elderly or Issei Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. I would make this statement: That the majority of men on that Committee of Seventy-two were either Issei or aliens or internees from the Bismarck camp or the Santa Fe, N. Mex., camp, or Kibeis.

There are very few Nisei on that de facto strike group.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In summing up the strike at Poston, would you say that the Japanese won the battle?

Mr. JAMES. I would put it this way, if you want an opinion, and you can take it for what it is worth: That since the camp opened up, beginning with the return of these internees, the various investigative agencies were conscious that there was a definite attempt being made to destroy the Americanism of the American-born Japanese.

It was being done by men who had slipped through the net of the F. B. I. It was done by groups who had veered away from Americanism and assumed an antiwhite attitude and that these various factors crystallized was a result of the Uchida incident.

Mr. COSTELLO. And I presume the internees who returned were also leaders in those two factions?

Mr. JAMES. They were.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel that there was a strong undercurrent or movement in the camp to try to alienate the Japanese residents from Americanism?

Mr. JAMES. That is right; yes. And I think as a result of the strike they were able to throw up and amalgamate their positions with these men who, at the very least, were with very questionable background as to their loyalty.

Mr. COSTELLO. By their success in obtaining their demands at the time of the strike they assumed their position of leadership and were able to maintain it in the center?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And as a further result they are able to impose their doctrine and thinking on the Japanese, either willing or through fear?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you say the Japanese won all their demands in connection with the strike?

Mr. JAMES. If Uchida was never tried I most certainly would say that they won a very definite victory there. That was the immediate cause of the strike and I think, secondly, they were able to greatly increase their part in the administration of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I was just coming to that. As a result of the strike, did this alien group who were partly formerly internees, finally emerge as leaders in the Japanese community?

Mr. JAMES. They did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And I am referring to this group of 72.

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did they set up a city-planning board?

Mr. JAMES. They did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you three mimeographed pages entitled, "City Planning Board Meeting," dated, "Thursday 11 o'clock a. m., November 26, 1942," and ask you if you have seen this before [handing document to the witness]?

Mr. JAMES. This is material which was prepared by the de facto government of Poston. It is the official transactions covering the period November 26 to November 28, and mimeographed by them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This outlines the community government that came into being immediately after the strike or riot?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; and continued for a period of approximately 2 months and it still continues to some extent today.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't wish to take up the time of the committee by reading this entire document into the record, but I would like to submit it in evidence for incorporation in the record. And at this point I would like to ask Mr. James some questions about this particular document.

Mr. COSTELLO. The document does set forth, you believe, accurate statements of fact?

Mr. JAMES. It is signed by their secretary.

Mr. COSTELLO. And do they put out similar documents from time to time with reference to their meetings, even up to the present time?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; I believe they do.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, the reporter is directed to copy this document into the record.

(The document referred to is in words and figures as follows:)

#### CITY PLANNING BOARD MEETING, THURSDAY 11 A. M., NOVEMBER 26, 1942

Each member of the city planning board presented his credentials, which was a signed affidavit by the residents of his respective block, giving him their assurance of full support and confidence in his representation.

The first meeting of the city planning board was called to order by Mr. Sugimoto (block 3), vice chairman in the absence of Mr. Omori, chairman of the emergency committee. Mr. Sugimoto, Mr. Takanashi, and \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> were nominated for chairman of this meeting. Mr. Sugimoto was elected.

Mr. Sugimoto opened the meeting by calling for an election for a chairman and vice chairman of an executive city planning board upon whose shoulders would fall the real work of planning a true self-government body in Poston, taking into consideration all elements which were instrumental in the spontaneous incident just ended.

\_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> was elected chairman.

Mr. Sugimoto was elected vice chairman.

Mr. Matsubara was appointed as Japanese secretary.

Mr. Amano was appointed English secretary.

It was decided to have 12 members, 6 Issei and 6 Nisei, on this central committee.

The meeting was divided into two groups, Issei and Nisei, to elect their respective members to the board.

At the Nisei meeting the following people were nominated: Dr. Ishimaru, James Yahiro, Hidemi Ogawa, Masaru Kawashima, Franklyn Sugiyama, Seiichi Nomura, Harvey Suzuki, George Fujii, Teruo Kasuga, Smoot Katow, Frank Tanaka. From these nominees, the following six were elected: Messrs. Kawashima, Ogawa, Ishimaru, Nomura, Yahiro, and Katow.

The Issei members elected were: Messrs. Matsumoto, Takahas, Mitani, Okamoto, Nakamura, and Niiseki.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, THURSDAY, 2 P. M., NOVEMBER 26, 1942

The various elements causing the incident and how to prevent future incidents were discussed in a round-table open forum. The meeting was adjourned with the plan to bring back various plans to be discussed the following morning.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, FRIDAY, 10 A. M., NOVEMBER 27, 1942

Discussions of various plans submitted by Messrs. Mitani, Matsumoto, Sugimoto, and Yahiro were held. The differences in plans were very slight, and Mr. Sugimoto's plan was with slight adjustments adopted. This plan calls for no change in the heretofore council set-up but provides for the creation of three new boards, namely, (1) a central executive board, (2) a court of honor, (3) a labor relations board.

The central executive committee was chosen from the executive council and will have final decisive powers pertaining to the internal order and welfare of this community. This board shall at all times work directly with the project director.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.



All members of this central executive committee must be qualified by the honor court and they may be recalled by a two-thirds majority vote of their respective councils. The members comprising this committee at present are Issei: \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> (3), Mr. Okamoto (30), Mr. Nakamura (17), Mr. Niiseki (60); Nisei: Mr. Sugimoto (3), Mr. Yahiro (37), Mr. Ogawa (38), Mr. Katow (12).

The duty of the Labor Relation Board will be to plan on the ability of all applicants for key positions. It will work hand in hand with the employment office.

The court of honor will have no connection with executive body council or other boards, but will be the people's honor court separate from any political or labor affiliations.

Further discussions brought about the decision to return to work all former employees to their former positions until replaced by permanent workers. All permanent workers must be qualified by the court of honor and the Labor Relation Board. All positions are open to any person upon application and all former employees must reapply for their previous work. Upon qualification by the above two boards, their position will be permanent.

The meeting was adjourned with the understanding that a general meeting of the civic planning board would be held to further discuss and then approve the plan presented by Mr. Sugimoto, at 10 a. m., Saturday, November 28, 1942.

#### CITY PLANNING BOARD MEETING, SATURDAY, 10 A. M., NOVEMBER 23, 1942

After roll call a report of the work of the executive council was given by Mr. Nagai. The following points were discussed:

1. The names of the central executive committee were read.
2. The council would exist and function as heretofore, however their actions must be passed on by the central executive committee, and the project director.
3. A detached discussion of the new plan was held to clarify all points in their relations to the three proposals submitted to the administration by the emergency committee. These three proposals are—

- (1) Establish a public relation committee to mediate with and settle all problems affecting personal reputations and damages not within the jurisdiction of the court.
- (2) The Poston residents to be given the right to nominate, select, or appoint all key evacuee administrative personnels and other important positions.
- (3) The present emergency committee shall establish within the framework of the War Relocation Authority a city planning board which shall recommend the creation of necessary administrative, legislative, consumer, and productive organizations to the project director, subject to approval of majority of the residents of Poston.

Mr. Sugimoto gave a brief report on the conference held with the project director the previous evening.

1. That the project director approved these proposals and would support them 100 percent.

2. The block managers will be elected by the residents of their respective blocks. The only requirements be that they be able to speak, read, and write English.

Mr. Head then gave a brief address stressing the following points:

1. Poston is a part of the State of Arizona and of the United States. Therefore the Federal Bureau of Investigation has jurisdiction here as elsewhere in the United States. Mr. Head did not call in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. This body will be held responsible for the peace and welfare of this committee. If there are undesirables here they will be transferred. Mr. Head does not believe there are any informers in here at present. He knows nothing of the people's past, but the administration here has no informers working for them, nor will they as long as he is project director. There should be no further beating, threats, or intimidations.

3. The harm done to the until-now-favorable reputation of this community, will take a year to regain.

4. That people be urged to report back to work immediately.

5. That there is a need for more unity in this camp between the people and the administration. They should be as one, not two separate bodies.

Mr. Nagain responded stressing the importance of full confidence and trust in each other.

<sup>3</sup> Names stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

## CITY PLANNING BOARD MEETING, Saturday, 2 P. M., November 28, 1942


After much discussion and alteration the committee approved the three new boards. The corrections added, the boards duties and personnels are:

1. The central executive committee was approved and passed untouched. The central executive committee was elected by the executive council of the city planning board. It is composed of 8 members: 4 Issei—<sup>3</sup> (2), Mr. Okamoto (30), Mr. Nakamura (17), Mr. Niiseki (60); and 4 Nisei—Mr. Sugimoto (3), Mr. Yahiro (37), Mr. Ogawa (38), and Mr. Katow (12). This board shall at all times work directly with the project director and shall have final decisive powers in all matters pertaining to the internal order and welfare of this community.

2. The Labor Relation Board was set up with 8 members: 4 Issei—Mr. Kadowaki (27), <sup>3</sup> Mr. Matsomoto (35), and Mr. Nakachi (19); and 4 Nisei—Mr. Ono (60), Mr. Yana (5), Mr. Fukuvama (2), and Mr. Nakai (27). The duty of this board shall be to pass on the ability of all applicants for important positions. It will work hand in hand with the employment office.

The forming of the court of honor was left to nine members, one from each quad. Those members and the quad represented being as follows: Dr. Ishinaru, quad 1; Mr. Tazawa, quad 2; <sup>3</sup> quad 3; Mr. Ishikawa, quad 4; Mr. Nakamura, quad 5; Mr. Takahas, quad 6; Mr. Hahiro, quad 7; Mr. Kawabe, quad 8; Mr. Masukane, quad 9; the works of this committee will be recorded under the reports of the personal relation board selecting committee.

## ORGANIZATION CHART



Submitted by  
HIROSHI AMANO

Hiroshi Amano—Eng. Sec.  
City Planning Board.

ANDREW SUGIMOTO

Andrew Sugimoto  
Vice-Chairman  
City Planning Board.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I notice on the planning board that emerged after the strike, <sup>3</sup> was elected chairman. Is this the same Japanese named <sup>3</sup> who addressed the strikers and offered each Japanese who would remain loyal ten thousand yen?

Mr. JAMES. Loyal to Japan, ten thousand yen; yes, sir, it is. And his name is off the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the leaders of the strike emerged as the leaders of the inside government at Poston after the strike?

Mr. JAMES. At Poston No. 1. For the sake of the record I should like to point out that the people of Poston No. 2, who came from California—Salinas Valley and Monterey County, refused to join

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

the people of Poston No. 1 in this walk-out, even though pressures were brought to bear by certain individuals in their camp. They attempted to carry terrorism into Poston No. 2 but they withstood the pressure and stayed with us, and so did the people at Poston No. 3.

Mr. COSTELLO. The strike and trouble was all confined to Poston No. 1?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say the people from Salinas Valley and Monterey were located in camp No. 2?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; and stayed with us and gave us loyal support.

Mr. COSTELLO. From what area did the people in camp No. 3 come from?

Mr. JAMES. From San Diego and a number from the San Joaquin Valley.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those in Poston No. 1 came from what area?

Mr. JAMES. Orange County, Imperial Valley, Boyle Heights, Los Angeles; San Bernardino County, and a few from the southern San Joaquin Valley and a few from Arizona.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what was the population of Poston No. 1?

Mr. JAMES. Approximately 10,000 at the time of the strike. We had over 19,000 in the entire camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what was the population of camp No. 2 and camp No. 3?

Mr. JAMES. Well, the division would be something like this: Approximately 10,000 at Poston No. 1, about 4,000 at Poston No. 2, and pretty close to 5,000 at Poston No. 3. It added up to in excess of 19,000 at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. Were there about 10,000 people involved in the strike?

Mr. JAMES. Between 9,000 and 10,000 involved.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there very many people in Poston No. 1 who remained in their homes and did not participate in the strike?

Mr. JAMES. There were a number. The people from Yuma, Ariz., and from practically all of Arizona, practically all the Arizona group that we had in there, several hundred of them, maintained perfect order and while they were threatened they were cooperating with us.

Mr. COSTELLO. To a great extent did the leaders of the strike go into their homes and force them to participate in the strike?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. The coercion usually took place in the mess halls. They would lock them in the mess halls and give them the line of action and keep them there for a sufficient period of time to condition them as to what duties they were to perform.

Mr. COSTELLO. At mealtime they were given harangues and pep talks about the strike?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; the indoctrination occurred there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the addresses usually given in Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Usually in Japanese; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there any white persons at the mess halls during the lunch hour, usually?

Mr. JAMES. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. So the nature of the talks would not be known except as hearsay?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Unless somebody reported it?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. You started to read a poem at one time and you stopped. I wondered why you started to read it and then stopped. Did it have some special significance?

Mr. EBERHARTER. May we go off the record?

Mr. COSTELLO. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. On the record.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask one other question? Where is this very wealthy Japanese merchant now?

Mr. JAMES. He is still in Poston.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any questions?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., the hearing adjourned until 10 a. m., Saturday, June 12, 1943.)



# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

SATURDAY, JUNE 12, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., in room 1543, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Los Angeles, Calif. Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, and Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Steedman, you may proceed with the interrogation of the witness.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, when we recessed yesterday we were discussing the Poston relocation center with Mr. Norris James.

I want to recall Mr. James for further testimony in connection with the Poston relocation center.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

## TESTIMONY OF NORRIS W. JAMES—Recalled

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. James, I hand you a memorandum marked "Confidential," and entitled, "Problems of Internal Security at the Colorado River War Relocation Project," and ask you if you have seen this memorandum before? [Handing document to the witness.]

Mr. JAMES. I have, Mr. Steedman. As I recall it was in the latter part of September 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And have you read this memorandum?

Mr. JAMES. If it is the same one I think it is, yes; I have seen it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the facts contained herein true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Mr. JAMES. To the best of my knowledge and belief; yes.

I would like to examine them a little bit further.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I intended to question you on the various statements made in the memorandum as we go along.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence this memorandum which I have been discussing with Mr. James.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to quote from the memorandum:

Foreword. The Colorado River war relocation project at Poston, Ariz., now has a Japanese evacuee population of approximately 18,000 persons.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you fix the date of this memorandum?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I would say offhand about September 20, 1942, was the time I saw it last.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And was that the first time you had seen it?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. I would say it was prepared somewhere around that time. \* \* \*

Mr. STEEDMAN. I quote again from the memorandum:

Poston is located approximately 19 miles south and slightly west of Parker, Ariz. The three center units (Poston I, 10,000; and Poston II and III, each 5,000) are all within 4 miles of the Colorado River. Three miles of mosquito-covered desert separate each of the three units.

To the immediate east, 5 to 10 miles from Poston and rising sharply above the Parker Valley plain (elevation 480 feet), is La Quadra Desert, a waterless, deeply eroded arid tract of approximately 800 square miles.

Between June 15 and September 1, 1942, daily temperatures at Poston varied between 120° and 130° in mid-July, the United States Army engineers recorded one thermometer reading of 145° in the direct sun.

In materials and labor, the Poston project cost in excess of \$10,000,000. Per barrack or apartment unit, the United States engineers estimate the cost at \$3,500.

Disaster, with attendant loss of life and/or property, can occur at Poston in three forms: (1) Fire, (2) flood, (3) internal rioting, involving either groups of Japanese evacuees, or Japanese evacuees and members of the Caucasian administration, or Japanese evacuees and Mojave Indians on the adjacent Colorado River Indian Reservation.

In examining the problem of internal security at Poston, the possibility of external sabotage must not be overlooked in spite of every surface indication that Poston is isolated by stretches of arid desert.

External sabotage at Boulder or Parker Dams, along the Los Angeles Metropolitan Water District Aqueduct, on the Santa Fe transcontinental railroad from Barstow to Needles, on the Santa Fe Line, via Cadiz and Parker, to Phoenix, and on the Southern Pacific Sunset Route from Los Angeles to Yuma, Ariz., might conceivably be financed and even directed by subversive elements of wealth and power who may, or may not, be residing in Poston as evacuees.

Again, remote as it may seem, there are possibilities of direct and indirect contact between any subversive elements residing as evacuees in Poston and Japanese Navy or military personnel in Baja California, or the area adjacent to the delta of the Colorado River within the boundaries of the Republic of Mexico.

Is the paragraph I have just finished reading substantially correct, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. Of course it is all based on hypotheses, Mr. Steedman. It would be possible; yes.

There are people of great wealth residing in Poston without any mail censorship to my knowledge. It would be possible for those people to act as pay-offs, I imagine, for external saboteurs, either white or other racial extractions.

That, again, is purely hypothetical. Those conditions do exist though.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. James, do you have any knowledge regarding the Japanese south of the California border? Have they been evacuated from Lower California?

Mr. JAMES. They were evacuated by the Republic of Mexico, Congressman Costello, at approximately the same time that we evacuated our Japanese from the American Pacific coast.

Prior to our evacuation, for the purpose of the record, I should like to point out that in Canada the Japanese were moved out of British Columbia and settled in small camps in distances from 1,000 to 1,500 miles from the coast.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the present time in Mexico there are no Japanese along the coastal region?

Mr. JAMES. Neither in Lower California nor on either side of the Gulf of California; that is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any information on a movement in Canada to resettle the Japanese who were removed from British Columbia?

Mr. JAMES. None whatever. To my knowledge they were all in the small camps that have been selected in the Canadian Rockies.

Mr. STEEDMAN (continuing to quote from the memorandum):

#### INTERNAL SECURITY AT POSTON

1. There are now at Poston 3 separate police forces composed entirely of Nisei evacuees. None of the personnel, now numbering between 60 and 80, has ever been checked as to loyalties, family background, or identification with Japanese "loyalty" societies. Since Poston first began receiving evacuees in May, there has never been any trained Caucasian supervision of police personnel, and to this date (September 15, 1942) there has been no appointment for the position of internal security officer.

When was the internal security officer appointed at Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. I believe Mr. Ernest Miller was appointed effective October 1, Mr. Steedman. That would seem to the best of my knowledge, to be substantially correct.

And there was no Caucasian or white internal security officer supervising the three police departments of Poston during the period from approximately May to October 1, nor was there a check made as to the background of the personnel of the police department. As I pointed out yesterday, at Poston we had limited resources in the way of material in checking on the background of these people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who selected the original policemen?

Mr. JAMES. I believe that at that time the position of internal security officer was under community services. In other words, under Miss Nell Findley.

The appointment, however, I am sure would have to be made by the project director, Mr. Head. And here again I am passing on material that I need to refresh my memory on; but to the best of my recollection, Mr. Steedman, that was the set-up. The appointment would be made by Mr. Head through Miss Findley's office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But in the final analysis Miss Findley would actually select the policemen, isn't that correct?

Mr. JAMES. She would have something to say about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Mr. Head would have to act on her recommendation in selecting the Japanese policemen?

Mr. JAMES. You mean the white or Japanese police?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Japanese policemen inside of the center?

Mr. JAMES. That I don't know. I imagine she had something to say about the police department.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I continue to quote:

For the past 4½ months, the Poston police department has operated as a division of community services.

At that time, September 15, 1942, Miss Nell Findley was the head of community services, was she not?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And as head of the community services she was chief of police at Poston too, was she not?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I suppose so. I suppose hypothetically, yes, sure she was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have here the ridiculous situation of Miss Nell Findley, who has the background of a social worker, working as chief of police of this large city of 19,000 evacuated Japanese.

Mr. JAMES. Let me put it this way: She had a great deal of say about the operation of the police force and the procedure for apprehending the people who committed misdemeanors or anything of that sort, subject, probably, to Mr. Head's final decision.

Mr. COSTELLO. The possibility is, however, that there was very little supervision of the police force by any white personnel?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, Mr. Costello.

Mr. COSTELLO. And as a consequence the Japanese themselves were operating the police force?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. It was technically under Miss Findley's direction without any supervision on her part.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I continue to quote:

The post fire department was first organized by William Hoffman, regional fire marshal. It is now operating as three separate units, each responsible to the unit administrator. (For further details of the operation of the Poston Fire Department, see Mr. Hoffman.)

3. Communication remains one of the most serious internal-security problems at Poston. Since early May, United States Signal Corps units have been constructing a new telephonic circuit along the abandoned Colorado River Road south of Poston III, thence to Ehrenberg, Ariz., by way of the ghost town of La Paz, thence across the river to Blythe, Calif., and a transcontinental truck system. Due to duststorms this telephonic system between Parker and Blythe is frequently out of commission. Early in June there were several instances, reported by the United States Army engineers (see San Diego area headquarters) in which this line was frequently disrupted due to sabotage.

Do you know what the nature of the sabotage was in connection with the disrupting of this telephone service between Parker and Blythe?

Mr. JAMES. I know of several instances where there was actual sabotage, Mr. Steedman. I happened to have seen several instances where the wires were down.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you investigate those instances yourself?

Mr. JAMES. I investigated one with Mr. Ellis Georgia, who was the area engineer for the United States engineers at Poston, Ariz.

In this particular instance a circuit breaker had been placed across the wires—a circuit breaker about this long [indicating], a heavy piece of wire that had been curved on both ends and it had broken the telephone circuit.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did that happen?

Mr. JAMES. That happened in the month of October—no, the month of September on or about September 15. It occurred about 100 yards north of the old military police barracks at Poston II. Line between Poston II and Poston I, as I recall, went out along about 3 o'clock in the afternoon and we were able to put through no telephone calls between Poston I and Poston II. There were Japanese residing in the camp then.

I do want to point out that in the period from early in May through June there was reported breaks in the telephone circuit between camp III and Ehrenberg, Ariz., and Blythe, Calif., due to the work of Indians, probably.



I remember Mr. Georgia reciting that to me. In that case the wires were torn off the telephone poles. The Indians did not like the Japanese particularly. They felt some resentment at these people occupying their happy hunting grounds.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does any feeling exist between the Indians and the Japanese there now?

Mr. JAMES. There is feeling on both sides. The Indians don't like the Japanese and the Japanese don't want to be regarded as wards of the Government as the Indians have been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has there been any trouble between the Indians and the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. On July 4, we had a baseball game between—a softball game between an all-star Poston team and the Parker Indian Reservation team. The score was Poston 29 and Parker Indians zero, and the Parker Indians didn't like that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Even Brooklyn doesn't like that.

Mr. JAMES. On May 28——

Mr. STEEDMAN. What year?

Mr. JAMES. 1942, with the cooperation of the Columbia Broadcasting System of Los Angeles, a transcontinental radio broadcast was put on at Poston.

I helped Chet Huntley, special events director for C. B. S., Los Angeles, in the preparation of this program, which was part of the O. E. M. program Report to the Nation.

Because of the frequent break-downs of the telephone system, the Signal Corps officer at Poston had every piece of mechanized equipment that he had patrolling the line between Poston III and Ehrenberg, so the wires would not go down during the course of the broadcast.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Directing your attention to the instance you investigated where the breaker was across the telephone wire between Poston I and Poston II, was anybody ever apprehended for this particular act of sabotage?

Mr. JAMES. No. It is very difficult to apprehend anyone because of the distances we would have to patrol.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Georgia say that was an act of sabotage?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely. I believe that that actual circuit breaker is in the possession now of the United States district engineer's office in Los Angeles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese evacuees have access to the particular spot where that act occurred?

Mr. JAMES. Oh, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they passing back and forth daily?

Mr. JAMES. They were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That location?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I continue to quote from the memorandum:

4. The possibilities of disaster by flood should not be overlooked at Poston. Flood control along this section of the Colorado River which flanks Parker Valley is largely based upon controls established at Lake Huavasu (Parker Dam) and Lake Mead (Boulder Dam). Each autumn, in the months of October, November, and December, sufficient run-off is permitted at Huavasu and Mead to allow for the annual spring run-off and flood from watersheds and river and stream tributaries to the Colorado. In the event, however, of early autumn rains or early snowfall, followed by rains, flooding of certain areas of Parker Valley can be expected to a greater or lesser extent. Such a flood, attributed to the foregoing

reasons, occurred in 1939, according to Mr. Robert Rupkey, Chief of the United States Indian Service Engineers, with headquarters at Parker, Ariz. This flood, to a depth of between a foot and two feet, actually spread over an area now occupied by Poston I. A second source of possible flood at Poston is the La Quadra mesa to the immediate east of the Colorado River relocation project. Here are located two large washes—Brouse wash and Tyson wash. When storms of cloud-burst proportion occur on this mesa land, one or both of these washes can be expected to reach river proportions with flood depths of from 1 to 4 feet and a flood breadth of from 400 to 800 feet. Floodwater from the Brouse wash can be expected to hit either Poston I or Poston II. A similar flood condition occurring in Tyson wash, could conceivably inundate portions of Poston III.

#### EVACUEES AND INTERNAL SECURITY AT POSTON

Herewith are a number of case histories, tabbed with sources of additional information from reliable persons, which may, or may not, substantiate the following personal observations:

1. That Japanese evacuees at Poston, both Issei and Nisei alike, are arming themselves with implements of force.

2. That there is increasing antagonism on the part of both Issei and Nisei toward the "hakujin" or Caucasian, and that at in at least one instance there has been actual use of force toward said Caucasians on the part of evacuees.

3. That there are ever-increasing sources of conflict between the Caucasian administration due to—

(a) Lack of a realistic policy on the part of both the War Relocation Authority and the United States Indian Affairs Bureau in refusing to recommend the segregation of disloyal Japanese, labor agitators, or radicals from loyal groups.

(b) Loss of "face" by many administrators, their assistants, and subordinates in dealing with Japanese evacuees because of ineffectual policies and work programs but particularly because of their inability to make loyal Nisei feel that they are contributing to the war effort.

(c) A growing consciousness on the part of many evacuees that they are often being used as human guinea pigs by doctrinaires, anthropologists, and social-service workers attached to the project staff.

4. That, by throwing together a heterogeneous group of both loyal and disloyal Japanese, the trend in Poston is now definitely toward a major portion of the Nisei population shedding any outward loyalties to the Government of the United States. And further, because the Nisei population has almost completely depleted its slim financial resources, it must more and more come to depend upon an internal economy controlled by the Issei, hence it may be anticipated that Nisei attitudes and acts will be increasingly shaped by Issei forces. Finally, with mass claustrophobia—the sense of being shut in on all four sides by a desert wilderness—prompting strange mental quirks, especially among the younger elements of the Poston project, one can anticipate some measure of suicides, attempts to escape by land or river and, finally, if strong subversive forces are residing at the project, actual sabotage, internal or external.

Is the information contained in the portion of this document which I have just read, entitled, "Evacuees and Internal Security at Poston," true and correct to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. I would say that that is a good summary of the way things stood in September.

Mr. STEEDMAN. September of 1942?

Mr. JAMES. September of 1942. We had just come out of a very hot summer and the problem of segregation had not been dealt with at all, Mr. Steedman. I think that was the thing that was perhaps most detrimental to the operation of this tremendous project.

I think here you had a project which was staffed with capable men—those entrusted with the major task of administration, but I think there were not enough first things that had come first, and segregation is certainly one of them.

The danger signals were there but they were not heeded. I would concur with most of the things that are mentioned in that paragraph.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact had not the so-called bad Japanese left Los Angeles first and arrived at Poston and thereby gained control of some of the major functions inside of the Japanese community?

Mr. JAMES. That is partially true. In the first groups that came—and in looking back now it seems strange that at Poston and at several of the other centers that I am acquainted with—in voluntary groups, there were always a few who later popped up as trouble-makers. That is, my frank opinion would be that they were planted there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you mean they decided to leave Los Angeles before the F. B. I. picked them up?

Mr. JAMES. That is probably true, in the belief that they were going to be resettled there permanently or relocated in the centers permanently; and probably the investigating agencies and law-enforcing agencies thought they would be perfectly safe.

Of course, when the resettlement program was announced on approximately the middle of November by Mr. Dillon Myer, then the security of confinement within the relocation centers disappeared.

I merely stress that point because I think that was the original belief on the part of the investigative agencies, that they would be secure, these people of questionable character would be secure in the relocation centers pending a screening test to find out just who they wanted to be sent to Bismarck or Santa Fe, N. Mex.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the need for segregation known to the heads of the projects and to the head of the project at Poston, and I am referring to such men as Mr. Head and Mr. Empie?

Mr. JAMES. I believe it was. I know Mr. Head personally, back, way back in the middle of the summer, in August, recommended segregation.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he make that recommendation to Washington?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words the authorities in Washington were aware of the conditions pretty well as to how they stood at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. That is true. I remember in August—I can't mention the date because I haven't the notes here, we received from Santa Anita assembly center the greater portion of the Tokyo gambling club from Los Angeles, including the bouncer and some of the most conspicuous characters in the operation of the games.

There were some twenty of them that came in. They had been involved in trouble at Santa Anita and for some reason they were sent to Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the names of those comprising the Tokyo gambling club group?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; I do. I remember the name of the bouncer. His first name was Kinji Ikeda.

Kinji Ikeda, for the sake of the record, is the former middleweight judo wrestling champion of the Pacific coast. He is a man of about 43 years of age now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Kinji Ikeda at the Poston center now?

Mr. JAMES. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Steedman, he is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it your information that the Black Dragon Society operated the Tokyo gambling club in Los Angeles?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know about that, Mr. Steedman. I can talk about northern California but not about Los Angeles. I would



rather be inclined to doubt it, though. Unquestionably, members of the Black Dragon Society frequented the Tokyo club. The Tokyo gambling club was a well-established gambling outfit here in Los Angeles.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. James, do you think there was anyone in the camp administrative personnel, and I am referring to the white personnel, who was competent or had the means and facilities to distinguish who might be termed "troublemakers" and those who might be termed "good Japanese?" In other words could a separation have been practicably accomplished?

Mr. JAMES. Not without the help of all the existing qualified agencies.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You mean the investigative agencies of the Government?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And including city authorities?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. To detect loyalty requires, in my estimation, a very minute check on the performance records of these individuals during the years they lived in California or in other sections of the west coast, plus other factors. It isn't a simple task.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is what occurred to me; it would not be an easy thing to accomplish.

Mr. JAMES. It isn't. It isn't an easy thing. I want to be perfectly fair to all officials at W. R. A. and the Indian Service. I think that segregation is extremely difficult to carry out. I think it requires the best efforts of all the law-enforcing agencies, local, State, and certainly Federal, including the Army and the Navy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And there was nobody in the administrative white personnel at Poston really qualified or competent to carry out the segregation, was there?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But you say Mr. Head recommended it?

Mr. JAMES. Mr. Head saw it coming and I am sure recommended it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did he recommend a method by which it could be accomplished?

Mr. JAMES. No.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Or any steps or procedure for its accomplishment?

Mr. JAMES. I don't think he did.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just generally recommended it?

Mr. JAMES. Generally recommended it. I know that he deeply resented two things: The coming of the parolees from Bismarck and New Mexico, and the dumping into Poston of these subversive elements from Santa Anita and criminal elements from Los Angeles.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Those could have been, and in your opinion should have been, segregated immediately?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And they could have been segregated?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Without any difficulty?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And with complete justification?

Mr. JAMES. With complete justification; yes. They had already been involved in an incident at Santa Anita.



Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. If that had been done it would have been a comparatively simple matter to pick up other troublemakers in the camp from time to time and segregate them likewise?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. It could have been done very humanely. Those men and their families could have been picked up and deposited in some other center especially created for the handling of troublemakers.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you, with your knowledge of Japanese psychology, think that would have had a good effect on the rest of the Japanese in the relocation centers?

Mr. JAMES. It would have bolstered up the Americanism of the young, immature Nisei. They looked to us to do it.

I think the average Nisei when they first came into the camp, represented a very fine type of youth. They were very much like our own American-born youngsters. I am talking now in terms of a year ago—May and June a year ago.

They were interested in the things that other American kids are interested in—sports and various American activities. They were not strong enough, however, to stand up against their elders and against the small fractional group which had been indoctrinated and given, probably given instructions from representatives of Imperial Japan as to just what to do.

As this program developed I feel convinced in my own mind now, that right from the start there was a small group who were determined to destroy the usefulness to the United States of these American-born Japanese. I think that they have been successful. I think that the record shows that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So you think actually there is now less loyalty on the part of a great number of these Japanese, less loyalty to the United States than there was before they came to the camp?

Mr. JAMES. I think that they are definitely confused and that they have now developed very definitely an antiwhite feeling, an anti-Hakujin feeling, and have become psychopathic cases, if you please, where it is extremely improbable whether they can be resettled any place until they have been reconditioned in the relocation centers.

Until segregation can be worked out and the vacuum that exists in most of these centers eliminated, the vacuum being the absence of a wartime spirit—of a feeling that they are playing a part in America at war, I question very much whether we can salvage these potentially fine American-born boys and girls.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without segregation, we definitely will not salvage any of them?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the physical set-up in these camps such that segregation can successfully take place within the boundaries of a single camp?

Mr. JAMES. I wouldn't want to express an opinion on that, Congressman Mundt. I think there are Army officials and certainly F. B. I. officials, who could give you an expert opinion on that. I wouldn't feel qualified, but in my own opinion, no; it can't be done.

Mr. COSTELLO. It wouldn't be practicable, for example, at Poston, to put all the segregated Japanese into camp three, for example?

Mr. JAMES. I doubt it.

Mr. COSTELLO. There would still be too much communication between camps one, two, and three?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. If that is correct, that it cannot be done, then segregation cannot take place until the W. R. A. policy at the top, in Washington, is changed?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Knowing that the project directors themselves can do nothing about segregating them?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. And it now must be worked out on a mass scale where if it had been worked, starting a year ago last May, it would have been confined to a few hundred. Now, your estimate is as good as mine.

Mr. MUNDT. While it is undoubtedly true, we are not able to attain anything like perfection in this segregation business, and you would have to call in all the agencies of the Government and have an enormous amount of investigators, is it not equally true that if the policy of segregation was approved and authorized by Washington, that each project director—Mr. Head at Poston and the other people in the other localities, the next day would be able to recommend small groups from their camps who should be segregated?

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. So that progress could begin at once?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Without any increase in cost or administrative personnel in the business of segregation if somebody at Washington would order that policy?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. I believe this too, that evacuation from the west coast was an essential wartime movement. Those of us who were born and raised out here feel in our hearts that was absolutely a necessity. That there were unquestionably hardships rendered in the mass evacuation, but nevertheless it was splendidly carried out by the Army and its civilian agency, W. C. C. A. Similarly in the tremendous problem of segregation hardships and injustices may occur, but I feel that in the case of segregation not only will we have the support of approximately 130,000,000 white Americans on the outside, but we will also have the extremely appreciative support of those girls and boys and the few aliens who appreciate what America means.

We will have their support and gratitude because they want these malefactors, these subversive people moved out too.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words you believe that a majority of the Japanese themselves would be better pleased if the roughneck element were segregated away from these camps?

Mr. JAMES. I certainly know that the women would. The women want to be Americans. I pointed out yesterday that I am firmly convinced some of those women would rather die than go back to the bondage their mothers were in.

Mr. MUNDT. That should also be true of some of these men who have tried to remain loyal during the strike?

Mr. JAMES. That is true. It is true of such cases as the old alien I pointed out to you, who raised and lowered the flag every day I was there—Mr. Tashima.

Mr. MUNDT. And to correct or start the process of correcting this perfectly indefensible position now existing in some of the camps, all

that is needed is for somebody in Washington to push a pen in the proper direction at the proper time?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, in my estimation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Directing your attention again to Kenji Ikeda, have you inspected Ikeda's work record since he was at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. I did, but I haven't the papers with me. He was identified with the strike. He was a picket during the Poston disturbances—a block picket representing a block. I haven't his record here, Mr. Steedman, so I cannot tell you what he was doing at Poston.

In other words, I don't know whether he was a goh player or not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether he was plying his trade as a gambler at the Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does organized gambling exist in the Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. In a city of 18,000, I imagine there is. These people are like many other people of Asiatic origin—they like to gamble.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is gambling organized there?

Mr. JAMES. I couldn't say; I am not familiar with that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Ikeda was very prominent in the judo club, I believe you stated?

Mr. JAMES. Previously, yes. He was a retired middleweight judo champion on the coast and he later used his talents to become a bouncer for the Tokyo club.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continuing to read from the memorandum the paragraph headed:

#### CASE HISTORIES AFFECTING INTERNAL SECURITY AT POSTON—ARMS AND THE EVACUEES

The Office of the United States Army Engineers at the Poston project confidentially reports that whenever such material as pipe, or reinforcing steel has been used on the project for construction, hundreds of left-over pieces have been appropriated by the Japanese.

Mr. JAMES. That should not be the "Army Engineers." It should be "U. S. E. D." For the sake of the record, I know Mr. Georgia's connection and Mr. Ferguson's connection. It isn't the Army; it is the U. S. E. D.

Mr. COSTELLO. This designation of the branch of the service that Mr. Georgia and Mr. Ferguson are in is incorrect?

Mr. JAMES. It is incorrect. It should be U. S. E. D.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did this matter of the Japanese appropriating left-over piece of pipe come to your attention while you were at the center?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; there were hundreds of pieces of small pipe that were left over from the construction of the sewage-disposal plant and other works where reinforcing steel was needed and where plumbing was used.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And were the pieces of pipe that were stolen the same type of pipe that was used to beat up Kay Nishimura?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the Japanese armed with pipe during the so-called strike or riot?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I never saw any, but I imagine in a state of affairs such as existed there, unquestionably certain elements did carry



pieces of pipe. It would be natural that they would want to defend themselves.

MR. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am quoting again from the memorandum:

On or about August 15, 1942, at approximately 6 p. m., the following incident occurred at Poston Camp III, involving a Mr. Steele, subforeman for Del E. Webb Construction Co. Mr. Steele and a helper had just completed work at the Poston III sewage-disposal plant, located in an area of that camp as yet unoccupied by evacuees.

The policies laid down by Mr. Wade Head, the project director, and the administrator of Poston, Mr. Moris Burge, traffic laws are enforced by Japanese policemen who have control over both Caucasian and Japanese traffic.

Mr. Steele and his helper left the sewage-disposal plant in a pick-up truck and were progressing through Poston III at a speed of approximately 35 miles an hour (violating the 10-mile-an-hour limit posted on signs throughout this camp) when they were stopped by an evacuee policeman who attempted to arrest Mr. Steele. Bitter words followed, and Mr. Steele struck the policeman on the arm with a tool carried in the car. The policeman then called for help and within 2 minutes the car was surrounded by a group of angry Japanese. The size of this crowd was estimated to be between 20 and 50 men. They were armed with clubs, pieces of pipe, and pieces of reinforcing steel.

The windshield on the car was broken, and one fender damaged. Mr. Steele was taken to the Poston III police station, but in the meantime the helper escaped.

The evacuees rushed to a telephone and telephoned to the Signal Corps unit located in Poston II. In a very short space of time the Signal Corps unit arrived and took over the police station at the point of drawn automatic rifles. The project director and his assistants arrived on the scene and the dispute was temporarily settled.

MR. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the incident that I have just read?

MR. JAMES. I do. I think there is a mistake there. I think it was the helper who was with Mr. Steele that called the Signal Corps unit and not the evacuees.

As a matter of fact, I am quite sure it was not the evacuees who called the Signal Corps unit for help. It was the helper, but that is substantially correct, to the best of my knowledge.

MR. STEEDMAN. Did the Signal Corps unit have to rescue Mr. Steele from the Japanese policemen?

MR. JAMES. What happened was, as I recall it, the helper forgot to call the military police; he called the Signal Corps instead. Actually there was a mix-up on that case. The military police, as I understand it, under the terms of the agreement set down by the War Department and the War Relocation Authority cannot enter the camp except on the request of the project director.

In this case, however, Mr. Steele's helper called the lieutenant in charge of the Signal Corps for help and he rushed in to move Mr. Steele out of the jail.

There was a question there as to whether the Japanese police at Poston had the right to arrest a white man for a violation of a speeding law which had been set up, presumably by the Japanese themselves. I recall that there was a good deal of tension in the No. III unit at Poston—that is Poston No. III, as a result of this incident.

It is quite true these men who surrounded the car were armed with short pieces of pipe and clubs and that they did do damage as stated in that report.

MR. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese attack Mr. Steele after they arrested him?

MR. JAMES. I believe that in the office of the Del E. Webb Construction Co. at Phoenix, Ariz., there is an affidavit in connection with



that incident and to the best of my recollection in that affidavit Mr. Steele was not molested when he was in the Poston III police station.

The molestation occurred when the policeman laid a hand on Mr. Steele and attempted to take him from the car and when the mob came—not a mob, but when this crowd of 20 or 30 men rushed to the assistance of the policemen, they, too, attempted to hustle Mr. Steele out of the car by laying hands on him. That is all in the affidavit, I believe, that is on file in the office of the Del Webb Construction Co. in Phoenix. I recall seeing that affidavit and it was signed by Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And reading further from the memorandum:

#### ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF INFORMATION

In the possession of the Del E. Webb Construction Co., Mr. Charles Newell, superintendent, there is an affidavit from Mr. Steele setting forth further particulars.

Although evacuee baggage has been subject to search by the provost marshal guards upon the arrival of Japanese groups at Poston, no check for contraband items has ever been made on hundreds of parcel post packages and express bundles which arrive on the project each day.

In connection with the statement I have just read, has a search of baggage been instituted since the writing of this memorandum?

Mr. JAMES. There has. Lieutenant General DeWitt issued a special order, I believe, in November of 1942, and, to my knowledge, the military police search or examine all parcel-post packages which arrive at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is the military police and not the Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Not the Japanese. The military police do that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Speaking of the Japanese police, do they have authority to arrest any of the white personnel who might violate any traffic regulations or would disturb the peace, or so on?

Mr. JAMES. It is a little confused, Mr. Costello, as to just what the set-up on that is.

When this Steele incident occurred, for a short period of time, for about a month, they presumably had the right to arrest white people for speeding. I don't know whether the code of laws in Poston has ever been recognized by the W. R. A. and the Indian Service.

I know the temporary code was drawn up and forwarded to Washington, but I am not sure whether that has been okayed.

Mr. COSTELLO. With reference to the Steele incident and in order that the record may be perfectly clear, did I understand you to say the Japanese police officers placed their hands on Mr. Steele at the time the officer stopped him to arrest him for speeding?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, whereupon Mr. Steele reached in his glove compartment and pulled out a small wrench and hit the policeman on the arm.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I continue to quote from the memorandum:

Evacuees visiting in Parker, Ariz., have occasionally purchased knives in local stores. The manager of a five-and-dime store reported in August that an evacuee laborer had purchased several large knives "at the request of his mess hall chef."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the situation which is referred to in the paragraph I just read?

Mr. JAMES. Not of the actual purchase of knives, although it is probably true, Mr. Steedman. Our people used to go in there and

they were able to buy in Parker anything that the merchants would sell them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were there no restrictions as to what they could purchase in the stores at Parker?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, up until the time they were no longer permitted to do so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the purchases of the Japanese inspected when they returned to Poston from Parker?

Mr. JAMES. Presumably checked by the military police at the station there—the guard station.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it a part of the duties of the military police to check all incoming parcels?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct, they were supposed to check all incoming parcels but, on the other hand, it would be quite possible if a Japanese had purchased a knife, to conceal it on his person.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was a list of contraband established?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. Lieutenant General DeWitt set up the contraband items that were contraband in the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were knives and other weapons on that list?

Mr. JAMES. I am a little hazy on that, whether knives of a certain length were contraband or not. To my knowledge knives were not contraband but firearms were, though.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there a different list of contraband before General DeWitt issued his order, or no list at all?

Mr. JAMES. No. There was a list as to what constituted contraband within the Western Defense Command.

Mr. MUNDT. But no provisions were made for checking the incoming packages?

Mr. JAMES. No. That was a loophole so that it would be quite possible for anyone to have shipped in certain items of contraband through the mail by parcel post during the period that—the interval before General DeWitt issued his order that parcels should be inspected.

Mr. MUNDT. And that was a rather substantial loophole, was it not?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; I imagine it was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am quoting again from the memorandum:

During periods of tension and conflict between evacuees and administration, foodstuffs in sizable quantity have been taken from mess-hall storerooms for hiding on the project.

Is that statement correct?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. It was during the period from May through November.

I would like to point out for the sake of the record, that since January 1, Poston has been under a rationing system—even before the country at large went on a rationing system when a very capable steward, C. E. Snelson came in and did, in my estimation, a very good job in cleaning up a bad situation.

There have been, to my knowledge, no surplus foods nor have there been opportunities for Japanese to cache food.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to that time had they been caching food and removing it from the storerooms and dining rooms?

Mr. JAMES. I believe in connection with the general strike there was a good deal of food cached during the period of tension, and the immediate days ahead or preceding the strike—2 or 3 days preceding the strike a lot of food did disappear.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the project administration instituted a search for hoarded food at the center?

Mr. JAMES. I believe that one of Mr. Snelson's first acts when he came on the project, under the direction of Mr. Empie, was to collect this food—as much as could be brought in from mess halls—that is the storerooms of mess halls—and from various hiding places.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Hiding places inside the Japanese barracks?

Mr. JAMES. In the Japanese barracks, yes, sir; and in laundry rooms, ironing houses, and things of that sort—places where food could be stored, case goods, perhaps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you discuss this search with Mr. Snelson?

Mr. JAMES. I did, but I am not in possession of any figures of the amount of food that was brought back. I know it was a sizable amount.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the approximate amount?

Mr. JAMES. No; I haven't. Mr. Empie or Mr. Snelson, I am sure, could furnish those figures.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was Mr. Empie familiar with the searches made by Mr. Snelson?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. A lot of this food disappeared during Mr. Townsend's regime there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was when they were storing up food in anticipation of the strike or riot that did later occur?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. It has been my observation that the same phenomena has occurred in other centers just preceding trouble.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Quoting again from the memorandum:

#### ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDES TOWARD DISLOYAL JAPANESE

##### CASE HISTORY

On or about July 2, 1942, during the intake period coincident of the arrival of 3,800 evacuees from the Salinas assembly center, the following incident occurred:

A Mr. Henry Fujita, spokesman for a family of six, refused to sign either War Relocation Authority Form No. 1 or No. 2.

I believed you explained to the committee yesterday what Forms 1 and 2 were so I shall not go into that at this time.

War Relocation Authority Form No. 1 is used for enlistment in the Work Corps. Form No. 2 is a simple affidavit not to engage in subversive activities against the United States Government.

Since we were experiencing a daily temperature of 120° and 130°, and most of the arriving Salinas evacuees were requiring treatment for heat prostration, I attributed Mr. Fujita's sullen and antagonistic mood to these conditions. I therefore gave him 5 days, until July 7, at 5 o'clock to return W. R. A. Form No. 2, the affidavit of loyalty, properly signed, to me.

In the ensuing 5 days Mr. Fujita twice attempted to return the papers defyingly stating that he would not sign the affidavit of loyalty.

Accordingly at 5 p. m., July 8, the deadline having been passed, Mr. Fujita was brought to the administration building in Poston I by police escort.

In the office of Mr. Ralph Gelvin, associate project director, Mr. Fujita was questioned by Mr. Norris James, press and intelligence officer, Mr. Theodore Haas, project attorney, and Special Agent Ed Smart of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Phoenix, Ariz.



Most of the questioning was conducted by Mr. Smart. Mr. Fujita, while insisting that he was an American citizen (subsequently substantiated) gave testimony with wide discrepancy about the years he admitted he spent in Japan. Mr. Smart, through questioning, secured several admissions that Mr. Fujita had belonged to various Japanese organizations.

At this point Mr. Gelvin took over the questioning and directed them in such a fashion that Mr. Fujita came to the realization that unless he signed the affidavit, the administration would send him and his family out of Poston in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Smart indicated that he saw no reason, in view of Fujita's continuing sullen mood and the damaging admissions he had already made, that the evacuee and his family be allowed to remain. Nevertheless, the administration's wishes were permitted to prevail. Henry Fujita continues to live in Poston.

Do you recall that incident?

Mr. JAMES. I do very well. I was a participant in it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And is Fujita still at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. He is. He is the sort of person who, in my estimation, should be subject to immediate segregation. The F. B. I. agent who was present and questioning him discovered that Fujita belonged to certain subversive organizations.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he a member of the Black Dragon Society?

Mr. JAMES. Not a member of the Black Dragon Society.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what organization was he a member?

Mr. JAMES. Kibei Shiman, which is an overseas cultural branch which can be traced directly to Toyama who directed the overseas work of Japanese subversive activities.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What other organizations did he belong to?

Mr. JAMES. He belonged to the Junior Kenjin Kai, which has made from time to time contributions to the Imperial Navy fund and Imperial Army fund.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is Fujita's age?

Mr. JAMES. I believe about 31.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not Fujita is married?

Mr. JAMES. I don't. I know that in his case he is dominated by the rest of his family and they all refused to sign W. R. A. Form No. 1, which was a simple affidavit not to engage in subversive activities or sabotage while at Poston.

In connection with that, Mr. Fujita came out with a fine bit of double talk. He was asked directly by Mr. Smart if he was prepared to make an oath on this affidavit. To the best of my recollection Mr. Fujita replied:

When I make an oath in one person's house that means one thing; if I make it in another person's house, that means another thing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Meaning his oath to the United States didn't mean very much, is that correct?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I wouldn't want to put that interpretation on it but I would say that certainly the Japanese conception of an oath differs completely from a white man's idea of an oath. In other words he was capable of making an oath with his fingers crossed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Certainly the W. R. A. had sufficient evidence on Mr. Fujita to segregate him?

Mr. JAMES. They did, but there was no segregation program set up at that time and no place to segregate him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In view of the information you had with regard to Fujita when he came into the center, don't you think he should have been segregated?



Mr. JAMES. I think so. I think Mr. Smart should have been permitted to take him out. Mr. Smart said he had enough evidence to take him out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The point I am making is that even after they learned the bad Japanese, they took no action to segregate them?

Mr. JAMES. Simply because Washington would not set up a policy of segregation.

Mr. MUNDT. Wasn't there a place where he could have been sent—Bismarck or Santa Fe?

Mr. JAMES. I believe now the administration took the position that he was an American citizen and that American citizens could not be sent to concentration camps such as Bismarck or New Mexico.

(Off the record.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Continuing to read from the memorandum:

#### CASE HISTORY

On or about June 27, 1942, at approximately 10:15 p. m., Pacific standard time (11:15 p. m. Mountain standard time), west-bound train No. 124 from Phoenix, Ariz., to Los Angeles, crashed into a burning trestle 7 miles west of Earp, Calif. The engineer and fireman were killed, and one Poston administrator, H. A. Mathiesen, was seriously injured. Aboard that train were 25 United States Army flyers, and 1 coach was filled with enlisted men.

This incident was thoroughly investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and it is well established that the trestle fire was the work of one or more saboteurs. The burned trestle is located by air line some 20 miles from Poston I.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the facts that I have just read into the record true to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. JAMES. They are. This train—that was an unusual case, Mr. Steedman. Very seldom on that branch line are troops carried from Phoenix to Los Angeles. At least they were not being carried over that line at that time. They had not been carried, according to my best recollection, for a period of several months.

This was a special case where this car with young aviators, graduated from Luppe Field, were bound for Los Angeles. And there was a coach filled with Negro soldiers.

There is no question in the minds of the investigating officers and Sheriff of San Bernardino County as to its being sabotage.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you interview the investigating officers?

Mr. JAMES. With the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I worked with them down on the river.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you work with them on that case?

Mr. JAMES. I did. I happened to have been, the night before, in Needles, Calif., and I was awakened by the division superintendent of the Santa Fe Railroad and went directly to the scene of the wreck, arriving there at about 4 o'clock in the morning.

We were there before the Sheriff of San Bernardino County, and an Indian trapper was there before the others came up.

I worked on the case for 2 days and I found down at the river signs indicating the Japanese had camped there. I believe the F. B. I. was able to get statements that they had actually camped there the night of the train wreck but there was nothing to indicate that they had gone across the river. There were no marks or any way of identifying that this was the work of Japanese.

However, the river could have been crossed, not at that particular point but about a mile away. There was a sandbar about a mile away where it would have been easy for them to cross the river.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What evidence of sabotage developed from your investigation at the time?

Mr. JAMES. It developed it was a candle stick type of fire. The fire started from the base of the piling, with nothing growing around the piling to start the fire. It is just a dry wash. There was no mesquite or brush around the pillars holding up this trestle.

As I recall the wreck it had been timed perfectly. The trestle had been weakened to the extent that the locomotive plowed down into the wash and the baggage car jumped over the locomotive and No. 1 coach went into the wash. The car behind it, which had the young flyers in it telescoped into the baggage car.

Most of the flyers, for your information, were taken to the Poston General Hospital for hospitalization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many people were injured or killed in the wreck?

Mr. JAMES. Two were killed, to the best of my knowledge—the engineer and the fireman. The baggage man was badly injured in the wreck. Mr. Mathiesen was hospitalized for a period of about 4 months.

Now, may I go on a little bit further on that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Was this bridge within the boundary of the project?

Mr. JAMES. This was on the California side, Congressman.

Mr. MUNDT. Just across the river?

Mr. JAMES. Across the river not over 18 miles away. It is flat country with the river in between, but there were sandbars in the river so that it would be quite possible for an average swimmer to get across the river. The river is quite shallow there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have the Japanese been known to have gone swimming in the Colorado River and to have crossed the river to the California side?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know about going across to the California side.

Mr. COSTELLO. I had a newspaper article which I believe was sent into one of the local papers from a paper in Imperial Valley, indicating that the Japanese have been known to have gone swimming in the Colorado River and crossed to the California side, and to some extent attempt to molest the white people who might have been swimming also in the river on the California side.

Mr. JAMES. For the sake of the record I would like to point out that there were, at that time, still approximately 1,000 workmen employed by the Del E. Webb Construction Co. in completing the camp.

Some of these workmen were Negroes. They had been gathered from all over the United States. Plumbers were employed from as far away as New York City and obviously they were not the very best type of workmen, because desert conditions are quite tough and the better class of workmen were working here on the coast.

There was no check to my knowledge ever made by any of the investigative agencies of these workmen who were working on the project.

Now, this type of bridge fire is very similar to a series of fires that occurred in the Imperial Valley, in Niland, Calif., and elsewhere, where railroad trestles were burned and attempts were made, apparently, to sabotage trains.

In those instances, however, there were no train wrecks. But this one at Poston followed the general pattern of the so-called Niland trestle burning.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any arrests made after this wreck?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the investigating officers come to the conclusion it was sabotage?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely came to the conclusion it was sabotage.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had the Japanese been in the habit of camping or picnicking in this general area along the Colorado River?

Mr. JAMES. They had gone down to swim, yes. Now, as I say, I am not in possession of any facts whatsoever to show that they had ever crossed the river; that they were ever seen in the neighborhood of the railroad bridge or the highway.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the F. B. I. or any other investigating agency ask the project director, Mr. Head, to ascertain how many Japanese were out of the camp on the night of the wreck?

Mr. JAMES. I believe they did, and I know that Mr. Head, to the best of his ability, tried to find out who was away and who wasn't. However, that is an enormous job.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Head would be dependent on the block managers for that information; would he not?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And don't you believe that is a very poor source of information?

Mr. JAMES. That was the only one he had available, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. MUNDT. In the similar type of bridge fires that you say took place in the Imperial Valley, was that at a time when there were a great many Japanese living in the Imperial Valley?

Mr. JAMES. Those fires occurred before evacuation.

Mr. MUNDT. And did a large number of Japanese live in that vicinity?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know. I know there were prior to evacuation several thousand Japanese living in the Imperial Valley and in counties contiguous or adjacent to Imperial County.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they ever able to find out who started the fires in the Imperial Valley?

Mr. JAMES. No. To my knowledge those bridge disasters have never been solved. However, in fairness to the Japanese, I would like to point out that whoever is responsible for that—the burning of the trestle near Earp, Calif., must have been in possession of information from Phoenix, Ariz., that this special trainload of young aviators was leaving Phoenix.

It would require quite a complicated system of espionage—a complicated system of tie-ups.

Mr. MUNDT. How far is it from Phoenix to Parker?

Mr. JAMES. About 230 miles. No, I will take that back—it is 185 miles.

Mr. MUNDT. Do the Japanese from the Poston center ever get into Phoenix.

Mr. JAMES. They at that time had never been near Phoenix.

Mr. MUNDT. But they were getting away as far as Parker?

Mr. JAMES. They were getting away as far as Parker, yes.



Mr. COSTELLO. Had there been any newspaper publicity regarding the departure of those aviators from Phoenix?

Mr. JAMES. None whatsoever to my knowledge.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have the Japanese living in Phoenix been moved to relocation centers?

Mr. JAMES. No. The line ran through a section of Phoenix. Glendale, Ariz., was omitted from the evacuation zone so there were actually Japanese in Glendale, Ariz., and in certain sections of Phoenix—a few, I believe.

Mr. MUNDT. You mentioned yesterday that one of the evacuees, or maybe more than one of the evacuees, from Poston, had been transferred to Glendale.

Mr. JAMES. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Had any of those transfers been made prior to this train wreck?

Mr. JAMES. No. In this case that was this man Seta that we talked about yesterday who was removed for his own safety to Glendale.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it your information that there is quite a large colony of Japanese living in and around Phoenix?

Mr. JAMES. There are several hundred—primarily in the Glendale area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And their status has not been affected by the evacuation of the Japanese from the west coast, has it?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. They were outside of the zone set up by General DeWitt.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Again quoting from the memorandum:

#### EVACUEE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ADMINISTRATION

All members of the project administration are somewhat in the familiar "gold fish bowl" position in relation to the evacuees. This has been accentuated at Poston by the formal policy laid down by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that the Caucasian staff is at Poston "to serve the evacuees."

Friction between Japanese and Caucasians develops—from the evacuee standpoint—along several sources:

(a) Lack of materials to develop work projects.

(b) Administrative personnel at the project which is sometimes inferior in education and (at least, judged by the Japanese themselves) inferior in ability to evacuees serving in minor capacities under particular administrators.

(c) An attitude, in some quarters of the Poston personnel, which regards Japanese as Indians and treats them as wards of the Government, i. e., paternally.

(d) A growing consciousness on the part of many evacuees that they are often being used as human guinea pigs by doctrinaires, anthropologists, and well-meaning social-service workers attached to the project staff.

As a result, there are two major trends in mass thinking which will directly affect Poston during the autumn and winter months just ahead.

Is the information I just read true and correct, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. JAMES. I would say it is basically true. You have a difficult problem. For example, in the school system there, you will have a number of white women who have been brought out of retirement, and who, perhaps, have not been overly successful in the field of education. They are paid on a standard of teachers' wages, commensurate with what teachers are paid outside and beside them there will be working Japanese teachers who hold Phi Beta Kappa keys and receiving \$16 and \$19 a month—men and women who are extremely well educated.



In my opinion naturally there would be a feeling of contempt, perhaps, for someone who had been brought out of retirement. I can see where there would be plenty of cause for friction.

Mr. Steedman (continuing to read from the memorandum):

#### CASE HISTORY

The duly elected community council of Poston I, chairmaned by Dr. Y. Ischimar, and largely at his prompting, has developed a number of committees which in the ensuing weeks will "investigate project management and project finances."

Mr. H. G. Palmer, project procurement officer, reports that on or about August 25, he was approached by Dr. Ischimar who insisted that he be permitted to bring in his own accounting and purchasing experts to investigate why the project is unable to requisition supplies more speedily.

Then in parentheses:

Source of information: Mr. Palmer, and Mr. Henry Smith fiscal officers.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that which I just read correct?

Mr. JAMES. Substantially so, Mr. Steedman. I think that this is another case where, because of leadership at the top in Washington, the project officials were up against a very, very difficult job of administration.

I happen to know this particular case quite well where the Japanese, believing, in perfectly good faith, that they were at Poston and the Caucasians were there to serve them, naturally felt that they had a perfect right to investigate project management and to actively participate in it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the investigation, suggested in what I just read, take place?

Mr. JAMES. I believe they attempted to, but Mr. Smith, being a particularly strong-minded man said: "No" emphatically and I don't think in his department there was any investigation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there an investigation in the other departments?

Mr. JAMES. I believe there were. I am not acquainted with what departments were investigated.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was a similar committee set up in Poston II and Poston III?

Mr. JAMES. No. This was in Poston I.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the Japanese decided it was about time to investigate the project?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. Poston No. II, I would like to point out as I did yesterday, the people from Monterey County, Calif., have given us very, very little trouble. The vast majority of them have been extremely loyal and extremely helpful even though they have, perhaps, the toughest row of all of them, coming from the cool California coast to these high desert temperatures.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading again from the memorandum):

#### CASE HISTORY

Mr. Saburo Kido, president of the Japanese American Citizens League, and a resident of Poston II, has publicly gone on record as stating that the Japanese American Citizens League believes that, in view of the war and the demands that are being made upon American manpower, that "most of the project administrative jobs can be filled by loyal Japanese."

Then following that paragraph there is in parentheses:

Source of information: Mr. Kido, himself.

Is that information correct?

Mr. JAMES. That is substantially true. I know Mr. Kido quite well and I would say that statement approximates his views.

In September of last year, Mr. Kido, at that time I believe, was perfectly reconciled to his people being permanently relocated in Poston and other centers for the duration of the war and that they felt, as the Army and as other branches of the armed services required the needs of white men—the Caucasians—that they should be replaced by loyal Japanese and the Japanese American Citizens League, although it represents a minority of the American-born Japanese citizens, was doing a very fine job.

Mr. MUNDT. To the best of your knowledge, Kido was a loyal Japanese, was he not?

Mr. JAMES. He was, to the best of my knowledge, and extremely helpful in the administration.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me digress from this particular line of testimony for a moment: Have you any knowledge by which you can give the committee an approximation of the number of Japanese in the United States who are not subject to the evacuation order and who are still living normal lives and in the communities where they have always been?

Mr. JAMES. It would have to be a guess, Congressman.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I interrupt? I believe there were about 25,000 Japanese in the country outside of the 3 Pacific Coast States.

Mr. JAMES. That would be my approximation—somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there any special surveillance of them?

Mr. COSTELLO. Outside of the coastal area, there has been no attempt to remove them from their homes or businesses. The only ones who would be under any sort of surveillance would be those who might be looked upon as possible enemy agents, the same as you might find among Germans or Italians. No attempt has been made to remove them from other cities such as Washington, New York, or wherever they are.

Mr. MUNDT. Are the Japanese, Mr. James, in these detention centers or relocation centers, permitted to correspond with Japanese living normal lives in the areas where evacuation has not taken place?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; they are. There is no mail censorship whatsoever in any of the centers. They can write to the coast to friends who are there—friends of any race and write them anywhere in the continental United States. And for that matter I presume outside of the continental United States subject to censorship at the border.

Mr. MUNDT. Phoenix is not in the evacuated area, is it?

Mr. JAMES. The line ran right through Phoenix. A portion of it was.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean in the city of Phoenix there are Japanese living on one side of a street while those on the other side were evacuated?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. In fact in Glendale there was a very unusual situation arose—Glendale, Ariz. The line of demarcation made it impossible for the Japanese residing in Phoenix, who had

children, to send their children to the Glendale school. They had to be sent to Peoria, Ariz., some 4 or 5 miles away because it was on the wrong side of the line.

Mr. MUNDT. At least hypothetically, it would have been perfectly possible for a Japanese citizen with subversive inclinations, living in Phoenix, to have written to a subversive Japanese in the Poston project that this troop train was leaving on a certain date and none of the Caucasian personnel would have learned anything about that transfer of information?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. In a hypothetical case you can work out all sorts of hypotheses along that line. Yes; it was possible for a Japanese residing in Poston, if you want to put another hypothetical case in, because there was a great deal of money within the city to have actually put up the money for sabotage to be conducted by someone else—perhaps a man working for Del Webb Construction Co.

Mr. MUNDT. But about the only hypotheses we could establish which would make that seem improbable is that the Japanese are not interested in sabotaging our troop trains?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Up until the time you left Poston, had the project received any evacuees from Hawaii?

Mr. JAMES. None, Mr. Steedman, except those who were caught on the coast when evacuation took place.

There were some who were attending school in the south here, or who were living here or over here on visits, but they to my knowledge, up until the time I had left there, there had been no movement of Japanese from the Territory of Hawaii into Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have the officials at Poston received any information from Washington indicating that evacuees from Hawaii would be quartered at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Not until the time I had left. There had been some discussion late last fall when General Emmons indicated that a few Japanese, number undisclosed, were to be evacuated from Hawaii.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But up until the time you left Poston, had the project received any evacuees from South American countries?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. Again there had been rumor and talking on that—that we might possibly receive some.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is Japanese who were living in Brazil or Bolivia were being evacuated and sent to the United States?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. There has been a movement of Hawaiian Japanese to other centers. There is a camp in Arkansas which has received Japanese from Hawaii.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to return to the South American Japanese for a moment. Have you seen any correspondence at Poston indicating that subversive Japanese from South American countries would be quartered at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. I have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I continue to read from the memorandum:

#### CASE HISTORY

Between August 15 and September 15, two men and two women from the Rochdale Cooperative Institute of New York City were brought to Poston under a contract between the Indian Service and Rochdale to lecture on the operation of a consumer cooperative system of stores and factories.



Arriving in Poston, the Rochdale representatives intensively worked the field. Upon the advice of the ————<sup>3</sup> Japanese minister, these cooperative experts in lectures and in written publicity—both in English and in Japanese—stressed the point that Issei were not being represented in Poston politics, nor in the economic program of the project but that this would be remedied if—

and I might add at this point that the word "if" is underscored,

they supported their (the Rochdale) program for consumer cooperatives.

On or about September 6, the Rochdale people shipped in from New York headquarters three short reel colored films dealing with cooperatives. These were included in the usual public showing of movies for the benefit of the people of Poston.

At the first public meeting, an audience of approximately 1,500 sat silently through the first cooperative film, mildly demonstrated throughout the second, but raised such furor during the showing of the third film that the entire exhibition had to be called off.

The films were not subsequently shown.

Nevertheless, in view of a War Relocation Authority directive that all projects must accept a form of consumer cooperative for the operation of the evacuees' own stores, shops and factories—Poston is proceeding to install such a system, even though it has not been put to a test vote by the people.

Then following that paragraph in parentheses:

Sources of additional information—copies of petition form in Japanese and English circulated by Rochdale people—statements from R. G. Fister, chief, temporary administration of Poston Community Enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Can you tell us whether the information I have just read from the memorandum in question is true and correct?

Mr. JAMES. It is correct. The operation of their own stores, canteens, barber shops, shoe-repair shops, and beauty shops—that is their own enterprises, where they have put up their own money, the W. R. A. insisted that a form of consumer cooperatives be established in their stead.

To further that cause the Japanese were opposing the cooperative idea. Most of the Japanese, apparently, wanted the operation under a trust agreement wherein there would be a white administrator representing the Government and acting as an umpire and arbiter and overseer. They wanted that form, but this W. R. A. directive emphatically stated that a form of consumer cooperative must be established, so to educate the Japanese as to the value of consumer cooperatives, these four people were sent out from Rochdale Institute and to the best of my knowledge, spent a month there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were these four people from Rochdale paid by the Government?

Mr. JAMES. They were paid by the Government; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how much they were paid?

Mr. JAMES. To the best of my knowledge, it was around—somewhere between \$2,500 and \$3,000 for the month they spent there. That is collectively for the four people.

In addition to that, there were one or two experts in consumer credit unions who were there at the same time, endeavoring to instruct the Japanese as to the value of that type of organization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were those people from a private organization?

Mr. JAMES. I believe they were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the name of that private organization?

Mr. JAMES. Well, it is a New York City organization, Mr. Steedman. I can't think of the name of it now.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the names of the four representatives from the Rochdale Cooperative Institute?

Mr. JAMES. There were a Mr. and Mrs. Perkins and Miss Arnold. I can't recall the name of the fourth one.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have the first names of Mr. and Mrs. Perkins?

Mr. JAMES. No; I haven't. Reference to the Poston Daily Chronicle of those dates would give you that information. They lectured about the camp for a period of about at least a month. They met opposition because most of our Japanese are extremely brand-conscious. They don't want to buy anything except branded merchandise.

At that time there was no rationing, of course, and the stores were selling canned goods, cigarettes, and such things and they did not want to buy the consumer-type brands because they didn't have confidence in them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Were the two credit-union men also paid by the Government?

Mr. JAMES. They were paid by the Government, too.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know how much they were paid?

Mr. JAMES. No; I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not just clear about this matter yet. Had there been any demand on the part of the Japanese for consumer cooperatives of any kind?

Mr. JAMES. Except from one source: From the so-called Christian minister, ————<sup>3</sup>, whose name I asked to be left out yesterday because he is being investigated, and the group ————<sup>3</sup>, formerly of Bakersfield, Calif., had formed with the help of ————<sup>3</sup>, this Nori food king from Japan.

They had formed an adult study group to study consumer cooperatives. I was suspicious because ————<sup>3</sup>, according to his own admissions, was a rugged individualist who had come up through the competitive system of Japan and why he should be interested in consumer credit unions was a puzzle to me.

It became apparent that ————<sup>3</sup> and ————<sup>3</sup> and their group, through their influence with Commissioner Collier, were endeavoring to secure control over the economic life of the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. How large was the group you are speaking of?

Mr. JAMES. A group of about 20 people. Later on it developed that ————<sup>3</sup> organized it on a block-to-block basis. That is, he had the representative for the proconsumer operative working on the block basis.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they communicate directly with Mr. Collier?

Mr. JAMES. ————<sup>3</sup> quite frequently wrote letters to Commissioner Collier.

Mr. MUNDT. But there was no request for a consumer's cooperative movement that came from the project?

Mr. JAMES. Not to my knowledge. May I carry this on a bit further, Mr. Steedman?

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not want the name of the minister or the merchant to be used?

Mr. JAMES. They can be referred to as a "Christian minister" or as a "wealthy Japanese."

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Indicative of the attitude that the majority of the camp felt, particularly the American-born, about 1 month after the visit of these Rochdale people, ————<sup>3</sup> succeeded in calling an election under the provisions of these W. R. A. orders—an election for delegates to a temporary community cooperative congress, which was to set up the machinery whereby this consumer cooperative could take over the already successful community enterprises which were operating under these shops on a trust-agreement basis.

For your information the gross, the monthly gross, on these various enterprises operated by the Japanese was around \$90,000 a month.

This election was held and the candidates that were put up were largely ————<sup>3</sup> men. In both instances this was only one man from every block. And as I say, they are the ones who more and more have been taking over the control of the community enterprises, where, up until March of 1943, the working personnel of this sizable merchandising organization was American-born Japanese headed by Fred Ota. They are now being replaced by aliens.

The present general manager of Poston community enterprises, soon to be "Poston cooperative enterprises," is Mr. S. Y. Katow, formerly a director and general manager of the Asia Co. of Los Angeles.

To my knowledge Mr. Katow is a very loyal Issei. However, he is directly under the influence and under the direction of the ————<sup>3</sup>, because ————<sup>3</sup> is chairman of the new board of trustees which has been elected by his own cooperative congress for the operation of the Poston cooperative enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have the cooperative enterprises been turned over to the consumer council?

Mr. JAMES. The community enterprises, operating formerly on a trust agreement, are now in the process of being turned over to the Poston cooperative enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And is that in line with the Rochdale plan?

Mr. JAMES. In line with the Rochdale plan, yes. Whether they will use the Rochdale merchandise or not, I am not sure. I am rather inclined to doubt it in view of the opposition of even the alien Japanese—I mean even the pro-cooperative Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there any historical background for consumer cooperative organizations in the Japanese culture or history?

Mr. JAMES. Not this type of consumer cooperative. They are, so far as production is concerned. They were quite successful on the west coast but they consisted largely of families. Our Japanese are very peculiar. They are just as they are in the old country in the suspicions that they have against one another. They are a reticent people. They don't confide in each other. Even the men don't confide very much with one another. They tell one another no more than they think the other one knows unless they have some particular reason, and your business organizations are largely on a family basis. At least they were here in California.

We witnessed a number of farm cooperatives which were small, but they were producing cooperatively largely on a family basis. And where there may have been isolated instances of retail cooperatives, again they were on a family basis.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to call your attention to a sentence in the memorandum to the effect that the Japanese "raised a furor during the showing of the third film, and the entire exhibition had to be called off."

Apparently the Japanese didn't like the idea of cooperatives; is that correct?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely. The meetings held by the Perkins and Miss Arnold were very fully attended. The Japanese were very lukewarm to the Rochdale plan of consumer cooperatives or a consumer cooperative.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does the Rochdale Institute supply commodities for sale in the cooperatives?

Mr. JAMES. They have, I believe, a tie-in with various consumer sources of supply—consumer-cooperative sources of supply.

They have a certain cigarette that they handle, with a brand on it and similarly in canned goods.

Mr. COSTELLO. But those commodities are not the standard brands?

Mr. JAMES. That is right. These people, for example, are sold on Buick automobiles. They are extremely brand conscious in their prejudice against certain types of food and merchandise. They want Del Monte canned goods.

Mr. COSTELLO. Because they are accustomed to certain quality under brand labels?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; and they won't buy anything else.

Mr. MUNDT. Did this quartet of people from the Rochdale movement come to Poston with the permission of Mr. Collier or Mr. Myer, or both?

Mr. JAMES. Well, I imagine that the thing met with the approval of Mr. Dillon Myer, because Mr. Myer, I know, had drawn up this directive which expressly provides for the establishment of consumer cooperatives, and insisted that that was the only form it should take.

Mr. MUNDT. Apparently then the cooperative sponsors at Poston first contacted Mr. Collier and then Mr. Collier contacted Mr. Myer?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. You see there is no provision under the W. R. A. set-up for private enterprise to be practiced at the centers, although in my experience a great many Japanese would like to have a form of private enterprise. They would like to be self-supporting.

Mr. COSTELLO. The whole effect then of this transfer from the trust agreement arrangement over to the cooperative program has been to destroy the existing situation and change the personnel and the management?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it means that alien thinking and alien control actually comes into it instead of the loyal American control which existed previously?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Has it also had the effect of switching over to a different brand of merchandise or a different type of merchandise?

Mr. JAMES. Of course since rationing went into effect in this country, gentlemen, it has been extremely difficult for the Japanese to secure merchandise for their small stores. Certainly they can secure nothing that O. P. A. has on a ration basis because rationed



goods are not permitted to these Japanese. That is with the exception of clothing. They are still able to get some clothing.

There is a tremendous problem out there on shoes. We have an awful time getting around that coupon No. 17 business, but special arrangements have been made with the O. P. A. on that.

Mr. MUNDT. You indicated the Japanese like to buy Del Monte canned goods?

Mr. JAMES. I mentioned that as only one item.

Mr. MUNDT. Doesn't the consumer cooperative sell Del Monte canned goods?

Mr. JAMES. Can't get Del Monte canned goods out there.

Mr. MUNDT. They don't show any special preference for any other brands?

Mr. JAMES. I happen to be speaking particularly of the Monterey County crowd which I know quite well and, by and large, they are sold on Del Monte goods. They know the brand and have extreme faith in it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to clear up one matter. The Rochdale Institute does not sell regular brand names, do they?

Mr. JAMES. No. Most of these consumer cooperatives, as I understand them, sell unbranded merchandise or merchandise which bears the brand of the cooperative.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact Japanese are opposed to the system of unbranded merchandise?

Mr. JAMES. That is right, definitely.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There is one thing I would like to clear up: Was the opposition to the establishment of a cooperative system itself, or was it to the result which would come about—that they would have to purchase particular types of merchandise?

Mr. JAMES. The Japanese never favored a semitype of cooperative—a cooperative where there would be at the top a Caucasian supervisor.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then they really favored a cooperative system?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; broadly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Broadly? But there were certain differences of opinion as to how it should be operated?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But the main opposition, I take it from your statement, is that they did not want to take the particular brand of goods which they would have had to take had this Rochdale plan been adopted?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. And they were opposed to it—I judge the Nisei were opposed to it because they were suspicious and fearful of ————<sup>3</sup> because, particularly because of the important position he had occupied during the Poston trouble from November 14 to November 25.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it because of the possibility of these two or three Japanese who were instrumental in bringing about this change might have gained control of the cooperative and become the sole beneficiaries of any benefits that might have accrued out of it?

Mr. JAMES. No; I don't think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't think it would develop into a situation such as exists in Japan, where three or four families control the entire wealth of the country?

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.



Mr. JAMES. You would have tremendous political power, whoever controls the cooperative would have tremendous political power. He could control a lot of things in the camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. They would not gain financial control or benefits from it, but would have political control of the people themselves?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct; yes. I bring this out to show you the background struggle that has been going on in the camp, just as yesterday I cited the various steps leading to the trouble at Poston where an attempt in that direction was made to destroy the American-born Japanese.

Here there is another movement on the other side through the economic channels of attempting to control their economic life.

Mr. MUNDT. Just another procedure in the pattern of certain Japanese to break down the Americanism of the Japanese at Poston?

Mr. JAMES. That is a hypothesis that I would agree with. I think the pattern is there and I think it exists at every project.

Mr. COSTELLO. The leaders in the camp who are anti-American, have seized upon every available opportunity they could find to use it as a medium——

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Whereby they would gain control of the people there?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And subvert their loyalty?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; and to build up power.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I might make the observation here that I got the impression that this cooperative movement came about because of a directive from Washington?

Mr. JAMES. It did. It very definitely did and they took advantage of it, Congressman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is contrary to the theory, isn't it, that it is the idea of this certain group of Japanese to gain control?

Mr. JAMES. Well, let me make that point clear.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is what I would like to know.

Mr. JAMES. The plan was set up by Washington, Congressman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is what we want clear.

Mr. JAMES. Definitely. This plan was set up for the establishment of consumer cooperatives at Poston following that and every other center cooperative was established by that W. R. A. directive.

Mr. MUNDT. Under Myer or under Eisenhower?

Mr. JAMES. Under Eisenhower—Milton S. Eisenhower.

The ————<sup>3</sup> and his group were the only—that was the only group that pushed this plan at Poston because the Indian Service had originally adopted a plan similar to those that they use in various reservations for the operation and maintenance of community stores; that is, where the Indian agents will actually be the supervisors or the monitor of this particular store and where the people will share in the profits is in dividends, but where there will be at the top control, semicontrol by this governmental agency.

That was the system that we had set up at Poston and which had apparently been acceptable to the people.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then this directive had been in existence for some time?

Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. JAMES. Yes, it had been in existence, to the best of my knowledge, since June 1942, approximately 1 month before Milton S. Eisenhower resigned and Dillon Myer took his place.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It is not very clear in my mind yet. I don't know whether you want to follow it any further but I don't see anything we could deduce from what has been presented to us here with respect to this cooperative thing.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to develop that a little further.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I wish you would, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has Mr. John Collier been interested in the Rochdale movement for some time?

Mr. JAMES. I don't know. I believe he has. I think he is a close friend of the head of the Rochdale Institute in New York City.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you believe the \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> was familiar with Mr. Collier's interest in the Rochdale movement?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; I do. One of \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> first steps when he came to Poston was to establish by mail, and by personal interview whenever Commissioner Collier came in, a close relationship with Commissioner Collier.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> suggested the sending to Poston of these Rochdale representatives?

Mr. JAMES. I do. I think it is quite possible to produce correspondence showing \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> actually recommended that cooperative experts be sent from New York to lecture before the Japanese in Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>, knowing that Commissioner Collier was interested in the cooperative movement, suggested to him that he send representatives to the Poston center for the purpose of setting up a Rochdale plan in Poston?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; I believe that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And these representatives were sent to Poston following that?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And as a result this plan has been put into effect?

Mr. JAMES. It has.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> intent or purpose in setting up the Rochdale plan in Poston center?

Mr. JAMES. All I know is the immediate effect. Here is a man who emerged from Poston's general strike or disturbance, on the one hand, as a powerful political leader, and paralleling that he emerges as the chairman of the dominant economic factor in the life of Poston through the cooperative enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This change put \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> and his group in control of the cooperative enterprises?

Mr. JAMES. Definitely, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the selling of this plan to Collier virtually turned over this \$90,000 a year business to the Issei and to the \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> group?

Mr. JAMES. It did; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to continue reading from the memorandum the paragraph entitled, "The Absence of Surveillance":

Because of the liberalism of the Colorado River project administration, with its emphasis upon social values, evacuees are under no surveillance. In the

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

absence of boundaries, they are permitted to wander at will, without military police escorts, anywhere to the east, west, or south of Poston. To the north, a military police guard post effectively checks and examines all in-bound and out-bound traffic.

Because of the size of the project and the number of evacuees housed, only the most carefully supervised census could determine whether any evacuees are missing.

It is not unreasonable to believe that there are at least 200 evacuees in Poston who in the past or at the present time have engaged in espionage for the Japanese Empire. This would roughly tie in with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's own estimates that, subsequent to December 7, 1941, for every Japanese agent arrested, one or more unknown agents escaped. Who these possible suspects are, what, if any, subversive activities they are now engaged in, what outside contacts they have, and to what extent they can engage in external subject, are, of course, unsolved.

However, it is the writer's personal belief that any creditable information cannot be developed from—

(1) The Nisei or loyal Americans, because of present material and psychological trends within the project.

(2) The former Federal Bureau of Investigation Japanese informers—who were never reliable sources of news in the first place—and who now are in the unhappy position of living side by side with relatives of family heads, perhaps, interned in Bismark or Santa Fe.

(3) The so-called Japanese Christian ministers—especially those who were trained in the American Methodist schools in Japan.

And then following that paragraph in parentheses:

For some fine double talk in English, examine the files of the Poston Christian Weekly church organ now in War Relocation Administration information files.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the information I have just read from the memorandum true to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; for the period, Mr. Steedman, from approximately the middle of May to September 15, 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the project administration tightened up on the Japanese aliens insofar as restricting them to the camp is concerned?

Mr. JAMES. It has now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, they cannot come and go at will at the present time?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct. As far as getting into Parker, Ariz., it has developed within the last 2 months. Prior to that time they were.

Following the strike and disturbance at Poston; that is roughly, from November through to the spring of the year, groups were permitted to go into Parker just as they had in the period from May through to the middle of September, but since March, in view of the trouble that has occurred at Parker, Ariz., very few have gotten in.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese aliens wander around outside of the camp area in the desert without a pass from the project administration?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At the present time?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir. The place is so vast there, so huge, there is no way of keeping them locked up.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they are only restricted insofar as the city of Parker is concerned?

Mr. JAMES. That is right.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do they go to the Colorado River without a pass from the project administration?

Mr. JAMES. They can. The boundary line of the Colorado River project is the Colorado River itself. That is the western boundary line.

The eastern boundary line is the road running from Parker to Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they can move back and forth freely between the three camps without a pass from the project administration?

Mr. JAMES. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. I notice the memorandum refers to 200 Japanese at Poston who were former agents of the Japanese Government.

Mr. JAMES. I would revise that and say, if you say "agents" and include those who engage in propaganda work or who had been members of the various types of societies mentioned yesterday, I would say probably 600.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words at Poston there are possibly 600 definitely known subversive Japanese?

Mr. JAMES. Congressman Costello, I believe there are that many.

Mr. COSTELLO. And if their records were investigated, they would show they had affiliations with subversive activities?

Mr. JAMES. If you start with the number that were returned from the internment camps; may I go into that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. JAMES. Yesterday I said to the best of my knowledge 365 had been returned to us. I checked the number last night and I find there were 195 that were returned. The 365 that I referred to yesterday were those who applied for repatriation to Japan. If you take the 195 that were returned from Bismarck and Santa Fe where the established investigative agencies—the O. N. I. or the F. B. I. or G-2—had felt there was sufficient evidence to send those men to concentration camps for the duration of the war, plus others who have since been brought to light at the relocation centers, 600 would not be an unreasonable estimate of those against whom cases could definitely be proven that they are dangerous to the country at large.

Mr. COSTELLO. The figure of 600 would include the 195 from Bismarck and Santa Fe?

Mr. JAMES. I would include them on the list; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And would the 600 include the 365 that you refer to as having requested repatriation?

Mr. JAMES. No; that would be in addition.

Mr. COSTELLO. That would be an additional group?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; who certainly should be segregated by all means.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let us make this clear. Some of the 365 might be included in the 600?

Mr. JAMES. They might be, now that you mention it, there probably would be some. There probably would be some who would be included in that figure.

Mr. COSTELLO. But there are at least 600 who have the background that would indicate definitely subversive tendencies?

Mr. JAMES. I would stay with that figure; a minimum of 600.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I quote from the memorandum the paragraph entitled:



## POTENTIAL SABOTEURS AND SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS AT POSTON

If the Issei succeed in gaining control of the economic life of Poston through investment of their funds in Poston Consumer Cooperative Enterprises, a major opportunity is presented for internal sabotage; that is, turning hundreds of erstwhile loyal Americans of Japanese descent into persons of pronounced racial antipathy toward Caucasians in general, and to extend this further toward a mass acceptance of pro-Axis sentiments.

There are at Poston several evacuees of great financial power and ability and there is nothing in the record thus far to prove that they are loyal (or for that matter disloyal) to the United States.

## CASE HISTORY

\_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> age about 50 years, is reported to be the "Nori" food king of Japan. Since about 1920 he, by his own admission, has secured a virtual monopoly of the manufacture and sale of this seaweed product in the islands of the Empire. In 1941, according to his story, he came to the United States, secured a directorship in the Asahi Trading Co. of Los Angeles, and was exploring the possibility of developing a market for his product on the west coast when the war occurred.

At the present time, \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> is living with the \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>, a Christian minister, formerly of Bakersfield, Calif.

With \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> he has headed a group, largely of Issei, who since June 1, has campaigned for a consumer cooperative in Poston.

\_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>, by his own admission, is worth in the neighborhood of \$5,000,000. Although his funds in this country are supposedly "frozen," he seems to have sufficient ability to muster money for \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>.

It is difficult to see how \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>, by his own admission a lifelong Japanese industrialist used to highly competitive business, should become such a staunch advocate of consumer cooperatives. It is easier to learn how he dislikes and disapproves of American manners and customs accepted by many of \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> Nisei parishioners.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the information in this particular paragraph that I have just read true and correct?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; concerning this \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> has requested repatriation?

Mr. JAMES. I believe he has not requested repatriation. I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. But he is only here as a visitor?

Mr. JAMES. He is here as a visitor; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. So such a request would not be necessary?

Mr. JAMES. It is true, as that report states, that \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> has been and still is to the best of my knowledge, rooming with the \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup>.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as the war is concerned, as soon as the war is over, \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> would definitely have to return to Japan?

Mr. JAMES. Yes, sir; that is right. He would have to go back to Japan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This memorandum states that \_\_\_\_\_ <sup>3</sup> was a director in the Asahi Trading Co. of Los Angeles?

Mr. JAMES. Yes; he was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that the Japanese who has recently been placed in charge of the consumer cooperative at Poston was formerly connected with the Asahi Trading Co. of Los Angeles?

Mr. JAMES. A question on that, Mr. Steedman. The man who is now in charge of the Poston Cooperative Enterprises is Mr. George Y. Katow, who was general manager and director of the Asia Co. of Los Angeles.

<sup>3</sup> Name stricken from the record at the request of Chairman Costello.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There is a difference in the companies?

Mr. JAMES. Yes. Mr. Katow has not been in Japan for 30 years.

I have every reason to believe that he is loyal but he is at the present time, under the direction of the \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup>, who is the chairman of this all-important board of trustees of the Poston Cooperative Enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Under the law \_\_\_\_\_<sup>3</sup> is allowed to draw from frozen funds \$500 a month; is he not?

Mr. JAMES. I am not sure on that point, whether it is \$100 a month or \$500 a month. But he can definitely draw, to the best of my knowledge of that law, he can draw certain sums each month.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that include your interrogation of the witness?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Anything further this morning?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much, Mr. James, your having appeared before the committee.

I think you have been extremely frank and a very capable witness and we appreciate it very much.

Mr. JAMES. I would like to put in one further remark in the transcript that I have fully appreciated the difficulties with which the administration at Poston has worked; that I have found after being associated with them for a year to the best of my ability, the director and other administrators of the project are attempting to do a good job. But in my opinion they are handicapped by insufficient direction at Washington; and that they have been handicapped further by confusion and by uncertainties created by a lack of policy at Washington in the problem of segregation of disloyal and subversive Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In other words, they are conscientious and a hard-working group?

Mr. JAMES. That is the only thing I have attempted to put forward on my own and you may take it for what it is worth.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think you have helped us very materially in getting a clearer picture of the situation in the camp and the conditions under which the camp is being operated, as well as the many difficulties which the administrators of the camp are confronted with, and to that extent materially aids us.

Mr. JAMES. I feel if they were able to do so they would concur with me; and that is my last observation.

Mr. COSTELLO. We wish to thank you.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand adjourned until Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m., Tuesday, June 15, 1943.)

<sup>3</sup>Name stricken from the record at the request of

William Costello.

# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., in room 1543, United States Post Office and Court House, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, and Hon. Karl E. Mundt.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Steedman, will you call the first witness.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have a delegation here today from Phoenix, Ariz., composed of Mr. Lin B. Orme, president of the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, Mr. Harold R. Scoville, county attorney of Maricopa County, Mr. Lon Jordan, sheriff of Maricopa County and Mr. Irving Jennings, who is an attorney in Phoenix.

These gentlemen came from Phoenix to Los Angeles to testify regarding the Japanese problem as it affects the State of Arizona and particularly the section surrounding the city of Phoenix.

Our first witness is Mr. Orme, who has a prepared statement for the committee.

Will you stand and be sworn, Mr. Orme?

## TESTIMONY OF LIN B. ORME, PRESIDENT OF THE SALT RIVER VALLEY WATER USERS' ASSOCIATION

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. ORME. Lin B. Orme.

I have this statement and if you gentlemen have no objection I should like to read it.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Orme.

Mr. ORME. I am president of the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association, and have been for the past 9 years.

Prior to that time I was vice president, and also served on the council and was a member of the board of governors.

I have lived in the Salt River Valley near Phoenix since 1879, and have lived on, owned, and operated the same farm since 1896.

The Salt River project operates what is generally known as the Roosevelt project. It is a Federal reclamation project irrigating approximately 250,000 acres of land surrounding Phoenix, Ariz.

The water supply comes from the Salt and Verde Rivers which drain the mountains to the north and east of Phoenix.

The two rivers come together 30 miles above Phoenix where the water is taken out and distributed through our canal system which irrigates the project in the Salt River Valley.

There is one large storage dam on the Verde River approximately 190 feet in height above the stream bed, and storing when full, nearly 200,000 acre-feet of water.

On the Salt River there are four large storage dams: Roosevelt being the largest, which is 240 feet in height above the stream bed and holds when full 1,650,000 acre-feet of water.

Below that is Horse Mesa which is 272 feet in height above the river and stores 240,000 acre-feet of water.

Some 12 miles below that dam is the Mormon Flat Dam which is 150 feet above the stream bed and holds approximately 70,000 acre-feet of water.

Some 10 or 12 miles on down is Stewart Mountain Dam which is 140 feet in height above the stream bed and holds 60,000 acre-feet.

An acre-foot of water is that amount of water which will cover an acre of land 1 foot in depth. All reservoirs when full store nearly 2,000,000 acre-feet of water, or sufficient water to cover the entire project approximately 8 feet in depth.

The St. Francis Dam which went out a number of years ago contained only 24,000 acre-feet of water. The two dams recently blown up by the British in Germany had a capacity of approximately 250,000 acre-feet of water.

Roosevelt Dam alone when full holds six times that amount of water and at the present time has four times that amount of water in storage.

If any one of the dams should be blown out, it would cause disastrous floods. If any one of the dams on the Salt River would go out, it would unquestionably cause the other dams below to break and go out, and cause one of the great disasters of American history. If Roosevelt Dam should be blown up unquestionably all Phoenix would be under many feet of water, and the loss of life and destruction of property would be enormous.

The main line of the Southern Pacific Railroad crosses and runs close to the Salt River for many miles. Any such flood as I have described would put the main line of the Southern Pacific out of commission for many months. Thousands of troops pass over that railroad every week.

The entire cultivated area of Maricopa County, which is the county in which Phoenix is located, is approximately 400,000 acres; 250,000 acres of which is under the Salt River project.

Approximately 40 percent of the population of the State is in Maricopa County, and the greater part of which live in Phoenix, and in the cultivated area surrounding the city.

Some months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, the association placed guards on its dams. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the number of guards were increased. Since that time from 24 to 30 have been used to guard the dams and power plants of the association. Since July 3, 1941, the Government has paid one-half of the cost of this guard duty.



The Salt River Valley is not a semiarid country like southern California. Crops cannot be grown without irrigation. Should anything happen to our dams which would release the water, economic life so far as farming is concerned, with the exception of a small amount of land that could be irrigated from the low flow of the river, and from pumps, would cease.

The destruction of our dam system would also put out of commission our power plants. The production of power in this area is between 600,000,000 and 700,000,000 kilowatt-hours per year.

All of our storage dams with the exception of one, have large hydroelectric plants. In addition, we have five small hydroelectric plants on our canal system.

The total hydro capacity of these plants is approximately 100,000 horsepower.

We also have a new modern steam plant of approximately 37,000 horsepower and two Diesel plants of approximately 7,000 horsepower each.

In addition the association purchases 40,000 horsepower from the Government from the power plant just above Parker. All this power is distributed by the association all through the Salt River Valley; to the mines in the Globe-Miami and superior districts, and in the Casa Grande Valley for a distance of some 110 miles from Phoenix.

All told the association has approximately 1,500 miles of power lines; operates 13 transmission substations and 8 smaller substations.

The Inspiration Copper Co., which produces something like 10,000,000 pounds of copper per month, gets its power exclusively from our project. The Castle Dome Copper Co., a new mine which has just come into production, depends exclusively on power from our association. Its capacity is 10,000 tons of ore per day.

The Magma Copper Co., one of the large producers, also gets part of its power from the association. There are other mining companies which get smaller amounts of power from the association.

A large acreage of land is irrigated in this area from deep-well pumps. The association furnishes the power exclusively to approximately 200,000 acres of such land.

The association also furnishes power to the Central Arizona Light & Power Co., which in turn serves the city of Phoenix and most of the smaller towns in the valley as well as a pumping area northwest of Phoenix.

That company has an additional supply of power from a 60,000-horsepower steam plant west of Phoenix, and it likewise gets 40,000 horsepower from Parker Dam over the same lines which serve the association.

The power line which brings in this Parker power is unguarded. The Parker Dam also supplies power to Tucson, Ariz., the second largest city in the State of Arizona, as well as 7,000 horsepower to the Indian Service at Casa Grande and Florence.

We have been uneasy over the safety of our dams and the safety of our power stations ever since the war broke out. To guard all of our power lines, dams, power plants, substations, and our main canals 100 percent would take an army of men.

The Japanese infiltration into this valley commenced several years ago. Their standards of living are away below that of the other inhabitants of the valley. That standard is not one of necessity but ap-

parently one of choice. Sanitation around their homes could often be described a little less than filthy. They do not mingle with the white people, but have built their own social centers and schools where their own language is taught their children.

A number of years ago Arizona passed a law forbidding the ownership of land to be in persons other than those qualified for citizenship. That did not solve the problem.

Ownership of land was placed in the name of dummy holders or corporations, and it was often very difficult to ascertain the true ownership.

Since the Government has adopted the program of releasing the Japanese from the two centers in Arizona, they and their agents are trying to buy and lease large areas of land in the Salt River project.

There have been attempts at sabotage on the works of the project. In November 1941 four Japanese tried to visit one of our dam sites. As they had no passes they were denied permission to go near the dam.

This year a shot from a rifle severed one of our high-tension power lines. It was never discovered who did it.

In April 1942 three men attempted at night to enter the grounds surrounding the association's Diesel and steam plant. They were detected and fired on by the guards, and the intruders returned the fire. They had either revolvers or rifles. They were never apprehended.

On July 31, 1942, five Japanese went fishing in Roosevelt Lake. They stayed for some 24 to 48 hours. Three of them were from the Salt River Valley and two of them from Los Angeles. They did not enter the restricted area, nor did they come near the dam, other than to pass by it on the public highway which goes within a few feet of Roosevelt Dam.

As I understand it, there are approximately 30,000 Japanese in the two camps in Arizona. One of these camps is only 40 miles south of Phoenix, and the other is at Parker, some 150 miles from Phoenix.

If the Japanese are released from these camps they will naturally drift into the Salt River Valley area, and to let 30,000 Japanese into this Valley would play havoc with the economic life of this valley.

As the Government assumed the responsibility of moving these people from their natural habitats on the Pacific coast, they should also assume the responsibility of keeping them out of the Salt River Valley.

The war industries in the Salt River Valley are just as important as those on the Pacific coast. A large percentage of the copper production of the United States is dependent upon power from the Salt River Valley.

Goodyear has an airplane factory some 12 miles from Phoenix, that is depending exclusively for all its power from the Central Arizona Light & Power Co.

The large aluminum plant, costing some \$30,000,000, and just going into production 3 miles from Phoenix, is supplied with power from the association and the Central Arizona Light & Power Co.

There is another plant known as the Ari Research Co., which makes precision instruments for the Government, that is dependent for a large amount of power from the plants of the Salt River Valley Water Users' Association.

In addition to that we have six large air fields there, with thousands of soldiers who are being trained for the air service. All of these air fields require large amounts of electricity.

All of the lettuce, cantaloupes, and carrots used in the United States at certain seasons of the year come from the Salt River Valley. The Salt River Valley is the largest cattle-feeding area in the United States of similar size. Some 300,000 sheep are fed in the valley every winter. The total value of farm crops grown in the Salt River project is nearly \$30,000,000 per year.

If the United States turns loose 30,000 Japanese in the Salt River Valley, there is bound to be race riots that will make the zoot-suiter riots which you had in Los Angeles look tame.

I have some maps which I would like to turn over to the committee which show the locations of the various dams and power lines and canals about which I have testified.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will be very glad to receive them, Mr. Orme.

Mr. ORME. If there are any questions you would like to ask, I will be glad to answer them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Orme, directing your attention to the Roosevelt Reservoir, I believe you stated that reservoir is unguarded?

Mr. ORME. No; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You did not state that?

Mr. ORME. No; I did not. It has guards. We have four guards there. There is one man on all the time—just one man.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that one man sufficient to guard that large dam?

Mr. ORME. No; it is not. We have four guards and they are on 8 hours with an extra guard, but that is not sufficient.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those are company guards?

Mr. ORME. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Army does not provide any guards or protection for any of the dams in that system?

Mr. ORME. Right after Pearl Harbor for a few months they did.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you placed your guards there prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir; but they kept their guards right along with ours.

These dams from the first one to the last one cover about 70 miles of territory. And at Roosevelt we have four guards and at Mesa we have two and a guard on at night punches the clock and the guard on in the daytime just stays there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are the dams in country that is accessible to anyone who would want to go to them?

Mr. ORME. All but one. Roosevelt is very accessible. It is one of the main highways of central Arizona that goes over the top of Roosevelt Dam.

About the only rule we make there is that cars should keep going; that is, you shall not stop for a quarter of a mile on each side.

We did have a scheme of stopping them and making them roll up their windows but we found out that was slow and they would pile up in the road, and a lot of them are our own people. so we just shove them right on through.

The guards are entirely insufficient but if we increased the guard we would have to increase them to hundreds. Why, the Army put a detachment of 30 men to guard the Roosevelt Dam alone.



Mr. EBERHARTER. Just the one dam?

Mr. ORME. Just the one dam; and they also had 30 at our steam plant.

Mr. COSTELLO. With the 30 men at Roosevelt Dam, that only provided four or five guards on duty at any one time?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the others would be off duty at a camp located nearby?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact those four guards have the duty and responsibility of guarding 150 miles of shore line in connection with the reservoir; is that not true?

Mr. ORME. Yes. But we don't even attempt to do that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But there are 150 miles of shore line?

Mr. ORME. Yes; there are 150 miles of shore line with roads on each side that we don't attempt to guard.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Your testimony indicates that you think the chances of sabotage by these released Japs at Roosevelt Dam is pretty serious?

Mr. ORME. I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have any of the Japanese from the relocation centers centered in the Salt River Valley irrigation district?

Mr. ORME. You mean lately?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. ORME. My information is they have. I couldn't give you specific instances—well, I know they have; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they are attempting to secure land there?

Mr. ORME. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the attitude of the water users of the Salt River Valley irrigation district toward the Japanese moving into that area?

Mr. ORME. Absolutely against it almost 100 percent. I suppose there is always in a community some people who would like to make some money out of anything, but they are against them and were against them before even there was a war. They have always been against them coming into the community and restrictive laws have been passed.

They just passed one restrictive law in the last legislature but I will let Mr. Jennings tell you about that. It is against the law for a Jap to own or lease agricultural land there.

I don't think it says, "Japs" but it describes them.

Mr. COSTELLO. But that limitation, Mr. Orme, is not really effective, is it?

Mr. ORME. No; it is not entirely effective.

Mr. COSTELLO. That has been our experience.

Mr. ORME. Yes. They do business through dummies and one thing and another. An alien can't hold land but a child 10 years old does.

Mr. COSTELLO. An American-born Japanese can hold title to that land?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the title could be put in the name of a 6-month-old baby if they wished to do so?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or else they can handle it through a dummy corporation which is not too difficult to arrange?



Mr. ORME. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Orme.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORME. There is one instance that happened that I haven't here in my paper.

There was a very reputable nurse there who wrote me a letter about her nursing a quite wealthy Japanese and he was incoherent and was talking in his fever and in that fever he babbled about blowing up the Roosevelt Dam and I turned that matter over to the F. B. I. and they made some investigation but never made a report back to me, but that Japanese was removed and I supposed interned in some internment camp.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have the name of the Japanese that the nurse listened to and whom you say the F. B. I. removed?

Mr. ORME. No, I haven't but I can get it for you.

Mr. COSTELLO. I wonder, Mr. Orme, if you will obtain that name and supply it to Mr. Steedman?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Is the Salt River Valley in the evacuated area at the present time?

Mr. ORME. The restrictions cover a part of the Salt River Valley. It was first all in the restricted area but we had an immense cotton crop down there of pima cotton that the Government was very anxious to get for war purposes and that restriction was lifted with the idea that these Japs, if they were paid well, would pick the cotton. That is, there were seven or eight thousand of them and there might be a thousand that would go out and pick cotton in this restricted area.

As I understand the restriction was raised to allow them to do that, but only a couple of hundred went out and they were absolutely a failure. They might have been supermen in fishing and fighting but as cotton pickers they were no good. They were bums.

They had 500 soldiers guarding them but they were only out a few weeks.

Mr. MUNDT. Was there—was that near Glendale?

Mr. ORME. In Glendale and Pinal County. Most of them were used in Pinal County down closer to this settlement at Rivers.

Mr. MUNDT. But it didn't work out in either place?

Mr. ORME. No; it didn't work out. There was a few of the Japanese girls who did pretty well but they were all called off.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you attribute that failure on the part of the Japs to pick cotton due to the fact they were just not interested?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And do you feel they were not interested because they felt they were promoting the war effort?

Mr. ORME. I don't know. They didn't seem to be interested. They could make from \$3 to \$5 a day picking cotton if they would pick it, but they were not interested.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Orme, are you familiar with the relocation center known as the Gila River Relocation Center?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir; I am familiar with the land.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are familiar with the Rivers Relocation Center?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they have about 7,000 acres of land at the Rivers Relocation Center; isn't that correct?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir; they have 7,000 acres of good land and good water supply.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that land being farmed?

Mr. ORME. Why, they are farming it some but not a great deal. Just to what extent I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would it be possible to grow sufficient vegetables on that land to supply the camp if the land was farmed properly?

Mr. ORME. Oh, yes, they would be able, if they farmed it properly, to grow 5 or 10 times as much as they would use.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that land farmed before the camp was placed there?

Mr. ORME. It had been placed in a very high state of cultivation by the Indian Service of the United States Government for the Indians.

Mr. COSTELLO. What crops did they grow?

Mr. ORME. It was all in alfalfa then.

Mr. COSTELLO. And alfalfa requires a large amount of water, does it not?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that water supplied by the Gila River?

Mr. ORME. Yes, sir; it comes from the San Carlos Dam. They have made attempts to raise some cabbage and some stuff like that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any further questions?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Orme, for taking the time to come here from Phoenix to testify.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Arthur J. Barnes, who is a member of the State Legislature of Arizona, has just joined the delegation and will testify later.

Our next witness will be Mr. Harold R. Scoville, who is county attorney of Maricopa County, the county in which Phoenix is situated.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please stand and be sworn?

### TESTIMONY OF HAROLD R. SCOVILLE, COUNTY ATTORNEY, MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your name to the reporter?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Harold R. Scoville.

As Mr. Steedman has stated, I am the county attorney of Maricopa County which comprises the area of Phoenix.

I should first like to mention the fact that our population there is approximately, in Maricopa County, about 200,000 persons.

We have had prior to the war a number of Japanese families living there, as Mr. Orme has mentioned.

There were troubles in the past many years before the present war, which pretty well straightened the situation out.

We are principally concerned with the method or the activity at the present time, of the War Relocation Authority in relocating Japs in the Salt River Valley.

Those relocated there have come to my attention particularly as I have had some investigations under way for several weeks, particularly

in connection with the enforcement of a new law there which requires advertising of notice of intention to do business with persons whose movements are restricted under certain conditions, and which also comprise certain exceptions.

In that connection we have found that a large number—several hundred Japanese have been released to the Salt River Valley. For example, a recent check just made a few days ago, indicated that in the last 2 or 3 months, some 75 Japanese were released from Poston—approximately that number, and included among those Japs were Japs who came from California. And also there have been Japs released to the Salt River Valley from the camp at Dennison, Ark. I believe that is the Jerome Relocation Center.

We have run onto families who were interned there and who up to this time had never resided in Arizona.

In connection with the investigation in the field, we find that the Japs, as they express themselves to us, and as they have expressed themselves to farmers with whom they have sought places, them and their families, many, many of whom were heretofore in California, a desire to take up residence in the Salt River Valley because of the fact it is a vegetable-producing area.

They had a small hold in there before as has been mentioned by Mr. Orme, with their own community center, their own schools, and their own churches.

Mr. COSTELLO. How large a population of Japanese was that?

Mr. SCOVILLE. It had dwindled down to a comparatively small number. I don't believe we had more than, and I am just estimating now, more than 100 all together. Perhaps that is even too large.

Now, the method that appears to us from our investigation to be employed is to release the Japanese from Poston to people who desire to place them on land, either as employees or under some arrangement to us which is not clear, and also to release them to other Japanese.

We find, for example, in parts of the valley that there are Japanese who have land leased and have had it leased for many years holding it in the name of either dummy corporations or in the name of their children who are citizens, and to whom have been released as high as 30 or 35 Japs to one single other Japanese.

As I say, the public generally in the valley, and the people generally, are very, very seriously concerned with the activities of the War Relocation Authority in resettling or relocating the Japanese in the Salt River Valley.

The feeling is rather intense at times. Being interested in law enforcement, the situation is such at this moment that both the sheriff and myself have no doubt that in the event it should be tomorrow morning reported that a Japanese committed some overt act, either by way of sabotage or by way of some criminal assault on a white woman, let us say, when the people of Phoenix will take their rifles and there will follow numerous killings.

That is the feeling at the moment. And it has been spoken of, in returning the Japanese to California, that that would be apt to incite riot and difficulty.

We are very much nearer to that by reason of the fact of the steady influx of the Japanese into the valley.

That is the problem from the viewpoint of a law-enforcement officer and the problem has been stated by Mr. Orme from the standpoint



of the excellent opportunities that are there offered to anyone interested in committing any sabotage with its attending disaster.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel the retention of the Japanese in the relocation centers is a matter for their own safety as much as anything else?

Mr. SCOVILLE. It is a matter for their own safety and for the matter of respect for law and order in general on the part of the rest of the population which a person in my job attempts to hold on as high a plane as we possibly can.

I have talked to a considerable number of Japanese in this manner. They come to me individually and in delegations. I have had three different delegations to call upon me in connection with my activities in enforcing the new law which requires advertisement of intention to do business with persons whose movements are restricted.

Their general attitude is, that is, on the part of those who are citizens and some who are not—and most of those who make it a point to call upon the law authorities, of course, are the younger Japanese. Their general attitude is that they have rights and they intend to assert them. They are looking for suggestions constantly and make inquiry as to methods of evasion of our present law in order that they may continue to farm and operate in the fashion they have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Can alien Japanese lease land in Arizona?

Mr. SCOVILLE. An alien Japanese cannot lease land in our State.

Mr. COSTELLO. They cannot acquire title to land and cannot lease land?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Cannot lease it, but leases as mentioned before, are ordinarily executed in the name of minor children for whom a guardian has been appointed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Could the guardian be an alien Japanese?

Mr. SCOVILLE. No; no, he could not. They usually get someone else.

Mr. COSTELLO. A guardian has to be a citizen of the United States?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Yes, sir.

I would like to digress for just a moment, gentlemen, in connection with the work which has been done by our office.

Just yesterday I came across a matter in which I thought you might be very interested, in connection with the sale of rationed commodities to the Japanese.

In the investigation in that connection, it has been disclosed that some 15,000 pounds of candy was sold to the Poston and Rivers camps. I have here, and I am glad to supply for your records, copies of the original invoices. I do not have the original records here but they are available to me in Phoenix.

Those invoices will disclose that the Harold Brokerage Supply Co. by name, which is located at 741 East Ninth Street, Los Angeles, Calif., whose dealings I am informed are carried on by a man who heads that organization by the name of N. H. Marshall.

The four invoices which I have show for example, "April 30, 3,000 pounds"—

Mr. COSTELLO. What year?

Mr. SCOVILLE. 1943—were sold to the Poston Community Enterprises, which is the cooperative association operated within the camp and by and with the consent and approval of the War Relocation Authority. That is 3,000 pounds of hard candy and that was sold to Poston, as I mentioned before.



It is certified as being correct on the original voucher by a Japanese by the name of Seichi Honda, accountant, and the buyer is Bob Urgama.

There is also shown on that invoice 1,500 dozen grade A eggs at a price of \$690 and the 3,000 pounds of candy at a price of \$1,500.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Scoville, is candy rationed?

Mr. SCOVILLE. I do not mention candy as a rationed food, but only as sugar. We all know that the candy producers are rationed in their sugar, and the public generally find it very difficult to secure candy. At least in our locality I know that is true, and I believe it is generally true. The supply is very limited.

Then there is, on April 12, 1943, 4,000 pounds of candy to the Poston Community Enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what was the price of that candy?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Fifty cents a pound.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then that sale was \$2,000?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That is right. And also on the 3d of April, 4,000 pounds of candy, at 50 cents a pound, \$2,000. That was in 1943. That went to the Poston Community Enterprises. I understand a portion of that was also delivered to the Rivers camp and in that connection it has been brought to our attention—just a moment, let me go back to that.

I have another copy of another invoice by the same organization for the sale of an additional 4,000 pounds of candy, at 50 cents a pound, \$2,000, to the Gila River Community Enterprise, making a total amount of 15,000 pounds.

I believe that is all in the month of April.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these invoices into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. They may be introduced at this point.

**(The invoices referred to were marked "Scoville Exhibit No. 1," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you certify they are correct copies of the original invoices?

Mr. SCOVILLE. I have the originals of which these are true copies; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the total pounds purchased?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Fifteen thousand pounds.

Mr. SCOVILLE. Within a period of a few weeks.

Mr. MUNDT. That is about 1 pound per Japanese inhabitant at the camps?

Mr. SCOVILLE. There were two camps involved.

I just happened to come across that and thought it might be of some interest to you.

Now, I don't believe either myself or the sheriff can emphasize too much the fact that a very very serious situation does exist as the result of the relocation of so many of the Japanese in the Salt River Valley.

Mr. MUNDT. About how many have been relocated there all together?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Well, I attempted to ascertain how many had been released from the Poston camp, for example, and all I was able to get was the dates of release on those whom we had discovered and had their names.

And in connection with that investigation, I imagine that I have here the names of well over 200. As I mentioned all those that I have

been able to tie down to any particular time is some, approximately, 75 who were released in the last 2 or 3 months.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you inquire of either the Rivers or Poston camps for the names of persons who had been released to the Salt River Valley?

Mr. SCOVILLE. We were able to give them a list of those we had and they furnished us with the dates of release as near as they could find them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A list of those that you had?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Of those we had; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But that was not a complete list?

Mr. SCOVILLE. No; that was not a complete list.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Only those to whom your attention had been called?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they did not give you a list of the names of those that they had released, although those names should be available to the camp authorities?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That is right. And my own efforts to determine if there was such a list were futile in Phoenix. Neither the F. B. I. nor the Immigration Service had such lists available of Japanese released there.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you call on the project head for such a list?

Mr. SCOVILLE. A personal call was made in that connection by Mr. Barnes and also by an investigator from my office and they were unable to secure it.

Mr. Wade Head at that time was away from the camp and they talked to an assistant director there.

Mr. COSTELLO. About what time was that request made to Mr. Head?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That was approximately 10 days ago or a week ago—a week ago today. We desired that list in our attempt to keep up with the situation.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the assistant director to whom Mr. Barnes spoke, say he would prepare a list and send it to you after Mr. Head returned?

Mr. SCOVILLE. I was advised that he did not—I was advised by the investigator who went there that he did not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you visited Poston center yourself?

Mr. SCOVILLE. No; I have not visited it myself. I sent my investigator there, Mr. Phillips who went with Mr. Barnes, who will testify later, and it is Mr. Phillips' assertion to me as a positive fact that they found no guards about the gate of the camp whatsoever.

They drove into the camp and searched at some length in order to determine where the office was located and where they might find Mr. Head, for whom they were looking, which was rather a surprise to them.

I had armed them with credentials in order that they might effect an entrance to the Poston camp.

I believe the sheriff who will speak after I do, who has had some experience and business at the camp, will tell you more about that. Our business there has been because we feel there is a threat to our industries and military objectives in the Salt River Valley.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not feel it would require any large number of people to effect sabotage on the dams or other important installations around Phoenix?

Mr. SCOVILLE. It would take only one or two persons. As a matter of fact I have spent practically all my life in the valley and Maricopa County and that portion of the State, as Mr. Orme pointed out the situation with regard to the dams, with the vast amount of shore line of the Roosevelt Dam, the fact that, although it appears to be in an inaccessible part of the country, a person who takes the highway, the old Apache trail to Roosevelt Dam—there are other roads, bush highways where it would be very easy to approach the dam from above it and put a raft into the river or into the reservoir; and as Mr. Orme has pointed out, cause a large explosion which would wreck that dam and would carry the others with it, and would entirely submerge the valley.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, the release of one or two Japanese who have subversive intentions or any desire to commit sabotage, would undoubtedly be able to carry that out with a great deal of ease?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Under present circumstances they certainly could.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it wouldn't require a large number of them? It would only mean the releasing of one or two disloyal Japanese among other evacuees released? Just one or two would be sufficient to carry out a program of that character?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That is correct; it would not be difficult.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would the people of Arizona object to the relocation centers if they were properly managed, would they?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Well, let me say this: That we have also objected to their being situated there, in view of the fact that we believe the danger to the military is just as great there as it is in southern California. There has always been an objection to the location of the centers there.

But the greatest concern of the people of Maricopa County, is the relocation of the 30,000 Japanese, the greater portion of which appear settling in our valley and in our irrigated areas.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If there was a strict administration of these camps and the Japanese in them were confined to the camps, and not allowed to roam about throughout that area, would the people be willing for the camps to remain there for the duration?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Well, we feel if they were properly guarded and maintained strictly, that our problem, our worry to some extent would certainly be decreased.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCOVILLE. There is one other matter, and I am speaking only on hearsay now, but I have every reason to believe it is true, and that is in connection with further investigations the committee might be interested in.

There are or is a great deal of mineral water which I am advised is being sold to camps at something like \$1 a bottle which is being bought by the Government.

We get along pretty well with the water up there, without importing any California special mineral water. That has caused a great deal of comment.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is the normal drinking water that is available to the camps is perfectly satisfactory for drinking purposes?



Mr. SCOVILLE. I am sure that is true insofar as the Rivers camp is concerned. It is within close proximity to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does Sheriff Jordan have the detailed facts with reference to that mineral water?

Mr. SCOVILLE. I believe he has more information than I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Scoville, for having been present and giving us your testimony.

We will take a short recess.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Will you call your next witness?

Mr. STEEDMAN: The next witness is Sheriff Jordan of Maricopa County.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please stand and be sworn?

### TESTIMONY OF LON JORDAN, SHERIFF OF MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. JORDAN. Lon Jordan. I am sheriff of Maricopa County and I have been connected with that office most of the time since 1930.

I have a little statement that I prepared which I would like to read.

Mr. Scoville has told you—talked about just everything that we had in mind, but I would like to read the statement which I have prepared.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may do so.

Mr. JORDAN. There is an extremely hostile attitude toward the Japs in and around Phoenix, the capitol city of the State. This is perhaps true of other sections of the State, but Maricopa County of which Phoenix is the county seat, is a rich agricultural area and many of the Japs who have been released from relocation centers have settled in this area.

I am fearful that if Japs are released and attempt to settle in and around Phoenix, there will be rioting and bloodshed. My office is being called 30 or 40 times a day by people who are demanding that I do something about getting these Japs out. They make no bones about saying that if the law enforcement officers cannot handle the job, citizens will take it into their own hands.

Several years before the war, when there was no particular reason for hostility toward the Japs, a good many of the Jap people were injured and an attempt made by the farmers in and around Phoenix to run them out of the State. Every time the newspapers carry a story of some atrocity committed by Japs against American soldiers; the telephones at my office are kept hot, demanding that we get "these damn Japs out of the country."

It is my opinion that all of these camps should be placed under the direct control of the Army or the Marines.

Mr. STEEDMAN. From a law-enforcement officer's standpoint, you are opposed to the release of the Japanese from the relocation centers?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir; very much so. There is not a day we don't get call after call, and as I say, especially every time some of the citizens see a new Japanese face around the valley. They are right on us right now to see what we can do about it and why we don't do something.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Do Japanese from the relocation center at Poston visit Phoenix for the purpose of shopping and go to theaters?

Mr. JORDAN. No; we don't have—do you mean do we have them coming to our office?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No. Do Japanese from the relocation centers visit Phoenix?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I haven't seen them there myself, but I have had several complaints that they come there and stay all night and put up at the hotels in Phoenix. Of course, I never checked the hotels to see if they do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the Japanese who visit Phoenix escorted by Caucasians?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I haven't heard of any that were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You haven't investigated such complaints?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I haven't because there are just so many of them a fellow couldn't do it. We are short-handed and that is all we would be doing, investigating Japs, if we investigated every call we get.

Mr. STEEDMAN. With your present force of men you do not feel you could maintain law and order in Maricopa County if Japanese are continued to be released to settle there?

Mr. JORDAN. No; with four times the size force I couldn't maintain law and order because the people are very unhappy about it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Scoville stated you had some information regarding the sale of mineral water to the Japanese in the relocation centers; is that correct?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, now, my information is not in too good shape. I have a deputy or did have at one time, who had a water business there in Phoenix and at the time the tire rationing program began he was afraid that he couldn't get tires for his trucks so he sold his business out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is the name of that deputy?

Mr. JORDAN. Cal Boies. A short time after he sold his business he came—in fact I kind of insisted on his selling it because I thought he would be in trouble over the rubber situation and after a short time he came in and was kind of razzing me because I had caused him to lose a good business.

I asked him what the trouble was and he said that the man he sold out to had gotten a contract with some fellow in Los Angeles to deliver—I have forgotten the amount, but it seems like 500 bottles of water a week or maybe more than that, to Poston, and the best I remember is this water was costing him about 25 cents in Phoenix and something less than 50 cents a bottle delivered over there, and the man that was selling it was getting a dollar a bottle for it.

Now, I could check up on that very easily when I go back and give you the correct information.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please do that and write us a letter giving us the facts?

Mr. JORDAN. I sure will.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you visited the Poston center yourself?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir; I was in Poston on—I don't recall just how long ago—I was over there on some business and I just thought while I was there I would go down and take a look at the camp.

Another boy and myself got in the car and drove around and drove into the camp and all over the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you stopped by any guards when you drove into the camp?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir. We were not stopped at any time. Drove all around through the camp and never were stopped. Japs were walking on both sides of the street and we were looking at the recreation hall and the stores and nobody ever stopped us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the automobile in which you were riding have any particular identification marks to indicate you were the sheriff?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Or to indicate that you were a law enforcement officer?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir; it didn't have anything.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were there no guards at the gate?

Mr. JORDAN. I didn't see any guards. We just drove in there and nobody said anything to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Could people drive in or walk in the same as you did?

Mr. JORDAN. Oh, yes; there is a big wide gate—a gate about 15 feet wide.

Mr. MUNDT. Were you stopped when you went out of the center?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you enter the camp through the main approach?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I will tell you it was the west side of the camp. I never thought about ever having to remember or discuss it again, but we just drove around the camp on the outside and we came in from the west side but for what reason I don't remember.

Mr. COSTELLO. When you approached the camp from the road, you made a circle around the camp?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir. Our business was on the side next to Parker and I was over there after a man, I recall now, and afterward we just drove clear around the camp and on the west side there was a gate open and we saw a lot of Japs in there and drove in to see what it looked like.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you have the name of the man in Phoenix who purchased the water business from your deputy?

Mr. JORDAN. I don't have it with me; no.

Mr. COSTELLO. You might also provide the name of the party in Los Angeles who sold the water to the man in Phoenix at the same time you secure the name of the firm in Phoenix.

Mr. JORDAN. All right.

I believe I heard you folks say you were going to Poston for an investigation. If you do and if you will contact a boy by the name of Peterson—Dewey Peterson, who is a drag-line operator there—he might give you some information as to how they behave inside of the camp and what help he gets out of the Japanese that are supposed to help him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it your definite opinion that the people of Maricopa County are opposed to the Japanese settling there?

Mr. JORDAN. Very much so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is all of Maricopa County in the restricted zone or is it unrestricted insofar as Japanese traveling is concerned?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I think part of it is restricted and part of it isn't.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know where the line runs?

Mr. JORDAN. It just runs a short way north of Phoenix.

Mr. SCOVILLE. Perhaps I can help on that, if I may interrupt?

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Scoville.

Mr. SCOVILLE. The zone 1 line is moved clear down south of Pima County line. That is some 100 miles below Rivers, approximately—maybe not quite that far, 60 or 70 miles, but our entire area is unrestricted except for certain designated areas around airfields, as I understand it.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, Maricopa County is in zone 2?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That I can't tell you. I have the proclamation but I didn't bring it with me. The Japanese move freely and we see them all the time.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Japanese are free to move anywhere around the county?

Mr. JORDAN. They are all over, everywhere—everywhere they see fit to go.

Mr. COSTELLO. You are not in zone 1?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Absolutely not.

Mr. COSTELLO. And zone 1 is the area in which the Japanese have been excluded entirely?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all. We thank you very much for appearing here, Mr. Sheriff.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the next witness is Mr. Barnes.

### TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR J. BARNES, MEMBER OF THE ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your name for the record?

Mr. BARNES. Arthur J. Barnes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Barnes, are you a member of the Arizona State Legislature?

Mr. BARNES. I am.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And from what county?

Mr. BARNES. Maricopa County.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Barnes, did you make an investigation of the Poston relocation center near Parker, Ariz.?

Mr. BARNES. I was at the relocation center last Monday, a week ago today, in company with an investigator from the county attorney's office.

For the past 2 months I have been devoting a good deal of my time to this Japanese question in our valley.

Mr. STEEDMAN. While at the Poston center, did you interview Mr. Head?

Mr. BARNES. Mr. Head was not there at the time but Mr. Nelson was in charge when we arrived there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Nelson for statistics regarding the number of Japanese that had been released to settle in the Salt River Valley and in and around Phoenix?

Mr. BARNES. I asked Mr. Nelson if he could give us a list of all those who had been released to Maricopa County and he said, "No," but that if we would furnish him a list of those that we were interested in he would have them looked up for us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you gather from that conversation that they didn't know what Japanese had been released to that vicinity?

Mr. BARNES. That is the distinct impression that I received, that they didn't know and that it would have been difficult to find out from their records.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But he did check your list?

Mr. BARNES. He did check my list and on my list there were a number that he couldn't even find on his records, although I had their names and their signatures that they had come from Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did you advise him of that fact?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did he correct his records accordingly?

Mr. BARNES. Well, I presume that he did. We couldn't get them while we were there. We had to leave our list and come back to Phoenix and it was mailed to us 2 or 3 days later.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much time did you spend at Poston?

Mr. BARNES. Oh, in the camp proper I presume we were there an hour.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who were you with?

Mr. BARNES. Mr. Jack Phillips, an investigator for the county attorney's office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you have any difficulty in gaining access to the camp proper?

Mr. BARNES. No; no difficulty at all. In fact, after we had finally found the office, Mr. Head's office, and had transacted our business, I asked Mr. Nelson if there was any place around there that we might butt into that wasn't proper for us to be in and he said, "Well, you have a pass, haven't you?" and I said, "No, we have no pass."

"Well," he said, "I guess maybe we had better give you one," so he called a girl and had a pass made out for us to get out of the place, but we had no trouble. We would not have needed the pass to get out or in.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was your car searched when you entered the center?

Mr. BARNES. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And when you left was your car searched?

Mr. BARNES. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did your car have an identification indicating it was a State-owned automobile or an official car?

Mr. BARNES. No; I didn't have any identification on the automobile at all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. No identification?

Mr. BARNES. Only the license plates.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Your car simply had Arizona State license plates on it?

Mr. BARNES. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. License plates indicating a private car and not an official car?

Mr. BARNES. For a private car; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any additional information regarding your visit to the Poston center that you would like to give to the committee?

Mr. BARNES. Yes. I went there with Mr. Phillips who was gathering some information for the county attorney's office, but my particular interest in the visit was to find out why out of something over



200 people, whom I had personally interviewed from relocation centers, that with the exception of less than a dozen, they were all of them former residents of California and not the Japanese that had been taken out of Maricopa County.

I asked Mr. Nelson three different times why it was they were sending the California Japanese in to us instead of Japanese that had been taken away from us at the time of the evacuation.

He evaded the question every time. The nearest thing to an answer he gave was that he sent those out who made application to go out and he presumed, maybe, the Arizona Japs hadn't made an application.

If I may be permitted to make an observation based upon my work, I am satisfied that there is a direct conspiracy to get all of the Japs from the Western States centered in Arizona, and that they be settled there before the time comes to break up these camps and then say to us: "Well, Arizona, you have got these Japs and you have got to take care of them."

In other words it appears to me to be a direct conspiracy to unload the Japs on our area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And are the Arizona people opposed to that?

Mr. BARNES. The people are bitterly opposed to it. In fact I am saying without mental reservation that the situation at the present time is so acute that should some Japanese commit an overt act or some hair-brained individual allege that they had committed an overt act, that it would lead to very serious implications in our valley at the present time, even to the point of bloodshed.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any statistics on the number of Japanese who have been relocated in the State of Arizona from the relocation centers?

Mr. BARNES. I have a list of over 200 that have returned to our valley from various relocation camps. I am satisfied, though, that I have not anywhere near the number of those that have returned and it was for that reason that we went to Poston, to see if we could get the total list of those that had been sent there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you are attempting to compile statistics now on the exact number that have been released and are in the State of Arizona?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As soon as you have finished that compilation, will you furnish the committee with a copy of it?

Mr. BARNES. I would be glad to. However, you realize this, that they are scattered all over the valley out there and there are large numbers, I dare say, that are working as domestics in homes in the city that we will never locate, but we are riding our streetcars and busses and see them getting on the busses from residential areas and we have reason to believe that there are a large number of domestics working in homes that we never will be able to locate.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are speaking of Japanese in Phoenix now?

Mr. BARNES. In Phoenix, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Phoenix is a large Air Corps area; is it not?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir; it is becoming one of the important air centers of the Nation today.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does anyone know in whose homes these domestics are working?

Mr. BARNES. No one knows as far as we are able to learn. We have searched every available place where we thought the names should be available and no one knows where they are.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated that there was a conspiracy?

Mr. BARNES. In my mind, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. To settle the Japanese in Arizona?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the persons behind the conspiracy?

Mr. BARNES. I do not but I am satisfied that there is a master brain behind it some place and that there is some reason for it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you made an investigation to determine who the persons are behind the conspiracy?

Mr. BARNES. I have carefully tried to find out but I have been unable to find out.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many Japanese were removed from Arizona and put into relocation centers?

Mr. BARNES. That I could not answer. I have seen the figure on it but I wouldn't dare state the figure at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the Japanese removed from all of Arizona in the beginning?

Mr. BARNES. As far as I know but I am only conversant with Maricopa County. But the Japanese, most of them, were removed from there. There were some few who had been born there and had connections that were not removed at all.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, Maricopa County originally was part of the restricted area and the Japanese were prohibited from going into that area?

Mr. BARNES. It was, yes; but the ban was lifted some time ago.

Mr. COSTELLO. After the lifting of the ban, there was no attempt to allow the Japanese who had been removed from that area to return to the area?

Mr. BARNES. There is less than 1 dozen of those whom I have checked, that were formerly from that area.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, it would appear if any one was to be released to that area, particularly since the restrictions have been lifted, that the original Japanese who had lived there before would be the ones who would be entitled to return to their homes?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But that has not been done?

Mr. BARNES. That has not been done; no.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know who might be exerting this pressure to release the California Japanese into Arizona for settlement there?

Mr. BARNES. I don't know. I might guess but it would be purely a guess.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any indication of that pressure to release them emanating from the camps themselves or from outside sources?

Mr. BARNES. I would think it emanates from outside the camps but as I say, I have no definite information on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't think it is the Japanese in the camps who are themselves trying to obtain permission to be released and locate in Arizona?

Mr. BARNES. Well, I think they are making the effort but I rather think there is some motivating power behind them that has them to make the effort.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel they are being induced to do that?

Mr. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe the pressure would emanate from California or from the War Relocation Authority in Washington?

Mr. BARNES. Well, I don't believe it emanates from the W. R. A. office in Washington.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You said you might speculate on the persons behind the conspiracy to release the Japanese. Would you care to do that?

Mr. BARNES. I would speculate that it is a military motive emanating from Japan itself.

Mr. STEEDMAN. To release the Japanese?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir; to settle them in our area which is a strategic area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Directing your attention again to the visit you made to Parker, did you see any military police on the highway as you drove into Parker?

Mr. BARNES. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see any military police at Poston?

Mr. BARNES. The only thing I saw in the nature of military police, was just as we got inside of the camp, we saw a car marked "M. P." that was full of Japs. There were no white men in it at all. They were Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it an Army automobile?

Mr. BARNES. It was an Army type automobile; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Driven by Japanese?

Mr. BARNES. Driven by Japanese; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And full of Japs?

Mr. BARNES. Full of Japs; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The back seat and the front seat?

Mr. BARNES. Back and front seats; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And no white men in the car at all?

Mr. BARNES. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were any military police on guard at the gate when you drove in?

Mr. BARNES. There were two boys about a mile and a half from the camp at a little station out there that, I presume were in charge of the station. We pulled up and asked how we could find Mr. Head's office and they said they didn't think Mr. Head was there. We asked them if they could find out for us and they went to the telephone and phoned and said that Mr. Head wasn't there, but that Mr. Nelson was and he would see us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you identify yourselves?

Mr. BARNES. We did tell them that we were from the county attorney's office in Maricopa County.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they passed you in?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, they passed us there, but that was a mile and a half up the road from the camp. From the camp there were roads leading out everywhere from there on, at which there was nobody at all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Nothing further.

Mr. MUNDT. Is anyone in your county or your city notified when released Japanese are sent to your area?

Mr. BARNES. If there is, we have been unable to find it, and we have tried very hard to find out.

Mr. MUNDT. Has the sheriff endeavored to determine that?

Mr. BARNES. I can't speak for the sheriff; but I have.

Mr. MUNDT. Sheriff, have you been notified when the Japanese are released to your county?

Mr. JORDAN. I have not; no, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know of anybody in the area who has been notified?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I don't know of anybody.

Mr. MUNDT. Has the county attorney's office been notified?

Mr. SCOVILLE. It has not. As I mentioned a while ago we attempted to secure such a list but were unable to do that.

Mr. MUNDT. As far as you three gentlemen know there is no authority anywhere in your area who has been notified by the Washington office or by the project office when Japanese are sent into your territory?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Insofar as we are able to learn, no. I asked Mr. Head that very question, I believe it was on Saturday on the telephone—no; it was later in the week, about Thursday, and he advised me that the only place that there might be any—we might be able to find that would be to try the regional office in San Francisco. I believe he said they might be able to give us that information.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there an F. B. I. office in Phoenix?

Mr. BARNES. Oh, yes; a large staff.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you asked them whether they have been notified when the Japanese are returned?

Mr. SCOVILLE. Yes; we have. We asked for a list and they said they didn't have one available.

Mr. MUNDT. The F. B. I. didn't have a list either?

Mr. BARNES. No.

Mr. MUNDT. It seems to me that we have had testimony here that the F. B. I. was informed when the Japanese were sent into their territory.

Mr. BARNES. We haven't been so informed and we tried to get a list. They referred us to the immigration authorities and the immigration authorities said they didn't have it.

Mr. COSTELLO. When you talked to Mr. Head, he did not indicate the list of names was turned over to the F. B. I., did he?

Mr. SCOVILLE. No. He indicated to me that all that would be handled by an office higher than his.

Mr. MUNDT. You said you interviewed about 200 Japanese personally?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Who had been released?

Mr. BARNES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. From your interviews with those Japanese, do they seem to have the feeling that they are locating in Arizona permanently or just there temporarily?

Mr. BARNES. That is their opinion, that as fast as they can they want to get a hold of something and stay right there.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you gather from your conversations with the Japanese that some authority had led them to believe that they were being released permanently in your community or is that just a hope on their part?



Mr. BARNES. I would not say that my information had led me to believe that some authority had led them to believe that, but that they have a definite aim in that direction.

Mr. MUNDT. They have that aim or hope?

Mr. BARNES. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. But they have had no reason to feel that that is the case?

Mr. BARNES. I could not say that they had been given that assurance by any authority of this Nation.

Mr. MUNDT. They are not taking any steps which would lead you to believe that they are acting with that in mind—that they are there for keeps?

Mr. BARNES. Well, I wouldn't say that because I have on three different instances, been asked if I knew where they could rent land and, of course, told them that I didn't, so that in itself shows that they are making an effort.

Mr. MUNDT. You haven't come across any instances where they have been able to sign up any long-term leases or rental contracts?

Mr. BARNES. No; I have not; with the exception of one Jap who holds a 5-year lease, but that was made before he was sent to the relocation center and then he came back and took up his lease, which has something over 2 years yet to run, I believe.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you known of any instances where Japanese are actually buying land?

Mr. BARNES. Nothing with the exception of two or three notices that have been put in the paper recently, of intention to sell to Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. In your experience have you run across any instances where Japanese have purchased land?

Mr. BARNES. In my interviews I have not; no, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Barnes, have you conferred with the United States attorney at Phoenix, Mr. Flynn, with reference to the number of alien Japanese who have been released to return to the Phoenix area?

Mr. BARNES. No; I haven't talked with him on it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the other gentlemen who testified today, if they have conferred with Mr. Flynn regarding the number of alien Japanese who have been released in the Phoenix area from the relocation centers.

Mr. SCOVILLE. I don't believe I have.

Mr. JORDAN. No; I haven't.

Mr. ORME. No.

Mr. SCOVILLE. There are a number of them, as Mr. Barnes mentioned, a dozen or so of the families who were there before—members in the families where the parents are aliens who have returned. I know of seven or eight of them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have had testimony, Mr. Chairman, to the effect that the aliens are required to check in with the United States attorney in the district in which they settle.

I have no further questions of Mr. Barnes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnes, for appearing before the committee today.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Jennings.

**TESTIMONY OF IRVING A. JENNINGS, ATTORNEY, PHOENIX, ARIZ.**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. JENNINGS. Irving A. Jennings.

I hold no official position. I am an attorney in Phoenix, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you connected with the American Legion?

Mr. JENNINGS. During the years 1940 and 1941 I was chairman of the national legislative committee of the American Legion and by reason of that fact have been quite familiar with the activities and investigations of the Dies committee.

In fact, as you men know, the Legion has always gone to bat every time an appropriation came up for a continuance of the Dies committee.

It was my job for 2 years to assist in every way we could to see that the committee continued.

I would say that I believe the public generally has the utmost confidence in the Dies committee. They believe that the Dies committee is an unbiased public body and they believe that the Dies committee should be commended most strongly for bringing these facts out and invite the press in so the people of the United States can really learn what is going on in these camps.

Our newspapers in Arizona have attempted from time to time to get information directly from these camps, particularly at the time of the riot in Poston last November, but they were denied admittance—denied any information concerning it.

To illustrate what I mean by the confidence of, at least the people in Arizona, have in the findings and the testimony given before this committee, yesterday there was a hearing before the Arizona Corporation Commission, which had revoked a permit or a license of a Japanese cooperative which was organized and incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, and attempted to qualify as a foreign corporation in the State of Arizona.

The War Relocation Authority had their counsel represent this Japanese cooperative which consisted of 7,800 members—all Japanese.

The chairman of the Arizona Corporation Commission made the statement at the opening of the hearing yesterday, that if there had been any doubt as to the wisdom of the Corporation Commission in denying or canceling that license, that it had been removed by the facts which had developed during the Dies committee hearings in Los Angeles, and during the past week or 10 days.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the permit denied?

Mr. JENNINGS. The hearing is still continuing this morning. It had been cancelled and this was an effort on the part of the War Relocation Authorities themselves to have it reinstated.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know who the attorney is representing the Japanese cooperative?

Mr. JENNINGS. A man by the name of Terry.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is he employed by the Government?

Mr. JENNINGS. He is employed by the Government; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. By the W. R. A.?

Mr. JENNINGS. By the W. R. A.; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is he a white person or a Japanese?

Mr. JENNINGS. He is a white person.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has the American Legion adopted any resolution regarding the relocation of Japanese in the State of Arizona?

Mr. JENNINGS. The location organization has not adopted any resolutions that I know of, except that they do, of course, approve the stand and resolutions that have been adopted by the national organization.

You are perhaps familiar with those resolutions or the stand that the Legion has taken nationally, which is to the effect that, in the first place, those Japanese who are definitely disloyal to this country should be segregated and placed in concentration camps.

The eventual program of the American Legion is, of course, to move all Japanese out of the United States—out of the territorial limits of the United States.

May I say that I don't believe Mr. Barnes intended to imply by his testimony that we regarded an Arizona Jap as any better than a California Jap. They are all the same. We don't want any of them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that the general feeling of the people in and around Phoenix?

Mr. JENNINGS. It is very strongly that way. As a matter of fact the people of the State of Arizona have determined they are not going to have them there and there is now a legal boycott against trading with any Japanese in the State of Arizona.

Mr. Scoville did not mention it but the last legislature passed a law which requires a 10 days' publication of notice and also a filing of that notice in the Office of the Secretary of State, of any proposed dealing with Japanese except the purchase of foodstuff and clothing.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any attempt to do business with the Japanese as a regular procedure, would have to be advertised 10 days in advance before a contract could be negotiated and go into effect?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct; and Mr. Scoville, within the last 2 or 3 days, filed information against four citizens in the city of Phoenix, or near the city of Phoenix, who had not complied with this law.

The Standard Oil Co., a short time ago, was charged with a violation of that law and pleaded guilty to violating the law—for selling, I think, \$9 worth of gasoline and oil.

So, I believe, generally speaking, that the law is being very carefully observed by the people. They just won't sell them anything—it makes no difference what.

Mr. COSTELLO. With reference to the sale of oil, was that a casual sale to an individual Japanese?

Mr. JENNINGS. Just a casual sale.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then it would not be possible for a Japanese to go to a filling station and get gasoline and oil for his car, would it, without having such a notice published?

Mr. SCOVILLE. No; it would not. That was a Japanese who bought gasoline from the Standard Oil Co. by the barrel or half barrel which he used for his tractors and trucks.

Mr. JENNINGS. It isn't possible for him to purchase without complying with this act—anything except food and clothing.

Mr. COSTELLO. Food and clothing are the only things exempt?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is right.

Mr. SCOVILLE. May I make a correction? Goods, wares, and merchandise for personal consumption, are exceptions, and liquor and medicines.



Mr. JENNINGS. Yes; and liquor.

Mr. COSTELLO. But gasoline that is used for a private car of a Japanese for ordinary driving would not be?

Mr. SCOVILLE. That is the construction that has been placed upon it locally.

Mr. ORME. Could I add something? Tell what the court did to those who pleaded guilty as a result of the Standard pleading guilty.

Mr. JENNINGS. The court imposed a \$1,000 fine for the sale of \$9 worth of gasoline and oil in violation of this law.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the company pay the fine or did they appeal the case?

Mr. JENNINGS. No; they paid the fine; they didn't appeal the case.

Mr. SCOVILLE. They didn't want the attendant publicity; they wanted to plead guilty.

Mr. JENNINGS. It was the definite intention on the part of the War Relocation officials to release a large number of Japanese to the Phoenix area as evidenced by the fact that in the latter part of April of this year, the Federal Government set up an employment office in Phoenix for Japanese. The avowed purpose of that employment office was to find work for Japanese that they planned to release from these relocation centers.

The Governor of the State of Arizona very strongly protested that action and within about a week the employment office was closed up, and we haven't had any since that time.

It seems to be the general feeling in our State that there is no difference—of course there is the legal difference—but actually no difference between the American-born Japanese and the alien Japanese. As a matter of fact they attempt to hide behind a cloak of American citizenship while at the same time they maintain their dual citizenship or loyalty to the Emperor of Japan. Unquestionably that leaves a feeling in the minds of the people that there is no difference at all.

As a matter of fact the way one person put it, he said, if we happened to have been born in Japan, would that make us a Jap? The feeling is just the reverse of that—because they happened to have been born in the United States they are not American citizens although technically, of course, they have been recognized as such.

Mr. MUNDT. Is this new law which prohibits anybody in Arizona from selling anything to a Japanese except food, clothing, liquor, and medicine—does that law apply to American-born Japanese also?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Has anybody brought the question of the constitutionality of that law into the Supreme Court?

Mr. JENNINGS. It hasn't been tried out yet. There is apparently no loyal American citizen who wishes to try it out.

Mr. COSTELLO. At least in Arizona?

Mr. JENNINGS. At least there; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. The word "Japanese" is not mentioned in the act, is it?

Mr. JENNINGS. No; it is not mentioned. They are not mentioned by name. We have a copy of the act here if you would like to have it.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like for it to be in the record as an exhibit.



Mr. JENNINGS. It is a legislative intent of the State Legislature to actually boycott the Japanese in any business enterprise of any sort.

Mr. SCOVILLE. And I would like to say in that connection, if I might interrupt, devious means are being used to avoid that act. For example, some Japanese themselves proposed to me if they set up a corporation, the members of which were American citizens, that dealing with the corporation would not be a person whose movement was restricted and in that manner they could circumvent the application of this law.

They also, some of them, have entered into agreements with a member of the Caucasian race whereby that person will transact all their business for them on a small percentage basis.

There are devious routes being used to evade the law at the present time. We are constantly attempting to ferret them out.

Mr. MUNDT. If that law is constitutional, if it can be enforced, doesn't that solve your problem in Arizona? Obviously, a Japanese cannot live there very long if he can't buy anything except liquor, food, medicine, and clothing?

Mr. JENNINGS. I will say this: The people of the State of Arizona are doing everything they can to solve the problem, but we are strongly of the opinion that we are bucking pretty strong forces in the National Capitol, and that we might not be able to stand out against those who have in mind releasing the Japs from these centers.

Mr. SCOVILLE. In connection with the matter you just mentioned, the foodstuffs at either wholesale or retail, are exempt. The majority of the Japs are devoting their efforts to raising foodstuffs.

Mr. MUNDT. Under that law can the Japanese farmer buy a hoe or a spade or a shovel or a plow?

Mr. SCOVILLE. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Then how is he going to farm?

Mr. JENNINGS. We are hoping he won't. However, sooner or later that law will reach the Supreme Court.

Mr. MUNDT. It would seem to me, as I said before, if your law is constitutional, and if it is enforced, you have solved your problem because there is no way a Japanese can live with nothing more than food and clothing and medicine.

Mr. SCOVILLE. But there are a few people, of course, who are undertaking to do business with them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I offer this bill in evidence. It is entitled: "State of Arizona, house of representatives, sixteenth legislature, regular session. Chapter 89, house bill No. 187. An act relating to dealings with persons whose movements are restricted; presenting condition under which such dealings may be had; and declaring an emergency."

Appearing on the first page is a rubber stamp which reads as follows:

Compiled and issued by Dan E. Garvey, Secretary of State, for use until Session Laws are printed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, a copy of the law will be incorporated in the record.

(The document referred to is in words and figures as follows:)

STATE OF ARIZONA, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SIXTEENTH LEGISLATURE,  
REGULAR SESSION

(Compiled and issued by Dan E. Garvey, Secretary of State, for use until Session  
Laws are printed)

CHAPTER 89, HOUSE BILL NO. 187, AN ACT, Relating to dealings with persons whose movements are restricted; presenting conditions under which such dealings may be had; and declaring an emergency

*Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona;*

SECTION 1. *Notice of business relations with restricted person.*—Any person who: 1. Enters into any contract, agreement, or understanding, written or verbal, involving business relations; 2. purchases, sells, trades or exchanges any real or personal property, commodity or thing, except goods, wares, and merchandise for personal consumption, from a person whose movements are restricted by operation of law or by any executive or other order authorized by law, or from a person who is not eligible to citizenship, shall give notice of the transaction or business relationship, by publication not less than three times in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county in which the principal place of business of such person is located. Upon the completion of notice and at least ten days prior to the consummation of the proposed transaction, he shall file in the office of the secretary of state a copy of the notice, accompanied by detailed information regarding the transaction, and a report thereon not later than the fifth day of each month. A separate notice and report shall be required for each separate transaction.

SEC. 2. *Penalty.*—Failure to comply with any provision of this Act is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, imprisonment of not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both. The making of any false statement, in either the notice or the report prescribed by this Act is a felony, punishable by not less than one nor more than three years imprisonment.

SEC. 3. *Exceptions.*—This Act shall not be construed to apply to any person: 1. acting on behalf of an agency of the United States; 2. dealing with or on behalf of Indian wards of the Government, or, 3. dealing at wholesale or retail in wearing apparel, food supplies, medicines, or spirituous liquors.

SEC. 4. *Emergency.*—To preserve the public peace, health, and safety it is necessary that this Act become immediately operative. It is therefore declared to be an emergency measure, to take effect in the manner provided by law.

Approved by the Governor, March 23, 1943.

Filed in the Office of the Secretary of State, March 24, 1943.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, the county attorney just handed me a few exhibits of the type of advertising which takes place when they seek to employ or do business with Japanese under the terms of this law, and I ask permission to include them in the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The newspaper clippings referred to were marked "Jennings Exhibit No. 1".)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you anything else you wish to present to the committee?

Mr. JENNINGS. About the only thing I have to offer in addition to what I have said already, I think it cannot be too strongly emphasized that I think our irrigation and power system is extremely vulnerable; that it is within easy striking distance of Japanese released, even on leave, from these relocation centers.

It is a wholly impracticable proposition to attempt to guard the entire area which is vulnerable and it is the opinion—I believe the consensus of the opinion of the people of the State of Arizona, that the administration of these camps, so long as they are maintained, should be taken away from the relocation authorities and placed in the control of the Army or Marines. I would prefer the Marines to take charge of all the Japs in the United States.

Mr. COSTELLO. I suppose you feel the Marines have had some experience and know how to handle the Japanese?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke earlier about the Japanese cooperative being organized in the District of Columbia and attempting to register as a foreign corporation to do business in Arizona?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you say that permit has been canceled?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes; it has been canceled.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then at the present time the cooperatives operating in the relocation camps in Arizona would not have authority to do business there?

Mr. JENNINGS. They would not have; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as the camp itself is concerned, they are on Indian reservations and I presume the cooperatives could do business there.

Mr. JENNINGS. I should think they would be able to do business on the reservations and, of course, they have attempted to use this for the purpose of avoiding or circumventing the provisions of this law.

In other words if they can buy and sell through the cooperative, then they could purchase all the goods necessary to distribute among their members.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words it would be possible for the Jap cooperative at the Rivers camp to purchase supplies for the Japanese and then the Japanese from the city of Phoenix could have the supplies sent to them from the camps?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it would not be possible for the cooperative to engage in business in any way in Phoenix, for example, the selling of excess market products that might be produced at the camp in the Phoenix market?

Mr. JENNINGS. No. I assume that would be under the control of the relocation center itself, unless their practice still exists down there.

In Rivers they have a very democratic system. They have what they call the town council which is composed entirely of Japanese and anything respecting the administration of that camp must be first taken up with the town council and they follow the recommendations of the town council.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the cooperative would not need to have a permit from your corporation commission in Arizona if the business was handled in the name of the W. R. A., would it?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is right. The law specifically exempts the sale or purchase of goods through Government agencies.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there a cooperative in operation at the Rivers camp?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have either of the cooperatives attempted to actually set up an office or a business institution of any kind elsewhere outside of the camps?

Mr. JENNINGS. I think not. However, the attorney announced to the corporation commission that he would bring an action in the United States district court to compel the corporation commission by mandamus, to reinstate their certificate to do business.



Mr. COSTELLO. How long has this act that we incorporated into the record been a part of the law of the State of Arizona?

Mr. JENNINGS. The effective date is March 23 of this year.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether the cooperatives had been set up in these camps prior to that date?

Mr. JENNINGS. The date on which they attempted to qualify in the State of Arizona was April 1 of this year.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that it is more than likely that the cooperatives had been planned and organized prior to the passage of this particular law?

Mr. JENNINGS. Yes. It had been, as a matter of fact, incorporated in the District of Columbia, I think, a year ago.

Mr. COSTELLO. A year ago?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And at that time there was no bill of this character before the State legislature in Arizona?

Mr. JENNINGS. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or any attempt to pass legislation of this character?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words the attempt to set up the cooperative was initiated prior to the consideration or passage of this legislation?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is right. It wasn't designed for the purpose of circumventing this law, but it makes a very handy instrument to do so.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Jennings, has Governor Osborne of Arizona set up a fact-finding commission to determine the extent of Japanese infiltration into the State of Arizona?

Mr. JENNINGS. That is correct. In the latter part of April of this year, the Governor appointed a fact-finding committee to determine the extent and the effect of the resettlement of Japanese in the State of Arizona and has vigorously protested to our Senators and congressional delegation the movement to permit that relocation in the State of Arizona.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has that committee filed a report yet?

Mr. JENNINGS. The committee has filed a report and the vice chairman of the committee had intended to appear before this committee today, but it was impossible for him, at the last moment, to get transportation.

As a matter of fact we had intended the chairman of that committee being here today but he found at the last moment that he could not come, and it was too late for the vice chairman to secure transportation. Otherwise he would have been here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have nothing further.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Jennings, for appearing before the committee.

Mr. Steedman, does that conclude the witnesses for this morning?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; it does.

Mr. COSTELLO. We want to thank each of you gentlemen from Arizona for coming up here today. Your testimony has been very helpful and we greatly appreciate the sacrifice you have made.



Mr. SCOVILLE. And we appreciate the opportunity to be here.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(Thereupon, the hearing was resumed at 2 p. m., pursuant to the taking of the noon recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO: The committee will be in order.

We have this afternoon Mayor Bowron, who has previously appeared before the committee. It will not be necessary for the mayor to be sworn again.

We appreciate your coming back to the committee to give in person the information which the committee requested you to furnish when you were on the stand last week.

I might state the committee has received a copy of a telegram, apparently addressed to you, by Dillon S. Myer, and I will read the telegram into the record:

I have today sent the following telegram to Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles:

"Press reports of your testimony at hearings of Costello subcommittee of Dies committee quote you as saying Kiyoshi P. Okura whom you consider dangerous had been released from a relocation center. For your information Kiyoshi P. Okura has never been in a relocation center or under jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority.

"If there are others whom you regard as dangerous and who may have been released from relocation centers this agency would like to have their names and any evidence you can provide supporting your feeling of their disloyalty in order that the national safety may be protected."

DILLON S. MYER, *Director.*

Apparently the original of that telegram was sent to you, Mayor Bowron; but for the purpose of the record, I think I will read into the record at this point a telegram which was sent by Mr. Myer to me previous to the copy of the telegram which I have just read. The telegram transmitting the one sent to Mayor Bowron is dated June 12, while the one I am about to read, and addressed to me by Mr. Myer, is dated June 7, 1943.

It is addressed:

Congressman JOHN M. COSTELLO,

*Care Dies Committee, 1405 Federal Building,  
Los Angeles, Calif.:*

"I am informed that a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activity, under your chairmanship, is opening hearings today in Los Angeles to investigate activities of Japanese and Japanese-Americans in this country. The War Relocation Authority will welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the committee by supplying information on those phases of the problem for which this agency is responsible.

Because of recent statements in the press attributed to members and representatives of your committee in which facts have been garbled, I suggest it may be helpful to have statements concerning policies and procedures of the War Relocation Authority checked before statements are released to the press. To this end while you are on the coast I am glad to offer you the services of Mr. R. B. Cozzens, field assistant director of this agency whose headquarters are in the Whitecomb Hotel, San Francisco. Mr. Cozzens is thoroughly conversant with the War Relocation Authority program and he will be at your disposal to assist in any way by supplying or checking information.

D. S. MYER, *Director.*

And I might state for the purposes of the record, that most of the statements that have been quoted in the press, I believe, have been obtained directly from information that has been supplied to the committee and I believe the press has not garbled the reports or the facts which have been presented to the committee. On the contrary I think they have given a very factual record of the proceedings that have taken place before the committee.

And I might also add that it was not the intention of this committee to call upon Mr. Cozzens, so that he might censor any reports that might go out to the press from this committee.

I don't think it is possibly within the jurisdiction of Mr. Myer to suggest in any way that the statements that are made on behalf of this committee to the press should be first submitted to Mr. Cozzens for his approval or discussion.

As a matter of fact I don't believe that the Office of War Information has, in spite of the authority vested in it to supervise press releases, even suggested at any time that releases on the part of Congress should be censored by that Office, and for that reason I don't think it was necessary for this committee to call upon Mr. Cozzens to supervise any of the press releases that might have been made by this committee.

In view of the telegram, Mayor, that was sent to you, I would appreciate any statement you might like to make regarding Mr. Okura, in view of the fact that Mr. Myer seems to take issue with you regarding the release of Mr. Okura from confinement as a Japanese who was evacuated from the Pacific-coast area.

#### TESTIMONY OF FLETCHER BOWRON—Resumed

Mr. BOWRON. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am glad to make a statement and give such additional information as I have been able to collect since the receipt of the telegram.

I have not had time nor opportunity to make a full and thorough investigation relative to Mr. Okura. But I have had access to the confidential files of the Los Angeles Police Department and I find some very interesting and I think, hitherto unpublished information about him, and with your permission I will refer to the records which are before me as the source of my information.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those are the records of the Police Department of Los Angeles?

Mr. BOWRON. That is correct, and prepared and kept by Capt. Vernon Rassmussen, commanding the homicide bureau of the police department.

Mr. COSTELLO. I presume, Mayor, there is no objection to the public release of the information you are about to give us?

Mr. BOWRON. I know of none. I think it would be in the public interest.

Mr. Okura was born in the city of Los Angeles on September 26, 1911.

He attended high school in Wilmington, in the harbor area and the University of California at Los Angeles from 1928 to 1933.

He received a B. A. degree in psychology and he later returned for further studies and received an M. A. degree and then subsequently, and as late as 1939, studied public administration.

He has held various positions as a research assistant in the psychology department at the U. C. L. A.

Then from 1935 to 1937 he was executive secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League in which capacity he supervised up to 75 people.

He was administrative assistant of the Los Angeles County Department of Charities, from 1938 to 1939, and subsequent to 1939, he was personnel technician of the Los Angeles Civil Service Commission.

When he registered as a voter he gave his address as 529 East Anaheim Street, Wilmington, which is a part of the city of Los Angeles. He registered as a Democrat.

Then reading from the report:

It has been established through the Federal Bureau of Investigation that subject's father, Momota Okura, and the wife's father, T. Arikawa, were arrested December 7, 1942, and they are now in a concentration camp.

We also have information that subject was friendly with Kitsuma Mukaeda, the president of the Japanese Cultural Society, a registered agent of the Japanese Government.

Mukaeda was an importer of Japanese films and received money from the Japanese Government for propaganda purposes.

Mr. Mukaeda is now in a concentration camp.

We interviewed Mr. Logan Hart, at 929 Third Avenue. Mr. Hart is a teacher of stenography and office practice at the Los Angeles City College. He states that he had many people of Japanese ancestry in his classes and has had much success in teaching them office practices.

Mr. Hart also is employed by the Los Angeles Civil Service Department in intermittent work, helping the department prepare examinations for office help.

He explained that he had become acquainted with subject while they were both working for the State personnel board, and that Okura had later asked him if he might take the city of Los Angeles examination for examining assistant, which he did and later was certified as such.

I mention that in support of my testimony that he was in a position to solicit and secure other Japanese for placement in various positions in the city's service.

Turning now to—I have just read from a report prepared by Police Officer Carl R. Abbott, which was submitted to Captain Rassmussen.

I now read from a report prepared by Captain Rassmussen and addressed to Chief of Police C. B. Horrall, dated March 10, 1942:

In addition to the investigation of Officer Armstrong, which is attached, I made the following investigation and had a personal interview with the above subject.

In supplement to the education listed in the attached report, I learned that Mr. Okura made a trip to Japan in 1933 where he remained for about 4 months, as a member of the Japanese-American Student Conference.

During this time he traveled extensively over Japan and made several public addresses or appearances before the Japanese universities.

In 1934 a return trip to the United States was made by the Japanese University and a conference was held at Occidental University. At this conference Okura was director of social intercourse for the visiting body.

He further stated that he had made several trips to Mexico and a trip to Seattle, Wash., in 1936, to attend the Japanese American Citizens League there.

His immediate relatives in the United States are covered in the report of Officer Armstrong. However, there are two uncles on his mother's side who are in Japan, one of them being an engineer on the Manchukuo Railroad line, which is a Japanese Government project, and another being a police lieutenant in Asaka, Japan.

He stated that all the rest of the members of his family have made about two trips to Japan during 1935 and 1936.

He denied going on these trips with them.



Above subject stated that he belonged to the following organizations: Japanese American Citizens League, secretary in 1935; Japanese University Club, vice president in 1940 and 1941; Japanese-American Savings Association, commonly known as the Japanese Junior Chamber of Commerce; Japanese Young Men's Christian Association organization and the Japanese Athletic Union, which is a branch of the Japanese Young Men's Christian Association.

Subject stated that he was a member of the Wilmington Presbyterian Church and that his wife Lilly was also a member of the Long Beach Presbyterian Church. However, in the last year the subject and his wife were married in the Buddhist Shinto Temple at 2400 East Third Street, Los Angeles.

Subject further stated that he was a member of the entertainment committee for the Japanese contingent of the Veterans of Foreign Wars when they held their convention in New Orleans.

He also stated that he lived with his father and mother continuously until the time of his recent marriage, which was 5 or 6 months ago.

His father is Momota Okura, who was arrested on a Presidential warrant on the 26th day of December and is now in a concentration camp.

The following is a short résumé of the past activities of Momota Okura:

He was born in Akayama, Japan. He came to the United States in July of 1906 by way of Canada. He returned to Japan in 1910 or 1911 and married his present wife.

He has resided at Wilmington, Calif., most of the time since then.

Mr. Okura is a member of the Nanka-Tiekoku-Gunyu-Dan, which is commonly referred to as being the Imperial Military Friends' Group, of which he was vice commander in 1936.

He is also a member of the select committee of Hogii Kai, which is an organization of the Japanese Army Reserves in the United States.

He was president of that organization in 1937 and vice commander in 1938.

He had received the eight class decoration from the Japanese Army and the seventh class order of merit from the Japanese Army.

He was past president of the San Pedro Japanese Association, which is a tangent of the Central Japanese Committee and was director of the Wilmington branch of the Okavama Immigrant Association in 1938 and an auditor of this same organization in the following year.

He is also a member of the Imperial Japanese Reserves of the Order of the Golden Kite.

I would like to interpolate here—I do not see it in the record, but with reference to the activities and connections of the subject Okura's father.

I was informed personally by the police officer that when the father was arrested the son was in his home, although he had married and gave his address as elsewhere. He was apparently living with his father subsequent to Pearl Harbor.

Now continuing from the report:

In a conversation with Patrick Okura, and the subject sometimes is known as Patrick Kiyoshi Okura and sometimes uses the name Patrick and other times the other name interchangeably.

In a conversation with Patrick Okura recently, I inquired as to whether or not he had ever been a member of the board of directors of the Southern California Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and he denied that he had. However, on page 121 of the Rafu Shimpo Yearbook of 1940 and 1941, he was designated as director of social intercourse.

Enclosed is a photostatic copy of this page which was recently turned over to me from a very authentic source.

In this same conversation Okura stated he had been registered, and this relates to a conversation between Captain Rassmussen and Okura, in this same conversation Okura stated he had been registered as a dual citizen of Japan at his own request.

He further stated that he had made application to be expatriated about 1 year ago but he was unable to produce his expatriation papers.

In view of the above close association between father and son and the extremely pro-Japanese attitude shown by his father, together with the fact that he became a dual citizen of Japan at his own request, and that he is a member of an organization fostered by and is a part of the Japanese Imperial Government program, and



at the same time maintaining a position of trust and extreme confidence in the branch of our local government, to wit, the civil-service department, I do not feel that he can properly serve with loyalty these two diametrically opposed governmental agencies.

It is my opinion in view of the above evidence that there is sufficient provocation to terminate his employment with the city of Los Angeles immediately.

And then I read from a copy of a communication to the subject matter, Okura, from the general manager of the civil-service department, dated March 17, 1942, pursuant to this report:

DEAR MR. OKURA: On Friday, March 13, the civil-service commission was presented with a report stating among other things, that you had registered for dual citizenship at your own request; and further that there was no evidence that expatriation had ever been granted.

The report also stated that you were a director of social intercourse in the Southern California Chamber of Commerce and Industry, although such connection was alleged to have been denied by you.

Because of the above the commission instructed me to notify you that your connection with the city is hereby terminated.

They at the same time appointed a committee consisting of Commissioners Gillette and Welner, to hear any appeal you might care to make concerning this action.

JOSEPH W. HAWTHORNE, *General Manager.*

I have not had time to contact either Mr. Gillette or Mr. Welner, both of whom are members of the commission, but I have been advised that he made no denial of the allegations.

At the time of my testimony here on Thursday, I was under the impression, and a rather natural inference I believe, that Okura had been released from a relocation camp.

I have since learned, and I give this information to the committee for checking and further investigation, that Okura never was in a relocation camp; that he was taken to Santa Anita and that by some means or method, of which I am not familiar, that he was, apparently, released from that camp by what authority I do not know. And that subsequently he located in a certain institution of learning, a school for boys.

I have further been informed, and I present this information to the committee for investigation because my information is hearsay, that when a list was presented by the Japanese Government to the State Department for a return of civilian prisoners to Japan in exchange for Americans incarcerated in Japan, that the name of Okura was on the official list presented by the Japanese Government; that when Okura was advised of that fact he made a considerable show of objection and said that he would decline to go back to Japan and avowed his undying patriotism to the United States Government and he was released.

Now, in further response to the suggestion of Mr. Dillon S. Myer, director, I have not had a full opportunity to make an investigation with respect to all of the employees of the city of Los Angeles, but I have found in my files this bit of information, and I will read from a letter which I wrote to Richard B. Hood, special agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, under date of October 22, 1942:

I feel that the following information is authentic and of such importance to require consideration. Miya Sannomiya Kikuchi, a Japanese woman who for sometime has been a resident of Los Angeles, has been released from the concentration camp at Manzanar for a period of 30 days to go on a lecture tour for the International Young Women's Christian Association, speaking before women's groups.

Mrs. Kikuchi is the wife of Dr. Y. Kikuchi.

She was born in this country and is a graduate of the University of California. She is not only well educated but brilliant, attractive, and charming, the kind that could disseminate Japanese propaganda in the most subtle way by making favorable impressions upon all with whom she comes in contact, and creating the impression that probably native-born Japanese have been unfairly dealt with and by inspiring a friendly feeling if not actual sympathy for the military Japanese class.

Just why it is necessary that Mrs. Kikuchi should be released to make a tour of this character is very hard to understand by those of us who worked so hard to bring about the internment of Japanese on the coast.

The selection of this woman to make a tour for the International Young Women's Christian Association is even more significant because she recently spent 4 years in Japan where she perfected herself in writing and reading the Japanese language, and during the time of her stay in Tokyo she was in constant contact with influential persons in social and political life.

She was connected with the travel department of the Anglo-Japanese division of the Japanese Society of Cultural Relations.

Since her return to this country she has been very diligent and very effective in creating friendly feelings for the Japanese and the Japanese Government.

Additional information may be secured from Miss Fay Allen who, for some years, served as secretary of the Y. W. C. A. at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Miss Allen was in Japan in about 1935 and noted Mrs. Kikuchi's activities while there and recalls that she associated with Germans.

I might suggest that not only should this woman be carefully watched, her contacts noted, the nature of her talks to groups of women carefully recorded, but an investigation might well be made as to just how she rather than others, if a Japanese woman had to be selected at all, happened to be chosen for making a tour under such circumstances as would permit the dissemination of Japanese propaganda.

I had an acknowledgement from Mr. Hood, who advised me that the F. B. I. would make an investigation. I have heard nothing further relative to that case.

Pursuant to the request of the committee, I have made inquiry from the police department and from all other departments of the city government in which Japanese employees formerly worked, and I find that no inquiry has been made as to any Japanese that had formerly been employed by the city of Los Angeles.

The chief of police states that from time to time some requests for information concerning Japanese individuals who happened to be citizens of Los Angeles, were received from the provost marshal's office, but not from any other source. And he says:

I can find no record of direct correspondence between any governmental agency and this department concerning the request for investigation for the release of Japanese from internment centers.

I think that is all I have to say on the subject.

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I interrupt with a question:

You made a statement that occasionally the police department did receive requests from the provost marshal's office. That would undoubtedly be in connection with Japanese who are in the United Army?

Mr. BOWRON. He says:

They have stated these requests were made for the purpose of determining the character of Japanese because of contemplated enlistment in the armed services.

That is the assumption of the police department and the chief of police believes that, so far as his records show and his memory serves him, that no request has ever been made with respect to any Japanese after they were rounded up and taken to relocation centers.

There is just one point, and I make this statement in the interest of the city, and it may not concern or be of great interest to the com-

mittee, but that has to do with the location of the relocation center at Manzanar.

I may say that I was quite active in getting the Japanese out of Los Angeles and its environs. I thought there was a dangerous situation here and I held various conferences and worked with Tom Clark, now Assistant United States Attorney General, who was designated in charge of enemy alien activities on the Pacific coast, and together with him and then the Attorney General, now Governor Warren, we held a long conference with General DeWitt relative to the situation, and I hope we were somewhat helpful in General DeWitt making his decision, which I feel was a very fine one for the safety and security of the Pacific coast.

If it had not been for his prompt and courageous and efficient action, I am afraid we would have had some serious events on the coast.

Because of my interest and my insistence in getting the Japanese away from the coast, and out of Los Angeles proper, we were placed in a somewhat embarrassing position when it was suggested that a relocation camp be located in Manzanar in the Owens Valley, on land controlled by the city of Los Angeles.

I personally accompanied Mr. Tom Clark before a meeting of the Board of Water and Power Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles and urged favorable action, upon Mr. Clark's statement, and I am sure that it was made in entire good faith, that that would be a temporary camp only; that it would in a sense be a checking station to be used only until permanent camps could be developed, locations selected and buildings constructed in other localities.

I understood they were merely selecting this place because they had to move quickly and promptly and under such circumstances the board of water and power commissioners gave their consent.

I would like to call attention to the fact that Manzanar is close to the headwaters of the domestic water supply of the city of Los Angeles, a supply for upwards of one million and a half people. And while we have not had any reports of anything that would endanger the water supply, there is, nevertheless, that possibility.

And while we want to be helpful in this entire program, we feel that they have rather out-worn their welcome which we understood would be only a short visit.

We hope that if it means the releasing of Japanese and scattering them over the country among the civilian population we will not insist upon—we would rather see them there than in no camp at all, but if—

Mr. COSTELLO. It would be better to have them retained at Manzanar rather than have them scattered throughout the country?

Mr. BOWRON. If there are other places available we would like to see them moved on.

There is one more matter of interest that may have come to the attention of the committee, or may not: I receive a great many letters from citizens relative to the Japanese situation. I may say that I think 98 percent of them insist that the Japanese be not brought back here at all. I will go further: I know of none that say they should be brought back here.

Some of them object and say I have gone a little too far in attacking a minority group. But I think that the opinion of the people as



indicated by my correspondence, shows that the people of this locality feel alike with respect to the return of the Japanese.

In one of these letters received within the last few days, a Mr. R. C. Douthitt, whose address is 6350 Newell Street, Huntington Park, Calif., encloses with his letter a communication from a special assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, to whom Mr. Douthitt had written. I shall not make reference to his letter, as to what he wrote about, but the letter from the Department of the Interior or the letter signed by W. H. McCrillis, special assistant to the Treasury, states in part:

Perhaps you might be interested in reading the enclosed leaflet concerning these unfortunate people.

And he enclosed a pamphlet printed in the United States Printing Office which refers to "relocating a people."

Inasmuch as this may not have come to the attention of the committee, I might, if you desire, offer it for the files of the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will be glad to make the letter and pamphlet an exhibit.

**(The letter and pamphlet referred to were marked "Bowron Exhibit No. 1.")**

Mr. BOWRON. Now, I would like to add just this much to the testimony: The city of Los Angeles and the police department and all officials and employees of the city know our place. We have not endeavored to inject ourselves into matters of Federal concern.

We have endeavored to cooperate with all governmental agencies and have not made investigations of Japanese in this locality.

We have assumed, we hope correctly, that there are governmental agencies which have made sufficient and full investigation of Japanese who are released.

But at no time have we been advised that Japanese who have been connected with the city of Los Angeles or who have lived in this locality have been released or were about to be released.

We would be very glad through our police department or other city agencies to supply any information that we could if requested.

I make that statement because I am not prepared to give Mr. Myer all the information that he should have about the release of Japanese merely because they lived in the city of Los Angeles.

I believe many of them to be dangerous but I can't tell him which one or ones. If he would tell us that some of our former fellow citizens were about to be thrust upon the people of the country, we would be very glad to tell him whether we thought they were dangerous or not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mayor, do you feel the proposal as outlined by Mr. Myer is in reverse gear; instead of your supplying all the information on all the Japanese that might be available in the city here, that he should specifically make request upon the city concerning Japanese who are about to be released, if that is to be the program of the Authority?

Mr. BOWRON. It would seem to me in the interest of the public safety, if through certain agencies, not necessarily making the information public, but a list of those about to be released could be furnished in order that a check could be made—that would be the proper manner to handle this situation.

We have assumed, and I think practically everyone in this area has assumed, that they were there for keeps—at least for the duration,



until we commenced to read that they were being scattered around the country and then we didn't know what ones they were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any questions, Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt?

Mr. MUNDT. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that conclude your testimony, Mr. Mayor?

Mr. BOWRON. I think that is all I have to say.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your coming back before the committee and I believe you have given us very valuable testimony in the course of this afternoon's proceedings.

We appreciate your suggestion regarding the desirability on the part of the W. R. A., to elicit information—all the information possible regarding any Japanese who are to be released before such persons should be released from the relocation centers in which they are being detained.

Thank you very much, Mayor.

We will take a short recess.

(Thereupon a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will please be in order.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Alfred A. Cohn.

### TESTIMONY OF ALFRED A. COHN, MEMBER OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your name to the reporter?

Mr. COHN. Alfred A. Cohn.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Cohn, are you a member of the Los Angeles Police Commission?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For how long have you been a member?

Mr. COHN. Three years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you at one time collector of customs for the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. COHN. No; for the southern California district.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And how long were you collector of customs for the southern California district?

Mr. COHN. Five years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. During that time did you come in contact with the Japanese at the Los Angeles Harbor?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did you become familiar with Japanese organizations?

Mr. COHN. Yes, I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As well as the Japanese fishing fleet operations?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In the course of your duties as collector of customs, did you meet a lot of Japanese?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And just prior to Pearl Harbor, did you become interested in the Japanese situation?

Mr. COHN. No. I think it was after Pearl Harbor that—well, I have always been interested in it.

I instituted the investigation by the Treasury Department into the activities of the Japanese fishing fleet some years ago, but I wasn't very active in looking into Japanese matters until after Pearl Harbor and the day of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. COSTELLO. In your position as collector of customs, however, the customs officers were taking cognizance of the Japanese activities, particularly around the harbor?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And any information you uncovered was made available to the Naval Intelligence or G-2—the Intelligence Department of the War Department?

Mr. COHN. Well, G-2 wasn't very active then but O. N. I., Naval Intelligence, was very active and has been all the time in the Japanese situation. But my activities were in connection, of course, with the Treasury Department directly.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Cohn, after Pearl Harbor did you familiarize yourself with the conditions in the city government with reference to the employment of Japanese?

Mr. COHN. Yes. The mayor asked me to make certain investigations or, I might say, a survey of the situation rather, and an investigation which I did for him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you make an effort to work or cooperate with the young American-born Japanese during that period?

Mr. COHN. Yes; on the assumption that there would be no evacuation; that they would continue to be here. We thought it very important to keep the Japanese in line, so to speak and we knew that the elder Japanese, the Issei were the dangerous ones and that they would be taken into custody as they were discovered and we figured that the chief problem was to get control of the American-born Japanese and see what we could do to keep them in line.

Mr. COSTELLO. What efforts were made in that direction?

Mr. COHN. Well, we had several meetings with Japanese-Americans. I endeavored to set up under the direction of the mayor, an agency to propagandize the Japanese of different classes, by radio, newspapers, and in other ways.

We lined up an organization of writers who worked with the Japanese. I made a trip to Washington for the purpose of getting aid from the Federal Government, because there were no funds available for the expenses that would be necessary, such as buying radio time and newspaper space or whatever was required.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you meet with any success in Washington in obtaining assistance for the program?

Mr. COHN. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. None of the Government agencies seemed interested in carrying out that program?

Mr. COHN. No; they didn't seem to be interested in the Japanese at all back there. I went to every agency that I thought would be interested and found that there were no funds available for anything of that kind.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it your thought immediately after Pearl Harbor that definite steps should be taken and efforts made to keep the Japanese patriotic Americans?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And not permit them to be alienated?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And for that purpose a program of propagandizing them was proposed but the Federal authorities were not interested or not cooperative in such a movement?

Mr. COHN. That is right; but, of course, almost immediately came the evacuation orders and that would have upset any plan that we might have made.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you familiar with the case of Kiyoshi Okura?

Mr. COHN. Yes; I am.

I could add to the mayor's statement about Okura, that he denies these allegations contained in Captain Rassmussen's report—the story that he admitted registering dual citizenship—that is, on his own initiative.

When he was cited before the Civil Service Commissioners he didn't produce any evidence or any documents to support his denial, but he made such a good talk before the Civil Service Commission that they refused to separate him from the service as requested and merely extended his leave.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And is that his present status?

Mr. COHN. I think that is his present status. Now, the police who have investigated subversive activities have regarded him from the beginning as the leader of the—I wouldn't say the leader, but the most important person on the bad side.

Captain Rassmussen told me no later than today when I wanted to check on the various stores, that he regarded Okura as the most dangerous Japanese in America today and he said that went for aliens as well as Americans—American-born Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Captain Rassmussen make a thorough check on Okura?

Mr. COHN. Yes, he has. He was in charge of the subversive detail.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you visit Santa Anita when the Japanese were located there?

Mr. COHN. Several times; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In any of your visits to Santa Anita, did you see Okura?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did you discuss him with the officials at Santa Anita?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who did you discuss Okura with?

Mr. COHN. I discussed him with Mr. Wilbur—Gene Wilbur, who was in charge of Santa Anita during the closing days there. He told me that Okura's name was on this list of exchange prisoners, I guess you would call it, or an exchange of nationals, which amazed me because Okura was a native-born. He was American born but as I recall it they received a list from the State Department containing 68 names of Japanese who were at Santa Anita, and Okura was the only American-born Japanese on the list.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the list of names submitted by Tokyo requesting their return to Japan?

Yes, sir; this list came from Tokyo and it was in connection with the return of Americans and Japanese in our concentration camps.

That was the first exchange in which they used the Swedish liner *Gripsholm*.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Apparently the Japanese Government thought that Okura was very important from their standpoint?

Mr. COHN. Well, that would be the natural assumption. However, when Okura was notified that his name was on this list he appeared before Mr. Wilbur and made violent protest against going to Japan; he said that he was born in America and that he wanted to stay here.

His wife also made a very eloquent plea for him and he was not included in the list.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was Okura at Santa Anita during the last days of Santa Anita?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Just prior to the relocation of the Japanese?

Mr. COHN. Yes; he was there while they were evacuating—while they were sending them to these different relocation camps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any information regarding the reasons behind the releasing of Mr. Okura?

Mr. COHN. Not the reasons, no. I can't conceive of any reason.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any of the facts surrounding his release?

Mr. COHN. Yes; I know the facts.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please relate the facts?

Mr. COHN. I was of the opinion that Okura went out with the last evacuees. He was helping in the evacuation and I didn't know until March, about the middle of March.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 1943?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir; this last March—I didn't learn until then that he was out of a relocation center because I assumed that he went with the rest of them.

I didn't learn until 3 or 4 days ago that he was never evacuated to a relocation center and that on the day that the last Japanese went out from here, from Santa Anita, that he and his wife were driven down to the station and got on a train for Omaha, Nebr., so actually during all this time he never did come under the supervision or authority of the W. R. A.

Now, how he was released I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know of any other Japanese evacuees who were released from Santa Anita or any other evacuation camp directly to the midwest or eastern section of the country?

Mr. COHN. I made some inquiries in the last few days and I was told that a small number of them had been evacuated from Santa Anita to go to college somewhere. But again that wasn't the War Relocation Authority—it must have been the W. C. C. A., which was the civilian agency under the Army.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the civilian agency that was operating the evacuee centers?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir; and those men were all obtained, I think, from the W. P. A.

But I couldn't get any facts regarding these others that were evacuated.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have reference now to those who were released to go to school or to attend classes?

Mr. COHN. They were released to go to certain specific schools. I think they had made application to attend certain schools in the Middle West.



Mr. COSTELLO. And that was a case of continuing their education?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But Okura's education, apparently, had been completed?

Mr. COHN. I would say it had.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he is not at the boys' school as a student?

Mr. COHN. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. But he is there in some other capacity in the school?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have finished with my examination, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe, Mr. Cohn, if the program, such as you and the mayor had under advisement earlier for propagandizing the Japanese in order to keep them loyal had been consummated that it might have been possible to retain the loyalty of a great percentage of the Japanese?

Mr. COHN. I do decidedly. I had several meetings with different groups of Japanese-Americans in trying to make as intelligent a survey of the situation as possible, but the whole picture was very much confused because of the jealousies between various Japanese groups.

There was a group in Los Angeles, in Little Tokyo, a group of American-born Japanese that were so well Americanized that they saw in the gathering up of the so-called dangerous aliens who controlled the business life of the Japanese colony all over the coast; they saw in that an opportunity to take over some of these businesses, and they did.

They had no thought that they were going to be sent away to a concentration camp and they took advantage of a lot of those aliens.

There was another organization that made a racket of selling travel permits to Japanese. I mean they just preyed on their own people.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that was a Japanese organization?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And identified with the Japanese themselves?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir. They had what they called the Big Four—composed of four of the smartest young Japanese Americans, and they just went to town on it.

In my efforts to obtain information I had one meeting with this Japanese American Citizens League and I tried to get their cooperation in this plan. They thought it was a great idea and I was trying to get at just what they had to work on.

I asked them their views on how many could be regarded as loyal Americans and one of the leaders told me that would say that only 25 percent of the Japanese-Americans could be relied upon as 100 percent loyal; that 50 percent were wavering.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, could be influenced?

Mr. COHN. That could be swung into line and that 25 percent, the remaining 25 percent were regarded as disloyal.

Now, that was their own figures but it would give us enough to work on. It gave us at least this 50 percent to work on.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of the group that was disloyal, would you say the majority of them were Issei or would they be native boys?

Mr. COHN. No; the Kibei. I think the least dangerous of the lot was the mass of aliens who had come over here years ago, long before Japan had launched its military program.

The most dangerous were the Kibei—the ones who had been sent back to Japan to be educated and indoctrinated at an early age.

The ones who had returned within the last 6 or 7 years before the invasion of Manchukuo, because they were really modern Japanese, subscribed to the military program.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel the most dangerous group among the Japanese is the Kibei who had been educated in Japan since Japan set forth on the conquest of Manchuria?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir; they didn't even go to the trouble of learning English. A great many American-born Japanese today cannot speak a word of English. They didn't want to learn the English language.

Mr. COSTELLO. But that was true only of the Kibei who came back to this country in recent years?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. How about the earlier Kibeis?

Mr. COHN. The earlier Kibeis came back because they didn't like it over there; they didn't see the opportunities there for them that there was in this country.

Mr. COSTELLO. At that time the military regime did not have complete control in Japan so as to be in a position to indoctrinate all American-born Japanese going over there with their military culture?

Mr. COHN. That is right; yes, sir; and I would like to say in their behalf that I think by and large the Japanese, not only the citizens but the aliens, were the most law-abiding minority we had in this country.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was going to ask you about that.

Mr. COHN. And the police records will show that.

Mr. COSTELLO. As member of the police commission, you have available the records of the city of Los Angeles and they indicate that the type of crime for which they might be convicted, was for minor offenses and things of that character?

Mr. COHN. Not only that but while I was collector of customs, I was also coordinator of all law-enforcement agencies of the Treasury Department and we had quite a lot of contact with Japanese and a chance to study them.

There was one group in this country that was crooked and gangsters which constituted all the narcotic smuggling that was done in this country, but outside of that very small group, I think they were law abiding and I think there still is an opportunity to make pretty good Americans out of the group—the majority of them, if it is gone about right.

I think with another generation—I think at least the younger Japanese—the Japanese-American youngsters are perhaps the most patriotic of the lot and I think that incident at Manzanar proves that—the incident of the Boy Scouts up there. I don't know whether you have heard that story or not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Not in the testimony.

Mr. COHN. Well, I think it should be a part of your record because it is a part of the general picture.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee has not gone into the Manzanar situation in its investigation, but we hope to get that into the record before we close the record.

Mr. COHN. This isn't merely Manzanar. It is just a fact. These Boy Scouts when the riot started up there and the rioters went over to pull down the American flag, these Boy Scouts surrounded the flag and bravely defied them.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you feel if the proper influences are at work within the relocation centers the Japanese can remain loyal Americans, but if you allow the disloyal Kibei group to assume control, the opposite effect is going to be had?

Mr. COHN. Yes; and I think that is what has happened because instead of—and of course the story that I get is hearsay—not exactly hearsay because I have the information in letters, and I guess legally that is hearsay, but the story I get is that when there is trouble in these camps instead of corralling the bad ones—

Mr. COSTELLO. The troublemakers?

Mr. COHN. The troublemakers, they take the loyal Japanese and send them away in order to protect them from harm. I know that that was done at Manzanar.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have found that whenever the Kibei stir up trouble that the loyal Nisei are sent out of the camp into other centers where they are protected?

Mr. COHN. Yes. It shows at least that they are not able to protect the loyal Americans and the ones who want to be loyal.

I know they sent 50 or 60 out of Manzanar after that demonstration on December 7. They sent them down to an abandoned C. C. C. camp at Death Valley Monument.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those 50 or 60 had nothing to do with inciting the riot?

Mr. COHN. They are the ones who tried to stop the riot.

Mr. COSTELLO. And for having tried to stop the riot, they were rewarded by being confined in a separate camp on the desert?

Mr. COHN. Yes; and put in a place where there was not even the conveniences that they had had at Manzanar.

Mr. COSTELLO. If the same theory were followed every time there is a burglary in Los Angeles, you would take the householder who was burglarized and put him in jail and let the burglar go free?

Mr. COHN. Yes; and if you want to follow that to a logical conclusion, let the crooks terrorize the rest of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Cohn, do you have any suggestion that you might offer to this committee regarding the method of handling these camps that might improve the present situation? I mean, from the particular instance which you cited the administration is not accomplishing the best results in preserving the Americanism of these Japanese. Do you have any suggestion to offer that we might consider as a possible means of improving the administration of these camps and preventing the subversion of the Japanese?

Mr. COHN. I think the important thing is to get people running these camps that know the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you think such people are available?



Mr. COHN. There are. I don't subscribe to the theory that all Japanese are bad because I know some that are pretty good and I would vouch for their loyalty anywhere.

I think a great many people back in Washington subscribe to the idea of returning the Japanese to the control of the Army.

Now, the Army never was in control of them. The Army simply ordered their evacuation but it was the civilian authorities that had charge of it.

If I had any say in the matter I would turn the situation over to the branch of the service that knows the Japanese best. I don't think anyone has suggested this, but I think the Navy knows more about Japanese than the Army because the Navy has specialized in that.

Every year for years the Navy has designated certain officers whom they call language officers to go to Japan and learn about the people and learn the language and everything.

The Office of Naval Intelligence long before Pearl Harbor had made a study of the Japanese. Japanese language officers have always been assigned to duty on this coast and they always maintain contacts with Japanese Americans and as a consequence they know more about the Japanese, here as well as those in Japan, than anyone else.

Now, the Army never had that set-up. While I know the Navy had for 3 years an officer out there who is now in virtual charge of Naval Intelligence. He made it a life work really. He would go around and lecture to the Japanese societies. He knew more about it, I think, than anybody—I mean he knows more about the Japanese than anybody and how to handle them.

My only suggestion would be that a man like this officer, Captain Zachery, whom I understand has recently been made an admiral, a man like that if he had over-all management of the thing, could control the situation.

I don't think anybody else can because you have got to know the Japanese to do that.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he was located here in Los Angeles?

Mr. COHN. No; he was in charge of the Eleventh Naval District. He was located in San Diego but this was all his district and he would go around and lecture. For years he lectured to the Japanese. He would go around to the Japanese societies and he told them what was going to happen.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had he spent some time in Japan?

Mr. COHN. He had spent 3 or 4 years in Japan. I think he is regarded as the most able man in Naval Intelligence.

If they could get a man like that who knows the people and knows their problems and knows how to talk to them instead of a lot of welfare workers who—well, far be it from me to express my thought—

Mr. COSTELLO. It would be your thought to have a man with the background of Captain Zachery in charge of this whole war relocation program?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir; and it would still be in charge of the armed services and it would be handled intelligently.

Mr. COSTELLO. Somebody with that background would be able to provide competent direction to the organization and operation of the camps?

Mr. COHN. Yes, sir.



Mr. COSTELLO. And then possibly the existing camp administrators would be able to function as long as they had a superior in charge who thoroughly understood the Japanese?

Mr. COHN. Yes. But you can't handle Japanese like a lot of flood refugees or Dust Bowl refugees.

I think the thing has been very badly handled from its inception. I think the W. P. A. people who had charge of these assembly centers, as they called them, did a much better job because they had very little trouble in any of those camps.

Mr. COSTELLO. At least they had no subversive trouble such as has taken place in the relocation centers?

Mr. COHN. No; and they had a tough job because they had to take these people when they were fresh and after just having suffered a terrific disillusionment—that is the American-born Japanese who had no idea that they would ever be put in any kind of a camp.

A pretty good job was done by them, and I don't think there was any trouble anywhere until they got into these places where they were handled by welfare workers and men trained in Indian affairs.

There is quite a difference between the American Indian and the Japanese—a lot of difference.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you any questions, Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt?

Mr. MUNDT. No questions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any further statement to make, Mr. Cohn?

Mr. COHN. No; I have not.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your coming here and offering these suggestions to the committee. I think they are going to be helpful to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the following gentlemen representing the Fellowship of Reconciliation have requested a hearing and their request was granted by the committee:

Mr. Glenn E. Smiley, 1411 West Twenty-second Street, secretary, Fellowship of Reconciliation, clergyman in Methodist Church.

Rev. Allan Hunter, 4609 Prospect, chairman, Southern California Fellowship of Reconciliation; chairman, Social Action Committee of the Southern California Congregational Conference.

Rev. Norman Taylor, 3764 Watseka Avenue, chairman, Commission of Interracial Goodwill of the Church Federation of Los Angeles. Methodist clergyman.

Dr. Kirby Page, La Habra, Calif., vice chairman, National Council, Fellowship of Reconciliation. Minister of the Christian Church.

Alan Hennebold, 1546 North Poinsetta, member, National Committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation.

Dr. S. Martin Eidsath, 1749 West Forty-second Street, pastor, Southwest Presbyterian Church. Chairman of the Department of Social Education and Action of the Church Federation of Los Angeles. Also chairman of the Committee of Social Education and Action of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Our first witness will be Mr. Eidsath.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please stand and be sworn?

**TESTIMONY OF S. MARTIN EIDSATH, MEMBER OF THE CHURCH  
FEDERATION OF LOS ANGELES**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name and occupation to the reporter?

Mr. EIDSATH. My name is S. Martin Eidsath. I am appearing as a member of the Church Federation of Los Angeles, and speaking for Dr. Farnham, the executive secretary.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Eidsath, I asked Mr. Smiley if he would submit credentials prior to any witness appearing here today.

Did you bring with you your credentials from the organization which you represent?

Mr. EIDSATH. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I did not, except I have a written statement on the stationery of the Church Federation of Los Angeles, which I would like to submit unless you wish me to read it.

I have nothing oral to add to the written statement.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the statement prepared by yourself?

Mr. EIDSATH. Prepared by members of the church federation which appears in the statement.

Mr. COSTELLO. And who signed the statement?

Mr. EIDSATH. Dr. E. C. Farnham, executive secretary of Los Angeles.

It is accompanied by several documents signed by the president of the federation and the president of the Southern California Church Council.

It has also other documents attached to it.

Mr. COSTELLO. All we are interested in is knowing whom you represent when you appear here and by what authority you speak on behalf of the organization.

In other words, if you come representing the Church Federation of Los Angeles, we want some indication as to your authority to speak for the church federation.

Mr. EIDSATH. Sir, if you will permit me to read the opening paragraph of this statement perhaps that will clarify it.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is a signed statement?

Mr. EIDSATH. This is a signed statement by the executive secretary of the church federation.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed to read the statement.

Mr. EIDSATH. The church federation has not been able to act formally on a statement to be presented to your committee, but leaders of the federation have endorsed the statement that follows as being a fair interpretation of the views of the church on the issues involved. Attached to the statement are copies of documents adopted previously by the church federation being upon the subject.

While we, as churchmen, worked hard during the times of peace to secure an international order which could preserve the peace, we recognize the fact of war and the military necessities incident thereto and are concerned for the quickest success of those efforts by which war may cease.

Second. Regarding the evacuated Japanese, we do not seek nor do we know of any sizable group of people who seek the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast during the war. While under the

American Constitution except for martial law and military requirements, the American-born Japanese probably have legal right to return, we hold that it would be most unwise for them to do so.

Third. We hold no particular brief for the War Relocation Authority as such, certainly not as a political football; but we have been impressed that its leaders have undertaken to do a constructive job by which to save and encourage the Americanism that existed among the Japanese. We believe that honest evaluation should be made of those policies and procedures and that when found to be good they should not be disrupted for political or ulterior reasons. Particularly, do we believe that criticism or attack on the W. R. A. should not be for the purpose of perpetrating indiscriminating severity of treatment upon Japanese who may be desirous of proving themselves to be good Americans.

Fourth. We fear that the agitation regarding the American-Japanese is much in excess of the facts: That too much of it arises from a spirit of hatred and racial animosity which is un-Christian and un-American and directly in kind with the sort of thing which we are attempting to curb on the part of the Axis Nations.

We have suggested, as indicated by attached documents, that there are organized groups engaged in fostering ill will. We believe such agitation can cause a wasteful diversion of public attention from the more important business of winning the war.

Fifth. We believe there should be no pampering of our American-Japanese people for they must bear the hardships of war along with all the rest, but we do not believe that the conditions under which most of them now live can be considered by any stretch of the imagination as pampering. We believe that any other policy which might be based upon animosity, unnecessary harshness, or abridgement of civil rights where there is no military necessity means a disappointing denial of American principles and a deplorable failure to apply Christian and American standards in behalf of a constructive solution of an unhappy situation.

Sixth. It has been our privilege to know many of the Japanese who are now under evacuation. Many of them have been members of our Christian churches. We know their desire to be worthy citizens of the United States, even on the part of those who were denied citizenship because of our laws. We believe that distinctions can be made—within the requirements of national safety—between the loyal and the disloyal.

We believe that a policy of confinement of the suspected disloyal is proper; and that the loyal ones, especially the American-born are products of our American schools, should be encouraged and aided in finding places in civilian or military life by which to advance their Americanism.

We believe that such a constructive policy will reveal that these people have something of value to contribute to our national life and that such treatment will prove an encouragement to peaceful international relations in the future whereas a policy of hatred and harshness will generate bitterness and be a cause for international ill will and future wars.

Seventh. We have had impressive evidence of a strong anti-war party in Japan prior to the war, led by Christian people; and that these people are praying for the termination of the war and the



establishment of an international relation based upon good will and cooperation. We believe that unfounded agitation is short-sighted and detrimental to both the present and the future well-being of our country and to our international relations.

Eighth. We believe that now is the time for sanity in our approach to this matter. We believe that the Government should be diligent in ferreting out disloyalty; but we believe that this process should go on persistently and quietly and without agitation of the public with false issues to the detriment of war-time industry and social well-being. Let us get on with the main job.

Ninth. We believe that the question of the location whether in California or elsewhere of the American-Japanese should be set aside until war is over and tempers have cooled. It is quite possible that the question will largely solve itself. We know many of these people realized after it was too late that they should not have settled as a group. We believe that a dispersal will take place naturally with each succeeding generation. We believe that an understanding policy, marked by cooperation and appreciation, will produce a solution that will be sound, valuable, and happy.

We urge thoughtful deliberation on these propositions by our fellow citizens. Inflamed passion should not be permitted to lead us into acts which, later, we will regret. We deny that the Japanese race is incapable of civilization. Any shortcomings may be our failure to exercise sound relations with them. Ultimately they must take their place among the United Nations or be permanent outcasts and the standing cause of war. We urge that, even while waging war, we employ these processes by which to speed sound relations, good will and peace.

And it is signed by E. G. Farnham, executive secretary of the federation.

There are then documents which were drawn up and passed by the federation's executive council on hate and race prejudice, dealing with the Japanese question.

There is also another document attached which was passed by the Church Federation of Los Angeles, its executive council, and also endorsed by the Church Council of Southern California.

That is signed by Alphonzo E. Bell, president, Church Federation of Los Angeles, Dr. Donald H. Tippet, president, Southern California Council of Churches, and E. C. Farnham, executive secretary.

There is also a pamphlet attached headed, "Slap the Jap" which is published by the Home Front Commandos, Inc., A. J. Harder, president, and Edward Keelen, vice president, 607 Nicolaus Building, Sacramento, Calif.

I respectfully submit these, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. The other documents will be received as exhibits.

**(The documents referred to were marked "Eidsath Exhibit No. 1")**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have any additional statement you would like to make at this time?

Mr. EIDSATH. No, sir; I have no additional statement to make.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any questions by members of the committee?

Mr. MUNDT. Do all the churches of Los Angeles belong to this church federation?

Mr. EIDSATH. I should think that the majority of them belong. There are small denominations which do not belong but the majority



of the Protestant bodies do belong to the Church Federation of Los Angeles.

Mr. MUNDT. And the statement you have read has been approved by all the members of the Church Federation?

Mr. EIDSATH. No; that is contained in the document itself in the opening paragraph, that it has not been so approved.

Mr. MUNDT. It represents then the opinion of the officers of the association rather than the opinion of the membership?

Mr. EIDSATH. There are two other documents which have been approved by the legally constituted bodies, executive bodies of both the Southern California Church Council and the Church Federation.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. I notice in the statement, where you are itemizing various points that you bring out, the matter of the location of the Japanese after the war.

I might state for your information and for the purposes of the record, that this committee has not gone into the question of the handling of the Japanese in the post-war era.

We are only interested in the conduct of the Japanese while in the relocation centers and particularly with regard to any possible subversive activities on the part of the Japanese.

You made a statement to the effect that the Government should be diligent in ferreting out disloyalty among the Japanese. Do you have any direct information at all indicating the officers in charge of the W. R. A. camps have been diligent in trying to ferret out the disloyal Japanese?

Mr. EIDSATH. I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Evidence has been introduced before this committee which indicates that that is one of the things which the War Relocation Authority has not done, and not only have they not been diligent in trying to ferret out the disloyal Japanese, but have actually been negligent in that regard.

That is one of the criticisms that has been leveled by this committee against the War Relocation Authority.

Also in one of your points, you referred to the matter of criticism of the War Relocation Authority, recommending that the Authority should not be criticized; but in the very thing which you are urging the Government do, that is, be diligent in seeking out the disloyal Japanese, in effect you are criticizing the W. R. A. as properly you should do in view of the fact they have failed to do that very thing.

How many Japanese actually belong to the Protestant churches which churches might be members of the Church Federation of Los Angeles? Do you have any knowledge as to the number?

Mr. EIDSATH. I could not give you the statistics now, but I could obtain them if the committee wishes to find that out.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would like to have the figure as to how many Japanese actually belong to the Christian denominations. You haven't any rough estimate at this moment as to the percentage?

Mr. ALLEN HUNTER. May I answer that question?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. From Prof. E. K. Strong's book called Japanese in California, at page 182, he states that the first generation preferred Buddhism to Christianity, 77 percent and the reverse was the case with the United States born Japanese, 39 percent preferring Buddhism

and 47 percent of the males and 56 of the females preferring Christianity. That is just a little over 51 percent of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry preferring Christianity.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you haven't the actual numbers of Japanese who are members of Christian churches?

Mr. HUNTER. For the State?

Mr. COSTELLO. That is correct.

Mr. HUNTER. I don't. I am trying to remember the number but I can't remember it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do I understand from your statement that the Church Federation of Los Angeles is not in favor of any of the Japanese being returned to the Pacific coast for the duration of the war?

Mr. EIDSATH. The position we have felt was the wisest would be that while they may have the legal right to return, it may not be wise to return at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. When you say they have a "legal right," what do you mean?

Mr. EIDSATH. That is constitutionally as a citizen they may have the right unless barred by military necessity or martial law—they might have the right to be any place where any other citizens were.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words you feel as we do that the Army authorities had the right to remove any persons whom they thought should be removed from a military area such as the Pacific coast?

Mr. EIDSATH. I am not in a position to say whether they had or not. I don't know enough about the law but the Church Federation and the Presbyterian Church took this position at the time of the evacuation, that we believe a limited evacuation of those who are disloyal or thought to be disloyal should be removed and that those who were loyal and would work, perhaps at farming under proper supervision, could have stayed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Don't you believe it is somewhat difficult to determine who would be loyal and who would be disloyal in order to determine who should be evacuated?

Mr. EIDSATH. That would be I suppose very hard to determine in the case of Germans and Italians as well.

Mr. COSTELLO. Don't you think it would be easier to determine the subversive activities on the part of Germans and Italians than it would be on the part of the Japanese?

Mr. EIDSATH. Personally I hardly believe so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Don't you think there is a vast difference between the natures of the Germans and the Italian people as compared with the Japanese? Don't you feel that the Japanese are a very emotional but unexpressive group of people? They do not reveal their inner emotions in their facial expressions or by outward signs, which I do not believe is true of other people. And the same thing might be said of the Chinese, for example, that they do not reveal by their outward signs as to what their inner thoughts or inner emotions might actually be, whereas practically all the white races are inclined to be more expressive and indicate their thoughts by outward signs and symbols without stating their thoughts.

Mr. EIDSATH. My own observation has been that as I learn to know them better I learn to understand their expressions—that is their emotional expressions, and I came to think that it was because I knew the Germans and Italians or the Caucasians, better than the orientals

that I could see—that I could not see the same thing in the oriental that I could see in the Caucasian.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have had some experience with the Japanese people, have you?

Mr. EIDSATH. With the Japanese and with the Chinese.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the nature of that experience?

Mr. EIDSATH. I have gone to school with some of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that school in this country?

Mr. EIDSATH. In this country; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you been to Japan?

Mr. EIDSATH. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you never dealt with the Japanese people directly?

Mr. EIDSATH. No; except as I have in religious work.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have a church here in Los Angeles?

Mr. EIDSATH. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any Japanese members of your congregation?

Mr. EIDSATH. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman, do you have any other questions?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I understand, Reverend, from your statement that you read, that at the present time the position of the federation is that none of these Japanese that were removed from the Pacific coast area should be returned to the Pacific coast during the war.

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, the statement, I believe, is that we do not believe it wise to bring them back during the war, although they may have the legal right to come back.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think that is the gist of your statement with regard to that particular subject.

Does your federation, or the federation that you represent, feel that it would be all right to release the evacuees from the relocation centers so they might circulate freely in the eastern part of the country as well as the Midwest?

Mr. EIDSATH. So far as I know the opinion of the federation it is that it would be best to get them dispersed into constructive activities where they could give their contribution, wherever it is possible to have them go out—that is the loyal Japanese to go out of the relocation camps and take part in constructive activities which would be helpful to the country.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Can you tell the committee why there is any differentiation in the mind of the church federation as to why they should not be allowed to come back to the Pacific coast but yet allowed to circulate on the eastern coast or in the central part of the country?

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, there has been a great deal of newspaper discussion on this subject which has been detrimental, it seems to me, or it has been conducive to build up an anti-Japanese sentiment, thus barring their return.

There is an attached pamphlet to the document which indicates that there are organizations which would promptly go a long ways in opposing such a return and it might result in unpleasant experiences which would bar a more sane return later on.



Mr. EBERHARTER. Don't you think there is some inherent danger that the same thing may occur in other sections of the country aside from the Pacific coast? A bad feeling may be aroused by numbers of these Japanese locating in certain sections rather heavily—don't you think there is some danger in that?

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, there might be danger. I am certainly not omniscient as far as the situation obtains all around the country.

I believe that where there would be no or very little opportunity for direct contact with their own people it would be all right. Suppose some subversive individual did get out where there was little opportunity for contact with his own people, then there would be no danger to the community in them working in the community.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, Reverend, in almost every community in the United States there are certain valuable, strategic installations; don't you think there might be an element of danger in allowing Japanese free access to that type of installation?

Mr. EIDSATH. I don't think there would be any danger from loyal Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, of course, if there is no danger from loyal Japanese in the central part of the United States, there is no danger from loyal Japanese on the Pacific coast.

Mr. EIDSATH. I do not believe there would be any danger from the loyal Japanese on the Pacific coast any more than there is danger of having them loose in the Hawaiian Islands, which are much closer to Japan, and there I understand they are loose.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So, your main reason for the differentiation between the central part of the country and the Pacific coast area, is because of the feeling in the minds of the American people against the Japanese in general, which exists on the Pacific coast and perhaps may not exist in the central part of the country?

Mr. EIDSATH. Referring to the loyal element of the Japanese, I would say that the differentiation would be from the psychological angle.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that is really what you fear, the psychological angle?

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, I fear it might be taken advantage of by certain groups which have expressed themselves very strongly in opposition to it and it may prevent a better adjustment later on.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one other thing I would like to ask you: You recall, I believe, that it is difficult on the part of the average American to understand the Japanese ideology and psychology, speaking generally, do you not?

(No response.)

Mr. EBERHARTER. Unless they have had some experience with the Japanese people?

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, the same difficulty would arise with a strange group. The same difficulty would be present there.

It was a little difficult for me to understand a Greek when I first met a Greek.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one more question and I will be through. You feel that it just as easy to understand the Japanese people as it is to understand European peoples?

Mr. EIDSATH. I can only say that I have found it as easy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thank you very much.



Mr. COSTELLO. You have also indicated you haven't had much experience with the Japanese people; isn't that true?

Mr. EIDSATH. I wouldn't say a great deal; I have had some experience.

Mr. COSTELLO. What has been the nature of your experience?

Mr. EIDSATH. I have gone to school with them; I have worked with some of them in committees. I have worked with some of them in the Presbyteria of Los Angeles.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many were in school with you at the time you were in school?

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, in theological seminary I think we had out of a student body of about 100, I think we had about 10 at one time.

Mr. MUNDT. Just to clear up one point in your testimony in response to the question asked by my colleague as to your reason why you felt the Japanese could better be released to the central or eastern part of the United States than the Pacific coast.

I believe you said one reason you had for feeling that way was because there would be little opportunity for Japanese to contact or communicate with their fellow nationals if they were located in the central part of the country.

I am not sure that you want that to go as one of your reasons because under the existing circumstances the best place in the world to put a Japanese evacuee now would be on the Pacific coast if the idea was to prevent him from communicating with his fellow nationals, because they have all been evacuated out of here.

Mr. EIDSATH. I think I said on questioning later on that as far as the loyal Japanese was concerned, there certainly would be no danger of releasing them on the Pacific coast—there would be no more danger than releasing them in the central part of the United States or eastern United States.

Mr. MUNDT. That part of your testimony, I think, represented what you really wanted to leave with the committee?

Mr. EIDSATH. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Rather than the other idea?

Mr. EIDSATH. I think that is true.

Mr. MUNDT. I wanted to clear that up for you.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you mind stating to the committee what other organizations you belong to other than those you have given us?

Mr. EIDSATH. Well, politically I am listed with the Democratic Party as a Democrat.

I belong to the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. In the civilian service in Los Angeles I am an evacuation officer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation?

Mr. EIDSATH. I am not and never have been. I know many of the men in the fellowship but I have never been a member and I am not now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Directing your attention to the prepared statement that you read, did Dr. Farnham consult you when he was writing the statement?

Mr. EIDSATH. There were several of us consulted on that statement.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you consulted?

Mr. EIDSATH. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And who else was consulted?

Mr. EIDSATH. The Reverend Mr. Norman Taylor, who is present here, was consulted.

Since part of this was done under the commission on race relations, racial groups within the federation, which is a commission under my department, the Reverend Mr. Taylor knows more about the number that were actually consulted with relation to this statement.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And this statement was never submitted to the church membership for approval of the various churches?

Mr. EIDSATH. No; it says no in the document itself.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It simply represents the opinion of the leaders of the church federation, isn't that right?

Mr. EIDSATH. We state in the document we believe it represents a fair interpretation of the views of the church.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But the church members themselves have never had an opportunity to pass on it or vote on it, have they?

Mr. EIDSATH. Not on this document; no.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Reverend, for your testimony here.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. The next witness is Rev. Kirby Page.

#### TESTIMONY OF KIRBY PAGE, VICE CHAIRMAN, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your name to the reporter?

Mr. PAGE. Kirby Page.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. PAGE. La Habra, Calif.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And where were you born?

Mr. PAGE. Texas.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. PAGE. 1890.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you attend school?

Mr. PAGE. Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you at one time editor of the magazine known as World Tomorrow?

Mr. PAGE. Yes; for 8 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the background of the magazine known as the World Tomorrow?

Mr. PAGE. The World Tomorrow is a religious journal attempting to interpret Christianity in terms of social relationships.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you had any connection with the Garland Fund?

Mr. PAGE. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know what the Garland Fund is?

Mr. PAGE. Oh, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you explain to the committee what the Garland Fund is?

Mr. PAGE. I will do that, sir. But would it be all right if I inquire if I am supposed to be talking about the Japanese or to give my personal history? It would be all right, Mr. Chairman, I don't mind answering the question, but the time is going pretty fast and it will soon be up.

Now, if you want to use the time this way, it is all right with me.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only purpose of the question is to learn something of your background with relation to what you are going to testify to.

Mr. PAGE. I don't think the Garland Fund has anything to do with it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am simply trying to give the committee the benefit of Dr. Page's background, so the committee will be able to evaluate his testimony.

Mr. PAGE. O. K.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And if he will be so kind as to answer the questions I am certain the committee will be glad to give the witness every opportunity of making a detailed statement here today.

Mr. PAGE. Any question you want to ask me about the Garland Fund insofar as I have an answer, I will give it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe the information regarding the Garland Fund would be of any value to the committee in view of the fact the witness stated he is not a member of the organization? The Garland Fund would not have any relation to the witness' background if he is not a member or has not been a member?

Mr. PAGE. That is the point—I have not been a member nor am I now.

Mr. MUNDT. May I inquire, Dr. Page, are you here today in an individual capacity or do you represent somebody?

Mr. PAGE. I am representing the Fellowship of Reconciliation, sir, and there is an official document here to that effect.

Mr. MUNDT. You are president of that association?

Mr. PAGE. Vice chairman they call it—that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Dr. Page about other organizations of which he has been a member or is a member at the present time?

Mr. PAGE. Please.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you ever a member of the National Council Committee on Militarism and Education?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what is the nature of that organization?

Mr. PAGE. It was an organization for the purpose of keeping education in the United States democratic and not controlled by the military.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you opposed to military training in the various schools in the United States?

Mr. PAGE. I am opposed to military training in civilian schools; not in military schools.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that was the purpose of the National Committee on Militarism and Education?

Mr. PAGE. That is right. We said we didn't want the civilian schools to be military schools; that militarism ought to be taught in military schools.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was one of the committees that was working to abolish the R. O. T. C. in the various schools and colleges in the country?

Mr. PAGE. That is right, in civilian institutions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you ever a member of the Peace Patriots?

Mr. PAGE. I don't—I know what the Peace Patriots are but I don't know whether there is a membership in it or not. But I am

sympathetic with them whether there is an actual membership list. I don't know about that but I am certainly sympathetic with them.

The Peace Patriots was a group that said we ought to make heroes out of our civilians as well as out of our soldiers.

The Peace Patriots were the nonmilitary heroes. I think it is a good idea.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Robert Morss Lovett?

Mr. PAGE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you ever associated with Dr. Lovett?

Mr. PAGE. No; except I have sat down in rooms like this with him. I have had no official connection with him at all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have never been on any committees with Dr. Lovett?

Mr. PAGE. I don't know. I have never, so far as I can recall—I have never sat in a committee meeting with him. Now, it is entirely possible that he might have been a member of a committee that I was. I am not trying to evade you. I have no recollection of being on a committee with him.

I wouldn't mind because I like him very much.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Rose Schneiderman?

Mr. PAGE. No; I don't know her. I heard her speak once but I don't know her.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask you once more if you have ever publicly solicited contributions for the Garland Fund for use in aiding the Chinese Communists?

Mr. PAGE. The answer is, "No."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you insert an ad in the World Tomorrow along with Dr. Robert Morss Lovett and Rose Schneiderman, soliciting contributions?

Mr. PAGE. For the war?

Mr. STEEDMAN. For the Chinese Communists.

Mr. PAGE. The answer is, "No."

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the ad in connection with?

Mr. PAGE. It was an ad where there was a strike in Hong Kong and some of our friends said that the labor movement in China needed strengthening.

I believe in organized labor. I have believed in it for 20 years. I believe in it now and I expect to believe in it as long as I live. Therefore, I thought the labor movement in China ought to be supported and the advertisement had nothing to do with communism at all. It was about organized labor. Is that clear?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Very clear. Have you ever contributed to the Commonwealth College in Arkansas?

Mr. PAGE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How much have you contributed?

Mr. PAGE. Oh, \$5 a year, or \$10 a year. Not more than \$10 in a year. My contributions are necessarily small; sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you visited the Commonwealth College?

Mr. PAGE. I have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you approve of what was taught at the Commonwealth College?

Mr. PAGE. The answer is yes and no. I approve of some of the things they taught. I disapproved of some. I approved of their



support of organized labor. I disapproved of any effort—any encouragement of communism.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You didn't approve the communistic teachings in the Commonwealth College, did you?

Mr. PAGE. Don't get me wrong there. You see I have been opposed to communism, publicly all these years and written, some of my friends say to approaching ad nauseum about it, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But when you contributed to the Commonwealth College—

Mr. PAGE. When I sent the money there was no charge it was communistic. Later when I heard the charge that it was communistic, I sent them no more contributions.

Mr. Chairman, this is all very interesting.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We just want to lay a background for your testimony here.

Mr. PAGE. You will leave us a little time, won't you?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. PAGE. It will be interesting to see the proportion of time we are going to use on the Japanese question.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think the committee will be very fair and allow you what time you need.

Mr. PAGE. Go right ahead, I don't mind answering.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you ever a member of the American League Against War and Fascism?

Mr. PAGE. I was not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you connected with it in any way?

Mr. PAGE. I was not. As a matter of fact as editor of the World Tomorrow, I lost a good many friends because of my attack upon that organization.

One of the biggest controversies I had as editor of the magazine was the continuous attack upon that organization. I was not only not a member of it but I was opposed to it, and that is a matter of written record, Mr. Chairman.

I think our friend, Mr. Steedman, would save time if he would remind me just what he is reading there.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe counsel for the committee has merely a few notes in relation to your background that he would like to bring out and verify before permitting you to appear as a witness.

Mr. PAGE. That is all right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually what we are doing here as a committee, is simply gathering evidence regarding the Japanese situation. Now, the various witnesses who come before us we wish to identify their background in order that we may evaluate the opinions set forth by them and then present that testimony to the other members of the committee in Washington so when they read the testimony they will be also able to evaluate the worth of the testimony regarding the subject at hand.

Now, with reference to the time element. I believe Mr. Steedman made arrangements with you whereby you would have 20 minutes, or something of that sort, but this testimony is preliminary and you will be allowed full opportunity to present your side of the matter.

Mr. PAGE. As a matter of fact I don't want to be misunderstood. I don't mind answering the questions. I have tried to be forthright.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever visited Russia?

Mr. PAGE. Once in 1926 for 3 weeks and I never went back.

I might say that I visited 34 other countries beside Russia.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was Japan one of those countries?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir; once in 1918 and once in 1930.

Mr. COSTELLO. How much time did you spend in Japan on those occasions?

Mr. PAGE. I spent about a week the first time and about 10 days the second time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Dr. Page, we can save time if you will answer this generalized question: How many antiwar or so-called pacifist organizations have you been connected with?

Mr. PAGE. A great many. For 27 years I have been opposed to war as a Christian clergyman. All I understand about my religion teaches me that war as a method is wrong. I reached that conclusion back in 1916 and have held it ever since and therefore as a clergyman and public speaker, and as a writer, I have expressed my convictions innumerable times.

I have worked through agencies that were antiwar. I have not worked through communistic agencies that for other purposes were against a particular war.

I am not against a particular war. I am against the method of war in general.

Now, I have said that, I suppose, from a thousand platforms and in about 20 books, so by this time it ought to be pretty clear I am opposed to war.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you belong to any other political organizations?

Mr. PAGE. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Socialist, for instance?

Mr. PAGE. I am now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are a member now?

Mr. PAGE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you always been?

Mr. PAGE. No; about 7 or 8 years—maybe 9—let me see; it was about—well, within 10 years.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask, Doctor, as a Member of Congress, I don't like war either, but if you had been sitting in my seat on the Monday after Pearl Harbor and voting on the declaration of war, would you have voted "Aye"?

Mr. PAGE. No; I would not have voted for a declaration of war. I would have voted against it. I would vote against a declaration of war against any nation at any time, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your position in opposition to war is that you are opposed to all wars under any circumstances?

Mr. PAGE. Completely, completely so.

Mr. COSTELLO. And would that apply to personal combat between individuals?

Mr. PAGE. It would apply to war between individuals; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words you do not believe in the right of even an individual to protect his own person and his own property against the aggression of some other person or individual?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, I only speak for myself and I am not talking about what other people ought to do, but as far as I am concerned, I think the method of war is wrong always, under every condition and, therefore, I would not keep a firearm in my house; I

wouldn't learn how to use one; I wouldn't have one; and I wouldn't use one under any condition.

I think the whole method of war is wrong.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you would keep a lock on your front door?

Mr. PAGE. No. As a matter of fact we live in the country 3 miles away from the village. We have lived there for 8 years and the door has not been locked in 8 years.

Mr. COSTELLO. You are fortunate.

Mr. MUNDT. I have no quarrel with your convictions about war or peace, but I am going to pursue it a little further.

Suppose the Japanese instead of bombing Pearl Harbor had bombed Los Angeles and you had been a Member of Congress, would you have voted against a declaration of war?

Mr. PAGE. I would not vote for war under any circumstances against any nation at any time, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask this question, Doctor: Would you have fought back against the Japanese if they had proceeded to invade this country?

Mr. PAGE. With arms? No.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words you believe after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States should not have fired a gun; should not have sent out an airplane; should not have had a man in uniform; and we should have left ourselves wide open to the Japanese to proceed with all their military power and force at their disposal to invade the United States and to occupy every section of this country with their troops?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, you do not express my point of view.

Mr. COSTELLO. You said you were opposed to war and you said you would not vote for war under any circumstances, and that you would not take up arms against any nation.

Now, what I am asking is, Would you fight against an aggressive nation, against a country invading this country?

Mr. PAGE. And I said I wouldn't fight against any nation.

Mr. COSTELLO. And I prefaced my question with: If the Japanese had invaded the Hawaiian Islands and taken the Islands and then proceeded to invade the United States with all the force at their disposal, if you were in charge of a naval vessel you would not fire a gun or in charge of the Army, you would not fire a gun; you would not in any way attempt to stop the aggression of the Japanese Nation in trying to conquer this country?

Mr. PAGE. The answer is that a person holding my point of view would not be in command of a naval vessel and never get elected to Congress, and a person holding my point of view would never be President of the United States.

I am not speaking for the group when I make these statements; I am speaking for myself.

Mr. COSTELLO. But during all the years you have held this point of view, you have been preaching from your pulpit, been giving lectures throughout the country, and trying to convert people in this country to that point of view; isn't that correct?

Mr. PAGE. May I comment? If I had succeeded, we would have prevented the war.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean to say if everybody in this country had been completely disarmed and we had not a single gun at Pearl



Harbor or a single battleship at Pearl Harbor, that the Japs never would have bombed it?

Mr. PAGE. On the condition that the reason we disarmed was that we held this conviction; because if we held this conviction we would have conducted ourselves in relation to Japan in such a fashion we would have kept a liberal, nonmilitary government in Japan and there would not have been that aggression in Japan.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, you feel if we had never had an army or a navy in the United States of America, there would be no military power in Japan?

Mr. PAGE. No; I said if the people of the United States had disarmed for the reasons that they believed—the convictions that I hold——

Mr. COSTELLO. All right; if those had been the convictions under which we disarmed, you believe there never would have been a military power in Japan and no military force in Japan?

Mr. PAGE. It is my deep conviction the military regime would not have been in control of the Japanese Government and therefore the Japanese Government would not have been aggressive.

Mr. COSTELLO. And do you believe the same thing to be true of Germany?

Mr. PAGE. Exactly so.

Mr. COSTELLO. You believe if the United States was totally pacifistic and totally disarmed, for the purpose of promoting a program of peace for all the world, that Hitler would never have attempted to militarize the German people and develop the military power which he did?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, in that event he would not have been in power. He would have been simply an agitator on a soap box because the thing that put him in power was the condition and attitude of the rest of the world.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you think we could have changed world policies by totally disarming?

Mr. PAGE. I think it would, even if we had adopted total pacifism, it would take us several centuries to convince the world.

You know I didn't bring this up.

Mr. COSTELLO. But I think it is of material value to the record to know the background of the witnesses who appear before the committee; and this viewpoint, frankly, is rather astounding to me because I can't possibly conceive of any American citizen, who has any love for this country, not being willing to try to protect this country from being overrun by an aggressive militarist from some foreign land who wants to come in and dominate and assume dictatorial power over it.

I have no doubt in my mind whatsoever if Japan were to invade this country, and we were not to resist the invasion, that this country would be under their dominion for the next 20 centuries and we would not have any religious groups.

Your own churches would be eliminated. We would be under the heel of a foreign and pagan power that would not permit us to exist in the manner in which we exist now.

I think those things are worth fighting for and worth protecting; and if somebody attempts to steal my watch, I think I have a right to attempt to protect myself against him stealing my watch; and if



some military power attempts to steal my country, if I have any love for it at all, I would want to protect my country against such a thing.

It seems to me any normal human being would do the same thing. If a man broke into your house to steal your wife, it would seem to me that a man would fight to protect his wife and that same doctrine ought to apply to the love of country; and the individuals in this country who enjoy the blessings of the country ought to fight against invaders.

Mr. PAGE. I don't want to continue this longer than you want to; but since you provoked a reply, may I give it?

Mr. COSTELLO. I would be glad to hear your reply.

Mr. PAGE. My comment is that we also want to protect and defend the country. That is the reason we are opposed to militarism. We think that militarism is an enemy of democracy and if a country becomes militarized it will cease to be democratic.

It is not only in terms of democracy; it is in terms of other human values. We believe that overcoming evil with goodness is sounder policy than resisting evil with evil, and we have no doubt at all that if the policy which we represent had been adopted generally by the people of the country our attitude toward Japan and Germany and Italy would have been such we could have lived in peace with them and in no danger of invasion.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is only one conclusion I can draw from your statement, and that is the only way to fight crime is to eliminate our police force and thereby eliminate crime.

Mr. PAGE. No; the best way to eliminate crime is to remove the causes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you think by removing the guns and by removing the Army and by removing the Navy from this country, you will remove the causes of war?

Mr. PAGE. No. You remember I said at least six times that I am assuming that disarmament would do good. If it represented just a negative attitude of laying down the arms, it would simply invite aggression, but if the reason, sir, that we put down our arms was that we had so much goodwill toward the Japanese, toward the Germans, toward the Italians and were putting that good will into our practice, then I for one would rather run the risk of trusting good will than I would to run the risk of trusting dynamite.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, you think as far as Japan is concerned if we had laid down our guns and announced to Japan it is not because we are setting aside a program of aggression that we are laying down our guns, but because we love our neighbors and that because we told the Japanese we love our neighbors and therefore not arming ourselves, that thereupon they would desist from any desire to take the Philippines or to attack Pearl Harbor or any other part of the world?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't say that immediately they would desist from all evil desires because, as a clergyman who has had considerable experience—

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently we have very divergent views so we had better leave them at this point.

Mr. PAGE. You will let me remind you I did not bring this up.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was an interrogation going into your background for the benefit of the committee.

Mr. PAGE. I might say I don't mind this a bit; it is perfectly all right with me.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I should think the good Doctor would be pretty well up on his subject and prepared to argue it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the American Civil Liberties Union?

Mr. PAGE. I have been for about 20 years and I am now and I am proud of it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In the Los Angeles branch?

Mr. PAGE. Yes; and proud of it. I wouldn't mind having that widely publicized.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People?

Mr. PAGE. I am not. Sure, I have been in the past. If I am not now it is simply an oversight, but I believe in it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You believe in what they are trying to do?

Mr. PAGE. I believe in the general procedure. I don't say I believe in everything they have done, but I believe in the idea.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you approve of the leadership of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People?

Mr. PAGE. In the sense that I approve of the leadership of Mr. Roosevelt. I agree with some of the things he does and disagree with others.

I approve of some of the things he does. You don't approve everything that an organization does when you join it. If you did you couldn't be a member of any organization on earth.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the National Council for the Prevention of War?

Mr. PAGE. I am now and have been for years and glory in it. That is one of the numerous ones, sir, I was telling you I belonged to.

Mr. STEEDMAN. If you were of draft age at the present time would you be a conscientious objector?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, if I were of draft age at the present time I would avail myself of the legal and patriotic provisions provided in the Selective Service Act and would select the third form of national service.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you be a little more specific?

Mr. PAGE. I will be more specific, but I spoke accurately.

The National Selective Service Act has three courses open to a young man of fighting age—three loyal, legal, patriotic actions.

First, he may accept service as a combat officer or private. That is, he may take combat service.

Second, he may ask for and obtain service in a noncombat unit—the Medical Corps; or, third, he may select the service of national importance as designated by the Government of the United States under the civil service.

The third is what I would select.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is commonly known as a conscientious objector?

Mr. PAGE. Of course I am a conscientious objector and have been since 1916, therefore, that is what I would do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to introduce into the record a memorandum on the letterhead of the Fellow-

ship of Reconciliation, 1411 West Twenty-second Street, Los Angeles, Calif., addressed to:

*To Whom It May Concern:*

This is to certify that Kirby Page is a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and is hereby authorized to represent said organization before the Dies Committee meeting in Los Angeles, Calif.

That is signed: "Glenn E. Smiley, secretary, Southwest Pacific Area."

I would like for that to be included in the record at this point.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions of Dr. Page at this time.

You may continue with your statement, Doctor.

Mr. PAGE. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed.

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly address myself to one aspect of the Japanese situation and that is the policy of the W. R. A. in releasing from the centers internees under certain specified conditions.

If that is permissible I would like to address myself to that.

I would like to state first of all what I understand to be two legal principles in American law and then two facts and then draw a conclusion from the principles and the facts.

The two legal principles are, first, that an American citizen is assumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty after due process of law.

That is, as I understand it, basic in American law.

The second principle in American law is that when an individual has by a court of his peers been proved guilty of a crime, he alone is to be punished.

Now, the two principles stand out in clarity when you state the contrast. The contrast of the first one would be that the individual is assumed to be guilty until he is proved to be innocent.

Ours is the opposite of that. The individual is assumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty.

The opposite of the second principle would be that the family of the guilty man would be punished as well as the guilty man.

Now, as I understand it, our procedure is that the man is assumed to be innocent until proved guilty and that he alone must be punished for his crimes.

Those I believe to be principles that are relevant to this discussion.

The two facts that I would like to state are these:

First, that some seventy thousand, more or less, American citizens are now interned in the Japanese relocation centers—that is citizens up to approximately sixty-five or seventy thousand.

The second fact is that, as I understand it to be a fact, that the W. R. A. does not release members, internees, or members of the camp for outside life unless and until—unless the F. B. I. has made a formal written declaration that the man under the American system is innocent; that he has not been proved guilty. There are no charges against him. There are no justifiable suspicions.

In other words, no man goes out of the war relocation centers until the Government, acting through the F. B. I., says:

So far as we know he is innocent.



Mr. COSTELLO. Where did you obtain your information regarding that?

Mr. PAGE. From friends in the camps and officers in the camps.

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason for asking that is just the other day a release appeared in the daily press to the effect that the F. B. I. is not consulted regarding any of the evacuees who are being released from the relocation centers.

Mr. PAGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, all I can say is that I have been in, very briefly, 9 out of 10 of the centers and the testimony I had in all 9 was the same.

Now, they may all have been mistaken but they all told me the same thing.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is rather strange because the press release was directly opposite of that, and, frankly, the press release rather surprised us.

However, it was the press release emanating from the authorities in Washington. It was stated in Washington that the F. B. I. are not consulted regarding evacuees before they are released.

Mr. PAGE. If those are the facts, as I believe they are, then my conclusion is that the present policy of the W. R. A. in releasing under this safeguard internees for two purposes:

First, for outside employment and, second, for further study and education, that that policy is sound and deserves the support of American citizens, and with very great enthusiasm I support the policy of releasing American citizens who are innocent under our system of legal justice.

Now, my conviction is that this policy is sound is reinforced by three other kinds of evidence.

The second bit of evidence is the evidence that comes from the United States Army.

The United States Army officially believes that a certain portion of these American citizens of Japanese ancestry are loyal and patriotic and to prove that the Army believes that these men of Japanese ancestry, both in the Philippine Islands and in this country, have been inducted into the United States Army.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are referring to the Hawaiian Islands, rather than the Philippines?

Mr. PAGE. I am sorry, that is a slip of the tongue. I did not mean the Philippines; I meant Hawaiian Islands. That was a slip of the tongue.

That is the Hawaiian Island and in this country you have the fact that the Army has inducted them.

I would like, if it is permissible, to insert into the record, and you will have to decide, sir, whether it is relevant and germane, an article which I clipped from this issue of Harper's Magazine that deals with the problem, and I want, if I may, to read about 10 lines. I won't read interminably.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you want to include all of it in the record?

Mr. PAGE. The article was written by an officer in the United States Navy. It is in the June issue of Harper's Magazine.

Mr. COSTELLO. June of this year?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, 1943. The title of it is, "The Japanese-Americans in Hawaii," and the lines that I want to read—

Mr. MUNDT. Will you give us the author's name?



Mr. PAGE. It is Cecil Henry Coggins.

He is a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy on active service and the particular lines that I would like to read have to do with the question of whether the whole group is disloyal or whether some of them are loyal and he says that General Emmons, who is the commanding officer in Hawaii, insisted on establishing the truth as to the loyalty of the population and the intelligent searching of their files covering more than 100,000 individuals resulted in 4 conclusions.

I shall not read them, but I will summarize them.

The first conclusion was that there were some dangerous Japanese there. The second conclusion was there were some pro-Japanese sympathy there. The third conclusion, and I will read it:

That by their actions an overwhelming majority of Japanese-Americans had shown hatred of the enemy and made brilliant records in all the war effort in which they had been allowed to participate:

4. That not one act of sabotage had been committed in the islands either by alien Japanese or by the Nisei, consequently every one of the hundreds of rumors that have circulated in the islands and on the mainland to that effect was proven definitely false.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of the quotation. One could go on longer but I ought not do so.

My second point, you see, in addition to what I believe to be the policy, that the F. B. I. clears them before they go out, is the fact that the United States Army receives them.

They accepted volunteers in the Army in Hawaii and Secretary Stimson said he would accept 1,500 volunteers, but when this article was written there had been 7,500 volunteers from the young Americans of Japanese ancestry, and the editor of Harper's Magazine put in a footnote that the number up to the time the magazine went to press was 10,000.

That is in the Hawaiian Islands—10,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry had volunteered for service in combat duty in the United States Army.

Now, surely that is evidence that ought not to be overlooked.

Now, my third point—first was the F. B. I. and the second was the Army. My third point supporting my contention is the testimony that comes from my friends who have known many Japanese over long periods of time.

I have at least 50 friends who have lived among the Japanese and worked with them a considerable length of time, many of them as missionaries in Japan and others as teachers in agencies—in institutions where there were a good many Japanese students and some of them as pastors of churches. And in this particular tour which I have just completed, where I went to 9 out of 10 of the centers—covering all 10 of them except the one in Wyoming, I talked at length with Protestant preachers. The fact that I am a clergyman myself causes me to approach this problem from a religious point of view, but I had long and unhurried conversations with most of the clergymen—the Protestant clergymen in the camps, and the question that I asked over and over again is the question:

Sir, what is your judgment about the loyalty of these people?

And I am talking now about the American citizens. I am confining myself to them. I am not talking about the others than the 70,000

American citizens. My remarks are addressed entirely to that section of the problem.

Mr. COSTELLO. Might I interrupt for a question?

In referring to citizens do you also include, Doctor, those Japanese who were born in this country and educated over a period of years in Japan?

Mr. PAGE. Yes; I would include them but with the qualification that there the doubt in my mind would be considerable and I would not want to make a blanket assertion that everybody who studied in Japan was necessarily anti-American, but the fact that he did study in Japan would make me look into his record more carefully.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is a possibility that those educated in Japan are more likely to be disloyal than the ones educated in the United States?

Mr. STEEDMAN. May I ask a question at that point?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you take into consideration the dual citizens?

Mr. PAGE. You are getting into another problem now. May I say this, that I talked at length with my friends as to whether they thought these people, the young Nisei generally were loyal or not and the testimony I got, without exception, from my friends was that most of them were loyal. They all said "most." I didn't talk with anybody who said they were all loyal. I didn't hear one single person say: "Oh, they are all right."

But I heard at every point in every camp I went that an overwhelming proportion were loyal.

Now, for myself at the moment I am not interested in the racial cause. What I am saying is that the ones that are guilty ought to be treated differently from the ones that are innocent, and the ones I am talking about now are the ones that, under our system of law, are still innocent because they have not been adjudged guilty. It is that group that I believe to be substantial—whether it is 10 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent or 80 percent, doesn't affect the validity of the argument, because I am only talking about that number.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You say you are only referring to the American citizens of Japanese ancestry?

Mr. PAGE. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And I asked you the question, Did your statement take in the dual citizens—those Japanese who have been registered with the consulate for dual citizenship and who had never renounced their registration in any way?

Mr. PAGE. My answer would be a divided answer. I would divide that group into two divisions: First, the group that voluntarily and are of mature age, registered themselves. I would put them in the category, Mr. Chairman, where I said I would put a big question mark. I would say that group would need to be examined with great care.

Now, the other group, and it is a substantial group, is the group of young Niseis in this country who were registered in Japan without their consent and without their knowledge.

That question came up in conversations in the camps over and over again and my preacher friends and the people I talked with said: "We hear all the time the young people say, 'I don't know whether I am registered or not.'"

You see, the registering in most cases was done by the elder people for the children. Now, surely the fact that an older person wanting to keep the ties with Japan before the war would register his son, surely, that ought not to be held as evidence the son is anti-American, so I divide my answer, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just evidence that the parent was complying with the Japanese law with reference to being a citizen of Japan?

Mr. PAGE. But, Mr. Chairman, when an American citizen goes to China and there a son is born, of what land does that son become a citizen? Of the United States, so——

Mr. EBERHARDT. That is only on occasions when they are on official Government business.

Mr. PAGE. No; take my missionaries, for instance——

Mr. EBERHARTER. Of if they are over there just on a temporary visa.

Mr. PAGE. I may be mistaken but this is my judgment.

Take my friends who have gone out there as permanent missionaries. They went out as young husbands and wives. They settled down with the expectation of living the rest of their lives there——

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think you are right on that.

Mr. PAGE. So my answer is that is not unusual; that that is what we do also and surely that is not proof they are un-American—the fact that their fathers adopted the same policy we adopt when we are born in the Far East.

So, I would divide the answer. I would say some of them need to be looked at with great care and others ought to be freed of suspicion until proved guilty.

I hope I have not used up my time. Will you let me have about 3 minutes more?

Mr. COSTELLO. Take what time you need.

Mr. PAGE. I would like to sum this up in not more than 3 minutes.

What I want to draw is that if the policy of keeping the innocent Americans of Japanese ancestry in the camps should be that policy, that policy should be terminated. The guilty ones should be dealt with; the innocent should be dealt with differently than the guilty ones and that number, whatever the proportion is that has not been adjudged guilty, they should be permitted under the safeguards of F. B. I. investigation and declaration that they are not guilty; that there is no evidence that they committed a crime or are disloyal, that the present policy of permitting them out should be continued and should be extended and it should be speeded up for two reasons, because the effect of a further internment of these people will be disastrous. It is disastrous because it is doing three things to them:

It is bringing them to a sense of hopelessness. They don't see anything ahead. They know they are not wanted back in California. They know nobody wants them.

One girl said: "I feel as if I had been dropped in a vacuum."

The sense of hopelessness—now, hopelessness is a terrible thing for human character and when you take 70,000 American citizens, or what portion of the 70,000 are innocent, and nevertheless in spite of their innocence you put them in a situation where their characters are deteriorating by the sense of sheer hopelessness and despair, that is wrong by any test of wrong.



Now, the second effect upon them is that they have a feeling that they are victims of rank injustice. They believe themselves to be innocent—this group I am talking about, you see, and it is a terrible thing for American citizens believing themselves to be innocent to be victims of American governmental processes.

It destroys in them the confidence in the very system they have been taught to love—many of them in which they believe and for which they would be willing to die.

They say it is an insufferable thing, an intolerable thing that they, American citizens, should be victims of American processes.

And the third, it is creating a very great deal of bitterness and for myself I am convinced that the way to destroy democracy fastest is to turn American citizens into bitterness against the democratic process and the effect of this internment upon these people is making them bitter—making them doubt the validity of the democratic process; making them doubt whether this thing is what they were taught.

The other reason I think why we ought to get them out is for the sake of democracy itself. Democracy differs from totalitarianism. It differs in fundamental ways. Democracy believes in doing justice to its own people; totalitarianism does not make any pretention of dealing justly with the people because that isn't a concept of totalitarianism. But the democratic process is based upon justice.

Now, it seems to me if my analysis is sound, and I believe it is sound or I wouldn't be here, if it is sound, then what we are doing is undemocratic. What we are doing is very bad for democracy and, therefore, for the sake of democracy as for the sake of the Japanese who are innocent, we ought to get them out as fast as we can.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In the first place, Doctor, I want to say that this committee certainly has come to no formal conclusion with respect to any charges that may have been made insofar as the operation of the camps are concerned, or any policy they have pursued.

We are merely now in the process of investigating these centers and that is the reason we are all happy that your group is here.

I wouldn't want you to think for a moment that this committee is out with a certain, definite, fixed conclusion in its mind before we have heard all the testimony.

Mr. PAGE. I am glad to hear you say that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am positive about that part of it.

Now, according to your testimony, you certainly do not go on the basis that all American-born Japanese are loyal to the United States?

Mr. PAGE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You don't go on that basis?

Mr. PAGE. No.

Mr. EBERHARTER. We all know that there are some who are not loyal to the United States?

Mr. PAGE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you also indicated that you believe a thorough investigation should be made before any person is released from the relocation centers?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that correct?

Mr. PAGE. That is correct.



Mr. EBERHARTER. I think I can agree with you on every one of those three propositions without any hesitation whatsoever.

Mr. PAGE. Good.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You also believe, I think, Doctor, that the bad Japanese should be segregated from those that are what we might term good Japanese?

Mr. PAGE. I do; and if I may comment, my friends in the camps tell me that to a considerable degree that has already been done.

You know there are internment camps in addition to the 10 relocation centers—there are camps that I think are officially designated as “internment camps.”

Mr. COSTELLO. And they are for the aliens.

Mr. MUNDT. For Japanese aliens only.

Mr. COSTELLO. The internment camps are for alien and dangerous Japanese. The relocation centers are the only centers at which the Japanese are located except the aliens who have been interned in internment camps.

Mr. PAGE. May I suggest that is worth checking. I can't prove it at the moment but my judgment is contrary to that and the reason I have that opinion is because I have one particular friend, a Japanese man and his wife that I saw some months before they were put in the internment camp. It is my belief that they are American citizens. Now, I haven't checked it. The man is now in an internment camp and I think, Mr. Chairman, that is worth investigating.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may be correct in that. They may be American citizens who have indicated subversive tendencies. Some of that type may be interned, but it seems to me they could only be interned through legal process.

Mr. PAGE. That is my point. They have already done that and they are taking American citizens out of these camps when they believe them to be guilty.

Now, if I may refer to an instance—I happened to be in the Gila River relocation center on one of the nights when the F. B. I. came in for an extensive raid—that is what, at least, that is what the residents called it, and that particular night 26 internees were taken out.

Now, I don't have any way of knowing whether any of them or all of them were American citizens, but I do know they were being taken out because it happened one of the very nights that I was there. The F. B. I. did take them out so I would say: “Yes; take them out when they have been—when there is evidence that they are dangerous.”

And I believe that to be the present policy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It is one of the purposes of our investigation to find out what has been done between the good Japanese and the bad Japanese.

Mr. PAGE. My judgment, sir, is that separation is going on in the camps at all times. At least that is what my friends believe to be the case.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I have no further questions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Dillon Myer?

Mr. PAGE. I don't think I do. The reason I say, “I don't think I do,” is because I go to so many conferences and conventions and meet so many people that I have always qualified by saying, “I don't think I have.”

So far as I know I do not know him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You referred in your testimony a number of times to your friends in the camps?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you refer to Japanese who are living in the relocation centers or to the personnel in control of those centers, ostensibly?

Mr. PAGE. Both. I have a great many Japanese friends—I mean friends of Japanese ancestry in the camps.

I can illustrate that: A good many times in the course of—I made public addresses, I preach sermons—I am long on preaching, so when I go into a camp I would preach and after I would get through a sermon this happened a good many times:

A man would come up to me and would say: “I met you at Assilomar.”

Now, “Assilomar” means a great deal. That is the place where the student conferences have been held for the last 20 years, so that a great many of these people I had known before and I know a good many of the missionaries and some of the W. R. A. officials and I speak of my friends in that sense.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you know some of the W. R. A. officials prior to their taking the positions they now have?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Which officials did you know prior to their being employed by the W. R. A.?

Mr. PAGE. The one I knew best was Mr. Joseph Hunter, who is the director of community activities at Rohwer.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is in Arkansas?

Mr. PAGE. That is in Arkansas. He is a preacher that I used to know in Little Rock. Before that he had been a missionary in Japan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Frank Heron Smith?

Mr. PAGE. I don't think so. His name came up in conversations all the time in the camps and I know who he is. I certainly don't know him; I never met him.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How did you obtain permission to visit the camps?

Mr. PAGE. By invitation of the ministers—the Protestant ministers in the camps. The procedure by which you get admission to the camps is upon invitation from some responsible group in the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they write you a letter inviting you to go to the camps?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir; and I gladly accepted.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have a church here in Los Angeles?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, I do not. For 22 years I have been an itinerant preacher—preaching constantly but with no local church.

Mr. MUNDT. I have a question I would like to ask.

Dr. Page, you indicated a little agitation at the beginning of this hearing because you felt you might not be given an opportunity to have your full say.

Mr. PAGE. I have had it, thank you; I really had it.

Mr. MUNDT. You feel the hearings are all right?

Mr. PAGE. I have taken more time than I should.

Mr. MUNDT. I just wanted to have your opinion as to whether you have had a fair opportunity to present your views.

Mr. PAGE. More than fair and I thank you.

Mr. MUNDT. There is some doubt in your mind and some doubt in the minds of the committee as to whether or not the F. B. I. does make investigation of the Japanese before they are released?

Mr. PAGE. There is no doubt in my mind.

Mr. MUNDT. But there is some doubt in our minds. The facts show that such investigations are not made. If that is true, do you believe these Japanese should be investigated before being released?

Mr. PAGE. My answer is "Yes."

Mr. MUNDT. You visited a number of the camps—9 out of 10, and on the basis of that experience, do you feel that by and large we are going to get better management in these camps if the officials in charge are folks that had experience with the Japanese or if the leaders are men who have not had experience with them?

Mr. PAGE. My answer would be that the people who have had experience with the Japanese, everything else being equal, will do a better job.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you recognize this to be a valid situation: That the Government of the United States has an obligation to these Japanese also to see that they are protected if they are out in civilian life; that they are not picked on by gangs doing them bodily injury without process of law?

Mr. PAGE. The answer is "Yes" with a qualification that while I believe in police action, I don't believe in all forms of police action, but generally the answer to your question is "Yes."

Mr. MUNDT. But you would feel the police themselves have an obligation to protect civilian Japanese in the community?

Mr. PAGE. Within limits. In certain ways I wouldn't approve and in certain ways I would approve.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you feel there might be a danger if in this relocation of the Japanese under prevailing circumstances and sentiment, if they were to return to the Pacific coast at this time?

Mr. PAGE. My conviction is this: That these American citizens who are innocent ought to be treated as all other American citizens are treated. Unless they are guilty, there doesn't seem to be any basis in American procedure for treating them differently.

Mr. MUNDT. I wasn't trying to justify a different treatment. I am asking your judgment whether you do not feel they might receive some other different kind of treatment?

Mr. PAGE. Mr. Chairman, I grew up in the South and I have lived in communities that are familiar with mob violence and I know the American mind well enough to know mob violence comes easy, and that is a confession.

Mr. MUNDT. You do feel the Government should take every precaution to prevent that?

Mr. PAGE. I didn't finish. Nevertheless I think that American citizens ought to be treated as equals under the law and if it is all right for a man of Norwegian ancestry, a citizen of Norwegian ancestry, to come into California, and a citizen of Chinese ancestry to come into California, then it ought to be the right, and I would underscore "it ought to be the right," of Japanese citizens who are innocent under the law to come along with the other people.

Now, whether they can or not, I would leave that decision to them. I wouldn't prevent them from coming because I don't see any basis



to deny them coming. If what I have been saying for these principles is sound, then there isn't any basis for discrimination.

The only basis for discrimination is between a guilty American and an innocent American. There is no basis for discrimination because your ancestors lived here and this man's ancestors lived there.

We ought not to treat a man under the law according to the place where he was born.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you consider it a justifiable basis if the facts were such that the measure seemed necessary for the Government to keep the Japanese out of an area where they might have bodily injury done to them?

Mr. PAGE. No. I would say what we ought to do is deal with the people who would do them bodily harm. That is where the Government's activities should be.

If there is danger that would result because of the return of some Japanese to the Pacific coast, that danger or violence would come either from the citizens of Japanese ancestry who have just returned or the violence would come from other Americans who objected to the Japanese coming.

Now, if the people of other than Japanese ancestry object to their coming, then their actions are lawless and the Government ought to deal with the lawless ones. In other words, if you have a vigilanteism, the law ought not to deal with the victims but with the vigilantes.

That is the American way.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you think it might be a little difficult in view of the general temper of the people on the Pacific coast to try to avoid possible injury to such Japanese that might be returned here? The only thing the Government could actually do in fact would be to attempt to arrest the perpetrators of the crimes rather than avoid the commission of crime.

Mr. PAGE. One other thing we could do, and that is to stop the distortion in our emphasis of our fellow Americans of Japanese ancestry. Instead of all the time picturing them as scoundrels and deceitful we might picture the innocent ones in their correct colors. That would be helpful.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee appreciates your appearing here and giving us the benefit of your views.

The committee will take a short recess.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order, and Mr. Steedman, will you call the next witness?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The next witness is Mr. Taylor.

### TESTIMONY OF NORMAN W. TAYLOR, MINISTER OF THE METHODIST CHURCH

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name and occupation to the reporter?

Mr. TAYLOR. Norman W. Taylor; minister of the Methodist Church, chairman of the Commission on Interracial Good Will of the Church Federation of Los Angeles.



Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. TAYLOR. 3764 Waseka Avenue, Los Angeles 34.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Your occupation is that of a clergyman?

Mr. TAYLOR. Minister of the Methodist Church.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you attend school, Mr. Taylor?

Mr. TAYLOR. University of Redlands for my college work; Yale University Divinity School for my theological work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you state briefly the organizations of which you are a member?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. I am a Mason and a member of the Methodist Church, a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and a member of the executive board of the Church Federation of Los Angeles. I think that is all. There may be some others. If so, they don't amount to much.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a statement you wish to present to the committee?

Mr. TAYLOR. No. I want to explain something about the statement presented by the church-federation committee—how that statement was made, if I may.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. TAYLOR. The impression was given that this statement was just made by the officers of the church federation rather than as a representation of the entire church federation.

The Church Federation of Los Angeles includes 280,000 of the large Protestant churches, including all of the denominations of Los Angeles.

Its membership, of course, is representative. There is no process—just as there is no process by which the people of the United States can vote on most of the laws that you Congressmen pass—there is no process whereby our people could take a referendum on this matter but this is the process:

In the first place there are three statements attached to the report that I gave you.

The second statement—that is, the first attachment to the statement that we made to you—is a joint statement from the California Council of Churches and the Church Federation of Los Angeles, signed by Dr. Tippet, president of the Southern California Council of Churches; Dr. E. C. Farnham, executive secretary, and Alphonzo Bell, president of the Church Federation of Los Angeles.

The statement on hatred and race prejudice, with reference to the Japanese, represents a study which has been read in our pulpits and which has been discussed in our local churches and which represents, so far as can possibly be stated, the position of the Protestant churches in Los Angeles. That is the second statement.

This third statement we explained could not be acted upon that quickly because we are a large and unwieldy body, but we did this yesterday:

Dr. Farnham asked me, as chairman of the interracial committee of the church federation, if I would give time to getting consent of the leaders of the Protestant churches to the statement which we are making to you today.

The statement was written by Dr. Farnham and I spent an afternoon, 4 hours, talking on the telephone incessantly to the leaders of the Protestant churches whom I knew and who had refused to sign this statement.

We discussed this point by point, and some of the paragraphs have been changed after discussing the paragraphs with these men: The Right Reverend Bishop Bertrand Stephens, head of the Episcopal Church in southern California; Mrs. Irene T. Heineman, who is an officer of the women's division of the Church Federation of Los Angeles; Dr. E. C. Farnham, executive secretary; Dr. Remsen Bird, a former president of the church federation and president of Occidental College; Dr. John Nixon, head of the social-service department of the social welfare of the Church Federation of Los Angeles; Dr. Walter Mudler, professor of religion in the University of Southern California and chairman of the Commission on International Justice and Goodwill of the Church Federation of Los Angeles.

All these men had full voice and they said they would be very happy to sign this statement.

We believe it is representative of the feeling of the churches.

We can't take action in 2 days in an unwieldy body. It takes about 2 months to get a statement like the one, Hatred and Race Prejudice, which we passed on.

I would like to point out that this reaches farther down into the rank and file of the churches than do the newspapers of southern California.

When the Japanese people were evacuated the churches rallied to the Japanese churches. My own church and the churches of West Los Angeles and Culver City gathered together and provided for our Japanese friends on the day of their evacuation with hot rolls and coffee.

My little church—a church with a very small membership was responsible for getting rolls for some 2,000 people. We tried to indicate to those people at that time in that way that as Christians we considered them to be our Christian brothers.

We did that for two reasons: First, the church is above all nations and our loyalty to God is above the division of the nations and above the divisions in war and therefore knowing that most of these people were loyal to the United States, we wanted to conserve their loyalty and their Americanism.

That is part of the picture.

I had in making an appeal in my local church, which is an indication of the temper of the whole church, because mine is no rabid, radical church—it is a very conservative church—it is, I hope, a very Christian church, but my people responded with money which paid for the food that we gave to the people and the soldiers who evacuated the Japanese and the Japanese people themselves stood at the church tables and rubbed elbows with us to receive the food we gave them.

There were mothers of men in the service who helped feed the evacuees and those mothers afterward told me that that was the greatest experience in their lives—their having taken part in a larger and more inclusive Christian loyalty.

Another indication of the fact that our communities are not rabid as the newspapers make out we are on this subject, is the fact that in our district pamphlets were circulated through Culver City by one of the congressional candidates appealing to the hatred of the Japanese and the candidate circulating that petition or that pamphlet lost the election and the candidate who insisted that an attitude of tolerance should prevail won the election in every district where those pamphlets and handbills were circulated.

The other thing that I should like to call attention to in conclusion, is that from December to March all of these people lived among us. There was no sabotage. The people were fearful. There was no harm done to them.

My personal conviction, and not the conviction of the Church Federation, but my personal conviction is that that is evidence that this matter has been greatly—the danger involved in this thing, has been greatly overplayed and that in the long future the day will come when sanity comes back to us and when we will be a little bit ashamed of the emotions that have taken possession of the minds and hearts of Californians in this particular time.

Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Dr. Taylor, do you have any Japanese actually belonging to your church?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where is your church located?

Mr. TAYLOR. Culver City.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you had any personal experience with the Japanese?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you describe that briefly?

Mr. TAYLOR. I have cooperated with the Japanese Methodist churches. All of my contact previous to this time was in connection with the Japanese-Mexican churches except in Arizona when a hate-and-pressure group tried to chase all the Japanese out of the Salt River Valley in 1935.

At that time I was a member of a committee which received letters of thanks from the State Department and the President of the United States for our attitude of friendliness toward the Japanese people.

At that time members of our Methodist-Japanese church were bombed by people and we rallied behind those people and we bore testimony to the California State Legislature and were instrumental, according to the testimony of some of the people, who hated the people of Japanese ancestry and race, we were instrumental in keeping the California Legislature at that time from passing more repressing land and property laws against the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many Methodist churches are there that serve the Japanese people in Los Angeles?

Mr. TAYLOR. I can't tell you that. I might miss several if I told you the ones I know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just numerically.

Mr. TAYLOR. Five or six Methodist churches, perhaps, in southern California. There are probably more but I am not familiar with the minutes of the Japanese Conference. I can't tell you that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any idea as to the number of Japanese belonging to the Methodist church or Christian churches?

Mr. TAYLOR. I can give you the place where you can get that information. You can get that from Frank Heron Smith, superintendent of the Japanese Mission of the Methodist Church, whose address is on Hilligas Avenue, in Berkeley, Calif.

He has all those records and any statement concerning those things would be—would more properly come from him.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was interested in one statement you made that the church was above all nations. That was one reason I was inquiring as



to the number of Japanese that might be members of the Christian religion.

It is my understanding the majority of the Japanese are not members of the Christian religion and that many of them follow Shintoism, which is a worship of the Emperor of Japan, and it seems to me in view of the statement you made that the church was above all nations, it is undoubtedly true that those Japanese who worship the Emperor as God, could not be loyal to this community, because of the fact their spiritual obligation comes higher and would require loyalty to the Emperor instead of to a civic loyalty to the United States.

Mr. TAYLOR. My acquaintance with the Japanese has been narrow in this respect: The Japanese whom I have known as friends, with few exceptions, were members of the church and active in the church.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have not had much contact with Japanese who are not members of the Christian religion?

Mr. TAYLOR. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the name of this interracial commission?

Mr. TAYLOR. The Inter-Racial Commission of the Department of Social Education and Action of the Church Federation of Los Angeles; it is a group within the church federation.

Mr. COSTELLO. What are the activities of that commission?

Mr. TAYLOR. Our object is to, as far as we can, make clear the Christian consciousness and the common ground on which the churches stand with regard to attitudes toward other races; to promote goodwill between the races that compose the Los Angeles communities; to help in any way we can lift up the conscience of the church on these matters and to try to sift it down into our own membership, which is one of our toughest jobs.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is not properly a matter for this committee to go into—it is a little off the question, but I couldn't help take notice after coming out here of the "zoot suit" activities.

Mr. TAYLOR. We have taken some action on that. We have met with Mr. Cranston, who is the president's representative, in discussing this thing.

He was here about a year ago and our church federation committee met in the mayor's office with Mr. Cranston and I understand Mr. Cranston is to be back here again; and I am sure we are in the process now of making our contacts to offer the good services of the church to promote the unity of our community with regard to the different races in any way we can.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel those activities were stirred by racial animosity?

Mr. TAYLOR. It played a very large part in it; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel that there has been any Axis agent operating behind the scenes in stirring up those activities?

Mr. TAYLOR. One of our Methodist ministers says it has. I am not in close enough touch with the Mexican people to express an opinion. I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee has not gone into it fully?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir; it hasn't.

Mr. COSTELLO. Hasn't it been indicated the activities are largely carried on by American citizens, so, at least to that extent, the activities of the "zoot suiters" would not be that of a foreign race but would actually be activities of our own citizens'? Isn't that correct?



Mr. TAYLOR. I am not in any position to express an opinion on that.

All I wanted to be clear was the fact that we did everything we could on short notice to get the full discussion within the church leadership. This isn't just something that a few of the officers of the church cooked up, but as far as we could we tried to be faithful to our constituency and prepare a statement that was representative of them all.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate your testimony here very much.

Will you call your next witness, Mr. Steedman.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think it would be well to request the following witnesses to confine their testimony to 10 minutes, if that is possible.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would not—I would rather not give them a limitation. I can stay here as long as they want to. So far as I am concerned, it is all right. They may take as much time as they see fit.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The next witness is Mr. Alan Hennebold.

**TESTIMONY OF ALAN HENNEBOLD, FORMER PHOTOGRAPHER,  
MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER, MANZANAR, CALIF.**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your name to the reporter?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Alan Hennebold.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your address?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. 1546 North Poinsetta Place, Hollywood, 46.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Colorado.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Pueblo, 1922.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you go to school?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I went to school in Hollywood—Hollywood High School.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you go to college?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. No, I didn't. I went to work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I am a photographer. I have been working as a photographer before and since I have been out of school.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where have you been working?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. First in Balboa, Calif., and since in Hollywood, Calif.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you a professional photographer?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. A portrait photographer?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes, sir; I specialize in child portraits.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is your office?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I work—my home is my studio.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you register for the draft?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes; I did. I knew you would get to that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present draft status?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I am 4-E. That is a so-called conscientious objector's classification.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a statement you would like to make to the committee?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes, I do. My statement isn't so much with the organization. I have no work with the Fellowship of Reconciliation, but purely on my own interest in the situation, I secured the job at Manzanar, Calif., February of this year, as photographer.

I was not employed by the W. R. A. and I did that specifically so I could see—hope to see the situation as it was and not as the Government agency wanted me to see it. I had full freedom of the camp at any time and I was able to get a much more candid viewpoint of what the feelings in the camp were than the average person traveling through or a Government administrator, because I believe quite a few of the people accepted me as one of them or accepted me on a much more even basis.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At that point: How did you secure your position at Manzanar?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I heard that they needed a photographer. By the way I was employed by the cooperative in the camp which set up a photographic studio, and since no Japanese evacuee is allowed to operate a camera, they needed a person to do the portrait work and so I did that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who employed you?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. The Manzanar Cooperative. It is in all centers—all of the business centers. It is under a community enterprise which is set up and cooperatively owned by the people in the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is in charge of the cooperative at Manzanar?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. It is a Japanese named Okada. It is all directly under a Dr. William Bruce, a professor from Stanford. His Government job is director of consumer enterprises.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Dr. William Bruce interviewed you and later employed you?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. He interviewed me but the actual employment was done by the Japanese themselves, because it is a cooperative owned by them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But your employment was approved by Mr. Bruce?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your salary?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I went in because I really wanted to make a real investigation—I went on the same basis as a professional Japanese—I got \$19 a month.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And your subsistence?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You may proceed with your statement.

Mr. HENNEBOLD. First I want to say I tried not to let my former experiences with Japanese people in high school and so forth, color my observations in the center, and I tried to make it as candid as possible.

In my work I came in contact with, I would say, many hundreds of people and my thoughtful judgment after being there for 3½ months was and is that the great majority of the Nisei are very much loyal to the United States and to the ideals of the United States; that the Kibei—that means the ones that have gone back to Japan, are truly the questionable group and are the group that should be investigated, and I as understand it, are being watched more closely.

I was quite amazed at the loyalty of a great majority of the older people, although they had sympathy toward Japan and some love toward Japan, as any person does, coming from another country.

I felt very conclusively that—well, I won't say a majority because that is a broad statement, but a great number of the older people are also very sympathetic toward the United States.

I feel that a great deal of disintegration is taking place in the people because of their confinement, because politically they have been brought up in our schools; they have been taught of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights just as all the rest of us and they have really believed in it and the incongruity of their treatment now weighs upon them very heavily and it is taking a toll of them.

I also felt very strongly that a very sad thing was rapidly happening—a great number of them were getting the typical W. R. A. feeling: "Well, they jerked us out of our homes, ruined our business, now let them take care of us."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Right at that point, may I ask you a question: Will you fix the date of your employment at Manzanar?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I believe it was around the 7th or 8th of February of this year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And when did you leave there?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I left there about 2 weeks ago. I don't know the exact date.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Around June 1?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Right around June 1.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 1943?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Proceed.

Mr. HENNEBOLD. The thing I was mentioning is, I feel that it is very important that the younger people who have a great contribution to make to America and can contribute, and most of them are willing to contribute to the war effort, that it is a very sad thing to keep them in confinement where they have to be fed; where they are practically of no use to our society.

On one thing I differ from all the rest of these gentlemen: Although I am of Christian faith, I made a very strong attempt to get to know the Buddhist group because that is the group that none of the rest of the people do see or talk to and in my work all of my employees were Buddhists, and on that score I will say that I feel that the great majority of the Buddhists, the young Buddhists, haven't a great deal of interest in the Buddhist church but go merely because that was the religion of their fathers; but it doesn't mean much to them.

I would say that the large majority of the Buddhist leaders are the group that are the most pro-Japanese and the most interested in Japan and have retained the strongest connections with Japan.

I very candidly observed the W. R. A. set-up and I feel that Manzanar—that there has been no coddling of Japanese there; that on the whole the whole management of that center, which is the only center I can speak about, has been very, very good and very thoughtful, and I believe the director of that camp is doing a very fine job.

Also one other thing I want to mention. Last fall I made a trip up and down the—not all the Pacific coast, but from San Francisco down just to merely satisfy my own opinion on how people did feel on this problem.

I talked to just everybody I could and I do feel that the hatred toward the Japanese is being very greatly stretched; that the average run of people that I talked to at that time and that was last fall, was



not all that is represented in the newspapers, and that if they were assured that the group that was brought back was loyal, they would accept them, especially if the Government would make some kind of a statement as they have made in the Negro question, where President Roosevelt has made the statement: "It is the American thing to do, to accept people of other races in employment."

I think a statement like that would make it all right for them to come back to the coast.

It is my understanding that while, although there is not a private investigation made of each person that goes out, that the F. B. I. records in Washington are checked against.

I, of course, not being a Government employee have no way to check that but that is my understanding in discussion with the officials there.

I know that a very careful investigation is made of what the record of the person has been while they were in the camp.

As far as telling the loyalty of the Japanese, I think that is entirely feasible if we want to do it, and that it is the thing we should do.

I believe that about covers what I wanted to say.

MR. EBERHARTER. You believe the bad Japanese should be segregated?

MR. HENNEBOLD. Yes; I certainly do. I think that is one of the saddest things, keeping the great majority of the loyal ones in the camps because they are constantly taunted by the people: "Well, here is your America; here is the way they treat you."

I have talked to them and I know that and for that reason I think they should be segregated.

MR. EBERHARTER. As far as you observed there was no segregation of the bad ones from the good ones?

MR. HENNEBOLD. I will say this: The ones that were dangerous to the others in a physical way had been segregated, but I would not say that all of the people that weren't 100-percent loyal had been segregated.

MR. COSTELLO. I believe you stated all your employees were Buddhists?

MR. HENNEBOLD. Not all my employees. I meant the men I worked with in the studio.

MR. COSTELLO. Most of those working in the cooperative photographic department were members of the Buddhist cult?

MR. HENNEBOLD. That represents only a small part of the cooperative but that is true.

MR. COSTELLO. What is the situation generally in the cooperative?

MR. HENNEBOLD. I would say the majority of the cooperative workers are Christians.

MR. COSTELLO. Is the cooperative actually controlled by the Nisei group in the camp or are the older Japanese in control of it?

MR. HENNEBOLD. It is a mixture of both; it is controlled by the people.

MR. COSTELLO. You were not able to distinguish any control between the two groups?

MR. HENNEBOLD. Definitely not.

MR. COSTELLO. It seemed to be a joint control of the cooperative?

MR. HENNEBOLD. Yes, sir.

MR. COSTELLO. And not by any particular element in the camp?



Mr. HENNEBOLD. No; of course the people that have had business experience before were working in it because of their experience, but did not predominate. I believe the chairman of the board at present is a Nisei.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Kibei group, as such, for example, had not gained control of the cooperative?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. No; definitely not.

Mr. COSTELLO. No one group really dominated it?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Definitely not.

One further statement I would like to make: I think one thing that would help the operation of the camp a lot would be on this financial thing—on the clothing allowances. You know they are given so much for clothes.

If that could be handled more carefully, so they wouldn't be given such a large sum of money at once—I mean where there is a whole family and not hold it out for so long, that has caused quite a bit of trouble.

Of course the thing that comes to my mind all the time is that if these people are going to be held out, it is a very sad thing that the camp is not allowed to become self-supporting so that it isn't a drain on the public.

Mr. COSTELLO. From your observation, do you believe the situation at Manzanar would make it possible for them to make that camp self-supporting?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I think to a great extent it could be.

Mr. COSTELLO. Through agricultural production and things of that character?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke of disintegration taking place in the camp due to confinement.

Do you believe that the fact that the Japanese are confined is the sole reason why there seems to be a disintegration of the loyalty of the Japanese?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. It is not so much disintegration of the loyalty but disintegration of their whole outlook toward everything.

I will speak first of the older people who have really tried to contribute something to California. Their feeling is: "Here we have spent these years working," and so forth, "and now we are just completely thrown down."

I mean there is a sense, certainly, of bitterness about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel possibly that some of the Kibei may be working on the other Japanese to build up that person's reaction?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. Yes; and that is one of the dangerous things.

Mr. COSTELLO. And there has been no attempt on the part of the authorities at Manzanar to prevent that or interfere with it that you observed?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I believe there is. All the time people are being removed.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know for what reasons they are being removed or to what locations they are being sent?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. No; I don't. I wasn't in the Government so I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. I thought you might have picked up information through conversations.

You spoke of your trip from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Do you believe the sentiment you witnessed last fall exists in the same degree today?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I don't know the rest of the coast but I believe it does to a large degree here in Los Angeles. I think some bad sentiment has been whipped up by the press.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel that there has been an increase in the feeling of the people here against having the Japanese returned to California, say, during the last three or four months?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I don't believe a normal—I mean I don't think it would have come to their minds had it not been brought up in the press so much.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think that possibly the return of many of the marines from Guadalcanal and other fighting fronts in the Orient has had any influence in the feeling of the people of California?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I wouldn't say so. I have talked to quite a few friends of mine who have come back and have a very good attitude.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you mean?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. I know one young man who made the statement to me:

That is what we are out fighting for so at home we do have democracy so that people who were not accused of anything would not be locked up and concentrated in a camp when they had not been accused of anything.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he make any comment to you regarding the Japanese fighters?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. He said that all the stuff about them being such fanatical fighters didn't seem to be true; but they seemed to be like any other fellows.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he speak to you about any deceit or tricks that they performed, for example, playing wounded and waiting for some one to come up, like a doctor, or an Ambulance Corps man or Medical Corps man and then exploding a hand grenade?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Having a hand grenade or something of that sort ready to kill the Medical Corps man or the doctor?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. No; he didn't. I asked him specifically about that and he said that he hadn't.

Mr. COSTELLO. He had personally not witnessed anything of that kind?

Mr. HENNEBOLD. No; nor heard of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. I want to thank you very much for the information you have given to the committee.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you any other witnesses?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, Mr. Hunter. But I have one thing I would like to do before Mr. Hunter goes on the stand.

I would like to introduce for the record a memorandum signed by Mr. Smiley, authorizing Mr. Hennebold to represent the Fellowship of Reconciliation before the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is on the letterhead of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1411 West Twenty-second Street, Los Angeles, Calif.

It reads as follows:

*To Whom It May Concern:*

This is to certify that Alan Hennebold is a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and is hereby authorized to speak for such organization before the Dies committee meeting in Los Angeles.

And that is signed:

Glenn E. Smiley, Area Secretary.

Mr. Hunter, will you please be sworn?

**TESTIMONY OF ALLAN H. HUNTER, MINISTER, MT. HOLLYWOOD  
CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. HUNTER. Allan H. Hunter.

Mr. COSTELLO. And your occupation?

Mr. HUNTER. Minister, Mt. Hollywood Congregational Church, 4609 Prospect Avenue, Los Angeles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long have you lived in Los Angeles?

Mr. HUNTER. Sixteen years—more than that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born, sir?

Mr. HUNTER. Toronto, Canada.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. HUNTER. 1893.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you an American citizen?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you become a citizen?

Mr. HUNTER. My father was naturalized and when I became of age I presume that would be it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state some of the organizations that you are presently a member of?

Mr. HUNTER. Fellowship of Reconciliation, chairman southwest area; executive committee, American Civil Liberties Union; committee on social action of the Southern California Congregational Conference.

I don't recall being a member at this time of any other organization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum similar to the other two, authorizing the Reverend Mr. Hunter to appear before the committee as representing the Fellowship of Reconciliation. I would like to read this into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, you may do so.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

*To Whom It May Concern:*

This is to certify that Allan H. Hunter is the southwest Pacific area committee chairman of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and is authorized to represent the organization before the Dies committee meeting in Los Angeles.

And it is signed, "Glenn E. Smiley, Area Secretary."

Do you have a statement you would like to make to the committee at this time?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. It is based on the study of the oriental problem in this country in a book of the Far East, published by the missionary education movement of this country and based on intimate contact with individual Nisei and Issei, and based on being the speaker at several Nisei Christian conferences at different years and the re-

treats—religious retreats, and based on visits to where I preached at the Rivers Gila Relocation Center and Manzanar.

My point is very simple; that out of this experience and to repeat based on a good deal of effort through many years, I am convinced as a minister that a great number of these American citizens of Japanese ancestry are quite loyal. They are committed to the democratic spirit; that we should encourage them and give them a chance to make the contribution they would like to make to democracy to this country.

I would agree with the President of the United States that no loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship regardless of his ancestry.

The principles on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of mind and heart. Americanism is not and never was a matter of race or ancestry.

A good American—

And this is from President Roosevelt's message on February 1; this year—

A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy.

Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country wherever his skills may make the greatest contribution, whether it be in the ranks of our armed forces, war production, agriculture, government service, or other work essential to the war effort.

My experience bears out the generalization made by many friends that a great number of these Nisei are very eager to help in any way they will be allowed to help. The analogy, if I may be permitted to give it, is that of a German shepherd dog. If you kick him and mistreat him he can become a problem; if you train him, give him a master to take care of so he is a seeing dog, he will be faithful in the discharge of his responsibilities.

And these Nisei have great gifts. We talked with principals of schools and college presidents.

I have statements from different ones, if you care to hear them, and ministers who know them, and the generalization is that a great number of them are very eager to serve. And I find in talking with them in the camp and in getting letters from them constantly, that a number of them are getting discouraged. I don't mean by that they are against democracy. I mean they are feeling as though they are not wanted.

And I would like to point out to this committee a great opportunity for us as soon as possible to encourage them to give them confidence to help them make their contribution by dispersing them over the country.

Now, the question of whether they should come back here is a rather technical and somewhat debatable question.

I think, personally, they have a great number of friends here who respect them and who are loyal to them and that if a plan could be worked out to allow it to be known that those would undertake to fulfill certain conditions could be allowed back here, those who are American citizens, who are proved loyal, I believe there are techniques for discovering loyalty.



There was an article published in Harper's by a Lieutenant Commander of the Navy, who indicated that if one could find a corps of loyal Nisei and get their double check and then get the F. B. I. double check and a double check from the administration and other double checks, and thus determine the loyalty, I think we have the techniques that were suggested by the lieutenant, in charge of the Intelligence of California—Naval Intelligence.

I think we can get those techniques.

Now, the other point, briefly, I would like simply to intimate is that unless we do take action to allow these young people to give expression to their loyalty, which I am convinced many of them have just like our own people—I don't think they are much different from our own young people, much less different than the publicity makes out—much less different than one would gather from the rather synthetic prejudice and hatred that is being generated—that if they are allowed to get out these normal healthy young people, it would help them to offset the propaganda going on in the Far East and from Hitler's agents that we are denying, the democracy that we believe in.

There would be no risk in allowing some to come back here, that is true. There may be greater risk in allowing it to be understood in the Orient where are millions of people watching to see whether we really mean our democracy.

I will grant the risk, but I rather think very few young Nisei would come back here in a hurry; that it could be put up to them so they would do the reasonable thing at a good deal of sacrifice.

I feel they are willing to sacrifice, many of them, and that the technical problem of preventing mob riots and vigilanteism can be handled through the law.

I don't think it is a hopeless problem. Here is our problem to, among other things, not only persuade our own people but to persuade the world and the Orient that is watching, that we really mean our democracy.

It is a serious problem and there are risks if we live up to democracy, but I am making a plea for us not to permit Hitlerism and racialism to triumph.

I am not saying it is triumphing, but we are running that risk unless they take advantage of the chance to disperse the young people out of relocation centers and give them a chance to get their roots down in a community and make their contribution. But right now some of them have what they called in the last war, barbed-wire disease.

They are getting disheartened. They are getting disorganized. It is taking the heart out of them and I do feel I am in a position to know something about this.

In my book published on this question I made the statement that there was a wall between the older generation and the younger generation. It is a glass wall—politically, linguistically, culturally. They are quite different, the younger ones.

I have an adolescent child, and I find that even Caucasians can be different from their parents. But it is more marked and I played that up in the book, and one of the experts laughed at the statement. He said:

It isn't a glass wall; it is a brick wall.

My point is that there is great difference between the American citizens and the older people. A great number of them are active Christians. I can testify to that. And we have had some in our church whom I trust and I would like to see them given a chance to make their contribution.

The testimony, if you would care to hear it—I would like to read from just one or two notes that I have here, the first one being a quotation from Mr. Milton Eisenhower, brother of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower:

I would say that from 80 to 85 percent of the Nisei (American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry) are loyal to the United States. I just cannot say things too favorable about the way they have cooperated under the most adverse circumstances.

We need to know that people are what they are not because of their blood or the shape of their head or noses, but because of their response to stimulus, and I believe that a lot of these American citizens have already responded to the challenge of the Bill of Rights.

They are good citizens and they are very eager to help.

The statement of Dr. Franz Boas, late dean of American anthropologists in *The Mind of Primitive Man*, says:

We are acting like primitive man when we imagine that because we classify a man as a Japanese he is foredoomed to act according to our sentimental picture of what all Japanese are like. As a matter of fact, all individuals in every class are a little different. You have to judge a man according to his actual ability and character, not according to the so-called class you think he belongs to.

Anthropologist Otto Klineberg says:

There is nothing in the brain or blood of other races which justifies our ill treatment of them.

Here are 70,000 of them, a lot very loyal, and here is the Orient watching. We have risks whatever we do, but I would do all I can to get us to take the risk on the side of democracy and the Bill of Rights; and it isn't necessary for them to be a problem. And I agree with the others that the Kibei—many of them, not all—I know one or two very well who are loyal Kibei, five men—that is a different problem, but to have the double check, using the findings of some of the loyal Nisei themselves.

I think that is what the lieutenant pointed out and that is a very valuable insight.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might call your attention, Dr. Hunter, to the fact that we have found, according to the testimony that has been developed in Poston, that in many cases those Japanese Nisei who have indicated any attempt toward loyalty have been subject to attack, apparently by the disloyal Japanese. For that reason I was wondering whether you thought it might be possible for us to obtain from the loyal Nisei any definite or concrete evidence to any extent, as to the good Japanese whom we could trust to be removed from the camps?

Mr. HUNTER. That was Lieutenant Commander Ringle's suggestion.

I wondered about whether you could get a group—I think you could, of loyal Japanese. I don't know. I wouldn't want—I think I would

give evidence without any question when a big issue like this was involved, I think we could depend on them. I know one or two that have had threats. I think they would welcome physical danger if they were given a chance to do it, to vindicate the democracy that I believe they live in.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe any Jap who would suffer personal violence because of his beliefs indicates his loyalty to this country.

The testimony so far before the committee has indicated very definitely that checks are not being made on the Japanese who are being released from the centers. So, I am very glad to have your statement that you feel a check should be made and that those checks should be made before they are released.

Mr. HUNTER. May I add I get letters constantly referring to these checks from the W. R. A., asking for information on this person and that person and I can't testify as to how thorough that is and how many people give testimony, but I am constantly answering those letters.

Mr. COSTELLO. You receive letters from the W. R. A.?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes; asking about this man and that man.

Mr. COSTELLO. Inquiries about Japanese whom you have known or had contact with or were members of your congregation?

Mr. HUNTER. Those whom I have known—I don't want to exaggerate the number in our congregation—one or two youngsters from the church school and others, but our church took over the Hollywood Independent Japanese Church and we are holding it for them. They were near us and we have had close contact with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have those whom the W. R. A. writes about given your name as a reference?

Mr. HUNTER. Apparently so—I assume that.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is a case of the W. R. A. checking up the references that are given to them by the Japanese themselves?

Mr. HUNTER. Quite probably; it would have that flavor.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether they have contacted the former employers of any of these Japanese to obtain from them a record of their previous employment?

Mr. HUNTER. I can't give accurate information on that; no.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have anything further to state to the committee?

Mr. HUNTER. No; I think that is all I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your appearing before the committee.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Smiley is the next witness.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you be sworn, Mr. Smiley?

#### TESTIMONY OF GLENN E. SMILEY, SECRETARY, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you state your name to the reporter?

Mr. SMILEY. Glenn E. Smiley.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your address?

Mr. SMILEY. 1411 West Twenty-second Street, Los Angeles 7, Calif.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your occupation?

Mr. SMILEY. I am a Methodist clergyman. At the present time I am employed as the secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation for the Southwest Pacific Area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. SMILEY. Born in Texas in 1910.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where in Texas?

Mr. SMILEY. Loraine.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you attend school?

Mr. SMILEY. High school in Loraine, Tex.; college in a number of schools—McMurray College, University of Arizona at Tucson; Georgetown—I mean Southwestern University in Georgetown, Tex.—and I neglected to say Gainesville Junior College.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you married?

Mr. SMILEY. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a statement that you would like to make to the committee?

Mr. SMILEY. Yes. I have not had wide experience with Japanese previous to the evacuation, but I have visited three of the camps—Manzanar, Poston, and Rivers on several occasions.

I was at Poston at the time of the outbreak that they had there sometime ago—I believe in December, and it is my conviction upon these visits—upon the basis of these visits and correspondence I have had with Japanese, that the majority of them are loyal and do seek an opportunity to make their contribution to American life.

I feel it is the policy of the organization that I represent that the best possible thing that could happen to the Japanese-Americans, and to democracy as a whole, is to make relocation immediately available for all Japanese whose loyalty has not been questioned, and that they be allowed to make that contribution to American life.

I think it would also be the policy of the organization that while it would not probably be wise for great numbers of them to return to California, that certainly they should be given the opportunity if they were willing to meet the dangers entailed for some of the numbers of them to return.

That, I think, in order to conserve time, is the burden of the statement that I would like to make—that we are convinced that the majority of the Japanese are loyal. I would not confine it to the Nisei but to the Issei as well.

I do not know enough about the Kibei to voice an opinion.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you visited the Poston center since the outbreak there last November?

Mr. SMILEY. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you found conditions to be any different since that time than they were prior to the outbreak?

Mr. SMILEY. A gradual deterioration has been mentioned before. It has been mentioned there has been considerable deterioration on the part of the people but yet a great hope that they can be relocated.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you mean by "deterioration"?

Mr. SMILEY. I consider by deterioration discouragement and general lethargy or lassitude settling upon the people as a result of the confinement.



Mr. COSTELLO. Do you find a weakening of their loyalty to the United States as a part of that distintegration?

Mr. SMILEY. I have not found that among those that I have contacted.

I could give some figures about the Christians in the camp.

There are 2,500 Christians in Manzanar, according to the Christian pastors. I could voice no opinion as to the increase of disloyalty.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you observed at Poston an increase in sentiment for Japan?

Mr. SMILEY. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. By the Kibei or any of that group?

Mr. SMILEY. I have not detected that. I have moved largely in Christian circles and I am sure disloyalty among the Christian group is very small.

I feel reasonably sure that to be true of the other groups as well, but I have not had contact with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words the group with which you have moved you have not found any great measure of disloyalty at all?

Mr. SMILEY. I have found no evidence of disloyalty. But it should be remembered, however, that my contacts have been limited to the Christian group. But just visiting in the camps I have found no evidence of disloyalty.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I hand you a photostatic copy of a brochure and ask you if you can identify that as being an official document?

Mr. SMILEY. Yes, sir; this is an official document presented by the Fellowship of Reconciliation. It is a small pamphlet that is given to people when they inquire as to our principles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this pamphlet into the record with the suggestion it be printed in the testimony of the witness who testified regarding the aims and purposes of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is a photostatic copy?

Mr. SMILEY. This is all contained in this pamphlet; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you accept it in evidence?

Mr. SMILEY. This is last year's pamphlet.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is the pamphlet put out last year by the Fellowship of Reconciliation?

Mr. SMILEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. In the pamphlet put out this year have any material changes been made in the subject matter?

Mr. SMILEY. No. Some names on the back have been changed as new members have been elected to the national council.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the general matter concerning the organization and its purposes and objectives are the same?

Mr. SMILEY. Practically the same.

Mr. COSTELLO. With that explanation, the document will be received as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Smiley Exhibit No. 1.")

Mr. STEEDMAN. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMILEY. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any further statement you wish to make?

Mr. SMILEY. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. I want to thank you for your patience in coming here today and waiting from early morning until late tonight.

That will conclude the hearings for today and we will recess at this time until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 7:05 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m., Wednesday, June 16, 1943.)

# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m. in room 1543, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Los Angeles, Calif., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, and Hon. Karl E. Mundt.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may call your first witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Thomas Cavett.

## TESTIMONY OF THOMAS CAVETT, FORMER INVESTIGATOR, CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name for the record?

Mr. CAVETT. Thomas L. Cavett.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. CAVETT. 815 Cloverdale, Los Angeles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. CAVETT. Pittsburgh, Pa.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. CAVETT. 1889.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you married?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever served in the armed forces of the United States?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. CAVETT. During the World War, and then I was in the Reserve for 10 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you a member of any organizations?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please name the organizations you are a member of?

Mr. CAVETT. Masonic order and the American Legion.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please state for the record some of the important positions or jobs that you have held?

Mr. CAVETT. I was formerly claims examiner—investigator for the United States Veterans Bureau for 6½ years. I was in the district attorney's office of Los Angeles for 12 years.

I worked as an investigator for the past 2 years for the California State Legislature.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the so-called Tenney committee?

Mr. CAVETT. That is the Tenney committee, yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you assigned by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities to investigate Japanese relocation centers?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you leave Los Angeles for that duty?

Mr. CAVETT. About May 10.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 1943?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, May 10, 1943.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you return to Los Angeles?

Mr. CAVETT. The 30th day of May.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many miles did you travel on that investigative trip?

Mr. CAVETT. 5,040 miles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Which war relocation projects did you investigate or visit first?

Mr. CAVETT. Manzanar.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is Manzanar located?

Mr. CAVETT. Up in the Owens Valley.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And how far is Manzanar from Los Angeles?

Mr. CAVETT. About 230 miles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you fix the date of your inspection of Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. We got there about the 10th or 11th of May.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long did you stay at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Well, I worked first on the outskirts in Lone Pine and down at Independence for about a day and night, and then I worked in the camp for about a day and a half.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How far is Manzanar from Independence, Calif.?

Mr. CAVETT. About 10 miles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is Independence the nearest small town to Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What officials did you first interview at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. I first interviewed Mr. Ralph Merritt. He was the director of the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you take a stenographic record of Mr. Merritt's statements?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And was that statement taken down by one of Mr. Merritt's own stenographers in his office?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did Mr. Merritt furnish you with certain material and data regarding the war relocation project at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. He did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have that data and material with you?



Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will your testimony for the most part be based upon the material and evidence furnished by Mr. Merritt?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the material which you have spread before you in folders, material furnished you by Mr. Merritt at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with any statistics of the population of Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please read into the record the number of persons who are presently living inside the relocation center at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. On May 6, 1943, the population of Manzanar was 9,143. There was one man absent from the camp that was supposed to be there. He was in the Inyo County jail.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The two memorandums referred to by the witness I ask be marked "Committee's Exhibit No. 1," and be made a part of the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. It will be so ordered.

**(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 1," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with any information regarding the number of evacuees that have asked for repatriation?

Mr. CAVETT. He did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And how many were there?

Mr. CAVETT. There were 399 as of the date of May 6. These included citizens and dual citizens, aliens. I have here a list of their names and age and sex.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In connection with the list of Japanese who have asked for repatriation, I would like to point out that some of the Japanese who have asked for repatriation have admitted on their repatriation request that they have dual citizenship.

I think it is rather interesting to note some of the Japanese have actually come forward and admitted they are dual citizens.

I wish to make this a part of the record and marked "Exhibit 2."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with any forms or questionnaires having to do with the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese ancestry who are now evacuees at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the form which I am handing to you contain question known as question No. 28?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please read into the record question No. 28?

Mr. CAVETT (reading):

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese Emperor or any other foreign power, government, or organization?

Then, Mr. Steedman, they had another revised form which they instituted, which they gave a higher rating on their loyalty. That is the so-called voluntary amended oath.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The original oath was rejected by some of the alien Japanese and this new form, the so-called voluntary registration form, was submitted in order to get the Japanese to sign some kind of an oath of allegiance to the country?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make these two forms part of the record, and marked "Exhibit No. 3."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without any objection it is so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 3," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with other forms that are required to be filled out by the evacuees at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir. There was Form W. R. A. 26, Form 154, for male citizens for volunteering for the Army, and 304-A, which was filled out by male citizens only.

Also Form 165 filled out by male citizens volunteering for the Army and then there was Form 304-A filled out by all male citizens registering.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And these are the forms that the W. R. A. furnished the Japanese evacuees and on which they based their information regarding each evacuee?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make these forms part of the record and marked "Exhibit No. 4."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with a report setting forth the monthly cost of operating the mess halls at Manzanar, including the cost of food, labor and overhead, and so forth?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And do you have that information before you at this time?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; on Form No. 735.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you read into the record the information contained on this form?

Mr. CAVETT. It is an inventory of stores on hand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what is the date of it?

Mr. CAVETT. This is dated March 1943, headed, "Relocation Center, Manzanar, War Relocation Authority Monthly Subsistence Report."

In February 1943 there was an inventory of all stores on hand of \$154,461.72, and a recapitulation of various amounts of stores on hand which is reflected in the further inventory which we will show later on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words they had \$154,461.72 worth of goods on hand to serve 9,143 evacuees?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What type of goods does that refer to? Is it food-stuffs, clothing, or what?

Mr. CAVETT. Foods.

Mr. COSTELLO. Food?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to introduce this report in evidence as exhibit No. 5.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

**"(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 5," and made a part of the record.)"**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you obtain a copy of a monthly report showing incoming subsistence supplies for any particular month?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; I did. I am reading at this time from the report of May 10, 1943. There are so many items on here it is almost impossible and would take quite a while to read them all, so I will read off a few of the items showing the amounts and quantities they have on hand.

In the butcher shop inventory, for instance, they had 10,588 pounds of pork shoulders; 2,798 pounds of mutton; 1,950 pounds of margarine; 1,580 pounds of cheese.

There is a long list of vegetables and baby foods such as asparagus, 4,841 cans; canned beans, 7,720 cans.

Mr. COSTELLO. What size are those cans?

Mr. CAVETT. Pound cans.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you say "baby food"?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you reading from an inventory provided you by the camp director at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; these are all their records.

Mr. MUNDT. Their own records?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. Now, we come down to canned beets and various other canned goods: 5,658 cans of apples; 4,854 cans of blackberries; 2,292 cans of blueberries; 10,259 bottles of catsup; 4,823 cans of corn; 804 cans of cranberries.

And then there is another brand of cranberries too, 138 cans.

In fish they had 12,239 cans of salmon—15-ounce cans.

Then sardines—there were 10,032 cans.

Fruit cocktail, 3,352 cans.

Skimmed milk, dry, 7,250 pounds.

Evaporated milk, 28,248 cans.

Canned peaches, one brand, 3,195 cans. Another brand of canned peaches, 6,254 cans.

Mr. EBERHARTER. All No. 1 or what size cans?

Mr. CAVETT. Pound cans.

Pears, 7,560 cans. Then another brand of pears, 1,034 cans.

Crushed pineapple, 1,752 cans; spiced pineapple, 684 cans.

Solid pack tomatoes, 50,138 cans. Another brand of tomatoes, 782 cans.

They had in brown sugar, 3,293 pounds.

Granulated sugar, 17,828 pounds.

Cube sugar, 120 packages.

Under powdered sugar they have 3,092 pounds.

Tea, 11,556 pounds.

On another grade of tea, 13,810 pounds. Another grade of tea, 1,457½ pounds.

And then the inventory goes on and enumerates many other items.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was it your understanding that this inventory was a compilation of goods and subsistence in the camp for the period of 1 month?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. This is the monthly inventory.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This is the monthly inventory of food and subsistence received, is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. This is the warehouse inventory.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the subsistence on hand in the warehouse?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, the material or subsistence that you have read into the record is stored in the warehouse?

Mr. CAVETT. That is already stored in the warehouse. In addition to that they have a monthly supply coming in on top of that which we have here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And this supply is kept on hand to feed 9,143 evacuees, is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make this report a part of the record as exhibit No. 6.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be received.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 6," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you obtain copies of requisitions addressed to the commanding officer at Mira Loma, Calif., and also a requisition to the Quartermaster Market Center, 4224 District Boulevard, Vernon Station, Los Angeles, Calif., signed by J. R. Winchester, chief steward at Manzanar, dated March 5, 1943, for the period of May 1943 and April 5, 1943, for the period of May 1943?

Mr. CAVETT. I did. This is a copy of a requisition to the commanding officer of the Mira Loma Quartermaster Department, Mira Loma, Calif., and I would like to state at this time, Mr. Steedman, all the commodities for these camps are bought through the Quartermaster Department.

Whether they pay the wholesale price or retail price, why, they don't seem to know out there at the camps. In other words, they don't know whether these prices are wholesale prices or retail prices.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the date of this requisition?

Mr. CAVETT. This is dated March 5, 1943 and it says: "For the period May 1943."

This was evidently put in in March to be delivered in May. The dates are March 5, 4, and 3, and the period is for May 1943.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact they order for 3 months in advance?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; they order 3 months in advance on top of the stock they have on hand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And this was ordered in March for delivery in May?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right; yes. I will read a few of the items. This was for the week of May 6. These are all for weekly periods.

For the week of May 6 they ordered 1,330 pounds of coffee. In fact they ordered 1,330 pounds of coffee for each week, May 6, May 13, May 20, and May 27. For the 4 weeks 5,290 pounds of coffee were ordered.



They ordered 1,920 pounds of cornstarch.

Soda crackers, 2,400 pounds.

Hard wheat flour, 12,000 pounds.

Soft wheat flour, 12,000 pounds.

Rice, 180,000 pounds.

Granulated sugar, 19,200 pounds.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there anything to show how long a period this food is supposed to supply them?

Mr. CAVETT. They say they always keep 3 months' on hand.

Mr. MUNDT. Is this a 3-months' allotment?

Mr. CAVETT. No; this is the weekly allotment. They are ordering now for a week. In other words they order every week, but they say:

"We always want to keep 3 months' supply on hand."

Mr. MUNDT. Then the figures which you are reading represents the food needed for a week at that camp?

Mr. CAVETT. Evidently that is it; yes. It says here these goods are to be delivered here on or before May 1, 1943, and the order was made out March 5 for the period of May, and they say: "To be delivered on or before May 4."

Mr. MUNDT. I understand that, but I was wondering if there was anything in the record to show that was intended to feed the camp for 1 week, 2 weeks, or 1 month or 3 months, because the figures are not significant unless we know the amount of time that is to be used to consume that food.

Mr. COSTELLO. The figures you read from exhibit 6 were the permanent inventory of the camp?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. The inventory that they keep on hand?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. So at any time if one of the weekly supplies you are now reading does not arrive, they can fall back on the reserve stock?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And there is approximately \$17 worth of foodstuff per person held in reserve?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I don't know whether there has been read into the record the net cost per person per day of feeding the evacuees and what their rations consist of. It seems to me that is the important part.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have had testimony on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony indicated it was either 40 or 45 cents per person as the daily amount allotted to each of them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I note on this exhibit No. 5, Form 735, the monthly subsistence report for the month of March 1943, at Manzanar, item 22 says: "Net cost per person per day \$0.43765."

That is evidently the cost of feeding each evacuee per day; is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Item 9 says: "Monthly average food cost of one ration." And then in parenthesis: "A ration is the cost of three meals for one person for 1 day." And it has \$0.35307. That evidently is a little over 35 cents?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. That is correct. They are allowed, I think, 45 cents and it varies between various camps. It varies between 35 and 45 cents. All figures run between those two figures.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, we are not going to make much headway by simply reading a lot of figures into the record unless we know how long a period is involved, because it is utterly meaningless to say they ordered 180,000 pounds of rice unless you specify whether it is going to be used in a day or week or 10 years. I think it is highly important to have that. If we don't, I see no purpose in reading the figures into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. As I understand, these figures represent the supplies shipped to the camp during the week of May 6 and that similar supplies would come again on May 13, May 20, and so forth. As I understand it the figures he is giving us now represent subsistence sent in from the Quartermaster Department to this particular camp.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the thing I would like to clear up. If that is the correct statement of the fact, let the record so show and if not, let us clear the atmosphere.

Mr. COSTELLO. The amount of rice that you just read into the record was 1 week's supply?

Mr. CAVETT. That is the rice ordered for that particular period to be delivered on May 1 or before May 1.

Then as you go back further you will find, Mr. Costello, for instance, here are your deliveries for fresh fruit for delivery on May 5, and then on May 12, they get another order and likewise on May 19.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does the requisition show any additional shipments of rice to Manzanar during the month of May?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe this will clear up the question:

It says: "For delivery on May 5, apples, 240 boxes."

That is on May 5. Then for delivery on May 12, 1943, it says: "Apples, 240 boxes."

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, as far as apples are concerned, the weekly allotment is 240 boxes?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes. And on the same page of the requisition, it says: "Bananas, pounds, 2,500."

That is for delivery on May 5. And then for delivery on May 12, 1943: "Bananas, pounds, 2,500 pounds."

And it goes on further down through the month and the same situation exists week by week.

Mr. MUNDT. In case of perishable fruits, it is obvious they would only order week by week, but on imperishable items such as sugar and rice, I think it would be wise to have our investigator contact Manzanar and get us definite information as to the period of time for which this was intended, unless you have records that indicate that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We will be glad to obtain that information.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does the particular record you have before you for May show any additional shipments of rice other than the one you just read?

Mr. CAVETT. This is the shipment they asked for in the month of May.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that shows 180,000 pounds of rice?

Mr. CAVETT. That is correct..

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the date of delivery for that rice?

Mr. CAVETT. This is to be delivered "on or before May 1."

Mr. COSTELLO. Are there any additional requisitions for rice other than that one item for the month of May?

Mr. CAVETT. No; not on rice.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently that is the supply of rice to be used for the entire month?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. How much rice did they have on hand in the warehouses according to the exhibit you read earlier?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, the figures on the amount of goods ordered, it seems to me, are not so significant, because there are many items which must be ordered seasonally. In other words certain types of canned foods would be ordered earlier in the year for delivery in May or June or July or August.

The significant figures, if we can obtain them, would be figures as to the total amount of consumption of each particular item of food for a specified period.

Do you have any figures available showing the consumption of various items of food over a certain specified period?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; I have that information right here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, continuing on with the requisition which Mr. Cavett was just reading from, I think will further clear the atmosphere on the amount of food being shipped into Manzanar and I would like to read from the requisition dated March 5, 1943.

It says:

For delivery May 5, 1943, beef, alternate hinds and forequarters, 10,000 pounds.

Pork, pounds, 5,000.

Mutton, pounds, 2,800.

Salt pork, jowls, or squares, pounds, 1,200.

Frankfurters, pounds, 2,200 pounds.

Liver, pork, pounds, 2,000 pounds.

Then for delivery on May 12, 1943:

Beef, alternate hinds and forequarters, pounds, 10,000.

And that goes on through the date of May 26. In other words, for delivery on May 5, May 12, May 19, and May 26, the requisition indicates that the project requisitioned 10,000 pounds of beef each week.

Mr. MUNDT. Per week?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; and 5,000 pounds of pork, 2,800 pounds of mutton, and so on. I think we can point out as we go along that was a requisition to feed 9,143 evacuees per week.

Mr. MUNDT. In the case of beef, that would be a little bit more than a pound of beef per week per evacuee.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is on beef alone, however. There were other meat items as I pointed out. They ordered pork and mutton and other meat products.

Mr. MUNDT. Were there ample supplies of beef on the west coast between March and May so that beef was easily procurable by civilians?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not in position to answer Mr. Mundt's question.

Mr. MUNDT. I just wondered. Beef was a scarce article in Washington and I wondered if it was scarce out here.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state for your benefit the shortage of meat started in California about the middle of December. These supplies, however, that are sent into the relocation camps are obtained from Army supplies. The Army does the purchasing for the Army as well as the war relocation centers.

Mr. MUNDT. But the Army does not raise the beef; it buys it from the public pool.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Army would get meat that is available and whatever is left over would go to civilians, so a shortage of civilian meat supplies would not indicate there was a shortage of beef in the war relocation centers.

Mr. MUNDT. Then if that is correct, the Japanese are getting first call on beef which is purchased through the Army Quartermaster?

Mr. COSTELLO. That is right. As far as the camps are concerned, they are getting the same type of food that is purchased and given to the Army itself.

Mr. MUNDT. It seems to me the O. W. I. should beam that news to Tokyo by short-wave radio, and maybe they will treat our prisoners a little better when they find out we are feeding their Japanese better than our white citizens.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I wish to make the copies of the requisitions we have been discussing a part of the record, marked "Exhibit No. 7."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7" and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you obtain from Mr. Merritt—copies of the daily menus for the weeks May 2 to May 8, 1943?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir. I have here the menus headed, "Second Week, Saturday, May 8, 1943." I will read three or four of them at random: "Breakfast: Stewed peaches——"

Mr. STEEDMAN. What date is that?

Mr. CAVETT. The second week, Saturday, May 8.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then that would be breakfast for Saturday May 8?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right. It reads as follows: "Stewed peaches——"

Mr. STEEDMAN. Read the entire menu.

Mr. CAVETT. "Stewed peaches, dry peaches, sugar," do you want it broken down?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like for you to read the breakfast menu.

Mr. CAVETT. They had stewed peaches, rice, and frankfurters, hot biscuits, evaporated milk, fresh milk, oleomargarine, and coffee.

For lunch they had macaroni salad, baked hash, stewed carrots and turnips, bread, jam, and tea. That was for lunch.

For dinner they had soup, vegetable salad, pork chow mein, cauliflower, Japanese pickles, and tea.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there any record of a midnight snack?

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that menu typical of the regular menus?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; from day to day. I will read two or three of them, Mr. Costello, and then you can get the idea just how they go.



On May 5, breakfast, fresh apples, oatmeal, hot biscuits, potatoes, potatoes lyonnaise, jam, oleomargarine, coffee, fresh milk, evaporated milk, sugar.

Then for lunch they had radishes, green onions, cold lunch meat, potato salad, bread, jam, rice, cookies, and tea.

Then for dinner they had split-pea soup, carrot-and-raisin salad, Japanese sukiyaka, which is composed of veal, cabbage, and other vegetables; Japanese pickles; rice; and tea.

They all run the same way.

For breakfast on May 2 it was stewed prunes, wheat crispies, scrambled eggs, hashed brown potatoes, toast, oleomargarine, coffee, fresh milk, evaporated milk, and sugar.

For lunch they had coleslaw salad, pot roast with noodles, Italian squash, jam, bread, rice, fruit jello.

For supper they had Scotch barley soup, Spanish slaw salad—the rest of that meal disappeared some place. I don't know what happened to the rest of the menu.

Those are the menus they submitted to us.

Mr. COSTELLO. You haven't the complete menu for that dinner?

Mr. CAVETT. No; the last page is gone.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether we have first-hand knowledge as to whether at Manzanar these meals are served cafeteria style, family style, or individual plate style?

Mr. CAVETT. The evacuees go through cafeteria style. All camps are run on the same basis. They take their plates and the plates are filled up by the chefs and the Japanese tell them the equivalent of "hit it light" or "hit it hard" and they load the plates up accordingly.

Little children who are able to get up and walk along carry their plates also.

They feed about 200 or so in each dining hall. They take their plates back when they are through.

Mr. COSTELLO. I notice you read from the menu, oleomargarine. Are they ever served butter?

Mr. CAVETT. None of the camps receive butter for the evacuees. They used to serve butter but they don't any more—not at the camps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make these copies of the menus a part of the record as exhibit No. 8.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 8," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a short recess at this time.

(Thereupon, a short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you obtain a copy of a letter written by Robert L. Brown, acting project director at Manzanar, to Mr. Dillon S. Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority, Barr Building, 910 Seventeenth Street, Washington, D. C., dated May 8, 1943?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And attached to the letter were the following copies of reports:

Complete inventory in pounds and dollar value of all rationed and unrationed goods, both warehouse and kitchens.

Report on all deposits and withdrawals from ration-bank account. However, a few outstanding bills for meat that we have not had the point invoices as yet, on the 1st, remain.

Monthly incoming report of all subsistence supplies received.

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have that letter with you and the attachments?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you read into the record the letter which I have just referred to?

Mr. CAVETT. The next sheet is headed, (reading exhibit 9).

Manzanar relocation center, Manzanar, Calif., rationed items inventory as of April 30, 1943. Canned and processed fruits and vegetables

of which I will read off a few for the committee:

Apples, 37,420 pounds.

Mr. STEEDMAN. These are the rationed items from the inventory as of April 30, 1943, contained in the warehouse?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; they are in there now: Apples, 23,841 pounds; apricots, 20,580 pounds; blackberries, 31,247 pounds; blueberries, 14,611 pounds; fruit cocktail, 22,626 pounds; peaches, 10,979 pounds; another brand of peaches, 20,949 pounds; canned pears, 13,855 pounds. Another brand of canned pears, 6,979 pounds. Pineapple, sliced, 4,741 pounds; pineapple, crushed, 11,853 pounds; tomato catsup, 9,574 pounds; various brands of tomatoes, solid pack, 91,908 pounds; tomatoes of another brand, 6,285 pounds; canned beans, 20,000—total amount of baby food in cans, 39,793 cans. Sugar, 29,157 pounds. On cracked wheat flour they had—

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Cavett, have you finished what you want to convey to the committee with respect to the rationed foods? Cracked wheat flour is not rationed, is it?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is unrationed.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Before we leave the rationed foods, do you have the totals of the rationed foods that they have on hand?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. The point value of processed foods issued from warehouse—

Mr. EBERHARTER. What I would like to know is the total inventory of the rationed foods on hand as of April 30 and the point value of the rationed foods on hand as of that date, and divide that by 9,143 and see what it amounts to for each individual.

Mr. CAVETT. The total rationed items inventoried in dollars and cents is \$58,419.82.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you have the total number of points of rationed foods?

Mr. CAVETT. No.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You haven't the total number of points that they have on hand as of April 30?

Mr. CAVETT. Here is the list of the amounts issued from the warehouse during that month.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How many points?

Mr. CAVETT. During that month they used up 558,461 points.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is 558,461 points for 9,143 persons; is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many points for meat, et cetera?

Mr. CAVETT. 637,448 points for meats and fats and butter.

Mr. COSTELLO. How does that differ from the 558,000? Is that canned foods and things of that sort?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; in addition to the meat which is 637,448 points. There are two different items there.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, two items of stamps? Is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. Two items of stamps, yes; one red and the other blue.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is about 50 points per person for the rationed, processed foods per month for the month of April. Is that not correct?

Mr. CAVETT. I haven't figured it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is the thing I wanted to get—the number of points per person for the month of April. According to my figures it was about 50 points per person.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is only on the processed foods?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Now, for the points on butter, meats, and things of that character, the value there would be approximately 75 points per person?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; 637,448.

Mr. COSTELLO. And about 50 points per month on the other goods?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. So it would be about 75 points per person for the meats and butter and fats?

Mr. CAVETT. They have it rationed on meat, butter, and cheese all listed and set out.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What I would really like to have, and it probably would take some time to work it out, is the number of red stamps, as they call them, red ration coupons used per person a month and also the number of blue stamp points per person per month during the month of April.

You will probably need some time to figure that out, but if we have it accurately we can make a comparison as to how many ration points the evacuees at Manzanar are using in comparison with what individual citizens are using. I think you can work that out later and put it in the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Eberharter, we can request that from the camp director by letter and insert the letter in the record at this point. Would that be your suggestion?

Mr. EBERHARTER. That would be all right. That would give me the information I want.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you want that for the month of April only?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Any specified period; it doesn't make much difference. We have the record here for April and you might get that information for the month of April.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to introduce in evidence a copy of the letter we have been discussing, together with the attachments thereto, and mark it "Exhibit No. 9."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 9," and made a part of the record.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does that complete the information which you secured from Mr. Merritt regarding the subsistence at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. It does; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might make this comment, before you proceed to another matter, that the committee is going into the food situation at Manzanar simply to get a part of the over-all picture of the investigation of the camp and to learn conditions there.

It might be stated for the purposes of the record that the committee feels that the Japanese should be well treated and well fed in these camps.

It is not our purpose in going into the record to find out exactly how much food they have, but to make sure they are properly cared for and properly treated.

I think that is something every citizen in the country would want to see, that the Japanese were given appropriate treatment in these camps, and I think the testimony we have had today indicates that.

However, we are equally interested in seeing to it that there is no waste or excess amount of food being allotted to the camps, over and above what they normally and properly should have.

You may proceed with the next subject.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt give you a copy of a certain instruction issued by the War Relocation Authority in Washington, which is designated as "Administrative Instruction No. 85," dated February 26, 1943, subject: "Trial and Punishment of Offenses Against Law and Order in Relocation Centers"?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a copy of that instruction before you?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt advise you those instructions were being followed by the project officials at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make this copy of instructions No. 85, a part of the record, and marked "Exhibit No. 11."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 11," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt give you a copy of a police report, dated May 10, 1943, covering the day shift at Manzanar, the swing shift, and the night shift?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I wish to offer this copy of the police report of Manzanar in evidence, for the purpose of having the record indicate the type of report that is filed with the project director by the internal police at Manzanar, and ask it be marked "Exhibit No. 12."

Mr. COSTELLO. It is so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 12," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you obtain from Mr. Merritt a mimeographed copy of a Manual of Internal Security at Manzanar, dated January 1943, together with a copy of traffic regulations for Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have that manual with you today?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer a copy of the manual of Internal Security, together with a copy of the traffic regulations for Manzanar in evidence as exhibit 13.



Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 13," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you receive from Mr. Merritt a copy of a list as of May 12, 1943, setting forth the names of the personnel, that is, the office and field workers, comprising the community welfare staff?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have that list before you today?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make this list a part of the record and mark it "Exhibit 14."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 14," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt give you a copy of the Manzanar Junior-Senior High School course of study?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What are the studies that they have?

Mr. CAVETT. It is listed in this exhibit.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record a portion of the course of study as given by the Manzanar Junior-Senior High School, and I am quoting from that exhibit which incidentally, is exhibit No. 15. Before reading the exhibit, I would like to offer it in evidence.

Mr. COSTELLO. It will be received.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 15," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

The Manzanar schools are divided into an elementary system, grades 1 to 6, inclusive, 910 students, and a Junior-Senior High School, grades 7 to 12, inclusive, 1,260 students.

The elementary schools are conducted in 10 different barracks buildings scattered over the camp. The high school is located in one block of barracks where teachers and other appointive personnel are also housed.

The schools are operated under a memorandum of understanding executed with the California State Department of Education, and the courses of study, standards, and requirements conform to those of the state.

Special emphasis is given to trade and vocational training which is now being developed on an apprenticeship basis and offers opportunities in carpentry, agriculture, commercial subjects, domestic service, nurse and ward aide training, and in the needle work trade.

Teachers are appointed under civil service and meet with the State requirements for a teaching certificate in California.

The remainder of this exhibit lists the various courses of study at the Manzanar schools, and gives the curriculum. Did Mr. Merritt give you a copy of a memorandum captioned, "Brief Occupational Background of Departmental Heads at Manzanar Relocation Center"?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir. This list shows the background of the various chiefs, such as the director, Ralph Merritt, acting assistant director, Robert L. Brown; senior administrative officer, Edwin H. Hooper; project attorney, Robert B. Throckmorton; community services, Mrs. Lucy W. Adams; agricultural superintendent, Horace R. McConnell; senior engineer, Hervey Brown, Jr.; associate fire protection officer, Frank Hon; manufacturing superintendent, Bertis R. Chamberlain; chief steward, Joseph R. Winchester; chief internal

security, John W. Gilkey; and chief counsellor community welfare, Margaret D'Ille.

It also shows their schooling and past positions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make this memorandum a part of the record marked "Exhibit 16."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 16," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with a list of organized clubs and organizations at Manzanar, said list setting forth the names of the organizations or clubs, the age groups, the sponsors, and functions?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir. That is headed, "Manzanar Secondary Education, School Clubs, and Organizations" as of May 12, 1943.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make this document a part of the record and mark it "Exhibit 17"?

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 17," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt give you a list of churches and church-sponsored groups at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. This list is headed "Churches and church groups sponsored clubs at Manzanar." It is exhibit 18, and it gives a list of the various churches and the names of the officers and their functions.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make this document a part of the record, marked "Exhibit 18."

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it is so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "No. 18," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. COSTELLO. Does the church list indicate the number of persons belonging to each denomination?

Mr. CAVETT. No. Just the officers, I think, and so forth—the officers and directors.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the numbers following the churches indicate the location of the church by block number?

Mr. CAVETT. By block number, I imagine, yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you obtained no information as to the membership in the various blocks?

Mr. CAVETT. No. He just gave us a list of the officers and leaders of the congregations.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Steedman, did you make any inquiry or endeavor to ascertain what proportion of the evacuees in any of these camps are Buddhists or Shintoists or those who belong to the more modern religions?

Mr. STEEDMAN. We don't have those statistics, Mr. Eberharter, but we could request them from the various camps.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It would seem to me it might be of some importance to know how many, approximately, have embraced the religions of the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We will request that information from each camp director.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They can't give us the exact number, but I should think they would have an approximate number.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you do that not only for Buddhism but any or all the other oriental religions?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Wouldn't it be a good idea to request a religious break-down of all the affiliations of persons released from the various centers?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes, including the category that belong to no church at all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt furnish you with a copy of a question-and-answer interview with Senator Chandler of the Senate committee, had on March 3 with the staff at the Manzanar relocation center regarding the War Relocation Authority's handling of the relocation areas?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please read into the record those excerpts from the interview which bear on our investigation?

Mr. CAVETT. The director of the camp and I were discussing the purchase of water which is used in the camp, and he said it was best explained in the Chandler report, which I shall read from page 5 of the Chandler report. The director told me as follows:

I would like to say that the property upon which we are located belongs to the city of Los Angeles. The Army made the lease and the War Relocation Authority is a lessee. The price of water and electricity are at excessive rates: \$4.32 an acre-foot for water flowing down hill and as high as \$16 an acre-foot for pumped water, which could not be paid by any farmer, or even the Army.

He further said:

At my farm about 20 miles up the valley I pay \$5 an acre a year for land with water. The city guarantees nothing in the way of water supply except that I can have all the water from the creek to irrigate my farm. But the Army came to Manzanar as a purchaser of water. The city of Los Angeles charged the Army rates which are charged in Los Angeles to domestic purchasers of water in Los Angeles. My rate is \$5, where Manzanar pays \$35 per acre.

Mr. COSTELLO. To whom does Manzanar pay for water?

Mr. CAVETT. To the city of Los Angeles.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that a contract between the W. R. A. and the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. CAVETT. Evidently; yes. He said they have an agreement drawn up where they pay that and he said he was going to see if he couldn't have that rectified. He said the water situation was terrible.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Army is only paying \$5?

Mr. CAVETT. No; he is paying \$5 and the Army is paying \$35.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is, the W. R. A. is paying \$35?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; \$35.

Mr. MUNDT. Who signed that agreement? Mr. Dillon Myer?

Mr. CAVETT. It doesn't say who signed it. It was all arranged for and that agreement is still in force and effect and he was trying to bring it to the attention of the various officials and see if they wouldn't at least allow him to proceed to have that lease canceled, or that agreement canceled, and pay the same as other people instead of that excessive rate.

He said it would break even the Army to carry on at that rate.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you inquire into the nature of the lease arrangement whereby W. R. A. is using the ground for the camp?

(No response.)



Mr. MUNDT. Is the city of Los Angeles receiving any rental for the use of that ground?

Mr. CAVETT. They told me in all the camps that the agreements and leases were all confidential matters and were in the confidential files in Washington. They don't have those in the camps.

Mr. MUNDT. This committee shall endeavor to turn the spotlight of public opinion on those confidential files.

Mr. CAVETT. In every instance when we wanted any information like that, we were told we would have to get it from Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. None of the camps have any information regarding the nature or terms of the ground leases where the camps are situated?

Mr. CAVETT. No. They just tell you the land was purchased or else it was leased, or that it belongs to the Bureau of Reclamation.

Mr. MUNDT. Those negotiations were done through the Washington office?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; so far as I know.

Mr. COSTELLO. You would not know whether the charge for the electricity and water might be considered as part compensation for use of the ground, in view of the fact you do not know whether there is a ground lease?

Mr. CAVETT. No; that information is in Washington.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to quote from page 12 of the transcript—

Mr. MUNDT. Pardon me, just a moment, Mr. Steedman, but I wonder if you could determine and insert in the record at this point, from the records of the city of Los Angeles, how much they have received in payment for electricity and water and other rental fees for the use of the land at Manzanar?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I shall write the city of Los Angeles and will request that information.

Mr. COSTELLO. The bureau of water and power should be able to furnish the information as to how much is being paid there and the basis on which the rates are charged.

Mr. MUNDT. That should clear up whether the rental rates are part compensation for use of the land.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from the memorandum that Mr. Cavett has been quoting from—that is, the interview between Senator Chandler and his party, and the officials at Manzanar.

I quote:

Senator CHANDLER. Does Japan want these Kibei to come back?

Mr. MERRITT. No. A good many of them were sent here for a purpose.

Mr. MALONE.

I believe Mr. Malone was an employee of the Chandler committee.

Mr. MALONE. Can you pick them out?

Mr. MERRITT. We know most of them.

Mr. MALONE. Who did Japan ask for?

Mr. MERRITT. Among others, Japan asked for Tokio and other outspoken pro-Americans. Mr. Myer has these lists of people asked for by Japan.

Senator CHANDLER. I would rather get it from Mr. Merritt.

Mr. McCORMACK (Federal Bureau of Investigation). Could we have a copy of the Kibei for the F. B. I.?

Mr. MERRITT. For lists of repatriates refer to the State Department.

Mr. COSTELLO. That would indicate that possibly the F. B. I. did not have a list of the Kibei located at that camp.



Mr. STEEDMAN. On that date at that camp, March 4, 1943.

Mr. COSTELLO. It tends to indicate that the Government has very little information regarding the background of the Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. And it further indicates the F. B. I. is being asked to pass on individuals to be released to civilian life but are furnished with no information regarding those individuals.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m., of the same day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(Thereupon, at 2 p. m., the hearing was resumed, pursuant to the taking of the noon recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Before proceeding further with Mr. Cavett, I would like to call Mr. Buzzell.

#### TESTIMONY OF J. W. BUZZELL, SECRETARY, LOS ANGELES CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your name to the reporter, please?

Mr. BUZZELL. J. W. Buzzell.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your address?

Mr. BUZZELL. My home address is on West Sixty-fifth Street, 1225, and my business address is the Labor Temple.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are secretary of the Los Angeles Central Labor Council?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have a statement which you want to make to the committee?

Mr. BUZZELL. Yes. I came here because our organization, which represents all the American Federation of Labor unions in the city, have an interest in the subject matter in which the committee is inquiring into.

We made inquiry as to whether you would be interested in hearing our opinion and we were invited to be here, I imagine, motivated much by the same reasoning that most citizens in the West are.

The labor council made some inquiry into the situation and has expressed its belief, because of its knowledge generally of things, that the Japanese should not be here.

Our official statement was written to Mr. Russell T. Robinson, Director of the War Relocation Authority, Whitcomb Hotel Building, San Francisco, Calif., on the first day of this month.

The letter is as follows:

Mr. RUSSELL T. ROBINSON,  
*Director, War Relocation Authority,  
Whitcomb Hotel Building, San Francisco, Calif.*

DEAR SIR: The Los Angeles Central Labor Council, representing approximately 200 American Federation of Labor unions in this city and with a membership of more than 100,000, feels called upon to express itself to you and to your commission its opinion concerning the current problem of handling Japanese residents, both citizen and alien, in this country during the duration of the war.

To say that we are concerned about it states it very mildly. First, we are convinced that there is no one who is capable of judging entirely whether a person

of Japanese ancestry would or would not be loyal to this country if put to the test during the war with Japan, and therefore we are opposed to taking any chances by allowing Japanese, whether civilians or members of the armed forces of the country, whether citizens or noncitizens, being allowed to come to any of the Pacific Coast States, and more particularly to southern California, where most of the Japanese were at the time of the beginning of the war.

Those who advocate that Japanese in the military service be allowed to visit their "homes" on the Pacific coast during leave surely cannot understand all the circumstances. To begin with, the Japanese no longer have any homes to come here and visit. Second, the Japanese all look alike, and we are of the opinion that nothing could suit the Japanese Government any better than to have American people on this coast become used to seeing Japanese in military uniform. The Pacific and the Mexican ports cover a wide expanse of territory and offer an excellent chance, in spite of all the surveillance that can be exerted, for submarines to land Japanese, and if the people in this vicinity, and particularly southern California, become used to seeing Japanese in military uniform, it would be impossible to detect Japanese, who spoke good English, and thousands of them do, even in Japan, and who might be landed here and put on American military uniforms, and then circulate freely, and no one could tell the difference. That would be highly dangerous.

Next, we think that General DeWitt's statement that "A Jap is a Jap," is complete. It tells the whole story, and we are of the opinion that for every good one, and undoubtedly there must be some good ones, there are a hundred bad ones who would stop at nothing if they had an opportunity to do something against this country and for their own.

To illustrate this, I would like to tell you what was told me by a school teacher who taught school in the Terminal Island area of this city, a place almost entirely populated by Japanese fishermen and their families. She had one boy in her class that she had taught from the time he had started in kindergarden until he graduated from the grade schools, and she had taken an interest in him even after he had gone to high school.

In that time he had taken an intensive interest in American history and American traditions, and had been a member of the Boy Scouts, and had in every way indicated that he had thoroughly become adapted by America. But when the evacuation of the Japanese from Terminal Island took place, the authorities discovered in his room in his home short-wave radio sets, military cameras, maps of the whole area and its defenses, and a great many other things, all of which indicated he had made an intensive study of them for the purpose of aiding Japan, and if a boy of a third generation of American-born Japanese family could so completely fool a person who had taken an intensive interest in him during his entire career, certainly they can fool those who only know them casually, or as a result of inquiry or investigation.

The American Federation of Labor yields to no one in their zealous jealousy of our civil rights that go with the Constitution of the United States, and especially the Bill of Rights, and we, of course, look with a great deal of concern over the violation of these rights by any lawful citizen of this country. In addition thereto, we are not much given to yielding to expedient. However, we feel that in a war such as this one, where this country will either live or die depending upon its results, it will be far better to make amends to such of its Japanese citizens as may be unjustly dealt with, than to run the risk of inviting certain disaster in order to avoid doing that injury.

We therefore insist that your commission do not do anything that would permit Japanese to come to the Pacific coast area for the duration of the war.

We have one other matter in this connection that we would especially direct to your attention. It happens that we knew a number of American-born Japanese prior to the war, and we know, also, that many of them were ardent followers of the Communist Party, and were ardent believers in the theory that the American form of government should be overturned, and the only practical way to do that was by a violent revolution. We are not talking in generalities when we make this statement. We know some of them personally, and one of them we did know was involved in the December 7 riots at Manzanar. We insist that these Japanese should be kept in concentrated groups where they can be kept under surveillance, and not be allowed to wander at will, and that these groups be located in the central portions of our country.

In view of the great need of agricultural pursuits, at which the Japanese have proven themselves to be excellent, we believe that they should be put to work, under supervision, at agricultural work, and that they should be paid by the

United States Government, and all they produce should be used by the United States Government to feed the military forces in this country. We would be opposed to allowing such Japanese to be employed on privately owned farms where the products of their work would be sold in the open market in competition with farmers who do not have such Japanese labor, or cheap labor, unless the Japanese were paid the full rate of wages ordinarily paid farm help in the locality where they may be.

We close with the statement that the labor movement is positively opposed to any Japanese being allowed freedom of movement anywhere in the United States, and equally opposed to their being allowed to return to the Pacific coast under any circumstances.

That completes my statement.

Chairman COSTELLO. Do you have any further statement you want to add?

Mr. BUZZELL. None, except I make a direct statement there as to the Japanese communistic activities.

In 1938 we organized a number of occupations—people in occupations into labor unions here in Los Angeles, occupations in which a number of Japanese were employed, more particularly wholesale produce markets, and in the organization of those unions we found numbers of young Japanese, both men and women, boys and girls some of them, who were very ardent Communists. One of them we expelled from our union for making a speech that he made openly, advocating the rabble-rousing riots as being the only way for the common people, and especially like people of his own kind who had lived in slavery all their lives through all history, as the only way for them to accomplish anything—mob action.

His name was Uno.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know his first name?

Mr. BUZZELL. I will have to stop and look for it when I return to the office. It is in some old records. I can find it and I will give it to you.

We were much concerned with that and our point is, if the committee is interested in it, that out of the younger Japanese, even though they may not hold a feeling of loyalty to Japan, they are equally bad, in our opinion, because of their Communist leanings.

Mr. COSTELLO. To what do you attribute that communistic activity among the Japanese? Is it very widespread?

Mr. BUZZELL. We thought it was—not in the degree that that might sound as to the proportion of the whole, but there were lots of them and many of them belong to the young Communist League, and things of that kind.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has an attempt been made by the Communist groups in this country to directly bring the Japanese people into their activities?

Mr. BUZZELL. Oh; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Are the Communist organizers mostly Japanese, or are they white Communist organizers?

Mr. BUZZELL. Well, the original organizers, I imagine, were white-skinned—I don't think they are white.

Mr. MUNDT. They were Caucasians?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Most of the Communists among the Japanese would be the younger element?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And not the older people?



Mr. BUZZELL. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you think there is quite a menace there? That there are sufficient numbers of Japanese who are Communists to make a real threat?

Mr. BUZZELL. Yes. I think there again is the effort on the part of the Communists to organize minority groups who are citizens of the United States, but racial minorities who have constitutional rights the same as every other citizen of this country, but with whom and concerning whom it is an easy matter to raise the question of racial discrimination, and in the earnest belief, in my opinion, and I think the facts and history support it, that aroused minority groups furnish excellent material on which to base revolutionary movements.

Mr. COSTELLO. All you have to do is arouse that feeling in a minority group and you can stir up general disorder?

Mr. BUZZELL. I think they caused nine-tenths of the trouble in the zoot-suit business here.

Mr. COSTELLO. I was going to ask you if you think they had some hand in that?

Mr. BUZZELL. Unquestionably—we think they did.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you any definite proof of the fact that the Communists have been active in the zoot-suit activities?

Mr. BUZZELL. The only definite proof we have, after putting things together—such things are hard to prove because there are so many intangibles, but the Communists organized one of their front committees when the first zoot-suit crowd was arrested for the Sleepy Hollow murder cases, I think it was.

They have circulated the Mexican colony with pamphlets; they have held meetings, rabble-rousing meetings, and they have convinced a great many Mexicans who are citizens of the United States but who have lived all their lives in the Mexican colony and are not thoroughly assimilated, they have convinced them that a large part of the prosecution was persecution of these kids because they were Mexicans and not because of the crimes they were alleged to have committed.

I gave to the O'Leary committee such material as I had, including copies of a letter that was sent out by the American-Mexican Youth Defense Committee when that was organized.

The stationery upon which it was printed and as most of those front committees are presented, it had a great many names on it of citizens of this community that no one would suspect of being Communists.

It also had a number of Communists, including the secretary of the committee, who is LaRue McCormack, a Communist woman.

Anyone who studies it will find out how easy it is to understand how they get those names, because they go by many steps before the final party gets to the one whose name they want, so that that person would never have a suspicion where his name is eventually going to show up.

That is the way they do that.

But another thing I want to explain about this is, in nearly all activities of that kind where the Government itself takes any interest, it somehow or other happens that some Communist finds his way on the Government pay roll and he becomes one of the leaders in that—whatever branch of Communist activities that his job might touch. And



in this minority group of the War Production Board, I think there are a number of them.

One in particular was here but he has gone to the Marines. I think that is the Marines' bad luck. That was a fellow by the name of Nunn. He is known to have been a Communist engaged in Communist activities in New York.

I am not sure of this but I am told that he was a contributor to the Daily Worker—a writer contributor; that he participated in a number of Communist union activities in the C. I. O. Streetcar Men's Union in New York, and in Joe Curran's Seamen's Union, and he came here and he allows his name to go on the stationery of these Communist front committees with his Government title.

He made speeches at the mass meetings that they had out in the Mexican colony and in the Negro colony.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, even though the Communists may not have originated the idea of the zoot-suit warfare, they undoubtedly took advantage of the situation to propagandize and stir it up further?

Mr. BUZZELL. I don't think they initiated the wearing of zoot suits; no.

Mr. COSTELLO. Getting back to the Japanese again: Were many Japanese affiliated with labor unions?

Mr. BUZZELL. At one time I imagine we must have had 1,000 of them in unions here in Los Angeles.

Mr. COSTELLO. What type of unions were those?

Mr. BUZZELL. They were sales boys and girls in the retail produce stores—green goods—groceries.

Mr. COSTELLO. Clerks?

Mr. BUZZELL. Clerks, yes; and workers in the produce markets—some in restaurants but not many; and in scattering occupations.

Most of them either related or were close to the food industry.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were no Japanese unions in connection with the fishing industry?

Mr. BUZZELL. There was in San Pedro a union at one time, and there was a peculiar circumstance. When the C. I. O. first broke out on the Pacific coast, as you perhaps know they broke out on the water front, and there was a definite attempt made to capture all the water-front activities, including transportation and control of the food production that originated in or in which the handling of it at the water front made it important.

In the fish canneries where we had about 3,000 members that took place and after considerable maneuvering, which I don't believe your committee would be particularly interested in, the C. I. O. and the Communists worked out of that union.

Among them was a fellow by the name of Jack Moore, who has become recognized, in spite of his youth as being one of the smartest and best organizers the Communist Party ever has had.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there many Japanese in that union?

Mr. BUZZELL. There were lots of Japanese in that union. They worked in the canneries down at Terminal Island and then when the fishermen got drawn into that vortex between the C. I. O. and the Communists, and the A. F. of L. unions, the Japanese for some reason or other divided from the southern European group, the Slavs and others, and that latter group went to the C. I. O. and the Japanese stayed with the American Federation of Labor which put us in a posi-

tion down there of having a real war on our hands and injunction suits and other things.

But we had the one Japanese fishermen's union for awhile and had about eleven hundred members in it.

Mr. MUNDT. Eleven hundred?

Mr. BUZZELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. All Japanese?

Mr. BUZZELL. Practically all Japanese. There were a few others but most of them were Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words there were some labor locals of almost 100 percent Japanese?

Mr. BUZZELL. That one was about 100 percent.

Mr. COSTELLO. The opposition of the American Federation of Labor then, to the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast, is not based at all upon labor competition or anything of that kind?

Mr. BUZZELL. Not at all.

Mr. COSTELLO. That has been indicated at times but you do not feel they would in any way interfere with the other workers in that area?

Mr. BUZZELL. No; I don't think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your opposition is based upon the fact you don't believe it would be safe for the war effort to allow them to return?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right. We think it is entirely unwise to do that.

Mr. COSTELLO. And in recommending that they be distributed in the Middle West, you emphasize the point they should be in concentrated groups?

Mr. BUZZELL. Yes; keep them under surveillance.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only way you recommend they be release from the camps, would be in large numbers where they would be confined to a specific area?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And not be allowed to move freely about the country and at random?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right. And we make one more point: We think it is a dangerous—our movement thinks it is a dangerous thing to tamper with the civil rights of any citizen, and some of these Japs are citizens, without due process of law, but we think we are in an emergency and if such a course is followed and injustice might have been done to some of them, but we think it can be made up to them after the war, and if they are loyal Americans we think they ought to stand it and take it in good faith.

Mr. COSTELLO. If they want to be loyal to the country, they should be willing to make a sacrifice at this time to promote the war effort?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You say there are 200 locals in the Central Federation of which you are secretary?

Mr. BUZZELL. Nearly 200. There are a few A. F. of L. local unions not affiliated.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do any of those local unions exclude Japanese from membership?

Mr. BUZZELL. Most unions up to about 10 years ago very definitely had an oriental bar in their constitutions, but during the last 10 or 12

years a great many of them removed it or removed it sufficiently so that on the Pacific coast they could be taken into our unions.

I have in mind the hotel and restaurant employees and a number of others. They didn't get into many trades. The Retail Clerks' International Union opened its door so they could come in; the obvious reason for that was we were expanding our organizations in a number of trades in the field where the Japanese were largely employed.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You say that a fair proportion of the Japanese workmen were members of some organized labor group?

Mr. BUZZELL. No, no; I wouldn't say that at all, in proportion to the whole number of them; no. They were already in the industries which we were taking in and where we found them—for instance in the cheaper restaurants east of Main Street, where some of the restaurants were run by Japanese and employed Japanese. That group we had just about organized and then for internal reasons it didn't quite materialize.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Suppose I put the question this way: In those occupations where the workers were fairly well organized, was there a fair proportion of the Japanese in that particular occupation members of the union?

Mr. BUZZELL. If they were in there; yes. The answer to that question would be, yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You would say then that the Japanese had no aversion to joining the labor movement?

Mr. BUZZELL. Well, it wasn't—I don't know whether the answer to that would be yes or no. It wasn't an easy job and I would like to qualify my first answer. Among the grocery clerks we didn't have a majority; we had a little less than a majority in the grocery stores, but we run into the typical Japanese tradition in our organizing work; they wouldn't go contrary to the advice of their oldsters. That is what they would tell us. When they went home to talk about it, they would be advised by their parents and grandparents to leave this American thing alone.

In most cases they were also employed by Japanese. In most of the places we broke into they were mostly employed by Japanese so we had to meet that same condition from two points of view, first, from the employer, and then from the traditional family obedience.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do they have any labor organizations comparable to our unions in Japan?

Mr. BUZZELL. They had a federation of labor in Japan up to about 1934, when the Government moved into it. There was a delegate who used to come here to this country to attend our State federation of labor conventions. He was supposed to come in September, but he didn't arrive and we have never heard from him since. We don't know what happened to him.

I think that was in 1934.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Generally speaking, it is rather difficult to organize the Japanese into the labor movement.

Mr. BUZZELL. I think it could have been possible, but I think it would have been impossible if they were employed alone where there was no contact, but in the places where we did organize them, for instance, in the market, we had almost the complete organization of the Negroes and Mexicans and we had the teamsters organized and had



a great many that fitted in which made it easier there, and the same thing was true in restaurants.

Mr. MUNDT. It is one of the recommendations of your group, as I understand it, that the Japanese be relocated from these present camps into civilian life in the Middle West?

Mr. BUZZELL. No; not in civilian life. We think they should be taken far away from military locations and power dams. There are not many of such installations in the Mississippi Valley, and we think there is plenty of land there where they could be taken and where their talents as farmers could be used and they should be kept concentrated.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean kept in concentration camps?

Mr. BUZZELL. Call them "concentration camps" if you wish, but we mean places where they can't wander away and are under surveillance.

Mr. MUNDT. I live in that country and I don't know of any area where there is productive land available for such purposes—where you could put them in big blocks or groups such as you mention.

In my particular State we have a small contingent of Japanese working in the sugar-beet fields, and during the seasonal period, that worked out rather satisfactorily. But on a permanent relocation basis, even for the duration of the war, there just wouldn't be the agricultural opportunity where you could move a large number of Japanese into such areas.

Mr. BUZZELL. Well, I am not prepared to offer a solution for all the problems in the world by any manner of means, but it seems to me from letters I get from relatives in Minnesota, a great many farms went begging up there for somebody to work them.

Mr. MUNDT. There are farms where they can use additional labor, but the point I am trying to make is your organization is opposed to the release of Japanese into areas where they can be placed a dozen here and fifteen there and one hundred somewhere else, or do you feel if they are located in the Middle West that would be an appropriate method to follow?

Mr. BUZZELL. If they could properly be kept under surveillance. It is our suggestion, definitely, that they be, well, almost kept in confinement so far as wandering around is concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words you don't think they should be released unless they are kept under surveillance?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Wherever they are?

Mr. BUZZELL. That is right—constant surveillance.

Mr. MUNDT. If they are kept under constant surveillance wherever they are relocated, wouldn't they be just as safe and secure in the Imperial Valley as they would be in the Mississippi River Valley?

Mr. BUZZELL. Well, I am not so sure of that. I am not an alarmist and neither are the people whom I represent, but it would only take one or two clever Japanese to escape into the Imperial Valley and they could just raise plenty of hell around some of those canals and dams.

Mr. MUNDT. I think that is true, but I think it is equally true around the power dams of the Middle West and around the airplane factories.



Mr. BUZZELL. There are not so many of those. I think as a practical thing a half dozen Japanese who might escape could not do so much damage in a factory where the damage would have to be done more widespread.

Mr. MUNDT. As a matter of fact, the principal distinction that you feel exists between the release of Japanese to the Pacific coast and the release of the Japanese to the Middle West, is the fact that you have a feeling that the attitude of the people in the Middle West would be more receptive to the Japanese than it would be out here?

Mr. BUZZELL. No; I don't know. I have only been east twice since the war started. I wouldn't know but I would imagine the people in the Middle West would not welcome them anymore than we do. I know that is true of Arizona. That is my opinion. I have no means of knowing whether I am right or wrong.

Mr. MUNDT. You base it strictly on a feeling it is more secure for the national interest to have them in the Middle West?

Mr. BUZZELL. They are here in America and nobody has suggested a way to get rid of them. You can't dump them into the river. You have to put them somewhere but I think the farther away from actual war activities and such locations as power dams, the better off we would be.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to take you on a personally conducted tour of the defense industries of the Middle West.

Mr. BUZZELL. I have been in some of them.

Mr. MUNDT. There is a tremendous development there as there is all over the country, and it is just as important, of course, to preserve production in Omaha or Rapid City or Sioux Falls or Minneapolis or Chicago as it is in San Diego or San Francisco or Los Angeles.

Mr. BUZZELL. Did you ever stop to think what could be done if a dam was to be blown up? For instance, the one out here in Hollywood. It wouldn't take much to shoot that dam off. That could be done quickly, and it could destroy everything from Hollywood Boulevard several miles wide clear to the ocean. While sabotage of a plant has to be done here and there and everywhere, but that could be done in one place. That is our thought about the West.

Mr. MUNDT. In that specific connection, is your organization satisfied with the manner in which the present relocation centers are being administered from the standpoint of sifting of Japanese in and out of the camps who are supposed to be permanently residing there?

Mr. BUZZELL. No; we are not at all agreed on that, that that is safe, good, or what was intended.

The people that were sent to Manzanar, if that was a good place to send them on short notice, that is where they ought to stay—that is what they were sent there for. They might just as well let them run loose if they are going to let them wander around the country.

Mr. COSTELLO. We also had testimony before the committee that the Japanese located at Poston have access by an overnight journey to some highly important reservoirs and dams and the Japanese are quite frequently out of the camp for a night or two and then come back again, with no check made as to where they are at night.

Mr. BUZZELL. I would just as soon—I would feel just as safe if they took the camps where I read about in the newspapers, where they brought a lot of prisoners from Tunisia, I would just as soon turn

those fellows loose to wander around as the Japanese, even though born and raised in this country. There may be some good Japanese but I don't think anybody can tell who the good ones are.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know whether or not the national governing body of the American Federation of Labor has taken any stand with respect to the relocation centers?

Mr. BUZZELL. I do not know whether they have or not. The only opportunity they would have to pass a resolution would be in the May meeting in Washington. I saw no such thing in the papers and we haven't any minutes of it yet that would indicate that they did. I am of the opinion they did not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have they had a meeting lately?

Mr. BUZZELL. The week beginning May 17. They meet again in Chicago in August.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any further questions?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No questions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Buzzell, for appearing before the committee. We appreciate the additional testimony which you have made available to us.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. You may call your next witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Best.

#### TESTIMONY OF EARL A. BEST, FORMER EMPLOYEE OF POSTON AND HEART MOUNTAIN WAR RELOCATION CENTERS

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman).

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name to the reporter, please?

Mr. BEST. Earl Alfred Best.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your address?

Mr. BEST. 2241 Overland Avenue.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that your temporary address?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your permanent address?

Mr. BEST. 1629 York, Denver, Colo.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you speak a little more loudly so the committee can hear you?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long have you been living in Los Angeles?

Mr. BEST. Off and on for 20 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long have you been here on this trip?

Mr. BEST. This trip?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. BEST. Oh, about a month now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where are you working at the present time?

Mr. BEST. I am working in Shanon's.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that a restaurant?

Mr. BEST. That is a drive-in.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your occupation?

Mr. BEST. I am dinner cook there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you give us the location of Shanon's?

Mr. BEST. Yes. It is on Pico and Sepulveda.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. BEST. California.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. BEST. 1898.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever served in the armed forces of the United States?

Mr. BEST. I have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have not?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you served in the armed forces of Canada?

Mr. BEST. I have, twice—both wars.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you serve overseas in World War No. 1?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. For how long?

Mr. BEST. Four and a half years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You saw service throughout that war?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Combat service?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What type of work have you been engaged in from the last war to the beginning of this war?

Mr. BEST. Hotel-chef work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That has been your occupation throughout your life, is that correct?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At the beginning of the war in 1939, did you rejoin the Canadian forces?

Mr. BEST. I went to Canada from Los Angeles in 1939 and my son and I joined the Canadian forces.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Both you and your son?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your son's name?

Mr. BEST. Clifford Best.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you see active service in France during World War No. II?

Mr. BEST. I did. I was hurt in the Dunkirk evacuation and invalided home, back to Canada, and I left Canada after I got my discharge in December 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long were you actually in the service?

Mr. BEST. From 1939 to December—from October of 1939 until I was discharged. I believe my discharge is dated December 4, 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is a medical discharge?

Mr. BEST. 1941, pardon me.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that is a medical discharge?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you actually saw service in France during the battles over there in the Second World War?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is your son still in the service?

Mr. BEST. My son was killed in Africa on January 11 of this year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. BEST. In Africa with the Canadian forces.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he in the air force?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ever take a position with the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. BEST. I accepted a position with them on April 4, a year ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. 1942?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir, 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. BEST. As chief steward.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where?

Mr. BEST. Poston, Ariz.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please relate to the committee the circumstances surrounding your employment with the W. R. A. as chief steward at Poston?

Mr. BEST. I was hired as chief steward and went to Los Angeles to hire cooks to open that camp. There was supposed to be an advance party that was going over there to open the camp at Poston, but shortly after arriving in Poston on April 13, I received a telegram saying that those cooks that I had hired in Los Angeles would not be allowed to go to Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why?

Mr. BEST. The Army would not approve of them going to Poston. I later went to Heart Mountain and found them all there. I never did get any of those cooks. I proceeded to Poston and we opened 71 kitchens in Poston.

I was the chief steward and I had no Caucasian help until shortly before I left there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was the preparation of the meals under your jurisdiction?

Mr. BEST. That is right. I also requisitioned all supplies from the quartermaster.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words the feeding of the Japanese evacuees was your responsibility?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And will you fix the date that you went to Poston?

Mr. BEST. April 13, 1942.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the date you left Poston?

Mr. BEST. Early in September. I was on the pay roll until the 21st of September.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Then you were there for a period of a little more than 3 months?

Mr. BEST. No; almost 6 months at Poston—from April until September.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were the circumstances surrounding the termination of your employment at Poston?

Mr. BEST. I was notified that I was being transferred.

I had a 4 months' appointment and when that expired they extended it for 30 days and later extended it for another 30 days and I was told then that I was being transferred and to report to the San Francisco office, which I did, and at San Francisco they offered me a job at Gila, at much less money than I had received at Poston.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was your salary at Poston?

Mr. BEST. \$3,800 a year.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what was the salary they offered you at Gila?

Mr. BEST. \$2,600. I refused that and was out of Government service until I received a telegram from Mr. Smart, the regional director in Denver, offering me a job at Heart Mountain as associate project steward at \$3,200, and I accepted that.



Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to first take up the Poston phase of your employment with the W. R. A. and later we will go into the information you have regarding the Heart Mountain center.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Best, did the project at Poston furnish fresh milk for the evacuees?

Mr. BEST. When I first arrived there we didn't. For possibly 2 months we got along without fresh milk. There was an unlimited supply of canned milk and Drs. Snively and Schnor, who were in charge of the hospital, advised me that it would not be necessary to have fresh milk; we were too far from a market and they advised that canned milk was the safest thing to raise babies on out there in the desert anyway, so we got along very nicely without it for 2 months.

At the end of 2 months Mr. Head called me in one day and told me he had to put in fresh milk and wanted to know what it would cost to give the Japanese people in that camp a pint of milk per person per day. I reported back to him it would cost \$2,000 per day.

Several days later he called me in and told me we would have to order the fresh milk. I tried to advise him that we didn't have proper refrigeration to handle it and that it would cost \$60,000 a month, and I thought that money could go to better purposes during the war, and he said:

We don't need money to win the war and these people must have fresh milk.

So I obeyed his orders and ordered the fresh milk immediately.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Up until the time you left Poston, they were serving fresh milk to the Japanese evacuees?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Mr. Head indicate whether that was his own idea or something he had received in the nature of advice from the Washington office?

Mr. BEST. I think it was pressure brought to bear by the social workers.

Mr. MUNDT. Within the camp?

Mr. BEST. Within the camp; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't think that recommendation came as a part of the program of Henry Wallace by any means?

(No response).

Mr. EBERHARTER. Had you heard any complaints from the Japanese when they were being served canned milk?

Mr. BEST. There were very few complaints.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think as a whole they were satisfied?

Mr. BEST. Yes; they were satisfied.

Mr. EBERHARTER. With the canned milk?

Mr. BEST. That is right, sir. We also had many different brands of canned milk and different baby foods.

Mr. STEEDMAN. During your service with the Government you worked at Poston and at Heart Mountain relocation centers?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Of the two projects which one would you say is run most efficiently?

Mr. BEST. I would say Poston. Poston is run very efficiently compared to Heart Mountain.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Poston has the reputation of being one of the most efficiently run relocation centers in the W. R. A. set-up, isn't that correct?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that is due to the fact that some of the officials at Poston have had some administrative experience in the Government prior to taking positions at Poston?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. Most of the officials there are ex-Indian Agency men.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to go into the details of Poston with Mr. Best, but I would like to develop the information we have regarding Heart Mountain.

If the committee has any questions it would like to ask about Poston at this time I will be glad for you to ask them.

Mr. MUNDT. You were not at Poston during the riot which took place there?

Mr. BEST. No; I left there shortly before that. I was not there during the riot.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you have occasion to witness any evidence of pro-Japanese activities on the part of the evacuees at Poston?

Mr. BEST. Yes; there was considerable evidence of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. And I presume you had Japanese working under you?

Mr. BEST. I had 1,600 in my department, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were they cooperative in their work?

Mr. BEST. No; they were not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you ever hear any comments on the part of any of them that they expected Japan to win the war and they wanted Japan to win the war?

Mr. BEST. Yes; that was common.

Mr. COSTELLO. You heard remarks of that character in your presence?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were those remarks made by older Japanese or by the native-born Japanese?

Mr. BEST. Native born—by the native born more than by the older Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would that be because you had contact more with the younger groups?

Mr. BEST. That is possible.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you in mind any instances where Japanese working in the kitchens deliberately misused or wasted or squandered foodstuff?

Mr. BEST. Yes. Not so much at Poston as I did at Heart Mountain.

At Poston I was the chief steward and I didn't allow them enormous supplies. They got their daily allowance and they couldn't accumulate sufficiently large stocks to be wasteful, and so long as they couldn't accumulate them they couldn't waste them, but at Heart Mountain it was just the opposite. They had enormous accumulations.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, at Poston if they did try to waste food it would be simply depriving their fellow nationals of rations?

Mr. BEST. That is right, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did they have any system at Poston for reporting the Japanese who made pro-Axis assertions?

Mr. BEST. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So the head of the project or any of the administrative officers would not be able to know which of the Japanese had made these remarks?

Mr. BEST. I have reported several of them to the administration.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But there was no administrative order that any of those remarks should be reported when they were made?

Mr. BEST. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there any evidence of stealing food from the mess halls during your administration?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that very widespread?

Mr. BEST. It was.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were any large quantities stolen?

Mr. BEST. Not at Poston; no. I wouldn't say there was any great amount because they didn't have enough to allow them to steal any great amount.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as you were concerned you saw to it that there was never an excess of food in the mess halls?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or the kitchens where food was being prepared?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. I guess that is all on that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Best, you stated you received a telegram from the regional director of the War Relocation Authority in Denver, offering you a job as associate steward at the war relocation project at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the date of that telegram?

Mr. BEST. It was in December and I wired back that I would accept, and they wired back for me to come up immediately and I landed there on the 15th of December.

Mr. STEEDMAN. December 15, 1942?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And your salary was \$3,200 a year?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. I also got the 20-percent raise at that time that brought me up to about the same figure I was making at Poston.

Mr. MUNDT. Who was the chief steward at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. Fred Haller.

Mr. MUNDT. Was he the chief steward all the time you were there?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What were your duties as associate steward at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. My first duty when I arrived there, was to take an inventory of the camp.

Mr. Haller informed me that they had never had an inventory in the kitchens and he discovered there was a lot of groceries hidden in the attics.

I suggested to him that the inventory be taken on the last day of the month and taken all in 1 day, but he said they didn't have the help to do that; that I would have to take the inventory, which I did.

It took me just about a month to take that inventory in 42 kitchens. Mr. STEEDMAN. During the period of this inventory, did you visit all the kitchens in the project?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you have any difficulty with any of the Japanese in the kitchens with reference to taking the inventory?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; I did. The seventh kitchen I inventoried, the chef—I had a Japanese helper with me who Mr. Haller had detailed to me. This Japanese boy got in an argument with the Japs in this seventh kitchen that I inventoried. It was all in Japanese and I asked what the argument was about, and the chef informed me that I wasn't going into the attic; that that was his attic.

I informed him that the attic was in a Government building and that I had orders to go into the attics. I tried to show him that I had inventoried other kitchens and had also gone into the attics, which were my orders.

In his attic he had \$2,000 worth of goods hidden—many cases——

Mr. COSTELLO. \$2,000 worth of foodstuffs?

Mr. BEST. That is right. It inventoried at \$2,000. Also in his attic he had 500 pounds of coffee up there, which he didn't want me to find, along with an unlimited amount of supplies of all kinds.

There were 50 cases of cereals which the mice had built nests in. Those cereals had been in the attic so long that mice were building nests in them. I tried to advise this cook——

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the name of that cook?

Mr. BEST. Hariguchi.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is his first name?

Mr. BEST. I don't know his first name. I went into the attic and the Japs got quite excited about it and the chef got a knife—Hariguchi got a cleaver and the second cook got a butcher knife and they stuck their heads up in the attic and told me unless we got out of there immediately they were going to "cut our damn heads off."

Mr. MUNDT. Told you that in Japanese or in English?

Mr. BEST. In English; and they spoke very good English.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, they spoke Japanese when they were talking——

Mr. BEST. To my helper.

Mr. MUNDT. And you didn't know what they were saying?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. I asked the helper what they were saying in Japanese, and he said they were accusing him of being a stool pigeon and tipping me off to what was in that attic, and they were determined that I was not going to go into that attic and take an inventory.

I had heard before I arrived there that there were 10 sacks of sugar in the attic. I was tipped off it was there, but I never did find the 10 sacks of sugar because I did not finish the inventory that day.

Before the inventory was over we were driven out of the kitchen. Two girls finally came in and got up on the ladder and stuck their heads up in the attic and they said:

Mr. Best, we wish you would get rid of the Japanese boy——

The boy who was helping me. He was known as Harris. Harris was his first name. I don't recall his last name. They said:

We don't think that this chef would hurt you but we do know he intends to kill Harris.



Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you speak a little more slowly?

Mr. BEST. I advised Harris to leave and the girls told him—they said:

When you hit this floor you make for that side door and don't stop running; the rest of the women have Hariguchi over in the corner of the dining room and they are trying to hold him off until you get out of here.

Well, Harris left and he never did stop running until he hit the warehouse. I came down out of there then. I couldn't take an inventory of the attic without anybody to hold the light for me and I proceeded to continue my inventory in the pantry.

This chef, Hariguchi, insulted me at least 20 times. He threw a case of apple sauce at me one time. He brought it in from the kitchen and he said:

There is another for you, you white son of a b.

I decided it was time to leave and I went down and reported to Mr. Haller, insisting that this be reported to Mr. Guy Robertson—

Mr. MUNDT. Is Mr. Robertson the director of the camp?

Mr. BEST. That is right; project director.

We proceeded to his office. It was right at noontime. He was eating his lunch. He carried his lunch pail and he was eating his lunch in his office when we arrived. We stated to him what had happened and he sent out and brought in the three Japs representing that block and told his associate director, Mr. Todd, to question them as to why this chef would threaten a Caucasian employee.

The three Japs came in and they couldn't understand—the three Japs representing the block, one known as the block chairman, the block administrative officer, and the block steward. They couldn't understand why this chef had done that.

They were trying then to alibi for him. They said they didn't think that he had threatened me because Japanese talk with their hands a lot and no doubt he was cutting meat and he had a knife in his hand.

I informed them that he wasn't cutting meat; that he had deliberately got a knife and told me what he was going to do with it—he was, "going to cut my head off."

They then brought in the chef. He was taken into a conference room in front of Mr. Todd, associate director, Mr. Everett Lane, transportation officer, Mr. Fred Haller, chief steward, Lawyer Housel—the lawyer of the camp.

Mr. Todd's secretary, who was taking the notes, Mrs. Bottrell—

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was Mrs. Bottrell secretary to?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Todd's secretary.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And she took minutes of the conversation?

Mr. BEST. Yes; she took the minutes of the conversation. And also the three Japs representing the block, the chef Hariguchi, and myself were present. At first Hariguchi claimed he couldn't speak English. They brought in an interpreter and he didn't give the interpreter a chance to speak. He got right up and talked very good English.

He said:

Yes, I don't like this man; I threatened to kill him. He had no business in my attic. Mr. Haller comes in here and takes inventory in 2 minutes; he looks around the pantry and says, "you have got \$300 worth here," and leaves.

This man, he don't know how to take an inventory. He takes each can down, the size of it. I just didn't like that and I didn't want him in my kitchen at any time.

We proceeded from there. The man pleaded guilty to all charges that I had made against him. He was sent back to his kitchen and the rest of the conference went into Mr. Robertson's office and the lawyer made the report to Mr. Robertson that the man had pleaded guilty to all charges.

Mr. Robertson instructed Mr. Haller at that point to fire this chef immediately, but just then a Jap representing the block got up and he said:

Now, Mr. Robertson, you can't fire this chef. If you fire this chef you are going to have a lot of trouble in that block and other blocks because he is a good chef and he is very well liked.

Robertson then asked the next Jap what he thought about it and he made a similar speech. He said the man was very honest.

I questioned his honesty. I told them that when he had \$2,000 worth of groceries hidden in that attic, and it was in the shape that it was in, that in my estimation it was just sabotage.

The third Jap got up and made a similar speech that—

You can't fire the chef without having trouble.

Mr. Robertson then instructed Mr. Haller to not fire the chef because he did not want trouble in that block, but he advised that the chef should at least apologize to Mr. Best and to Harris, which was done.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the chef did not lose his position as a result of that?

Mr. BEST. The chef did not lose his position at that time, but 8 days later he beat up another Japanese who was working for him in the kitchen and he cut another one quite badly with a knife and they had him in jail for 8 or 10 days. After that they put him in another kitchen and to the best of my knowledge he is still a chef in one of the kitchens at Heart Mountain.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did the Japanese whom he beat up claim to be a loyal American?

Mr. BEST. That is right. That was the cause of the beatings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In going around to the other kitchens, did you discover any more hoarded food?

Mr. BEST. Yes. There was a small investigation by somebody from Washington—I don't remember right offhand who it was, and they were instructed to get those supplies out of the attics.

At kitchen 17 they had more supplies than any other kitchen in the camp. They had 100 sacks of rice—10,000 pounds of rice.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that would feed how many people?

Mr. MUNDT. In the attic?

Mr. BEST. No; they had it piled in the dining room. The attic was full, the pantry was full so they were piling it alongside of the dining room—one side of the dining room. They had 100 sacks of rice. I don't remember how much flour but an unreasonable amount, and case goods of every description.

Mr. Haller was told that he must remove that from the dining room because if anybody came in on an inspection tour and saw it there there might be some bad reports, so he sent a Japanese to tell

them that he was coming out the next day to move the supplies and if they could find some place to put it before he got there that it would be quite all right.

The next day he sent a truck up there and they came back with about six cases of dried cereals. The rest of the supplies had disappeared from the dining room. I understood from the Japanese that it went to private apartments.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In checking on the various kitchens, did you find any evidence that the Japanese were trading the hoarded groceries for whisky?

Mr. BEST. Yes; there was much evidence of that. At one kitchen a garbage man who was selling the Japanese a lot of chickens—at that time we were not giving the Japanese chickens—they are getting it now, but they weren't then.

This garbage man was buying chickens and bringing them to the camp and selling them to the Japanese. In many kitchens that I went in they would have two or three hundred pounds of chicken.

Mr. MUNDT. How would they pay for those chickens?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Loverchech—

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who was he?

Mr. BEST. He was hauling garbage from the camp. I never saw any money change hands but one morning as I arrived at this kitchen where Loverchech had his truck parked besides the garbage cans, there was a case of hams—I would say about 12 hams and there was 2 slabs of bacon and there was 6 cases of canned fruits. Those were No. 10 cans. That would be roughly, 6 gallons of canned fruits.

There was also some canned vegetables. It was piled in the snow beside the garbage cans and the truck was parked beside it.

This was quite early in the morning—I would say about 6:30. I asked the chef what the groceries were doing out there, as they had had no delivery from the supply room that morning, and he said he was cleaning the pantry and he put them out there to be out of the way, which was a ridiculous explanation because they had a large dining room and plenty of space in the kitchen. They didn't have to carry it outside and put it by the garbage cans in the snow.

Mr. MUNDT. To the best of your belief then the chefs were trading hoarded material to the garbage man for chickens?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. Shortly after that Mr. Haller was away for a few days and I took his place and while taking his place a Japanese from that particular kitchen come down to the steward's office and asked me if I would fire his chef. He said the chef was drunk all the time and that he had reported it to Mr. Haller many times but he said:

My chef has got a lot on Mr. Haller so Mr. Haller won't fire him.

Now, that Mr. Haller is away we are in hopes that you will fire him because he is drunk all the time and he is trading hams for whisky.

The transportation officer, who was my boss, was in the office at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. And heard that conversation?

Mr. BEST. Heard that conversation; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Was the trading of hams for liquor done with the same garbage man?

Mr. BEST. No. I questioned this man as to who he was trading the hams with and he said that soldiers were coming in and visiting a

lot and he said they were the ones that were taking it out. He said to his knowledge they had been taking it out of the camp and bringing whisky in in exchange—that is Japanese soldiers who visited the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. Where were those soldiers from?

Mr. BEST. I don't know where they were from but many of them were visiting there all the time.

Mr. MUNDT. Japanese soldiers from the American Army who were on furlough?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the procedure by which the chefs of these kitchens get their supplies from the central warehouses at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. At Heart Mountain Mr. Haller has a steward representing each block. The Japanese stewards come down to his office and tell them what they want and he sends it to them. That is how they accumulate such an enormous stock.

Mr. MUNDT. They tell him what they want? How do they do that? Is that by written request?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. A written requisition?

Mr. BEST. That is right; a written requisition. He goes over the written requisitions and he cuts them down to a certain extent. If he gave them all they asked for, why, the kitchens would not hold it.

He told me at one time not to give them any more canned fruit; that there had been a complaint that they had too much canned fruit in their kitchens and hidden in their attics.

Mr. MUNDT. Up to the time you arrived there no inventory had ever been made of the materials that might have been hoarded in the kitchens?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. And you arrived there on what date?

Mr. BEST. 15th of December.

Mr. MUNDT. How long had the camp been running at that time?

Mr. BEST. I believe it opened around the first of August.

Mr. MUNDT. And had Mr. Haller been steward all that time?

Mr. BEST. No; they had a steward there first who, I believe, done a good job but the Japanese didn't like him because he wouldn't give them an unlimited supply and they made it so tough for him that he left the camp in a hurry.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his name?

Mr. BEST. I have heard it many times. I have met him and would recognize him if I met him again, but offhand I can't think of it. Mr. Haller, I believe, arrived there in October.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Haller had to put his O. K. on requisitions by which the chef in kitchen No. 10 accumulated all that rice?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. It could not have been done without Haller's approval?

Mr. BEST. That is right. At one time he told me not to give them any more fruit. He had me O. K.-ing the requisitions for a short time and the Japanese asked for more canned fruit and I told them they weren't going to get any more until they used up what they already had. They had an unreasonable amount.



The next day a delegation of Japanese came down to see Mr. Haller. I was in the office when they arrived and they told him—they said:

We want canned fruit and we don't want it tomorrow; we damn well want it this afternoon and you get it out there.

He immediately called two trucks and sent canned fruit to all kitchens.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who were the men that called on him?

Mr. BEST. Japanese stewards from the different blocks, representing the cooks' association in the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. Pretty persuasive salesmen, weren't they?

Mr. BEST. They were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there much garbage being disposed of at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; they fed cafeteria style at Poston. While I was there I fed them strictly family style. I found that on cafeteria style where you have women and children that it is almost impossible to feed a large amount of people without enormous waste.

They go through in line and the cooks have a lot of food dished up before they get there and as they march by in the line they hand them a plate. They hand the same amount of food to a man who is doing a day's work that they hand to a child or a lady that is sick. They take it and they don't say anything. They know it belongs to the Government anyway, so they think, "I will throw it in the garbage can."

That is where a lot of it ends up. They have eight garbage cans per kitchen where one would be sufficient if they fed family style.

Mr. MUNDT. By "family style" you mean put the food on the table?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; they have eight people to a table and have dishes suitable for family style. They could put enough potatoes and so forth on the table for eight people and if they didn't want to eat that, they wouldn't have to and the food would not be wasted. If you once take it out of the dishes and put it on the individual plate then what is left has to go in the garbage can.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will declare a recess for 5 minutes. (A short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How was the garbage being disposed of?

Mr. BEST. There were two firms from the outside—Mr. Lovercheck and one other party that were hauling the garbage out—they were hauling a small amount away from the kitchens, and the rest of it was hauled and dumped in a garbage dump. It wasn't used for anything.

Mr. STEEDMAN. No attempt was made to conserve it?

Mr. BEST. There was not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were there any hogs at Heart Mountain belonging to the center?

Mr. BEST. No; there weren't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. By the way how far is Heart Mountain from Cody?

Mr. BEST. Fourteen miles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Cody is the nearest city?

Mr. BEST. That is right. Powell is just about as close in the other direction. I think it is 14 miles the other way.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Heart Mountain is a Bureau of Reclamation development, is it not?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was there such an accumulation of foodstuff and subsistence on hand at Heart Mountain that there came a time when they decided to ship it to other W. R. A. centers?

Mr. BEST. Yes; they were notified when Mr. Jack Carberry, from the Denver Post—

Mr. STEEDMAN. At that point, Mr. Best, I would like to develop the circumstances surrounding your resignation. I believe you stated you submitted your resignation on March 31?

Mr. BEST. March 1.

Mr. STEEDMAN. March 1, effective when?

Mr. BEST. March 31.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Effective March 31?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You gave them 30 days' notice in your resignation?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did you intend to take a position with the Alcan Highway?

Mr. BEST. I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is the highway running through Canada to Alaska?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you intended to take a position as chef with one of the contractors?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But you were rejected for physical reasons?

Mr. BEST. That is right; the doctor would not pass me.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Were you offered employment by some governmental agency?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. The Alcan Highway is a private organization, is it not?

Mr. BEST. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it a corporation?

Mr. BEST. There are many different contractors up there and I was to work for a contractor.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall the name of the contractor?

Mr. BEST. Callahan—there are three names. I think it is John Callahan and somebody else. I remember it was called "Callahan." It is known as "Callahan."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Now; after you resigned from your position as assistant steward at Heart Mountain, did you get in touch with Jack Carberry of the Denver Post?

Mr. BEST. I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he is sports editor of the Denver Post, isn't that correct?

Mr. BEST. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you tell him your story concerning conditions at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. I told it first to Mr. Martin, the editor of the Post, and he called in Mr. Carberry. He sent Mr. Carberry out to my home to interview me that same day.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And after Mr. Carberry interviewed you, he went to Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And when the project administrator at Heart Mountain heard that Jack Carberry was going to the Heart Mountain center, they decided to ship out a considerable amount of foodstuffs?

Mr. BEST. They shipped out many tons—many carloads.

Mr. COSTELLO. What date was it Mr. Carberry visited the Center?

Mr. BEST. I would not be sure of the date but I imagine it was around the 15th of April.

Mr. COSTELLO. When did you speak to the manager of the Denver Post?

Mr. BEST. I believe it was the 8th of April.

Mr. COSTELLO. About the 8th?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And why did you resign?

Mr. BEST. I resigned because I didn't believe in taking orders from Japs. If I remained there I would be under Japanese orders. Mr. Haller insisted that I take orders from the Japanese. He called Mr. Lane and gave him my resignation. He was the transportation officer there.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean the Japanese were going to be placed in charge of the chef steward?

Mr. BEST. At all times Mr. Haller, from the time I arrived there, wanted me to take orders from two different Japs that were in his office.

Mr. COSTELLO. What were their positions?

Mr. BEST. One was an office manager named Nosey—his first name is Arnold.

Mr. COSTELLO. Arnold Nosey?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he is Japanese?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Who was the other one?

Mr. BEST. Jimmie Yeuda.

Mr. MUNDT. How long did you continue working at Heart Mountain after you submitted your resignation?

Mr. BEST. 30 days.

Mr. MUNDT. You worked throughout the period of notification?

Mr. BEST. That is right, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Mr. Carberry actually visit the camp?

Mr. BEST. He spent 3 days there and inventoried the warehouses while he was there.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he subsequently submit a report of his findings to the Denver Post?

Mr. BEST. That is right. He ran a series of articles that lasted for 6 days.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know the dates of those articles?

Mr. BEST. Well, I imagine they started about the 17th or 18th of April. I wouldn't be just positive about that.

Mr. MUNDT. And they ran for a period of 6 days?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I think we should have the articles in the files of the committee and I request Mr. Steedman to secure a set of the articles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have most of them, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. I think we should have the whole series so they will be available to us.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I had thought about requesting Mr. Carberry to appear before the committee in Washington because he made a first-hand investigation of Heart Mountain.

Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke, Mr. Best about several freight cars of surplus foods being shipped out of Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. When did that take place?

Mr. BEST. That took place the day before Mr. Carberry arrived there. They knew he was coming. They had been notified from Washington that he was arriving.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that would have been April 14?

Mr. BEST. Around that time; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You were not at the camp at that time?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. How did you obtain your information regarding the removal of the freight cars?

Mr. BEST. From Mr. Carberry and also from some of the officials at Heart Mountain.

Mr. COSTELLO. They informed you as to the removal of this equipment?

Mr. BEST. I would rather not answer that question. There are a lot of people at Heart Mountain who are worried about their jobs and I don't want to be the cause of them losing their jobs.

Mr. COSTELLO. The people up there are the ones who informed you concerning the removal of the freight cars?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. And those supplies were sent to other relocation centers, were they?

Mr. BEST. Yes; they could be quite easily traced.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any idea as to how many freight cars may have been removed from Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. I believe there were five.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those five carloads were sent to various other centers?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know whether they all left on April 14 or whether they were sent out on different dates?

Mr. BEST. No. Many of them—three carloads I believe—I was told there were three carloads left there the day before Mr. Carberry arrived and I understand there have been some shipped out of there since.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't know to which camp they were sent?

Mr. BEST. No; but Mr. Wickersham told me he received one carload at Poston.

Mr. MUNDT. He also told the committee he did and gave us the number of the car so we can trace that one definitely.

Mr. BEST. They had 10,000 gallons of mayonnaise and were only using 600 gallons a month and much of it was broken and going back



to oil and the Japs were just wasting it. They refused to rewhip it. It could have easily been rewhipped but they refused to do that. It was too much work.

Mr. COSTELLO. And large quantities of other foodstuffs were being wasted?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. Corn meal—they had a 65 months' supply of corn meal—over 5 years' supply.

Mr. MUNDT. 65 months?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; at the rate they were using it.

Mr. MUNDT. They must have been figuring on a long war.

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir. And 5 years' supply of canned tomatoes at the rate they were using them, but if they went on the point system the supply would have lasted 8 years. But much of that may have been shipped out later to other camps, but that was what they had the time I took the inventory.

Mr. COSTELLO. You took an inventory and found all this surplus food existing in the camp at the time you were there?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you make any recommendations regarding the surplus at that time?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; I did. I wrote memorandums to Mr. Lane and Mr. Robertson suggesting that they remove the stuff or do something about it because it was going to spoil, and mice were nesting in the corn flakes, and so forth.

I made a report to them of the condition at the time but there was nothing done about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Nothing was done about it until some time in March or April when they started to ship freight cars of food out of there?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But during the time or from the time you made your recommendations up to the middle of April, they didn't do anything about it—in fact continued to purchase additional foods?

Mr. BEST. Yes. I wrote a memorandum to Mr. Lane at one time telling him that he had 10,000 gallons of mayonnaise and that on the last day of February a shipment to arrive—I believe it was 800 gallons, and there was another shipment to arrive on the last day of March, which had all been ordered in advance, of 600 gallons. I suggested that he stop those shipments because he already had much more than he could use and I believe they did stop those shipments.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was any reason ever given for the accumulation of this large supply?

Mr. BEST. No; there wasn't.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, it wasn't done with the idea they were going to have twice as many Japanese evacuees at the camp than they actually received?

Mr. BEST. No. They knew the capacity of the camp and the camp was full at that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. How many evacuees are at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. Sir, that is a question I don't think anybody can answer.

Mr. COSTELLO. Approximately how many?

Mr. BEST. W. R. A., Mr. Myer, or anybody else. I don't think they can tell you that because they come and go as they please. There are many of them we only see on pay day.

Mr. COSTELLO. The camp authorities have no control over the Japanese at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. They were drawing rations for 11,500 people at Heart Mountain when I am positive they didn't have over 10,000. That is how they kept the food cost low or down to 45 cents.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, they were drawing rations for more people than they were feeding; is that right?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean to say there is no periodic check-up or census at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. There is no roll call or check-up.

Mr. MUNDT. There is no roll call or any count to determine the number of people in Heart Mountain center?

Mr. BEST. That is right. At no time did they ever have a roll call or a counting of those people. It was suggested once while I was at Poston that they count the people at the camp once a month and it was suggested that they go around at night after they were in their quarters and count them, but the social workers objected to those people being disturbed in their quarters and it was never done while I was there.

Mr. COSTELLO. The social workers were opposed to a census being taken?

Mr. BEST. That is right. The housing committee takes a census. They know how many people should be there but to actually be able to swear that they are there, that is different.

Mr. MUNDT. Were you at Poston at the time a Miss Findley was serving there as a social worker?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. At Heart Mountain did they have anybody holding a similar position?

Mr. BEST. Yes. At Heart Mountain it was Miss Virgil Payne.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you know Miss Payne personally?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you know Miss Findley personally?

Mr. BEST. I did.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they have similar ideas as to the proper attitude to take toward the Japanese?

Mr. BEST. They did, and at Heart Mountain Miss Payne took her orders from Sam Nagata, the Jap that runs the camp.

Mr. MUNDT. A Japanese?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; he is connected with the community service. Virgil Payne takes her orders from Sam Nagata and Mr. Guy Robertson takes his orders from Virgil Payne.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know anything about the background of Sam Nagata?

Mr. BEST. Yes. I understand Mr. Nagata was born in this country but he is a Kibei. He was educated in Japan. His wife is an old country Japanese woman and does not speak English. Their son, David, is 12 years of age. He was taken to Japan at the age of 6 to go to school over there and he returned to the United States shortly before the evacuation—shortly before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. STEEDMAN. About how old a man is Sam Nagata?

Mr. BEST. I am not much of a judge on Japanese ages. Are you referring to Sam Nagata, the father?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; I am referring to the father.

Mr. BEST. I don't know, but I imagine—I would guess him to be 35.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he take an interest in the Judo Club?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; he takes an interest in everything in the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And is he active in the Judo Club there?

Mr. BEST. I understood he was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they do have Judo Clubs at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. They have a Judo Club there and also run the post. I had orders from the social workers that I must feed those Judo workers every night at midnight as their exercise was very strenuous.

Mr. MUNDT. I knew we would get around to the midnight-snack business we were talking about.

Mr. BEST. At Poston I refused to do it, but at Heart Mountain I was compelled to do it.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that a fourth meal a day?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that a midnight snack?

Mr. BEST. That is right. I suggested if they wanted exercise to give them a pick and shovel.

Mr. MUNDT. What did they serve them at the midnight snack?

Mr. BEST. Served a regular meal.

Mr. MUNDT. A regular meal?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. That would be the same as the dinner meal or the lunch?

Mr. BEST. The same as the dinner meal.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the number of evacuees at Heart Mountain, Mr. Cavett obtained the following information from Mr. Todd, who is the associate director, and the information is dated May 28, 1943, and it indicates that the total population as of May 24, 1943, was 9,910 at Heart Mountain.

That figure includes 2,458 children of preschool age, persons handicapped through physical disability, aged persons and housewives who have children to take care of.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever see the participants of a Judo Club going through their lessons?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You have never seen judo wrestling take place?

Mr. BEST. No, sir; I was invited down there several times to their class but I never did attend.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, also in connection with the food shipped out of Heart Mountain to the other war relocation centers, Mr. Cavett obtained an itemized account of the food shipments to the other centers or military posts, dated June 4, 1943, and it is headed, "Statement for Dies committee, John A. Nelson, senior administrative officer."

It is unsigned, but I would like at this time to ask Mr. Cavett if he received this document from Mr. Todd of the Heart Mountain relocation center?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; I did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think it might be a good idea to insert this document in the record at this point.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Cavett, was this statement prepared by or under the direction of Mr. Todd?

Mr. CAVETT. Under Mr. Todd's direction; yes. He called the gentleman in and told him to prepare what we wanted. I told him that there had been information received that after the information had gotten out that they had surplus food supplies, that they immediately shipped the stuff out. I told him I wanted an inventory as to what was shipped out and where it was sent to and the date it was sent.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And he gave you this statement?

Mr. BEST. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. According to this statement some of the shipments were sent not only to relocation centers but to other various governmental agencies, such as Army air bases and various other locations, and the Trinidad internment camp; the Army air base at Colorado Springs; the quartermaster at Fort Logan. In other words, they shipped it all over that section of the country?

Mr. CAVETT. They shipped out to whoever would take it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does this indicate the actual number of freight cars that were actually shipped out?

Mr. CAVETT. I asked if it was about four or five cars and those are the figures on there.

I will say this, Mr. Todd was very cooperative. Anything we asked him for he gave to us.

Mr. COSTELLO. He seemed perfectly willing to give you the information you asked for?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; and he is the assistant director.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection that may be introduced as an exhibit in the record.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was any attempt made to save grease, fats, or tin cans up at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. I had suggested that it be saved and returned to the quartermaster but I was informed by one of the W. R. A. officials—I don't remember his name, that the Boy Scouts called at the steward's office and collected egg crates, lettuce crates, tin cans, and some of the grease. I asked what they were going to do with it and I was told that they were selling it locally in Powell. He said they had already sold a considerable amount in Powell and Cody, Wyo. I asked how they accounted for the money when they sold Government property and he said they were turning the money over to the Japanese Boy Scouts.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You mean the Japanese Boy Scouts at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. At Heart Mountain; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And those Boy Scouts are a regular American troop of scouts, is that correct?

Mr. BEST. It is composed of Issei, Nisei, and Kibei.

Mr. COSTELLO. There wouldn't be any Issei Boy Scouts, would there?

Mr. BEST. There are Kibeis, but there wouldn't be any Issei scouts.



Mr. COSTELLO. Generally the scout movement there is the same as the scout movement in other places of the country?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Best, do the Japanese at Heart Mountain go on hikes?

Mr. BEST. Yes; they do. I have noticed them many times leave the camp and go on long hikes. They are free to go almost any place they want to and they all carried a uniform pack and a long stick. The packs they carried on their backs were very uniform. I don't know what they would weigh but they looked very military.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many went out at a time?

Mr. BEST. Groups that I have seen leave—I would say the groups that I have seen leave would range around 50.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know where they went to?

Mr. BEST. No; I don't.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they have to obtain passes to leave the center?

Mr. BEST. I understand one man had to have a pass—the man that was in charge of the group, but they were all Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would they be gone overnight?

Mr. BEST. Not to my knowledge. They leave very early on Sunday morning and come back late that evening.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you required to furnish lunches for the group?

Mr. BEST. I was.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long would they be gone altogether? About 8 hours?

Mr. BEST. They would be gone all day, from early morning until quite late in the evening—10 or 12 hours.

Mr. COSTELLO. What group of people usually went on those hikes? Were they men and women?

Mr. BEST. No; they were all men—full-grown adults, all of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. No younger boys or anything of that kind?

Mr. BEST. I would say they ranged in ages, the groups that I have seen, from 20 to 50.

Mr. COSTELLO. And would they be all three groups of Japanese—Nisei, Issei, and Kibei?

Mr. BEST. I wouldn't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't know who the persons actually were in the group?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Japanese leave the center without permission?

Mr. BEST. I am sure they do. I have met many of them in town who didn't have permission to be in town.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is in the town of Cody, Wyo?

Mr. BEST. Cody and Powell. Mr. Macheau is in charge of the Heart Mountain Sentinel, the newspaper, and he takes a lot of the Japanese out of the camp to basketball games in different towns in Wyoming.

On two different occasions they played in Powell and they all got very drunk at the Pioneer Bar and some of them did not return to the camp. Those that did return a Jap drove the car for Mr. Macheau. He didn't drive. He was a little too intoxicated.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact both of the cities of Powell and Cody have passed resolutions requesting the camp officials to keep the Japanese out of Cody and Powell; is that correct?

Mr. BEST. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. After you obtained the information that you did during your tour of duty at Heart Mountain, you gave that information to Mr. Carberry and he wrote the articles which appeared in the Denver Post.

Following that were you contacted by any officials of the W. R. A.?

Mr. BEST. Yes. Mr. Duncan Mills and Mr. Malcom Pitts contacted me the day the first story appeared in the papers. They had been to Heart Mountain for a few days prior to that.

I went to their room in the Albany Hotel and stayed there from 10 o'clock at night until about 3 in the morning. They asked me many questions about the camp. They admitted they were surprised that all this had happened at Heart Mountain. They said that Tule Lake was in much worse shape than Heart Mountain and they wouldn't have been surprised if something had happened at Tule Lake.

Mr. MUNDT. What position do those two men have with the W. R. A.?

Mr. BEST. Mr. Duncan Mills is Associate Director to Mr. Dillon Myer in Washington and Mr. Malcom Pitts is regional director in Denver with his office in the Midland Bank Building.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did anyone pay any attention to you prior to your going to Mr. Carberry of the Denver Post?

Mr. BEST. No; they didn't; and I went to Mr. Malcom Pitts the same day that I went to the Denver Post and he seemed very disinterested.

Prior to that, before resigning, I had gone to the military police, Captain Green, at the gate and he told me he had no authority to come into the camp; that he knew conditions were horrible and suggested that I go to the F. B. I., and he sent me in to the local sheriff. I reported to him and through the sheriff I contacted the F. B. I. on several occasions and the F. B. I. man told me that he was satisfied that conditions were as I had stated but there was nothing he could do about it.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you remember his name?

Mr. BEST. Yes; Mr. Harold W. McMillan.

Mr. MUNDT. From Denver?

Mr. BEST. I believe he works at the Denver office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Jimmie Yohairo?

Mr. BEST. Yes; I know Jimmie Yohairo. He worked for me during the time I was at Poston. I used him as chef instructor, instructing the other cooks in the kitchens.

I thought Jimmie was a pretty good Japanese. He later got a pass while I was at Heart Mountain. He came there to visit his dying father. It so happened his father was not even sick.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You mean he left Poston to go to Heart Mountain to visit his father?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Whom he said was sick?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; he claimed he got his pass by stating that his father was sick at Heart Mountain and he went to visit him. His father was quite elderly, but he was not sick at the time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was his purpose in going to Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. He held lectures every day advising the Japanese at that time not to answer questions 27 and 28.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you hear him deliver those lectures?

Mr. BEST. On the questionnaire.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you hear him advising the Japanese that?

Mr. BEST. No; he spoke also in Japanese which I couldn't understand, but other Japanese informed me of what he was saying.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many others informed you as to what he was saying?

Mr. BEST. Oh, many. I immediately notified Mr. Head by telegram and followed it up with a letter telling him what the Japanese had told me that Jimmie was saying at these lectures.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is Jimmie Yohairo?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; and Mr. Head replied asking me to get copies of the minutes of those meetings if I could; but the Japanese that had informed me of this didn't care to give me a copy of the minutes of the meetings. They said they hadn't taken notes and they were just a little bit afraid of Yohairo's family—Jimmie's brother and many of the other Yohairos who were in camp at Heart Mountain. They were a little bit afraid to talk. They said:

We have to live here with these people for a long time and we might get our heads taken off.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long was Jimmie Yohairo at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. He was there several days before I discovered he was there and after I notified Mr. Head, I would say he was there for another 8 days after that—possibly he was there 15 days.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Question 28 was the question on the form relating to loyalty to the United States?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he was advising the other Japanese to refuse to sign question 28?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you seen Yohairo since his visit to Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. No; I have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know Jimmie Oku?

Mr. BEST. Yes. He worked for me at Heart Mountain. I met him on the street in Denver just before I left Denver, a month ago, and he came up to me and he called me by name and I stopped and talked with him awhile and asked him where he was from and he said:

Don't you remember me; I worked for you at Poston.

And I finally placed him and we talked awhile, while I was waiting for a train. We talked about an hour.

He gave me his address where he was living in Denver. I asked him how he liked Denver and he said:

"Much better than Poston," and he said at Poston, "I only got \$19 a month," and he said, "now, I am working for the Government and getting \$200 a month."

Mr. STEEDMAN. What Government agency was he working for?

Mr. BEST. He didn't tell me. We possibly could get that information from Mr. Jack Carberry. I think he has it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not Oku is a Nisei or Kibei?

Mr. BEST. I wouldn't know, but he has some relatives—his father, I understand, asked for repatriation. He is an old-country Jap and asked to return to Japan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have no detailed information regarding Oku?

Mr. BEST. No; I haven't, except that his father asked for repatriation. As far as Oku himself is concerned, I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. During the time that you were at Heart Mountain did the Japanese conduct a strike?

Mr. BEST. No. They had a strike shortly after I left Heart Mountain. They planned several strikes but something happened that they didn't pull them.

One cook told us that they were going to have a strike 10 days after the holiday. He told us that on Christmas Day. This cook was in kitchen 27—no, kitchen 27-29. That cook's name was Itichi. I am not sure but I think it is spelled I-t-i-c-h-i. He was the chef in charge of that kitchen and Mr. Yohairo asked me to go up and visit him on Christmas Day in the presence of Mr. Haller. This cook was fairly well intoxicated that day and he gave all the cooks in the kitchen a bottle whisky for Christmas presents and the people who ate in the dining room, which was round 300, he gave them all a bottle of beer that day and when we went in to visit him he took us in the pantry and offered us a drink and he told us then that they were planning to strike.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there any restriction on importing whisky into the center at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. No; there isn't. It is hauled in there in Government cars by Japanese.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there a State law limiting the sale of whisky in Wyoming to 5 gallons?

Mr. BEST. I understand there is but some of them have accumulated large amounts to take care of the Japanese trade.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are automobiles entering the center searched at the gate?

Mr. BEST. No; they are not. A citizen of Powell stopped me on the street and drew my attention to the fact that a Japanese was in town in a Government car and that he had gone to two barrooms trying to buy whisky and they wouldn't sell him whisky, but at the third bar he bought \$50 worth and this man wanted to know how the man was going to get in the gate or what he was going to do with the \$50 worth of liquor. I suggested that he follow the man to the gate and find out how he got in, which he did.

The car drove up to the gate and the guard said: "Howdy, John, go ahead."

He didn't look in the car. Mr. Green told me he was warned ahead of time that that car was coming and there was \$50 worth of liquor in it and he said: "I didn't give my men orders to search it because I had orders not to search those cars from the W. R. A."

Mr. MUNDT. Who is Mr. Green?

Mr. BEST. Captain Green in charge of the military police at the gate.



Mr. MUNDT. Who gave him his orders not to search the car?

Mr. BEST. W. R. A. He said that he was instructed by W. R. A. not to search those cars and he was not searching them.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you mean by "W. R. A."?

Mr. BEST. War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MUNDT. Who in the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. BEST. The Project Administrator, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. MUNDT. Let us go into the whisky and beer that the chef put out on Christmas Day. Was that whisky and beer purchased by the cook or was it obtained by trading Government supplies for it?

Mr. BEST. He did not tell me how he obtained it but several days after Christmas I went to his kitchen to take an inventory and when I arrived in the kitchen he produced a bottle of good Scotch whisky and offered me a drink and I told him I was working and didn't drink on the job, and he said: "There is just you and me here."

And I said: "It is right after breakfast and I don't want a drink anyway."

So he then wanted to make a cake for me to take home to my family and I informed him I didn't have a family and he said: "Don't put all this down," and he pointed to the shelves. He said: "I have got an enormous stock here and it is going to look bad if you put it all down."

I informed him it would look bad if I didn't put it down; that his food cost would be so high that we would have to change cooks in the kitchen.

I convinced him of that so he took me around and showed me secret pantries that he had, that I wouldn't have found otherwise. He did have an enormous stock. While I was there—when I finished the pantry—I had left my coat in the pantry and I went out in the dining room to inventory what was there and as I finished that two Japanese came in the back door and one of them looked quite a bit like a Mexican and they had a parcel of whisky for this particular cook and I heard them say:

It is all right; it is all right, this man is all right.

They took it in and set it in the pantry and when I went in after my coat I took a look into it and there was 2 quarts of Scotch whisky in it, which was just a paper sack with 2 quarts of whisky. It was quite open—the top of the sack was open.

At that time I hadn't found any butter but I knew they had some butter in the kitchen and I asked him where he kept the butter and he said he didn't have any, but I kept searching because they had so many secret pantries, in hopes of finding the butter and just as I was leaving I found 2 barrels of soap and 2 cases of butter outside in a little vestibule at the entrance—at one of the entrances of the dining room.

I drew his attention to the fact it was there. There was a truck that left shortly afterward and then the truck came back and I followed them back and they took 2 cases which looked to me like 2 cases of butter away from that kitchen.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the nature of the secret pantries that you speak of?

Mr. BEST. Some of them have sliding doors in the wall. In block 6 they have two kitchens in that block, 27 and 30, and they received a shipment of coffee from the warehouse. When I took inventory I couldn't find the coffee but I knew they had it someplace. I kept

searching and was about to give up, but when I was in the dining room I noticed their pantry extended further out into the dining room than other pantries, so I started searching for a door to get into this built-on part. There didn't seem to be any door and I went back into the pantry and at that end of the pantry there was a nice little desk built in a little hole cut in the shelves and by pulling the desk out there was a door that slid in the wall and they had a space in there, I would say, about 5 feet by the width of the dining room and up to the ceiling and that was piled full.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Five feet by what?

Mr. BEST. I believe the building is 20 feet long and there would be the aisle at the side. It would be about 5 feet by 15 and the height of the building.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was there a number of such concealed pantries in each of the mess halls?

Mr. BEST. Yes; in many mess halls. I found those concealed pantries other places. The other No. 6 kitchen had a similar one and they had the door hidden with coats. They hung a lot of overcoats up over the door.

Mr. MUNDT. What reason did the chefs give you for the existence of the secret pantries?

Mr. BEST. They didn't give any reason at all. They laughed about it and said that other cooks put them there.

This cook said he didn't know it was there. They just laughed at it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it a part of the building regularly built in?

Mr. BEST. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean were they built in originally?

Mr. BEST. No; that is built on. They built it themselves. Almost every kitchen has new store rooms that they have built on themselves.

In one case they were using the dining room for a theater and they built a stage which was clear across the dining room and would extend about 12 feet out, and I suppose it was almost as high as this table from the floor, and underneath of that it was all boarded up solid and underneath that it was packed so tight with case goods—case goods of every description that it was quite a job to inventory it. We had to take it all out to get an inventory of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it a case of simply storing the goods there because they had such an excessive amount or was it an attempt to conceal the goods in these places?

Mr. BEST. I believe it was a case of wanting to steal it and trade it for whiskey, and so forth.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words out of every shipment received in the mess halls some of it was stored away in secret locations?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Since these exposures do you know whether or not there has been any improvement in conditions at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. Up to the time I left there was not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated in your testimony that Japanese were running the camp. Do you mean by that that the white personnel are afraid to do anything in connection with administering the camp, that would be contrary to the wishes of the Japanese?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do the Japanese control the center through the internal community government set-up?

Mr. BEST. Yes. At the time I took the inventory at Heart Mountain, they had from six to seven hundred pounds of lard in each kitchen and a few days after I finished the inventory I took Mr. Haller's place in the office and while I was in the office we had a shipment come in of 42 barrels—steel drums which would weigh about 300 pounds each, arrive and we had no place to put them, so I was instructed to send them to the kitchens.

On top of what they already had we had to send them another 300 pounds.

I called on every kitchen every day and the Japanese were making a lot of doughnuts. They would melt a large vat of lard, use it once and throw it away. There was absolutely no grease being saved except a little that the Boy Scouts gathered and sold locally.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they have adequate storage facilities at Heart Mountain to store material and subsistence?

Mr. BEST. For a reasonable amount they had plenty of store room, but they had such an unreasonable amount the store rooms were full.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did they have as much storage space at Heart Mountain as they have at Poston?

Mr. BEST. About as much as they have at Poston; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they have any secret pantries in the mess halls at Poston?

Mr. BEST. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions I have of Mr. Best at this time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. At the time you left were the Judo clubs still in operation?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How many kitchens were there at Heart Mountain?

Mr. BEST. Forty-two, including the hospital.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When you made your first inventory, how many of the 42 kitchens would you say had a surplus of food?

Mr. BEST. Every one of them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A surplus in each one of the kitchens?

Mr. BEST. That is right. There were 6 that didn't have anything hidden in the attic out of the 42.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is what I wanted to find out. There were only six that did not have goods hidden in the attic?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then that would be 36 instances out of 42 where goods were hidden?

Mr. BEST. That is right, sir. In the kitchen they had 480 pounds of ham hidden in the attic and it had hung there so long—the Caucasian butcher was with me helping me that day, and he examined it and he declared 280 pounds unfit for human consumption. It had hung there so long in the attic—it was directly above the stoves where it was very, very hot and they no doubt threw it away.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Threw it in the garbage?

Mr. BEST. I imagine they did. I didn't hear any more about it. At one time they were ordered to dump 42 barrels of herring. They claimed the herring was bad and they brought it down to the office and the butcher, Mr. Van Buskirk, Mr. Haller, and myself examined it and we could see nothing at all wrong with it. It was very good but

the Japs didn't like herring and they already had more than they knew what to do with, so Haller instructed them, if they didn't like it, to throw it away; that he couldn't send it back, but he could have sent it back if it was bad. He should have had a health inspector condemn it—some officer in charge and it should have been returned to the quartermaster and we should have gotten credit for it.

I advised Mr. Haller of that and he said: "No, that is too much work; let them dump it, and it is all charged up in their 45 cents."

Mr. EBERHARTER. He said, "It is too much work?"

Mr. BEST. Yes; he said: "We will just dump it, because," he said, "after all, it is charged up to them." To the Japs.

There was also a truckload taken out of the hospital of spoiled goods. Mr. Van Buskirk, he is the camp butcher—when I inventoried the hospital, in their warehouse they had \$12,000 worth of strained vegetable juices for babies; they had between \$800 and \$900 worth of zwiebach. The Japs couldn't make their own toast so they bought them zwiebach.

In the kitchen there were eight lugs of sweetpotatoes that were starting to spoil; there was also eight large sacks of turnips which were spoiling.

I instructed the chef to use this up right away because it was spoiling and he was quite sarcastic with me. He told me to mind my own business—that that was his business and he would look after it.

I called back there 8 days later and it was still piled up there and not in use and then it was beyond use. I loaded it into trucks—Van Buskirk helped me and we took it down and showed it to Haller and he said: "Well, it is all charged up in their 45 cents—take it out and dump it and forget about it."

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. Is it your belief that in order to arrive at this so-called 45 cents per day per Jap that they deliberately padded the census roll there in order to increase the amount?

Mr. BEST. That is my belief. That is what they tried to do—what the Japanese tried to do with me at Poston before I went to Heart Mountain.

I put a chart into each kitchen and asked them to count the amount of people that ate at each meal and they had a chart there for 1 week. At the end of the week when I totalled that up I found I had a couple of thousand people too many in the camp. They were padding it up in each kitchen so as to get more supplies.

Mr. MUNDT. And that was at Poston?

Mr. BEST. Yes, sir; so that system didn't work at Heart Mountain. The Japanese do all the bookkeeping, and when Mr. Haller wants to know what his food costs he goes to the Japanese and they tell him.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words they compile the statistics from which they tell us whether the rations cost 45 cents or 35 cents?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you report the conditions that you found in these kitchens—that is, that there were concealed and secret pantries, to the project director?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. What did he reply?

Mr. BEST. He didn't take any action, to my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. Nothing was done to correct it?



Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. And that is Mr. Robertson?

Mr. BEST. That is right; also to Mr. Lane, the transportation officer, and Mr. Todd and Mr. Haller on many occasions.

Mr. MUNDT. As an old soldier you did not want to continue working with that kind of outfit and you resigned?

Mr. BEST. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Best, for appearing before the committee today and giving us the testimony which you have.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will take a 5-minute recess.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order and you may proceed with your next witness, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am recalling Mr. Cavett in order that he may complete his testimony.

### TESTIMONY OF THOMAS CAVETT—Resumed

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Cavett, exhibit 20 is copies of the Manzanar Free Press immediately preceding and after the December incident, which contains a story concerning the riots and strike which they had at Manzanar in December of 1942.

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to introduce this into the record as exhibit 20.

Mr. COSTELLO. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 20", and made a part of the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Those are copies of papers published at the camp at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; they are probably printed in the town adjacent thereto.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it is the official newspaper of the center?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; and one of them contains an article about the attempt to burn down the community store within the camp itself.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the date of that article?

Mr. CAVETT. November 30, 1942.

Mr. COSTELLO. Briefly, what is the story of that attempted burning?

Mr. CAVETT (reading):

Attempted arson foiled as store blaze quenched.

With all evidences pointing to an incendiary origin, a fire at the general store Friday evening at 9:20 was discovered in the nick of time by Y. Tanabe, who extinguished it before it could gain any damaging headway.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Next is a document containing a list of evacuees leaving Manzanar center on May 11th for employment by the Amalgamated Sugar Co., and I would like to introduce this into the record as exhibit 21.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the origin of the list?

Mr. STEEDMAN. We identified all these exhibits as having come from the Manzanar project and having been furnished to Mr. Cavett by Mr. Merritt.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is a part of the material Mr. Cavett received from the officials at Manzanar?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. This will be received as exhibit 21.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 21," and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Cavett, do you recall the incident at Manzanar on December 6, 1942, during the riot, when Japanese-American Boy Scouts protected the United States flag?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And those Japanese-American Boy Scouts were members of the center at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, exhibit 22 is a list of those Boy Scouts who protected our flag at Manzanar during the course of the riot and I would like to introduce the names of those boys into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 22" and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, exhibit No. 23 is a summary of statistical reports of hospital for the month of April 1943, including births, deaths, admissions, discharges, communicable diseases, daily in-patients, surgery, and the various clinics for the month of April 1943; and I would like to introduce this into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be so ordered.

**(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 23" and made a part of the record.)**

Mr. STEEDMAN. When you conferred with Mr. Merritt, the project director, was the conversation with Mr. Merritt taken down in shorthand by one of the stenographers employed at the War Relocation project at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And is this document which I am now holding in my hand the original transcript of the notes taken down at that meeting?

Mr. CAVETT. It is.

Mr. STEEDMAN. This document has been marked "Committee Exhibit 25" for identification only. We do not wish this exhibit to be included in the record, but Mr. Cavett desires to testify from the exhibit.

Did you ask Mr. Merritt if the evacuees were segregated as to good and bad Japanese?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What did he say?

Mr. CAVETT. His answer is on page 3:

The segregation of the different groups was attempted and carried through immediately following our riot. At that time, within 2 weeks after my arrival, the "bad ones" were taken to Moab, Utah. There were 16 at that time and since then 10 more have gone to Moab.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Moab is a small, isolated camp out from Manzanar where they are trying to segregate bad Japanese from the good ones; is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; it is some place out there. It is not right in the camp.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is an isolation camp?

Mr. CAVETT. An isolation camp; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Merritt say how many Japanese were in the isolation camp?

Mr. CAVETT. No. He didn't know how many were actually in there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But he said he had sent 16?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; he sent 16 in one bunch.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is for internment under the direction of the Army?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Merritt if the Japanese were organized into groups with special names?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; and his reply was as follows:

No, apparently not. We have had three classes of Japanese: Issei, Nisei, and Kibei. An Issei is a person born in Japan; a Nisei is a person born in the United States and who has not been to Japan for the purpose of securing an education or staying for any length of time; a Kibei is a person born in the United States who has returned to Japan for education, spending 3 years or more there during his formative years. A very few of each of these groups have been the troublemaking type, but on the whole the Kibei furnished the largest number of our troublemakers. We have been making a very careful and thorough investigation of the Kibei group in this center in the past month. We have personally questioned 503 Kibei to get their complete story down in typewritten form. These men were born in this country but educated in Japan.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Merritt regarding a Japanese by the name of Carl Yoneda?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. I asked him regarding Carl Yoneda and his answer was as follows—I will start in with my question:

Have you a Japanese man here by the name of Carl Yoneda, married to a woman by the name of Elaine Black, said to be a Jewess.

Mr. Merritt started to check up on this and then found the man in question was Carl Yoneda, and Mr. Merritt stated as follows—then he brought out in the meantime his personnel record which he had and said:

He was a waterfront worker in San Francisco and the right-hand man of Harry Bridges; his wife was a member of the Communist Party and an officer of some Communist organization; that Yoneda is in the military language school at Savage, Minn.

I asked him if his wife was with him and he said:

No, his wife and the boy are on the coast.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact Carl Yoneda ran for public office on the Communist Party ticket a number of times, didn't he?

Mr. CAVETT. I think we have his history here. I think his background is that he is a Communist, both he and his wife.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he is now in a military language school?

Mr. CAVETT. A military language school at Savage, Minn. They are going to make an intelligence officer out of him.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean this Japanese that used to be a Communist organizer is now being educated by the Government at the Savage, Minn., school, for intelligence purposes?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. And you know he is a Communist?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; we have his record.

Mr. COSTELLO. He is not there just to teach the Japanese language or something of that sort?

Mr. CAVETT. I don't know. According to Mr. Merritt, he is a member of the armed forces now. His answer was:

Yes; he is in the military language school at Savage, Minn.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, we have testimony to the effect they were recruiting Japanese Americans who speak the Japanese language at Poston, to go to this school.

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. I thought the F. B. I. was supposed to investigate those who go to Savage.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please read into the record Mr. Merritt's comment with reference to the rewards granted and the penalties imposed on Japanese at the Manzanar center?

Mr. CAVETT (reading):

We have no system of rewards and penalties. The penalties are only for those infractions of the laws of this center. We have two types of law: The law of the State of California, and our center rules. One man was recently charged with disturbing the peace. The case was taken next morning before the local justice of the peace and prosecuted by the district attorney of this county. The man is now in the Independence County jail. He is the only man in jail for any reason. In addition, we have our center rules pertaining to traffic and so forth.

Question. The penalties, then, are practically nonexistent?

Answer. Yes, except as they would be imposed on any citizen in normal life.

Question. What are the restrictions placed on the residents here?

Answer. They must remain in the boundaries of the center. Picnics are allowed within the area.

Question. Where do they go for picnics, and how far?

Answer. Just to the local creeks, which is a distance of about 2 miles. The boundaries of the center are posted with General De Witt's orders.

Question. Then the immediate area is the fenced area, and the picnic area is outside the fenced area?

Answer. That is correct. The picnic area is outside the center but inside the boundaries of the Manzanar posted area.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you take up with Mr. Merritt the question as to whether or not there were any cameras in the center at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir. And I will read from this transcript:

Question. Have there been any firearms in the baggage or explosives?

Answer. No.

Question. Knives or swords?

Answer. Some knives such as used in a kitchen, and various tools, but no swords.

Question. Contraband that has been taken from the Japanese baggage when shipped in, is now on the grounds in a warehouse?

Answer. Yes; it is in the custody of our military police force. Certain items are released to the evacuees on relocation.

Question. All cameras were to have been taken up before the Japanese came here?

Answer. Some were taken from personal belongings.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words, some Japanese arrived at the Manzanar center with cameras in their personal belongings?

Mr. CAVETT. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But they were searched and the cameras were taken away from them?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Merritt regarding the censoring of mail at Manzanar?



Mr. CAVETT. Yes. He was questioned regarding the censoring of mail. This question was asked:

Do you know whether or not the mail was censored there?

Answer. The mail was not censored and no packages coming in or out were censored at any of the camps, and Manzanar is no exception. They can ship in anything at all—in or out.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Merritt about Japanese having radios at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. All Japanese have radios that want them at Manzanar. They are not outlawed. They do not have short-wave sets but they have the regular sets.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you please read into the record what Mr. Merritt had to say about the riot that occurred at Manzanar on December 6? If the committee has no objection, I will read that into the record for Mr. Cavett.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STEEDMAN (reading):

Our incident of December 6 was caused primarily by the fact that various groups here were dissatisfied and mad about various things that had occurred even much before evacuation. They brought their political griefs and intrigues from Los Angeles. They brought all of the disappointments of evacuation, and there were many groups here who believed the Government had given various promises which had not been kept since coming to Manzanar.

These people were brought together in a dissatisfied mob because of the fact that on the 3d and 4th of December Federal Bureau of Investigation agents came into Manzanar and questioned the pro-American group about the activities of other Japanese in the center and based upon the information received from these pro-American Japanese the Federal Bureau of Investigation took out of Manzanar four men who had been charged by the pro-American group as being pro-Japanese.

Their friends and families immediately charged the pro-American group as being stool pigeons. Many people in the center tried to stop the stool pigeons by beating up on these people.

On December 4 Fred Tayama was beaten up. It was then my job to find the people responsible for beating up Tayama and several men were arrested. The men who were arrested were considered by the camp as heroes, because they were believed to be ending the stool pigeon activities of the pro-American group.

Then the question was asked:

What is the definition of a stool pigeon?

Answer. Any man who tells on anyone else. The Japanese are very much against informers. The informer is known as a dog, and is the worst type of man.

Question. Would the term "informer" be applied to loyal Japanese who might inform or report disloyal activities of disloyal Japanese?

Answer. As they see it, any man who informs on any other man for any purpose is an informer. In this case it was a case of American and anti-American. The agitating members of the center were able to bring together all of the discontented people into a crowd under the guise of using the opportunity to rid the camp of informers.

Question. Were clubs used?

Answer. Yes; in beating Tayama.

Question. What happened then?

Answer. On the night of December 4, Tayama was beaten up and almost killed. I immediately arrested one man and held others on suspicion. Harry Ueno was the man arrested.

Question. Was he a Los Angeles man?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Was he Kibei?

Answer. Yes. Ueno was held in the Independence jail.

At noon on the 6th of December the entire center sat in a mass meeting to protest the arrest of Ueno as they thought he was doing good for the center.

During the afternoon and early evening of December 6 this crowd got completely out of hand of the leaders who called it together so that it was necessary for me to call upon the military police to disperse the crowd.

The wind was against us for the use of tear gas. Firing began right after dark on the part of two of the military police. After 10 men were shot down, the captain gave orders for firing to cease. The crowd was dispersed and the camp remained in a sullen mood for about 10 days.

From this we have worked out a workable system of handling the center. Since that time the Federal Bureau of Investigation have made their contacts through my office and they do not use their former stool-pigeon methods. The Japanese are being assured of this and have cooperated to the fullest extent during the past month in collecting the information so desired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I have records of this information.

Question. Was there a Japanese flag put up on a mast during the trouble?

Answer. No flag was hoisted. That is always reported as happening at the other centers. In fact, we had a group of Japanese Boy Scouts who voluntarily stood around our flag to defend it against anyone who might try to tear it down.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, that is the account of the trouble at Manzanar on December 6, which was just prior to the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, as recounted by Mr. Merritt, who was the project director at Manzanar.

I would like to call your attention to the similarity of this riot or strike with the riot or strike at Poston at about the same time.

Mr. COSTELLO. They apparently started out on a similar basis; namely, holding one or two Japanese as prisoners and then a demand on the part of the other Japanese in the camp for their release?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is correct, sir. Was there a branch of the Kendo or Judo at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. I asked Mr. Merritt: "Is there any branch of Kendo or Judo here," and he stated: "We have a Japanese fencing group and a Japanese Judo group."

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you question Mr. Merritt regarding the various religious groups at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir [reading]:

To clear up this point what is the basic spiritual or religious belief here?

Answer. Approximately half of the members of our center are Buddhists.

Question. Any particular sect?

Answer. No. We have a Buddhist Church for all Buddhists. We have not allowed the development of any particular sect.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were there any Shintoists at the Manzanar center or a Shinto Church?

Mr. CAVETT. No Shintoists there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As a matter of fact didn't Mr. Merritt later find that Goichi Ishimaru, who was a known member of the Shintoist Church, or a priest in the Shintoist Church in Los Angeles, was at the Manzanar relocation center?

Mr. CAVETT. He stated they had no known Shintoists in the center but that it was later found that Goichi Ishimaru was listed as a Shintoist. He stated Goichi Ishimaru had no family and had applied for repatriation.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cavett asked Mr. Merritt regarding the internal set-up of the camp at Manzanar and I would like to quote from the statement with reference to the internal set-up and I do quote:

Question. What do you call the organizations most prominent in the center?

Answer. The organizations which function in this center are local to the center.

For administrative purposes we have an advisory council consisting of an elected representative from each of the four blocks. There are nine members.

Each block has a block manager elected by the people of the block. The block managers are in effect hotel keepers who see that the people of the block have use of the utilities and sanitary facilities.

The block managers meet once a week to bring in the thoughts and ideas of the block and I meet with the block managers every Friday morning to discuss these problems.

In addition we have many social organizations in the center which have to do with such things as Mr. Kondo's public affairs group meeting once a week in which he interprets current events. There is a music club and there are other additional recreational and social groups.

Question. How many organizations would you say there are here?

Answer. As Mrs. Adams says, approximately 30 educational groups and 25 social groups. Alumni groups, Y. M., Y. W., reading clubs, young Buddhists and religious groups.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Merritt how much territory there was in the confines of the Manzanar center?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, and his answer was:

Answer. Our total area is 6,000 acres. It is leased by the Army from the city of Los Angeles.

Question. What are the dimensions?

Answer. Approximately 2 miles wide and about 5 miles long.

Question. Is this fenced in?

Answer. One square mile where the people are confined is fenced in.

Question. With what?

Answer. Barbed wire fence approximately 5 feet high.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you ask Mr. Merritt how far the aqueduct was from the relocation center at Manzanar?

Mr. CAVETT. I ask Mr. Merritt that question and he said:

The nearest ditch is approximately 1 mile east of here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that aqueduct is the aqueduct which brings water to the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; the main line.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that the main water supply for the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; that is the main supply. The city line comes down from there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Part from the Inyo-Mono Basin and the other supply comes from the Colorado River.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I want to ascertain if this aqueduct furnishes a considerable portion of the water supply for the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the mayor testified that the Owens River Aqueduct provides water for facilities for one and a half million people.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Cavett, you visited all of the relocation centers with the exception of the ones in Arkansas and Tule Lake; is that correct?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask you an abstract question regarding the camps: Which center would you say is the worst?

Mr. CAVETT. The worst is a toss up between Rivers and Heart Mountain. Rivers is especially noted for its subversive activities and Heart Mountain for strikes, lock-outs, sit-down strikes, and just general trouble of all natures.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. Which would you say is the best?

Mr. CAVETT. I think Poston and Manzanar are about as well handled as any of them. Poston is just as well handled as any of them—Poston and Manzanar.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe the conditions at some of these camps, so far as controlling Japanese subversive activities is concerned, that those conditions are worse at other camps?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes; especially the un-American activities at Rivers. It is awful. Something should be done immediately at Rivers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel that the un-American activities going at the Rivers camp exceeds all that we have heard here thus far regarding Poston?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes. In other words we haven't heard anything at all of un-American activities of any consequence compared to Rivers.

I have the statements of two Japanese taken down in shorthand. Both of these men were World War veterans and they said they could stand it themselves and did not expect to come out of the camp alive on account of the activities that they were pursuing in opposing these disloyal Japanese, but they think the Government should step in and take out the disloyal Japanese for the protection of, at least, the children, because all the work that has been done in the past toward Americanization of the Japanese, he said, was just a case of every day how many less you can salvage.

The statements of these two men are in the record.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask you one additional question: Did you ask Mr. Merritt whether or not he thought the Army should be put in charge of the relocation centers?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes, sir; I asked him that question.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you read the question you asked him?

Mr. CAVETT. The question I put to him was:

Do you think from your experience that the center should be under the present set-up or under a strict military set-up? What is your opinion on this?

His answer was:

That is a matter for the War Department or the War Relocation Authority to determine.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all he said in reply to your question?

Mr. CAVETT. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. He did not, as the project director under the W. R. A., recommend that the W. R. A. continue to control the center?

Mr. CAVETT. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. MUNDT. That is an eloquent statement by its silence.

Mr. CAVETT. I will add that in some of the other statements officials came out and stated their opinions definitely, and those statements are in the transcript.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all the questions I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. That concludes the session for this afternoon.

The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 6 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m., Thursday, June 17, 1943.)



# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Los Angeles, Calif.*

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., in room 1543, United States Post Office and Courthouse, Los Angeles, Calif. Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, and Hon. Karl E. Mundt.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order, and Mr. Steedman, you may call the first witness.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the first witness this morning is Gen. Thoburn K. Brown, commanding the southern land frontier sector.

Mr. COSTELLO. General Brown, in view of the fact you are an officer of the United States Army, it is not necessary to swear you in for any testimony you give before the committee.

## TESTIMONY OF GENERAL THOBURN K. BROWN, UNITED STATES ARMY, COMMANDING THE SOUTHERN LAND FRONTIER SECTOR

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason we have asked you to appear before the committee this morning, is that in the course of our testimony that has been taken during the past week, we had various representatives here from the State of Arizona.

They testified many strategic installations in and around the city of Phoenix, Ariz., are not adequately protected and guarded. The committee felt it would be proper for it to inquire into that situation and see whether something should not be done to make sure there is no possibility of sabotage to any important, strategic installations of that character.

Particular reference was made to the water system that has been developed to irrigate the Gila River project, adjacent to Phoenix.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, you might add for the general's information, the mayor of Los Angeles was in and gave somewhat similar testimony concerning the water system and reservoirs around the camp at Manzanar.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, the installations adjacent to Manzanar are definitely not under General Brown's jurisdiction, but the mayor

of Los Angeles did indicate that the same conditions relate to the Japanese relocation center at Manzanar as well as in Arizona.

The country adjacent to Manzanar, of course, is the principal source of water supply for the city of Los Angeles and for the area adjacent thereto.

Might I ask, General, whether the reservoirs adjacent to Phoenix, Ariz., particularly Roosevelt, Coolidge Dam, and Mormon Flat and the other dams there, are under your jurisdiction?

General BROWN. No, sir; they are not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your jurisdiction does not extend that far north from the border?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. You, therefore, would not have any control of the matter of assigning guards to such an installation?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. I wonder if you might inform the committee as to who would be the proper officer to contact regarding such installations and what procedure is normally followed by the Army in obtaining additional guards for strategic installations of that character?

General BROWN. Those two dams are in the territorial jurisdiction of the Ninth Service Command, commanded by General Joyce.

Mr. COSTELLO. And his headquarters are where?

General BROWN. Fort Douglas, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you give us General Joyce's first name?

General BROWN. Gen. Kenyon A. Joyce.

Normally State utility installations, and also those of private companies receive military guard or make application for military guard to the commanding general and then it becomes a decision for him to make, considering the employment of troops and the number he has on hand and so on.

The policy that we are guided by, generally, is this: That normally cities, States, and private corporations furnish their own guards but in exceptional cases where the installations are of vital importance to the war effort a commander is justified in placing sufficient guards to safeguard these installations.

Mr. COSTELLO. Such a decision, General, as to whether guards should or should not be placed, of course, depends upon the decision of the commanding officer of that area?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And also depends on the personnel he might have available for such purposes?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. We recognize the fact that the Army cannot keep a tremendous army at home if we want to fight a war all around the world.

General BROWN. I think that is the policy.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as this installation is concerned, it would be proper for the Governor of Arizona to request a military guard, if he thought that were necessary?

General BROWN. That is the procedure.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you, of course, do not know whether such a request might have been made or not?

General BROWN. No, I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or what the conditions might be as to the availability of troops for such a purpose?

General BROWN. No. I do know that the troops available to General Joyce for such missions are rather limited.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Ninth Service Command covers quite a large area, does it not?

General BROWN. Yes; it does.

Mr. COSTELLO. In fact, several States would be included in that area?

General BROWN. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Therefore, in that area there would be a tremendous number of strategic installations that might require protection of this character?

General BROWN. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. General Brown, would you care to indicate, or inform the committee whether or not the territory under your jurisdiction has received guards from your command for the protection of both public and private properties?

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Of course, you understand your testimony here may be published?

General BROWN. Yes, sir. I have the copper smelters and mines in Arizona. We consider them very important to the war effort and I have placed guards on the Douglas Smelter and other works.

Mr. COSTELLO. General, I might state it isn't necessary to specify particular installations if you desire not to do so.

General BROWN. I have assisted both private corporations and States and cities also.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You have assisted them?

General BROWN. I have.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel, General, the strategic installations adjacent to the border are adequately protected against possible sabotage or damage that might occur to them?

General BROWN. I think so.

Mr. MUNDT. General Brown, inasmuch as you have placed some guards and troops at the copper smelters, I presume that you feel that the power which feeds the electric lines into the smelters and mines is of rather vital significance to our war effort?

General BROWN. It certainly is.

Mr. MUNDT. And that power comes from some of these reservoirs about which we have been discussing, is that not right?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. And those power plants and reservoirs are in the area commanded by General Joyce?

General BROWN. Yes; the dams themselves.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask this question: The committee plans to transmit to the Governors of Arizona and California a transcript of the hearing had this morning and a transcript of the hearing at which time representatives from Arizona testified about the alleged danger to their dams, and the testimony which the mayor of Los Angeles gave us detailing the circumstances at Manzanar.

If we transmit transcripts of those hearings, together with your testimony to those two executives, are we following the correct procedure?

General BROWN. Yes; I would think so.

Mr. MUNDT. And we are following the correct procedure in calling the attention of the proper authorities to the dangers or alleged dangers in those areas?

General BROWN. Yes; I think so.

Mr. MUNDT. And we need do nothing further in that connection?

General BROWN. I think if their attention is called to that, that that should be sufficient.

Mr. MUNDT. If the Governors, after reading the transcript of these hearings share the alarm which we feel on the committee, they should then contact General Joyce directly and work out a joint defense system among themselves?

General BROWN. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much, General Brown, your making yourself available to the committee this morning and coming here to give us this information.

We felt the situation as indicated by the testimony calls for some action on the part of this committee to make sure that nothing is left unattended that should be done, in order to protect these installations.

We want to thank you for your testimony here this morning and being present with us.

Mr. MUNDT. I might add, General, for your information that this committee is going to do all it can to keep the Japanese who may be disloyal from having access to these strategic installations, but we thought we should go the second mile and make this information also available to the military authorities.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, General.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the next witness is Mr. A. L. Wirin, who appears before the committee on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you stand and be sworn, Mr. Wirin?

#### TESTIMONY OF A. L. WIRIN, ATTORNEY, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA BRANCH

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name?

Mr. WIRIN. My name is A. L. Wirin.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what is your address?

Mr. WIRIN. 257 South Spring Street, Los Angeles.

I am an attorney and am attorney for the southern California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Other representatives of the Civil Liberties Union are here. I would like to state their names for the record:

Rev. E. P. Ryland, who is chairman of the southern California committee, and these gentlemen live in Los Angeles,

Mr. Jerome W. MacNair, who is a businessman in Los Angeles and a member of the executive board of the southern California



committee of the Civil Liberties Union, and Rev. Clinton J. Taft, who is the director of the southern California committee.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would like to ask a few preliminary questions.

Mr. WIRIN. By all means.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. WIRIN. 257 South Spring Street, Los Angeles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And are you married?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you born?

Mr. WIRIN. I was born in Russia.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. WIRIN. 1900.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. WIRIN. 1908.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where were you naturalized?

Mr. WIRIN. I was not naturalized. My father was naturalized and I am a citizen by virtue of his naturalization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what is your father's name?

Mr. WIRIN. Baranett Wirin.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where was he naturalized?

Mr. WIRIN. Boston, Mass.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. WIRIN. In 1916 or 1917. I am not certain of the date.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where did you attend school?

Mr. WIRIN. I attended and graduated Harvard College in 1921. got my law training at Boston University Law School.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When did you graduate from the Boston University Law School?

Mr. WIRIN. I didn't graduate, Boston University Law School, but I completed my work there about 1927.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You are admitted to the bar in California?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When were you admitted to the local board?

Mr. WIRIN. Some 15 years ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you a member of any other bar?

Mr. WIRIN. I am a member of the Massachusetts bar and of the Oregon bar and of the Supreme Court of the United States bar.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What organizations are you a member of in addition to the American Civil Liberties Union?

Mr. WIRIN. So far as I know I am not a member of any other organization as a member. I am special counsel for the Japanese American Citizens League, and I have been requested by that organization to appear here and make a short statement about its purposes and activities.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have a statement from the J. A. C. L. to that effect?

Mr. WIRIN. I do not have a formal statement from them, but I represent the Japanese American Citizens League in the case of Regan against King, involving the question of citizenship of American-born Japanese.

My name appears on the brief in that case and I represented publicly that organization.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the Japanese American Citizens League has requested you to speak for them today?

Mr. WIRIN. They have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Would you mind indicating who is the president of the Japanese American Citizens League at the present time?

Mr. WIRIN. The president is Mr. Saburo Kido. He is now at Salt Lake City, Utah, the headquarters of the league. He was formerly a resident of California for some 15 or 20 years, practicing law in San Francisco as a member of the California bar.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you ever been employed in the United States Government service?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When?

Mr. WIRIN. From 1935 to 1937, approximately.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And in what agency?

Mr. WIRIN. I was senior office attorney for the National Labor Relations Board.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In Washington, D. C.?

Mr. WIRIN. In Washington, D. C.; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you have been practicing law in California and Los Angeles since 1937?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What law firm are you a member of?

Mr. WIRIN. I am not now a member of any law firm. I am practicing law alone. I have an assistant, too, but he is now in the United States Army.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is his name?

Mr. WIRIN. Fred Okrand.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were you ever a member of the law firm of Gallagher, Wirin & Johnson?

Mr. WIRIN. I was.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long were you a member of that firm, Mr. Wirin?

Mr. WIRIN. About 4 years. That firm primarily did work for labor unions and more particularly for the C. I. O. organization in California. But at the same time as a member of the firm I did considerable work formerly, as I am doing now, for the Civil Liberties Union.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did that law firm also represent the Communist Party in the State of California?

Mr. WIRIN. I don't think the law firm ever represented the Communist Party. I appeared for the Civil Liberties Union in connection with the rights of the Communist Party to appear upon the ballot of California and the Supreme Court upheld our position in that respect.

Mr. Gallagher, I think—I know, at times has represented the Communist Party.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he is the senior or was the senior member of the firm of Gallagher, Wirin & Johnson?

Mr. WIRIN. I think he might be called that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And Mr. Gallagher ran for attorney general in the State of California in 1938 on the Communist Party ticket; is that correct?

Mr. WIRIN. I think he ran for secretary of state.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In 1938?

Mr. WIRIN. I am not sure as to the date.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Either 1936 or '38?

Mr. WIRIN. I am not certain of the date. However, I have never been a member of the Communist Party nor am I now. My sole interest in the Communist Party has been its rights under the Constitution.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am glad to have that statement.

Mr. WIRIN. I have friends among the Communists and I hope I have friends among all other groups.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many Japanese clients do you have at the present time, Mr. Wirin?

Mr. WIRIN. I have no Japanese clients except the Japanese American Citizens League, for whom I am acting as special counsel. I became interested in the Japanese American Citizens League and became its counsel subsequent to the evacuation. My contacts with the Japanese prior to the evacuation were nil. I had no interest in the Japanese as a group prior to the evacuation.

My present interest in the group is solely because of the rights which I believe it has under the Constitution as a minority racial group.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you represented any Japanese clients other than the client that you indicated in your testimony just a few minutes ago?

Mr. WIRTH. In the testimony I gave a few minutes ago, if you are referring to the case of Regan against King, I represented no Japanese client except in the case of the Japanese American Citizens League, in which I secured leave of the circuit court to appear as a friend of the court and I appeared before the circuit court in that capacity.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At the present time you have no clients of Japanese extraction whatsoever?

Mr. WIRIN. None at all. I did appear for the Civil Liberties Union as friend of the court in a case in Los Angeles in the superior court, and then the district court of appeals, known as Brown against Oshuro, involving the rights of a Japanese lessee of a hotel, as to whether or not the Japanese lessee continued to be liable on the contract in view of the evacuation.

I appeared wholly as a friend of the court and the district court of appeals agreed with our position.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. Wirin has a formal statement he would like to make to the committee; and you are at liberty to make that statement at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. We are very glad to hear the statement which you are about to give. As we understand it is in connection with the Civil Liberties Union?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes, sir; and I would like to make an additional statement with respect to the Japanese American Citizens League.

Mr. STEEDMAN. It might be appropriate at this time to insert into the record a letter on the letterhead of the American Civil Liberties Union, dated June 16, 1943, addressed to the committee, 1405 Federal Building, Los Angeles, Calif.

Gentlemen, this will authorize Attorney A. L. Wirin to appear before your committee on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, southern California branch, and give such information as he may have concerning the Japanese who have been evacuated from the coastal areas.

Sincerely yours,

CLINTON J. TAFT, *Director*.

I would like to offer the letter in evidence and suggest it be inserted in the record at this point.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection it will be inserted in the record.

I might state at this point, Mr. Wirin, that you are appearing here at your own request and the reason why the committee has requested the letter of this character is so that the committee might know whoever is appearing here is appearing as the official spokesman of whatever organization he proposed to speak for.

Other witnesses who appear at our request do not furnish us with that background, but since you requested an appearance before the committee on behalf of the organization you represent, we asked for that background.

You may proceed.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you designate clearly the point at which you cease to speak for the Civil Liberties Union and start with the other?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes. Let me state that I and the committee for whom I am spokesman, appreciate your consideration in allowing us to appear and present our views.

I do not have a formal statement but I shall make a statement and it will be very brief, and if you desire to ask questions, I shall be glad to answer them.

First, I want to speak very briefly as to our position, the Civil Liberties Union, with respect to the matter of citizenship for American-born Japanese.

We believe that citizenship should not be or may not be under the Constitution, based upon race or ancestry, but that all persons irrespective of race or ancestry, should be entitled to citizenship on the same basis without discrimination.

In that connection very briefly I want to call your attention to some litigation in which the Civil Liberties Union participated. I refer to the case of Regan against King, and perhaps I ought to give you the number of the case in the circuit court of appeals. It is No. 10299.

That was a proceeding filed by Mr. Regan, who, I think, is the secretary of the Native Sons of the Golden West—sponsored by them, in which the former attorney general of this State, Gen. U. S. Webb, represented Mr. Regan.

The defendant was Cameron King, the registrar of voters in the city and county of San Francisco.

It was a suit filed in the Federal Court in San Francisco, to secure cancellation to the rights of citizenship of persons of Japanese descent or persons born in the United States of Japanese descent. And while no Japanese was named as a defendant, the names of a hundred or more Japanese were included among the names that were to be stricken from the registry of voters in the city and county of San Francisco.

The district judge, Judge St. Sure, after a hearing, dismissed the suit and held that American-born persons of whatever race are entitled to citizenship under the fourteenth amendment.

An appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals. In the circuit court of appeals the Japanese American Citizens League appeared as a friend of the court and the American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Lawyers' Guild, each filing briefs and I was given permission to argue before the court, but the court sitting en banc, a seven judge court, after hearing the presentation of General Webb, without even adjourning from the bench, after a hurried conference,



announced there wasn't any case presented by General Webb and by Mr. Regan of the Native Sons of the Golden West, and summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court, dismissing the case.

A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by Mr. Regan to the Supreme Court of the United States. No opposition to the petition was prepared by anyone.

On May 17, 1943, in the case of Regan against King, bearing the Supreme Court No. 986 of the October term for 1942, the Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for writ of certiorari and that litigation is now terminated.

Generally the position of the Civil Liberties Union in that connection is in accord with the statement by the President of the United States, made on the occasion of the setting up a special combat unit in the United States Army consisting of citizens of Japanese ancestry, and I quote just one sentence from that statement as reflecting our view.

In a statement made by the President to the Secretary of War, under date of February 1, 1943, approving the setting up of opportunities for American citizens of Japanese ancestry to serve in the armed forces, the President said, among other things, and I quote:

The principle upon which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed, is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not and never was a matter of race or ancestry.

Now, I would like to move on, still speaking for the Civil Liberties Union, with respect to another problem involving Japanese with which the committee is interested, as I understand it.

The evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific coast, including the evacuation of some 70,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry, is, for the moment, a fait accompli—an accomplished fact, and I do not care to, unless the committee desires to question me about it, to go at all extensively into the propriety or constitutionality of that act.

I may state a word about it though and then I want to move on to what is more immediate, and that is, if you are interested in our position as to the return of the Japanese to the Pacific coast.

When the Tolan committee held hearings in Los Angeles, I appeared before it for the Southern California Committee of the Civil Liberties Union and stated our position that the evacuation of persons of a particular racial group, particularly without hearings, was a violation of the constitutional rights, and stated the Civil Liberties Union would participate in a challenge of any orders of evacuation.

This, of course, was prior to the entry of the military orders. Thereafter some cases challenging the orders were filed. More accurately criminal prosecutions were instituted against American citizens of Japanese ancestry for not complying with the military orders.

There are three such cases and I would like to call them to your attention so that your records may have the information.

One is the case of Gordon K. Hirabayashi; another is the case of Minoru Yasui.

Those cases are now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, bearing Nos. 780 and 871 of the current term, respectively.

In those cases the American Civil Liberties Union appeared as a friend of the Court by permission of the Court and so did the Japanese-American Citizens League.

The cases were argued and I participated in the oral argument on May 10 of this year—May 10 and 11, and a decision of the Court is awaited either before the Court adjourns this term or next fall.

Generally the position which we took was that orders of evacuation directed against a group, particularly a racial group and directed solely against a particular racial group, denied the equal protection of the laws to the members of that group, that is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

We took the additional position that such evacuation without attempting to discriminate between the loyal and disloyal by some kind of hearing, no matter how summary, was a violation of the due-process laws of the fourteenth amendment.

I don't care to dwell upon that more particularly because the matter is pending before the Supreme Court and we will know whether our views as to the constitutionality of the orders are sound or not in short order.

In a general way our position is this: We have no particular concern with the Japanese as such as I have indicated to you.

Mr. MUNDT. Didn't you say there were three cases?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes. The last case is known as Korematsu. The full name is Fred T. Korematsu against the United States. That is No. 912.

That case went to the Supreme Court on a procedural question, namely, in that case Korematsu was granted probation by a judge at San Francisco and the Government first took the position that the order upholding the constitutionality of the military orders, the order by the judge, and putting Korematsu on probation was not an appealable order.

That question was certified to the Supreme Court of the United States. I argued that case and on June 1, 1943, the Court agreed with us that that order was appealable.

That is all that case decided.

Mr. MUNDT. Are the three Japanese whom you just mentioned now in relocation centers?

Mr. WIRIN. No. Yasui, as I understand it, is in the county jail at Portland, Oreg. Yasui was a Portland attorney.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you tell us why he is in jail?

Mr. WIRIN. The judge refused to fix bail on an appeal. He was convicted and sentenced, I think, to 2 years and the judge refused to fix bail on appeal.

My information is not as of the moment; it is as of a couple of weeks ago. He may be out on bail now, but I have no information that he is.

Hirabayashi, my understanding is, has been released from the relocation center. He is a Quaker, as I understand it, and is doing some work for the Friends' Service Committee of the Quaker group.

Mr. MUNDT. And the third man?

Mr. WIRIN. I am not certain as to where Korematsu is. My impression is that he is not in a relocation center, but I have no direct information about that.

I have already told you that so far as I was concerned, and I think I speak for most of the members of our committee, we have no particular concern with the Japanese prior to the evacuation because there seemed to be no special abridgement of civil liberties of that

group as such prior to the evacuation which, at least, came to our attention and called for our action.

Our approach is that to treat a racial group discriminatorily and harshly is of consequence, not because of the injustice we mete out against the particular group, but because we establish a precedent that might be used against other minority groups.

We feel the treatment accorded these Japanese because these Japanese ancestors were born in Japan is the kind of treatment that may be accorded the Chinese, who are of the same general stock but are our allies, and against whom there was much prejudice on the Pacific coast in the former years. It might break out against Filipinos, as there was prejudice against them in California before the war.

Once the war is over it might suddenly affect the Negroes; and we are not too certain that the Jewish population may not also become a victim or subjects of special persecution and treatment once we allow special treatment, purely because of racial grounds, against any one group.

In other words I want to make this as clear as I can: We are not concerned with the Japanese, either alien or American citizens as such, at all. We are interested in the principle of the matter and the constitutionality of the matter as applying in a democratic community to other minority groups.

Now, briefly, our position with respect to the return of the Japanese, and I make this statement studiedly, and with an appreciation that the point of view we are taking is most certainly a dissenting or minority point of view in most California or Pacific coast communities.

Generally we feel that persons of Japanese descent or of the Japanese race should be treated the same as other persons are. And once again that the matter of race or the accident of birth, particularly the accident of birth of one's ancestors, should not be an important or determining factor. We say, therefore, that the Japanese, and certainly American citizens of Japanese ancestry, should be allowed to return to the Pacific coast and allowed to return immediately, with the following limitations:

That first there should be a sifting or determination between the loyal and disloyal. We feel that there are adequate facilities in the Department of Justice and particularly in the F. B. I. for a determination as to loyalty or disloyalty.

The Japanese loyalty or disloyalty, and I am speaking of Japanese American citizens, can be determined pretty much on the same standards as is determined the loyalty of any other racial stock. On the whole the F. B. I. had done that prior to the military evacuation orders.

We do not take the position, however, that the Japanese, those of Japanese descent, should necessarily be allowed, as it were, full freedom, in that they should be allowed to enter munition plants or airplane factories or even immediately upon the beaches of the Pacific coast. We agree that there are many places on the Pacific coast, as many places as elsewhere in the United States, which should be open to no lay person.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you permit the Japanese to work in the defense plants where you would permit any other American citizen or would you discriminate between them?

Mr. WIRIN. I will express my own opinion now since my committee has not given that question any consideration. Perhaps it should be I express my own views and the members of the committee if they differ with me may express their views.

Mr. MUNDT. We assume they assent unless they express themselves otherwise.

Mr. WIRIN. We think Japanese whose loyalty has been proved should be allowed to work in any defense plant the same as any other person.

Mr. MUNDT. And on the beaches the same thing would apply?

Mr. WIRIN. On the beaches we think probably no one should be allowed, or there might be a permit system invoked whereby only those having a military permit should be allowed. We hope that the permit system will not be used as a means of discrimination because of race.

Mr. MUNDT. You would not discriminate because of race among any civilians once they had been released?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes; and certainly once a person's loyalty has been, as it were, passed upon and approved; and of course, the Army takes that view in two respects:

In the first place there are, as I understand it, Japanese interpreters who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, who are recognized to be loyal and who not only are in the armed forces but because their loyalty is proven, given special privileges. And, secondly, if I may complete my statement, in setting up opportunities for American citizens of Japanese ancestry to join the armed forces, in setting up the Japanese American combat unit, the Army recognized that it can determine the loyalty of Japanese—that it can determine the loyal from the disloyal and invited the loyal to join the armed forces.

And in that connection I want to call your attention to a statement made by the War Department on February 1, 1943, in connection with the making of opportunities available to Japanese for service in the armed forces, and I quote:

Americans of Japanese blood are wanted to fight for the United States like any other citizens.

Continuing the quote:

They are wanted because the Government and the Army are convinced of their loyalty.

So, apparently, the Army after a good deal of consideration on the subject, can tell the loyal from the disloyal and want the Japanese to serve in the armed forces.

I may have occasion to refer to that——

Mr. COSTELLO. Returning to the matter of beaches: Do I understand you to feel no civilian should be allowed to go upon the beaches at all?

Mr. WIRIN. I feel that if the military determine as a matter of military necessity that civilians should not be allowed on the beaches, it should apply to all civilians irrespective of race.

Mr. COSTELLO. That has not been done here on the Pacific coast, has it? Civilians are allowed practically free use of the beaches at the present time.

Mr. WIRIN. I don't know about that but I think there are some areas, for instance, Terminal Island, that have been taken over by the Government.



Mr. COSTELLO. Of course that particular part of Terminal Island is now a part of the Roosevelt base and also a flying field, so there is no beach available to the public anymore. It is part of the military installation. But as I understand it, there have been no restrictions to civilians along the beaches at the present time unless it be after sundown. During the daytime there is no restrictions for military reasons against civilians using the beaches.

Is it your thought no Japanese should be allowed on the beaches if they are allowed to return to the Pacific coast?

Mr. WIRIN. My thought is a twofold one: It is that Japanese whose loyalty is proven should not be discriminated against because they are Japanese, but I take less broad position in that by saying if Japanese were returned here, I would not allow them to be actually on the beaches.

That kind of deprivation of civil rights would be nominal or inconsequential as compared to the evacuation of a group from a very large portion of the United States, or to continue to exclude them.

I don't, of course, necessarily take an absolutism position on that.

Mr. MUNDT. Why would you advocate such a discrimination against the Japanese?

Mr. WIRIN. I wouldn't, but I would look upon that discrimination as a better kind of treatment than we have accorded the Japanese up to now.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel it would be proper to prohibit Japanese the use of the beaches if they were allowed to return to the Pacific coast, and that that restriction might be a proper restriction for the military to make?

Mr. WIRIN. I would rather leave my own statement stand by saying I would consider it an improper treatment of the Japanese but not anywhere near as improper as the present treatment.

Mr. COSTELLO. Taking the statement as you put it now, it would seem to me what has happened then, in evacuating the Japanese from California there has been merely an enlargement of the area. In other words where you are going to consider a stretch of beach, say 50 feet wide to the high-water mark, or 300 feet or a 3-mile stretch, it seems to me the principle involved would be identical. If you eliminated them from the 50-foot stretch adjoining the water or a 100-foot stretch adjoining the water and you thought that were proper, and then why would an expansion of the area to a larger extent, still using the high-water mark as the guiding line, be proper? It would seem to me it would be identical. It would be only an enlargement of the area.

Mr. WIRIN. Sometimes a difference in degree becomes a difference in substance. Nominal violations of civil rights may have to be overlooked in a war but substantial violations, perhaps, should not be.

The extension of the position that you have stated, which I assume you stated as you are thinking it out, would mean if the entire United States were deemed by certain groups as sufficiently eminent to attack that Japanese should be excluded from the entire United States because of race, but there is a limitation beyond which you cannot go. It may very well be that in terms of fighting a war there may be some that may appear to be some justification for a minor abridgment of civil rights when there wouldn't be a justification for a more comprehensive one. I agree with you on the principle which I adhere to—

there should be no discrimination against the Japanese because of race anywhere.

Mr. COSTELLO. The evacuation order was limited to a definite area on the Pacific coast and it did not apply to Japanese generally in the United States.

In other words, throughout the vast majority of the United States wherever Japanese were, they were not removed from their homes, even on the eastern coast, and it happens that the majority of the Japanese were, of course, located on the Pacific coast. But there were still some 25,000 scattered throughout the country who were not disturbed, so at least to that extent the evacuation order complies with the principle laid down in that it does not cover the entire country. It was not a complete movement against the Japanese minority as such but limited purely to the area that was determined as critical and from which the Japanese were removed.

Mr. WIRIN. May I give you my reaction to that statement? We agree that the evacuation orders excluding Japanese from the Pacific coast are not as harmful to democratic principles as if the Japanese had been excluded from the entire United States. We concede that.

On the other hand we say the area which they excluded the Japanese from, representing the entire Pacific coast, is altogether too broad an area; but we wouldn't be so much concerned if we didn't have the feeling which we presented to the Supreme Court, that the military orders of evacuation were not based upon military necessity but were based upon and were the result of the activities of groups along the Pacific coast—some of them economic groups—some of these groups not immediately economic, who exploited prejudices of the community and engendered hysteria in the community against persons because of the color of their skins, and whose parents happened to have been born in Japan.

So, it is our considered view and it is the same view we presented to the Supreme Court, the decision to evacuate was not based on military necessity but was based on prejudice.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel the orders which General DeWitt issued were not a determination—were not based upon a determination made by the military and General DeWitt personally for strategic reasons but were the result from pressure of other groups outside the military?

Mr. WIRIN. We say that very definitely. In the 150 or more page brief filed by the Japanese Citizens League in these cases we tried to cite the facts. The statement made by General DeWitt before a subcommittee of the Congress investigating housing in San Francisco to the effect:

"A Jap is a Jap"—doesn't make any difference whether he is a citizen or not, seems to us to, of itself, constitute rather weighty evidence that General DeWitt became the victim of, or at least adhered to just sheer race prejudice which we feel has been a dominating factor on the coast.

Mr. COSTELLO. But that does not indicate he yielded to the pressure of outside groups in coming to his determination.

Mr. WIRIN. Well; we feel that that kind of a statement is a statement which expresses an attitude of racial prejudice.

Mr. COSTELLO. The thing I am trying to get at is whether any other group outside of the military, was able to bring sufficient in-

fluence to bear on the military authorities here to cause them to issue an order which the military felt was not necessary. That is the implication I get from the statement you have made and that is what I was wondering—if you had any indication of that.

Now, the fact that General DeWitt seems to have determined that a Jap is a Jap and being such could not be trusted, does not indicate any outside pressure on him, but that it may be a determination of his as to the racial background and history of the Japanese people as such, which might be racial prejudice or whatever you want to call it, but the thing I am interested in is the pressure by civilian groups upon the military to bring about this determination.

Mr. WIRIN. May I say in that connection that I shall be glad to file with your committee the briefs filed in the Supreme Court of the United States, in which I undertook in great detail to demonstrate the point I am discussing.

There were hearings by the Tolan committee, as I have indicated, and there was evidence before that committee of the functioning of these anti-Japanese groups, and we feel that we are able to demonstrate by the facts in the record before the Tolan committee and other facts in the official record, that the dominant factor in determining evacuation was not one of military necessity generally arrived at by the military, but was the result of these pressure groups. And let me supplement that by this:

There were on the Pacific coast a Japanese population of approximately 1 percent of the entire population prior to the evacuation. In the Hawaiian Islands the Japanese consist of approximately one-third of the population. The entire Japanese population was evacuated from the Pacific coast on the ground of claimed military danger.

I suppose it is generally conceded that the Hawaiian Islands have been—certainly were at one time, in more grave military danger than the Pacific coast, but no order of evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry was ever made in the Hawaiian Islands, where the population is greater and the danger is greater; and the reason for it, it seems to me, is reflected by the position taken by the then commanding general, General Emonsoy, of the Hawaiian Islands, who was not a victim, we believe, of race prejudice against the Japanese and who, when the opportunity for service by Japanese in the armed forces was made, made this statement as commanding general of the Hawaiian Islands:

All people of the Hawaiian Islands have contributed generously to our war effort. Among these have been Americans of Japanese descent.

That is where Pearl Harbor took place, where the attack took place.

He went on to talk about the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands——

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he discuss the Japanese in the Philippine Islands?

Mr. WIRIN. He did not discuss that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There has never been an invasion of the Hawaiian Islands, has there?

Mr. WIRIN. The Government called it an invasion; the President of the United States on December 8:

We have been invaded.



He said:

We had been attacked.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But there was no invasion by land?

Mr. WIRIN. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you have information regarding Japanese subversive activities and fifth-column activities in the Philippine Islands?

Mr. COSTELLO. At the time of the invasion of the Philippine Islands by the Japanese?

Mr. WIRIN. I do not have that information. All I am doing is drawing a contrast, if I may, between the treatment of a racial group at a place where I think the danger is greater than it was here, and General Emmons, who certainly was in a position to know first the danger and, second, the subversive activities of any of the Japanese population, said of the Japanese:

They have behaved themselves admirably under the most trying conditions and have bought great quantities of War bonds, and by the labor of their hands have added to the common defense.

Now, General Emmons, who I understand is on the Pacific coast, didn't have the race prejudices which we feel General DeWitt has and, secondly, there were not in the Hawaiian Islands powerful and militant pressure groups as there were on the Pacific coast at the time of the evacuation; and the demands of the pressure groups not having been made in Hawaii, there was no evacuation.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might inject one statement there: Personally I think the situation in the Hawaiian Islands was and is considerably different from the position of the Pacific coast area, and the fact that the Japanese do constitute one-third of the population over there presents a very difficult problem to the military and for that reason a difference in the percentage of population might be of itself sufficient justification for not attempting to remove the population, because it would mean disseminating the people throughout the islands, if it were possible to actually physically remove them. So, conditions in Hawaii are considerably different than what we find on the Pacific coast and for that reason a failure on the part of the military commander in Hawaii to remove the Japanese might not be due to any lack of racial prejudice but because of different military considerations confronting the military commander which called, therefore, for different strategy in that area than here.

I have had the pleasure of knowing General DeWitt and I am quite well acquainted with him. That is the reason I made this issue with you because I never thought General DeWitt was subject to pressure from any outside group. As a matter of fact I believe he has been pretty much of a two-fisted military leader and when he has said, "No" I found that instead of yielding to pressure that on the contrary he resisted it very forcibly and very strongly. And he has adhered to any orders that he has given here on the Pacific coast most rigidly, and I think the best indication of that would be the matter of horse racing, on which he almost immediately put a ban in California. I think that you will admit that if any group could bring pressure to bear upon General DeWitt certainly an organization such as those connected with the horse-racing industry in the State—chambers of commerce, hotel men and people of that sort, who are closely inter-



ested in the racing seasons, were unable to exert sufficient pressure to cause him to change his order one iota and for the first year of the war there was simply no horse racing, and at the present time only one track is permitted to operate.

So, I think that indicates the vigor with which General DeWitt reaches a decision and adheres to it, and I don't think he is subject to outside pressure.

My judgment would be that his determination for the evacuation of the Japanese for military reasons was based entirely on military strategy as he saw it and not at all upon any racial prejudice or outside influence.

Mr. WIRIN. May I state I agree substantially with your estimate of General DeWitt. I don't think he is the kind of man when direct pressure is brought upon him directly yields to it. My point is that racial prejudice is a subtle and insidious psychological factor which dominates a man's mind without he necessarily knowing it is being dominated.

None of us admit race prejudice. No matter how much our words speak it. It seems to me the statement General Emmons made in the islands, and the statement made by General DeWitt discloses a different state of mind, and all I am saying is that General DeWitt adopted a state of mind which was current here in California, and which became current due to the hysteria which was engendered here, very largely as a result of false reports—reports of so-called sabotage activities by Japanese on the occasion of Pearl Harbor, reports which have been denied by the Secretary of War, by the chief of police of Honolulu, and which are set forth fully in the Tolan report.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Wirin, no one has denied the subversive activities of the Japanese in Burma and in the Malay Peninsula.

Mr. WIRIN. I must confess to you I don't know much of anything about subversive activities in such distant quarters, but I have tried to make myself familiar with allegedly subversive activities in the United States, and particularly in the Hawaiian Islands, and I am advised, and I speak with a good deal of personal confidence, first, that no act of sabotage was committed either on the Pacific coast or in the Hawaiian Islands, either before, during, or after Pearl Harbor, at any time by any American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Two—well, that is sufficient it seems to me.

Now, what happened in Burma, it seems to me, is a problem a little bit remote from the treatment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the United States.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you any knowledge of subversive activities by Japanese in the Philippine Islands?

Mr. WIRIN. What about them?

Mr. STEEDMAN. What about the subversive activities of the Japanese in the Philippines after the Japanese Army landed on those islands?

Mr. WIRIN. All I know is that so far as the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific coast—and that is what we are talking about—is there isn't any evidence of any single act of sabotage by any American citizen of Japanese ancestry.

Mr. COSTELLO. In following that up, there is no evidence of sabotage by the Japanese in the Philippines prior to the actual attack and invasion of the Philippines either, but there are definite indications

that many Japanese in the Philippines at the time of the invasion did take a hand in aiding the enemy in their invasion activities.

Now, as regards the Hawaiian Islands: While General Emmons in commenting on the fact that many Japanese were buying War bonds and things of that sort, that is very fine. This committee feels that unquestionably there are many loyal Japanese. I don't think anyone will dispute that, but the fact remains that prior to Pearl Harbor large amounts of money were being sent by the Japanese directly back to Japan. They were making investments over there immediately before Pearl Harbor. Of course I do not impugn the motives at all of those who are investing in War bonds. Unquestionably the Japanese buying War bonds in the Hawaiian Islands are doing it with the idea of furthering America's war effort, but prior to Pearl Harbor there were very definite loyal Japanese among the Japanese in Hawaii who were aiding Japan and the Japanese Government to the utmost of their ability.

Had an invasion by land troops been attempted in the Hawaiian Islands undoubtedly those agents of the Japanese Government would have joined in aiding those forces. And similarly unquestionably on the Pacific coast had the Japanese attempted an invasion here, those disloyal Japanese, who were among the Japanese people residing here, would have cooperated with the invading forces.

Now, the big problem that we feel and most people seem to feel, is definitely trying to determine between the loyal and disloyal Japanese.

I believe you made a statement earlier in your testimony that the F. B. I. had pretty well determined the loyalty of the Japanese prior to the evacuation.

Do you believe that that is a correct statement?

Mr. WIRIN. We feel that the F. B. I. and the Department of Justice had substantial evidence as to the loyalty and disloyalty of most of the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think their records were such as to be able to indicate which of the Japanese could be trusted as loyal and which could not?

Mr. WIRIN. I think the records were certainly adequate as a starter and further investigation could have been conducted.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you think had they then attempted to segregate the disloyal Japanese and place them in internment camps that they would have been successful in keeping those disloyal Japanese removed from the Pacific coast and kept away from areas in which they might be able to commit acts of sabotage?

Mr. WIRIN. I think so; and may I say this, by way of explanation to my answer: I think the F. B. I. was sufficiently in control of the nature of subversive activities of the Japanese on the Pacific coast as it is, I think concedely, in control of the subversive activities of persons of German descent on the eastern coast.

No one has suggested that all aliens should be interned or all persons of German descent in the United States should be interned in spite of the fact there was evidence of a definite plot of sabotage discovered and exposed, as far as Germans are concerned.

We feel the reason why the Japanese were treated this way is because they were a small group against whom racial prejudices existed in this community.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do think there is a very definite difference between the ability of Caucasians to understand the thinking and activities of oriental people, particularly the Japanese, and their ability to understand the thinking and activities of Germans or Italians.

I think it is very difficult for us to understand what the Japanese are really thinking about when they are speaking to us, but I think it is a little easier to understand the emotions and feelings of Germans, Italians, and other Caucasian people. But the Japanese understand what their fellow-Japanese are thinking when speaking to them, just as I might pretty well understand what you are thinking, or have in the back of your mind, although you may not utter it in words.

Don't you think that the justification of the placing of Jews in Germany, by the Hitler regime, in concentration camps was pretty much that the Germans did not understand the Jewish mind and therefore they thought the best thing to do was to get them out of the way?

Mr. WIRIN. No; I don't think so, because your so-called Semitic mind—I think there is a very decided difference, because Jewish people are definitely German people. In other words, they have lived among the Germans for many years and I don't think there is a distinct cleavage between a Jew who is of German origin and a Christian who is of German origin. I think they are German people. Their characteristics are those of German people, although they have racial characteristics.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me go back to the point of the internment camps because I would like to ask you whether the American Civil Liberties Union or any person at their behest, or members of the organization, have made any efforts to release Japanese from the internment camps. I am not speaking now of relocation centers, but definite alien internment camps.

Mr. WIRIN. I know of no such efforts, nor have we made any effort to release any particular person from any relocation center.

We have taken the general view that as quickly as possible those who are loyal should be released from the relocation centers and should find their places in American communities so they may be able to do constructive work in connection with the war effort.

Mr. COSTELLO. Following up my previous question in that regard, are you aware of the fact that at least 195 alien Japanese who had been interned at the direction of the F. B. I., have been released from internment camps and have been sent back to the Poston relocation center in Arizona?

Mr. WIRIN. I am not aware of that. Is there any evidence that any of them committed acts of sabotage while free?

Mr. COSTELLO. I am not on the question of sabotage, but I am pointing out that the F. B. I. in an effort to determine the loyalty or disloyalty of Japanese seized a large number of them on the Pacific coast whom they believed to be disloyal. Those Japanese were then placed in internment camps and subsequently at least 195 so interned Japanese, as I understand it, by some civilian board holding hearings in the camp, with which the F. B. I. had no connection, were released from the internment camps and at least 195 of them were returned to Poston.



The conclusion I would like to draw from that is, that even though the F. B. I. have definite records and actually did segregate the disloyal Japanese from the loyal and place them in internment camps, you still have no assurance that they will remain there if civil processes allow these alleged disloyal Japanese to be returned to the relocation centers.

My point is if the Japanese were left on the Pacific coast they would have been allowed to return to the Pacific coast under those conditions, so that even those whom the F. B. I. might have determined to be disloyal prior to evacuation, had evacuation not taken place, they undoubtedly would have been allowed to return to the Pacific coast.

Mr. WIRIN. May I state generally our position was complete confidence in the F. B. I. and we generally accepted their word as to whether a Jap was loyal or disloyal.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will take a 5-minute recess at this time.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order, and Mr. Wirin, will you proceed with your statement?

Mr. WIRIN. Mr. Chairman, I have been trying to emphasize the point that we of the Civil Liberties Union are concerned about the treatment of the Japanese because we believe the treatment was due to their race rather than military necessity, and that is where many members of the community differ with us or don't understand why we are so concerned.

If we felt that the question of racial discrimination did not enter into the orders of evacuation, many of us would be much less concerned than we are.

Here is what I have in mind. I call to your attention the testimony of Mr. Eric Bellquist, professor of the department of political science of the University of California.

He testified about the state of public opinion on the coast before the Tolan committee and I refer particularly to the Tolan committee fourth interim report at page 149, and Dr. Bellquist is a responsible, careful student of group psychology.

He said:

Altogether, as the committee has witnessed, the State of California, as well as Oregon and Washington, has been giving a demonstration of lack of balance and outright intolerance which will blacken its records for many years to come. If our public authorities have thus succumbed to hysteria, one can well understand, if only deplore, the housewives who dismiss Japanese gardeners and servants, and farmers who discharge help because of citizenship or extraction. On the whole the public has not shown so much hate or spite, except it has been incited to do so. But pressure groups and short-sighted politicians facing an election year are out for blood and wholesale internment. Jingoism is endeavoring under the cover of wartime flag-waving patriotism, to do what they always wanted to do in peacetime—get rid of the Japanese.

I just cite that for the benefit of the committee.

The Tolan committee report has considerable and substantial evidence to show how the pressure groups were trying to get rid of Japanese competition, and especially the vegetable growing associations. They admit they had a selfish interest in wanting to get the Japanese out of here.

Now, we, as I say, are distressed that the factor of race has been dominant or any factor at all in the determination as to what should be done to a group of persons.



Mr. COSTELLO. Do you believe the same thing would be true regarding labor organizations? In other words you believe they are urging the evacuation of the Japanese and they are being kept off of the Pacific coast for the duration, would emanate from the same basis as you indicate the agricultural associations?

Mr. WIRIN. I think it might and as I understand it there have been some isolated labor groups that have taken that position, but I think the record should disclose that before the Tolson committee there appeared Mr. Louis Goldblatt, the secretary of the California State Congress of Industrial Organizations, and he made a statement equivalent to the position taken by Dr. Bellquist that it was jingo groups and economic pressure groups that were responsible for the sentiment existing upon evacuation.

Mr. COSTELLO. As far as labor is concerned, it would not be a question of competition with Japanese labor in labor organizations because, generally, the Japanese were not engaged in industrial trade activities?

Mr. WIRIN. That is true. If there was opposition it would come from the agricultural groups and I do know the agricultural workers in the C. I. O. is a liberal and not a race hating group.

Now, let me go on, if I may, and attempt to give you my reaction to the discussion the chairman and I have been having.

If it is conceded that a large number of Japanese are loyal, and I am talking primarily about American citizens of Japanese ancestry—I notice the Solicitor General's argument in the Supreme Court conceded that a majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry are loyal, and that lends substance to the position that we take, that the loyal and the innocent should not be penalized because some are disloyal, and some effort should have been made in connection with the evacuation to segregate the disloyal from the loyal, and certainly some effort should be made now in connection with releasing them to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal and the innocent from the guilty so the innocent may not suffer.

As we understand it one of the cardinal principles of the democratic way of life is that we try to protect the innocent and we don't punish the innocent simply because they come from the same racial stock or have the same general ancestral stock that some guilty may have.

Mr. COSTELLO. You don't look upon this as a penal confinement, do you, removal of the Japanese?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes, we do. We say a rose smells the same no matter what you call it, and if you put persons into camps and you keep them there that is imprisonment.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then the same thing is true when we take soldiers and put them in camps. Do you call that imprisonment?

Mr. WIRIN. It is a form of imprisonment but it is not a form of imprisonment based on race or discrimination in any way.

Mr. COSTELLO. I don't think you would be willing to definitely state that our soldiers are imprisoned, would you?

Mr. WIRIN. We say soldiers' liberties have been taken from them.

Mr. COSTELLO. They are curtailed but they are not imprisoned. There is nothing penal about their being in the military service and likewise here there is nothing penal about the Japanese having been evacuated and placed in relocation centers.

I don't think it is proper to put it on the same basis as a jail or internment camp. It definitely is neither one of them. It is purely a relocation center. In other words a case of having to remove them from their former homes to new homes and it is not in the same category as punishment for a crime committed. I don't think the similarity exists there.

Mr. WIRIN. You may be technically right about that. I understand there are some persons in this community of ours who want to make relocation centers internment camps and object to a release of a substantial number. Those persons certainly would like to see these camps, whether you call them concentration camps or relocation centers, really prisons; but we also take this definite view that of all the democratic nations in the world, ours is the only one that has removed from a large portion of the Nation persons solely because of their race or ancestry; and ours is the only one that has—I don't like the word "internment" but has detained them for a period.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I ask you if Mexico is a democratic country, and has not Mexico removed the Japanese from Lower California?

Mr. WIRIN. I think I should say that ours was the first democratic country. We started it and then Mexico followed.

Mr. COSTELLO. And may I ask you further, what do you think of Canada? Is Canada a democratic country?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And did not Canada remove the Japanese from the Pacific coast area of Canada and did not Canada do that prior to our evacuation in this country?

Mr. WIRIN. No; Canada did it after our evacuation in this country—some time afterwards, and Canada has never interned or never detained a single Japanese. The Canadians excluded them from certain areas but did not detain them either by relocation centers or any other centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Steedman, I wish you would make some effort to find out what date Canada evacuated her Japanese people from the Pacific coast so it will be definitely clear in the record.

Mr. WIRIN. I hope that is done. I speak with some personal confidence that the evacuation in Canada and Mexico was subsequent to ours.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There is testimony in the record that Canada evacuated her Japanese prior to our doing so.

Mr. WIRIN. In any event I wonder if the testimony before your committee does not disclose that the evacuation of British citizens or Japanese from the Pacific coast, so far as Canada was concerned, was not accompanied with any detention but certain areas were declared taboo and the Japanese were allowed to go in a large portion of Canada without detention.

Mr. COSTELLO. We did not inquire into that phase either in reference to Canada or Mexico.

Mr. WIRIN. It might be interesting for I do make the statement categorically that ours is the only democratic nation that has ever detained them.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state that here such a large body of Japanese were being moved it was incumbent on the Government to provide transportation, food, and clothing for the Japanese and the proper way to handle them was to locate them in centers where they could be easily provided for.

Mr. WIRIN. I think the Government did well in affording some protection to the Japanese, and some financial assistance, but some of us do not quite see why the Japanese have to be moved to Arkansas and detained there without permission to leave—many, many miles distant from the Pacific coast.

Mr. MUNDT. Didn't Russia evacuate a large number of people?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes, Russia—

Mr. MUNDT. And kept them in camps?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes. I don't think they kept any in camps. My impression is that large areas were evacuated, consisting of persons of German descent. I said, "Democratic nations."

Mr. MUNDT. You don't consider communism a democratic form of government?

Mr. WIRIN. No; I don't think it is a democratic form of government.

I was discussing, however, our view as to the return of the Japanese. As I said at the outset the evacuation orders have been concluded long ago. We favor, therefore, the return of the Japanese to the coast now but with this additional suggestion or qualification:

That some group, perhaps this group, should explore into the activities of organizations in California and on the coast, the names of which we will be glad to furnish to this committee, which organizations we claim deliberately fanned the race prejudice which Dr. Bellquist testified about before the Tolan committee, and particularly to ascertain and to make public and to expose to the world which of these organizations have any direct economic interest in continuing to have the Japanese excluded from this area.

We think perhaps it would be conceded, assuming that the original exclusion orders were based on military necessity, that the present military danger is not quite as great as it was at the time of the original orders of exclusion.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I inquire whether the American Legion would be one of those organizations?

Mr. WIRIN. We think the activities of the American Legion should be explored into. We are not saying the activities of the American Legion were dominated by economic interests, but there are organizations—the Salinas Vegetable Growers as an example, and other economic groups who don't want any competition from the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason I asked about the American Legion was, we had some witnesses from there who testified regarding the return of the Japanese and that is why I inquired of you.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you a member of the Legion?

Mr. WIRIN. I am not a member of the American Legion.

Mr. STEEDMAN. There is a question I would like to ask you at this point:

Did the American Civil Liberties Union make any study of the Japanese subversive organizations prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WIRIN. I would say we have not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you personally made any investigation of the Japanese subversive organizations?

Mr. WIRIN. We have not made such investigation but we think we are in a general way familiar with the activities of the Japanese groups.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the American Legion has made such investigation?



Mr. WIRIN. I believe the American Legion has.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And they would be speaking from some facts when making statements before this committee?

Mr. WIRIN. Oh, I believe so. I think the American Legion, however, has been known to be wrong the same as other organizations have been known to be wrong and I think that there are members in the American Legion who permit their sense of patriotism to blind their sense of Americanism, and who allow themselves to be dominated by race prejudice; but I would rather not engage in a discussion about the American Legion. I am not a member of it and I do not care to discuss it.

Then if the Japanese are to be returned as we believe they have a right to be, under the Bill of Rights, at least they have a right not to be discriminated against because of race, then we say certain protection should be taken and that is groups who have shown race prejudice should be exposed and more particularly we feel that the Government and perhaps this committee, should publicly condemn race prejudice—race prejudice against the Japanese race or prejudice against any group.

And there should be assurances from the Government that when American citizens return to the coast, whether he is of Japanese descent or any other descent, that the full force of the law is on his side so long as he is innocent, and will protect him and will protect him particularly against such groups, whether they are law enforcement officers or Legionnaires or anyone else, who threaten or intimate that they will take the law into their own hands and be responsible for mob violence because they don't like certain persons, even though they are innocent because of the color of their skin or where their ancestors were born.

We feel it is a definite duty and responsibility in a democratic nation at war that the Government speak out against vigilante-ism and lawlessness rather than deprive a minority group of its rights because there may be lawlessness; and we feel that no Government agency has yet taken that point of view and performed that duty.

Mr. COSTELLO. You realize, Mr. Wirin, that is exactly the situation that is taking place in these relocation centers where some of the loyal Japanese are attempting to express and to voice their loyalty to this country. Those who have done that have been threatened and in fact in some cases beaten up by disloyal Japanese, and it has been the loyal Japanese who have been removed from the centers and placed in a special camp for their protection rather than taking the disloyal Japanese who are doing the injustice, and depriving them of their freedom in the centers.

Mr. WIRIN. I agree with you, that the innocent should be given protective custody. That is what is done with the Jews in Germany, but the guilty should be prosecuted.

Now, I want to change my role with your permission and speak to you as counsel for the Japanese American Citizens League, because the question that you asked leads me to that subject.

With reference to persons who have been beaten up and assaulted in the camps they were, as I understand, for the most part active members of the Japanese American Citizens League. And one of the most prominent was Saburo Kido at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that conclude your statement for the American Civil Liberties Union?



MR. WIRIN. It does. I understand that Dr. Taft is not in strict accordance with the statement I made about the beaches being restricted to Japanese. I would like to hear his view.

MR. COSTELLO. In other words the American Civil Liberties Union does not endorse entirely your statement in that regard?

MR. MUNDT. I think we should hear Dr. Taft first before you go into your other role; and I think also any of the other associates of Mr. Wirin who are here who may disagree with his statements be given an opportunity at this point to state their disagreement, if they have any.

MR. COSTELLO. Dr. Taft, do you wish to make a statement?

MR. TAFT. A very brief one.

### TESTIMONY OF CLINTON J. TAFT, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA BRANCH

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

MR. STEEDMAN. You are president of the southern California branch of the American Civil Liberties Union?

MR. TAFT. I am director.

MR. STEEDMAN. You heard the testimony of Mr. Wirin this morning. Do you desire to comment on his testimony?

MR. TAFT. I would like to comment on one thing.

MR. MUNDT. What do you mean by "director"? Are you the director or the man in charge?

MR. TAFT. I am the man in charge—the director of the work here.

MR. MUNDT. The same as being president of some other organization?

MR. TAFT. Yes, sir; I wanted to take exception to the one statement Mr. Wirin made about allowing Japanese to appear on our beaches if they were returned to California.

I don't recall that the Civil Liberties Union has taken any definite position on this point, but I think I reflect the opinion of our people when I say that we don't concede the point to the extent that Mr. Wirin seemed to in his statement to you.

I think as the chairman said in an off the record discussion here, that is a matter of principle and that in a way compromises the whole situation if you put it on a racial basis and say that a Japanese should not be allowed on the coast.

I base this statement on our general confidence in the character of the Japanese, speaking generally so far as our observations and contacts have been with these people, and I would call your attention to the record they have made since they have lived here in California;

Generally speaking, I think it is unquestioned—I would put it forth as something that has not been successfully challenged so far as my knowledge goes, that the Japanese of this area previous to their evacuation were regarded as a thrifty, fine, decent lot of people. They committed very few crimes. Their record in our courts was almost negligible. The matter of juvenile delinquency among them was very very inconsequential.

They were a hard-working, trustworthy people. Many of them were Christians and members of our churches.

I happen to be a congregational minister by training and I know of some of these people first-hand, and I think I can say without

contradiction that our confidence in these Japanese people, who belong to the Christian churches of this community, was as unqualified as our confidence in Germans or Italians or any other particular racial strain.

We have found them through the years—I have lived in California 22 years and this is my twenty-third year here, we have found them to be a hard-working people, people who had gone on our ranches and developed them highly; they produced most of our vegetables. They had settled in a section of our city here known as Little Tokyo and were carrying on their enterprises with the very greatest credit to themselves.

Mr. COSTELLO. Dr. Taft, might I interrupt? Isn't it a fact that that the lack of juvenile delinquency among the Japanese people may largely be attributed to the fact that the father of the family has almost dictatorial power in the homes of the Japanese?

Mr. TAFT. It is probably due somewhat to that. They are brought up very very strictly, as I understand it.

Mr. COSTELLO. And isn't that a part of the Japanese culture and background, that the father is the dominating figure in the family?

Mr. TAFT. Yes; I understand that is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. So likewise while it is true that the criminal record of the Japanese people in our midst has been very small, isn't it a fact that it has been shown that quite a few Japanese who were completely trusted and relied on here in our midst, prior to Pearl Harbor, have definitely been shown to have been agents of the Japanese Government and were working in behalf of the Japanese Empire?

Mr. TAFT. I think some of them have been but they have been weeded out pretty generally by the F. B. I. before the evacuation took place.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the point I want to make is that some of those who had been in the most trusted and most relied upon positions, and who supposedly represented the finest type of Japanese citizens in our midst, turned out very definitely to be agents of the Japanese Empire?

Mr. TAFT. I don't know of any that were taken by the F. B. I. and put into concentration camps—I don't know as to that—I couldn't speak on that point.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think there has been sufficient testimony here to indicate that some of the most highly respected Japanese were those who should have been less trusted.

Mr. TAFT. It is remarkable to me, however, that among the many tales that were current back at the time of Pearl Harbor, and subsequently, of treachery and sabotage, when they were sifted and chased down they wouldn't hold water. They didn't prove up.

And the testimony referred to by Mr. Wirin of many people like the chief of police of Honolulu and the territorial representative of that area—their testimony was very positive as to their loyalty and their refusal to commit actual sabotage.

If you go up and down this coast, so far as we can discover, there have been no genuine acts of sabotage that might have been expected from the type of Japanese that you describe.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is only my personal opinion, Dr. Taft, but that has been the one cause of alarm as far as I am concerned, the fact that you have not had on the Pacific coast any distinct case of proven sabo-

tage on the part of the Japanese. That would indicate to me that the Japanese have complete control over their people in the same manner as the father of a family has control over his family and for that reason sabotage has not been committed by individuals because they were under instructions not to commit sabotage, which is a most unusual situation because with 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry if you do not have a single act of sabotage by some one of them, it is phenomenal and it would indicate to me that they have a very definite and complete control of their nationals and that the time for sabotage has not arrived.

Now, the lack of sabotage on their part either prior to or subsequent to Pearl Harbor, is likewise very indicative. Nothing happened in the Philippines prior to or subsequent to Pearl Harbor, until the Japanese started their invasion, but when the Japs started the invasion of the Philippine Islands, that was when the Jap agents in the Philippine Islands began to carry out their activities.

My thought is that if the Japanese were ever put in a position to invade the Hawaiian Islands then for the first time the real Japanese agents among the Japanese people residing there would swing into action.

And if the Pacific coast were actually to be invaded, if it were possible for Japan to bring an invading force this far across the Pacific and attempt the actual invasion of the Pacific coast, then for the first time the Japanese agents in our midst would go into action.

So, the actual lack of sabotage on their part, to my mind, is the most alarming thing, and it indicates the greatest and strictest control by the Japanese Government over the Japanese agents in our population.

MR. TAFT. Isn't it rather significant, Mr. Costello, that during the several months before they were actually evacuated, when they could have gotten in some very bad sabotage work, that would have crippled our war effort, with the great number of utilities on this west coast preparing for war paraphernalia, like airplanes, tanks and so forth, and with the transportation system we have here, isn't it remarkable that for several months there was no effort made of any kind that can be proven up, to cripple our war effort here?

Japan at that time was threatening invasion——

MR. COSTELLO. I don't say it was "remarkable"; I say it was "phenomenal" because when you have 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry just recently removed from Japan—I mean they are living in this country only a short time—generally the first generation, it is remarkable that in that group you don't find 1 or 2 or 10 or 100 or 1,000 who have attempted that very thing.

Now, the most natural thing to expect if we were fighting Ireland, would be a couple of hot-headed Irishmen to do something. You would expect a few German saboteurs to do something. You would expect a few Italians to do something because we are fighting their mother countries. Yet the fact among the Japanese you do not have a single instance of it and that indicates that Japan has definite control; and there is no question but what the investigation of the Dies committee prior to Pearl Harbor, going into subversive activities of the Japanese Government, indicates that they had a tremendous network of spies and Japanese government agents operating among their people in this country; that they had definite control over them



and unquestionably they knew the names and addresses of every Japanese person in our midst.

And that indicates to me that they not only had the information on them but they had control over them and the lack of sabotage indicates they were exercising that control.

Mr. WIRIN. May I have a word there? It seems to us phenomenal and remarkable that, first the argument is that there are many persons among the Japanese who are guilty and that it is hard to tell the guilty from the innocent. Then the argument goes further: There isn't any evidence of guilt at all but still everybody of the group should suffer.

Let me complete my thought. This evidence that the Dies committee has had about the plans of the Japanese Government, if the Japanese Government had been successful to reach the Japanese population of the Hawaiian Islands, and I am not talking about the consular agents of the Japanese Government, who were paid spies, and who committed acts of espionage, and were exposed by the Roberts committee, but if the Japanese Government had succeeded in indoctrinating the military purposes of the Japanese Government to the Japanese population, isn't it remarkable that at the time of Pearl Harbor when, according to all our present information, the plan of the Japanese military regime was to win the war, if possible, by one attack on Pearl Harbor by destroying the American Navy at Pearl Harbor, isn't it remarkable that not one resident of the Hawaiian Islands committed one single act of sabotage? It seems to us if there was any plan for cooperation with Japan that that plan would have gone into effect at the time of the secret and unexpected attack at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think that again is indicative of what I am saying. The attack that Japan made upon the Hawaiian Islands at Pearl Harbor was the opening shot of the war. It was not the invasion attempt to capture the islands. It was to destroy our military effectiveness.

Mr. WIRIN. Wouldn't sabotage have helped considerably in the attack?

Mr. COSTELLO. Might have augmented the effectiveness of the initial attack but it would not have aided the invasion which Japan intended to follow through with at a subsequent date.

Now, had Japan worked out a program of sabotage to be coupled with the attack at Pearl Harbor, they would have had to notify the Japanese people in the Hawaiian Islands of the impending attack, and the success of the treacherous attack which they made depended upon the United States Government not having any information of the imminence of that attack, and had they notified their nationals in Hawaii, the attack was going to take place on a specified date, the danger of the American Government finding out that information and thwarting the attack, was too great. Japan did not trust passing that information on to her own nationals in Hawaii and they, therefore, did not tell them and the Japanese did not expect the attack any more than the Americans did. They did not expect that treachery.

Had it been the invasion force I have no doubt at all but what the information would have been passed on to the Japanese nationals there who were in the employ of the Japanese Government, and it would have had cooperation in the invasion attack.



Mr. WIRIN. I gather from your statement that is your own personal opinion?

Mr. COSTELLO. These are personal opinions; yes.

Mr. WIRIN. That the Japanese of the United States, at least a very large portion of them, are under direct control of the Japanese Emperor—the Japanese Imperial Government, and have not committed any acts of sabotage, awaiting word from the Emperor.

Mr. COSTELLO. I will qualify that by saying the loyal Japanese have no intention of committing sabotage and that the disloyal Japanese are waiting the orders to commit it. Therefore, they completely control the sabotage situation throughout all the Japanese who are not loyal to this country.

The loyal Japanese would not want to commit sabotage. It is only the disloyal ones and Japan undoubtedly knows who are the loyal Japanese and therefore they can control the situation.

Mr. WIRIN. It seems to us phenomenal and incredible and fantastic that if Japan has that kind of control over its nationals or a large portion of them, such as you intimate in the United States, that it must have had some similar control over the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands but there is not one single act of sabotage committed by any such person at a most critical time in the life of our Nation, when the war was started by the treacherous attack.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is pretty much off the subject.

Mr. WIRIN. But it shows an attitude which is important because if you give credence to that kind of position, then you feel like distrusting every Japanese and then you feel like denying the rights of the innocent.

Mr. COSTELLO. It isn't a question of distrusting every Japanese but I do believe it is extremely difficult to apply any tests, any series of tests, to determine the loyalty or disloyalty of the Japanese. That has been indicated because people here who have placed extreme confidence in certain Japanese, who have been with us over a long period of time, have turned out to be definitely Japanese Government agents. Now, that was not indicated prior to our getting into the war, and the same thing is true of other Japanese—the utter impossibility of having any reasonable assurance that the Japanese you allege to be loyal actually are. That makes it a very difficult problem to try to segregate them.

Mr. WIRIN. The difference between our view and yours is we do not say it is utterly impossible to tell the loyal from the disloyal. We accept the standards of the Army itself. There were some 5,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the armed forces. The Army has set up a special combat unit. They say they know the loyal from the disloyal. They want the loyal to offer their lives in the armed forces and if you can tell a loyal person for the purpose of letting him offer his life, we say you can tell him and accord him the liberties ordinarily accorded citizens.

I am not going to comment on the Army taking in the Japanese or whether they felt they were loyal. I do know once they become members of the armed forces, any attempt on the part of the Japanese to be disloyal to the country would meet with summary treatment on the part of the armed forces.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I do not think the American Civil Liberties Union is here to plead for any disloyal Japanese. As I take it, you are

appearing here to see if some method could be followed which would be the American democratic method of treating the loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry properly.

Mr. WIRIN. Precisely.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think if we confine the testimony to something along that line we will get along much better and we will have something constructive.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you wish to proceed with your statement, Dr. Taft?

Mr. TAFT. I had almost finished, Mr. Chairman. I just want to add this one thought: Instead of assuming that there is such perfect control on the part of the Japanese Government over these people that live here in our midst, who are of Japanese ancestry, as your remark awhile ago would seem to indicate, wouldn't it be more reasonable to assume that the 70,000 Nisei who were born in this country and have grown up here and who have stuck their roots down into our soil and gotten our system of education to some extent, and done business with the rest of our citizens, as they have grown up, are in love with America, are loyal to it and can be depended upon through thick and thin? Would it be well to assume that instead of the assumption that you make, that they are under the control of this foreign power and that when the opportune time comes then sabotage will be committed pretty generally by these special agents and these others who are under their control? Don't you think that would be a reasonable assumption?

Mr. COSTELLO. I would say yes—I could agree with your assumption that the native-born Japanese who have not returned to Japan and have not come under any pro-Japanese influence, but have simply been in contact with American influences, undoubtedly would be loyal but at least 10,000 of the native-born Japanese males have been members of the Butoku-Kai, which is a Japanese military organization in this country, which means that 10,000 of these 70,000 native-born Japanese have very definitely come into contact with and under the control of Japanese culture and military indoctrination and training, so that a very large percentage of the young males in the group to which you refer definitely are subjected or have been subjected to Japanese influence and their loyalty certainly would be subject to some question.

Now, as to the rest I will say that the thing would be to prove their association with Japanese influences and thus to prove their disloyalty.

Mr. TAFT. Granting what you have just said, then as a follow-up wouldn't it be a fine thing to correct what has been a mistake made in the past, and that would be to release those who prove up to be loyal to our satisfaction, from these camps or centers and give them a chance further to demonstrate their loyalty on a probationary basis, perhaps, and if they do anything in the way of sabotage or disloyal acts, then they shall be returned to the centers.

Wouldn't that be in harmony with American procedure and a fine way to, perhaps, correct what was a blanket method of handling a problem of this kind?

Mr. COSTELLO. That has been one subject of our criticism, that the authorities in charge of the relocation centers have made no effort, apparently, to segregate the good from the bad.

Mr. TAFT. Aren't they doing it now?

Mr. COSTELLO. At least the known bad in the camps have not been removed from the centers.

The testimony before our committee indicates in cases of dispute, attacks, and assaults the known bad Japanese have been left at the centers and the persons who were attacked and assaulted have been removed. In those cases the good Japanese were actually put in definite segregation camps—abandoned C. C. C. camps, and according to the testimony they are using reverse English on their procedure, and that at the present time no real effort is being made to segregate the known bad Japanese from the good Japanese in the centers. On the contrary pro-Japanese persons are gaining control in the centers and dominating the activities and are exerting pressure upon all the people in the centers, and that is the very subject of our criticism of the management of the war relocation services.

Mr. TAFT. Let me ask you, I understand between twelve and thirteen thousand have already been released by Mr. Myer.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is correct.

Mr. TAFT. Have any of those released people proven unworthy of the liberty that has been conferred upon them?

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not know the names of the individuals nor the places to which they have been sent, and I do not know of any acts of sabotage, if that is what you mean, having been committed by them. But from our testimony here it is indicated that no real effort has been made to check upon the past record of those individuals in the civilian communities in which they lived, and that the only record they have of the Japanese whom they are releasing is the record made at the center.

For example, the mayor of the city of Los Angeles testified that no check was made upon the records of persons in the employ of the city, by the authorities of the War Relocation Authority before they released those individuals, which I feel should have been done.

Mr. TAFT. As I understand it, they are being let go at about the rate of 1,000 a week from various centers in the West, and that they have gone on to these ranches and farms and to schools and to various places and by this time if that went forward at the rate of 1,000 a week, twelve or thirteen thousand, in 12 or 13 weeks have passed since the original ones were let go. Wouldn't it by this time appear as to whether or not that kind of an experiment were justified?

Mr. COSTELLO. I can only revert to my previous opinion that I have stated, that those who are intended to do sabotage or to carry out the workings of the Japanese Government, are under some control; that unless it is the strategic time for it, it would not take place and the time to worry about sabotage taking place is in advance and not after the act has been committed.

It doesn't do us any good to say, "Well, we shouldn't have released the Japs if three or four factories are destroyed." In other words, my criticism is they are not making a thorough check of the Japanese before releasing them.

Mr. TAFT. May I ask you are the Nisei released exclusively or have some of the Issei been released?

Mr. COSTELLO. There appears to be no distinction as to which persons are actually being released.



Mr. TAFT. Well, I think the method that is being used, while it may not be as thoroughgoing as it should be, it seems to have justified itself thus far unless there is—unless there is that absolute control that you assume on the part of the Japanese Government.

I can't quite conceive human nature made that way, myself—that is that there is such complete control over the Japanese that were born in this country and brought up under American influences that they could be relied upon to withhold any sabotage effort until the hour of 12 struck. That sort of thing doesn't happen in human psychology.

Mr. COSTELLO. The point I make is that the loyal Japanese under those conditions have no intent or desire to commit sabotage. It is only the disloyal who would do it and the disloyal are the ones trying to further the interests of Japan and under Japan's influence. Those are the ones Japan controls. The loyal ones are not controlled by Japan.

Mr. TAFT. And you feel there are quite a good many of them?

Mr. COSTELLO. Unquestionably there is a large number of Japanese but unfortunately in the centers in which they are living the disloyal Japanese seem to be allowed to gain the ascendancy and control of the centers and are undoubtedly exerting a subversive influence on all Japanese. But let us change the situation. We are seeking information from you but you are not interested in my personal views on this matter.

I prefer you continue to make your statement.

Mr. TAFT. Well, I just wanted, as an aside, you might say, inasmuch as we have had a pretty free give and take here, and I think we have enjoyed it on both sides, but I would like to ask what test the Dies committee or you personally would recommend to be used in the release of these people from the centers?

Mr. COSTELLO. Whether the committee will formulate any program for testing the loyalty of the Japanese, I cannot say. It will have to be determined when we have concluded these hearings and have visited the center at Poston, followed by hearings in Washington. At that time the committee may make a recommendation along that line but I do not know whether the committee will be in any position to make any such recommendation.

Mr. TAFT. Let me thank you then, on behalf of our Committee, for the privilege of appearing before you. We were eager to do so and we feel that you have given us a pretty good opportunity to speak and express our ideas.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you.

Mr. MUNDT. I have a question, Mr. Taft, I would like to clear up. We got away on a round robin discussion here, but my understanding of your attitude toward the Japanese is, if they are released to the Pacific coast, and you correct me if I am wrong, your position is that unlike Mr. Wirin, you feel that the Japanese who are returned to the Pacific coast, if they are, should have the same access to the beaches as any other American citizens?

Mr. TAFT. Yes; if they are released as loyal citizens.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, one other question: You made a rather startling statement and I am not sure it accurately reflects your convictions, but you suggested that we pursue the present policy of releasing the Japanese from these relocation centers and then if any of them are actually caught in committing an act of sabotage, that they be returned to the centers. Is that a correct statement of your position?



Mr. TAFT. I was stating what I understand is the policy in releasing them. They are practically on probation and they are returnable if they do commit acts that are disloyal.

Mr. MUNDT. You feel if they are caught committing an act of sabotage they should be returned to the centers?

Mr. TAFT. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. I must say as for myself that I entirely and wholeheartedly disagree with that. Certainly when a man is caught committing an act of sabotage he should be put in jail and prosecuted by due process of law and not put back in a relocation center.

Mr. TAFT. I meant to be returned immediately to the center and be prosecuted.

Mr. MUNDT. In my mind he should be put in jail and handled under the due process of law and convicted if guilty.

Mr. TAFT. Either way would be satisfactory to me.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not questioning your right to feel the way you do; I am simply stating what I think about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do any of you other gentlemen have a statement you want to make in disagreement or comment on Mr. Wirin's testimony?

Mr. RYLAND. Mr. Wirin has thoroughly stated our position, at least from my standpoint, and I concur in what he said.

I also ask to be excused.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate your coming and being present at the hearing this morning.

Mr. Wirin, you may continue with your statement regarding the Japanese American Citizens League.

### TESTIMONY OF A. L. WIRIN—Resumed

Mr. WIRIN. I shall be brief. Since the matter of standards for the loyal and disloyal was brought up, if your committee is going to concern itself with that question, may I suggest to your committee the study made by the Tolan committee of hearings granted in England, both in the last war and in this war, to aliens who are suspected of subversive activities, and I assume also you will make available to yourselves the experience of the Department of Justice, both in the last war and in this war, and the so-called alien board.

I want to say a few words about the Japanese American Citizens League.

I already told you that as a matter of fact I never heard of the organization before the evacuation. My interest has been solely because I felt that there was a question of discrimination. In a word, therefore, I would like as I testify about the Japanese American Citizens League, to refer to some documents and instead of quoting at length, give the document to the reporter for incorporation into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all right.

Mr. WIRIN. The Japanese American Citizens League, as I am informed, was organized in 1920—23 years ago.

As early as May 1941, prior to Pearl Harbor, the organization adopted what is known as a creed for Japanese-Americans.

That creed was reported to Congress and appears in the Congressional Record for May 9, 1941. It also appears in the brief filed

by the Japanese American Citizens League in the *Reeham case* at pages 2 and 3, which I shall leave with the committee with the request that the creed be incorporated in the record as my testimony at this time.

Mr. COSTELLO. The reporter will copy it into the record at this point.

(The creed referred to is as follows:)

I am proud that I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, for my very background makes me appreciate more fully the wonderful advantages of this Nation. I believe in her institutions, ideals, and traditions; I glory in her heritage; I boast of her history; I trust in her future.

Although some individuals may discriminate against me, I shall never become bitter or lose faith, for I know that such persons are not representative of the majority of the American people. True, I shall do all in my power to discourage such practices, but I shall do it in the American way—above board, in the open, through the courts of law, by education, by proving myself to be worthy of equal treatment and consideration. I am firm in my belief that American sportsmanship and attitude of fair play will judge citizenship and patriotism on the basis of action and achievement, and not on the basis of physical characteristics.

Because I believe in America, and I trust she believes in me, and because I have received innumerable benefits from her, I pledge myself to do honor to her at all times and in all places; to support her Constitution; to obey her laws; to respect her flag; to defend her against all enemies, foreign or domestic; to actively assume my duties and obligations as a citizen, cheerfully and without any reservations whatsoever, in the hope that I may become a better American in a greater America.

The persons as respectable and as clear-minded and as fair as Gen. David P. Barrows, Monroe E. Deutsch, Robert Gordan Sproul, and Ray Lyman Wilbur have said or testified in statements submitted to the Tolan Committee, which appears in the Tolan report, part 29, page 11200, said this about the patriotism and loyalty of the Japanese American Citizens League:

The Japanese American Citizens League, consisting of some 8,000 citizens of Japanese ancestry, has made repeated pronouncements of loyalty to the United States and of opposition to the aggressive policies of Japan. Many such Japanese have encouraged their sons to enter the United States armed forces and have subscribed to Defense bonds.

We appeal to all our members and to all citizens who see this statement, to make its contents widely known, to cooperate actively in insuring fair play and security to all law-abiding Japanese residents.

More particularly I want to call the committee's attention, first, to the fact that at first persons of Japanese descent—American citizens, were registered under the draft similar to other persons, and some 5,000 of them joined the armed services in that way.

Then the Army adopted the policy of not allowing persons of Japanese descent to be further drafted.

The Japanese American Citizens League in a resolution which appears in appendix C of the brief, and which I will ask to be incorporated, formerly requested the War Department to make opportunities for service in the armed forces available to American citizens of Japanese descent.

On January 29, 1942, in a letter addressed to this organization by General Hershey, which appears on page 5 of this brief, said:

We trust that the action taken will accomplish the purpose which prompted the resolution.

That is the action by the Army in cooperation with the Selective Service to make opportunity available to Japanese-American citizens of Japanese ancestry for service.

And then as already has been pointed out, statements were made at about that time, both by the President and by the Secretary of War.

Now, the first person to enlist in this unit known as the Japanese-American combat unit, was Masaoka—Mike Masaoka. Mike Masaoka has been for some time the executive secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League and last week Mr. Masaoka was inducted into the Army.

Another person who is in the Army is Walter T. Tsukamoto. He is a former president of the Japanese American Citizens League. The present president is Mr. Kido.

Prior to the setting up of this unit, he was a captain in the Judge Advocate General's Office and upon setting up the unit he volunteered his services and was accepted.

Now, one further word.

The Japanese American Citizens League, when General DeWitt announced the orders of evacuation, while believing that the orders were unconstitutional, because they were discriminatory against persons because of their race, as an act of loyalty and confidence in the Government, and in the military, if you will, cooperated completely with the evacuation program—so much so that the organization was unwilling at that time even, to sponsor any test case. It was unwilling to file any suits in the court by way of injunction, which were then contemplated, seeking to restrain the execution of the military orders.

While the Japanese American Citizens League has appeared in the Supreme Court as a friend of the court, as I have indicated, questioning the constitutionality of the exclusion, the organization has taken consistently before the war and since the war, despite a consciousness of discrimination and injustice, an attitude of complete cooperation, first, with the Army and then with the administration in any plan the administration or Army has outlined.

I think that concludes my statement with respect to the Japanese American Citizens League.

I would like to make one further brief statement, if I may.

I think it was yesterday a delegation from the State of Arizona appeared here, or the day before, and discussed with you a piece of State legislation which was adopted by the State legislature.

As counsel for the Civil Liberties Union, I have made more or less careful study of the legislation.

I advised the organization that the statute is unconstitutional and in the Forum, which is a publication of the local committee, there is a short article in which I discuss the constitutionality of the statute and I would like to leave that with the committee as well as the brief of the Japanese American Citizens League in the Supreme Court, and the brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in the Supreme Court.

Just a word about that statute since the papers carried great publicity and some suggestion by someone it might serve as an example for other States to follow.

The statute is, in our opinion, unconstitutional because it deprives persons of Japanese descent the equal protection of the law, because it is clearly discriminatory, and aimed solely against the Japanese, and the reason it is aimed against the Japanese, although that word



does not appear in the statute, is because it deals with persons whose movements are restricted and persons who are ineligible to citizenship.

The only group in American society at the present time whose movements are restricted and the members ineligible for citizenship, are persons of Japanese ancestry.

Of course there are persons who are ineligible for citizenship who are not members of the Japanese race—for instance the Chinese people. No person of Chinese descent is eligible to nationalization and that is also true of other oriental people; and now the statute is vulnerable and clearly unconstitutional and the Civil Liberties Union intends to appear in any court proceeding and challenge the constitutionality of it, only because it is discriminatory and aimed at a certain race.

I think you appreciate the general position that legislation or action which is aimed at a particular group because of race is unconstitutional.

The man who drafted the statute was very far from a good lawyer. It was drawn very loosely so that it includes any person who is a member of the armed forces, because every person who is a member of the armed forces has his movements restricted by order and by law, so that under this statute a person, a soldier who has a toothache could not have his tooth pulled by a dentist in Arizona unless the dentist published three times in a newspaper that there was an intention to do the tooth pulling and advised the Secretary of State and waited 10 days before he could consummate the business transaction.

Mr. MUNDT. Wouldn't the fact that the soldier is an American citizen exempt him?

Mr. WIRIN. No; because it doesn't say anything about American citizens. It says:

Any persons whose movements are restricted by any law or order.

Mr. MUNDT. And what?

Mr. WIRIN. I said the statute was aimed against Japanese because the only group in our community that comprised both elements was the Japanese group.

Mr. MUNDT. The language of the statute says: "Or," rather than "and".

Mr. WIRIN. That is right, but as applied it would apply to a soldier, and certainly would apply to a person who is in prison.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I thought there were two restrictions, one as to movement and the other as to eligibility for citizenship. Don't you have to have both of those factors before the statute applies?

Mr. WIRIN. In any event one thing is clear.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you read that part of the statute?

Mr. WIRIN (reading):

Any person who enters into any contract or sells or purchases and sells goods—

I am omitting certain words:

Whose movements are restricted by operation of law or by any executive or other order authorized by law, or from a person who is not eligible to citizenship.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That would refer to Chinese also?

Mr. WIRIN. Unquestionably refers to the Chinese.

Mr. COSTELLO. Doesn't the use of the disjunctive destroy your constitutional argument that it is discriminatory?



Mr. WIRIN. In my opinion, it does not destroy the constitutional argument because the constitutional argument as to discrimination runs something like this: That you—if you can show that a statute is intended against a particular group, then you come within the protection of the Constitution which prohibits legislation directed against a group.

Now, it often happens that legislation which is directed against a group is so loosely drawn as to include within its wide net persons never contemplated by the race baiters, and I say that the reading of the statute upon its face would include the soldiers, would include certainly a person who was in prison, because his liberties are restricted. Perhaps this is an exaggerated argument but it would include every person in Arizona and every person in the United States because all of us now have our movements restricted in one form or another due to various military orders.

Many of us cannot go to certain areas in Arizona which are military areas; and that is the peculiar vice of legislation which has race prejudice as its motive. It is always drawn loosely and catches within its net innocent persons who were never contemplated by the legislation.

Now, if I may go back for a moment, with your permission, with my role as appearing for the Civil Liberties Union, I would like to make a concluding statement and then I shall be done.

Mr. MUNDT. You are all through now in your role representing the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes.

I have tried to make it clear to the committee that neither I as a lawyer or citizen, nor any of us in the Civil Liberties Union, are interested in the Japanese as such. We are interested in them as human beings and interested in their rights as American citizens and in the protection of their constitutional rights because we feel it is proper to protect their rights even though they are small and at the present time a hated minority, in order that the rest of us may have our rights. As I have indicated we are particularly alarmed about this matter of race discrimination. I like these words of the President, and I quote them to you. They were uttered on January 2, 1942, and they appear on page 76 of the brief that I am filing with the committee.

The President said:

Remember the Nazi technique: "Pit race against race, religion against religion, prejudice against prejudice. Divide and conquer." We must not let that happen here. We must not forget what we are defending: Liberty, decency, justice.

Now, we are fighting a war for democracy—to maintain democracy and to extend it throughout the world. We are fighting the war, not alone. We are one of many united nations.

On our side are many nations whose people have a color of skin different from the color of our skin. The Chinese are orientals and we desperately need the help of the Chinese in these days. Indeed, most of the people of the world who are on our side do not have white skins. We certainly need the assistance of those countries as well as the Negroes of Africa.

We think that the unprecedented treatment of a group by way of exclusion, by way of detention solely because of race hurts rather than helps a war effort at a time when in order to win we need urgently and

desperately the assistance and cooperation of other peoples of the world, as I said, whose skins are colored differently from ours, and so we are most concerned, as I have indicated, about this precedence we have established in American life of discriminating against persons because of the places where their fathers were born and persons whose skins are different from ours, and the contour of whose eyes are different from ours.

I think that concludes my statement.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to ask a question or two, Mr. Wirin. You assume from your testimony that the American Civil Liberties Union does not believe in the so-called Exclusion Act.

Mr. WIRIN. I think that is a fair statement although we haven't given it any precise study in recent years.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Don't you think there are occasions during a war period that certain liberties which we would all like to have, must be dispensed with because of military necessity?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes; I agree with that.

May I qualify my statement: I agree to that but, however, the dispensing of or granting liberties solely based on race should not be tolerated in a democratic community, either in war or in peace.

Mr. EBERHARTER. We are at war with Japan now.

Mr. WIRIN. I understand that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Don't you think that should be taken into consideration as well as the equal treatment which you desire for all the Japanese Americans?

Mr. WIRIN. I think it should.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, wouldn't you advocate that the Japanese aliens be accorded exactly the same treatment as the Japanese-Americans?

Mr. WIRIN. I would not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And neither would you advocate that the disloyal Japanese be treated the same as the loyal American-Japanese?

Mr. WIRIN. No.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That those who would be disloyal to this country—

Mr. WIRIN. And on the same basis I would not advocate a disloyal German or a disloyal Italian or any other disloyal person should be treated the same as a loyal person of such national group.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I assume you further believe there should be a separation of the Japanese who are loyal to this country from those who are loyal to Japan?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes; but a separation based upon hearings where the person is given an opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty or where evidence is submitted of alleged disloyalty.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you believe that a thorough investigation should be made before any Japanese is released from a relocation center?

Mr. WIRIN. Well, I would say yes but I would say it depends again where he was going. If he was going to work in a defense plant, I would make a more thorough investigation than if he was going to work on a farm in Arkansas.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If you were going to give them liberty to go about the country after release from the relocation center you would naturally have to make a thorough investigation of every one released, would you not?

Mr. WIRIN. I think a thorough investigation should be made and I don't agree with the thought that he is given his liberty. I think he has his liberty and he is entitled to his liberty to start with. I don't think releasing a Japanese from a relocation center, who is an American citizen, is granting him a privilege or a favor. I think it is merely according him a right which he has as a citizen.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then you don't think it should be necessary for the Japanese to first prove his loyalty before he is allowed to be free?

Mr. WIRIN. I don't feel that a Japanese-American citizen should first prove his loyalty any more than a German-American citizen of German ancestry on the east coast should first prove his loyalty before he is released.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But you advocate a thorough investigation of each and every one?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is a distinction between internment and a relocation center.

Mr. WIRIN. There is, but I don't recognize it as significant.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the War Relocation Authority wants it recognized.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one more thing, Mr. Wirin. Let us assume it was absolutely a military necessity that the Japanese be removed from the Pacific coast, and there was no time to make an investigation of each and every one—that we did not have the facilities for that. What alternative procedure would you have followed or could you suggest?

Mr. WIRIN. The evacuation of the Japanese took approximately 6 months. The experience of Great Britain, which I have already submitted for your consideration, in the handling of German aliens, and, mind you, Great Britain was in rather serious military danger at one time, that some seventy or eighty thousand German aliens were, by a system of hearing boards—many of them—hearing boards similar to our local draft boards, were given some kind of a hearing, although rather summary and expeditious, and there was a sifting out of approximately the same number over a less period in Great Britain where the danger was greater. So, hindsight being better than foresight, since the evacuation took place here, in taking approximately 6 months, such hearings as we are talking about would have been entirely feasible.

The reason they were not held is because of the pressure of these groups that insisted upon immediate exclusion from this area of persons whom they wanted to make the scapegoat on the Pacific coast. That is why I commend so highly the experience of Great Britain in their alien hearing boards.

So I don't accept the theory there wasn't time to grant hearings.

General Barrows and Monroe Duetsch and President Sproul and President Wilbur took that view before the Tolan committee.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Can you suggest to the committee just what procedure should be followed now with respect to the release of the evacuees?

Mr. WIRIN. I think now that persons who are in relocation centers we should forget, perhaps, how they got there. That is a matter for the courts to determine and for organizations concerned with prin-



ciples of civil rights, like the Civil Liberties Union, but those persons ought to be given a hearing, and I don't care too much as to where the burden of proof is, as to whether a person has to prove he is innocent or that he is not disloyal, or whether the Government has the burden of proving he is disloyal; but those who are loyal should be accorded their freedom, including freedom to return here, because I think in refusing to allow them to return here the Government and this committee encourage the element in our community to repeat their threats of lawlessness when they don't want a certain group, and if they don't want the Japanese they may decide that they don't want the Negroes around here and then they will come and howl before these committees about the danger from Negroes to the white persons and, therefore, the Negroes should be deprived of their rights.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there any indication of a movement of that character?

Mr. WIRIN. We feel that you are at the core of it. The newspapers are full of statements. One of the worst offenders is our own mayor in beating the drums of prejudice against persons——

Mr. COSTELLO. I mention the Negroes because you—don't you think you are now shouting wolf, wolf, before there is a threat of a wolf?

Mr. WIRIN. No; I am not. I think what happened in this community in the last week or so against persons of Mexican blood, most of them being American citizens, and many Negroes, on the alleged claim it was because of the suits they wore were unattractive to other persons is an example of clear race rioting in our community.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did the American Civil Liberties Union take any part in the defense of these so-called zoot-suiters or have they taken any part in the defense of them during the past 2 or 3 years in which they have been active in the city?

Mr. WIRIN. No; we have not, but we do intend to offer counsel to a number of persons who have been arrested and are now in custody in connection with the recent riots against so-called zoot suiters, because we believe they are race riots.

Mr. COSTELLO. Don't you think it is purely a case of gangsterism and hoodlumism on the part of a bunch of youngsters who have not had adequate home supervision, and the attempt to make it a racial problem is dodging the factual issue of juvenile delinquency? That is my personal opinion.

I think the activities on the part of groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union or welfare workers in trying to make it a racial question are only fomenting the difficulties and encouraging these youngsters to be disorderly and not law-abiding, and they themselves may be responsible for much of the disorders created here in the city during the past week.

Mr. WIRIN. The views of the Civil Liberties Union is pretty much the views of the committee appointed by the Governor of the State, which includes some very responsible persons, and that is while there is a problem of juvenile delinquency, it is not limited to persons who are Mexicans or Negroes and that in any event persons, whether they are soldiers or otherwise, who take the law into their own hands and resort to vigilanteism, are not to be encouraged or condoned by the committee.



Mr. COSTELLO. I think we will agree on that point, but I am going back before the time the Army or the Navy became involved in the picture.

Mr. WIRIN. This matter is not directly in point, but I will be glad to discuss it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just briefly, I think the zoot-suit trouble is indicative of some of the other troubles you are referring to.

Mr. WIRIN. With the exception there were acts by some persons wearing zoot suits which amounted to antisocial acts, and they have been prosecuted and should have been prosecuted, but no Japanese, so far as we know, has committed any act of interference with the war.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only point I wanted to bring out was that many of these groups who, having adopted the zoot suit as a costume which provided identification for their group, have indulged in lawlessness, and the attempts of police officers here locally to bring charges against those lawless elements have been interfered with by either social welfare workers or others who have taken the misguided position that the police were infringing upon the rights of a minority group, whereas it was simply an exercise on the part of the law enforcement agencies to try to protect the community against lawlessness.

Mr. WIRIN. So far as we are concerned we have not appeared for any person wearing a zoot suit or any other unusual garb until the recent incidents in our community, which we considered approximating race riots.

Mr. COSTELLO. The recent incidents came out of direct lawlessness, and it wasn't a case of trying to create lawlessness on both sides. It was because an attack had been made on individual personnel of the Navy.

I agree with you that all persons who indulge in lawlessness, or taking the law into their own hands, should be treated equally before the law, and I think had an effort been made to do just that the situation would be different.

Mr. MUNDT. May we go back for just a moment to the problem which is immediately before the country, and that is the wisdom of releasing Japanese from the relocation centers, and the problem of determining upon their loyalty or disloyalty.

You apparently feel that before these Japanese are released from relocation centers, if they are to be released, that some type of screening, I believe it has been called, or some type of hearing—some type of investigation—should be made to determine which are loyal and which are disloyal; is that right?

Mr. WIRIN. That is true.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to ask you, Mr. Wirin, whether you feel you have had an opportunity today to present your viewpoint and the viewpoint of the American Civil Liberties Union, and also the Japanese Citizens League, in a complete manner, and that you have been accorded fair and courteous treatment?

Mr. WIRIN. I acknowledge I have been accorded courteous and fair treatment, and I should like the opportunity of submitting a memorandum on behalf of the Japanese Citizens League, because my statement about that organization has been very sketchy and I want to say one further word, and that is, while the granting of a clean bill of

health by the Dies committee has not necessarily been a mark of satisfaction, the Dies committee has—of the Civil Liberties Union, granted us a clean bill of health.

Sometime ago Mr. Hays, our general counsel, was before the committee and Mr. Dies made a statement that the Dies committee had investigated our organization and found it not to be subversive; so we appreciate small favors from wherever we get them. We hope you don't change your mind.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel if we permit you to file this memorandum of which you speak, you then will have been granted an adequate and fair hearing?

Mr. WIRIN. Yes. Of course, I would much rather, if you propose to make a report about the Japanese American Citizens League, that you permit one of its spokesmen who is familiar with its activities to speak for the organization.

Mr. COSTELLO. The purpose of these hearings is to inquire into the Japanese relocation center activities.

Mr. WIRIN. What I have in mind, the papers have intimated—I don't believe everything I read in the newspapers, but they have intimated that your committee is investigating the Japanese American Citizens League or has some opinion as to its alleged, subversive character.

If you intend to make some findings or report in that connection, I think in fairness some official of that organization should appear before the committee.

Mr. MUNDT. None of these hearings during the past 2 weeks have been directed to a determination of the loyalty or disloyalty of that organization. However, there have been some previous investigations, but not at this time; and I think the chairman will bear me out, we have not denied to any representative of the Japanese American Citizens League the privilege of appearing before our committee during the past 2 weeks.

Mr. WIRIN. They can't come here; they are in relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. The organization as such has not been a direct subject of our inquiry at all. I do not recall any statements with reference to it.

Mr. MUNDT. And you are the only person who has requested a hearing before the committee, representing that organization.

Mr. WIRIN. You have been very courteous and very fair, I admit, and am glad to admit it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That will conclude our hearings in Los Angeles.

The committee is going to make a visitation of the war relocation center at Poston, Ariz., tomorrow, and testimony will be taken at that time.

Following that it is the intention of the committee to return to Washington, and I expect hearings will be resumed there.

With that, the committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 2 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until Friday, June 18, 1943.)

# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JUNE 18, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Parker, Ariz.*

The subcommittee met at 6 p. m., in Room 26, Parker Hotel, Parker, Ariz., Hon. John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, and Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: James H. Steedman, investigator for the committee, acting counsel.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

For the purposes of the record I will state the committee visited the relocation center at Poston today and is assembled at this time for the purpose of hearing one or two witnesses.

As I understand it, Mr. Steedman, you have a statement you desire to make?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please be sworn.

## TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. STEEDMAN, INVESTIGATOR, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please state your full name?

Mr. STEEDMAN. James H. Steedman.

Mr. COSTELLO. And your occupation?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I am an attorney by occupation; I am an investigator for the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you proceed with your statement, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, this afternoon in company with Mr. Jack Ambrose, the committee reporter, and Mr. Ralph Stringfellow, the chief special agent for the Metropolitan Water District of California, I visited the warehouses near Parker.

Mr. COSTELLO. Warehouses belonging to the W. R. A.?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is right, sir.

And at the warehouse we interviewed a Mr. Sawyer.

In the first warehouse we visited, we found it to be full of cabinets.

Mr. COSTELLO. What type of cabinets?

Mr. STEEDMAN. They were large cabinets made out of plain lumber. Mr. Sawyer advised us those cabinets had been shipped into Parker

and had been in the warehouses for some time. I inquired of Mr. Sawyer if that type of work could be done by the Japanese evacuees at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean the construction of those cabinets?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes. And he advised us that there were many carpenters at Poston who were not doing anything and could do that type of work.

We proceeded then to the second warehouse and found what Mr. Sawyer termed "another carload of these same cabinets." We asked Mr. Sawyer if the Japanese could not also build cabinets of that type and he said they could.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have an estimate as to the number of cabinets in the two warehouses?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No, sir we didn't have time to count them but both warehouses were filled with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. What size would you say these warehouses are?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would say they are at least 75 feet square.

I asked Mr. Sawyer if he knew what they intended doing with the cabinets, and he said he thought they were ordered for use in connection with houses they were building for school teachers, but that he thought the Japanese carpenters at the center should be put to work to do that type of construction.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long had the cabinets been in the warehouses?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Sawyer stated they had been there for some time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they appear to be covered with dust and that they had been there for some length of time?

Mr. STEEDMAN. We could not tell that, Mr. Chairman.

From the looks of the cabinets they had not been there very long.

We proceeded from that warehouse to another warehouse containing huge refrigerating rooms. In one refrigerated compartment, according to Mr. Sawyer, was a carload of smoked bacon, pork loins, pork shoulders, frozen liver sausage and he said that had been there for 10 days and had not been touched up to that time.

While leaving that refrigerator, Mr. Sawyer pointed to a refrigerator box car standing on the railroad siding and said that they had just finished unloading a carload of spoiled spinach that had come there from the center at Granada, Colo.

He said they, meaning the employees at the warehouses, called the chief steward at Poston and told him the spinach was there; that it was all rotten, and what should they do with it.

The steward advised the employees at the warehouse at Parker to unload the spinach and they would feed it to the hogs. Mr. Sawyer told the chief steward, Mr. Snelson, that there was \$411 freight on this spinach and suggested that the spinach be rejected.

Mr. Sawyer advised us that Mr. Snelson said not to bother with that; to unload the spinach and they would feed it to the hogs.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did the warehousemen refuse to accept that shipment?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; he said they refused to accept it. It was then, he said, they called Mr. Snelson but Mr. Snelson said:

Send it on down and we will feed it to the hogs.

Mr. COSTELLO. And then the carload of spinach was unloaded?



Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what did the spinach weigh?

Mr. STEEDMAN. More than 14,000 pounds according to Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether that was the same spinach that members of the committee saw while going through the camp at Poston? We observed them throwing spinach into a ditch, crates and all?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I couldn't testify to that because I wasn't with the committee at that time. I was inspecting the warehouses.

Mr. COSTELLO. The members of the committee in the course of driving about the camps observed at least three truckloads on the project.

Mr. MUNDT. And Mr. Nelson who was driving the car in which I was traveling, said the spinach arrived from Granada, so that is apparently where the spinach came from, is it not?

Mr. STEEDMAN. That was the information furnished by Mr. Sawyer. I didn't see the bill of lading myself.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, the committee observed the destruction of the spinach concerning which you have been testifying.

Mr. MUNDT. I asked him why he didn't feed it to the hogs and he said:

It wasn't fit for the hogs.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think in response to a question by myself, "What is that being unloaded over there?" Mr. Head made a reply which I did not quite get. Perhaps you remember what he said. I think it was something to the effect that the material was spoiled. Isn't that what he said?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes; and he made no further comment other than it was stuff that had spoiled that was being thrown into a dry ditch, crates and all, directly from the trucks and at a considerable distance from the place where the hogs were kept. It evidently was not going to be retrucked to the hogpens.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Nelson who is in charge of No. 1 camp, and Mr. Empie, who were both in my car, said the spinach came from Granada and it arrived spoiled. I asked them why they didn't feed it to the hogs and he said:

The people there said it wasn't even fit for the hogs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I think it might be pointed out in connection—in that connection—Mr. Chairman, that at Granada there is another War Relocation Authority project. I inquired of Mr. Sawyer what in his opinion would have been the proper business practice to follow upon receipt of that spoiled spinach, and he advised me that the railroad was at fault for not properly icing the car and that the spinach should have been rejected when it arrived at the warehouse at Parker.

Mr. COSTELLO. But, according to your testimony, it was accepted by the project authorities and delivered to the project and apparently destroyed at the project.

Mr. STEEDMAN. I was so informed by Mr. Sawyer in the presence of Mr. Ambrose and Mr. Stringfellow.

Mr. Chairman, while we were at the warehouse, we were going over the ground rather carefully, and we saw a considerable amount of food on the ground and I asked Mr. Sawyer just where it came from,

and he told us that the Japanese who come up to the warehouse bring their lunches and then throw the food away.

We picked up some of the cheese sandwiches which I would like to show to the committee as an example of the cheese sandwiches that they make at Poston.

Here is another sandwich that was thrown away and here is a piece of cheese. For the record I judge it is about 4 inches square and about 1 inch thick. This was thrown away, according to Mr. Sawyer, by the Japanese.

He said not only do they throw away cheese like this but the Japanese also throw away meat sandwiches.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he explain why the Japanese do not use these sandwiches? In other words was it a dislike for the bread on which the sandwiches were made or what was the reason?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No. At that point he just said:

Last winter the Japanese refused to work or to eat unless the project furnished them hot lunches at the warehouse.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are there any facilities at the warehouse for serving hot lunches?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No. Mr. Sawyer advised us that the project sent trucks loaded with hot food to the warehouses for the Japanese working there.

I have finished my testimony regarding our visit to the warehouses, Mr. Chairman, and at this point I have a document, the heading of which is:

Background for the Relocation Program

It is also headed:

Prepared for Information of the Staff of the War Relocation Authority and Not For Publication.

And the word "not" is underscored.

I obtained this document from Mr. Townsend. On the back of the last page it has the stamp of the mails and files, "Received 4 o'clock, December 3, 1942, Poston, Ariz.," and I would like to introduce that into the record as an exhibit and quote from this document.

Mr. COSTELLO. I will authorize the quotation, and you may incorporate it in the record.

You say this is a document that Mr. Townsend gave to you and was taken from the files of the W. R. A. center at Poston and was prepared by the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I received the document from Mr. Townsend, and on the back it has the stamp, "Mails and Files, Poston." I am quoting from the document at page 10, under the title: "Relocation Program."

In every way the evacuees should be made to feel that it is *their* community and that its ultimate success or failure depends largely on their efforts. Fulllest possible latitude should be accorded to the residents in the conduct of their community affairs. Cooperation and not paternalism should be the guiding principle of all relationships between War Relocation Authority staff members and the relocation people.

I think the portion which I have just quoted will explain a lot of testimony that we have received during the last 2 weeks with regard to the coddling of Japanese. I believe that these camp directors are working under these instructions and that due to that fact they do give in to the Japanese.

I would like to quote now from page 11:

Under the leave regulations which became effective October 1, 1942, it is the policy of the War Relocation Authority to reestablish as many of the evacuees as possible in private life outside the relocation centers. Because of the widespread public apprehension toward all people of Japanese ancestry, individual relocation of the Japanese evacuees will obviously have to proceed slowly and without fanfare of publicity for many months to come. Wholesale discharge of the evacuees at this time would lead almost inevitably to the very type of situation that brought about curtailment of voluntary evacuation back in March. Within the limits of national security and administrative expediency, however, the Authority will work throughout the wartime period toward a gradual depopulation of the relocation centers and a dispersal of those evacuees about whom there is no question of loyalty. In the last analysis, the relocation centers should be regarded not as places of detention or confinement, but as way stations on the road to individual relocation and reassimilation into American life.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the date of that document?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The date of this document—it was received at Poston on December 3, 1942.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that was subsequent to the visit of Dillon S. Myer?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe so, and I think this document indicates the War Relocation Authority intends to relocate the Japanese in as quiet a manner as possible.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is the program that was being put into effect that Dillon Myer had suggested in his talk at Poston on November 17, 1942?

Mr. STEEDMAN. I would assume that, sir, without having the facts before me.

I also have a document dated October 23, 1942:

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY,  
Washington, D. C., October 23, 1942.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 8

##### SUPPLEMENT 5

Subject: Information regarding outside employment.

Negotiations for individual employment of evacuees outside relocation centers under the leave regulations effective October 1 are not a proper subject for press releases or public announcements by staff members of the War Relocation Authority. Requests from newspaper representatives for information of this kind should be referred in all cases to the prospective employer for reply.

D. S. MYER, *Director*.

This memorandum was furnished me this morning at my request by Mr. Wade Head, the project director at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. And what is the date of that?

Mr. STEEDMAN. The date of this memorandum is October 23, 1942.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is a memorandum that was received at Poston on that date or was it issued in Washington under that date?

Mr. STEEDMAN. It is dated October 23, 1942. I don't know what date it was received at Poston, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it indicates no publicity should be given to that particular document?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, sir. I believe these two documents indicate that the War Relocation Authority intended to relocate the Japanese without any publicity whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am handing you a copy of the Poston Chronicle dated June 18, which is today. You will observe on the front page an article referring to that particular notice or possibly to another notice, which was posted in the center?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes, sir; I have read that. Do you want to put that into the record at this point?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

(The clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 1," and made a part of the record.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, the memorandum which you just handed me is entitled, "Office of Outside Employment," and is dated "Thursday, June 17, 1943." I quote from the last paragraph of the memorandum you just handed me.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might state for the record that that memorandum was taken from the wall of one of the buildings at the Poston center today:

Robert Dollins, War Relocation Authority relocation officer stationed in Washington, has written this office inviting any one interested in doing farm work in Washington, D. C., Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware, to go directly without definite employment to those places and he will see to it that placement will be made immediately upon arriving. Mr. Dollins points out, however, that to be eligible under this program the applicant must already have his eastern defense clearance.

Mr. Chairman, there is a news item in the Poston Chronicle of June 18, 1943, entitled "Farmers May Leave for Eastern Area," which refers back to the memorandum which I just quoted from.

Mr. COSTELLO. The newspaper will be made an official exhibit and appended to the transcript of the hearing.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 2" and made a part of the record.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Yes; that concludes my testimony.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you call your next witness?

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Washum.

#### TESTIMONY OF JIM WASHUM, DEPUTY SHERIFF, YUMA COUNTY, ARIZ.

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. WASHUM. Jim Washum.

Mr. COSTELLO. And your occupation?

Mr. WASHUM. Deputy sheriff of Yuma County, Ariz.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long have you been deputy sheriff?

Mr. WASHUM. Eight and a half years now.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is your station at Parker, Ariz.?

Mr. WASHUM. I live at Parker and have the north end of the county.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You represent the sheriff of Yuma County for the northern end of the county?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. As I understand, the city of Parker is unincorporated?



Mr. WASHUM. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And throws the burden of law enforcement upon you here in the city of Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. Upon the sheriff's office; yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Since the Japanese relocation center was established at Poston, have you had occasion to visit the center?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes; I go down there quite often.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you frequently receive reports from people who are working in the center, and from people who go there frequently?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And also from people in and around Poston and Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Washum, have you received reports that the Japanese were fishing in an irrigation canal near the railroad bridge and the highway just above Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. I received a report of that about a week ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who reported that to you?

Mr. WASHUM. Mr. Roland—Henry Roland, who works for the agency, Indian Agency in Parker. He told me he saw them, six or eight of them, fishing at the tunnel here, the irrigation canal tunnel underneath the railroad and the highway.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And that tunnel runs under the railroad bridge at that point?

Mr. WASHUM. Runs under the railroad and highway.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were the Japanese in Government trucks?

Mr. WASHUM. They had a Government truck there he said, and they were fishing off of the heading of this tunnel, I guess you would call it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he ask them to leave?

Mr. WASHUM. He told them to—"You had better get out of here," is what he told me he said, "You have no business around here."

Mr. COSTELLO. And would that be on the Arizona side of the river?

Mr. WASHUM. It is on the Arizona side, yes; just at the end of the two bridges, the highway and the railroad bridge.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is the highway leading from the Arizona side into California across the river?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir; and the canal that irrigates the reservation down there.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the Japanese move when he told them to?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes. He said they left the tunnel underneath the highway and the railroad there and they were fishing off the head of that concrete heading at one end of the tunnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Washum, do you know Mr. Miller who is the director of internal security at Poston?

Mr. WASHUM. I know a Mr. Miller down there. I know him as the chief of police.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you seen him in the last day or two?

Mr. WASHUM. I saw him last evening.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he discuss with you the problem of the Japanese being in Parker with you last night?

Mr. WASHUM. He did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he tell you last night that if you saw any Japanese in Parker after this morning to run them out of town?

Mr. WASHUM. Well, from then on; from the time he told me.

Mr. STEEDMAN. From the time he told you last night?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He said that he did not want any Japanese in Parker after that date, is that correct?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did that refer to any Japanese who might be traveling by train and leaving the relocation center and going to some other location?

Mr. WASHUM. No. He told me that the day before—day before yesterday that they had a complaint that there was a number of Japanese in town here in Government trucks and someone had taken the numbers of the trucks and telephoned down and reported it and he asked me if I had seen them.

I wasn't in town that day and I told him "No," that I had not seen them and he went on to tell me, "From now on any Japanese that you catch on the streets here, run them out of town," and he said if any had Government trucks to take the numbers of the trucks and call him and report it to him.

I told him that we didn't have a quarantine on Japs any more. We did have a quarantine on them for awhile. There was infantile paralysis but I told him the quarantine expired and I didn't know on what authority I could run them out of town and he said the order had been issued for them not to come to town any more.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he say who the order had been issued by?

Mr. WASHUM. No, he didn't.

Mr. MUNDT. Did he indicate it was a recent order?

Mr. WASHUM. He talked as though it was. I understood it was just a recent order.

Mr. MUNDT. Normally during the past 10 days or 2 weeks, did you see many Japanese on the street at Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. Not as many as there once was, but I have seen them in the mercantile stores and hardware stores and drugstores.

Mr. MUNDT. Within the last 10 days?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes; I have seen quite a number in the hardware store in the last week or 10 days.

Mr. MUNDT. Apparently making purchases?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Japanese in the Poston relocation center purchased a large number of hunting knives recently?

Mr. WASHUM. That is not of my own knowledge. According to hearsay they have been.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has anybody reported that fact to you?

Mr. WASHUM. I have had people tell me that they had seen them buying hunting knives down there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did more than one person tell you that?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes; I have had several people tell me that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Buying hunting knives from the hardware store?

Mr. WASHUM. From the hardware store here in Parker; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Japanese are permitted to leave the relocation center at Poston?

Mr. WASHUM. Well, I know that they do leave. I have seen them all over the north end of the county by themselves in Government trucks with no guard or escort of any kind with them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the people of Parker concerned about the possibility of sabotage at the Parker Dam?

Mr. WASHUM. A lot of them are. A lot of people here think it is possible that they could sabotage anything around here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Because they are out and without escorts and in Government automobiles; is that correct?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. When the Japanese were settled at Poston, do you know whether or not citizens of Parker received assurances that the Japanese would not come up to Parker to shop and to visit?

Mr. WASHUM. I remember one man in here—I can't remember his name or what department of the Government he worked for, but he represented himself to be as a Government man.

He said that he came to town to talk with people and see what the attitude of them was toward the Japanese coming here, and he told me at that time that they would never under any circumstances allow any Japanese on the streets of Parker.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was that information disseminated generally around Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. That is the impression he left here with the people he talked to. I don't know how many he talked to but that is what he told me.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that a man from the Washington office or from the local project?

Mr. WASHUM. No; I think he was from the coast.

Mr. MUNDT. Probably from the regional office?

Mr. WASHUM. I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. By the way, what is the name of this hardware man who allegedly has been selling knives to the Japanese?

Mr. WASHUM. R. H. Thompson.

Mr. STEEDMAN. We have had considerable testimony before the committee to the effect that last November the Japanese either had a strike or a riot in Poston. What is your information on that point?

Mr. WASHUM. I understood it was a general riot. I was never down there during that time.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did you receive any reports on it?

Mr. WASHUM. I talked to a lot of different fellows who were working there and talked to them continually about it all the time it was going on.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did I understand you to say this afternoon that Mr. Head announced that the riot or strike was off and yet it was still in progress?

Mr. WASHUM. At the time that Mr. Head had in the papers his announcement that the strike was broken because the loyal American Japanese did their part in breaking up the strike, a number of different fellows that worked at the camp were telling me that it was going on just as strong as it ever was.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you visit the center during the course of that strike?

Mr. WASHUM. I never did; no sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the people of Parker are satisfied with the present management of the camp?

Mr. WASHUM. No, sir; they are not. The majority of them are not. Of course, you will find a few businessmen here in Parker, two or three of them, who would like to see the Japanese turned loose and sent up to town and do their shopping, but you will find a number of businessmen here that won't sell a Jap anything.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the Lions Club of Parker at one time send a committee to the project suggesting that they let a limited number of Japanese come to Parker to shop?

Mr. WASHUM. I couldn't say.

Mr. MUNDT. You haven't heard that they did?

Mr. WASHUM. I don't believe the Lions Club did, no, sir; I don't believe they did. That movement was around here—some of the businessmen were talking of doing that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does the sheriff of Yuma County maintain an office here in Parker, and do you operate out of that office?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, I have an office here.

Mr. COSTELLO. So if any complaints were to be made on the part of the people here in Parker, they would be addressed to you at your office here?

Mr. WASHUM. They would be made to me; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. So by reason of that you have many of the people in Parker come to you and register complaints concerning the Japanese being in the city of Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes—well, not in the way of complaints so much as just come to me, talking about it, and to tell me that they had seen a Jap do this or that they had seen a bunch of Japs unescorted and things of that kind.

Mr. COSTELLO. They try to bring to you facts that they feel you, as deputy sheriff of this county should have?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And leave those facts with you so they might be helpful to you?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And in that way you do receive considerable information from the people here in this community?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. That is all I want to ask the sheriff, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If I may ask one question of the sheriff. Has there been any trouble in the city of Parker within the last 6 months; that is, unusual trouble in any respect?

Mr. WASHUM. You mean caused by the Japs?

Mr. EBERHARTER. In the way of violence or in the way of disputes or in the way of excessive drinking, or has the work of the law-enforcement officers been increased in the past 6 months?

Mr. WASHUM. The biggest increase we had in business was during the construction of those camps when we had all the construction workers in here. We had an awful increase in business at that time. But, of course, we have more business now than we did 2 years back. You have a lot more people here than we did then, but we haven't had a great increase in business in the last few months.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Any increase in law-enforcement activities was the natural result of an increase in the number of people living in Parker?



Mr. WASHUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you say that the fact that the Japanese have been coming to the town of Parker has had any effect in increasing your duties as a law-enforcement officer?

Mr. WASHUM. Well, not in the town here. Of course, we have jurisdiction over the Japanese so far as State law is concerned.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. WASHUM. And we have had a few cases down there. Of course, that causes a lot of work, when we have a felony case or something like that there in the Japanese camp. When that happens we have to take it to Yuma to prosecute it and that causes a lot of extra work.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You have been caused extra work by reason of matters arising within the camp?

Mr. WASHUM. Oh, yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But insofar as the Japs being visitors in Parker and the surrounding area, that has not increased your duties as a law-enforcement officer?

Mr. WASHUM. When they were sending them up here shopping a few weeks ago—they used to send up 25 or 30 a day shopping, and we had to watch them pretty close because there are always some drunks or somebody else going to whip a bunch of them.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is some American citizens who feel resentment toward the Japanese, in general, would be inclined to start trouble?

Mr. WASHUM. That is right, both civilians and soldiers.

We had a soldier who went in a drugstore and there was a Jap in there and he was going to clean them out. He was about half drunk.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So the presence of these Japanese from the relocation center is a source of irritation to the people of Parker?

Mr. WASHUM. It is; yes. And it causes us extra work in that we just have to hang around to keep some of them from getting hurt and causes a lot of trouble.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you knowing the temper of the people in this area, feel that it may be the cause of a major disturbance sometime?

Mr. WASHUM. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all; thank you.

Mr. WASHUM. You have got a number of people here that have got boys in the Army—got several of them that have boys in the Army that have been killed by the Japanese and they walk into a drugstore for a Coca-Cola or something and the Japanese have all the seats, and they walk into the grocery store and the Japanese are crowded in there and you have got to mill your way around them and they resent that.

Mr. COSTELLO. So you feel the temper of the people is such that it is just not wise for the peace and quiet of the community to allow the two to mix together—the Japanese people with the white people?

Mr. WASHUM. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But actually your office has not had any cases against Japanese for law violations outside of the center at Poston?

Mr. WASHUM. No; the only law violations we have had to take care of among the Japanese have been in the center.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only time your office has been called in has been to remove Japanese from the center?

Mr. WASHUM. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. For violations of regulations there for which they had been apprehended?

Mr. WASHUM. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Sheriff.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STEEDMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Ralph Stringfellow.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you please stand and be sworn.

**TESTIMONY OF RALPH STRINGFELLOW, SPECIAL AGENT, METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA**

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Ralph Stringfellow.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed, Mr. Steedman.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What is your present address?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Earp, Calif.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And what is your occupation?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Special agent for the metropolitan water district of southern California.

Mr. MUNDT. Where is Earp, Calif., located?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Just across the river. It is just a mile across the river. That is the railroad junction on the California side of the Colorado River.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How long have you been chief special agent for the metropolitan water district?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have been with the metropolitan water district going on 11 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Prior to your employment with the metropolitan water district, what type of work were you engaged in?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I was in police work for the United States Government.

Mr. STEEDMAN. You have had many years of police experience, is that correct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir. Before I went with the Government I was in the Los Angeles sheriff's office.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What are your duties as chief special agent for the metropolitan water district?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. The protection of life and property on the metropolitan water district system.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And does that system include pumping plants and the aqueduct system?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. It does.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And does that aqueduct system supply water to Los Angeles?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. It supplies water not only to Los Angeles but to 13 coastal cities as well as to Camp Young, the largest desert training center there is in the country, as well as Camp Hahn, Marsh Field, and all of the camps along the desert.

Mr. COSTELLO. You are referring now to water supply?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes; that is water supply. The power comes from the Government plant at Parker Dam and not from the metropolitan water district.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And the water that is supplied the cities and training camps you have just named goes into the aqueduct by means of an intake pump at the Parker Reservoir, is that correct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir; 2 miles upstream from the dam.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is the reservoir back of Parker Dam known as Lake Huavasu?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. How far is that from the Poston project?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, it would be 36 miles.

Mr. MUNDT. From the boundary of the project?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir; from the boundary of the project. Of course our project runs closer than that to Poston. You see that is just the intake of the plant.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the closest point your project goes to the relocation center?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I would say 18 miles. That is an estimate.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Since the beginning of the construction of the aqueduct system, have you been employed by the metropolitan water district?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And during that period have you escorted engineers from foreign countries up and down the length of the aqueduct system?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have. I have escorted engineers from practically every country in the world.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you escorted Japanese engineers on similar trips?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. At least once a year for 9 years.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And have the Japanese engineers surveyed the aqueduct system during that period?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They didn't survey the aqueduct system but they had access to the maps and access to any part of the aqueduct that they desired to see, up until December 7, 1941—the time of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. STEEDMAN. What was the date upon which Japanese engineers last made a survey or inspection of the aqueduct system?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. About 2 years ago.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you recall how many Japanese engineers were in the party?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. A party of four.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they Japanese engineers from Japan or American Japanese?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I couldn't answer that question. They were sent to me with instructions to take them over the system, or I would meet them in a certain section where I would show them that part of the project.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it your understanding that they were taken over the complete project from time to time from one end to the other?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right. They start in, for instance, and go, say, to what we call division 5. Well, all right, there the superintendent took care of them and then they come to No. 4 and that superintendent would take care of them and then 3, 2, and 1. All right, there would be a section where there would be no one there. That is what we would call the "lay-off period" and it was up to me to take care of them at that time.

Ordinarily they were conducted by engineers of the company.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, were Japanese discovered measuring the flow and depth of water in Lake Havasue?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They were.

Mr. STEEDMAN. By whom?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. By a United States game warden by the name of Jim Meadows.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Meadows report that fact to you?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. He did.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where is Mr. Meadows today?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. He is in the hospital. He was bit by a rattlesnake night before last.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he would have been here today to testify had he not been bitten?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. He would.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did he give you any facts concerning the apprehension of the Japanese on Lake Havasu?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. He told me they were measuring the depth and speed of the water and the width of the current—of the stream.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were these Japanese in a boat?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir they were in a boat. The boat was launched from the Kingman side of the river.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And did Mr. Meadows report that also to his office?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I don't know whether he made a report to his office or not, but he made a report to me.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they doing that without permission?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Oh, yes, without permission. I took a boat the minute that he notified me—I took a fast boat and I went up there because 6 months before Pearl Harbor we made it a policy that no pictures whatsoever should be taken and regardless of who took the pictures I opened the cameras and spoiled the films.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever take any cameras away from any Japanese around Parker Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have.

Mr. MUNDT. How many?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. One Jap had seven cameras in a panel truck up on the river for 2 days. This was about 6 months before Pearl Harbor. And I opened his cameras and spoiled all the film that he had with him, and his good film and the film he had taken I exposed it all.

Mr. MUNDT. Were the Japanese taking a definite interest in the Parker Dam and the Los Angeles aqueduct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir; a very definite interest in it in that they have maps showing every foot of it, showing every syphon, showing every tunnel, showing every pump house.

Mr. MUNDT. How do you know that?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Because I saw the maps that they had.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the time they came to inspect the aqueduct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. When they came they were given maps and they made maps of their own and added to those maps.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Has any dynamite been stolen from the metropolitan water district during the last 60 or 90 days?



Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Not from the metropolitan water district, but 7 cases of dynamite was stolen 3 miles east of here; and it was not stolen by any miners because the dynamite stolen was inch and a quarter by 12 dynamite. No miner will ever dig a hole that big—an inch and a quarter when he can dig a three-quarter-inch hole and use three-quarter-inch dynamite.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Where was that dynamite stolen from?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Three miles east of here—out of a tunnel.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know who the dynamite belonged to?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No. Mr. Washum can give you that information. And less than 3 weeks ago the Government magazine was broken into here. They tried to get into the dynamite magazine but couldn't make that, but they did get into the cap magazine and got 100 fulminate of mercury caps.

Mr. MUNDT. Were any clues found indicating who might have done either of those things?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No.

Mr. MUNDT. And that material has never been recovered?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No.

Mr. STEEDMAN. In other words when the dynamite was stolen no caps were available to the thieves?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; no caps were there.

Mr. STEEDMAN. But later on some caps were stolen?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is an investigation being conducted with reference to the stolen dynamite?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. There is by the Bureau of Mines, by the F. B. I., and by Mr. Washum. This was all stolen in Arizona, you understand.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words the dynamite to which you refer was stolen from the Arizona side of the river?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. When you refer to a "tunnel," are you referring to the aqueduct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; not the aqueduct. It is a tunnel over here in the hills 3 miles east of town.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is the purpose of that tunnel?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I haven't been there and I haven't seen it.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was not dynamite belonging to the metropolitan water district?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. To whom did it belong?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I couldn't tell you. All I have is a report, and after receiving the report I went through the mines on the California side in the Whipple Mountains and inspected the dynamite that they had to see what they were using.

Mr. COSTELLO. That dynamite was taken out of a mining tunnel located on the Arizona side of the river?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How many guards are there on duty at the intake pumping plant at Lake Huavasu?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have four all told. I have one man on day shift and one man on swing shift and one man on night shift. Then I have what we call a lap-shift between 7 at night until 5 in the morning, which throws a double guard on there during the night hours.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Your responsibility goes only so far as the intake pumping station, is that correct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Starts there; yes.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And you have one man per shift at the intake pumping plant plus the spread shift that you mentioned?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is that an adequate guard at that important intake station?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; and the reason we have so few is because we can't get men, and the men we are working today are of such type that a year and a half ago we wouldn't even consider interviewing them or letting them in the office to interview them much less waste our time talking to them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At one time did you have satisfactory guards?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. At one time I had a good system, yes; but the State guard was organized and they took over. Of course that threw my organization out and now when I am trying to reorganize you cannot get men today.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the State guard supposed to be offering protection for the aqueduct system?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They were but they were disbanded.

Mr. COSTELLO. For about how long a time did they do that?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They came in July last year and they were disbanded the 26th day of last month.

And to show you the type of men that I hired, I hired 26 men out of the State guard when they were discharged, to do guard duty and I even went so far as to go to the adjutant general to get them discharged early so I would have them on the 26th. They weren't to be discharged until the 1st and I ended up with 4 of them and those 4 are gone now.

Mr. COSTELLO. What age were most of the State guards?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They were men up around 45 and above that. They are typical winos, as we would say; they came off of deep-five in Los Angeles. Strictly winos, a pay day and they are gone.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that the guard you have now?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes; that I hired out of the State guard.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are you satisfied with the present guard force that you have?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I certainly am not.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you feel that the metropolitan water district's aqueduct which supplies the Army camps, Los Angeles, and the coastal cities you have mentioned, is adequately protected?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, that is a problem. Naturally I am not qualified to answer that because of the fact I cannot speak for the metropolitan water district. I can only speak for myself, but in my opinion it certainly is not protected at all.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you communicated that fact to the metropolitan water district officials?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Very much so. In other words, we are working—we are getting the best we can and doing the best job we can.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether they have applied to the Governor of the State for additional guards?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No I don't know that.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does the Japanese center at Poston complicate in your mind, the protection you are trying to give to the metropolitan water district's aqueduct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Absolutely. I have absolutely no trust whatsoever in a Jap. I went to school with them in the years starting 1909 clear up through 1916 in Los Angeles, and I know what they are and I know what their education was and I know that when they get through with our schools they put the same number of hours in in the Japanese schools, and when they graduated from our schools they went to Tokyo.

And I have gone so far as to issue orders to my men if they see a Jap on the aqueduct, kill him, because I don't trust a one of them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have any Japanese been discovered around Parker Dam within the last 2 or 3 weeks?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No. About 2 months ago Mr. Meadows apprehended two on the Bill Williams River.

Mr. STEEDMAN. How far is that from the Parker Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. About 5 miles.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Were they Japanese from the relocation center at Poston?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes; 36 miles away from it.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Did Mr. Meadows question the Japanese?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. As to what he did I couldn't tell you. He just told me that he caught them up there. That is out of my jurisdiction. You understand the lake belongs to the Government.

Mr. STEEDMAN. So the Government is responsible for the protection of the lake and Parker Dam is that correct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is correct.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know how many guards the Government has at Parker Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Day before yesterday they had 32. What they have got today I don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are they civilian guards?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir; they are handicapped the same as I am.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Thirty-two guards to guard the Parker Dam 24 hours a day, is that correct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right. Not only Parker Dam but the generating plant.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know the length of the shore line of Lake Huavasu?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, the lake is backed up 55 miles to Needles, so that would be 110 miles of shore line.

Mr. COSTELLO. But actually the shore line would be much longer than that?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, on account of the coves.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there a current flowing through that lake sufficiently so dynamite on a raft might float down and explode at the dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, there is; and I will give you a demonstration of that.

Six or seven months ago we had a fatality up there in the river. A boat sank. You see there is one boat that is allowed to operate on the lake. That is Mr. Halstead's boat. Mr. Halstead is mining manganese for the Government and he is allowed to bring the boat down

the lake loaded with manganese and ship the manganese from Parker Dam. His boat sank in the middle of the lake. One man was recovered within 100 yards of where the boat sank; the other man was recovered 7 days later 18 miles down the lake.

Mr. STEEDMAN. At the dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Really in the mouth of the Bill Williams River 18 miles away is where he was recovered.

Mr. MUNDT. Which proves there is sufficient current to float a raft down to the dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Absolutely.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you know whether or not the Japanese at the Poston relocation center are permitted to leave the center for overnight trips?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I was told by the procurement officer——

Mr. STEEDMAN. And who is the procurement officer?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. At Poston? I don't know what his name is, but he is the procurement officer down there. He is tall, rather reddish hair, and a rather prominent nose.

He told me that they leave there with a pack on their backs and they are gone from 3 to 7 days at a time and they can't tell you right now how many men they have got in that camp because they don't know.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Why don't they know?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They have no check on them. They depend on the Japs to tell them how many Japanese they have in each block.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is it your opinion that the Poston relocation center is run in a very loose manner?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Very loose.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Have you discussed this problem of Japanese being allowed to roam around in this area with Mr. Head?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have not.

Mr. COSTELLO. That would not be proper subject of your work?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; that would be up to the proper officials of the metropolitan water district.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would it be reasonably feasible for Japanese from the center to evade the guards on the highway leading into the center if they desired to leave Poston?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Very very easy for them to get out. In fact I am satisfied in my own mind that the train wreck we had last June was absolutely nothing but sabotage, and I think it came out of the Jap camp.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you have occasion to examine the wreck at that time?

• Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I did.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether the Santa Fe Railroad Co. settled for damages arising out of that wreck?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They did. The doctor from Poston—I don't have his name, but I do have it in my files at the office, the doctor figured out, Mr. Head told me, that his settlement amounted to about \$1,100 above costs.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would it be difficult for the Japanese to wander out of the center and across the desert and make contact with other persons?



Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; it wouldn't be difficult. They could swim the river and after they swim that river they only have—well, they have anywhere from a quarter of a mile to 3 miles to get to the highway.

Mr. COSTELLO. During the summertime when the heat might be excessive, they probably would not wander out into the desert?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is true, but by carrying a one gallon water bag, you can travel all day across this desert regardless of the heat.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether the Japanese have any peculiar fear of the desert or anything like that?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; I don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. That might lead them to hesitate about venturing into the desert country?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; only to this extent, that we have found them up here in the hills quite some miles away from camp, and this is certainly all desert around here.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you find them traveling in Government automobiles?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have seen as high as seven Government automobiles parked over here and Japs unloading out of them. Every truck was loaded to the gunwales with Japs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there considerable feeling in Parker against the Japanese coming into the city?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir, there is. In fact on this whole river—that is from here on up the resentment is very great.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Are the people of Parker and the Parker Valley favorable to having the Japanese settled in those communities?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. The people I know in Parker and in the Parker Valley certainly don't want them, and the people, I know, on the California side certainly don't want them.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you believe your opinion represents the general opinion of this area?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I do.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Is there any additional information you have which you would like to give to the committee?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No, I can't think of anything else unless you want to refer to the trip we made this afternoon.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I testified regarding the visit we made to the warehouses this afternoon. It might be well for the sake of the record, since I am an employee of the committee that Mr. Stringfellow relate just what happened.

Mr. COSTELLO. You might give your own statement regarding the incident.

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, I took the two gentlemen down to the warehouses and—

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you name the two gentlemen whom you took to the warehouses?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Mr. James Steedman and Mr. Jack Ambrose. I found the man I was looking for. He was standing with another man on the platform looking down the railroad track.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you might name that man.

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Mr. Cy Hennerd.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the name of the other man?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I don't know the other man's name.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there any objection to his name being in the record?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; he doesn't care. Just a moment—the other man's name was Sawyer.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are both of those men employees of the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And are they in charge of the warehouse?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They are employed at the warehouse. I told Mr. Sawyer who these gentlemen were, and that they wanted to see the place, so he introduced himself to us and we started out.

He said: "There is something you might be interested in," and I said, "What," and he said, "Well, that cheese laying on the railroad tracks. This is where the Japs eat."

So we went down and picked up this cheese. There was quite a bit of cheese there. And as we started off there was a sack with more cheese in it.

Then we went on down and went through the warehouses and saw what was in the warehouses and what was in the refrigerators.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he mention anything to you about a carload of spinach?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I was going to tell you about the carload of spinach. He told us that carload of spinach was on the track and was spoiled, and that the chief steward accepted it anyway and it cost the Government \$410.

Mr. COSTELLO. According to his statement the chief steward, Snelson, accepted it at the track?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir; knowing that it was spoiled.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did Mr. Snelson have an opportunity to inspect the spinach before he accepted it?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the spinach was unloaded?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes; on Government trucks.

Mr. COSTELLO. On Poston trucks?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And removed?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Hauled out to feed to the hogs. That is what I wanted to add.

When I left here I got 10 miles out and I broke down and I had to call for a car to come and get me and while I was waiting, Mr. Joplin came by in his truck, which is a 1-ton Chevrolet pick-up truck, and it was loaded with spinach. He was hauling it up to feed it to his own hogs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Who is Mr. Joplin?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. He is a man here in town that has a hog ranch up on the California side of the river.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Does he buy garbage from the Poston relocation center?

(No answer.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he talk to you concerning that particular truck load of spinach?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No; but I saw the spinach go by and I know there is only one place you can get that much spinach in Parker; it had to come from Poston. It couldn't come from any place else.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no spinach grown adjacent to Parker?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What time in the afternoon was that?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That was approximately 4:30 California time.

Mr. MUNDT. What time would that be in Arizona?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. 5:30.

Mr. MUNDT. I might say that we saw them dumping this same spinach you speak of out on the desert and it wasn't fed to the hogs. It may be he either shoveled it back in his truck and brought it here inasmuch as they were simply dumping in ditches.

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Sawyer told us the orders were to take it out and feed it to the hogs.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Will you tell the committee what you saw in the relocation center's cold-storage plant at Parker?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, they have three large refrigerators there and in one refrigerator there was bacon, pork loins, pork shoulders, liver sausage, and other articles.

We went to the next refrigerator and it was full of roofing paper, and we went to the next refrigerator, and it was all roofing paper and the refrigeration system was on and it was down to 26°.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there any purpose in putting roofing paper in a freezing temperature?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Not that I can conceive of. I might add that to my knowledge that roofing paper has been in the ice box now for over a month.

Mr. MUNDT. Is there a shortage of storage space in the warehouses? Do they have to store the paper in the ice box?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I couldn't conceive of it. I saw plenty of warehouse space there today.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Had they turned off the refrigerating unit in those two cold-storage rooms? And I am speaking of the room where the roofing paper was stored?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They could have turned it off, but they said they had stacked the paper up against the switch and now they couldn't reach it.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the dimension of the refrigerators you are speaking about?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Oh, I couldn't tell you the size of them. They are hard to estimate because we came in out of the sun and it was real cold in there, but there was a full carload of meat in one refrigerator and I don't think it took up more than 15 or 20 percent of the space.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think that each refrigerator might accommodate as much as five or six carloads?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I would say so; yes; judging from the carload that was in there.

Mr. MUNDT. You don't mean to tell us there were 10 carloads of roofing paper in the refrigerators?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I couldn't tell how much was in there because all we saw was by the front door. Now, how far back it went, I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any questions, Mr. Eberharter?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Stringfellow, you testified there were seven cases of dynamite stolen?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I did.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How many pounds of dynamite would that be?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That would be 350 pounds of dynamite.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Three hundred and fifty pounds?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How much damage would 350 pounds do? You see we are not experts when it comes to dynamiting and I doubt if any person who reads this testimony will be experts on it, so I would like to know how much damage, say, 10 pounds of dynamite would do or 50 pounds or 100 pounds?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, I will put it this way. A dam, regardless of what dam it is, is built to hold only six times the dead weight of the water back of it. That is the tensile strength of a dam, and with the proper placing of 350 pounds of dynamite Parker Dam could be materially damaged.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And later on enough caps were stolen to set this dynamite off?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Three hundred and fifty pounds of dynamite could be set off with only one cap.

Mr. EBERHARTER. With only one cap?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes.

Mr. MÜNDT. How long would it take you to fix such a charge or dynamite? Could you do it in the course of one dark night?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. One night; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. One other line of questioning, Mr. Stringfellow: Between the relocation center and Parker, is there any patrol of any sort which could intercept or would intercept any Japs going along the road?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Not to my knowledge there isn't. There are only two officers in this vicinity and that is Mr. Bud Roberts and Deputy Sheriff Washum.

Mr. EBERHARTER. My interest in that question is this: If an evacuee at the camp got out of the bounds of the camp itself and then made a cut through the desert to get to the road, if he got safely to the road and got transportation he wouldn't have any difficulty whatever in getting into Parker, is that correct?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How far would he have to travel away from where the military police are stationed, who require passes to get in and out of the camp? Do you understand what I mean?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. He could make about a half mile circle.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And then he could get back to the road?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. To give him plenty of leeway he could make a 1 mile circle or a half mile circle. By doing that he could go around that guard very, very easily.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do the military police patrol the road between Parker and the relocation center?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. I have never seen any on it.

Mr. COSTELLO. For the purpose of the record, no power is generated at Parker Dam, is there?



Mr. STRINGFELLOW. There is; yes, sir. There are four 25,000 K. V. A. units right now in commercial use.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the power lines extend in which direction from the dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. At the present time they are all going to Arizona. They are going to Phoenix, Tucson, Yuma, and Bagdad.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is, the power generated at the Parker Dam site is used exclusively in Arizona?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, and any excess power is sent back to Boulder and is used as —

Mr. COSTELLO. That power is developed for use in southern California—the power at Boulder Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. How far is Boulder Dam from Parker Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Well, by stream, 155 miles; by road 185 miles.

Mr. COSTELLO. And Boulder Dam is north of Parker Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Yes; upstream.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to develop one other thing. If a Japanese would evade the guards nearby the entrance to the relocation center and got onto one of the main roads and then started to travel by automobile towards Parker Dam, is there any patrol which would be likely to intercept him?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. They would not be intercepted until they arrived at Parker Dam proper, which is gate No. 1 of the Bureau of Reclamation, where there is only one man on duty.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So there are no military police patrolling the highway between the relocation center and Parker Dam?

Mr. STRINGFELLOW. Not to my knowledge there is not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are there any further questions?

Mr. STEEDMAN. No further questions; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. If there are no further questions, we thank you very much, Mr. Stringfellow, for your testimony.

The committee will stand adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 7:30 p. m., the hearing adjourned.)



# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

THURSDAY, JULY 1, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., in room 1301, House Office Building, the Honorable John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Hon. Noah M. Mason, Hon. Wirt Courtney, and Hon. J. Parnell Thomas.

Also present: Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator; J. B. Matthews, director of research for the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will come to order. The purpose of the hearing is to continue the investigation which has been conducted on the Pacific coast. The Dies committee previously has investigated the activities of the Japanese Government and its agents in this country, and this investigation is a continuance of that investigation conducted during the past 3 or 4 years.

Having conducted hearings on the west coast, we want to now call on the administration and others acquainted with the activities in connection with the Japanese relocation centers located in the western section of the country.

Mr. Stripling, will you call the first witness.

Mr. STRIPLING. The first witness will be Mr. Paul Abe.

## TESTIMONY OF PAUL YOZO ABE

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you state your full name to the reporter?

Mr. ABE. Paul Yozo Abe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, will you state where you were born?

Mr. ABE. Seattle, Wash.

Mr. STRIPLING. What year?

Mr. ABE. April 11, 1914.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you married?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you give us the name of your wife?

Mr. ABE. Ida Abe.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is her full name?

Mr. ABE. What do you mean?

Mr. STRIPLING. What is her maiden name?

Mr. ABE. Her maiden name is Nakamura.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where is your wife employed?

Mr. ABE. Civil Service Commission.

Mr. STRIPLING. What division of the Civil Service Commission?

Mr. ABE. Classification.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do either you or your wife have any relatives living in Japan?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you please state for the record the names of those relatives?

Mr. ABE. My relatives, they are on my parents' side. I don't know, because I haven't met them. As for my wife, she has a brother over there, but other than that I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where does her brother live in Japan?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry; I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether or not he is in the Japanese Army?

Mr. ABE. Yes; he is.

Mr. STRIPLING. He is in the Japanese Army?

Mr. ABE. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, when did you come to Washington?

Mr. ABE. In September of 1936.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you receive your college education in Washington?

Mr. ABE. I have not received a degree yet.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where did you attend college in Washington?

Mr. ABE. George Washington University.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state your first employment after you arrived in Washington?

Mr. ABE. The Japanese Embassy.

Mr. STRIPLING. In what capacity?

Mr. ABE. First I came here as chauffeur and then after a while I was promoted to a clerk.

Mr. STRIPLING. Promoted to a clerk in what division of the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Military attaché.

Mr. STRIPLING. Military attaché?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What were your specific duties as a clerk in the office of the military attaché?

Mr. ABE. General clerical work.

Mr. STRIPLING. General clerical work?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you at one time classified as a decoding clerk?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long did your employment at the Embassy last?

Mr. ABE. I was employed there from 1936 to 1940, September.

Mr. STRIPLING. During the period that you were employed at the Japanese Embassy, where did you reside in Washington?

Mr. ABE. I resided at the following places: 2547 Waterside Drive, 1807 California Street, 3220 Seventeenth Street, and 419 Marietta Place NW.



- Mr. STRIPLING. What is your present address?
- Mr. ABE. 1324 Fourteenth Street NW.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Apartment number?
- Mr. ABE. Four.
- Mr. STRIPLING. With whom did you reside at 2547 Waterside Drive?
- Mr. ABE. T. Hara.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Will you give his full name?
- Mr. ABE. The first name is Tamenori and the last name is Hara.
- Mr. STRIPLING. What was his position?
- Mr. ABE. Clerk.
- Mr. STRIPLING. He was also a clerk?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.
- Mr. STRIPLING. In the office of the military attaché?
- Mr. ABE. That is right.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Did you have any other roommate?
- Mr. ABE. Yes. There was a man named—I have forgotten his first name, but his last name is Matsuzawa.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Was he also employed as a clerk?
- Mr. ABE. As a clerk.
- Mr. STRIPLING. In the Embassy?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.
- Mr. STRIPLING. You left the Embassy in 1940?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Why did you leave your employment with the Japanese Embassy?
- Mr. ABE. To continue my college education.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Did you receive a scholarship from the Foreign Office of the Japanese Government through the Japanese Embassy?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Did that scholarship specify any particular education or institution, or did you have a choice.
- Mr. ABE. I had my choice.
- Mr. STRIPLING. And you chose George Washington University?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.
- Mr. STRIPLING. When did you enroll in George Washington University?
- Mr. ABE. I enrolled first as an evening student in 1937.
- Mr. STRIPLING. But after you received this scholarship, when did you enroll?
- Mr. ABE. In the fall of 1940.
- Mr. STRIPLING. You then left the Japanese Embassy?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Did you have any employment while you were attending school at George Washington University?
- Mr. ABE. In February of 1941 through December 1941.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Where were you employed during that period?
- Mr. ABE. Foreign newspaper correspondent, as secretary.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Who were you secretary to?
- Mr. ABE. Mr. Kauno.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Give us his full name, please.
- Mr. ABE. His first name is Kenji and the last name is Kauno.
- Mr. STRIPLING. Kenji Kauno?
- Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was his position in this country?

Mr. ABE. As a foreign newspaper correspondent.

Mr. STRIPLING. For what newspaper?

Mr. ABE. The official name is Tokyo Asahi Shimbun.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you work for Mr. Kauno up until December 7, 1941?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. As secretary?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. During that period you also were attending George Washington University on a scholarship which was furnished by the foreign office?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir. If I wanted the thing renewed, I had to place a renewal application in the spring of 1941, and that I did not, realizing the political situation of the country, of the two countries. So I allowed the thing to lapse and, of course, I placed no renewal whatsoever. I never placed any reports, so therefore they allowed it to lapse, and they didn't ask me any questions, so I was entirely on my own from there on. The reason why I took this position as secretary to the correspondent was to help my funds.

Mr. STRIPLING. To help your funds?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you assist in the organization in Washington of a group known as the Washington Young People's Club, or the Seinen Kay Nisei Club?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. When was that organized, Mr. Abe?

Mr. ABE. Let me see. I don't recall the exact month, but it was in the year 1941.

Mr. STRIPLING. In 1941?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who was the first president of that organization?

Mr. ABE. Koichi Inouye.

Mr. STRIPLING. Spell that, please.

Mr. ABE. The first name is Koichi, K-o-i-c-h-i, and the last name is Inouye, I-n-o-u-y-e.

Mr. STRIPLING. He was the first president of that organization?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was your official position?

Mr. ABE. Vice president.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were the vice president?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many members, about, did the Washington Young People's Club have?

Mr. ABE. I would say approximately 15 or 20.

Mr. STRIPLING. Out of the 15 or 20 members, how many were employed at the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Well, I would say about two or three; legally members.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many employees of the Japanese Embassy attended the meetings of the organization, and who were active in it?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry; you have to repeat that.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many employees of the Japanese Embassy attended the meetings of the organization and were active in its work?

Mr. ABE. I would say one.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, how about Mr. George Kobata?

Mr. ABE. He was not a legally considered member.

Mr. STRIPLING. He did attend meetings, however?

Mr. ABE. Well, he came off and on, but that was to his own accord. We could not exactly push him out.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was he on the Embassy staff?

Mr. ABE. Yes; he was.

Mr. STRIPLING. What about Henry Onoto?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; he did come, and he paid.

Mr. STRIPLING. He was a member?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir. That is what I remember.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are those two individuals now in Japan?

Mr. ABE. To my information, I believe he is.

Mr. STRIPLING. Kobata and Onoto?

Mr. COSTELLO. One or both of them?

Mr. ABE. I beg your pardon?

Mr. COSTELLO. One or both of them?

Mr. ABE. I believe both of them are.

Mr. STRIPLING. How about Paul Otake?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was he a member?

Mr. ABE. I am quite sure he was not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did he attend the meetings?

Mr. ABE. I remember and recall only one meeting he has attended.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was he an employee of the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was Tamenori Hara a member of the organization?

Mr. ABE. Definitely not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did he attend the meetings?

Mr. ABE. He came once on his own accord.

Mr. STRIPLING. How about Edward Usuda?

Mr. ABE. No; he was not legally a member of the club.

Mr. STRIPLING. He did participate in its activities, however?

Mr. ABE. I remember his attending one, possibly. He was in the Army at the time.

Mr. STRIPLING. In the Army of the United States?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether his father was named Karl Usuda?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry; I don't know his first name.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether there was a Karl Usuda who was employed in the office of the naval attaché of the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. I don't recall any Karl Usuda.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the purpose of the Washington Young People's Club, Mr. Abe?

Mr. ABE. It was a social and cultural club for the second generation, that is, Americans of Japanese ancestry.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many meetings did you have? How often did you meet?

Mr. ABE. About once a month.

Mr. STRIPLING. About once a month?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who would you have as speakers at those meetings?

Mr. ABE. Let me see. I will have to give you the names as much as I can recall.

Mr. STRIPLING. All right.

Mr. ABE. Let me see. We had one representative from the N. Y. A, who gave us a talk.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is the National Youth Administration?

Mr. ABE. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Can you recall the approximate date when he appeared before the club?

Mr. ABE. No, I don't. I don't recall that at all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did anyone from the Library of Congress ever speak before your club?

Mr. ABE. Oh, yes. She was in the Oriental Division. It was Dr. Sakanishi.

Mr. STRIPLING. How do you spell that?

Mr. ABE. Her first name is Shio, S-H-I-O, and the last is Sakanishi, S-a-k-a-n-i-s-h-i.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know where the Doctor is now?

Mr. ABE. No, I don't.

Mr. STRIPLING. She is not in Washington, is she?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry, I have never looked her up, so I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is it not a fact that she was interned at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ABE. It is just my personal assumption that she may have been; I am not quite sure.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, were you at the Japanese Embassy on December 6?

Mr. ABE. What year?

Mr. STRIPLING. Nineteen forty-one, the day before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. ABE. I don't know. I often go there to look at the A. P. ticker.

Mr. STRIPLING. As a matter of fact, Mr. Abe, you were there on the morning of Pearl Harbor, were you not; on December 7?

Mr. ABE. I was there on the morning of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. STRIPLING. For what purpose did you go to the Japanese Embassy on the morning of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ABE. Well, the foreign correspondent wanted to have me attend the press conference, which was to be held in the State Department sometime in the afternoon, so I dropped over there, together with Mr. Kauno, strictly like a newspaper correspondent would do, to see if there was any news there, because it was an unusual time, and from there we went on to the State Department.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was there any occurrence at the embassy on the morning of December 7, any unusual activity or apprehension that you detected?

Mr. ABE. Not that I noticed.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not notice any?

Mr. ABE. No; in fact, things seemed quite calm that day. Of course, I was just in the front office. I wouldn't know what was back there.

Mr. THOMAS. May I ask a question right there?

Mr. COSTELLO. Surely.



Mr. THOMAS. I think it was mentioned when you terminated your employment with the embassy.

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMAS. But I would like to have it put in the record right at this point, just when did you terminate your employment, the date.

Mr. ABE. In September of 1940.

Mr. THOMAS. September of 1940?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMAS. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was Mr. Kauno, your subsequent employer, a registered foreign agent?

Mr. ABE. Not that I know of.

Mr. STRIPLING. He was not registered with the State Department as an agent of the Japanese Government?

Mr. ABE. He was registered at the State Department merely as a foreign correspondent.

Mr. STRIPLING. Following Pearl Harbor, were you arrested by any authority of the United States Government?

Mr. ABE. I was never arrested after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you ever taken into custody by the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. ABE. I was called in for investigation after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long were you questioned?

Mr. ABE. Oh, let me see. About 3 or 4 hours, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you then released?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Since that time have you ever been questioned or have you ever given any statement to any intelligence unit of the United States Government as to any knowledge that you might have gained while employed at the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. No, sir. The F. B. I. was the last place; in fact, they wanted me to report for a few days, and then after that they told me or assured me that I need not call in.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you apply for a position with the F. B. I.?

Mr. ABE. I placed an application; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you also apply for a position in the Map Section of Military Intelligence of the United States Army?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you recommended favorably for that position?

Mr. ABE. I do not know about recommendations, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was your application approved by anyone in the War Department? Did you receive any communication from the War Department advising you that your application had been approved?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. THOMAS. Are you sure of that? Are you certain?

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you not receive a letter on June 3 from Military Intelligence, Map Section, advising you that your application had been approved by a certain official of Military Intelligence, but had been turned down by a certain general because of your lack of experience?

Mr. THOMAS. Remember, you are under oath.

Mr. ABE. Yes. I am trying to recall every word of that. I am quite sure that this is the letter that I received. It said that they didn't have any vacancy at the War Department, but they would like to recommend me to the Army Map Service, so I placed my application at the Army Map Service, but due to inexperience I was rejected.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the witness be instructed to bring the letter in from the War Department.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have that letter in your possession that you received from the War Department?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you bring it to the committee and submit it to Mr. Stripling?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, have you applied for a position with the Civil Service Commission?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you now under consideration for a position in the Federal service?

Mr. ABE. I would be, according to that examination I took.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you heard from the Civil Service Commission as to whether or not you passed the examination?

Mr. ABE. No, sir. Yes; I received a rating, but I have not received any other certification.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, are you a member of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. ABE. We placed a pledge as a member about the first part of June, but we have paid no dues or have received no, what would you say—well, approval as a member, so, legally I would say, I am not a member yet.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you say "we," you mean you and Mrs. Abe?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know Mike Masaoka?

Mr. ABE. I do.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is he the national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; he is.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was his office located at 1324 Fourteenth Street, the headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. ABE. That was the branch headquarters, but when the secretary resigned, actually I believe that that was not legally the office.

Mr. STRIPLING. But the office of the Japanese American Citizens League was at 1324 Fourteenth Street for several months, was it not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You also reside at 1324 Fourteenth Street, do you not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. On the third floor?

Mr. ABE. Third floor.

Mr. STRIPLING. There are two apartments on the third floor?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You and your wife reside in one, and the headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League in Washington,

their national office, which is located in Washington, D. C., is in the adjoining apartment?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You have had very close contact with Mr. Mike Masaoka and Mr. Joe Kanazawa, who is the eastern representative of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. ABE. I just know Mike and Joe as a friend.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you attend a meeting on May 22 at the Calvary Baptist Church, this year, which was called by the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did your wife also attend?

Mr. ABE. Yes; she did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was the national president of the Japanese American Citizens League present—Mr. Kido?

Mr. ABE. Yes; he was.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many people were present?

Mr. ABE. Well, roughly, I would say about 30 or 35.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were they all Nisei?

Mr. ABE. I believe there was one Caucasian present.

Mr. STRIPLING. One Caucasian?

Mr. ABE. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who was that?

Mr. ABE. I don't recall her name at all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the representatives of the press there?

Mr. ABE. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was the minister of the Calvary Baptist Church present?

Mr. ABE. I did not see them at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the purpose of the meeting, as you gathered from the proceedings?

Mr. ABE. To my knowledge, I believe it was purely informational as to the activities of the J. A. C. L., what they are trying to contribute in utterances of all the principles of Americanism. And, first of all, I believe they are contributing a service not only to the Japanese people who are interned in there, but also to the American Government through a cooperation very graciously.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, where are your mother and father at the present time?

Mr. ABE. In a relocation center, Tullake, Calif.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where are your wife's parents?

Mr. ABE. They are at the war relocation camp at Heart Mountain, Wyo.

Mr. STRIPLING. Of the 35 people who were in attendance at the meeting on May 22 at the Calvary Baptist Church, how many of the group had recently been released from relocation centers, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. ABE. I would say about 65 percent of the group.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you meet the three evacuees who have recently been employed by Secretary of Interior, Mr. Harold Ickes?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. They were present at the meeting?

Mr. ABE. They were present.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many of the released Nisei who were present are presently employed by the War Relocation Authority, that you met there that night?

Mr. ABE. Oh, I believe I met about seven of them.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you assisted Mr. Masaoka and the Japanese American Citizens League in their work in attempting to get the release of all of the Nisei and other Japanese from the relocation centers?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You have not?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you familiar with their activities in that regard?

Mr. ABE. Very generally.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you ever discussed it with Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. ABE. I have never made any full discussion at all, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Informally or in friendly gatherings, or any discussion?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What happened to your organization that you were vice president of, the Washington Young People's Club?

Mr. ABE. Well, in the first place, realizing, of course, after Pearl Harbor, I had been working with a foreign newspaper correspondent who was from an Axis country, I felt that it would be better to discontinue it, so I gave that voluntary statement to members of the group, and if they wanted to continue, they could do so, but it was handing in of my voluntary resignation for the good of the group.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time you were president of the organization? Had you replaced Mr. Inouye as president?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. At what period did you become president?

Mr. ABE. Roughly, about the latter part of October to December.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the organization accept your resignation?

Mr. ABE. To the best of my knowledge, I am quite sure.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they ever notify you?

Mr. ABE. No, it was never answered, but I am sure, verbally, they understood it.

Mr. MUNDT. You have not attended any meeting since?

Mr. ABE. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. STRIPLING. Any questions, Mr. Matthews?

Mr. MATTHEWS. You had a scholarship at George Washington University which was provided by the foreign office of the Tokyo government. Did you do anything in return for this scholarship?

Mr. ABE. Definitely not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever make any reports to the Tokyo government or any agency of the Tokyo government after you received this scholarship?

Mr. ABE. I sent them a letter of acceptance to the Embassy that they gave me their scholarship.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that the only communication you ever addressed—

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS (continuing). To the Embassy or to any agency of the Tokyo government?

Mr. ABE. That is correct.



Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you asked, when you received this scholarship, to make reports to any agency of the Tokyo government?

Mr. ABE. No, sir. I was under no obligation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there any suggestion made to you that you should report on various matters to any agency of the Tokyo government?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You stated that you did not renew your application for this scholarship in the spring of 1941 because you realized the situation existing between the two countries. That was some 6 or 7 months, at least, before Pearl Harbor, was it not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What do you mean by "realized the situation"?

Mr. ABE. Well, I realized the situation was getting very tense, and as a matter of my particular principles it would be entirely contrary to what would be the result if I had continued in the capacity that I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What month would you normally have renewed your application for that scholarship?

Mr. ABE. I would say about April or May.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And in April or May of 1941, you realized that there was a situation existing between the United States and Japan which made it inadvisable for you to accept this scholarship from the foreign office?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did that realization come to you in whole or in part as the result of your employment at the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. I would say "Yes."

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, you learned things as an employee of the Japanese Embassy which indicated to you that the Japanese Government had hostile intentions toward the United States?

Mr. ABE. No; I would not put it as strong as all that. I feel that it is important in understanding, common sense, that things were not exactly, well, favorable enough for me to accept this scholarship and then feel entirely conscience free.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you mean that in common conversation around the Embassy there was an assumption that war would one day, before many months, break out between the United States and Japan?

Mr. ABE. Well, I would not put it as strongly as all that. But I would say that the feeling was enough, aroused me enough, to convince me that probably there was a feeling of uncertainty between the two countries.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, this scholarship would have run only 1 more year, up until the spring of 1942. You mean that you anticipated in that period there might occur something in the relationships between the two countries that would make it inadvisable for you to have a scholarship?

Mr. ABE. Personally, I felt that way. I imagine you would call it intuition.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But that intuition, you say, was derived from your experience at the Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Well, I would say that.

Mr. COSTELLO. No one at the Embassy suggested you drop the scholarship, did they?

Mr. ABE. Oh, definitely not. It was all on my own.

Mr. COSTELLO. Why were you given the scholarship originally?

Mr. ABE. Well, that I don't know.

Mr. COSTELLO. In previous years did the Japanese Embassy give a number of scholarships?

Mr. ABE. No; not that I know of.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was it merely because you were employed there at the Embassy that you were signed out?

Mr. ABE. I am afraid I don't know the exact background reasons for me being selected.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say it was not the custom, though, of the Embassy to grant scholarships generally?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you apply for the scholarship in the first instance?

Mr. ABE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you apply for the scholarship in the first instance; when you first received it?

Mr. ABE. I filed for it; yes, sir, when I heard about that.

Mr. MUNDT. With the Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever state to anyone that you thought the South Pacific should be controlled by an Asiatic power which had the means to do it, and that Japan was the only Asiatic power which had such means?

Mr. ABE. No; I don't recall that at all, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall a conversation of that tenor that you had with anyone early in 1941?

Mr. ABE. No; I don't.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that your view early in 1941?

Mr. ABE. No, sir; you see, my particular measure and interest in school is foreign trade, and I have always strived to make a personal understanding between the two countries, if at all, and in the sense that I wanted to do what I could, if possible, in my own way while I was working there. And, of course, when I quit the place I felt, in the spring of 1941, the tension was growing awfully bad, so when I heard about Kurusu coming over here I felt there would be some hope, at least, in the way of terminating these relations which would tend to become war.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you ever at any time in charge of the social affairs of the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. What do you mean, social affairs?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, the Japanese Embassy did have social affairs, did it not; receptions and social relations?

Mr. ABE. No; definitely not. They had women clerks to handle all that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. During the past year have you had in your possession a publication entitled "Pilot Rules for Certain Inland Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts and of the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico"?

Mr. ABE. I never heard of it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. During the past 2 years have you had in your possession, in your apartment, such a publication?

Mr. ABE. I never heard of it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Your answer is "No"?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That you did not have it in your possession?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have in your possession during the past 2 years, at any time, in your apartment, a publication entitled "Bureau of Marine Navigation. Functions and Activities of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation"?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you ever seen those publications?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have been living at 1324 Fourteenth Street, have you not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In apartment 5?

Mr. ABE. Apartment 4.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Apartment 4?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And in apartment 5 did you have any acquaintances?

Mr. ABE. Mr. and Mrs. Kanazawa.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was apartment 5 considered the headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League recently?

Mr. ABE. Well, I imagine it was until Mr. Kanazawa went into the Army.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you recently go from your apartment, No. 4, into apartment 5, to witness formally the turning over of the records of the Japanese American Citizens League to the agents of any official body?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who invited you to witness the turning over of these records?

Mr. ABE. Mrs. Kanazawa.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did your wife accompany you to act as a witness also in that capacity?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were these records, to your knowledge, turned over under a subpoena issued by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. ABE. I am quite sure, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you in the past 24 hours conferred with anyone concerning your testimony before this committee this morning?

Mr. ABE. Conferred in the sense of asking advice, do you mean?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you been proffered any advice concerning your testimony before this committee this morning?

Mr. ABE. I think I have my own common sense to bank on that, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has your common sense had any reinforcements from any other source?

Mr. ABE. I have had moral support, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. From whom?

Mr. ABE. Well, in the sense of my wife, I would say.

Mr. MUNDT. Anyone else?

Mr. ABE. Well, no. We have just talked it over; nothing particular to call it advice.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I would like to change one word in the question, Congressman. I asked him if he conferred with anyone. That seems to be the hitch. I would like to ask him if he has discussed his testimony or appearance before the committee this morning with anyone during the past 24 hours.

Mr. ABE. I have talked it over with Mr. and Mrs. Kanazawa.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. ABE. As a matter of natural inclination of the individual to talk over anything.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have advised with Mr. and Mrs. Kanazawa on other occasions, have you not, concerning matters that pertain to Japanese in this country?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; as friends.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Or as citizens of Japanese ancestry?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; as friends.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss your appearance before this committee this morning with anyone else?

Mr. ABE. This morning with Mr. Slocum.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is that Mr. Tokutaro Slocum?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. With anyone else?

Mr. ABE. No. That would be the only persons I would confer with.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have not discussed it with any other persons than those three?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. During the past 24 hours? Let us not have a mistake about this.

Mr. ABE. No. Last night was just those three persons, Mr. and Mrs. Kanazawa and Mr. Slocum.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You discussed it with Mr. Slocum last night also?

Mr. ABE. Oh, I just talked with him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And also this morning?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, I understood you to say that you had this morning. Where were you last night?

Mr. ABE. At 1324 Fourteenth Street.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were in your own apartment and also in apartment 5?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Sometime during the evening?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were other persons, other than the three you have named, present in your apartment or in apartment 5 last night?

Mr. ABE. Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. To your knowledge, no?

Mr. ABE. I retired early.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You did not see anyone?

Mr. ABE. No.



Mr. MATTHEWS. How long have you known Mike Masaoka?

Mr. ABE. I would say approximately a year when I first met him; a year ago when I first met him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you meet him?

Mr. ABE. I met him in New York City.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Under what circumstances did you meet him in New York City?

Mr. ABE. I was working as secretary to a minister in New York.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have seen him off and on since you first met him approximately a year ago?

Mr. ABE. Very infrequently.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have seen him in Washington?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long have you known Joe Tooru Kanazawa?

Mr. ABE. Let me see. Since about the early part of 1941, I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A little more than 2 years?

Mr. ABE. A little more than 2 years.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you have conferred or met him from time to time?

Mr. ABE. I have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you, when you worked with Kenji Kauno, who was representative in this country of Tokyo Asahi, make any reports to Mr. Terasaki, first secretary of the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Not that I recall, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, that employment has been rather recent, and if you made reports to the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy since you left the Embassy, you would certainly recall it, would you not?

Mr. ABE. Surely. Well, I would say "No."

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether or not Kenji Kauno, your employer, made regular reports to Mr. Terasaki, first secretary to the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. I don't know if he made any or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you have any verbal conversations with the first secretary since your employment with the Japanese newspaper?

Mr. ABE. I am sure he has had verbal conversations.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you had?

Mr. ABE. Nothing except very impersonal things.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you mean by "impersonal things"?

Mr. ABE. Well, he was quite a golfer and I like golf pretty bad, too, so we talked about it.

Mr. MUNDT. You played golf together a little bit, did you?

Mr. ABE. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Right along, until Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ABE. Well, no; during the fair weather days.

Mr. MUNDT. In fair weather, after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was it your understanding that Mr. Terasaki was the chief intelligence officer of the Japanese Government in the United States?

Mr. ABE. I didn't know that, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you ever heard that around the Embassy?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Are you a map expert or specialist of any kind, in maps or topography?

Mr. ABE. No, sir. I was turned down for inexperience by the Army Map Service.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you consider yourself a map specialist?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you at any time before Pearl Harbor request from the Department of the Interior any maps or geodetic surveys or any material of that general nature?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry; I didn't hear the first part, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I asked you if at any time before Pearl Harbor you requested from the Department of the Interior of the United States Government any maps or geodetic surveys or other material of that character.

Mr. ABE. I did ask them for bulletins, which was back in 1936 or 1937, I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What bulletins were they?

Mr. ABE. I imagine it was the bulletins of that office.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of the Geodetic Survey?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The office of the Department of the Interior?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ask for those on behalf of the Japanese Embassy or for your own personal use?

Mr. ABE. Well, I believe I asked for the office where I was working.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On behalf of the Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, the military attaché?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was your last request for such material as long ago as 1936?

Mr. ABE. About 1936 or 1937, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You did not ask subsequently for that kind of material?

Mr. ABE. No, sir; you can find all that out for the reason that the address was in the address that I had when I lived there in 1936 and 1937.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were on their regular mailing list at 2547 Waterside Drive, were you not?

Mr. ABE. Yes; they kept on sending me bulletins.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That was the official residence of the Japanese Embassy, or one of the official residences?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know how late they continued to send those bulletins and descriptions of maps to your address? When was the last time that any such bulletins were forwarded to you?

Mr. ABE. I guess until about 1940, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. 1940?

Mr. ABE. The latter part of 1940.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were residing there in 1940, were you not?

Mr. ABE. No; I moved away from there about 1939, in August. The reason why I recall that is the fact that they had it cancelled and forwarded to the other address.

Mr. STRIPLING. During your 4 years at the office of the military attaché of the Japanese Embassy, did you not have access or gain information which would be of assistance to this Government after Pearl Harbor, and will you explain to the committee why you never volunteered to any of our intelligence services the information that you might have had?

Mr. ABE. Because I don't think I am regarded anything that was so pertinent as all that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you told me when I served the subpoena on you on June 11 that you were a decoding clerk in the office of the military attaché. This morning you denied it. But, I have several witnesses who heard you make the statement.

Mr. ABE. Yes; but as it is, I didn't understand the message. If I did——

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not understand the message?

Mr. ABE. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. You worked there 4 years but you did not know what they meant?

Mr. ABE. No; they were very careful about that.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, during your entire 4 years there you did not obtain any information which you felt would be of any use to our military or naval authorities?

Mr. ABE. No; I am quite sure I didn't.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Coming back to your scholarship again. You say you were employed there as a decoding clerk.

Mr. ABE. No, sir; that is a mistake which I noticed in the paper, sir. You see, in the clerical capacity, well, I did some decoding, but it is a matter of decoding which anybody could do without any understanding of the original contents.

Mr. COSTELLO. What did you have, just a form code by which you transposed words and changed them into Japanese or English?

Mr. ABE. No; it was just alphabetical letters.

Mr. COSTELLO. What were your duties then in connection with that; actually transcribing the message?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What did you do?

Mr. ABE. Well, in code, I imagine anybody familiar with it to the extent that certain letters must be put together; in other words, they would know the message contents, whereas we just merely do the mechanical part of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you mean by "mechanical part of it"? You would take out the selected letters out of the word and put them together and then pass that message on?

Mr. ABE. Yes. And of those letters I would not have any understanding whatsoever.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did not know how to interpret the words after you put these particular letters together?

Mr. ABE. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were those messages from Japan?

Mr. ABE. From and to.

Mr. COSTELLO. You never had any knowledge or information as to the code being used or how to read the messages themselves?

Mr. ABE. No; they didn't show us how.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I am asking you a question. Are you employed at the present time?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where?

Mr. ABE. George Washington University.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is your occupation there?

Mr. ABE. Clerk.

Mr. COSTELLO. What kind of work do you do?

Mr. ABE. Well, recording clerk, I imagine you would call it.

Mr. COSTELLO. What office?

Mr. ABE. In the registrar's office.

Mr. COSTELLO. In the registrar's office?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. All right.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Abe, coming back to your scholarship, you stated that you were majoring in foreign trade.

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was not one of the stipulations for that scholarship that you would report to the Embassy on the attitude existing between the officials of the United States Government and the Japanese officials, and did you not state several weeks ago that the reason you would not take the renewal of the scholarship was the fear that if you continued to make these reports that the F. B. I. might get them, and that is the reason you turned down your scholarship?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. You are sure you did not make that statement?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you made no reports of any kind to the Japanese Embassy in any form on foreign trade or foreign relations?

Mr. ABE. Just my ordinary letter, the report to them that I submitted as a matter which you would call acceptance and my particular understanding of what I knew about foreign trade, interpreted in the sense of submitting a report of acceptance to him.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you a follower of the Buddhist religion?

Mr. ABE. I beg your pardon.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you a follower of the Buddhist religion?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you brought up as a Buddhist?

Mr. ABE. No; I was not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you belong to any Buddhist organization?

Mr. ABE. I was a member of a baseball team which was what you would call a Buddhist group.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the name of the organization?

Mr. ABE. Let me see. Young People's Buddhist Group, I would say.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I would like to go back to this question of reporting to the Japanese Embassy. A moment ago I thought I noted some hesitancy on your part as to whether or not you had or had not reported. You said: "Well, just the normal report." Now, what did you mean by that?



Mr. ABE. Well, it was a report confirming to them that I received the scholarship money.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did you discuss foreign-trade relations between Japan and the United States in that acceptance?

Mr. ABE. Well, yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How many pages were there, approximately, if you do not remember the exact number, in this communication?

Mr. ABE. I don't remember exactly; about four pages or so, I guess.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, now, when I questioned you sometime ago you said you did nothing but communicate your acceptance of the scholarship.

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, it would not take four pages to accept a scholarship, would it?

Mr. ABE. Well, it is merely expressing everything in the sense of accepting a letter, accepting the scholarship, and at the same time expressing my desire to get into foreign trade; to consider it as my future career.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long after the scholarship was granted did you write that communication to the Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Let me see. I imagine it was between May and September of 1940.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When was the scholarship granted?

Mr. ABE. About May of 1940.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you think it may have been as late as September that you wrote this acceptance?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And in this acceptance you had four pages which largely covered the field of foreign relations; is that right?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And then when did you make the next acceptance of this scholarship to the Embassy? You wrote a subsequent acceptance also, did you not?

Mr. ABE. No, sir. No, sir; that was the one that I didn't allow to be renewed, in the spring of 1941.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, the stipulation was that you were to make at least two reports a year to the Embassy; is that not correct?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is correct?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And yet you stated under oath when I examined you not less than three or four times that there was absolutely no stipulation of any kind connected with the scholarship. Now, you say there was.

Mr. ABE. Well, I am sorry. I misunderstood you on that point.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, I asked the question several times to be sure that there could be no misunderstanding. The record, of course, will speak for itself.

Mr. ABE. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But now you say there was a stipulation that you should make at least two reports a year to the Embassy.

Mr. ABE. I recall that now, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You recall that now?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say you applied for the scholarship?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; when I heard about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. What did you hear about it?

Mr. ABE. That there was a scholarship available, and I had personal ambitions of trying or of retiring from that office in the fall so that I could finish my education. Well, I thought that would help my financial reserve, so I applied for it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who informed you of the existence of this scholarship?

Mr. ABE. The secretary of the Japanese Christian Students Association of New York City.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they handle the scholarship or did the Embassy handle it directly?

Mr. ABE. I imagine he heard it from the consulate and he informed me of that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who financed the scholarship itself; the Embassy?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; the Embassy did.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether they had any other scholarships at all, in existence, or not?

Mr. ABE. No; I don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did I understand correctly that you only made one report since you were granted the scholarship?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that in typewriting?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry. I can't hear you.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was it a typewritten report or longhand?

Mr. ABE. It was typewritten.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It was typewritten?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you make a carbon copy of it?

Mr. ABE. No; I don't think I did. I don't think I did.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, you have had a good deal of experience as a clerk; have you not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is it not your usual practice to make a carbon copy of any letter that you write?

Mr. ABE. Well, if I did have any copy I must have thrown everything away.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Answer that question. Is it not your usual practice to make a carbon copy of any letter that you write?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You considered that an important letter; did you not?

Mr. ABE. Well, yes; important at that time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It was important to you yourself; was it not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now you state you did not make a carbon copy.

Mr. ABE. I don't recall, sir, exactly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You do not know whether you did or not?

Mr. ABE. Yes. I don't remember exactly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In your ordinary practice you would make a carbon copy; would you not?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; I would.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you have any reason for not making a carbon copy?

Mr. ABE. No; I don't think so.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Of anything so important as that?

Mr. ABE. I don't think so. Let me recall now. I believe I did make a carbon copy of it. I believe I did.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And do you have that copy in your possession any place?

Mr. ABE. No; I am afraid I threw up everything when I went to New York.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That was when?

Mr. ABE. Oh, in February 1942.

Mr. EBERHARTER. February 1942?

Mr. ABE. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You destroyed all your files at that time?

Mr. ABE. Well, I practically gave away a lot of things.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You did what? Speak up.

Mr. ABE. I gave away a lot of things and threw away a lot of things which I felt was irrelevant because I had so many useless things around.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was there anything in this report, in the light of what has since happened, that you would not desire the American Government or the American people to know?

Mr. ABE. No, sir; I wouldn't mind it. If I had a copy, I would show it to you right now.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you not think in February 1942 that you should have considered any report that you made to be of sufficient importance to preserve a copy of; a carbon copy of?

Mr. ABE. Yes; if it was important I would keep it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, the very fact that you considered it of no importance should have been of importance to you to keep it, to show there was no importance attached to the report. You see what I mean?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you are certain now that there was nothing in this report that you would not be willing to have made public?

Mr. ABE. No; I would not mind showing it to you right now if I had it with me. I will be willing to bring it; in fact, some of the letters that Mr. Stripling just mentioned now. I will be glad to bring it or any other records that you want. I will be glad to cooperate with you by trying to make it as constructive as possible; in fact, that is what I want more than anything else, is the truth in this whole thing.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did I understand you to say that your wife is employed by Civil Service?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say she is in the Classification Division?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What are her duties there?

Mr. ABE. Clerical, in the Classification Division. That is all I know.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know what type of work she is doing?

Mr. ABE. I imagine it is personnel work.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does she collect papers or mark papers or does she handle names or files, or what not?

Mr. ABE. From what I understand, she just writes letters, and so forth. I never asked her any details in the matter.

Mr. COSTELLO. She is simply doing stenographic work?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir; I imagine stenographic and clerical work.

Mr. COSTELLO. She has nothing to do with the fixing up of the lists of persons taking the civil-service examination or arranging lists of those who are being graded for positions?

Mr. ABE. I am sorry; I don't know, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether she does or not?

Mr. ABE. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your wife's salary in the Civil Service Commission?

Mr. ABE. Eighteen hundred.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the value of the scholarship that you received from the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. ABE. About \$115.

Mr. MUNDT. \$115?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. For a quarter or the term of the year?

Mr. ABE. For 1 year.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you instruct the witness he is still under subpoena, Mr. Chairman, until he furnishes the letter?

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you return to Mr. Stripling a copy of the letter you have from the War Department?

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You are subject to the subpoena until that is returned.

Mr. ABE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all.

(Witness excused.)

(The letter referred to above reads as follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT, ARMY MAP SERVICE,  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., June 3, 1943.*

Mr. PAUL C. ABE,  
*Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: This service recommended your appointment to Col. Kai E. Rasmussen of the Military Intelligence Language School with the request that your appointment be authorized. Colonel Rasmussen returned your application and states that he interviewed you and it is not believed that you were sufficiently linguistically qualified for the work performed by the Army Map Service. He based his decision on the fact that you lacked a comprehensive knowledge of geographical Japanese.

At the present time, the Army Map Service has filled all of the vacancies for this position. However, your application will be retained in our file, and if there is a vacancy in the future which you might be qualified for, you will be contacted and requested to report for duty.

Very truly yours,

T. L. SHARKEY,  
*Chief Administrative Assistant.*

Mr. COSTELLO. Call your next witness, Mr. Stripling.

Mr. STRIPLING. I will call Mr. Slocum.



## TESTIMONY OF TOKUTARO NISHIMURA SLOCUM

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. State your full name to the reporter.

Mr. SLOCUM. My name is Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum. I am known as Tokio Slocum or Jap Slocum.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you born?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was born in Japan, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where, what part of Japan?

Mr. SLOCUM. A little village called Oyama, Japan, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When?

Mr. SLOCUM. 1895, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. I think it was around April 1904, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were about 9 years old, were you, at the time?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you come with your parents?

Mr. SLOCUM. I came with my mother and brother and sister, sir; my father having migrated to the United States around 1894 or thereabouts.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You had not seen your father, then?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; not since the time he left Japan, up to the time he sent for us.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, he had been living in Japan before you were born, according to the dates I have. Did he leave Japan before you were born?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You said he left Japan in 1894, if I understood the date right.

Mr. SLOCUM. We came to this country around, let me see, 1904. He must have come around 1895.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Which was the year you were born.

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. All right.

Mr. SLOCUM. No, no; that couldn't be so, because I came in 1904 and father came to this country—I think he had been here about 5 years, I think, 5 or 6 years.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then he must have come around 1899 or 1900. At any rate, that is all hearsay. You do not recall when he departed, I suppose.

Mr. SLOCUM. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The time he left.

Mr. SLOCUM. I remember the time he departed; oh, yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You do?

Mr. SLOCUM. Because we all cried. You got me over a barrel there, Mister. Figures don't lie.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you enter the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. The *Empress of India* was the name of the Canadian Pacific boat that we came on, and we landed at Vancouver, and the port of entry was Seattle, Wash., sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you and your parents settle the first year after you came to the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. A little town called Manitou, N. Dak.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your father's occupation?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, he was working on a railroad and then farming at the same time, because he had already taken out a homestead, and he was plowing it up as much as his finances would enable him to, so he did work on the railroad and we lived on a homestead.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you live with your parents in Manitou?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, about a year and a half.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you leave home?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, at that time North Dakota was pretty interior country, sort of a pioneering State, and schools were few and far between—Dad wanted me to have an education and there weren't any schools around there, so he thought I should go to the nearest big town and acquire some education and to see if I could better myself. That is the reason I left.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were a boy of about 11, were you?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you go when you went away at your father's suggestion to get an education?

Mr. SLOCUM. Father had a Japanese friend working in the Great Northern roundhouse in the city called Minot, N. Dak. It was pioneered within about 50 miles away from our place and he thought he could get me a job as sort of an errand boy or bottle washer in Mr. Slocum's drug store.

Mr. MATTHEWS. So that you could go to school after work?

Mr. SLOCUM. To work my way through; yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he get you a job in Mr. Slocum's drug store?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; he got me a job as bottle washer and helper and janitor.

Mr. MATTHEWS. After you took that job, then eventually you went to school in Minot?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. Dad said, "You are going to school now."

Mr. MATTHEWS. When you say "Dad" you mean Mr. Slocum now; do you not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I do now, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And when you went to school Mr. Slocum told you to call yourself what?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, Dad said, "Your name Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum is too long, so from now on you are going to be my boy. I am going to call you Tokie Slocum."

And I said, "Very good, sir."

So that is how I became Tokie Slocum.

Mr. MATTHEWS. So you enrolled for the convenience of the teacher—

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS (continuing). As Tokie Slocum?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you finish grammar school in Minot?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I did, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you finish high school?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I did, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you go when you finished high school?

Mr. SLOCUM. I went to the University of Minnesota, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was it your purpose to go through college?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I thought I wanted to be a lawyer, and I thought all the lawyers were big shots and they made money, so I thought I would be a lawyer, too. I didn't realize at that time that in order to be a lawyer you have to be a citizen. I thought I was a citizen, because I grew up with Irish boys and all sorts of Caucasian boys, and I thought I was a citizen, too, and I thought I wanted to be a lawyer, and I was going to study law, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long were you at the University of Minnesota?

Mr. SLOCUM. One year, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you stop your education at that point?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, you know, the war came, and all my boyhood friends says, "Well, I am going to join the Marines, and you, too, Tokio."

And I says, "O. K. I go."

I tried to get in the Marines and they told me I was a Jap, so they didn't want me.

I said, "Well, by God, I am going to get in the Army somehow."

And I quit school and came back and dad said, "What is the matter, son?"

I said, "Well, I tried to get in the Army, Dad, but they won't take me."

He says, "Well, if you want to get in the Army why do you want to quit school and get in the Army?"

Well, I said, "Dad, all my boyhood friends went, and I feel kind of funny if I don't do as the other boys do."

Dad says, "I will help you get into the Army."

Finally he fixed—not fixed, but he spoke to some of the officers, and I finally got sent to Camp Dodge, Iowa, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was this early in 1918?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I think it was around January, the early part of January of 1918, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You volunteered and were sent to Camp Dodge?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I volunteered. You see, I was an alien. They found out I was an alien, and that is one reason why the marines won't have me. And, I could have claimed exemption because I was an alien, but I wanted to show dad that I was grateful for all the things he done for me, and Mother Slocum, too. You know, we boys have funny feelings, too, we are sort of clannish, and what one boy does we all want to do, because he is in the gang or crowd, and naturally you want to march right along with them, and naturally I went.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In what branch of the Army did you serve?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was in the infantry, sir, and later I was placed in the Intelligence Service, and later I became sergeant major, Three Hundred and Twenty-eighth Infantry, Eighty-second Division, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Three Hundred and Twenty-eighth Infantry?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was the Three Hundred and Twenty-eighth Infantry Sergeant York's outfit?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. That was his outfit, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did you leave the United States to go to France?

Mr. SLOCUM. I think, sir, it was in the early spring of 1918, sir. It was, I think, around April, I believe sir; early in April, I believe it was, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you went to France?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you go up to the front?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I did, sir. We landed at Southampton and then we came—no; we landed at Liverpool and came to Southampton and from there we took the channel boat, like all the other troops did, and landed at Le Harve. From there we went up to Abbeville, and back of Abbeville they picked some of us to learn the British Military Intelligence work, so we were sent up to the Amiens-Albert front.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you engaged in combat in the major operations around St. Mihiel and the Argonne Forest?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I was in both of them, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you gassed in one of those engagements?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was gassed in the Argonne, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were gassed in the Argonne Woods?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you experience difficulty or were you hospitalized as a result of being gassed?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I was hospitalized.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Both in in France and the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long were you in France altogether?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, sir, we landed there in April, late April. We came home in June. Well, now, you figure it out, because I don't want to be a liar on this again.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you were there at least a year or approximately a year; maybe a little more or a little less.

Mr. SLOCUM. A little over, I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you came back to the United States in June 1918 and you were mustered out then, were you?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I was honorably discharged, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you as the result of your service with the American Army in France in the First World War eventually become a naturalized citizen of the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. It is true, sir. I got my first paper over in France, sir, as the result of service over there, because at that time you recall, sir, the Wartime Naturalization Act was passed wherein it was stated that any alien that served in the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, may become a citizen of the United States by placing an application with the authority, military authorities, to become a citizen of the United States, and that was one of the things that I promised dad that I would try to be when he came to the station to see me off at the time I went to war.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did you finally receive your citizenship?

Mr. SLOCUM. The final papers came to me around 1921 or 1922, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That was revoked though, was it not?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir. I got my final paper and it was revoked in this way, sir. There came a case about that time, around 1922 or possibly 1923. I don't remember exactly the date, but it stated that in *Toyota v. United States* case, that was a case testing the validity



of orientals who obtained citizenship under the wartime act, not having specifically mentioned orientals who can become citizens of the United States under normal circumstances, therefore the Supreme Court said to the effect that your citizenship is null and void. That is how I lost it, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But subsequently you became a citizen. And, when was that?

Mr. SLOCUM. By a special act of Congress known as the Nye-Lee bill, Senator Nye and Congressman Clarence Lee of California, who were good enough to introduce the bill for me, with the blessing of the Department of California, of the national convention of the American Legion and the blessing of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The bill went through and I became a citizen of the United States again, for which I am very thankful.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What year was that?

Mr. SLOCUM. I think it was in 1935, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. So now you are a citizen of the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; full-fledged; yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. After you came back from France you were employed at several jobs in various parts of the country, most of them for rather short periods of time, were you not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you finally settle down, as it were?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, sir—

Mr. MATTHEWS (continuing). For the longest period of time after you came back from France?

Mr. SLOCUM. California, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, now, you went to Columbia University, did you not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, yes, sir. I went to Columbia University, sir, from January of 1921 to 1924, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive a Government grant in aid to enable you to go to Columbia University?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. For 3 or 4 years?

Mr. SLOCUM. Four years.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Four years?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you attended Columbia for 4 years?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I did, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you still working on the idea of becoming a lawyer at that time?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; but while I was working on this ambition of becoming a lawyer, sir, this *Toyota v. The United States* case came up, and at that time I had a long talk with the present Chief Justice, Dean Harlan Fiske Stone, and I had a hunch that this *Toyota v. United States* case, which was later to come before the Supreme Court—I had a feeling that my citizenship case would be nullified, so I switched over to the school of commerce, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And after you left Columbia then you settled in California; is that right?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. After I obtained my citizenship I went to work for the United States Employment Service in Los Angeles, Calif., sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you work there?

Mr. SLOCUM. I worked there for about 3½ years, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That was from 1934—

Mr. SLOCUM. No; 1935; late 1935 to about 1938, I believe it was, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you join the Japanese American Citizens League in California?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes; I did, sir. I was a member of the Japanese American Citizens League as far back as 1929, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you join it; in Los Angeles?

Mr. SLOCUM. In Los Angeles; when the war was declared I was drafted to take the chairmanship of the anti-axis committee. At that time, when the war was declared, they had nobody or Japanese organization to guide, advise, or cooperate, not only with the duly constituted Federal authorities, but Japanese citizens themselves were lost for leadership.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, just a moment before you get down to the outbreak of the war. You said you joined the Japanese American Citizens League in 1929?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I asked you where.

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, that was in Seattle, Wash., sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In Seattle?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you temporarily living in Seattle?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir. In 1929, my mother died in Saskatchewan, Canada, so I went to her deathbed and I came back by way of Vancouver and I stopped over in Seattle and just then it happened that they were having a national convention, and they asked me if I would cooperate with them in conducting this convention because they thought that I may have had a little experience along the convention line with the American Legion, and so forth, so I said I would be very glad to help them.

But, I wanted to know what the Japanese American Citizens League stood for. And, they told me that it was an agency to promote Americanism among Americans of Japanese ancestry. So, I said I will do all I possibly can.

And, I introduced such innovations as salute to the colors, respect for the departed, and singing of the National Anthem before the meeting, and things like that and saying prayers before the convention officially opened. The innovations of that nature were introduced at that convention, which has been carried on for some time, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who was the head of the Japanese American Citizens League when you joined it?

Mr. SLOCUM. A lawyer up there, a very fine American. His name is Clarence Arai. He was the only American of Japanese ancestry that I ever heard that attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the R. O. T. C. at the University of Washington.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who were the national leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League in those early years when you belonged to it?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, in the early years I believe Mr. Arai, and he later dropped out because the Japanese American Citizens League

gradually became degenerated into sort of a propaganda agency and as an agency to promote more of a racial interest rather than American interest, so he and I and quite a few others of us have dropped out. But, aside from Mr. Arai, there was Mr. James Sakamoto, Dr. Yatape, Mr. Saburo Kido, and Mr. Walter Tsukamoto. I believe those are the leaders, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke of the purpose of the J. A. C. L. changing. About what time did that change take place when it went into propaganda work?

Mr. SLOCUM. Sir, I would not call it propaganda, but gradually degenerating toward—

Mr. COSTELLO. Racial interest?

Mr. SLOCUM. Racial interest or, may I say, political? Instead of being a social organization, made up of Americans of Japanese ancestry, it was sort of a matter: well, more of a struggle for power and struggle for recognition among the Japanese leaders.

Mr. MUNDT. It became sort of a pressure group?

Mr. SLOCUM. I would say, to a degree; yes, sir. That came about, I would say, or I noticed it first around 1935; I mean 1936.

Mr. COSTELLO. Sort of a gradual change that took place, was it?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, that is the most prominent thing that I noticed and therefore I resigned. If I may go on, sir?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. SLOCUM. I resigned from the Japanese American Citizens League around 1936. Around Los Angeles, where I was living, attention was called to the fact that the Japanese American Citizens League was taking the census of all the American-born Japanese in and around Los Angeles for the Japanese consulate directly. Well, what I said is not quite fit to say before your august body, but I cussed them up and down and I started stumping and made speeches and wrote letters and notified Homer Chaillaux, director of Americanism of the American Legion, and I also notified Mr. Victor Deveraux, national director of Americanism, Veterans of Foreign Wars, of the tendency and the opportunity that we have ahead of us. That was around 1935.

I drifted out then and then I did not join, or I did not become affiliated with the Japanese American Citizens League again until war was declared, and that was in 1941; around January or thereabouts.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, you stated that the Japanese American Citizens League around 1935 set about taking the census of American-born Nisei.

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On behalf of the Japanese consulate?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, on page 1885 of our appendix 6, which is a report on Japanese activities, made in the early part of 1942 by the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, there is a reproduction of one of the census blanks headed "Japanese American Citizens League, Southern California Section, October 1, 1935."

Do you recall having seen any blank—

Mr. SLOCUM. That is it.

Mr. MATTHEWS (continuing). Similar to that?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is the one. That is the one that came to my attention. And I raised the roof with them, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that one of the reasons why you resigned from the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is the reason.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is the reason.

Mr. SLOCUM. Of course, you know, things had been collected up to that point before too, because the way they did it, you had the Japanese Intelligence Service, then what is known as the Japanese Association, Central Japanese Association, and then there are various Japanese newspaper syndicates and things like that. They were, in my opinion, working not for the American way, but rather for the interests of Japanese imperialism.

And, you can feel that. If you are not out 100 percent for the the interests of these things, why you are just socially ostracized or you are called a dog, or whatever they want to call you. And, for instance, if there is any talent, a man with good talent, just like a football squad, he would go out through the country to pick out some of the boys potential for football players and football team. They would also pick out the Americans of Japanese ancestry and they more or less used them. That was the tendency and temptations of that sort have been offered to me, too.

Mr. MUNDT. Would they give them a scholarship, too?

Mr. SLOCUM. I don't know that. This is the first time I ever heard anything about the scholarship. I don't know anything about that, sir. All I do know is that possibly you would be placed on a consular invitation list; maybe you would be included as a director in a Japanese association; you may get more business or enjoy special social favors, something of that sort. But, the tendency to utilize persons, of Americans of Japanese ancestry, toward their end, they did that; like a trip to Japan, for instance. That is one of their awards, or a banquet on a steamship, maybe. Well, that is another inducement, possibly. In that way the tendency to use them as their men, or whatever you want to call it, was already in motion.

Mr. MUNDT. Do most of the big Japanese enterprise operating in this country tend to employ people with ulterior motives behind them, as well as being as of American-Japanese ancestry?

Mr. SLOCUM. Sir, I can't say that for all of the companies, sir, because sometimes, I presume, ability goes a long ways. But the pull goes a long ways, too, like with Mitsui and other companies.

Mr. MUNDT. Perhaps you could not say it of all of the companies, but would you say it was a general tendency to do that?

Mr. SLOCUM. The general tendency perhaps is to take a person who is pro-Japanese plus ability, plus good scholarship, and one that can do possibly, or be of some use to the company as well as possibly for Japan.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever observe any tendency of the interests to pick talented young men of Japanese American ancestry and then endeavor to inculcate Japanese imperialist ideas in them?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, once they are in a company like that, I have had people tell me two sides to the story. Now, one part of the story is this. He says, "We Americans of Japanese ancestry, when we go to work for Mitsui, Mitsubishi, N. Y. K., or the Yokohama Specie



Bank"—those are semiofficial big guns—well, when they go to work for them, and since they are not citizens of Japan, they are given sort of a quasi status in the organization. They are not given full-fledged status. I heard that complaint.

Then again, from the various social or prestige angles, they would be invited, naturally, to big social functions or possibly be placed in the consulate or Central Japanese Association invitation list, and in that way they would enjoy certain prestige in the community, and that would be to their advantage.

Mr. MUNDT. Are the major newspapers of Japan involved with the Government directly or indirectly?

Mr. SLOCUM. Sir, I cannot answer that and be fair with you because I don't know that angle very well. But, I presume that a Japanese censorship—or a Japanese agency or a communication like Domei, and so forth, being as they are, in the country as they are, I presume that they are subject to a certain amount of censorship, perhaps like Germany.

Mr. MUNDT. I was not thinking of censorship as I was whether or not they had any semiofficial association with the Government.

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, that is what I heard.

Mr. MUNDT. You heard they did?

Mr. SLOCUM. I can't prove it, but I heard they did.

Mr. MUNDT. You heard they did?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In 1929 there was introduced in the California Legislature a bill popularly known as the antialien fishing bill, which was designed to curb Japanese espionage activities among the fishermen there. Do you know what the attitude of the Japanese American Citizens League was toward that legislation?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I particularly remember that, because I fought their stand on that. Previously I took the stand that the California Antialien Fishing Act, or I thought in the beginning it was distinctly discriminatory because they picked on the Japanese alone. However, as I analyzed the situation I came to realize that the people who were backing, or blocking the passage of the bill, was the Japanese American Citizens League. And, at that time I think Mr. Tsukamoto was in back of it.

So, Mr. Archie Claussen, past national commander of the American Legion of the Department of California, who was also past department national Americanization commissioner there of the American Legion, too, asked me that question.

And I said, "Archie, I think the time has come for us to take a definite stand on aid and assistance that is being given by the Japanese American Citizens League to try to block the passage of this bill. So, you listen to me tonight."

And, at a meeting, where I definitely took a stand in San Francisco, at a convention of the Japanese American Citizens League, that I thought that the stand they took was wrong, because I thought they were acting as sort of a front man for the various Japanese fishing interests, and I didn't know exactly where the money was coming from to combat the lobbying, or to promote the lobbying.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, to make the answer brief, you know that the Japanese American Citizens League was opposed to that legislation?

Mr. SLOCUM. To the passing of the legislation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you evacuated at the outbreak of the present war?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; we all were.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you residing at the time of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, at the time of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you residing?

Mr. SLOCUM. Van Nuys, Calif.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long before you were evacuated, after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. SLOCUM. We were evacuated around April of 1942, I believe it was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, in the meantime, that is, between Pearl Harbor and the time of your evacuation, did you become the chairman of what was known as the anti-Axis committee of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. I was drafted into it, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know why you were chosen for that position? State it very briefly, if you will, please.

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, sir, I submitted a letter to you, sir, that said that my record is pretty good and I got a pretty clean Americanization reputation. So, they wanted someone whose reputation was O. K. for an emergency of this nature, or something like that.

So, I said to my wife, I said, "They are offering me the chairmanship now after they have been fighting me, but I believe that I can serve, but before I serve," I said, "I want to get the O. K. from the F. B. I. and Naval Intelligence and Army Intelligence, the American Legion, the Masonic Order, the California Joint Americanization Committee, and the various recognized patriotic organizations."

And I put it up to them this way: I said, "You know how I have been fighting the Japanese, the encroachment of the Japanese things in our community. Now comes the war and they want me to take the leadership of my people here."

And, I said further: "I will accept it if you will O. K. it on the ground that I would be permitted to leave all the personnel as is," because I wanted to see what made the machinery of that organization run the way it did.

So, every one of them blessed me and said, "Go ahead, Tokio. They trust you."

I said, "O. K."

So, with the blessing of all the organizations, I took the leadership, but on the condition that every member of the organization shall cooperate with me fully, to cooperate with the duly constituted Federal authorities, sir; please understand that. That was the condition upon which I took it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you served as chairman of that group from about the beginning of 1942 until the time of your evacuation?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Which was in April of 1942?

Mr. SLOCUM. Until we all went to jail.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you evacuated to Camp Manzanar?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When you arrived at Manzanar, were you among the first to reach there?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir. I think we were about the third contingent, if I am not mistaken, sir. We were about the third to arrive there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How many evacuees were there in Manzanar when you arrived?

Mr. SLOCUM. I would say, perhaps, 3,000, or thereabouts.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How did you find conditions, generally speaking, when you reached Manzanar?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, sir, when I first reached Manzanar, everything looked all right. Of course, everything was new to us, and we sort of felt relieved from tension or accepting relief in it, accepting evacuation in it, so when we first landed, why, we were more or less relieved, sir, from tension, may I say?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you eventually begin to notice tension inside of the camp?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, yes, sir. We felt it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of those tensions inside of the camp?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well sort of a pent-up feeling for a long time, or, rather, dissension against the American Government for having evacuated the people into the camp, which sort of came to the surface; emotion, sir, reactionary feeling sort of erupted here and there. We heard the grumbling and we heard some speeches contrary to our form of government, and things like that, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In other words, these speeches that you heard and the discussions which you heard were pro-Axis, pro-Japanese and anti-American, were they?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. On the top of it, there was complete confidence on the part of the leaders that Japan was going to win the war and speeches that over the high Sierras will come Tojo to rescue them. That was the kind of feeling that existed.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there organized groups of a secret character working in Camp Manzanar?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; there were quite a few of them, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know the names of any of them?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, sir, I was a special investigator there, or inspector there, so it was my duty to obtain all this information and report that to the duly constituted authorities, so I happened to come across most of them, and many of them I would say were Blood Brothers, Black Dragon, the Dunbar Corps, or Dunbar Gang, and the San Pedro Yogres.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Gangs like the Dunbar Corps and the Blood Brothers Corps, did these groups operate secretly or put notices on the bulletin boards of the camps?

Mr. SLOCUM. They did, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How soon after you went to Manzanar did you begin to notice the activities of these underground subversive elements?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, sir, I believe it was right after, perhaps around July, June, or July, sir, about 2 or 3 months after I began to notice the increase in feeling of disorder.

Mr. MUNDT. When those notices were put up in camp, were they written in Japanese or English?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; they were all written in Japanese characters, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Can you read Japanese?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; I am sorry I can't, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You can understand some of the language though, can you not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. But you see, under this, what is known as special investigations, we ourselves had our secret group, too. One man can read Japanese and another man can write Japanese, and things like that. So, I had with me perhaps eight or nine persons who cooperated with me for the F. B. I.

Mr. MUNDT. And these notices were translated to you so that you positively know?

Mr. SLOCUM. Positively correct; absolutely correct. And then it was sent down to the F. B. I. in Los Angeles. There I told them, I says, "You want to double check this by your Korean interpreter, so that you feel you made it right." So, in that way, I know it was absolutely correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What Government agency was in charge of Manzanar when you got there?

Mr. SLOCUM. The W. C. C. A.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then what Government agency took over the administration of the camp a short time later?

Mr. SLOCUM. The W. R. A., sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did that transition take place from the W. C. C. A. to the W. R. A.?

Mr. SLOCUM. Sir, I cannot be absolutely accurate on that, sir, but perhaps it was around the month of May or June; somewhere around in there, possibly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you notice any difference in the atmosphere of the camp with respect to these subversive groups after the W. R. A. took over the camp?

Mr. SLOCUM. Unfortunately, yes; I did. I think W. R. A. is trying to do a thankless job well, but they somehow took advantage of something. I began to notice the growing activity.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you mean there was more unrest?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. There was more?

Mr. SLOCUM. It was not so much unrest as more a manifestation of pro-Japaneseism in the camp, because meetings then were permitted with greater frequency.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there greater leniency or tolerance of these manifestations on the part of W. R. A. than there had been on the part of W. C. C. A.?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I would say yes. On the other hand, it may have been a gradual transition which would have come anyway, whether it was the W. C. C. A. or the W. R. A., because we had become accustomed to the new rigor of life in that camp, and after once you become accustomed to any other why you begin to find fault. I suppose that is the way it started; I don't know.



Mr. COSTELLO. What was the general attitude of the Japanese when they were first evacuated?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, it was very funny, sir, Congressman Costello, because we were so grateful to be placed in there. That is the attitude that they expressed to me, they were so grateful to be placed in there; that we were no longer subject to rigid control or getting a permit before going to buy groceries, and we were not subject to being stopped by the F. B. I. on the road. They call them the F. O. B., by the way. You know, we were really exploited a good deal in these periods, and they were glad, because they were not exploited any more. That sort of feeling let down a little tension.

Mr. COSTELLO. The loyal Japanese, after Pearl Harbor, suffered a few insults, did they not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I could write a book, sir, because everything came to my hand for help, and the only men I could turn to was the F. B. I. and Navy, because they abused the name of the F. B. I. They would go around and pose as F. B. I.'s in case after case. They had two cliques that were going there with false badges and saying, "I am F. B. I. I am sorry, you have a nice range here. Well, you have to evacuate in 48 hours."

Well, these poor farmers didn't know what the score was, and then a driver would drive up and say, "I give you \$10 for the ice box," and F. B. I. and Navy, because they abused the name of the F. B. I. And the girls were being raped.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Japanese were being abused and taken advantage of and also threatened as to their safety by these people?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that when they first went into these evacuation centers, they felt, at least, they were safe from personal attack or bodily harm?

Mr. SLOCUM. Right, sir, and they were very grateful in the beginning. But, as they became used to it, like any other community, they began to find fault here and there.

Mr. COSTELLO. But after they were once concentrated in these centers, then these various organizations were able to operate and to function?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. To influence the thinking of the people in the centers?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is what happened.

Mr. COSTELLO. And nothing was done to try to prevent these organizations from functioning and developing a pro-Japanese feeling among the people?

Mr. SLOCUM. Some pitiful efforts were made, sir, from time to time, like putting them in jail for 1 week; like a man who stole a sack of cement, he was given 1 hour in jail, and things like that. While they were in jail, all their friends would come to them with ice cream and pop and cookies and coffee; a percolator and toast.

And I said, "What the blank blank is this?"

Well, finally they did away with that kind of stuff but that is the way it happened. It was sort of picnic-like.

Mr. COSTELLO. There was not sufficient punishment meted out to those found guilty?

Mr. SLOCUM. I don't think so. You know the Japanese trait, of the people, they have been for generations reared to respect the strong arm, or the fist, you know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, there are lots of Japanese people who believe that the father is a full dictator in his own home.

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right, and they expect the same thing, and they would have more respect for greater discipline.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Government of Japan operates the same way, dictatorially, in giving out orders and things of that kind.

Mr. SLOCUM. Please, Mr. Congressman, understand this angle, too. With that kind of attitude, see, well, you sort of penalize those people who are loyal, because the loyal people all get beaten up, which is not out of the camp; all our houses robbed and wives raped and insulted and intimidation and threats all the time, whereas they didn't have the law enforced enough within the camp, and therefore the bad ones became bolder and they became more outspoken in the end.

Mr. MUNDT. When the committee was in California, they had numerous other complaints along the same line that came before them. The people out there were pirating and exploiting the Japanese and acting as if they were F. B. I. agents and then beating the Japanese owners out of their property, and the committee thought that was indefensible, shameful, and we agree with you on that point.

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. We believe you have a just complaint in that regard.

Mr. SLOCUM. Thank you.

Mr. MUNDT. I ask you if that was the usual condition in Manzanar, and have you detected any attitude on the part of the Japanese folks that they want to be released from the camp and returned either to California or somewhere else in private life?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; not right away. You mean, right after they got to the camp?

Mr. MUNDT. Well, yes.

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; right after they got to the camp, we were so relieved, as I said a little while ago, and we knew the reason why we got put into the camp was because there being so much Japanese influence among Japanese natives, that the folks didn't know a good one, a loyal one, from the bad one. Therefore, with the war on if you will read the Tolson committee report, I stated that—I said, "By cracky, you don't know a good one from a bad one."

I said, "We all look alike, black hair, tan color, slant-eyed." And, I wish you would read that report. I took that stand.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you feel if there had been adequate discipline and leadership in these camps, that there would not have resulted this condition?

Mr. SLOCUM. From the very beginning. I say the W. R. A. can not be entirely blamed for it. You know, the W. C. C. A. handed down to the W. R. A. some of their own mismanagement and laxity—and please bear that in mind.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean the W. R. A. aggravated the situation, or did they tend to correct it?

Mr. SLOCUM. I believe the W. R. A. is going to correct it, but I don't believe it is strong enough to cope with the type of people administering, as I can see.

Mr. COSTELLO. This desire then on the part of the Japanese that they be released from the camps grows out of a lack of strong leadership on the part of the camp authorities?

Mr. SLOCUM. I think that ought to be the recommendation sir. Take the internal police department. I happen to know the officials and the workings of the internal police, and it is all made up of Japanese, with few Caucasian men on top, like the chief of police and assistant chief of police. Well, they are mighty fine fellows, sympathetic, and try to be very good to us.

On the other hand, when a showdown comes, like in a riot time, they being Japanese, they will say, "Why get ourselves heated up by strong arming against our own people?" That is the attitude a lot of people take. And, you have it in three shifts. One shift says, "Well, no use. What is the use of getting beaten up in a case like this? Let us resign." They did resign.

What kind of fellows have you got then? You have the M. P.'s a mile and a half away, and in the meantime the lower ones get beat up. It was real tragic comedy in the camp in those days.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When you learned of these pro-Japanese and anti-American utterances and activities in Camp Manzanar, did you call that to the attention of the W. R. A. Administration authorities at the camp?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I call it to the attention of some of the authorities, sir; a fellow by the name of Karl Yoneda went to Mister—well, he was the director at that time, and he asked the director, I believe, to have a special meeting of sort of an executive committee to thrash out the demonstrations, anti-American demonstrations that have already taken place, and this gentleman was very much in favor of firmer hands, but then again you have members in that group there who believe in soft-pedaling all this, so nothing definite ever came out of that, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you on more than one occasion report or call attention to the authorities of such activities?

Mr. SLOCUM. I certainly did, sir. It was my duty to report every day, practically, to F. B. I., and we compared data with data practically every day. Joe Masaoka and Tojo Tanaka. We compared data on many occasions to see what was taking place, because I wanted the report to get into the F. B. I. to be as accurate as I know how. There is not one thing prejudiced in there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What response did you get when you called the attention of the W. R. A. authorities to these subversive activities and attitudes?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, they said they are going to remedy it, and the remedies that they mete out were not compatible with the degree of crime, I think, because they would have sort of a quarrel out there and punishment in the cases—well, they were either let out on parole and maybe 1 hour in jail or maybe 1 week in jail.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did these manifestations of pro-Japaneseism and anti-Americanism increase during the year, during the summer and fall?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; notably increased.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And discipline became worse and more lax, did it?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right, until it terminated in the Pearl Harbor anniversary, December 7.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On December 7, 1942, was there a riotous demonstration at Manazar?

Mr. SLOCUM. It was very riotous indeed.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you present on that occasion?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I was the No. 1 Jap they were after. I sure was present.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean, the pro-Japanese were after you?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were they going to do you bodily harm?

Mr. SLOCUM. I understood they were going to kill me or tear me limb from limb, or something.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, had members of the camp been beaten up severely?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. There were about two or three cases up to that time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you describe briefly what occurred at this December 7, 1942, riotous demonstration?

Mr. SLOCUM. I will make it very brief, sir. In the fireplace in block 23, they had a big demonstration, I recall, and they named the death list of all the pro-Americans within the camp.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did they do that publicly?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, yes; right out in the open.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did your name head the list?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was the No. 1 Jap, sure.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were the No. 1 Jap?

Mr. SLOCUM. Tojo Tanaka, Joe Masaoka, that I mentioned, and myself and Fred Tayama and Tom Imai. We were on every definite list of death.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the date of that meeting?

Mr. SLOCUM. That was the 6th.

Mr. MATTHEWS. December 6?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then what occurred after that? Did the authorities take any action?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, the authorities were not there to see what was happening. And, I asked that the M. P.'s be called. They says, "No."

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who did you ask?

Mr. SLOCUM. Mr. Ned Campbell, assistant director.

He said, "When the M. P. comes, I go out."

I said, "Why?"

Well, he says, "If I can't administer without the help of the M. P.'s, why then I go."

Mr. MATTHEWS. The M. P.'s, that is the military police?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were the military police located?

Mr. SLOCUM. About a mile and a half away.

Mr. MATTHEWS. From the camp?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.



Mr. MATTHEWS. You reported this meeting of December 6 to Mr. Campbell?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And he refused to call the military police?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He said, "When they come in, I go out"?

Mr. SLOCUM. He said he would go out.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, that was his attitude?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did the disturbance continue that night and the next?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. Then the demonstrators, about 2,000 came singing Jap war songs, like what was human dynamite and all those Jap war songs, and it was unusual. And, they came marching down like the French revolutionists that I seen pictures of.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That was on the morning of December 7?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; that was the evening of December 6.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The evening of December 6?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; the afternoon.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You say about 2,000 came marching singing Japanese war songs?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; and yelling "Banzai" and "Dai Nippon" and "Hurrah for Pearl Harbor," and words following for that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is the meaning of "Banzai"?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is one for the—well, the equivalent of "hurrah."

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did they come from?

Mr. SLOCUM. They came right by the administration building. I was in the police station along with the other policemen. We police were impotent then.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were the internal police as distinguished from the military police, from the outside?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; military, if you do not come in.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were the military police in the camp armed?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; we have only a flashlight and a badge, that is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. These 2,000 were obviously belligerent, were they?

Mr. SLOCUM. Definitely belligerent, all the 2,000. I can't say that all 2,000 were pro-Japanese, you understand, but I think maybe 90 percent were spectators, coming down to see what was going to happen.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But you are sure that the mob spirit had seized the group?

Mr. SLOCUM. They were seething with it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. There was no question in your mind but what they were bent on destruction?

Mr. SLOCUM. Not in my mind.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who was in direct charge of the camp at that time?

Mr. SLOCUM. Mr. Ralph Merritt. He was a right good fellow. Everybody liked him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did he do?

Mr. SLOCUM. He called the military police in the meantime. He was at a dinner some place, and I know when he sized up the situation, after a few minutes he called the M. P.'s, and the M. P.'s came not long after.

But, he went out there to meet the mob. He raised his hand, I remember, sort of Indian fashion, and they all stopped about 100 feet away from the police station, and there they had sort of a confab, and Mr. Ned Campbell also went out there, but they chased Mr. Campbell back into the police department.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who chased him back?

Mr. SLOCUM. The mob didn't like him, somehow.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean they heckled him and hurled epithets at him?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. So he went back in?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And Mr. Merritt stayed?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes. A lot of things militated and added to the cause of the revolution. Some of the camp officials' attitude was. "Why talk about the loyalty and patriotism; you haven't got your citizenship. You are in jail with the rest of them, so forget about it."

And I refused to forget. I said, "Citizenship is the fountainhead of loyalty of people to America." I said, "Without it we have nothing." I said, "I will not stop preaching Americanism."

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were not making this kind of a speech during this demonstration, were you?

Mr. SLOCUM. No; previous to the demonstration, too, on the occasion when they would come up and speak for Japan, and I shook my fist in the face of the militant Japanese gang.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were explaining why they were after you, then?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was explaining why we were in the gang, so to speak.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And now you are explaining why they were after you?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. This might be a good point to stop for lunch.

Mr. STRIPLING. May we have a short intermission, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

[Short recess.]

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, Mr. Slocum, did violence occur at the culmination of this riot?

Mr. SLOCUM. It did, on the following day; on the following night; yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On December 7?

Mr. SLOCUM. Violence occurred. I am afraid I got the date mixed again, sir. This was on the 7th. The violence occurred that night.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On the night of the 7th?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; after the demonstrators came down and made demands on the administrators. The administrators best met the crisis as they knew how; in other words, they took Ueno, the leader.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, they took one of the leaders and locked him up?

Mr. SLOCUM. In the Bishop jail. Then they demanded that he be brought back to Manzanar.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, the mob demanded that?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did they bring him back?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did the mob do then?

Mr. SLOCUM. The mob demanded that he be released. In the meantime, the M. P.'s were all there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The military police did arrive?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. There was shooting, was there not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, one of the mob got a truck and put it in second gear and aimed it at the M. P.'s, you know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean he put it in second gear and then jumped out?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. They aimed the truck at the M. P.'s?

Mr. SLOCUM. They aimed on an angle on the crowd and they started shooting.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then the military police started to fire?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did they use a machine gun?

Mr. SLOCUM. I don't think they used a machine gun, not from what I understood. Of course, I was not there then. I was looking out for myself then, and I was in hiding by that time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You know from reports of the incident that there was shooting?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And there were two persons killed?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes; one died right away and the other one I understood died that night.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And a number were injured by bullets?

Mr. SLOCUM. Nine.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Nine injured by bullets?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And tear gas was used to disperse the mob?

Mr. SLOCUM. In the first set, but that didn't do much good.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And when you saw that violence was occurring, that shooting had started, you left?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, you see, when the demonstrators came there was an interim there when they demanded that this Ueno be brought back from Bishop to the local jail.

Mr. STRIPLING. At that time why was he jailed?

Mr. SLOCUM. He was beating up one of the boys there called Tajiri.

Mr. STRIPLING. They beat him up the day before?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. And they jailed him for being the leader of this mob?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes; Larry said, "I recognize this boy." He had a handkerchief over his face, but he said he could recognize this boy.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did others notify you that they were coming to get you?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. On the afternoon of December 6, about dark?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is right, is it?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did the mob approach your home?

Mr. SLOCUM. They did, and wrecked everything and stole everything.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you do when you saw the mob come to your house?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I was called perhaps three or four times that day, and I thought it was just the usual warning. But, this guy came into the house and he said, "Don't stay in the house tonight; they are going to kill you sure."

And, I looked out and it was dark then. And I looked out and there was the mob coming, and the only thing I had was the flashlight.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you do?

Mr. SLOCUM. I said, "Come and get me. Here I am." I wanted to take that pressure away from my house. I had two babies and a wife in there.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then what did you do?

Mr. SLOCUM. I ran as fast as I could a mile and a half to the police station, that I wanted to go to, but I couldn't make it.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you do?

Mr. SLOCUM. So I hid under the Kibei houses.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was the Kibei active in this pro-Japanese mob?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. So you hid under their houses?

Mr. SLOCUM. I thought, "By God, those are the only people that won't be home," so I hid there.

Mr. STRIPLING. How long did you stay there?

Mr. SLOCUM. About 2 hours.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then what did you do?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I began to say my prayers and everything else, and then I finally walked down in the open, far back, and finally made for the barbed-wire fence where the flashlight swings around like this in a circle, for the fire cook.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is the headquarters of the military police?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; not headquarters, but outpost. And I said to myself, "Well, by God, on this side the Japs are going to get me and on this side the M. P.'s will get me," and I said, "By God, I would rather be killed by an American anyhow." So, I waited for the flashlight to make a circle and when everything was in the dark I ran and ducked until I finally made it.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then, when you got there you put yourself in the custody of the military police?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes; I did, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. And did the military police then come and get your family?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, they were good, sure.

Mr. STRIPLING. They got your family?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. And, how many other internees did they so-call rescue from the mob?

Mr. SLOCUM. I judge about 25.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did they do with the 25?



Mr. SLOCUM. They placed us in the M. P. dispensary, no bed or nothing. We all sat there and glad we were alive.

Mr. STRIPLING. They put you there that night?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then the following day the shooting occurred?

Mr. SLOCUM. I believe so.

Mr. STRIPLING. I see. In other words, they sort of put you in jail to protect you from the other fellows?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I volunteered my services—this is off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. STRIPLING. Was it because you were working with the F. B. I. and working against this group that they were going to kill you?

Mr. SLOCUM. Definitely. The only thing I ever asked for from the F. B. I. was a postage stamp, and one day in the police station one boy opened the door enough to see the boy hand me a postage stamp, and ever since that time I have been a marked man.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. this day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to the recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Mr. Slocum, will you come forward? You may continue with the questioning where you left off.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to have you excuse Mr. Slocum and call to the stand Mrs. Kanazawa to identify a document about which Mr. Slocum will then testify.

Mr. COSTELLO. All right.

#### TESTIMONY OF EMILIE AUGUSTA ALDRIDGE KANAZAWA

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. State your full name to the reporter, please.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Emilie Augusta Aldridge Kanazawa.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, subsequently, when Mrs. Kanazawa is called to give further testimony, she will be identified at greater length. For our present purposes, we have only one question to ask her.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mrs. Kanazawa, were you served with a subpoena from the Special Committee on Un-American Activities on or about June 11, 1943, to turn over to the committee, duces tecum, the records of the Japanese American Citizens League which were in your possession, in your apartment?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Pursuant to the terms of that subpoena, did you turn over to an agent of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities this bound volume of mimeographed pages?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This volume is entitled "Supplement to Minutes Japanese American Citizens League, Special Emergency National

Conference, November 17-24, 1942, Salt Lake City, Utah, issued January 1, 1943, Japanese American Citizens League, National Headquarters, 413-415 Beason Building, Salt Lake City, Utah."

Several sections of this report are marked "Confidential."

What was the address where you resided at the time you turned this particular document over to an agent of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. The address was apartment 5, 1324 Fourteenth Street NW.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all for the present with this witness.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Slocum, will you resume, please?

#### TESTIMONY OF TOKUTARO NISHIMURA SLOCUM—Resumed

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Slocum, have you had an opportunity to read various portions of this document which has just been identified by Mrs. Kanazawa?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you read beginning with supplement No. 32 to the end of the volume?

Mr. SLOCUM. I did, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, the pages of this volume are not numbered, so I identify the page by supplement 32 to the end of the volume.

I will read, Mr. Slocum, excerpts from this portion of the document which you read and then ask you if you can confirm from your own first-hand experience the truth of the statements found herein, or if you can add to the facts as set forth in this report.

Supplement No. 32 of this report is entitled "Reports National Emergency Conference, Japanese American Citizens League, Internal Security."

In general, Mr. Chairman, this section of this confidential document of the Japanese American Citizens League deals with the activities of various underground and subversive Japanese organizations at work at the Manzanar camp of the War Relocation Authority. In the introduction to this document, we read as follows:

Now, with more leisure time, dormant forces are beginning to create disturbances. What has seemingly appeared to most Caucasian administrators as a placid community life, in reality, covered a cauldron in which differing ideologies, unmixable as oil and water, seethed and boiled. Surface indications of this internal strife have appeared from time to time. However, center officials have usually dismissed these symptoms with an academic leniency.

Mr. Slocum, is that description in line with what you found to be the conditions at Manzanar center while you were there?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; quite true, sir. If I may add, this is very well written up and the symptoms as expressed here may be added to mean symptoms of discontentment and unrest and pro-Japaneseism on one hand and pro-Americanism on the other, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Thank you. Again we read:

Internal security should be exactly what its title connotes. Reports issuing from some centers indicate that security of life and limb for those bespeaking constructive attitudes does not exist. On the other hand, malefactors have been

so condoned that their nefarious beatings of decent citizens continues not only unabated but with increasing frequency.

A warning note must here be again emphasized. As community leaders leave on individual relocation, the centers are drained of the spark plugs which give momentum to War Relocation Authority policies. The elements which maintained helpful attitudes of personal reestablishment may disintegrate. The centers may become hotbeds of unrest and indolence. Truly, a great many of the evacuees may become persuaded to remain as wards for the duration. With such a spirit rampant within the centers, War Relocation Authority administration may of necessity become transformed into a prison administration to maintain peace and order.

I take it, Mr. Slocum, that that section refers to the fact that those who were actively and vocally pro-American in their attitudes were in danger of being beaten and were actually beaten in some cases by elements in the camp who were energetically pro-Japanese?

Mr. SLOCUM. Very true, sir. Then, too, sir, not only were we subjected to the various beatings as it states here, of decent citizens, but we were placed in a constant fear, threat, intimidations, and every time you go to mess hall or line up in mess hall, or if you go to the canteen to buy something, you were insulted and taunted and you were called everything; even your children sometimes got stoned and your wives got abused with vile language. And, it is very true that it sort of seemed to put a premium on disloyal ones and didn't give any protection to loyal ones who had the courage to stand up for America.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you find on the part of the administrators of the camp, that is, the administrators of the War Relocation Authority, objection to segregating these disloyal and violent elements from the loyal Nisei?

Mr. SLOCUM. Their stand, as I noticed, seemed to be a rather passive one, and if they did take any measure it was a mild one.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, were they opposed to segregation of these two elements?

Mr. SLOCUM. In a way; yes. I would say possibly they were opposed, because it meant for us a repetition of another riot or they themselves did not take any definite stand; no, sir. They did not take any strong stand to discourage any of these nefarious beatings or anything of that kind.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, this confidential report of the Japanese American Citizens League speaks of gangdom existing in Manzanar, and the report states:

Manzanar gangdom is usually identified by the people as one of three groups:

- (1) Terminal Islanders known also as Yogores or the San Pedro Gang.
- (2) The Dunbar Gang.
- (3) The Blood Brothers Corps, known also as Yuho Kesshidan.

Were you, when you were at Manzanar, aware of the existence of these three groups of gangdom?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was definitely aware, sir, of two of them, that is the San Pedro Yogores and the hoodlum gang of Dunbar gangsters. They were sort of like a cross between zoot suiters and gangsters like. And they have absolutely no regard for anything. They run around in gangs and throw threats and intimidations, and they would hurt people, and they were absolutely there, sir. As for the Blood Brothers and Black Dragon, they were a phantom group. They would post signs in Japanese quarters, in the kitchen, because they



know everybody would have to eat at the kitchen, and you would have to line up, and as you lined up and get to your turn at the mess hall, why, you have to read the signs posted at the entrance door, so in that way they carried out their vicious mission.

Mr. COSTELLO. How old were the members of these gangs?

Mr. SLOCUM. The San Pedro Yogores were much older, sir, than the Dunbar group. I would say the Dunbar group averaged maybe perhaps 15, to perhaps the oldest one, maybe 25, sir. They always ran in gangs and they were really a lawless, vicious sort of thing.

Mr. COSTELLO. American born, were they?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And the same is true of the San Pedro Yogores?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. American born also?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; you can tell the difference between Yogores and the Dunbar group, because the San Pedro Yogores were more violent, but they were more clannish, and if one of their gang should be beaten up, why, then the whole gang would go to revenge them in typical Japanese fashion.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were any Kibei in these groups?

Mr. SLOCUM. Perhaps there were, sir; I couldn't say as to exactly what percentage each group were composed, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Kibeis were just a group of youngsters?

Mr. SLOCUM. Hoodlums.

Mr. COSTELLO. But causing trouble?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; but they were a very vicious group, sir, because they throw intimidations and almost force practically everybody to do as they will. For instance, they will break up dances and any kind of a sociable gathering. They would bust in and have their say, and the police force was not strong enough to cope with the situation. Again, I would like to emphasize, Mr. Congressman, when the military police force arrived, with their ability to combat, why they would stand up and take notice. That sentiment prevailed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you say that each of these groups was more pro-Japanese than the other?

Mr. SLOCUM. Absolutely. I didn't see any symptoms of pro-Americanism.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The report thus describes the Blood Brothers more in the following language:

This appears to be an underground movement, political in nature. Unlike the San Pedro gang or the Dunbar gang, no members of this group has come out into the open and acknowledged himself as a Blood Brother.

Their activities to date:

(a) On October 31, 1942, bulletins written in Japanese appeared on mess hall bulletins in violation of central regulations, which require approval of every poster. Translated, the bulletin read:

"Attention. We do not recognize any necessity for a self-government system. We should oppose anything like this as drawing a rope around our neck. Let the Army take care of everything. Stop taking action which might bring trouble to our fellow people.

"Blood Brothers Corps concerned about the people."

On Friday and Saturday, November 6 and 7, the members of the Manzanar Commission on Self-Government received letters via mail from the Blood Brothers. The following 17 persons, comprising the commission, were recipients.



Then follows a list of 17 persons who received two sets of letters.

There were two sets of letters, both in Japanese, apparently written by two different persons.

Following is a literal translation of the shorter of the two letters:

"Think of the shame the American Government has put us into. Think of the disruption of properties, and the imprisonment of the Nisei.

"To start a self-government system now is nothing but a dirty selfish scheme. As the Army put us in here without regard to our own will, we should leave everything up to the Army, whether they want to kill us or eat us.

"Because this is the only way the American Government can think of as a means of absolving itself from the blame of misconducting its affairs, the Government thought of a bad scheme, that is, this formation of the self-government system.

"The hairy beasts (white) are out to actually run the Government while using you people who can be used. It is evident if you read article 1 of the charter and can be proved by the facts of the past. You fellows who are acting blindly are big fools.

"If you do such things as those, which tighten the noose around the necks of your fellow people, some day you will receive punishment from heaven, so beware.

"Blood Brothers Corps which worry for their fellow people."

The longer of the two letters translated reads as follows:

Calling you fools who are running around trying to set up a self-government system.

Think back. The fact that the positions, the properties, and the honor which our fellow Japanese built up and won by blood and sweat during the past 50 years have all been stamped and sacrificed by the arrogant and insulting American Government after we have been put into this isolated spot.

For what are you beating around. What use is there for establishing self-government? Especially with such a charter so full of contradictions? Although we are ignorant people, we can foresee the tragic results which will come out of this self-government.

Remember that the majority of our people are absolutely against the self-government system. What do you think of the fact that 6 months ago in Santa Anita, the same attempt which you are now trying, was made, to organize a self-government. But it broke down before it materialized.

Leave everything completely as the Army pleases. If you nincompoops realize the fact that you are Japanese, why don't you assume the honorable attitude which is typical of Japanese? What a shameful sight you are about to present by being fooled by the sweet words of the Government. By so doing you are inviting suffering to your fellow Japanese.

We fellow Japanese are all like fish laid on the cutting board, about to be sliced. To jump around at this stage is a cowardly thing to do. Better lay down and let the Government do as it pleases, either cook us or fry us.

You should remain calm and conduct yourselves like nationals of a first-class power. Give more thoughts and deep reflections as to your attitude.

Blood Brothers Corps, which is concerned over fellow nationals.

When these signs or letters or communications were posted at Camp Manzanar, they were sometimes accompanied by the following words: "Anyone who tears this down is a dirty dog of a stooge."

Mr. Muxr. When these signs were posted, what was the experience? Were they permitted to be displayed for quite a while or were they quickly removed?

Mr. Slocum. Sir, the way it happened was this: In most cases we went to take them off and, naturally, send a copy to F. B. I. in Los Angeles and the other copy went to the administration, and immediately interpretations were made correct by two persons, so that we know they were accurate. But usually we get some warning from some pro-American loyal person that kitchen so and so got certain signs and it said so and so, "Come and get them." So the police in a car would go up there and tear them down, and we usually tore them

right down, and nobody ever stopped us from tearing down, but we were watched to see who were there in that car, and we were marked.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever apprehend any of the fellows who were putting them up?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir. I made several suggestions that the barracks opposite the mess hall where these things are usually put up be occupied by the police department and we placed in relay certain watchmen, but that didn't go through.

Mr. MUNDT. To whom did you make the suggestion?

Mr. SLOCUM. To the chief of police over there.

Mr. MUNDT. A Caucasian?

Mr. SLOCUM. A Caucasian, and also to the chief of police at the other place. But moving a barracks from one place to another is not very easily done, so in one way or another that sort of a suggestion never materialized.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the chief look with favor upon your suggestion?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; he did, but somehow it didn't go through, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. On account of the difficulty of moving the barracks?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Further, according to this report, the two signatures which appeared with the greatest regularity on these posters were the Southern California Blood Brothers Corps and the Manzanar Black Dragon Society.

Then the report states that as a rule, or almost invariably, these bulletins, slogans, or communications would appear on the bulletin boards of all 36 places simultaneously. Then it took a pretty good organization, did it not, to put posters up on 36 boards simultaneously?

Mr. SLOCUM. Sir, may I answer that, sir?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. SLOCUM. To answer the last part, and I may elaborate just a little bit on the first part, sir, it goes to show you, as I testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, that the kitchen was the first place that these Japanese factions, pro-Japanese factions or groups controlled, because they know any gang's stomach was of first consideration. Thus, they organized the kitchen crews and transportation, mail-delivery system, those vital positions; they saw to it that they are grabbed and they had control. That is how they got control of the kitchen. That is why it went up simultaneously. Therefore, I would say, sir, that the most of those people who were members of those nefarious organizations were members of the kitchen crews in the various places.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You spoke of the pro-Japanese or disloyal elements in the camps. Is it your experience that those disloyal elements included Nisei, Issei, and Kibei alike?

Mr. SLOCUM. I would not say alike, but as I noticed the kind of help they had in all the kitchens, I noticed they were mostly Isseis, perhaps Isseis 75 percent and perhaps Kibei or pro-Japanese Nisei constituting perhaps the balance.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Twenty-five percent?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. That is about the way it ran, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In this particular record right here, I think we have not yet had a definition of these Japanese terms. It might be

well to introduce that, Congressman. A Nisei is an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, is that correct?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And an Issei is a Japanese-born alien; is that correct?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And a Kibei is an American-born citizen of Japanese ancestry who has been sent back to Japan for an education and then returns to this country?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But, it is your observation, is it, that among all of these groups there are to be found some who are still full Japanese and disloyal to the United States?

Mr. SLOCUM. Definitely, sir. And as you read the manifestations of these posters they set up in the typical Japanese militaristic language, it goes to show you the very reason why we got kicked out of California; this kind of a thought premeditation among the leaders of the pro-Jap factions, and they tend to spread that sort of thought over the Niseis and younger Kibeis already have been imbued with this sort of conception of Jap philosophy. But that is the kind of stuff that made the Californians doubt our loyalty and since we look so much alike they don't know a good one from a bad one, and that is why they had to take us out and put us in camps.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In other words, the Government, in the first instance, initiated evacuation because it was difficult to distinguish between the loyal and the disloyal, merely on the basis of whether or not they were born in this country?

Mr. SLOCUM. No. They did that simply because they didn't know a good one from a bad one, and the war was on, and at that time there was possibility of invasion and things like that, right after Pearl Harbor. As you remember, sir, on the Pacific coast, right after Pearl Harbor, we were more or less jittery there, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this entire document from which excerpts have been read be received for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just those latter pages?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes; supplement 32 in its entirety; its entire text.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. SLOCUM. May I make a short addition, sir?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. SLOCUM. It mentions here about having attempted to put up self-government, but it failed before it materialized. As I understood, by common exchange of correspondence with a very pro-American-Japanese in that camp, this only was brought about by the pro-Japanese leaders themselves by intimidating and threatening those who were taking the leadership to create organizations of that sort, sir.

Furthermore, even now there seems to be a tendency on the part of some of the released Japanese in and around Chicago of organizing Japanese clubs and organizations. My opinion was asked and I emphatically stated that there ought not to be any organization for the duration, at least, because any gathering of Japanese in time of war, right now, will tend to create misunderstanding and arouse suspicion unnecessarily, and that in itself is not good.



In wartime right now we should make that sort of a sacrifice. But, they wrote back and said, "We are lonesome; we lack social contact."

And I asked that they remember that the boys in the front line trenches are lonesome, too, and they lack social contact. In that way there is already beginning to crop up around Chicago, as I am told, a tendency to create Japanese organizations. If so, I think that is very bad, because no matter whether they do it, there is some tendency to bring in portions of a Japanism in any kind of a Japanese organization.

My contention is that we should forget our national racial origin and consider ourselves as a part of the American citizenry and forget that we have any ties with Americanism and kind of lose ourselves in the shuffle, sort of to speak, and reconstruct ourselves, because by remembering forever "Japan, Japan, Japan," and everything is highfalutin with the Japanese and all this and that, that is the very thing that landed us in the concentration camps.

Mr. MUNDT. I think you want to correct the record, Mr. Slocum: You said to forget that we had any ties with America.

Mr. SLOCUM. Sure. I am sorry. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. From your experience at Manzanar, did the Japanese who were there look with favor on the idea of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Purporting to speak on their behalf?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, absolutely not, sir. They didn't think that the Japanese American Citizens League represented their opinion and they were very much against it, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. They were against the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, they were, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you find sentiment strong against the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; very strong, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Even on the part of the Nisei?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; the Nisei themselves. That is why Fred Tayama was beaten up, I am told.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was Fred Tayama's connection with the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, he was southern district council president of the Japanese American Citizens League, representing, I am not sure, but I think around 26 chapters of the Japanese American Citizens League before the war. And, he is also supposed to have capitalized on his leadership by issuing passes, and so forth, from the United States District Attorney's office for various people who wanted to go shopping or see somebody after freezing took place, and in that way I understand that he created himself a lot of enemies, because he sort of capitalized on the misfortunes of the Japanese people and made money during that time. So that got him in a very bad grace about that. I would say this, that a majority of the members of the Japanese American Citizens League are good, loyal citizens, but a few leaders like that may do very, very bad harm for the entire organization.



Then, too, as I stated before, in many localities, many of the leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League were used by the Central Japanese Association or Japanese Association, or newspaper association, or by the Jap Consulate, and so forth, are sort of a cats-paw, front line spokesmen, to do some propaganda work or to carry on some contact with American organizations or things like that, so it created rather unfavorable impressions, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On or about May 22, 1943, did you attend a meeting of the Japanese American Citizens League held at the Calvary Baptist Church in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. SLOCUM. I definitely did, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. About how many persons were present at that meeting?

Mr. SLOCUM. I can't say for sure, sir, but I would judge it must have been 25 or 30 people there, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that the larger number of Nisei residents in the Washington area?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I was told at one time that there were about 50 Americans of Japanese ancestry around this vicinity, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was this strictly a meeting of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. SLOCUM. I would say it was, and at this meeting Mr. Mike Masaoka was chairman and main speaker, and he spoke on the policies of the J. A. C. L. and aims they were striving for to liberate the Japanese evacuees from the camps, if I remember correctly.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is this Mike Masaoka any relation to Joe Masaoka?

Mr. SLOCUM. They are brothers, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. He is a brother?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; but Mike Masaoka is national executive secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League and Joe Masaoka now is head of the Japanese American Citizens branch in Denver, if I am not mistaken, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understood you to say this morning that he and a lot of others were to be put to death at Manzanar.

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, that is his brother, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Mike Masaoka speak at this meeting for approximately an hour, or longer?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, I don't think it was over an hour, perhaps 45 minutes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did anyone else deliver a formal speech?

Mr. SLOCUM. Mr. Saburo Kido, national president of the Japanese American Citizens League, he spoke, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He was present and spoke?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who presided at the meeting?

Mr. SLOCUM. Mr. Masaoka.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did anyone else speak formally?

Mr. SLOCUM. Formally, I believe Mr. Larry Tajiri spoke on the Pacific Citizen, which is the newspaper of the Japanese American Citizens League, and I believe he stated that their subscription is needed or would be appreciated, or something like that. That is about all, sir, in a formal way, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know most of the persons present, personally?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; I did not, sir. I knew quite a few of them because I had met them since I have been here, but I did not know the entire group.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you meet Mr. Abe there that night; Mr. Paul Abe?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; Mr. Abe was there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And Mrs. Abe?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And Mr. Kanazawa?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you meet the Kobayoshis, who are at present working for Secretary of the Interior Ickes?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; I met both the boys, Roy and Fred Kobayoshis. For the first time I met them there that evening. They are very nice, quiet boys.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Slocum, among other things, this committee and the country is interested in protecting our national security against any subversive efforts on the part of disloyal Japanese; also in protecting the loyal Japanese themselves against any bodily harm or economic operation or propaganda on the part of disloyal Japanese. If that is to be done, it is very essential that there be a definite distinction made between loyal and disloyal citizens of Japanese ancestry.

I would like to ask for your opinion. Do you feel that it is possible to make a positive distinction between a loyal and disloyal Japanese in these relocation centers?

Mr. SLOCUM. Sir, I appreciate the goal toward which this good committee is striving; therefore, I gladly came to submit myself to any question you gentlemen care to ask of me.

In regard to answering your question as to differentiating loyal from disloyal, I cannot say that 100 percent, but I can say pretty close to 100 percent that differentiation can be made as to those who are loyal to America and those who are not; first, by studying their family history; second, by the associations they keep and the kind of church or educational background they have and kind of employment they have held, and also by asking them psychological questions and also to ascertain if they were in Japan, and if so, for what purpose, and see if their fathers or any of their relatives are in alien enemy concentration camps at this time, picked up by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of course, and other methods, which other Federal authorities know, I am sure, that the biggest percentage of the people can be differentiated as to those who are loyal from those who are not, sir.

I believe so, sir, and I fully appreciate if the loyal ones can be fully protected, I would fully appreciate it, because they have been trying so hard to do the proper thing.

I get letters from all over the camps. They ask me what can I do for them. I said, "The only thing you can do is to appeal to your Congressman, appeal to fair-minded Americans here and there and all over and state the fact what you are really going through, but at the same time, when you state these facts, let it be facts and nothing else but facts."

Under that way I appeal to you, sir, that you be good enough to segregate the bad from the good and put the good ones where they can do our Nation some good instead of eating up our taxpayers' money. And the bad ones, you can put them in one place and put them under military rule, or whatever you deem necessary. But, under the present set-up, I am just wondering, in view of the fact that they have not taken definite rigid steps to segregate the good from the bad—I appreciate that they are doing a thankless job, but I am wondering, with their internal security system, the policing they have now, I question whether they can carry out that program the way they are going at it now, sir. I think that needs stronger hands.

Mr. MUNDT. I recognize it is a tremendously difficult task to make this segregation, and you recognize that, too. I wonder if you would agree with me that under prevailing conditions it probably is to the best interests of both this country and the loyal Japanese themselves, that if we cannot do a perfect job, as you have indicated probably cannot be done, that if we are going to make a set-up, we should make it on the concept of being exceedingly careful so as not to harm in any way the loyal Japanese element.

Mr. SLOCUM. I do.

Mr. MUNDT. That would be a benefit to the Japanese themselves, would it not?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Because I know and you know that among certain people, at least, on the Pacific coast, and especially today, there is the feeling that all Japs are bad.

Mr. SLOCUM. That is not so. I want to go on record and say that is not so, because I tell you the majority are good. And we have been branded bad because things like this go on and the authority doesn't suppress it. That makes me awfully mad too, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I am from the section of the country where they used to say the only good Indian was a dead Indian, but this country was very much developed by the aid of the Indian scouts that came to the rescue of the white men. However, that is a very difficult job. From your observation at Manzanar, considerable improvement has to be made before we have definitely a basis for making a segregation, is that correct?

Mr. SLOCUM. Right, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Your testimony, I want to say, has been of immeasurable value to the committee, and I appreciate your fair-minded attitude expressed in answering questions.

Mr. SLOCUM. Thank you very much, and I tried my very best. And, anything I can do, I am at your service.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where are you employed at present?

Mr. SLOCUM. War Manpower, Occupational and Information Department.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long have you been working there?

Mr. SLOCUM. Since I came here, around January 20, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of 1943?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.



Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Slocum, what is your opinion, generally, of the living conditions of the Japanese in Manzanar?

Mr. SLOCUM. The living conditions, sir? Well, sir, at best it is bad, sir. At best it is bad, because it lacks privacy; and at its best it is bad, because there is that element of human favoritism that creeps in, and certain people in the kitchen crew, for instance, they get the cream of the things, and that is about the only reward they get.

And then, too, living conditions are bad because it seems to be having sort of a moral degeneration effect on the people there. Perhaps, if I may say it this way, the Japanese are pretty thrifty, hard-working people. They are known for that; but now they are losing that initiative, that sort of place, like the Indians on the reservation. They feel like they want to be kept there for the duration; they are afraid to get out.

Like a letter I got the other day from a friend in Arizona; they said the boys that volunteered came back in American uniforms, landed in Phoenix, and were refused service in a restaurant. Maybe they were aliens. Well, they felt pretty bad that way.

Mr. MUNDT. I believe you are interpreting my remarks in connection with the belief that some people have, that the Indians have no desire to stay on the reservation.

Mr. SLOCUM. I thought the idea of the Indian was to stay on the reservation, to take it easy. That is all I know about the Indians. After all, I am a Jap, you know.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Slocum, generally speaking, what are the moral conditions of the camp? Do you know anything about that?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. It is our duty to keep tab on everything and moral conditions. I suppose you consider delinquency, for among 10,000 people, as we have in the camp there, with limited recreation and amusements, and so forth, we do have delinquency, sir, and what I understand is the tendency is toward increasing it, I heard.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to know whether or not, in your opinion, the living conditions tend to bring about less satisfactory moral conditions among those people living in the camp.

Mr. SLOCUM. I believe it does.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think the moral conditions would be improved if each family had an apartment instead of being compelled to live in one room?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, they have that tendency right now. Efforts are being made by W. R. A. to give one apartment to one family, sir, and as the people go out, they are being more and more vacant, so they are getting more and more the privacy as much as camp conditions will permit.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, at Manzanar, did they not have each family separated into at least one room?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes. The effort was made toward that direction that in each room either a member of the family or relatives live there; in each apartment.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What you mean by "apartment" is a single room?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A single space?

Mr. SLOCUM. A single space with so many beds in it.



Mr. EBERHARTER. And not separated, that is, the families were not separated. If there were three or four or five children, they all slept in the same room with the mother and father?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, yes; that is right; all in one room; yes, sir. We have lost all sense of privacy there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And you believe that helps to contribute to the degeneration of the moral life?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

But, first of all, it is sort of a spiritual degeneration that is taking place because they are in there, and all they hear and all they read is about the Jap is a Jap, about anti-Japanism, resolutions passed here and laws going to be passed there against the Japs. They say, "What is the use? I am afraid to get out. If we do get out, we will be kicked out." Then comes this propaganda like that that plays right into these boys' hands.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think they are losing the incentive they might have had because of the conditions under which they are living?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir; quite a few of them are losing incentive. But if you segregate the loyal from the disloyal and again go on the path of Americanism and give them the inspiration that they are American-spirited, and if you are protected by the duly constituted authorities and the other officials, that Uncle Sam trusts you, do your all to win the war, then a new feeling of life comes up.

But now it is sort of hopeless. We know that a certain clique is no good, but if the authority does not segregate the good from the bad, you still leave the good ones unprotected and there is no incentive to make the report to the F. B. I. or the duly constituted authority, because he will be beaten if he does.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Slocum, you think if a proper examination was made of each Japanese before he was released from camp and the public was led to know that the examination had taken place and was very thorough, that a lot of resentment toward the Japanese people would be eliminated?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. If the immigration authority comes to you and says, "Show me your passport," and you say "O. K." and show him your passport, as the result of that you are entitled to protection by Uncle Sam. By the same token, if those people who are released from the relocation centers are released by the duly constituted authorities and be treated as citizens on the outside, why, then their morale would go up and their sense of security and regularity would come back again.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, you believe there is a general feeling all over the country that no Japanese can be trusted?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, if you talk that way, you say these Japs haven't been treated right and in that way you can suspect me.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean, if they released both the loyal and the disloyal?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. I know a case where an officer of the camp itself told me, "I don't give a blank blank about loyalty or disloyalty. If a thousand more of those workers are wanted, we will give them to him." To that I objected. I said, "Once you get us out, please make sure that we are loyal and give us the stamp of approval if we are loyal, and let us live and give us a chance to rehabilitate, because we have been through hell long enough."

Once we have been given freedom by an O. K. of this good committee, as well as by Uncle Sam and the duly constituted authorities, please let us alone. That is the thing I have been appealing all the time. But, so far it seems that it lacks that stamp of approval by the duly constituted authorities, so it seems we are still under suspicion. It is not fair.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, there have definitely been some that have been disloyal that have been released from the camps?

Mr. SLOCUM. I know so. I know two from Manzanar and when I saw them I wrote to the F. B. I.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the very sort of situation that should be corrected, that you cannot trust any Japanese.

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. If the public did know that a thorough examination had been made as it should be, and that everybody who is released is a loyal Japanese and not a disloyal Japanese, I think it would break down a whole lot of opposition to release.

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Do they have any work to do in the camps?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. They have a camouflage net factory, a furniture factory, produce farm goods, more or less self-sustaining, raising their own produce.

Mr. MUNDT. Are there enough opportunities for employment, for those who want to work, in the center?

Mr. SLOCUM. I couldn't say as to that for sure, sir, because I was not in the employment section, but I do know that a great majority of the people were working, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And they were all paid \$16 or \$19 a month; the wage being paid to the Japanese?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That was the salary?

Mr. SLOCUM. \$19 was the salary.

Mr. MUNDT. Did many of the Japanese refuse to work because they felt the wages were not sufficient?

Mr. SLOCUM. No; a lot of the Japanese refused to work because of intimidation. In the early days of the camouflage factory, they said, "Why work for camouflage? It is going to hide the guns to kill the Japanese." My God! You need a firmer grip so that the loyal people in the camp who really want to contribute to this cause are protected, because they make suckers of those, by beating those and getting their wives insulted.

Mr. MUNDT. When did you leave Manzanar?

Mr. SLOCUM. On Pearl Harbor anniversary, December 7, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And you have not been back there since?

Mr. SLOCUM. Oh, I don't want to go back. Don't you send me back,

Mr. Congressman. I have been a good citizen.

Mr. MUNDT. You were in there from April to December?

Mr. SLOCUM. About 8 months, \$16 a month.

Mr. MUNDT. You were released then by W. R. A. to come back to Washington?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Or how were you released?

Mr. SLOCUM. I was released from there to my wife's mother's vegetable farm, produce farm, where my folks have been for 35 years, and

they were short of help. So, we went there and my colonel, Colonel Buxton, who is Assistant Director of Strategic Services here under Colonel Donovan, Wild Bill Donovan, he heard about it and he says, "Tokie, they can't do that with a boy from my regiment. Here is \$100. You come and help Uncle Sam here." I have been here ever since.

Mr. MUNDT. Is your family here with you?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; they are out there still farming.

Mr. MUNDT. About how many beatings have taken place in Manzanar, different incidents?

Mr. SLOCUM. Well, the violent ones, about six, I reckon.

Mr. MUNDT. There were quite a number of people who have been beaten up from time to time?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir. Some are a personal grudge, but most of them are by the gangs, because of manifestation of Americanism and things like that.

Mr. MUNDT. Were a large number removed from Manzanar following the December 7 riot there?

Mr. SLOCUM. I don't know for sure, but I read somewhere that about 12 or 14 of them were removed to a camp in Idaho somewhere, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those the troublemakers or some of the loyal Japanese?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, they were definitely pro-Japanese troublemakers. We suspected some of them to be Blood Brothers and Black Dragons; the kitchen leaders.

Mr. MUNDT. At least, they tried to remove some of the troublemakers from the camp?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Speaking of these different organizations, are any of these organizations that have been spoken of, like the Dunbar Gang or the San Pedro Corps, communistic in their tendencies or affiliations?

Mr. SLOCUM. If any group were communistic in that group, I would say definitely that the Dunbar gang is very likely to be.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you found much communism among the Japanese people?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir; not very many, sir. A Communist, in Japanese circles, is pretty well marked, and that is the first thing you hear. If they don't like anybody, they say he is a Communist. That is the first thing you hear, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Generally, the Japanese people do not approve of communism any more than the rest of the American people?

Mr. SLOCUM. That is true, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. During this morning's testimony there was some indication that among the Japanese people there might have been some previous information regarding the possibility of outbreak of war between Japan and this country. Did you at any time have any advance information yourself regarding a possible outbreak of war with Japan?

Mr. SLOCUM. I didn't have any advance information. Whatever information I got I cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Naval Intelligence, so as soon as I got that, as soon as I got around and got it, why they got it right away, sir, whatever information I had.



But, one time when Kurusu landed in Los Angeles. I was told by a certain duly constituted Federal authority to cover that job. And, I said "O. K."

Well, I said, "How can I cover him? I can't get near him."

Well, they said, "You cover him."

I said, "O. K."

That was my assignment. I went over Little Tokyo, Japtown, in the restaurants, and newspaper offices to try to get some information as to what Mr. Kurusu was up to, and I couldn't get anything. But, a couple of days after that an old friend of mine came knocking at my door late at night and he says, "War, war, war."

I said, "What?"

He said, "War, war, war."

I said, "What is the matter? Are you crazy?"

He said, "No; I got something."

Well, I said, "Come in the house. We don't want the whole neighborhood to know about it."

So he came in the house and he says, "There is going to be war. Sloum."

I said, "Don't get excited."

He said, "Yes; maybe war already."

I said, "Tell me about it."

He said, "You know, I was at the vegetable market today."

I said, "Yes."

He said, "And Mrs. Ken Nakazawa met me at the market today and said her husband was at a private banquet given in honor of Kurusu at the home of the Japanese consul, Yoshida, and at this banquet Mr. Kurusu was there."

I said, "Yes."

"Yes," he said, "he was drunk and shaking his fist like this and he said, 'Unless the Nanking Government is recognized, we will have war.'"

I said, "Wait a minute; say that again."

He said the same thing over again. And, he was absolutely sober. He is a Christian man. He was telling me the truth as he got it. I won't give this man's name because it is on the record.

I said, "Wait a minute. That may be Jap propaganda which is learning to have this kind of a news go around in the United States so that they get their point."

He said, "No; I don't think so. He was drunk, you know, very drunk, and shaking his fist, and he was very mad, and he says, 'Unless Nanking Government is recognized, we are going to have war.'"

So, I shot the news in, and they laughed at me. They said, "Tokie, the Japs haven't got the guts to hit us."

I said, "You are crazy; now or never."

I said, "Wake up."

He said, "What do you mean?"

I said, "The Japanese have the advantage on the Pacific coast, tonnage and everything. We are not ready for it." I said, "My God, wake up. This is the news I got and I am giving it the way I got it."

He said, "Thanks for the news. I am sleepy."

So, it turned out that really was how it started and who was controlling China there, and that was it.



Mr. COSTELLO. That was at the time Kurusu came in?

Mr. SLOCUM. At the time he landed; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the latter part of November?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. SLOCUM. Yes; even before he landed in Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. When he came he had information pretty well that war was imminent.

Mr. SLOCUM. That is the way it seemed to me, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you at any time been able to confirm that this incident at the banquet actually took place?

Mr. SLOCUM. You know, by golly, I read in the newspaper about 3 or 4 weeks after Kurusu landed, I remember reading—I don't think I was dreaming, sir—I remember seeing an article in the newspaper to the effect that something like that had happened.

Mr. MUNDT. I think I read it myself.

Mr. SLOCUM. Good. I am glad somebody confirms it, because I thought I was dreaming. I thought that I read that Mr. Cordell Hull and Roosevelt O. K.'d it.

Then the Chinese secretary seen this as put out and then they raised the question—what do you call it—"Are you going to sell us down the river after we fought these Japs all these years," and words of that effect. Well, a week after Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Mr. MUNDT. You must be a Republican. We were reading the same newspaper.

Mr. SLOCUM. Thank you. Well, I was also told to cover all the names and addresses and occupations, telephone numbers, entering into the United States, of all the Japanese who served previously in the Imperial Army, Navy, or Marines. The F. B. I. came to me and said, "There is good money in it."

"You know," I said, "blank blank, I don't fight for money." I said, "You can pay me for gasoline, oil, and telephone calls and give me lunch money for the time I am gathering all this information for you."

This went to the F. B. I. I got all their names, but I attached one condition. I don't want any money for this and I says, "You have to let me handle this according to Jap psychology. Will you give me a free hand?"

They said, "O. K."

So I went to the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the sheriff's office and notified them I was going to have a banquet. At this banquet I said it was going to be a Dutch treat so that nobody will be under obligation.

Before that I went to the leader of the Japanese Military Association, Dr. Rikita Honda. I said, "Doctor, it looks like war. And you know," I said, "If we American Legion men were in Tokyo when war is declared, you know we would be the first ones to be picked up. By the same token," I said, "if war does come, which it look like, you fellows are going to be No. 1 to be picked up."

He said, "Do you know that?" I said, "Yes, sure. Call your gang together. I am going to give them notice."

So, we got all of the veterans together at this meeting and I said, "It looks like war between Japan and America, so it seems to me that you ought to get things in shape."

"By the same token, you made your living here, raised your family here, and as a matter of gratitude you ought to make it as easy for Uncle Sam as you can, because you are going to be No. 1 picked up. So, don't you want to cooperate with our Government by giving us your name and address right now?"

They said, "Sure."

I said, "O. K."

So we passed the paper around and within 5 minutes had all the names. Then the F. B. I. got all the names, and at the night of Pearl Harbor they were picked up.

Dr. Honda committed suicide by slashing his wrists, and in his death letter I understood he blessed me. That was only one or two of the incidents of the services I rendered.

Then, on the night of Pearl Harbor I was summoned by the F. B. I. to assist in the arrest of the leaders of the disloyal group. I gladly did. We waited for an O. K. from the Attorney General, Mr. Biddle, and by 11 o'clock at night it finally came, and we got our men.

Thus, it has been my idea to pay back the service of being a citizen here, and it has been a tough one only or mostly only because I have been paying out my own money, and here I stood on the average 20 to 25 hours to watch this move and that move. But I am glad to do it, and if there is anything I can do, Mr. Congressman, please tell me and I will do it.

Mr. COSTELLO. We appreciate very much your coming before the committee and the frankness with which you have testified and the information you have given to us, and I think it has been helpful.

Mr. SLOCUM. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think it has been unfortunate that more of the Japanese can not do the same thing. They might feel they would suffer bodily harm or persecution in the event they gave information to the United States Government. I feel because of the situation that exists, many of those Japanese who want to be loyal are afraid to show their loyalty to this country because the disloyal Japanese would bring bodily harm to them, and until something is done to curb the disloyal Japanese and restrain them from wreaking vengeance on those Japanese who want to be loyal, it is going to be a very difficult situation. So, I appreciate your coming here. Thank you very much.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you have any idea about how many people belong to the American Legion, who were in the last war?

Mr. SLOCUM. There were two posts of American Legionnaires. One was in Los Angeles and the other in San Francisco, sir, but both had their charters taken away from them, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Just roughly, how many were there in the country; were there 10, 15, 100, 1,000, how many?

Mr. SLOCUM. The members of the American Legion? I believe there were pretty close to 500, sir, including Hawaii. In V. F. W., I believe there are about 50.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you very much.

Mr. STRIPLING. This morning reference was made to a letter which Mr. Paul Abe had received from the War Department, advising him concerning his status, the status of his application for a position in the Map Section of the Army. You instructed Mr. Abe to furnish

the committee with that letter and I have it here. I ask that it be made a part of the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. This is the letter he submitted to you from the War Department?

Mr. STRIPLING. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection, this letter will be inserted in the record immediately following his testimony.

In view of the lateness of the hour and the impossibility of completing the testimony of another witness this afternoon, the committee is going to recess over until 10:30 tomorrow morning. All the witnesses who are here under subpoena are instructed to appear here tomorrow morning at 10:30, when the committee will resume its hearings.

The committee will now stand adjourned until 10:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., the committee was in recess until 10:30 a. m., Friday, July 2, 1943.)





# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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FRIDAY, JULY 2, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m., in Room 1301, House Office Building, the Honorable John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator; J. B. Matthews, director of research for the committee.

MR. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Mr. Stripling, will you call the first witness?

MR. STRIPLING. Mrs. Kanazawa.

**TESTIMONY OF EMILIE AUGUSTA ALDRIDGE KANAZAWA**—Recalled  
(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

MR. COSTELLO. State your name to the reporter.

MRS. KANAZAWA. My name is Emilie Augusta Aldridge Kanazawa.

MR. MATTHEWS. Where were you born, Mrs. Kanazawa?

MRS. KANAZAWA. I was born in Lexington, Ky.

MR. MATTHEWS. Where did you receive your early education?

MRS. KANAZAWA. I received my first education in Maxwell School, Lexington.

MR. MATTHEWS. Did you finish high school in Lexington, Ky.?

MRS. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did, sir.

MR. MATTHEWS. Did you go to the university?

MRS. KANAZAWA. Yes. I went to the university for 3 years and one summer session.

MR. MATTHEWS. That was the University of Kentucky in Lexington?

MRS. KANAZAWA. That is right.

MR. MATTHEWS. Did the American Student Union have a branch or chapter on the campus at the University of Kentucky?

MRS. KANAZAWA. At the time I was a freshman there there was a group of about six or seven who were attempting to carry on a chapter and I was invited to become a member and I did, for one semester.

MR. MATTHEWS. Your answer is, "yes: there was a chapter."

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you did join it for one semester?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What year was that?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. In the spring of 1940.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What years did you attend the University of Kentucky? When did you enter?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I entered in the fall of 1939.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And when was your last registration at the University of Kentucky?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. January 1942.

Mr. MATTHEWS. January 1942, is that?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there only six or seven members of the American Student Union on the campus?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who was the student leader of the American Student Union there?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Mrs. Peter Gragis.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there any instructor or professor who was actively working with the American Student Union on the campus?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; a Mr. Frank Magee, an instructor in mathematics was a member, and he worked very diligently.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How do you spell his last name?

Mrs. KANAZAWA (spelling). M-a-g-e-e.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall what semester it was that you belonged to the American Student Union?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe it was the early part of 1940, from January to June.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have any special reason for not continuing your membership in the American Student Union?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your reason?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. In the national officers there was an election, and the left-wing faction got control.

Mr. COSTELLO. How is that?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. The left-wing faction, the communistic section, and at that time Russia and Germany were world allies, and the particular faction that was controlling the Student's Union were willing to overlook Germany in order to be aiding Russia, and I could not quite agree with that policy.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You differed with the national policy as it was determined at the Milwaukee convention, I believe it was, was it not?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Which was in favor of the Nazi-Soviet pact of this period.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. For that reason you dropped out of the American Student Union?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you attend a meeting of the American Peace Mobilization held in New York City in the early part of 1941?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, now, were you a member of the American Student Union at that time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I was not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You had already left almost a year before.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I still went around with the group who had formerly been A. S. U.'s, but, to my knowledge, there was no chapter on the campus at that time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Oh, you mean the chapter itself disappeared from the campus?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes. I was responsible for that, because after Peter Gragis had left the university I was asked to take the presidency, and I didn't think that it was——

Mr. MATTHEWS. What month was it in 1941 that you attended the meeting of the American Peace Mobilization in New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. It was April 4 and 5 in New York City.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How did you go from Lexington to New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. A group of us drove up in my family's car.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In your family's car?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did any other students from the University of Kentucky accompany you on that automobile trip to New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. A Mr. Richard Centers.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Had he been a member of the American Student Union?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he had.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know where he was from?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. He was from Paducah, Ky.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did any member of the faculty accompany you on that trip to New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Mr. Magee was along.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Frank Magee, who was an instructor in mathematics at the university?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did a Negro lawyer from Louisville, Ky., also accompany you on that trip?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you remember the date on which you left Lexington?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe it was Wednesday afternoon. I am not sure about that, though.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that 2 or 3 days before the morning of the meeting in New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That would have been April 1 or April 2 then.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of 1941?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe that I left on April 2 in the afternoon, from Lexington.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who at the University of Kentucky was active in promoting this delegation to the American Peace Mobilization in New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Mr. Magee was going up there. It was his idea, and he suggested that it would be a good thing if two or three others should go along.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Had you heard much or anything about the American Peace Mobilization at that time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I had not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know that it had been organized in the previous fall, in Chicago?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I was pretty much ignorant of the American Peoples Mobilization until I attended the meeting.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well now, it was known at this time as the American Peace Mobilization and subsequently it changed its name to the American Peoples Mobilization.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did it take you to drive to New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe it took a day and a half. We drove straight through.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you reach New York on the day before the beginning of the American Peace Mobilization convention or the same day that it began?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. We reached New York the same day it began.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were the principal meetings of the American Peace Mobilization held in New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. There was Mecca Temple, I believe, on Fifty-fifth Street, and that was the headquarters.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have a delegate's card or delegate's badge?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. When I got to the meeting I was registered as a delegate from Kentucky, but aside from that I had nothing else.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have a membership card in the American Peace Mobilization apart from your convention's membership?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe that I was identified as being an A. S. U.'r, because we had to have some identification to get a delegate's registration card.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I see. You were technically, at least, a delegate from the American Student Union at the University of Kentucky to the American Peace Mobilization; is that correct?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; technically that is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Even though the American Student Union no longer existed on the campus.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Richard Centers have the same kind of credentials, so far as you know?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I don't know what credentials he had.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know anything about the credentials of the Negro lawyer from Louisville, Ky.?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe that he was—I am not sure of this, but I believe that he was from a communistic section of the party there. I think that was his credentials; I am not sure.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he say anything in his conversation to indicate that he himself was a Communist?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; he did not.

Mr. Magee had referred to a liberal organization in Louisville who wanted to send a delegate, and it turned out to be this Negro lawyer.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the lawyer's name?



Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall the lawyer's name?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. About how old a man was he?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I should say he was about 43 or 44.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You do not happen to recall whether he was a delegate from the National Negro Congress, do you?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I don't.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you ever heard of that organization, the National Negro Congress?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. It is not familiar to me.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know anything about the credentials carried by Instructor Frank Magee?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I am afraid I do not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Mr. Magee express his sympathies with the Communist Party or the Communist movement in your presence?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did a number of times.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he ever tell you that he was a Communist?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he tell you that he was a member of the Communist Party or that he was just a Communist?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Well, as I remember him talking to me once, he said that a number of the Communists thought it was better to become members of the Democrat or Republican Party than to carry on like that. He said—well, the reason he explained this was that the Communist Party in Kentucky, in order to get a number, enough of people in the party to have a vote, had taken the names from tombstones and jail registers, and had made up a list of the communistic membership, and that when that came out in one of the Kentucky elections, the ones who were really Communist decided they would become members of the other party and do it that way.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know at the time that that was revealed by this committee before which you are now appearing?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When you reached New York, at Mecca Temple, were you there in time to attend the opening session of the American Peace Mobilization convention?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I believe I did. It seems to me that the meeting was called to order in one of the large assembly places, and that whoever the man was named off a number of rooms in which the committees would meet, and there were, I should say, about 60 or 70 committees that were going to discuss particular problems of labor or membership or things in each room, and it seems to me that was the beginning of the meeting.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In other words, because they announced at this session the general routine of the convention, you understand that that must have been the opening session.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I think that was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you attend all of the sessions of the American Peace Mobilization after your arrival?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I did not. One of the reasons I didn't was because I understand one of the Negro delegates from the West had gone into a restaurant and he had not received the courteous treatment that he thought he should, and he came back to the organization and he told one of the leaders about his treatment, and, one of the

leaders jumped to his feet and asked for a delegation to go out there and picket this restaurant. They seemed so willing to jump away from their main purpose and go off on a tangent to any other thing, so that I became rather disgusted with it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How many days did the convention last?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Friday and Saturday in New York, and it was supposed to end with the picketing of the White House on Monday of the next week.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you come to Washington after the meetings in New York?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you join the picket line in front of the White House?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall the general slogans and purposes of the American Peace Mobilization as they were expressed at the New York convention and also on the picket line in front of the White House?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. "Keep America Out of the War," I think was the most general slogan.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was the idea put to the forefront that the war in Europe was an imperialistic war?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS (continuing). In which the British Empire and Germany were struggling over strictly imperialist issues?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This was at the time when the Nazi-Soviet pact was still in force, was it not?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you reach the conclusion at the meeting of the American Peace Mobilization in New York that the organization was definitely a Communist Party enterprise?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Or had you already been aware of that before you went to New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I was not aware of that until I attended the meeting.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you further convinced of that by the picket line before the White House?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. The picket line before the White House did not seem communistic to me; I mean, it was other things that convinced me that the organization was communistic.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Can you state briefly, or would you care to state briefly what some of those things were that convinced you that the organization was Communist?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Well, the thing that convinced me most was that so many of the people there were willing to overlook Germany in order to aid Russia and the number that were willing to go to Russia's behalf, I mean, such as enlist in the Russian Army, and things of that sort, and quite a few of them were blaming the war on America and her imperialistic policy.

Mr. MATTHEWS. At the convention of the American Peace Mobilization in New York did you become acquainted for the first time with your husband?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. His name is Joe Tooru Kanazawa?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was he a delegate to the American Peace Mobilization, so far as you know?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; he was not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you meet him in connection with any of the meetings of the American Peace Mobilization?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No. I understand that he and Larry Tajiri were there. It was my impression at the time that Larry was covering that for an Asahi paper, I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. For what paper?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Asahi, that Japanese section of the—connected with the New York Times.

Mr. COSTELLO. Repeat that, please.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I was under the impression that my husband was there in the company of Larry Tajiri, who was covering this meeting for the Japanese newspaper.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that the Tokyo Asahi?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Tokyo Asahi had a branch office in New York City and Larry was working for it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It was your understanding that he was working for the Tokyo Asahi?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And covering the American Peace Mobilization?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. For that paper?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you meet Larry Tajiri and your husband at the same time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that at a meeting of the American Peace Mobilization or somewhere else in the city?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. On Saturday afternoon, Representative Marcantonio and Paul Robeson had been scheduled to talk to a large delegation of this meeting out at Tri-Boro Stadium Hall. It started raining and the meeting was called off, and we were reported or instructed to report back to Mecca Temple. On the way I became separated from the Kentucky delegation. And I saw Mr. Tajiri and my husband, and I asked them the way back to Mecca Temple, because I was very unfamiliar with New York transportation facilities, and they very kindly offered to take me there, because they were going the same way, and I accepted. That is how I met him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And they took you back to Mecca Temple, to the meeting?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did your acquaintance, made at that time, under those circumstances, then ripen into a friendship which eventuated into marriage?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When were you and Mr. Kanazawa married?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. December 3, 1941.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you married?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. In Baltimore, Md.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Mr. Kanazawa visit you in Kentucky subsequent to the meeting of the American Peace Mobilization in April, in New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did. In June and in September of 1941.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall what Mr. Kanazawa was doing at the time you met him; what his occupation was?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. He was doing free-lance writing.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In the meantime, that is, between April and December, did he become associated with the Japanese American Citizens League, or was that still later?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; as far as I know, he did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did his connection with the Japanese American Citizens League come about after your marriage?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, it did; in June of last year.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did you come to Washington?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. August 8, 1942.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, now, after your marriage to Mr. Kanazawa, I believe within a day or two you returned to Lexington, Ky.; is that correct?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you resume your studies at the University of Kentucky?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you continue there for the rest of the academic year until the spring of 1942?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And then in August you came to Washington?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, in August of 1942?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In the meantime had you taken a civil-service examination?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I had. I had taken civil-service for junior typist.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you passed that examination?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. As the result of that examination, you received a notice that employment was waiting for you in Washington?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is true.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And came to Washington and took employment with what agency of the Government?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Office of Defense Transportation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Office of Defense Transportation?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. As junior typist?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. At what salary?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. \$1,440.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you still hold that same position?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have held that position for almost 11 months, then; is that correct?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is true.

Mr. MUNDT. What salary do you get now?



Mrs. KANAZAWA. The same salary.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In June of 1942 did Mr. Kanazawa come to Washington to take up work with the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He was already here, therefore, when you arrived?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is true.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you then, on your arrival, take an apartment or eventually take an apartment with your husband?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is your present address?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I live in apartment 5, 1324 Fourteenth Street.

Mr. MATTHEWS. 1324 Fourteenth Street?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. During the past 10 or 11 months have you had occasion to learn of the activities of the Japanese American Citizens League in a general way?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you become acquainted with Mike Masaoka?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I know Mr. Masaoka well.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He is national secretary, is he, of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he is.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What position in the Japanese American Citizens League does your husband hold, or what position has he held?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. He was the eastern representative of the J. A. C. L.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did he relinquish that position to go into the Army?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. May 21, 1943.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of this year. In the course of your learning of the activities of the Japanese American Citizens League during the past 11 months, did you ever express the belief that the Japanese American Citizens League was in too close collaboration with the War Relocation Authority and that some trouble might come as the result of that?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I know I didn't express it that way.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, how did you express any idea that approximates that?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I made the remark once to my husband that I didn't think it was a good idea for the W. R. A. to be releasing confidential information to the J. A. C. L.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Had you learned that the W. R. A. was releasing confidential information to the J. A. C. L.?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I had.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And you learned that because you were residing at the temporary headquarters of the J. A. C. L. in Washington where your husband was an official?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you yourself become a member of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I did not, at no time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What other prominent officials of the Japanese American Citizens League did you come to know?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I met Dr. Yatabe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Spell that name, please.

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Y-a-t-a-b-e. He was the representative in Chicago. I met Saburo Kido.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He was national president or chairman of the organization; is that right?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. President. He was here in May 1941.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean 1943?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I mean 1943.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he from Salt Lake City?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he is. Well, I knew Larry Tajiri.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You had met him at the American Peace Mobilization in New York?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes. He was editor of the Pacific Citizen.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you attend a meeting of the Japanese American Citizens League held at the Calvary Baptist Church in Washington on or about May 22, 1943?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was your husband in the city at that time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No. He had left the day before for Camp Lee.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Mike Masaoka preside at that meeting?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Mike Masaoka make the principal speech at that meeting?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he talked for somewhere from 45 minutes to an hour and a half.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did a considerable conversation occur at the end of that meeting, or toward the end of it?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Stemmie Murayama began heckling, began asking questions about the J. A. C. L. and rather ridiculing Mike, and the efforts of the J. A. C. L., and Tokie Slocum interrupted him and began talking, and when he did, no one else was able to get the floor, and that was the thing that caused the tension.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you remember what Tokie Slocum was talking about?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. He talked about a number of things.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the trend of his remarks?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Well, he talked about the activities of the J. A. C. L. and he stood on the good things that the J. A. C. L. had done. He told of the attacks made upon him and how he had always stood up for being an American, and he mentioned about the leaders of the J. A. C. L. going into the Army.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he speak at some length?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. While he was speaking, was Stemmie Murayama also trying to speak, or actually speaking?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It seemed to me that way. Stemmie had made quite a few remarks before Tokie began speaking, though.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And can you identify Stemmie Murayama further? Who is he? How did you come to know him?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I met Stemmie on November 28, 1941. He was attending a meeting of which Paul Abe was then president, on California Street.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that the Washington Young People's League?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; it was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you attend the meetings of the organization, the Washington Young People's League, frequently?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I attended that one meeting.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Just that one meeting?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Paul Abe at that time was president?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know his predecessor, Mr. Inouye?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I didn't know Mr. Inouye.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That was approximately a week before Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And there you met Stemmie Murayama?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have any other acquaintance with Mr. Murayama?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I had seen him a couple of times here in Washington since I had been here, and I remember he was at Amy Sasaki's apartment.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know where Mr. Murayama is at the present time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I do not. He is in Washington, but I don't know his address.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, at this meeting on May 22 at the Calvary Baptist Church, approximately how many persons were present?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I should say between 35 and 40 were there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your impression of the purpose of the meeting, in general?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Well, I had understood that this meeting was to call all the Washington Nisei together and introduce Saburo Kido and Larry Tajiri and to talk about the things that the J. A. C. L. had done; to raise membership and also money for the J. A. C. L.

Mr. MUNDT. Why should an argument ensue in a meeting like that? Was Stemmie finding fault with what Tokie was saying? Was that the cause of the dissention?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; Stemmie was finding fault with the J. A. C. L. There were several Nisei besides me, and from our past conversations and things, we were under the impression that Stemmie knew about the J. A. C. L., and when he jumped to his feet and said that he knew nothing about it, and that people in Washington had hardly heard of it except to hear malicious things, we knew that he was not telling the truth. So Tokie began answering his remarks, and that was what caused the tension. The thing was that Mike had wanted to have questions about the policy of J. A. C. L. and the problems of the people in the relocation camps, and when Tokie and Stemmie started talking, the meeting took an entirely different turn.

Mr. MUNDT. More or less of a personality clash rather than a matter of policy?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were the records of the J. A. C. L. kept in your apartment, apartment 5, at 1324 14th Street NW.?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; they were.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were they in your apartment on or about June 11, 1943?



Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On that date were you served with a subpoena to deliver those records to an agent of the Special Committee on un-American Activities?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you turn over the records to that agent?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you request any person or persons to witness the turning over of those records?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did. I went over and asked Mr. and Mrs. Abe to come over and witness the records.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I presume that was because you were not quite sure of these procedures. Had you ever been served with a subpoena before?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No, I had not.

Mr. MUNDT. At the time you met Joe Kanazawa, I think you said he was engaged in free-lance writing?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Had he made any sales of his writings up to that time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. A few; not many.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you recall any of the papers or magazines to whom he sold those articles?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I do not.

Mr. MUNDT. Subsequent to your having met him, did he continue as a free-lance writer?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MUNDT. Was he selling writings then?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. He was not very successful. His writing lacked the punch necessary to put it across.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you remember any place where he sold articles after you became acquainted with him, so that you might be following his work more closely?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I am sorry. I missed that question.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you remember any place where he sold articles after you became acquainted with him?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No. Gene Bolles was his literary agent. He was doing quite a bit of typing. I believe that was what kept him supported.

Mr. MUNDT. He made his money that way?

Mr. MATTHEWS. By the way, is your husband an expert typist?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes; he is. He is very good.

Mr. MUNDT. It appears from your testimony that during your early days at the University of Kentucky—was it?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT (continuing). You were acquainted with some Communist down there. Professor Magee and other gentlemen. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party yourself?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No; I was not.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Dr. Magee ever suggest that you join?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Well, several of the boys thought, or several of them became rather disgusted with me and said it would be a good thing if I became a Communist, because I had read quite a bit of the communistic theories and ideas, and yet I could always find something wrong with them.



Mr. MUNDT. You always found something wrong with them?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. How far did you get in your university studies?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I completed my junior year. I was majoring in law.

Mr. MUNDT. In law?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. At that time you were married; in your junior year?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. At the time I was married, yes; in the first part of my junior year.

Mr. MUNDT. Is Dr. Magee still at the University of Kentucky?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I have lost contact with him since I came to Washington. I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you attend any of his classes down there while you were at the university?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. MUNDT. He taught mathematics?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. You do not know whether he intermingled a little mixed philosophy in the classroom or not?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I don't know that.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. The meeting held at the Calvary Baptist Church by the J. A. C. L., was the purpose of that to obtain new members for the J. A. C. L.?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir. I said that it was.

Mr. COSTELLO. There was a drive on at that time to get all the Nisei in Washington to join the J. A. C. L.?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they have any solicitation for membership at that time?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Because of the change in the temper of the meeting they did not actually solicit membership then?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much, Mrs. Kanazawa, for appearing here this morning.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. STRIPLING. The next witness is Mr. Kanazawa.

#### TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH TOORU KANAZAWA

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. State your full name to the reporter.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Joseph Tooru Kanazawa.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where were you born?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Spokane, Wash.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the date, Mr. Kanazawa?

Mr. KANAZAWA. November 12, 1906.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where were your parents born?

Mr. KANAZAWA. They were born in Yonezawa, Japan. That is a city.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are your parents now living?

Mr. KANAZAWA. My mother is living.

Mr. STRIPLING. Your mother is living?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where is she now?

Mr. KANAZAWA. She is at Poston relocation center.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you have any brothers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I have one brother.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where is he located?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He is at Morningside Sanitarium, Portland, Oreg.

Mr. STRIPLING. You had a brother who was interned at one of the relocation centers who recently died?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He was in internment at Lordsburg, N. Mex.

Mr. STRIPLING. Why was he in the internment camp?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I think he was waiting for a hearing for release. He had been up in Alaska, and I think they were just holding him before they gave him a release. I know he was making an appeal to have a hearing at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did your brother die from natural causes?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe it was cerebral hemorrhage.

Mr. STRIPLING. It was a natural cause, so far as you know?

Mr. KANAZAWA. So far as I know, it was; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you ever stated that you thought his death was brought about by treatment he received in the internment center?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. You have not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is your educational background?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I got my degree at the University of Washington, in journalism, B. A.

Mr. STRIPLING. What years were you there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. 1925 to 1931.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state your employment record from the time you graduated from college?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, it started back during my college years. I was working for the Japanese American Citizens League on part-time basis while I was going to school, and then after graduation I worked for the paper until 1932.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the paper?

Mr. KANAZAWA. The Japanese American Citizens League, I mean, the Japanese Courier; a weekly.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where was it published?

Mr. KANAZAWA. In Seattle, Wash.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who was the publisher?

Mr. KANAZAWA. James Y. Sakamoto.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was your position with the paper?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I started in as reporter and ended up as associated editor.

Mr. STRIPLING. Associate editor?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. While you were with the Courier, was there ever a charge made that it was subsidized by the consulate of the Japanese Government?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Not so far as I know, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether it was subsidized for propaganda purposes?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Insofar as I know, it was not. I know Jimmie had an awful time to keep it going, but he usually managed to pay from his advertisements.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was Sakamoto an American citizen?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; he was and is.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was your next employment?

Mr. KANAZAWA. In 1932 I went down to Los Angeles and I covered the Olympic Games for Rafu Shimpō.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you explain what "Rafu Shimpō" is?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It is the vernacular newspaper of Los Angeles. It is the Los Angeles Daily News, I believe. I am not positive on that.

Mr. STRIPLING. The committee members cannot hear you.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am sorry.

Mr. COSTELLO. Talk a little louder, and I think we can all hear.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Thank you. And I worked for that paper until the fall of that year, 1932, and then after that I worked in one of the markets in Santa Monica, and I think it was in about the first part of 1933 that I returned north and worked with Jimmy for a while, and then in—

Mr. STRIPLING. That is Jimmy Sakamoto.

Mr. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. STRIPLING. You went back to work for the Courier.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; for about a year.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was your title when you went back?

Mr. KANAZAWA. The same; associate editor.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was this paper published in the English language?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It was all in English.

Mr. STRIPLING. Go right along.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Then, in 1934, I went up to Juneau, Alaska. My brother, Bob, who just died at Lordsburg, had gone up there and had obtained a job, and he called the rest of my family up there, so I went up there with him, and in December of that year I got a job as driver, bookkeeper, and so forth, for the Juneau laundry, and I worked with them until—

Mr. MUNDT. Was that a Chinese laundry?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; Japanese laundry. And I worked with them about 4½ years, which would make it about—I think it was September of 1938 I came out again to the States.

Mr. COSTELLO. What type of work was your brother doing in Alaska?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He was a waiter in a restaurant there. By the way, this Juneau, Alaska, is where I spent, where I went to school as a child since I was 6 years old.

Mr. STRIPLING. Where did you go after 1938?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I went down to Los Angeles. My mother was living there at that time and my two married sisters. I spent about 1 year down there free lancing and then in 1939 I came to New York City, where I also continued my free-lance writing.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you recall any of the publishers to whom you sold articles?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I was not very successful, but I sold to the Christian Science Monitor, Common Ground, and to Thrilling Sports.

Mr. MUNDT. Field and Stream?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Thrilling Sports. And then in July—I want to correct my wife's statement; I came to Washington in July of last year to take over the job with the J. A. C. L.

Mr. MUNDT. That is the extent of your publication or free-lance writing?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, it was.

Mr. MUNDT. Those three.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes. Of course, I did a lot of writing for the English section of the vernacular press on the west coast, for the Rafu Shimpō and the Japan-California. I think it was, and the Courier and the Hokubei in Seattle.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those writings in the form of reportorial items?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Mostly articles, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Mostly articles?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. About what?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, during 1932 when I went down the coast, I had been trying to make a survey and study of Japanese conditions on the coast. Well, it was mostly statistical at that time because I was trying to get the break-down of the Japanese population in Issei and Nisei, in male and female, and so forth, and so on along that line. And I think you would find those in the files of the Japan-American Courier where they were printed.

Mr. MUNDT. Could you supply the committee with the dates? Do you have a scrap book? All of us writers have a scrap book, you know.

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, I don't carry a scrap book. But that was in the spring of 1933 that you would find them in the Courier.

Mr. MUNDT. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state all the organizations which you have been a member of?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Those that you can recall.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes. Of the Japanese American Citizens League I became a member with my taking over the job last year. I belong to the Japanese American Committee for Democracy in New York City, and I belong to an organization called the Young American Writers in New York City. Those are the three main ones.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you a member of the League of American Writers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I was not.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were not a member of the League of American Writers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you attend the American Peace Mobilization convention?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I went there as an auditor.

Mr. STRIPLING. As an auditor?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. What office did you hold?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Where?



Mr. MUNDT. You said you were there as an officer.

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; as auditor.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Please speak louder.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am sorry. I will try to speak louder.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you one of the original organizers of the Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I was one of the early members of it, one of the first Nisei members, I should say.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who organized the Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe Yeshitaka Takagi.

Mr. STRIPLING. He was the executive secretary?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; he was.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is he a citizen of this country?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He is not.

Mr. STRIPLING. He is not a citizen?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. What position did K. Nakano hold?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He was chairman at one time, just directly before his induction in the Army.

Mr. STRIPLING. And N. Nakamura; what was her position?

Mr. KANAZAWA. That was Natalie Nakamura. Let me see. She has held various offices. I really don't remember what.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you the recording secretary of Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. At one time; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you familiar with the members of the advisory board of the Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I was; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Can you recall the names of the members of the advisory board?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I can.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you name them?

Mr. KANAZAWA. At that time?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Bishop McConnell, of New York City; Gayland Fisher, of Orinda, Calif.; Roger Baldwin, of the American Civil Liberties Union; Albert Einstein; and this anthropologist at Columbia, Franz Boas; and Pearl Buck.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was A. Clayton Pyle, Jr., a member of the advisory board?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Let me see. I believe he became later; I am not positive.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was Katherine Terrill a member?

Mr. KANAZAWA. She was; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the purpose of the organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, it was an Americanization group, and it was militantly anti-Fascist in its policies.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was it pro-Communist?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, in a sense, that I think you could call it that; yes. I would not say it was Communist, however.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you say it was definitely pro-Communist, though?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I think it favored some of its policies; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you came to Washington, Mr. Kanazawa, to go with the Japanese American Citizens League, did you resign from the Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I resigned from the executive board, but not as a member.

Mr. STRIPLING. While you were writing, free-lancing in New York, did you at any time work for any magazine or publication which was engaged in propaganda activities on behalf of the Japanese Government?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I did proof-reading for Mr. Rasche, I believe R-a-s-c-h-e, I believe it is spelled, of the World-Telegram, who was working on the Japanese-American Review; I mean who worked for the Japanese-American Review.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the Japanese-American Review?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe it is called the cultural publication.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was it engaged in Japanese propaganda?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe it was; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. It was?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is that your only connection, so far as you know, with any publication or individuals who were engaged in Japanese propaganda?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. May I ask a question at that point?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mrs. Kanazawa spoke of your doing some writing for the Tokyo Asahi.

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I did not; but Larry Tajiri was employed by the Tokyo Asahi, the New York Bureau of the Tokyo Asahi, and I accompanied him to the meeting, that was all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you assisting him in that work?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; he was just a friend of mine.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you covering the American Peace Mobilization for any foreign paper?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I was not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But Larry Tajiri was working for the Tokyo Asahi.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. When you came to Washington and joined the J. A. C. L., what position did you accept with that organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I was given the official title of eastern representative.

Mr. STRIPLING. Eastern representative?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you work with Mr. Mike Masaoka?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I was his assistant, and when he was away from the city, I stood in for him.

Mr. STRIPLING. He was the national secretary of the organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; he was.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you ever visited any of the 10 war relocation center camps?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I never have.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you familiar with the activities of any particular camp?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; none.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you received reports from internees concerning conditions there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Some, yes; some reports, some letters, and so forth.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know a Mr. Carl Kondo?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I know him very well.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is your opinion of Carl Kondo?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, in what way do you mean?

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think he is a reliable person?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe he is.

Mr. STRIPLING. I show you a letter dated January 7, 1943, which is addressed to Dear Emilie and Tooru, signed Carl.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. The address is 33-11 Block 3, Manzanar, Calif. Do you recall receiving that letter?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read this letter into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. It may be read.

Mr. STRIPLING. It is dated January 7, 1943. [Reading:]

It was a surprise and a pleasure to receive that Christmas card from you. I'd been wondering how you were and where you were.

Of course, I gather you must be fairly busy in keeping yourselves together. I hope that you are both in good health.

Here in Manzanar, we are undergoing a severe test of democracy. And those of us who are pro-American and still hold true to a faith in this country and in the tenets of democracy, must walk a tight, circumspect path here in Manzanar. We've a history of bungling in the administrative heads and a crucifying torment of spirit in the breasts of us who can see a little more clearly than the majority of the people here. Generally felt is an attitude of bitterness by the Nisei who can't adjust themselves to the changing world and the fact that we're in an all-out war against fascism—and in such a war the sacrifice of a hundred thousand Japanese, citizens and non-citizens, is justified if such evacuation is the means of forestalling a racial animosity and cankerous suspicion in the west coast population of many million.

The Issei here on the whole are a bigotted, jealous, petty lot who attack Nisei and loyal Issei with pro-Japanisms. The Kibei side with this agitator class of ignorant Issei, and among them are some terrorist blackguards who intimidate the peaceable and loyal Issei, Nisei, and Kibei, and even threaten women.

Tooru, I'm getting a first-hand impression of the whole movement and the thing is interesting and fraught with danger. I was in on this before evacuation when the F. B. I. was sweeping the coast of Issei and lugging them into detention camps for a delayed hearing. I saw the power of the Japanese broken in the agricultural, commercial field. I saw a clique of rapacious Nisei riding down their parents and under the J. A. C. L. banner sabotage their own people and even their fellow Nisei. Tooru, the outbreak in this camp was largely due to an accumulation of feeling against these men who spoke not for themselves as they had every right to do, but for the whole group without that group's authorization. This was the type of man who ripped his fellow Japanese up the back with one hand and waved the flag with the other.

Of course, the mob went out of control and men were killed by machine-gun fire. It was a wonder that women weren't killed, since many of them were in the mob in front of the police station. After the excitement, the decent people were ashamed of what had taken place and eyed the trouble-making Kibei terrorists (who are being picked up by the military and local police) askance. Today only sporadic expressions of anti-Caucasianism is in evidence such as attempting to drive out the white teachers by harassing them.

Toora, this camp has been typified as the most Japanese Japan-like by a woman who visited many of the camps. I think the Issei (and by Issei I mean that certain dogmatic, ignorant, pro-Japan type of person, not the loyal, Americanized first-generation who as a rule is an educated person), and Kibei outnumber the Nisei here two to one.

Well, this is known as getting it off the chest, Tooru. I'm going to try to go to another camp or seek permanent relocation as a newspaper worker or typewriter repairman. I'm supervisor of typewriter maintenance here with a professional rating of \$19 a month.

Good luck to you both.

CARL.

Do you think that Carl Kondo was actually stating the situation at Manzanar Camp?

Mr. KANAZAWA. In the main part I think it is so. Of course, I ain't not familiar with the conditions, but I believe what he would write for the men.

Mr. COSTELLO. How did you come into possession of this letter?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It was written to me.

Mr. STRIPLING. It was written to him, Mr. Chairman, and obtained when the files of the Japanese American Citizens League were subpoenaed by the committee.

The reference here in which Mr. Kondo says, "I saw the power of the Japanese broken in the agricultural, commercial fields. I saw a clique of rapacious Nisei riding down their parents and under the J. A. C. L. banner sabotage their own people and even their fellow Nisei."

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you understand Mr. Kondo to mean by that reference to J. A. C. L.?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, like any other organization, the J. A. C. L. has had leaders who were not above doing such things, and we have always been free to admit that.

Mr. STRIPLING. What do you think he specifically has reference to there as to the conduct of the J. A. C. L. leaders?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, he may be referring to some of the things that took place right after Pearl Harbor or during the evacuation crises.

Mr. STRIPLING. As eastern representative of J. A. C. L. you are familiar with the organization and with its membership. How many members does the Japanese American Citizens League actually have in the United States; dues-paying members?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Mike Masaoka has told me that they have 20,000 on the rolls.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know of your own knowledge that they have 20,000, or are you going by what Mr. Masaoka says?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am just going by what he has told me. I have no figures to that effect myself.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You stated that the Japanese American Citizens League has had leaders who fit that description. Who are or were some of those leaders?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I can't make any charge because I can't prove it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have specific names in your own mind?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I have one.



Mr. MATTHEWS. Is he still in the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe he is.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And still an official of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I couldn't say to that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. According to your latest information about him was he still an official?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He is not active, but I don't know just whether his connections have been severed or not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was he ever formally charged with misconduct by the organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, he was not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do other leaders of the organization than yourself know about his gross misconduct?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe they do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It is a matter of general knowledge of the organization, is it not, among the top leaders?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes. I think it could be said, yes. However, I would not like to say anything, because this is all hearsay that I have heard, and I have no fact or evidence to substantiate this.

Mr. COSTELLO. This particular paragraph that Mr. Stripling read you from the letter regarding the J. A. C. L., just exactly what did that have reference to?

Mr. MUNDT. While the chairman is looking for the passage he wants to quote, Mr. Kanazawa, may I inquire whether you are in contact with your parents through correspondence?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. In their letters to you, have they at any time indicated about the same general conditions existed at Poston as described in this letter from Manzanar?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I am in constant communication with my mother and two married sisters in Poston, and I have been surprised because they have not put in much news about the political or economic or other conditions at Poston. They would write more about the temperature or the food or things like that, and very little about the political friction or other things.

Mr. MUNDT. Did they write anything at all about the riot which took place at Poston?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, sir. They just mentioned it, but they didn't go into any details.

Mr. MUNDT. They did not give any indication as to what might have caused that riot?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, they did not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they express anything to you regarding the conditions, at Poston center?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, their main complaint is about the heat and the sand and the wind, and also about the living conditions. They have tried to do the best with what they have, but they are rather crowded there.

Mr. COSTELLO. All living conditions are overcrowded.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. The particular sentence I have reference to in the letter is that portion which reads "riding down their parents."

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am not sure just what he would have reference to there. There may have been certain incidents that happened during the evacuation that he had in mind, but I don't know about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or whether he merely means taking advantage of them, or something to that effect.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; something like that.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you do not know what he means by the expression "under the J. A. C. L. banner sabotage their own people"?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I could not say what he meant there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would that have reference to the activities prior to the evacuation, or subsequently?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I have the idea that it would be about the time of the evacuation.

Mr. COSTELLO. Possibly some of the Nisei at the time of the evacuation were taking advantage of their own people by trying to buy their property, or things of that character.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I couldn't say. I would not know about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether it refers directly to that or not.

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I don't know what he had in mind here.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you heard that some of the Nisei leaders of the Japanese American Citizens League sold official passes to Japanese prior to evacuation; passes which they were able to obtain from the California authorities?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I do not know about that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you heard that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I have not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know Tokie Slocum, Mr. Kanazawa?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do.

Mr. STRIPLING. How well do you know Mr. Slocum?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I have met him in Seattle in about--well, the latter part of the twenties or early thirties; I don't recall the exact date.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you consider him to be a person of Japanese extraction who is working for the general welfare and betterment of the Japanese as a whole?

Mr. KANAZAWA. In general, I believe so.

Mr. STRIPLING. As eastern representative of the J. A. C. L., I believe you told the committee when Mike Masaoka was out of Washington, that you would replace him as the so-called head officer here.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I just filled in for him. I maintained the usual contacts.

Mr. STRIPLING. I have here a report which was obtained by the committee on the letterhead of the Japanese American Citizens League, dated January 14, 1943, entitled "Subject: Instructions and Miscellaneous. From Mike Masaoka to Washington office, attention Joe Kanazawa."

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you recognize this as the letterhead and report of Mike Masaoka?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read one portion of this report which was made by Mr. Masaoka.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed.

Mr. STRIPLING. I quote:

Tokutaro Slocum is now in Washington, D. C., and I suggest that you keep a close tab on him as he may cause us some embarrassment and difficulty. Slocum, as you probably know, is one of the outstanding Japanese heroes of the First World War. He is a marvelous patriotic orator, and was largely responsible for the passage of the special legislation which permitted Japanese veterans of the First World War to become American citizens. I believe he has some valuable contacts in Washington. Slocum is dangerous because he is fanatical about Americanism. He holds to the theory that all Issei and most of the Nisei are disloyal. We are afraid that because of his service record, he will be able to approach certain of the Congressmen who are antagonistic to us and there present his story in such a manner that the W. R. A. resettlement program, as well as their budget for the next year may be jeopardized. With his estimates and half-guesses, I am afraid that he will cause congressional investigations of an unnecessary nature and which may result in further mass segregation and internment. We consider Slocum one of the most dangerous men to the general program of resettlement, because he thinks only of himself and not of the general welfare. He has a persecution complex in that he feels that every person of Japanese ancestry is out to get him. I suggest that you check his activities as much as possible and to keep us fully informed as to his doings. Because of the potential danger of his presence in Washington and because George Inakagi may know how to handle him because of his associations with him in southern California, I am asking that he report to you in Washington as soon as possible after his Chicago conferences and that both of you work together to see that he does not jeopardize the future of the Japanese in this country by his sincere and misguided efforts.

What action did you take upon those instructions?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I didn't do very much, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. What do you think that Mr. Masaoka had in mind when he said "Slocum is dangerous because he is fanatical about Americanism"?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I think, at best, that I refer you to Mike Masaoka on that.

Mr. STRIPLING. You would not care to comment on that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not take any action?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you did not get in touch with Mr. Slocum?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I had met him here, of course, but I didn't do anything special.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you did not keep tab on him, so to speak, as they asked you to do?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I didn't.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you reply to that letter?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, we made reports every so often but I don't think I brought this up.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You never made any answer to that suggestion?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, sir; as far as I remember, I don't remember whether I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you share Masaoka's viewpoint as expressed in that letter?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Not entirely, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. To what extent do you share it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I know from what Slocum has testified since in the Senate investigating committee and here, that he does not regard most of the Japanese disloyal, as the letter states.

Mr. STRIPLING. He stated yesterday he thought the majority were loyal.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. As eastern representatives of the J. A. C. L., was it your duty to contact various government officials from time to time?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It was; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you state which Government officials you had most frequent contact with?

Mr. KANAZAWA. In the main they were W. R. A. officials.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who, in the W. R. A., did you contact?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, Mr. Myer.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Dillon Myer?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Mr. Dillon Myer; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Director of the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who else?

Mr. KANAZAWA. John Baker, public relations, and Tom Holland and Bob Frase, his assistants.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you contact the officials of any other agency of the Government?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I did have contact with the War Department officials. Let me see, I had occasion to see Mr. Ennis about two or three times, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Kanazawa, I show you a letter dated May 1, 1943, signed "Joe." Will you tell me whether or not that letter is from you?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; it is from me.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, this letter is dated May 1, 1943, addressed to "Dear Mike," who, I assume, is Mike Masaoka.

Mr. KANAZAWA. It is.

Mr. STRIPLING. It is signed "Joe." I would like to read this into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. STRIPLING. The letter reads:

Just as a point of information, Mr. Myer asked me about something he had been told: That over a year ago Lechner worked for us or had offered to work for us, but inasmuch as the league could not pay him what he wanted he went to work for the "opposition." Myer seems to think that Lechner is one of those who will work for the highest bidder.

Re the brief it occurred to me that the following is a vital point: De Witt declared the evacuation a "military necessity." Yet he thinks of us as "Japs is Japs." Could it be that he was prejudiced? If you get what I mean. However, keep in mind actual transcription.

Had a good talk with Myer, Holland, Baker, and they would all like to see you. They were sorry to have missed you last week. When do you think you will be back?

Regards to Etsu and Suzuki's, et al.

Sincerely,

JOE.

Now, Mr. Kanazawa, what did you mean when you said:

De Witt declared the evacuation a military necessity. Yet he thinks of us as "Japs is Japs." Could it be that he was prejudiced?

Could you elaborate on that? First, that has reference to General De Witt, does it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I know it has. Well, he was quoted in the coast papers as saying "Japs is Japs" and that he was opposed to



their return to the coast, and I felt that he was prejudiced in making the statement; that it did show that he was prejudiced when he ordered the evacuation.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think he ordered the evacuation purely as a matter of prejudice and not as a military necessity?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Oh, I do believe it was a military necessity, but I do believe he was influenced to some extent.

Mr. COSTELLO. In what manner? By outside pressure groups, or something?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I think there may have been some pressure groups.

Mr. COSTELLO. Like business concerns, or something of that kind in California and the west coast?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe so. But I have orders not to talk about military matters from the War Department, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is a matter which you should not properly comment on?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean it would be kind of tough for a private to talk about a general.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I cannot talk about the policies of the General Staff.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Kanazawa, are you a follower of the Buddhist religion?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you ever been?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. MUNDT. In regard to that letter, what did you have reference to, Mr. Kanazawa, when you used the word "opposition"?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Opposition?

Mr. MUNDT. As I understand Mr. Stripling, he referred to somebody who was supposed to be for the J. A. C. L.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Oh, I know what you mean there. I had reference to some of the anti-Japanese groups on the west coast.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know who he went to work for, specifically?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, I do not. Mike was going into the matter, but I think he left on one of his trips, and I never did get to know just exactly what he found out.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Kanazawa, your wife stated that one thing that disturbed her a bit was the fact that many of the confidential papers from the W. R. A. had been given to the Japanese American Citizens' League. She thought that was rather disturbing and an unusual Government procedure.

Do you share in her skepticism in such a policy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I think I will have to correct her. I will say some confidential information; not papers, as the representative here also turned in information and facts, news for the Pacific Citizen, and sometimes I was able to get leads to stories that were breaking in the future, but I passed them on and marked them "Confidential," that they were not to be released before the date of the general press release.

Mr. MUNDT. I want you to think pretty hard before you answer this question.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you positive that there were no confidential papers and reports from the War Relocation Authority turned over to the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. We were getting the directives from the W. R. A. that they were issuing.

Mr. MUNDT. You were getting official records?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; we were getting those.

Mr. COSTELLO. In advance of the release of those directives?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; the directives came in, usually, whenever they were sent out to the projects.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever get a directive, or directives, which were stamped or marked "Confidential"?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe we have; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Those would be considered, then, would they not, as confidential papers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; they would be.

Mr. MUNDT. So you did get confidential papers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, some.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, to go back to my original question, do you share in your wife's skepticism about the wisdom of such a policy?

Your wife said she thought that was rather unusual Government procedure. To me it is an amazing Government procedure; in fact, I consider that the most amazing single piece of testimony yet to come before our committee, that the War Relocation Authority should stamp papers "Confidential," "Not for public release," and then hand them out to other organizations than their own staff assignment.

I wonder if you share that opinion of your wife's?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, yes; I guess I do.

Mr. MUNDT. You do? That makes three of us because I certainly do, too.

Mr. STRIPLING. On that point, Mr. Chairman, among the records which were subpoenaed is a report dated September 19, 1942, to the national headquarters staff of the Japanese American Citizens League, which is signed "Dog-tiredly, Mike." That is Masaoka?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you familiar with this report? You were with the J. A. C. L. on September 19?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; and I did some typing for Mike sometimes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, this report on the first page states:

Just now he's—

referring to Mr. Kanazawa—

typing out copies of the directives from the War Relocation Authority which affect the evacuees (he claims that he can't finish copying them for a couple of days, after which we'll send them back on to you all) and so it means that I'm back at the old job of banging out my own news letters; so please excuse the more than usual mistakes. A word about the directives—we've got a lot more but they have to deal with the administration itself and so we are not enclosing copies of them. All are most confidential and we were lucky to get them ourselves, so please be careful of their use.

In the same report, on page 8, under the bold-type heading, under-scored "Strictly confidential," the report states:

Myer put this up to me directly and pointedly. He said that he and his staff deals with me on the same basis of confidence and mutual trust as they do among themselves.

Up to now I have been permitted to sit down and discuss every major policy before it was finally passed on. Up to now no confidence has been betrayed. The War Relocation Authority desires to continue that fine relationship and will continue to do so as long as confidential matters are kept in confidence and as long as we sincerely try to cooperate with them on the improvement of conditions.

He is afraid that certain guys in Congress would jump down their collective throats if they could only imagine a part of the part which we play in forming W. R. A. policy. Too, he desires that nothing is made public except through his office and at the proper time. He is a great believer in "proper timing" as the keystone to successful announcements and their general acceptance.

He has given us the directives and instructions of his department. They are to be held in the strictest confidence and are not to be announced to anyone. They are merely to serve as a hint to us of their policy; nothing more. If, in order to answer a letter, it is necessary to quote all or part of an administrative instruction, please contact me before so doing. In specific cases, I have been given the privilege of quoting them in full.

Our working relationships with Myer are now on a better plane than with Eisenhower. We've got to keep them that way. Be careful, and that refers especially to Kido in Poston—for if Wade decided to get sore if he discovered that you had copies, God Bless America! As a member of the legal staff, I suppose you see all of them, though, don't you, Sab?

You think Mr. Masaoka's report to the national headquarters is substantially true as to that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I just typed this and I would like to refer you to Mike as to Mr. Myer.

Mr. COSTELLO. You would not care to comment on that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I would not like to comment on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he dictate this to you?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you typed it up?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; that is what I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, the report refers to this: "For if Wade decided to get sore if he discovered that you had copies, God Bless America."

The "Wade" referred to there is the camp director at Poston?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe so; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you do not care to comment on this?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you do know that you had copies of confidential directives?

Mr. KANAZAWA. We have directives, yes; that were given to us.

Mr. STRIPLING. And instructions from the War Relocation Authority at the headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League here in Washington?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you ever attend any of these meetings with Mr. Myer or Mr. Holland, or any others connected with the W. R. A.?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I did not. Mike did.

Mr. COSTELLO. And you did talk with them?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I did talk with them. I had personal contact with them.

Mr. COSTELLO. When he was out of town?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you did not attend any of the other conferences? Mike usually attended those?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. He handled the communications back and forth directly with W. R. A.?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Kanazawa, were you successful in getting Mr. Willkie to file a brief on behalf of the case before the Supreme Court?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. On April 12, 1943, there is a letter signed "Joe" to "Dear Mike" on the letterhead of the Japanese American Citizens League; Washington Office [reading]:

DEAR MIKE: Although I understand that the Aclu will present a brief, I wonder if Willkie would take the chance of appearing as appellant before the United States Supreme Court. Think there'd be any harm in approaching him while you are up there?

You do not know whether Mr. Masaoka contacted Mr. Willkie?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe he tried indirectly, but was unsuccessful.

Mr. STRIPLING. Unsuccessful?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to read the remainder of this letter.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed.

Mr. STRIPLING [reading]:

A Nisei was shot and killed at Topaz by a military police. The story at War Relocation Authority is that he was challenged several times but didn't answer as he was going over the barbed wire fence. Hence the shooting. This is the first version, so far, of the affair. His name is not known and they are hushing it up here and back there. So far it has not made the papers unless it breaks tomorrow.

This leaves a bad taste in my mouth. Some rationalization was possible of the Manzanar shooting, but this one smacks too much of "concentration camp" stuff and not of a "refuge," if you get what I mean. Guard towers, barbed wire fences, and such shootings cast a shadow over the sincerity of the Government's resettlement program.

Am preparing a report tomorrow if I can get it out on the latest developments. Things are moving fast now and we must make preparations to be ready for them in the coming months.

Didn't get to write to Herbert Agar, so hope you can contact him. Am forwarding Father Tibersar's letter of introduction as I don't know to whom to write at Maryknoll. Perhaps you can find out from Catholic sources there in New York City.

Everything else will be ready for you down here so let me know when you are coming down.

Give my regards to Etsu, the Suzuki's, and the others.

Sincerely,

JOE.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who signed that letter?

Mr. STRIPLING. It is signed "Joe."

Mr. KANAZAWA. I wrote that letter.

Mr. MUNDT. What did you have in mind about Herbert Agar? What did you have in mind about him?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, we made all the contacts we can among various organizations to help in our work in resettling and Americanization and we made contact with all the liberal groups possible that we can to help in that work.

Mr. MUNDT. What liberal group is Mr. Herbert Agar with?

Mr. STRIPLING. Freedom House.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Freedom House. I think he is chairman of Freedom House in New York City.

Mr. MUNDT. You mentioned also Mr. Willkie. He is with the same group, is he?



Mr. KANAZAWA. No; it was not in connection with that at all.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever come across the name of Dr. Kagawa; the Reverend Kagawa? He was a Japanese lecturer who toured this country for many years.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Could you tell the committee anything about him?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe he is considered one of the greatest Christian leaders in the world. He is in Japan now, I believe.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he in Japan now?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Was he repatriated to Japan?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; he is a Japanese subject, and I believe he was in Japan at the time the war broke out.

Mr. MUNDT. Would he be considered a propagandist for Imperial Japan, do you know?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I went to one speech he made in New York City in back—I don't recall exactly the time; I believe it was before the war—in which he spoke at that time, his speech was along—I mean the type that a Christian minister might make of making better citizens of ourselves in this country; of that nature.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Kanazawa, there is reference here to the Nisei who was shot at Topaz. Did you follow that up? Could you enlighten the committee as to what took place?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't remember the name or anything, but I do believe the story did break a little later. I can't recall right now. I would like to refer that to the W. R. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think the W. R. A. would have all the facts and details regarding the incident?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I think that they would.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were no news releases regarding the matter at the time?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Not that particular day.

Mr. COSTELLO. So far as you know, then, any incident of that nature occurring in the relocation center would be withheld from the press or from the public at large?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I don't believe it would be withheld; it is bound to come out.

Mr. COSTELLO. But in this particular instance it did not come out?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I looked in all the Washington papers that day and I saw nothing about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know of any other instance of this kind that took place at any of the centers that may or may not have been released through the press?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you look in the Washington papers the next day for the story?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I looked the next day and I didn't see anything then, either.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you look the third day?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't believe that I ever read anything about this incident.

Mr. MUNDT. I mean, you were interested in it, and if there had been a story—

Mr. KANAZAWA. If there had been, I would have noticed it; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. And you never did notice it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I never did.

Mr. MUNDT. And the Washington papers take all the leading wire services of the country?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. So that if it were released, they would carry it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe they would, yes; if it was important enough.

Mr. MUNDT. And since they did not carry it, the news must have been withheld by somebody?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I think news has value according to the distance, and it might not have been considered important enough to print here. It may have been printed in the papers around the area.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever see a newspaper clipping of it anywhere?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I didn't.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think that the shooting of one of the Japanese evacuees at a center would make news, especially if it was done by the military force there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just a killing within the center itself, a murder taking place—that would be an incident that might occur any place in the country.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. But where there apparently is a Japanese claim that an evacuee was shot by the military guard, it seems to me that is an unusual incident and would be news, even in Washington, with all the news created locally.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, in regard to this story, it is possible I may have gotten this Nisei part wrong and it was an old man of about 60 years old who was shot and killed and that story did break. I may have got the facts wrong on this. I would like to have you check on this.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean there were two people shot down there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; just one.

Mr. COSTELLO. One Nisei and the other was an older man?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; just an old man. I know an old man was shot by the M. P.'s and that story was in the press.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know anything further about it as to the reason he might have been climbing over the fence?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I don't know anything about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have none of the details on that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Mundt asked you a question about this Dr. Kagawa who was lecturing here.

You say you attended one of his lectures in New York?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know what the nature of the subject was, or do you recall anything about the lecture?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It was along the spiritual line. I would not classify it as propaganda.

Mr. COSTELLO. The lecture which you attended was purely along religious lines?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; strictly so.

Mr. COSTELLO. But all of his lectures were not of that character, or would you know about that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I would not know about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it not a fact that he did a great deal of lecturing and propagandizing on behalf of consumer cooperatives while he was here in this country?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I am not so familiar with that. It was sheer chance I went to hear him; I wanted to see what Dr. Kagawa looked like and I was more interested in his personality than anything else.

Mr. COSTELLO. Making a personal study rather than the matters with which he was concerned?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether that is a fact, however, whether he was propagandizing on behalf of consumer cooperatives as opposed to the existing capitalistic system in this country?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I don't know about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you do know that the W. R. A. has started a program of inaugurating the cooperatives in some of the relocation centers, do you not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; they have.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you consulted with Mr. Myer regarding those cooperatives?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I have not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any direct information as to how many centers have cooperatives established in them at the present time?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I don't.

Mr. MUMPT. Do you know whether the starting of those cooperatives was at the insistence of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I don't believe it was. It was not a J. A. C. L. suggestion or anything like that.

Mr. COSTELLO. You never discussed that with Mike Masaoka?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I did not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you ever hear him discuss it, after having talked with Mr. Myer?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, I didn't.

Mr. COSTELLO. But so far as you know, then, the establishment of cooperatives in these relocation centers was a program that was inaugurated by W. R. A. and not by the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; it was not—Yes; I think that is so.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Was it the intention of the J. A. C. L. to keep the news of this killing of this Japanese by the military police from the Japanese people; to withhold that knowledge from the Japanese people generally?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I didn't get that, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. This Japanese who was killed by the military police; was it the intention of the J. A. C. L. to keep that matter secret?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, sir; it was not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, did the J. A. C. L. send out any communication whatsoever to any of its correspondents regarding this killing?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't believe so.

Mr. Congressman, I ask you to check this story because I believe I may have been misinformed on that particular date and that it really was an Issei who was killed. I do recall that an Issei was killed, but I don't recall just what date it was; whether it checks with the date of this, I don't remember.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you think it would have been a good idea for the J. A. C. L. to notify its correspondents or people that they came in contact with, of this fact, that this Japanese was killed?

Mr. KANAZAWA. For what purpose, sir?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, I will let you answer that.

Would it have served any purpose whatsoever?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, it would have called the attention of various organizations and groups to what had taken place, and might move them to some sort of action.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is the very reason I asked you the question, whether or not the J. A. C. L. took any action whatsoever in respect to this incident.

Mr. KANAZAWA. They might have, at the national headquarters. We did not take any action here in Washington, unless Mike did it himself.

Pardon me, but Mike Masaoka did quite a bit of traveling all over the country, so that I was not in close contact with him at all times.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, the reason you would notify Mike about this incident was so that he could take any action he felt that was necessary?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. To either correct the situation or for some other purpose; is that correct?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that the J. A. C. L. might have notified all of its correspondents of this incident?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So far as you know?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. You said in this letter that you wrote that a Niesi was shot and killed.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And now you say you think it was an old man.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe I did know this, that there was an old man shot and killed. Whether it was with reference to the same case or not, I can't say, but I think that can be substantiated if you would compare the stories; I mean, the news clippings, with this particular one.

I think Mr. Myer would be able to verify it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, if it was suppressed here in Washington and out there. I guess there would be no newspaper clippings with which to compare it.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I got the impression that it was being suppressed because I didn't see it in any of the Washington papers, but I did hear that there had been a killing.

Mr. MUNDT. Where did you get your information about the killing?

Mr. KANAZAWA. At the W. R. A.



Mr. MUNDT. At the W. R. A.?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You had some information first, did you not, about the killing before you went over to confer with W. R. A. regarding the matter?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I just picked it up that morning there.

Mr. COSTELLO. While over there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Judging from the letter, the story of W. R. A. is that he was challenged several times but did not answer?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. At the time you got your information from W. R. A., I presume that you also fathered your impression from the same place that the story was not being released by the papers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; the W. R. A. was rather surprised, too, that they didn't see anything about it—I mean in the papers here.

Mr. COSTELLO. You make the statement here in the letter, "His name is not known and they"—apparently referring to W. R. A.—"are hushing it up here and back there."

Now, you must have obtained that information by conferring with somebody down at W. R. A. regarding the matter.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I had talked with someone; that is where I got my information.

Mr. COSTELLO. With whom did you talk down there?

Mrs. KANAZAWA. I think it was Mr. Myer, but I am not positive.

Mr. COSTELLO. You believe you talked directly with Dillon Myer himself regarding this incident?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that he is the one that told you about it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And it was from him, then, that you got the information that W. R. A. was hushing up the news story, both here in Washington and out there at Topaz?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I think it would be best if you ask him about this.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, we intend to ask him, but I want to get the information from you.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, if you conferred with him, I would like to have your version of the story so that when he does come here we would be able to inquire of him regarding the incident.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Mr. Costello, this is the way it goes: As a newspaperman I go to various people and get leads from this person and that person and put them together sometimes.

This particular thing—I think I did talk to Mr. Myer about this.

Mr. COSTELLO. On April 12, 1943, was the date on which this letter was written; were you engaged in newspaper work at that time?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I was not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your occupation at that time was that you were employed by the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And your purpose in going to W. R. A. at that time was in connection with the activities of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that you were not looking for a news story or leads, but you were definitely conferring on the problem of the relocation centers and the matters of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I was referring to my training as a newspaperman; that was my technique.

Mr. COSTELLO. All the more reason you ought to remember the person with whom you talked and the person from whom you obtained the information.

Mr. KANAZAWA. That is true, sir, but I am really a little hazy about that. I think I talked with Mr. Myer after I got the information from somebody else. That is the impression that I have right now.

Mr. COSTELLO. This particular letter was written less than 3 months ago, and apparently the incident occurred a short time ago, and it seems to me you ought to remember who you talked with down there and pretty well remember the conversation down there itself, particularly a matter of this importance, in which you were suggesting that someone of the prominence of Mr. Willkie should be engaged to write a brief as appellant for the United States Supreme Court. I presume that was referring to matters of this kind.

Mr. KANAZAWA. It was in reference to the Hirabayashi and the Yasui cases.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those are cases recently decided by the Supreme Court?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those are the cases in which the Supreme Court held the right of General De Witt; the right to evacuate people of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coast?

Mr. KANAZAWA. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. The purpose of engaging Mr. Willkie would have been to act as appellant on behalf of the Japanese people.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And had no connection with the second paragraph regarding the shooting at Topaz?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; it had no reference to that. It was a different situation entirely.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the policy of the J. A. C. L. regarding the segregation within the relocation centers?

Mr. KANAZAWA. We are definitely for it.

Mr. STRIPLING. You are for segregation?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; and the earlier the better.

Mr. STRIPLING. What segregation do you propose?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, we leave that to the W. R. A. officials to carry out.

Mr. STRIPLING. What has been the attitude of the W. R. A. officials regarding segregation?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It has been for it.

Mr. STRIPLING. They have been for it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, but not as early as we had hoped for.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have they taken any steps that you know of in any relocation center?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; they have.

Mr. STRIPLING. What center?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe at Topaz they have. They have sent several of the people to a camp in Moab, Idaho.

Mr. STRIPLING. Those were persons of a criminal tendency; were they not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; not entirely. They did take some in the first group, but they also started weeding them out later.

Mr. STRIPLING. But, there has been no effort on the part of the War Relocation Authority, so far as you know, to segregate the Japanese of known loyalty from those of known disloyalty?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe the general policy has been set up, but I would like to refer that to Mr. Myer.

Mr. STRIPLING. You say that it is the policy of J. A. C. L. to segregate?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir; to favor that program.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, do they favor the segregation of the Nisei and the Issei and the Kibei?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; just the loyal from the disloyal.

Mr. STRIPLING. On August 14, 1942, did you write this letter to Mr. Ernst L. Maag, delegate in Canada of the International Red Cross Committee?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe I did; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. This is a letter dated August 14, 1942, written by Mr. Kanazawa to Mr. Ernst L. Maag, delegate in Canada of the International Red Cross Committee, Montreal, Quebec, Canada [reading:]

We understand that you have made an inspection of all camps for the International Red Cross. Would it be possible for you to spare us a copy of your report. We would value it highly.

Our league of more than 20,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry, represented by our national secretary, Mike Masaoka, has been acting in a consultative, advisory, and cooperative capacity with Government officials and departments here, and particularly with the War Relocation Authority, which has charge of the west coast evacuation in this country. Our work, naturally, is in the interest of all the Japanese evacuees in the United States.

We would like to have any additional material and information you may have on the status of Canadians of Japanese ancestry, of the basis and reasons for the evacuation, whether the army or civilians were in charge, the pronouncements, the zones, if any, set up, any voluntary evacuation, centers to which moved, where and when, any loyalty hearing boards, relocation, whether individually, in groups, or en masse, conditions, etc.

We are enclosing herewith Norman Thomas booklet, Democracy and Japanese Americans.

We deeply appreciate anything that you may be able to do for us, and take this opportunity of thanking you.

Sincerely,

JOE KANAZAWA, *Secretary.*

Why were you interested in the Japanese of Canada, Mr. Kanazawa?

Mr. KANAZAWA. That letter is dated August 14?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, we thought we might get some suggestions from Canadians in the way they had worked out their program, too, in carrying out the program here.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were the Japanese on the west coast of Canada evacuated from area?

Mr. KANAZAWA. They were; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know the date on which that evacuation took place?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I am not familiar with it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether it was prior to the evacuation in this country or not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I couldn't say positively.

Mr. COSTELLO. What do you think? Do you think it was before we had done it here, or afterwards?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I really don't know, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not have any particular knowledge of that?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know anything about how the Canadian Government is handling the Japanese evacuees there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I think they are doing it a lot differently from ours. It is what they call a work camp settlement, where the evacuees are more or less on a self-subsisting basis, but I am not too familiar to say absolutely about that.

Mr. COSTELLO. But all the Japanese were removed from the west coast of Canada as they were from the west coast of the United States.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they were removed to the interior of the country?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there any restrictions on their activities subsequently, or all placed in camps, and so forth?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe they also instituted a resettlement program, but I am not familiar with it.

Mr. COSTELLO. So far as you know, they have followed a similar program we have of placing Japanese in relocation centers.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. And providing work for them at those centers.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir. I believe it is this way, that a group may go to a regular camp and work there and things like that, but I am not positive.

Mr. COSTELLO. They are being employed up there by private firms, in some manner, so that they are able to provide for their own subsistence?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Kanazawa, do you believe that a Buddhist chaplain should be permitted in the special Japanese combat units of the Army?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I believe they should be, for this reason. Buddhism is a religion, and it is good to China, India, Japan, many of the oriental countries, and it is one of the things—freedom of religion is one of the things—we are fighting for and that we should have a good number of Buddhists in these combat teams. I believe they are due to have one.

Mr. STRIPLING. Does not Buddhism also preach Emperor worship?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't know.



Mr. STRIPLING. You sent a telegram—it is not dated, but it is on the letterhead of the Western Union—to Mike Masaoka, care of Pacific Citizen, in which you said:

War Department announces seeking Buddhist chaplain for combat unit would also consider Nisei Christian minister if latter tried hard to get in check with Tad Hirota on Masaru Kumata if latter interested and would pass loyalty screening wire Stinsons release morning.

Mr. KANAZAWA. This story broke in the Washington Post so I immediately wired to Mike Masaoka about that fact.

Mr. STRIPLING. The J. A. C. L. is not opposed then to the presence of Buddhist chaplains?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It was not opposed to that, no.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know the difference between Chinese and Japanese Buddhism?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I am not familiar with that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know that there are two very distinct sects of Buddhism, one of which is confined to Japan?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I am not familiar with that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know that Buddhism is nonexistent in India, even though it originated there?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, sir; that is something new to me.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you live before you went into the Army? What was your address?

Mr. KANAZAWA. 1324 Fourteenth NW., apartment 5.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Apartment 5?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Paul Abe live in apartment 4 at the same address?

Mr. KANAZAWA. He did; yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Are those two apartments on the same floor?

Mr. KANAZAWA. They are.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Are they the only two apartments on that floor?

Mr. KANAZAWA. They are.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you live next door to the Abes?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Let me see. I don't know exactly when we moved in, but I believe it was last fall.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Some months?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; some months.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A good part of last year.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I think it was right after New Year's that we moved in there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You know Paul Abe?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And Mrs. Abe?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have had frequent contacts with them, living next door to them?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You knew that Abe had worked for approximately 4 years at the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know anything about the nature of his work at the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I was not familiar with it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he ever inform you that he had been engaged in decoding work at the Embassy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; he never has.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he ever talk to you or convey to you any confidential information derived from his presence at the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; for the reason I was in New York all this time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, but since you became acquainted with him.

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; he never did tell me anything about his work.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he ever tell you as the result of his working at the Japanese Embassy that he had derived what he calls an intuition that war was in the offing between the United States and Japan?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't believe he told me that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you hear him testify to that effect yesterday?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I wasn't here.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were not here when he testified?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know that he had received a scholarship to attend George Washington University through the Japanese Embassy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. From the Foreign Office of the Tokyo Government?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't know where, but I believe he did have a scholarship, but I am not sure.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he tell you he had such a scholarship?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; he didn't tell me directly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You learned it from other sources?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did anyone ever tell you why he did not ask for a renewal of that scholarship?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know what his testimony is on that point?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I do not know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you the executive secretary of the Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I was—not executive secretary.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Recording secretary.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Recording secretary.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your answer to the question propounded by Mr. Stripling concerning the Communist character of the Japanese American Committee for Democracy? Are you convinced that it was strictly a Communist organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I am not convinced.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You are not convinced of that.

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know Roger Baldwin?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether Roger Baldwin resigned from the Japanese American Committee for Democracy?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Because he came to the conclusion that it was absolutely controlled by Communists?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; that is a conclusion he reached, and I know that he did resign for that reason.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You know that he did reach that conclusion, you say.

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I think in his letters—he didn't mention it in his letter of resignation, but he was disturbed by the position that J. A. C. L. was taking on such things as evacuation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, was he disturbed by the Communist control of the organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It is possible. I wouldn't know about that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he ever tell you about it?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; he never told me.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Has anyone ever told you that he had held that opinion?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know Lewis Merrill, member of the Advisory Board of the J. A. C. L.? He is head of the United Office and Professional Workers Union of the C. I. O.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am not familiar with him. I think he must have become an advisory member after I left New York.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know Katherine Terrill?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I never met her.

Mr. MATTHEWS. She was on the board, though.

Mr. KANAZAWA. She was one of the first members on the board.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether Katherine Terrill is a Communist or not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether Franz Boaz, the deceased anthropologist at Columbia University, was well known as a Communist?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't believe any of our advisory board members were known as Communists.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A recent witness before this committee. Mr. Goodwin Watson, whose name you have seen in the paper, recently testified that he suspected any organization of being communistic on the mere ground that Franz Boas was connected with it.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I see.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you ever heard of Boaz' reputation to that effect?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I hadn't; in fact, I was rather impressed by his general reputation as a scientist.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know Abner Green?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do know him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was Abner Green a high official in the International Workers Order?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't know him. I just know him as a member of the committee. I believe it was of the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know anything about the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Not too much.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you consider it a Communist organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't consider it Communist.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You do not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you consider the International Workers Order a Communist order?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am not familiar with the order.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What reason have you to think that the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born is not a Communist organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Well, I have no reason to say.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You have no reason to think that it is.

Mr. KANAZAWA. I have no reason to think that it is or it is not; I don't know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But you know that Abner Green is connected with it, do you not?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Yes; I do know that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. If you were shown checks payable to the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, in very substantial sums, from Communist sources, would that convince you of any Communist connection?

Mr. KANAZAWA. It would seem like factual evidence there.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know anything about A. Clayton Powell's political connections?

Mr. KANAZAWA. No; I do not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is he not widely held to be one of the Communist representatives on the city council of New York?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I don't believe so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, he is not on the Communist Party ticket, I grant you, but is he not known as a Communist in New York?

Mr. KANAZAWA. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know anything about the numerous connections with front organizations of the Communist Party which Bishop McConnell has had?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I am not familiar with that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then it is your distinct conclusion that the organization of which you were recording secretary was not a Communist front organization?

Mr. KANAZAWA. I do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you very much for the testimony you have given here before the committee. The committee is going to stand in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning, at which time we hope that Mr. Mike Masaoka will be available in the city. I understand he has not yet arrived in town, and for that reason we will not have a hearing this afternoon.

The committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m. an adjournment was taken until 10:30 a. m., July 3.)



# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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SATURDAY, JULY 3, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m. in room 1301, House Office Building, the Honorable John M. Costello (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator; J. B. Matthews, director of research for the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Call the first witness.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka.

## TESTIMONY OF MIKE MASAOKA

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Give your name to the reporter so that we can hear you.

Mr. MASAOKA. Pvt. Mike Masaoka.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you born?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was born in Fresno, Calif., the 15th day of October 1915.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were your parents born in Japan?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. My father passed away in 1924. My mother is now in Chicago.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have any brothers and sisters?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I have five brothers, four of whom are either in the Army of the United States or about to be inducted.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where is the other one?

Mr. MASAOKA. The other one is in Denver, Colo.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is he doing?

Mr. MASAOKA. He is working for the Japanese American Citizens League.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have any sisters?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have two sisters; one working in Chicago and the other in the Poston relocation center.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have any close relatives in Japan?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Are you married?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is your wife's name?

Mr. MASAOKA. Etsui Mineta Masaoka.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you educated?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was educated in Salt Lake City, Utah, through the grammar school, through the high school, and the State University of Utah.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you graduate from the State university?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did; in 1937.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What has been your employment record since your graduation from college?

Mr. MASAOKA. From the time I graduated until September 1, 1940, I was engaged in a number of different activities. I was a school teacher for a while.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you teach school?

Mr. MASAOKA. I taught at the West Side High School and the State university.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In Salt Lake City?

Mr. MASAOKA. In Salt Lake City.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you teach?

Mr. MASAOKA. Public speaking.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you major in public speaking in college?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir. I majored in political science and history, with a minor in economics.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you teach public speaking at the university?

Mr. MASAOKA. On a part-time basis, yes, sir; in fact, I was a freshman debate coach.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the date of your employment at the university?

Mr. MASAOKA. Approximately 1936 to 1938.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your salary?

Mr. MASAOKA. It was largely on a scholarship basis. I worked in return for tuition and that sort of thing.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you teach in the West Side High School in Salt Lake after you were an instructor at the university, or at the same time?

Mr. MASAOKA. Both at the same time and after.

Mr. MATTHEWS. About what date did your employment in the West Side High School terminate?

Mr. MASAOKA. About 1939.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you do after 1939?

Mr. MASAOKA. A number of minor jobs, including the editing of the English section of the Japanese Nippon newspaper.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is that a privately owned newspaper?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir. I believe it was a Utah corporation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A Utah corporation?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe it is; yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Does it formally or informally have any connection with any organization other than a publishing concern?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not to my knowledge. You see, I do not speak the Japanese language. I cannot read or write it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I mean by that, was it considered a mouthpiece for some Japanese organization in particular?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't believe so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long were you employed on that newspaper?

Mr. MASAOKA. Until about August of 1940, at which time I went to the Pacific coast on a vacation, and then was appointed as the national secretary and field executive for the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MATTHEWS. On what date did you begin your employment with the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. September 1, 1940.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And where did you reside while you were first employed with the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. My legal residence has always been in the State of Utah. My domicile, however, was in San Francisco, Calif.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you elected to that position by the Japanese American Citizens League or were you invited by the officials of the organization, or how did you become secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was appointed by the national board. If you please, at this time I would like to make a statement about the general organizational structure and history.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, I am going to ask you about that presently. You were appointed by the national board of the organization.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. As executive secretary of it?

Mr. MASAOKA. The title is a rather long and ponderous one—national secretary and field executive.

Mr. MATTHEWS. National secretary and field executive of the Japanese American Citizens League.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were you residing at the time of the evacuation of Japanese and those of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific coast?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was residing in San Francisco.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you among those who were evacuated?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How did you manage to not be involved in the evacuation: what were the circumstances?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was instructed by the War Department not to mention the military matters involved. That, I think is a part of that consideration.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you repeat the question, please.

(Question read.)

Mr. COSTELLO. You were in San Francisco, you say, at the time of the evacuation?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the date on which you left San Francisco?

Mr. MASAOKA. Approximately toward the middle part of May, I would say, of 1941; rather, 1942.

Mr. COSTELLO. May of 1942.

Mr. MASAOKA. Approximately.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you recall the date on which the evacuation order was made?

Mr. MASAOKA. The first date for San Francisco?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. Approximately 2 weeks earlier, I believe, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the order that caused all the people of Japanese ancestry to be evacuated?

Mr. MASAOKA. Out of that particular section in which I was residing; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You remained an extra 2 weeks in that area?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not in that particular area; no, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where did you remain then?

Mr. MASAOKA. I moved to another section.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of the city of San Francisco?

Mr. MASAOKA. Of the city of San Francisco.

Mr. COSTELLO. Which was not designated as a restricted area?

Mr. MASAOKA. At that time; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What were you doing at that particular period?

Mr. MASAOKA. My job, of course, was to, if possible, aid the Government in helping in the evacuation. That was my primary job at that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. You were helping in the work of evacuation?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of the other people of Japanese ancestry in that area?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Until May 14?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, approximately.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where did you go when you left San Francisco?

Mr. MASAOKA. To Salt Lake City, and then I came here.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed.

Mr. MATTHEWS. At that time you were national secretary and field executive of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you at the time of evacuation, immediately prior thereto or immediately afterward, volunteer any information to such agencies of the Government as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, information which might have been useful to those agencies?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did you leave Salt Lake City to come east?

Mr. MASAOKA. In the latter part of may.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of 1942?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You remained only a few days then in Salt Lake City?

Mr. MASAOKA. Approximately a week, I believe. These, you understand, are approximate dates.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. When did you set up your headquarters in Washington?

Mr. MASAOKA. In the first part of June of that year, I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you continue thereafter as national secretary and field executive of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. Until the date of my induction into the armed forces, which was June 14.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of this year?

Mr. MASAOKA. Of this year.



Mr. MATTHEWS. What date did you become a member of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. In Salt Lake City we had a Japanese American Citizens League long before it was affiliated with the national organization. I became a member of that Salt Lake City chapter, which was not at that time a part of the national organization, in approximately 1937. The Salt Lake City chapter became a member of the national organization approximately in 1940.

Pardon me. May I correct a date there? I became national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League on September 1, 1941. I am sorry.

In September of 1940 the Japanese American Citizens League held a conference in Seattle, and it was 1 year thereafter that I became the national secretary. In 1940 the Salt Lake chapter and the Intermountain District Council became affiliated with the national organization.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You stated a moment ago that you wished to make a statement concerning the set-up of the Japanese American Citizens League.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you give a brief statement to that effect and include as much as you think is pertinent to indicate what the organization is and what it stands for?

Mr. MASAOKA. I will be very happy to. The Japanese American Citizens League is an organization composed of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry 18 years of age or more. Every member is required by the constitution to sign a special oath of allegiance to the Government of the United States at the time that he becomes a member.

At the time of evacuation we had approximately 20,000 members throughout the United States; most of them, of course, on the Pacific coast and in the intermountain area. Our organization, although national in name, did not actually become national as the word denotes, until after I had assumed office in 1941. The reason for that, I think, is quite obvious.

The Japanese people are a comparatively new minority in the United States. Our foreign generation is rather old. We, the American citizens, are comparatively young today, only averaging about 21 years of age.

Away back in the late twenties some of the leaders of the Japanese American group in the Northwest and elsewhere thought that there should be a civic, patriotic organization composed of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry. That was the beginning of the Japanese American Citizens League. But, because most of the Japanese people, Japanese American people, if you please, were too young to be independent in business and elsewhere, that mushroom growth disappeared until about 1930, when some of the older of the Japanese American group were now established in business.

These young men and young women, as probably all other nationality groups do, banded together under the banner of the Japanese American Citizens League.

One word of explanation about the selection of the name Japanese American Citizens League. There is no hyphen between the word Japanese and American. In other words, we are not, never in-

tended, and do not now intend to be a hyphenated group of Japanese Americans in this country. Japanese is simply a modifying, qualifying adjective to the noun American.

Now, because of our loose affiliation, because we had no paid executive until the 1st of September 1940, many of our local chapters were practically autonomous. They carried on as they saw fit, with little or no relationship to the national organization, and it was not until September 1, 1941, that we tried to bring the groups together and to really solidify the national unit.

The Japanese American Citizens groups, just as any other national groups, were rather divided among themselves. They were young. They were interested in establishing a business and a livelihood for themselves, that they did not spend too much time in this sort of matter.

Since the war and immediately after the war, as the testimony before the Tolan committee will indicate, the Japanese American Citizens groups rendered a tremendous service to the Government of the United States, at the same time rendering a service to the Japanese communities, which includes both the Japanese nationals and the Japanese American citizens.

Now we see a tie-up between the two in this manner: Most of us, that is, American citizens of Japanese ancestry, believe in the United States. We are utterly foreign to Japan. We were educated here, made our friends here, built our associations, ambitions, and dreams right here in the American way. We would be foreigners and enemies of Japan if we ever get there, and we know it. We could not tolerate their system of life; we could not tolerate their system of government or their system of thinking.

Now, with that thought in mind, when war came, we did the best we could to help out an unfortunate minority, a minority which has been subjected, if you please, to many persecutions and unfortunate incidents because of the fact that they happened to be born, not because they asked it or wished it, but simply because they happened to be born with the same physical characteristics as the enemy abroad.

As far as I myself am concerned and many of my colleagues, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a dastardly deed, and it hurt us more than it hurt the average American, because by their actions they made it tough for us. And we are going to do everything possible to make them eat, if you please, those words.

Now, the Japanese American Citizens League, as you gentlemen know, is unpopular among the Japanese American groups. Why? Simply because we believe in the security of the United States first, and in the winning of the war. That is our prime consideration.

At the time when national unity was desirable and necessary, when there was much prejudice against the Japanese people, when the Government of the United States called upon persons of Japanese ancestry, as their contribution to the war effort, to evacuate, the Japanese American Citizens League took the lead in cooperation with the Government, as can be indicated in the Tolan report.

MR. MATTHEWS. I would like to ask you this question. You said that the Japanese American Citizens League is unpopular among the Japanese Americans. How do you reconcile that with the claim of membership of 20,000?

Mr. MASAOKA. That needs clarification. I am sorry I made that confusing. We had at the time of the evacuation approximately 20,000 members. We do not have that now.

Now, when I say "unpopular with the Japanese Americans" may I qualify it by saying "unpopular with some militant minority groups."

Now ours is an organization comparable to any democratic society. We take in all kinds. We have our cranks. We have our people who are alarmists and who are clamity howlers. We have groups that disagree with the policy as formulated by the national board. With these groups, seemingly, we have been very unpopular.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, what do you estimate the membership in the organization was when you left your position as national secretary last month?

Mr. MASAOKA. It would run into possibly 5,000 paid as of date.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And how long was that the figure; during your entire administrative work in the organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir. Most of the time it was considerably higher.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean there was a continued falling off of the membership?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir. When I first assumed my post I think the membership ran to three or four thousand. We built it up gradually, gradually, and gradually until it reached its peak.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Which was what?

Mr. MASAOKA. Which was approximately 20,000.

Then, of course, because we have membership dues, and the like, when the people were evacuated and they received these low salaries, which they do in relocation centers, naturally the membership would fall off. As far as the free zones—that is, the nonevacuated zones—were concerned, our membership has suddenly risen even after evacuation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. To what figure did it fall at the time of evacuation?

Mr. MASAOKA. It has never fallen below the figure I gave you—5,000.

Mr. MUNDT. How much are your annual dues?

Mr. MASAOKA. Our annual dues, if they are an associate member, are \$3.50 a year, which includes a year's subscription to the Pacific Citizen.

Mr. MUNDT. You say they are classed as members if they are associate members?

Mr. MASAOKA. We have two types of membership, Congressman Mundt. One is chapter membership. Now, most of those chapters were destroyed, of course, by evacuation, and, that caused a problem there, therefore we created what we call the associated memberships to take over that slack, and they are what we largely have today, outside of approximately 11 chapters, 12 chapters, that we have in the Intermountain district.

Mr. MUNDT. How much are the annual membership dues of a Japanese American who is also a chapter member?

Mr. MASAOKA. That depends entirely on the chapter. You see, the chapters levy their dues; a portion of which goes to national headquarters.

Mr. MUNDT. \$3.50?

Mr. MASAOKA. \$3.50 for the associated membership, and the others would be a break-down. If they take the Pacific Citizen it is \$2, plus \$35 per year per chapter levy, plus 25 cents per membership card, so



approximately with the Pacific citizen, shall we say it runs almost \$3?

Mr. MATTHEWS. I understand your testimony is that in May and June of this year the membership was roughly 5,000; is that correct?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you during this time, say May and June of this year, publicly or privately claim a much larger membership?

Mr. MASAOKA. We did, on this basis. In, let me say, when we held our last meeting in San Francisco, it was decided at that time to more or less freeze our membership, that is, to continue them on the books for the duration.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What date was that?

Mr. MASAOKA. That would be in March 1942.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean, you decided just to say that you had 20,000 members whether you did or did not?

Mr. MASAOKA. We had them on the books at that time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, when did you drop them from the books?

Mr. MASAOKA. We never have. The 5,000 which I refer to are the paid memberships as of date.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, at that point I would like to introduce in evidence a record which was obtained by subpoena on June 11 from the headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League, a folder which is marked "J. A. C. L. membership," and ask the witness to identify it if he can.

Mr. MASAOKA. I have never examined them individually, but I do know that we received them.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, there are 36 pages of names here. Each page is headed "Membership list," and then under it "Active members division." There are 36 pages with 15 names to the page; approximately 1,800 names.

Also the committee obtained a list entitled "J. A. C. L. Associate Membership List for 1943." Would you identify that?

Mr. MASAOKA. Again, I can recognize it generally.

Mr. STRIPLING. There are approximately 600 names on that list. There are 1,800 actual members and 600 associate members, according to the records of the organization.

Mr. MASAOKA. May I say I do not believe those records are complete.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where is it that you have a membership roll which includes 20,000 names?

Mr. MASAOKA. That would be somewhere in San Francisco.

Mr. MUNDT. Any particular place in San Francisco? Do you have an office there?

Mr. MASAOKA. We had an office. It is stored somewhere now.

Mr. MUNDT. Who would know where it was stored?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe possibly our national treasurer would, or national president.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you put their names in the record at this point, and the addresses?

Mr. MASAOKA. Their present address?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. Saburo Kido and Hito Okada, Beason Building, Salt Lake City.



May I say this for the record, at the time of the evacuation there was much confusion. Many of the records were lost. These may be among them.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the organization consider those who had ceased paying dues, members?

Mr. MASAOKA. As paying members, yes, naturally.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, what do your bylaws and constitution specify as to the requirements for membership in that regard?

Mr. MASAOKA. Let me see. I believe you have the constitution here. May I quote from it?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you are familiar with the stipulation.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I want to be exactly sure of the stipulation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you write a letter to one Dr. Morris Edward Opler on May 13, 1943? I show you a carbon of a letter and ask you if you wrote that. You did?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you write numerous such letters as this; by that I mean, express the same sentiments as are expressed in paragraph 1 of that letter?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not numerous, no. I believe this is the only one of its kind I have written.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The first paragraph of this letter states:

May I take this opportunity to thank you on behalf of the 20,000 members of the Japanese American Citizens League as well as all American citizens of Japanese ancestry in this country for your splendid research work on our problems which were made available to us for our briefs, Amicus Curiae, in behalf of Regan and evacuation cases.

dated May 13, 1943.

You say that you did continue to claim a membership of 20,000 even though you think you actually had about 5,000?

Mr. MASAOKA. Paid membership; I make that distinction.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You admit that so far as your office here was concerned, you had records of only some two or three thousand members, both associate and active; is that right?

Mr. MASAOKA. As of that particular date, perhaps. Now, I never examined them word for word or name by name.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, this was the membership list that you used, was it not; the one you had here in your office?

Mr. MASAOKA. What do you mean by the word "used"?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did you ever send out any communications to your members?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not to those members, specifically.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How is that?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not send out to those members specifically.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you tell the committee why you kept a membership record of this kind? What did you use it for?

Mr. MASAOKA. I didn't use it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, what did you have it in the office for?

Mr. MASAOKA. Just as a matter of information, I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, the information contained therein is that you had approximately 1,800 members.

Mr. MASAOKA. Those were the paid members.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You had approximately 1,800 paid members?

Mr. MASAOKA. At that time from those records it would seem to be so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is the date of that?

Mr. STRIPLING. The associate membership list is marked 1943.

Mr. MASAOKA. Is the date given, sir?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes; it is given, the date on which they all joined, over in the left-hand column.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is when they paid.

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes; all the way through.

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not communicate or use that membership list.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You did not what?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not use that list to communicate with my members, if that is what you mean.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It is the record of the payment of dues; in other words, you had about 1,800 paid-up active members.

Mr. MASAOKA. As of that particular date.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In May of this year.

Mr. MASAOKA. That may be right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. So that your figure of 5,000 is still somewhat an exaggeration, is it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. It may be. I think I would like the explanation beyond that, and I think we might as well be realistic about the whole thing.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I am sure the committee wants to know the measure of authority with which your group has spoken or claimed to speak for Japanese-American citizens.

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that is a very legitimate question, and if I may have the time to describe it without interruption, I think we will be able to get at the point.

There is no group, persons of Japanese ancestry in this country, who is organized to present properly their case, so we feel, except the Japanese American Citizens League. We, at least, have a membership of one kind or another in each of the relocation centers. We believe, thereby, we are best able or more able, let me put it, than any other group to present the cause of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry. Now, is that sufficient? In other words, I am explaining why we feel that we are in a position to represent them better than any other group.

Mr. COSTELLO. Were there other Japanese-American societies other than this one prior to the period of evacuation?

Mr. MASAOKA. There were quite a number of Japanese societies, but not Japanese-American societies.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were various organized American Japanese people.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; but most of those, of course, were concerned with alien Japanese. There were a number of smaller ones concerned with Japanese, too, but they seemed to have gone out of existence at the time of the war.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were very few Japanese-American societies that continued in existence after the start of the war.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am speaking only for the west coast and inter-mountain Japanese. I cannot speak for the East.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know whether or not the meetings at the relocation centers of the J. A. C. L. are confined exclusively to paid

members or whether Japanese generally are permitted to attend the meetings?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that would depend on the relocation centers. I am not too familiar with the procedure there, but at least, those that I have knowledge of, particularly in Topaz and Minidoka, I would say that they are open to the public at large.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Are you sure of that, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, at least when I visited there and visited the membership there—we have no chapters, you see—visited the membership there, everyone was invited to come to air out their problems and discuss ways and means of solving them.

Mr. MATTHEWS. During recent months, while you were still in an administrative position in the organization, you were very much concerned about the small membership, were you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you try to work out some plan or state that you hoped to work out some plan whereby you could make all Japanese-Americans automatically members of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I think all of us have delusions of grandeur at times. We played around with the idea, but discarded it pretty much as being pretty impracticable, especially inasmuch as we would have to take in all manner of people, and a lot of them would not want to come in anyhow, and we would have another problem on our hands.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Your proposal was that they would just be automatically made members.

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have made that kind of proposal in my time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was not that the phrase that you used?

Mr. MASAOKA. It may have been a phrase, but we have never tried to do that in any objective way.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You just thought about trying to do it.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, my job, as most of you gentlemen are acquainted with public relations men, I suppose, is simply to propose ways and means of doing the work. You are thinking about the thing consciously, I would say. I have made a list of proposals which just were made for proposals sake. I think that happens a lot in any democratic society.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the size of the monthly budget of the Japanese American Citizens League, say in March, April, and May of this year?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would not be positive of that. I would have to get those from the records.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, what expenses did you have?

Mr. MASAOKA. My personal expenses?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. What was the budget of the Washington office, for example? What would your outlay per month run at the time?

Mr. MASAOKA. Between three and five hundred dollars per month.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How does that compare with the Salt Lake City office?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is much greater than the Salt Lake City office. You see, I did a lot of traveling to New York, to Chicago, and elsewhere.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were there any other places where you had an office where there would be expense?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, let me say after or just about the time I went into the armed forces an office was created in Denver, Colo.; possibly a little previous to my time. Then an office was created also in Chicago.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Would it be a fair approximation to say that in March, April, and May of this year the organization as a whole was spending six or seven hundred dollars a month?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe those can be obtained from the records.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You said it was five or six hundred dollars in Washington and much less in Salt Lake City.

Mr. MASAOKA. Five or six hundred dollars, that may be. I use the word "may" advisedly. That may be a fair approximation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you say the dues of membership were?

Mr. MASAOKA. \$3.50 for associate members. The Intermountain group—

Mr. MATTHEWS. \$3.50 for associate members?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That, annually?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How much for active members?

Mr. MASAOKA. It depends on the chapter. What are you driving at: how we arrived at our finances?

Mr. MATTHEWS. How you got your money, yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. All right. That is much easier to explain than break it down, I think. The Intermountain District Council, composed of approximately 10 chapters contributed \$10,000 voluntarily to our treasury this year. In addition, a number of our chapters, Seattle and otherwise, had some moneys left over in their treasury, which they turned over to us.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did they get the \$10,000? Did they get that from dues or through subscriptions from persons other than members?

Mr. MASAOKA. They largely got it through contributions from their own membership as well as other nonmembers.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where were the dues paid, only to chapters, or did dues come into the national headquarters?

Mr. MASAOKA. Dues came into national headquarters from the chapters as well as from the individual associate members.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In your earlier testimony you used an expression something like this: You said, "Most of us American citizens of Japanese ancestry are loyal Americans."

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I take it you recognize that there is a problem involving some who are not.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I think that is true of any nationality group.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, let us get at your own testimony. Was not that the problem which led to the decision of the Army to evacuate persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast?



Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that is a problem for the military to answer.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, have you not discussed that frequently in your correspondence as an executive of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. Nevertheless, now I am a member of the armed forces. I don't believe I am at liberty to discuss my private views on the matter.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, wholly apart, from the reasons for evacuation, you recognize that there is a problem involving the national safety of this country, which arises out of the disloyalty of, let us say, a certain portion, without trying to determine what that portion is, of American citizens of Japanese ancestry; that is correct, is it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think we are all aware of the fact that within any racial group or within any group of any Americans, of any extraction, there going to be the loyal and the disloyal.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, at the Poston relocation center, out of some three or four thousand Nisei, that is, Americans of Japanese ancestry who were asked to sign a statement expressing their loyalty to the United States, were there not 630 who refused to express their loyalty to this country?

Mr. MASAOKA. That was, again, a procedure for the War Department. It was a policy and program of the War Department.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You are aware of the fact, are you not, that 630 out of three or four thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to express any loyalty to this country?

Mr. MASAOKA. I know there were a number. I am not aware of the particular specific figure; no.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you know it was appropriately that, do you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I can't say.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony in Los Angeles would indicate that that was approximately the number.

Mr. MASAOKA. I think there was testimony before the Chandler committee and others to indicate that figure.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That was the figure at the Poston camp on that matter. Well, now, Mr. Masaoka, if that proportion existed generally, let us say, among all Americans, as you have compared Japanese with this country, this country would be lost, would it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. That, again, I would have to pass off to the military.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, if 20 percent of the people, of the citizens of the United States refused to express any loyalty to this country, the country would be in a very bad situation.

Mr. MASAOKA. This is just a personal thought of my own. It may not have any bearing, relevancy, or anything to the case. I would like to say this, as far as I know, the records of the F. B. I., the Military Intelligence and all the other groups do not indicate a subversive activity upon the part of the Japanese.

Now, on the part of the other alien nationalities there have been acts, convictions, and indictments of these people; none against persons of Japanese ancestry.

Now, this is just expressing a thought. Perhaps the Japanese Americans and others are pretty loyal, I mean, pretty honest, you

know, if they express whether they are going to be loyal or not, and, therefore, they become a less dangerous group than any other group because they are willing to state one way or another as to how they feel to this country. And, I may say this, that many of the people feel as they do because, if you please, of the evacuation, of the conditions within the camps, and the things they have been subjected to after evacuation.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that the feeling at the time of evacuation, or a feeling that developed subsequent to evacuation?

Mr. MASAOKA. Both. I think it was a collection of many things.

Mr. COSTELLO. You think it was the general feeling of most of the Japanese at the time of the evacuation that, generally, it was for their own good and for their own safety?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is a rather difficult question to answer.

Mr. COSTELLO. The general expression seemed to be that most of the Japanese at the time of evacuation felt that they were better off being removed from the Pacific coast area, for various reasons; that should there be any attack by Japan the Japanese would be suspected, and being removed from the coastal area, they would not be. Likewise, the people on the coast, in view of the war and the manner in which it started, displayed a bitter attitude toward the Japanese people; they were insulted and threatened, and so, for their own protection, they felt they would be better off if they were evacuated from the Pacific coast territory.

Mr. MASAOKA. Of course, on that stand, the Army and the Government of the United States requested, in fact, ordered, this. We, as good, patriotic Americans, interested in the war effort, made it no less than to comply.

Mr. COSTELLO. My thought was, at the beginning, at the time of the evacuation there was a feeling of satisfaction with the program of evacuation, and that any dissatisfaction that they felt toward it was a feeling that has developed subsequent to the period of evacuation, and it developed principally in the relocation centers where they have been congregated together.

Do you care to express any opinion of your own in that regard?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir; I would not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think, in regard to the Japanese group, that the question of dual citizenship arises there which materially affects them as a minority as compared with any other minority?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir; I would not. I would say, and research would indicate, that all countries, except the Anglo-Saxon countries, I believe, and two or three others, have a system of dual citizenship which is comparable or more stringent than the Japanese regulations of dual citizenship.

I believe that Japan is the only world power which has taken an overt action on its own part to discourage dual citizenship, really. As we know of the law of December 1, 1924, no person born to Japanese citizens anywhere in the world or, rather, in certain stipulated countries, including the United States, would be considered a citizen of Japan if, unless within 5 days, I believe—I am not sure of the figure—unless within 5 days after birth the parents did not register them with the Japanese Consulate.

The rules of other countries, insofar as Germans and Italians and Englishmen—not Englishmen, pardon me, but most European countries, are far more rigid than that of Japan.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it not a fact that quite a large number of Japanese on the Pacific coast did register their children with the consulate, or the authorities?

Mr. MASAOKA. We do not believe so. The difficulty is, of course, that you cannot prove anything on that, because the Japanese consulate either destroyed or hid the records. My personal opinion is they are not, for the simple reason that the older or second generation group grew, the further and further it went from Japan, the less interested they were in matters of that kind.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Japanese American Citizens League, I believe, obtained a census of the evacuees in the United States centers, did it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. In the various centers?

Mr. COSTELLO. The relocation centers.

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall the census being taken.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was my understanding that a census was taken, and I believe that question was asked of those who registered in the census as to dual citizenship, and I think it was expressed in an exhibit here before the committee, in which the first list of names indicates that all of them were dual citizens, in response to that specific question, and the answer was "yes" right down the line.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am not acquainted with that particular exhibit.

Mr. COSTELLO. I just wondered to what degree that was true.

Mr. MASAOKA. If I could see that exhibit, possibly I could explain it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have a question, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I have a report dated September 19, 1942, which is signed "Dog Tiredly Mike," to the national headquarters, addressed to Mr. Saburo Kido and George Inagaki. Do you recognize this report?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Page 2 of this report reads as follows:

Kido's letter of September 9—

Kido is the president of the J. A. C. L.; is that right?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. The letter continues:

I've been waiting for your report on the meeting which you held to organize impatiently. The War Relocation Authority has given us the "go ahead" signal but we must submit our complete step-by-step plans in detail before we can actually move ahead. While Kido is thinking in long-time terms, when he suggests that the original membership might be exclusive, from the standpoint of my work we've got to get as many members as humanly possible and as fast as we possibly can. Our biggest talking point is our membership—so, please work out a plan for getting members or some scheme whereby all American citizens over 18 of Japanese ancestry are automatically members. I've got to get in my plans for the J. A. C. L. to Myer right away, but I haven't heard from any of the groups, and this includes Kido.

One paragraph down you state:

I'd much rather know how the fellows in the centers feel about it all, but I can't let Myer know that our own membership doesn't cooperate with us on the outside.

Now, Mr. Masaoka, coming back to the first portion which I read, you stated that—

The War Relocation Authority has given us the go-ahead signal but we must submit our complete step by step plans in detail before we can actually move ahead.

What did you have reference there?

MR. MASAOKA. The W. R. A., at the time that it began its program, was willing to permit any organization to work within its side provided that it was a normal function of the Japanese committee; in other words, they were attempting to simulate normal conditions within the camp as much as possible.

Here again I must allude to the fact that I get over-enthusiastic at times, as people will if they work for the organization, and possibly did exaggerate certain reports.

MR. STRIPLING. Had you represented to Mr. Myer, the Director of War Relocation Authority, that you were representing 20,000 Japanese American citizens or that you were representing a majority of the people who were interned.

MR. MASAOKA. "Interned" is not the proper word.

MR. COSTELLO. The majority of those Japanese who had been evacuated.

MR. MASAOKA. The majority in his camp; yes, I believe I did.

MR. STRIPLING. You led him to believe that you represented them.

MR. MASAOKA. Yes. Now, when he said that the plan had to be submitted to him, that was not an order or anything else of the sort.

MR. STRIPLING. What about your plan here?

Our biggest talking point is our membership—so please work out a plan for getting members or some scheme whereby all American citizens over 18 of Japanese ancestry are automatically members. I've got to get in my plans for the Japanese American Citizens League to Myer right away, but I haven't heard from any of the groups, and this includes Kido.

MR. MASAOKA. That was never carried out.

MR. STRIPLING. Well, there was no indication it was carried out, but it was a scheme of yours. How do you explain such a scheme on your part?

MR. MASAOKA. It was just a statement. I had no way of doing it, or anything of that sort.

MR. STRIPLING. You were, apparently, representing yourself as an agent, so to speak, for 20,000 people when, as a matter of fact you were representing at the most 2,000.

MR. MASAOKA. I disagree with that.

MR. STRIPLING. What do you mean when you say—

While Kido is thinking in long time terms when he suggests that the original membership might be exclusive, from the standpoint of my work—

MR. MASAOKA. Well, what does he mean?

MR. STRIPLING. That you did not represent the original membership.

MR. MASAOKA. No. Mr. Kido's ideas always have been that J. A. C. L. shall be a very restricted group, possibly comparable to a civic idea, military, or something else. He wanted a select group. I was more interested in a representative group.

MR. MATTHEWS. What do you understand by the phrase "fanatical Americanism"?



Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that would depend upon the circumstances of the case.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did you ever say that any individual was dangerous because he was fanatical about Americanism, or do you recall having said that?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have said it in connection with certain individuals. If you could give me the name, possibly I can explain what I mean.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I have here a letter dated January 14, 1943, addressed to Joe Kanazawa, signed "Mike," and ask you if that is your signature?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is my signature.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You recognize this letter, do you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On the second page of this letter the following sentence appears:

Slocum is dangerous because he is fanatical about Americanism.

Now, what did you have in mind in that particular instance about being fanatic about Americanism?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I believe that there were certain people in this country, and not necessarily any certain individual but many individuals, who have used the war and Americanism for their own or other selfish interests. I personally believe that we cannot fight for Americanism and the "four freedoms" abroad and destroy it here at home. I believe that certain peoples use un-American tactics to arrive at what they believe to be un-American ends.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is what you mean by being fanatical about Americanism?

Mr. MASAOKA. Possibly.

Mr. COSTELLO. You meant, when you used the word "dangerous" there, that he was dangerous?

Mr. MASAOKA. You mean to explain what the word "dangerous" in that particular sentence means?

Mr. COSTELLO. I want to know what you had in mind when you used the expression "he is dangerous"; you said "Slocum is dangerous because he is fanatical about Americanism."

Mr. MASAOKA. I think we should say that he was possibly dangerous to the intentions of the organization. In other words, I have no brief or, rather, let me put it this way: I think that there is no question of the sincerity or the patriotic Americanism of the person in question, but I do believe, and I say so sincerely, that some of the methods that he uses do not smack of Americanism as such.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you please specify what those methods are which are un-American?

Mr. MASAOKA. He, for example, or the person in question—I think we all have the same party in mind.

Mr. MUNDT. May I inquire, who is the person you have in mind?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Slocum. It is in the record.

Mr. MUNDT. All right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Tokio Slocum.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Tokio Slocum.

Mr. MASAOKA. As I said before, I think that no one questions his sincere Americanism. However, he oftentimes, too, legitimately or

otherwise, becomes friendly, using his friendship, and so on, and then "boom." The result has not always been fair.

Mr. STRIPLING. Fair to whom?

Mr. MASAOKA. Just fair. I just use the term "fair."

Mr. STRIPLING. What do you mean, fair to your organization or fair to you personally, or fair to the country or the Government?

Mr. MASAOKA. Let us put it both ways, fair to me and to the organization.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, now, just a minute. Do you say that any American citizen of Japanese ancestry who disagreed with the policies of the Japanese American Citizens League and opposed those policies is guilty of un-American practice?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, no.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you said his methods were un-American.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is, to my thinking.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, what methods, for example?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I think that is more of an expression which we use than actual step-by-step movement.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, "un-American" would ordinarily apply to something dangerous to this country, would it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; ordinarily it would imply that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, is not that the sense in which you used the expression?

Mr. MASAOKA. After all, when you write, you are not too careful of the language used, and so on.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, Mr. Masaoka, this expression as contained in this particular letter indicates to my mind something entirely different. You state he is dangerous because he is fanatic about Americanism. Now, I get the inference from that that he is to be watched; you better not deal with him, because he is too American; he is fanatical about being an American, and because of that fact we have got to watch him. The implication I would get from a statement of that kind is that maybe your organization is not American, and you are afraid of him because he is American. Now, that is the conclusion I draw from the words you use.

Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Congressman, may I ask this question?

Mr. STRIPLING. On that point, Mr. Chairman, further in this letter Mr. Masaoka ends up by saying that Mr. Inagaki and Mr. Kanazawa should—

work together to see that he does not jeopardize the future of the Japanese in this country by his sincere and misguided efforts.

You use the language "the future of the Japanese." You do not say "Japanese Americans" there.

Mr. MASAOKA. No; generally we use that to mean Japanese.

Mr. STRIPLING. Your own letterhead has "Japanese American," which you use in your correspondence.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, generally the Japanese.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, what do you mean by "his sincere and misguided efforts"?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I have always been under the impression, as have many others, that Mr. Slocum believes that the great majority of the Japanese—and I understand that this is an erroneous impres-

sion now, that before the Chandler committee, as well as elsewhere, he said that the great majority of the Japanese were loyal. Well, it was my impression that he made the other statement previously, and therefore I used the term "misguided."

MR. EBERHARTER. Mr. Costello made a statement here as to his opinion what the witness meant by the term "fanatical about Americanism." Now, I think it would be proper for the witness to answer that statement.

MR. MASAOKA. I don't believe that the Japanese American Citizens League, as far as I know, is subversive or un-American. I believe we have gone to great length to prove our Americanism; as far as the national organization is concerned, I believe there has never been any evidence, at least since I took active part in its administration, which would indicate a tie with Japan or desire on our part to see Japan win.

MR. COSTELLO. You can readily see that this particular expression which you have used can be interpreted to be just the opposite.

MR. MASAOKA. Well, I can see that anything can be interpreted the way desired.

MR. COSTELLO. I mean, just by reading it. The plain intent of the words is that Slocum is dangerous because he is fanatical about Americanism.

MR. MASAOKA. As I say, Mr. Chairman, oftentimes when you write letters, dictate them off hurriedly, you are not too careful of the selection of words. Now, if that impression is conveyed, I claim and I say for the record that it is entirely erroneous. And, I dare say, as I have said before, as far as I personally am concerned, Mr. Slocum is sincere in his Americanism. I think he has proved it in his records, and I think those of us who are now in the armed forces of the United States would like to equal his brilliant record in the war. That is why a lot of us volunteered in this combat team. We see it as the one chance to prove to all Americans that we are ready to die on the battlefield of war for our country. That is why I volunteered. That is why most of us volunteered. That is why we are going through one of the most rigid training—pardon me. That becomes the War Department again.

But, nevertheless, we are asking this: The Chinese used to ask for a Chinaman's chance against Japan. Today in this country, most of the factors are leveled against us, and so today, if I may use that paraphrased expression, we Americans of Japanese ancestry are asking for that same Chinaman's chance to prove our loyalty and the fact that we want to stay here in this country after the war.

MR. EBERHARTER. Now, Mr. Masaoka, is it your idea that there are people among all the different Americans, Americans of foreign ancestry, who are sincere and honest in their patriotic loyalty to these United States, but that sometimes they carry their pure Americanism so far that they use it for the very purpose of suppressing liberal ideas and suppressing freedom of thought, and by their intense loyalty, in other words, they themselves violate the precept of the Constitution of the United States?

MR. MASAOKA. I think so.

MR. EBERHARTER. Is that what you meant by that expression?

MR. MASAOKA. I believe that is so.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Of course, there is a great difference of opinion in the United States and even in the Congress as to how far we should go in our Americanism?

Mr. MASAOKA. I realize that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Masaoka, I show you a document dated September 19, 1942, a carbon copy of some 15 pages, addressed to national headquarters staff, Saburo Kido, George Inagaki, with the typed signature of "Mike," and ask you please to identify that.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. As a communication which you sent to the national headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you please indicate the persons in government with whom you dealt when you were national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, and I mean by that, with whom you dealt concerning the problems of the Centers and American citizens of Japanese ancestry and other items of interest in your organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. First of all, I would like to explain why we dealt with these groups and why we dealt with other groups. As an American citizen in any democratic country, we believe that it is the right and the privilege of any citizen who represents any group, or even representing himself, if possible, to approach Government officials, including Congressmen and others, to try to suggest their point of view, to present their case, as it were.

That, to me, is the essence of Americanism, when a person of lowly estate, regardless of his nationality, regardless of his race or creed, can approach the lawmakers and the executive at any time and express their point of view.

Now, we were in a tragic position. Because of the war we were placed in an embarrassing spot. Our job, if possible, was to present the case of the loyal Americans that were unsatisfactory to various Government groups. Now, specifically, of course, we contacted the various officials of the W. R. A., Mr. Eisenhower of the O. W. I., and a number of Congressmen and the Justice Department.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You said "Eisenhower." You mean he is now in O. W. I.?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; he is no longer in O. W. I. I believe he is now president of the Kansas State College.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, when you had your contact with him, where was he?

Mr. MASAOKA. My original contacts were with him in San Francisco when he was the regional director of the W. R. A. and later on, of course, I kept up contacts in Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say you contacted some of the Congressmen also?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you care to state the names of the Congressmen you contacted?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, Senator Thomas and Senator Murdock.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you ever contact any of those from the Pacific Coast States?



Mr. MASAOKA. Congressman Tolan.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, that was in connection with the hearing, was it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; and I contacted members of his committee here in Washington, that is, Dr. Lamb and others.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did not make any effort to contact any of the members of the three Pacific Coast States regarding conditions in relocation centers or in the handling of the Japanese problem, did you?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not as an individual. I thought it would not be too well received, shall I put it that way?

Now, many of these contacts were made indirectly too; in other words, my job was to try to get as many people as possible interested in this problem. I tried to do the job to the best of my ability, because I thought that by showing a democracy could work, even after the tragic episode, after evacuation, to prove to all the people in Asia, particularly, that America was sincere in their statement concerning the "four freedoms" for everybody.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In line with this discussion, this subject, I show you a copy of the minutes of the special conference of the national staff which bears the signature of Utako Takasu. Can you identify those minutes?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The answer is "Yes."

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The minutes read in part as follows:

Informal meeting was started at 8 p. m. National Secretary Mike Masaoka started the meeting by giving a brief report of his thoughts and ideas regarding our work in the East. Mike Masaoka is convinced that we must maintain somebody in Washington all the time. It was for the reason that the hearts of all the Japanese people lie in our hands. He has met Chief Justice Stone, Mrs. Roosevelt, Attorney General Biddle, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and Sumner Welles; also Senator Thomas and Senator Murdock.

Did you meet all those persons?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean that answer to stand the way you have given it; that you put that in the letter that you met them and that you state to the committee that you may or may not have.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I do.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not recall whether you actually met each of the persons named?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is right, at that particular time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know how many of them you did actually meet?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I do not.

Mr. MUNDT. How long ago was this letter written, Doctor?

Mr. MATTHEWS. August 17, last year.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, will you recall for the record, Mr. Masaoka, how many of these persons you can now recall?

Mr. MASAOKA. Now, let me put it this way. Many of these people we may have met indirect; in other words, we had our people contact them concerning their views.

Mr. MUNDT. And heard them?

Mr. MASAOKA. Many of these people we may have met indirect; other people may have contacted them for their views regarding somebody.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you contact any of them personally?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, yes. May I see that list again?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. Take Chief Justice Stone, for example.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I contacted him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mrs. Roosevelt.

Mr. MASAOKA. I met her.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Attorney General Biddle?

Mr. MASAOKA. I met him indirectly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What do you mean by "indirectly"?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think other people approached him on the subject.

Mr. MUNDT. You did not meet him personally?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Secretary Stimson?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir. I got his views indirectly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Secretary Knox?

Mr. MASAOKA. The same thing is true of Knox and Welles.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You could have extended this list to include thousands of people, could you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; in other words, being overenthusiastic.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You got the views of thousands of people without meeting them.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, in the next sentence you say, "they have all been very interested and helpful but wish to avoid any publicity."

Is that not a rather serious statement to make when you had not met them in the first place, to quote them indirectly, as wanting to avoid publicity, when there was no occasion for publicity?

Mr. MASAOKA. The general problem was touchy at the time and it still is.

Mr. MATTHEWS. As a matter of fact, were you not trying to impress your national organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. All right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. With having done things that you had not done?

Mr. MASAOKA. All right; let us put it that way. I am willing to accept that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well now, did some of these persons indicate to you that they wanted to avoid publicity, and if so, what publicity?

Mr. MASAOKA. In this particular problem, when the Japanese Americans and other groups were put on the spot, it was felt that they could more effectively work if they were not too closely associated with persons of Japanese ancestry. I believe that was the thought behind unfavorable publicity.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean some of them told you that?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. At that time was Mrs. Roosevelt trying to avoid publicity? You do not have to answer that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I do not know whether I asked you if you met Sumner Welles. Did you?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. As a matter of fact, you only met two of the persons on that list; is that right?

Mr. MASAOKA. That may be right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Chief Justice Stone and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Mr. MASAOKA. I met also Senators Murdock and Thomas.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you have frequent contacts with Mr. Dillon Myer of the W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. We were trying to cooperate with him to the best of our ability, because we felt that they were the most logical agency to which we could appeal.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did your so-called cooperation with the W. R. A. extend to the lengths of your determining W. R. A. policies?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, no. I think that that was just a phrase to impress, again, the national office.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive from Mr. Myer highly confidential directives which were issued by the W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think I may have sent them on to Salt Lake as highly confidential, but I believe they were a matter of public record, once they become a directive of a public agency.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you state that they were not documents for public use?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall making a statement one way or the other regarding that, but I do know, for example, that their employment policy October 1 of last year, originally issued as a directive, became a part of the public register—is that what they call it, or Congressional Register?

Mr. COSTELLO. Federal Register.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, in the document that you have identified as your report to the national headquarters dated September 19, 1942, you wrote in part as follows:

A word about the directives. We have got a lot more but they have to deal with the administration itself, and so we are not enclosing copies of them. All are most confidential and we were lucky to get them ourselves. So please be careful of their use.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, you know how it is if you want a secret kept—I mean, not kept—and wanted to prove your effectiveness, you always say "confidential."

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you mean by this report, when you touched on that subject, that you wanted your national office to broadcast the information?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, they could get them anyway; in other words, most of those were carried in news stories and releases. We received them much later than the other people received them. We received them in packets afterward, after they were generally distributed to the people that the W. R. A. distributed them to.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it not a fact that you received these directives ahead of schedule?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. You got these directives before they were released from the camps?

Mr. MASAOKA. We never received them before they were released from the camps.

Mr. COSTELLO. What did you mean by the statement in there that you were lucky to get them? That they were very confidential?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, we were lucky to get them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, if they were going to be released to the centers they were not public property.

Mr. MASAOKA. They were released to center project directors later. I understand they were released through public agencies and private agencies interested in the same problem, but so far as we were concerned, we were very lucky to get them.

Mr. STRIPLING. The fact that they were sent to the project directors would not mean that they were released; that they were public documents.

Mr. MASAOKA. Most of these had been carried later on.

Mr. STRIPLING. Later on, of course, but not at the time.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, we received them late, too. Never did we receive a document of this nature before it was released to the project directors.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do I understand, when you used the word "confidential" here that you meant to inspire your associates to release them and broadcast them?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not necessarily. You see, I acted in two capacities when I turned in these reports, one as the national secretary, at which time, of course, I would try to express to the national headquarters the good work that I was doing; and, secondly, as a reporter for the Pacific Citizen, which is a weekly bulletin issued by our organization.

Now, by steadying these things, the Pacific Citizen itself would be prepared for the different trends which might arise.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Mr. Kido and Mr. Inagaki understand your technique in reporting to them?

Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Kido on many public occasions has accused me of being quite an exaggerationist; in fact, he often said that if he could shoot the bull like I could, why he would be a much more successful attorney.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You consider yourself a pretty good lobbyist, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir; I have failed in many ways.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you follow the practice generally followed by lobbyists in Washington?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am not a lobbyist. I never had enough money to be. I never studied their technique or anything else. I was then a young fellow trying to present the case of the Japanese Americans. I have never been taken under the wings of any of the so-called high-priced lobbyists or anything else of the sort.

Mr. COSTELLO. Not all of the lobbyists are high-priced.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I received \$75 a month for my work to begin with, gentlemen.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you think that you were successful in impressing Mr. Myer with what you call "shooting the bull"?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe Mr. Myer recognized that I had a tendency toward that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In other words, you think you were not successful.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, not successful in what?

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, he asked you whether you were successful in impressing Mr. Myer.

Mr. MASAOKA. We discussed many matters of policy with him and presented our views. In some cases he agreed; in some cases he dis-



agreed. In many cases we expressed a viewpoint, but his department already dealt with them beforehand.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you think he allowed for your exaggerations and therefore dismissed the suggestions accordingly?

Mr. MASAOKA. Possibly, and very probably.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether he did or not.

Mr. MASAOKA. Most of the policies which he formulated he formulated with the aid of his department alone.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you do not know whether he took your statement to him at its full face value, or whether he possibly dismissed it as being exaggeration.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I would like to state for the record a moment, the W. R. A. has a difficult job as it is, as all of you can well appreciate, and that they are doing their job very well, considering the difficulties under which they labor.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, we concede it is quite difficult to transplant a hundred thousand people—men, women, and children, whole families—and relocate them in new surroundings and new locations. But, do you feel that the operation and management of the centers and the handling of discipline, and questions of that kind are such as to be beneficial to the Japanese people located there.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, on many minor items, possibly no, but generally speaking, I think the supervision and the government of the camps has been remarkable. Occasionally, of course, we get very mad about minor incidents and raise all kinds of hell, to use that expression, but over long-time terms, and looking it over broadly and as sanely as possible, I think you can't escape the conclusion that they have done a remarkable job.

Mr. STRIPLING. According to your knowledge of the W. R. A. and its policies, what is your opinion of the present plan of releasing 1,000 evacuees a week for resettlement?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that is a good program.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you think that they should be released without any check having been made on them?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think a proper check should be made.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether a check is being made or not?

Mr. STRIPLING. What do you consider to be a proper check?

Mr. MASAOKA. Your question was what?

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether any check is being made or not?

Mr. MASAOKA. At the present time?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes; of those who are being released.

Mr. MASAOKA. I do not; because I have not been in contact with them. I presume that they are being checked either by the projects or through checks with the F. B. I. files, or some other check.

Mr. MUNDT. I wish he would answer the question you asked.

Mr. MASAOKA. Will you repeat that question, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. What do you consider to be a proper check?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think the people in that kind of work would be in a better position to answer that than I.

Mr. STRIPLING. You mean the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MASAOKA. Possibly.

Mr. STRIPLING. On that point, do you consider Mr. Myer to be a person properly qualified to determine whether or not a Japanese or Japanese-American would be loyal?

Mr. MASAOKA. He has the facilities and agencies to determine it.

Mr. STRIPLING. What agency do you have in mind?

Mr. MASAOKA. Possibly the Federal Bureau of Investigation, W. R. A.'s own investigative staff, Military Intelligence.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know what type of investigation F. B. I. makes of an evacuee when he is about to be resettled?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I understood, if I recall correctly, that they were checked against the files of the F. B. I., is that correct; something of that sort?

Mr. MUNDT. Would you consider that an adequate check, if that is true that they check the Japanese against the files of the F. B. I.? Would you consider that complete and adequate?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. In other words, I believe that the F. B. I. is probably as competent and as qualified as any agency in the world to determine the loyalty, the subversive activities, or otherwise of any individual.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel that the F. B. I. has presently in its files a list of all the disloyal Japanese in America?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe if they have not, they are in a position to obtain it.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many names have you submitted to the F. B. I. of disloyal Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is putting me on the spot, but I can refer you to the Salt Lake City office on that.

Mr. STRIPLING. As a matter of fact, were you not called in by the San Francisco office of the F. B. I. and asked why you had not given them more names?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was by the San Francisco office; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well that does not tie in with what you said earlier in your testimony that you had assisted the Government.

Mr. MASAOKA. All right. You can check that with the Naval Intelligence in San Francisco.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you did not give any names to the F. B. I. and they called you in.

Mr. MASAOKA. We were working more with the Naval Intelligence than the F. B. I. at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, for the general welfare now of the Japanese, you do not think it would be a good policy for the War Relocation Authority to release Japanese-Americans without some form of check on them, do you?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is my firm conviction that the average Japanese-American is loyal.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you be willing for him to be released without a check?

Mr. MASAOKA. Unless he had something against his record. There should be some check. Yes; there should be some check.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you protest if you knew that they were being released, and in doing so it would jeopardize the status of the loyal Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that would depend pretty much on the larger program of the W. R. A.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, it was pointed out earlier in the testimony that at Poston 693 Japanese-Americans signed questionnaire No. 27 of the Army, in which they stated that they were not loyal to this Government.

Mr. MASAOKA. Those people certainly should not be permitted to get out; neither should those who ask for expatriation.

Mr. STRIPLING. For that very reason you feel that a check should be made?

Mr. MASAOKA. Some sort of check; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that your personal opinion or the policy of the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is my personal opinion.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then the J. A. C. L. has a definite policy in respect to the question just asked by Mr. Stripling?

Mr. MASAOKA. The policy of the J. A. C. L. in that regard has always been that upon proper check the future welfare or the welfare of those loyal Americans already out, would not be jeopardized. Every care and precaution should be taken—reasonable care and precaution—should be taken to see that only those who are qualified, not only for loyalty but also by talent and skill, should be permitted to be released.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that has been the policy of the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, yes. We have always advocated a system of release based upon their ability to sustain themselves or otherwise.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you make those representations to anybody on the W. R. A. staff?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think they were.

Mr. EBERHARTER. As the position of the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think they were made in an original statement to Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower at the very beginning of the W. R. A.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I would like to ask one question. You understand, do you not, Mr. Masaoka, what you call a check of an individual against the F. B. I. files is in no sense an investigation of that particular individual? Do you not understand that? At best it would be merely a negative finding.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, that is the way the ordinary American citizen is also permitted to roam about, is it not? Americans of Japanese ancestry are entitled to the same privilege.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Let us take the 630 at Poston.

Mr. MASAOKA. But you already have those, because you have the 600 definite names.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, I want to ask you a question about the 630. They were individuals who were willing to declare themselves in writing as being disloyal to this country.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you assume that all of the others who declared loyalty did so in good faith?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would assume that the majority did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Would you not, on the contrary, assume that some of the most disloyal individuals would declare their loyalty in order to be in a position to carry out their disloyalty?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would go one step further, Mr. Matthews, and say that if such dangerous persons were there the F. B. I. in all probability.

or they, at least, should have, because of the previous knowledge of their background, and so on, already had a check on those individuals.

Mr. STRIPLING. On that point, Mr. Chairman, this report dated April 26, 1943, from Mr. Masaoka to the national headquarters of the J. A. C. L.—and you recognize this as a copy of one of the official reports?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING (continuing). On page 2 of that report it states:

I had a long chat with Bob Frase about the resettlement program.

What is his title in W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. He is assistant to the Chief of the Employment Division, I think.

Mr. STRIPLING. The report continues:

This department of the War Relocation Authority has grown from the smallest into the largest, at least in the number of workers. Frase tells me that as far as the outside organization is concerned, it is ready to function but that some of the center organizations are still in a very backward state. Holland remains as the chief employment officer with Frase as his chief assistant. A fellow by the name of Sabin was brought in to handle the agricultural end of resettlement and Dave McEntire is visiting the centers to improve upon their organization. The latter two are also assistant chiefs. This is strictly off the record but the project directors alone now have the power to issue indefinite furloughs. They do not need a Federal Bureau of Investigation check. It seems that the prime requisite in determining whether one receives a furlough or not is his answers to questions 27 and 28. This unusual procedure is only a temporary one which will permit the War Relocation Authority here to catch up with the several thousand clearance requests which they now have in the files. Once they catch up, they will again resort to the former procedure of a Federal Bureau of Investigation clearance, but the project director will have the power to issue the furlough in cases of cleared individuals without referring them back to Washington, as previously.

If fellows like Sim Togasaki and George Ohashi take up the matter of their furloughs directly with their project director, they should be able to obtain them without trouble. It is impossible to check their status here because the filing system has not yet been set up whereby easy check can be made on the thousands of applications now pending.

Is that information, as you reported it, substantially true?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe so.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you make any protest to the War Relocation Authority that they had waived the F. B. I. checked and in so doing were jeopardizing the status of all Japanese Americans?

Mr. MASAOKA. To my knowledge I did not.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, you were not concerned as to how lenient the W. R. A. might become in their restrictions?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, they had the answers. There are certain people who already had applied. The people who desired to be dangerous, in most cases, I presume, would have applied to get out so that they could have done sabotage, if possible. Now, these people had already been refused, at least held up, so therefore I believe it was reasonable to assume that the people who answered "Yes" or "No" did so honestly and were not the dangerous nature.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel that the disloyal ones are only dangerous in that they might commit sabotage?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I believe the most dangerous thing which they can do now in relocation centers is to poison the minds of the loyal groups.



Mr. COSTELLO. You think they are more dangerous, so far as the safety and welfare of the country is concerned, if they carry on espionage work, which does not smack of sabotage, and forward that information to the enemy?

Mr. MASAOKA. Let me see if I follow you correctly. The question asked is about espionage, where they might get information to forward to the enemy. That may be true if they could obtain information, which I can't see how they can do in relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am not talking about those in the centers; I mean after they were released from the centers.

Mr. MASAOKA. I see. Whether that would be the most dangerous thing they could do or not? I imagine it would be.

Mr. COSTELLO. I mean, the big thing that has always been thrown up all along is that there has been no sabotage of any kind.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. They have not found any instances; at least, they allege there were none in Hawaii and other Pacific areas. The contrary situation, of course, existed in the Philippines. To my mind, the possibility of espionage is just as dangerous to the welfare of the country in the conduct of the war as is sabotage; perhaps even more so. I believe if any disloyal person were allowed to roam freely throughout the country, where he could carry on the work of espionage, he perhaps could do more damage than if he would blow up a factory or something of that kind.

Mr. MASAOKA. May I state there have been no cases or accusation of espionage against persons released. It seems to me persons of Japanese ancestry, by their very distinguishable physical characteristics, are more easily singled out of any group, more easily watched, more easily investigated than any other individual, and if the Japanese Government is as smart as we contend they are, it would seem to me that they would not use persons of Japanese ancestry to do their espionage and sabotage; the chances are too great.

Mr. COSTELLO. They might use some of their own nationality to obtain the information and pass it on to other persons, and under certain conditions, where the person's nationality might be a deterrent, use other means. As a matter of fact, to make indiscriminate releases, it seems to me, of all Japanese persons, to allow them in any type of work or industry in any place they might desire, makes it possible for them to have access to information.

For example, we had the situation, as you recall it, in Los Angeles, where persons of Japanese ancestry obtained positions with the metropolitan water district there, which gave them information which the Japanese Government had been endeavoring to obtain, which had been denied to the representatives of the Japanese Government. And, once the Japanese nationals, or persons of Japanese ancestry, obtained their positions with the metropolitan water district, the Government of Japan undoubtedly got the information; at least, they ceased requesting the information from that time on.

Mr. MASAOKA. Could not that be mere coincidence?

Mr. COSTELLO. It might be mere coincidence, but the requests were made over a period of several years, and once the persons of Japanese ancestry obtained their positions with the Metropolitan Water Dis-

strict the requests ceased and were never requested at any time subsequently.

Under the present program, with persons of Japanese ancestry being released, they are also being placed in various positions around the country where, undoubtedly, they are going to obtain information which may be of value to the enemy.

Mr. MASAOKA. I would like to give one or two ideas of my own on the subject. As far as the Los Angeles water situation is concerned, I don't believe I am concerned enough with the process to dispute one way or another, but I would like to say simply that we have regular investigative channels to look into that situation.

As far as the W. R. A. resettlement program is concerned, the great majority, the bulk of them, have been placed in unskilled labor jobs. Very few, if any at all, in relocation centers have been placed in highly skilled defense work; very few.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is not a case of having to be in a position where highly skilled ability is required; in other words, to obtain information you can get it through conversation, through hearsay, through various contacts, so it is not necessary that you have to be in a port of embarkation, that is, the harbor of New York, for instance, to find out what troops are going out. You might get that information here in Washington by being employed as a governor or as a waiter, by overhearing conversations of some who happen to know about what troops are going out.

Mr. MASAOKA. Wouldn't that also apply to other persons?

Mr. COSTELLO. Very definitely. It applies to everybody. But the point we are trying to raise here is that a proper check-up undoubtedly is not being made of the Japanese who are being released, and the things that have just been read there indicate that an F. B. I. check-up was not to be made.

Mr. MASAOKA. Temporarily.

Mr. COSTELLO. And apparently that meets with your approval, from the statements made here. Actually, the F. B. I. check-up was not an investigation of the Japanese who were about to be released, but was merely a check against their files as to whether they had any record or not.

Mr. MASAOKA. It was my understanding that the F. B. I. had a complete dossier of almost everybody of Japanese ancestry in this country.

Mr. COSTELLO. I thought perhaps you could give us some information on that.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Masaoka, I thought you said a little while ago that you were rather well satisfied with the administration of the project centers; with the Japanese program by W. R. A.; in fact, I thought you said, considering the numerous difficulties which had arisen and which we all recognize, it is doing a remarkably good job; is that correct?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Which would indicate that you have no particular criticism to make of their present policies; is that right?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I have a number. I would like to state them, if I may.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to have you state them.

Mr. MASAOKA. One, I believe, they are not getting out enough Americans of Japanese ancestry.

Mr. COSTELLO. Released, you mean?

Mr. MASAOKA. Released, yes, upon proper check, and I think they ought to step it up; they ought to get them out as fast as possible so that they will not be contaminated, as it were, with this artificial, un-American prison-like concentration camp life. It is not good for Americans of Japanese ancestry.

Mr. COSTELLO. By "contaminated" what do you mean there? Just their presence?

Mr. MASAOKA. The sheer fact of regimentation is bad. It is un-American, where you have to stand in line and get your food; where you have no privacy in your home, as you gentlemen well know from visits to relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. You are not referring to any disloyal activities going on in the centers then?

Mr. MASAOKA. There is some of that, too. And, they must be taken away from that. There are certain Issei, first generation Niseis, and other things of that nature, pro-Japanese influences, from which young Americans who are going to live here after the war should be protected against as far as possible.

Mr. STRIFLING. Do you think they will leave, Mr. Masaoka; will they leave the center?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, that is my fight against the W. R. A. I believe that they should furnish more money for the people to leave.

Mr. MUNDT. Let us have him list his criticisms first and then we can question him further.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that they should be provided with sufficient transportation and other finances to move them to the place where they wish to resettle. At the present time, resettlement is a rich man's resettlement program, because the poor people have spent practically all that they have saved; used it up waiting for the evacuation and in the relocation centers.

It is very much like Army life. They furnish you with a lot of things, but you still have to buy a lot of other knick-knacks, so many of the people who ought to go out are sorely pressed for finances. Although the W. R. A. does provide for finances of a sort today, I don't believe that they are adequate or sufficient.

I believe that the W. R. A. ought to make a more firm and aggressive step in presenting the case of the loyal Japanese Americans to the average American. I don't think that the average American has the true picture of the loyalty and the desires and aspirations of Americans of Japanese ancestry. I think that is very important; that is, the idea of education and explaining what our desires in that are.

Then, of course, center life itself can be improved.

Mr. MUNDT. In what way?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would like to see better educational systems within the schools. I mean, within the various centers. I think that is very important for the future.

I think greater intercourse ought to be made with the outside groups and the outside communities, wherever possible.

My present opinion is that when persons of Japanese ancestry reach high-school age, if at all possible, they ought to be permitted to go



outside to continue their high-school education so that they will have a complete assimilation with the American people.

Well, on the Pacific coast persons of Japanese ancestry were accused of being clannish; yet the very program of W. R. A. has tended to make them even more clannish. And it is no joke when a young person of Japanese ancestry asks his mother, "Mother, when am I going to get out of Japan and back into America?" because a lot of persons of Japanese ancestry who were evacuated had very little association with Japanese people, and suddenly they were thrown among only Japanese or Japanese influences.

I am particularly worried about the social controls which are no longer existing in the relocation centers.

I am particularly worried about the break-downs and the thinking of the persons of Japanese ancestry. They are not living a normal American life, and every effort ought to be made to restore these people to that community, to that normal American life, and so particular stress ought to be laid upon the resettlement of family groups, as much as possible, and not concentrated, as it is at present, on the young men and young women who can go out and forage for themselves, because too many of them are still too young to go out and do it alone.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you mean by that statement to apply it to the Issei, the Nisei, and the Kibei alike?

Mr. MASAOKA. If a check shows that they are loyal, that they desire to remain here in America, I think certainly it should apply to all groups.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you finished your list?

Mr. MASAOKA. Generally; in other words, gentlemen, I have not given this problem too much thought of recent date.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to ask you this question. You have listed four or five recommendations. You have not indicated any criticism of the War Relocation Authority policy, however, which fails to segregate within the camps between the various Japanese, from the standpoint of loyalty and disloyalty. Apparently, you do not feel that that is a serious deficiency in the present W. R. A. policy.

Mr. MASAOKA. I know that the W. R. A. is cognizant of that problem from their studying it. I have confidence that they will work out a satisfactory program.

Mr. MUNDT. What would you consider a satisfactory program?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would have to answer that in generalities, naturally.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me ask you a specific question, then. Do you believe that segregation is part of a satisfactory program?

Mr. MASAOKA. Segregation of some sort, yes, that would give justice and fairness, and possibly have a right of appeal in case of mistake or would take care of family units and others, I think would be possible.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel that the 630 members at Poston, who have indicated that they are not loyal to America, should be immediately segregated from the rest of the Japanese in the camp?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think some consideration should be given as to why the answer was given.

Mr. MUNDT. You think we should coax them into answering in the affirmative?



Mr. MASAOKA. No; but I believe that undue influences may have been exerted or that they misunderstood the program. There again we are going into the War Department prerogatives and privileges.

Mr. MUNDT. Undue influences by whom?

Mr. MASAOKA. By the pro-Japanese group; intimidation and the like.

Mr. MUNDT. In the centers?

Mr. MASAOKA. In the centers.

Mr. MUNDT. Would it not follow therefrom that you should segregate out of these centers into centers of their own all of these pro-Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. We believe and we have always recommended a program of segregation, if a satisfactory program can be worked out.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you recommended that to Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. We have recommended programs of segregation from time to time; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. To Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. What has been his attitude?

Mr. MASAOKA. He has constantly told us that he is working on the subject and working on the program.

Mr. MUNDT. Working in the direction of your recommendations or away from them?

Mr. MASAOKA. That would be rather hard to say. I don't know what his exact program is at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you ever had any indication from him as to what his program is?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe I have. I think it is listed in the records. I don't know the exact details.

Mr. MUNDT. In general, what is your conception of his program from the standpoint of segregation?

Mr. MASAOKA. In general, I believe—now, this is, again, my own thinking as to what he said, according to my own memory. First, those persons who request for, of course, repatriation, should definitely be segregated. Secondly, those who answered "Yes" in these questions should be given serious thought; third, if the administrative details can be worked out, I think segregation based possibly on family units and other units could be worked out. I think those are his general ideas.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you have any conferences with Mr. Myer in the last two or three months in which he has indicated this policy to you, or was that prior to that time?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think it was quite recently that he indicated that his group was seriously working out a program. However, Mr. Myer would be in a better position to tell you than I.

Mr. MUNDT. On April 26, 1943, just a very short time ago, you addressed a letter to the national J. A. C. L. headquarters staff, in which you said specifically: "It is the desire of the W. R. A. to avoid segregation, if possible." That does not jibe very well with what you have said now.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is, not segregation based upon arbitrary, artificial classifications. In other words, for a long time, if you recall, when Mr. Eisenhower was director of the W. R. A., they had a Naval

Intelligence man who was working out an artificial system of segregation based upon whether they were in Japan or not. Now, the present administration is not committed and does not believe in a policy of artificial discrimination or segregation based solely upon the fact that they might have been in Japan or something of that sort. Now, that is what that has reference to.

Mr. MUNDT. I will read the last paragraph. Maybe that will bring out your position.

It is the desire of the War Relocation Administration to avoid segregation, if possible. They would resettle as many as they could and leave the rest in the centers without branding any of them as dangerous or disloyal. Their idea is not shared by congressmen and other Government agencies.

I repeat this sentence:

They would resettle as many as they could and leave the rest in the centers without branding any of them as dangerous or disloyal.

Now, I would not call that exactly an artificial system of segregation.

Mr. MASAOKA. The whole idea, explanation, or point as I see it, I believe by that they meant that they would like to resettle as many people as possible on the outside after being checked properly, and they would be satisfied with the check, as being a sort of segregation. Now, the people who did not go out just stayed there; in other words, they didn't want to go out of their way, to be branded, in a way because of the hysteria of war, as being disloyal or anything of that sort.

Mr. MUNDT. How are you going to avoid branding Japanese disloyal when they refuse to answer?

Mr. MASAOKA. You have that record. You have that record whether it is proper or not, and I think personally it is not proper. The great majority of the American people, because of the failure of governmental agencies and others to explain satisfactorily to the American people the true case of the Japanese Americans—the great majority of people in America have the impression that we are interned because we are disloyal, you see, so that same stigma would remain over.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, the fact is, at the time evacuation was brought out, it was simply evacuation of all Japanese people without any question of loyalty or not.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Prior to evacuation the F. B. I. did have a list of all those whom they felt were disloyal to the country. They picked up Japanese, Germans, Italians, or anybody else, and those were definitely interned. I do not know to what extent differences may exist, although there were definitely the two distinctions made, and they were interned in camps; let me say, entirely separate and distinct.

Mr. MASAOKA. But the average American, by that I mean the people in the streets, particularly in the Midwest and in the East, have not been apprised of that, and I think that is one of the great evils of the program.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not believe possibly the fact that most of those interned at the direction of the F. B. I. have subsequently been released by civilian boards handling the internment camps, and that the Japanese have been allowed to return to relocation centers, has

possibly had an effect in that regard and created the public impression—

Mr. MASAOKA. It is my impression that the same board passed on Germans, Italians, and other people that passed on the Japanese, and if that is true then there is no reason why the matter of race should be held against any individual.

Mr. COSTELLO. But there is confusion in the public mind about that.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. That interned Japanese have been released and allowed to reenter relocation centers, which may be part of the cause of the confusion you speak of?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. As national secretary of the Japanese American Citizens League, you were interested, were you not, in the status of all good Japanese in this country, whether they were American citizens or whether they happened to be immigrants from Japan and could obtain citizenship, provided they were loyal?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. And consequently you were interested in guarding the reputation of all Japanese as local, law-abiding citizens; is that right?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And in the fair attitude toward the Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And consequently, when you discovered the surprising fact that temporarily, because they were needed to fill labor demands, the War Relocation Authority was releasing Japanese to private employment, without any F. B. I. check at all; were you not a little bit despaired that that would redound to the credit of loyal Japanese, if somebody did something wrong?

Mr. MASAOKA. We checked that very carefully and we found there wasn't a single case that the thing you were afraid, the thing you mentioned, occurred.

Mr. MUNDT. Were you not afraid it might happen?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Why did you not then go to Mr. Myer and say: "Look here, we are interested in the Japanese: this is a dangerous policy, because if some rascal does get out and does something wrong, it will discredit all of us?" You say you had that fear; nothing did happen, but you say you had the fear. How did it happen that you did not express that fear to Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. We may not have expressed it to Mr. Myer specifically, but I do recall that we expressed it to people in the W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. You did express it to people in the W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. To my knowledge; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. What was their answer?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think their answer was that they had checked at that time for harvest work, and so forth. I think some check was carried on.

Mr. MUNDT. Not a very careful check; not a complete check with the F. B. I., but more or less a check of the names?

Mr. MASAOKA. My contention is that persons of Japanese ancestry, simply because they were evacuated, are not criminals. I believe they should be treated as decently as possible.

Mr. EBERHARTER. We all agree with that.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes. You refer to the loyal.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. You do not refer to the disloyal?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. We all agree with that position. We are confronted with that difficulty as well as W. R. A. and you, as secretary of J. A. C. L. to determine loyalty and disloyalty.

We feel, and Mr. Slocum felt, and I am wondering whether you do, that in cases like this, with war upon us, with this type of hysteria that you speak of certainly permeating the minds of some people of this country, that if mistakes are to be made, we better make them in the direction of seeing to it that no disloyal get out rather than have five or six or seven disloyal Japanese come back to private employment and discredit by some overt act the reputation of all of the Japs.

Mr. MASAOKA. Possibly, if I may be personal about it, you may be overly concerned; in other words, the records do not seem to indicate that which you are pointing out. Personally, I believe that the record should be permitted to speak for itself.

Mr. MUNDT. Just release all Japanese then until some overt act has been committed?

Mr. MASAOKA. There is a check, as I understand it, the F. B. I. check, and also the check of the project director of W. R. A.; a check which they maintain. If I am not mistaken, W. C. C. A. also has a check or some record of the individual Japanese American. Now, those records are available, open for use.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me see if I summarize your attitude correctly. You apparently agree, then, first of all, that some form of segregation within these camps is desirable?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. To keep the loyal from the disloyal Japs?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You have so recommended to W. R. A. and they have studied the problem but have not yet achieved a formula for doing it?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Consequently, you agree that a very careful check should be made before evacuees are released from camp and determine that only the loyal ones are to be released?

Mr. MASAOKA. A reasonable check.

Mr. MUNDT. And you felt disturbed, as an emissary of good will for the Japanese people, that for a short time, at least, this check had apparently been dropped in order to meet labor demands, and you made a protest to W. R. A. in that connection?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think there is a mistake there. The labor demands came in the harvest season. Now, the letter you refer to specifically was after the harvest. Wasn't that in April?

Mr. COSTELLO. April 26.

Mr. MASAOKA. So that didn't deal with the harvest. At the time of the harvest I think a check was made, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. MUNDT. I am referring to this letter that Mr. Stripling was reading from.

Mr. STRIPLING. That was his report to the national headquarters.

Mr. MASAOKA. It could have been something in the fall.

Mr. MUNDT. What page is that on?



Mr. MASAOKA. I believe there was something last fall on the matter, was there not, Mr. Matthews?

Mr. MURDT. I am reading from your report dated April 26, 1943:

This is definitely off the record, but the project directors alone now have the power to issue indefinite furloughs. They don't need an F. B. I. check.

Now, you answered before that that was a rather dangerous procedure; that you made some protestations to members of the W. R. A.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. I said it is a little dangerous, and so on. I don't recall their exact answer, but I do recall that mention was made.

Mr. MURDT. But you do agree to that?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MURDT. That is what I wanted to find out.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only information which W. R. A. would have on any of these Japanese, so far as their files were concerned, would be from the time they took over control of the centers; would it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is my understanding that they have available also the records of the W. C. C. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, all they would know then generally about the persons in centers would be the records established by those investigations at the time they were evacuated?

Mr. MASAOKA. On the other hand it is my feeling, whether it is correct or not, that all Government agencies ought to work together, certainly the various intelligence services, including F. B. I., should have a very complete record at the time of the outbreak of the war. I don't believe the Federal Bureau of Investigation was asleep at the job.

May I make one statement about the situation, while I can remember that point of view? I was a newcomer to the Pacific coast. I was not in a position to describe the background of these people, especially when I was so busy that I didn't have time to go to the first generation functions, but I refer you specifically to the records in Salt Lake City as to my cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. MURDT. You stated you were affiliated with the Naval Intelligence.

Mr. MASAOKA. I was affiliated with the Naval Intelligence because they were interested in a little different work. Naval Intelligence is interested in the general picture, as I understand it, whereas the F. B. I. is interested in specific cases. Now, I didn't know the specific individuals that the F. B. I. were interested in. I could not help them.

Mr. STRIBLING. Mr. Chairman, on the point that Mr. Masaoka made, that all agencies should work together, let me ask this: Do you also agree that all Japanese should work together?

Mr. MASAOKA. I wish they would; but they don't.

Mr. STRIBLING. Here is a letter, Mr. Chairman, dated September 17, 1942, to Mr. Mamuro Wakasuga, Weiser, Idaho, signed by Mike Masaoka, national secretary. He states [reading]:

I have gone over the entire matter at great length with Mr. Dillon Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, and Mr. Roger Baldwin, director, American Civil Liberties Union. I have also consulted with Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, one of America's foremost educators and liberals, and Victor Rotnem, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice. They are all in agreement that self-imposed curfews and other restrictions of this nature are bad and that they ought to be resisted as much as possible. All are agreed that action from official Washington would in all probability only increase the tension, for should some directive be

issued from the capital ordering the elimination of restrictions, your local groups might resent such action and begin agitation comparable to that which forced evacuation in military area 1.

As a matter of strategy, it seems to me that all of you Japanese Americans and Japanese nationals in your section ought to get together and work out some scheme whereby you would be able to get all the evacuee labor in both the labor camps and relocation centers to agree not to work unless these curbs are done away with. Working on their part is purely voluntary, and it is my guess that their aid will be greatly needed during the coming harvest season. If the sugar-beet interests need helpers bad enough they will see to it that local community pressure is suppressed, just as they suppressed even the agitation of your Government when he demanded that all Japs be placed in camps. I believe that such a procedure is both dignified and effective.

Now, what is your comment on this proposal of yours?

MR. MASAOKA. I would like to explain the background of this. This deals particularly with certain curfew regulations and travel restrictions levied by a number of sheriffs in eastern Oregon—pardon me, eastern Idaho and western Oregon. The question came up as to what should be done.

Naturally, with curfew regulations, they could not take their produce to market; they couldn't operate their farms sufficiently. With travel restrictions they couldn't purchase the necessary supplies without going through the battery of a lot of restrictions, and so on.

The question was, how best would it be to deal with this type of curfew. The answer simply was, the Japanese ought to get together, Japanese nationals and American citizens of Japanese ancestry, as any group would do, labor or any other group, and organize for their own benefit, and to use each democratic means or process at their control to gain their just ends.

Now, we have been opposed to answer the first section of that letter, of people of Japanese ancestry imposing upon themselves curfews and travel restrictions. We don't believe that they should do that. We do believe that they should use just discretions in their actions and care, but certainly they should not impose upon themselves un-American practices, because by so doing they are only inviting and encouraging other groups to enforce them upon them.

MR. STRIPLING. You say further in the letter:

Be sure that you have all the Japanese agreed on this policy before announcing it, for any scabs or violators will destroy the effectiveness of your entire plan.

MR. MASAOKA. Incidentally, it didn't work out. The Japanese just would not get together.

MR. STRIPLING. The letter further says:

Please consider the above-given suggestions carefully. Both are loaded with potential dynamite and may backfire to the detriment of all concerned.

MR. MASAOKA. That is right.

MR. STRIPLING. Do you consider that it backfired?

MR. MASAOKA. It didn't work out. The Japanese just would not agree. In other words any proposals of Japanese connected with it were loaded with dynamite. Anything can happen; public misinterpretation; sometimes newspapers and other groups misinterpreted it. Therefore, we have to proceed with extreme caution.

MR. EBERHARTER. What was the date of that letter?

MR. STRIPLING. September 17, 1942. I would like to read one other paragraph, Congressman.

We Japanese Americans must learn to use the weapons of cooperation and united refusals which have been so effective in the labor movement.

Mr. MASAOKA. That we haven't learned.

Mr. STRIPLING. You speak of the Japanese national as well as the Japanese American?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; because there, you see—

Mr. STRIPLING. That is not quite in line with the policy of the J. A. C. L., is it?

Mr. MASAOKA. The Japanese nationals were already restricted by Justice Department regulations. This was a different requirement.

Mr. STRIPLING. The people had been evacuated at this date?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; but still the Justice Department requires—

Mr. STRIPLING. You were concerned about Japanese who had not been evacuated and who were not in relocation centers.

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, we were concerned with any person of Japanese ancestry in this country.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, you were not concerned with this immediate group who were interned?

Mr. MASAOKA. We were concerned with them and also with others, too.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were going to use the relocation evacuees as a means to further your aims?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. It was simply a case that there were already a lot of them there. They wanted to know what to do about their specific problems. We were trying to help them out, that was all.

Mr. STRIPLING. But you suggested that they all band together in one unified block.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. At a critical time of the agricultural season and make demands, and if they were not met, that no one would work or cooperate?

Mr. MASAOKA. At the same time, we were encouraging the people to go out and work; in other words, in that particular locality we thought that technique might be used. It was not, however, used.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Masaoka, in this letter that Mr. Stripling read to you previously, dated September 17, in which you urged that they should take such means as they could in order to accomplish their ends, such as strikes, and so on, had there been any strikes in the war relocation centers prior to the writing of that letter?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, yes. That was not written to relocation centers; that was written to people in free zones in eastern Idaho and western Oregon.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your suggestion was then that the people outside of the centers, of Japanese ancestry, should engage in strikes to accomplish their purposes, too?

Mr. MASAOKA. They should, at least, consider it. In other words, Americans of Japanese ancestry are human beings. They are entitled to be treated decently, as you gentlemen yourselves admit.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss this question of possible strikes with any persons who were experienced in such matters in the labor movement?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. In other words, it was pretty much my own idea, I believe. We did not become actively associated with labor unions until very late in the program.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You did not become actively associated with labor unions?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir. I didn't meet labor men until just before my induction.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What labor men did you meet?

Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Sweetland of the C. I. O. was about all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is his first name Monroe?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What were your contacts with Monroe Sweetland?

Mr. MASAOKA. For approximately a half hour's duration, discussing the problem.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss with him the question of these strikes?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. This was an idea that I thought up myself and never pushed or recommended at any other time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know what Sweetland's connection with the C. I. O. is?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe he is director of their war council, or something, isn't it; educational war council, or something?

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you discuss with him? What was the particular problem?

Mr. MASAOKA. There wasn't no problem; just a courtesy call.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did it come at his invitation or did you seek him out?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe I sought him out.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you advised by any of your associates or acquaintances to take your problems up with the C. I. O. through Mr. Sweetland?

Mr. MASAOKA. That may have been; I don't know, but I have known of the Sweetland name for some time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Where did you first meet Mr. Sweetland?

Mr. MASAOKA. I first met him in Washington just recently. I have only had one contact with him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know anything about Mr. Sweetland's background?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, I do not; except that he happens to come from Portland, Oreg.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Except what?

Mr. MASAOKA. Except that he happens to come from Portland, Oreg.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Masaoka, in this letter of September 17, the statement has been read to you:

I have gone over the entire matter at great length with Mr. Dillon Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, and Mr. Roger Baldwin, director, American Civil Liberties Union.

Did you meet with both of them at the same time?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. Their ideas were that we should not have a self-imposed curfew, and so on. That didn't have reference to the fact that they should ever strike.

Mr. COSTELLO. That had reference to your meeting——

Mr. MASAOKA. We didn't meet together.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean, you discussed individually the matter with them in order to do away with whatever curfews or restrictions were being placed on the Japanese?



Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Myer definitely said he couldn't do anything about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then you proposed that the Japanese evacuees in relocation centers should agree not to work?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not in the relocation centers; on the outside, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. It states definitely in here [reading]:

As a matter of strategy, it seems to me that all of you Japanese-Americans and Japanese nationals in your section ought to get together—

Mr. MASAOKA. In your section. They are not in relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Wait until I finish the sentence, and we will see.

Mr. MASAOKA. All right, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO (reading):

Japanese-Americans and Japanese nationals in your section ought to get together and work out some scheme whereby you would be able to get all the evacuee labor in both the labor camps and relocation centers to agree not to work unless these curbs are done away with.

Mr. MASAOKA. That when they came out to that section they wouldn't work, unless these—

Mr. COSTELLO. It does not say that at all. It says that all of you Japanese-Americans and Japanese nationals in your section—

Mr. MASAOKA. That is your interpretation of it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is found in the third paragraph.

Mr. MASAOKA. My intent at that time, and I believe that intent is important, is that we have never suggested, and there is nothing in the record which will indicate that we have ever supported or advocated strikes of any sort within the relocation centers. I think the rest of the record will bear that out.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, read the whole sentence in its entirety, and then let him interpret it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well. [Reading:]

As a matter of strategy, it seems to me that all of you Japanese-Americans and Japanese nationals in your section ought to get together and work out some scheme whereby you would be able to get all the evacuee labor in both the labor camps and relocation centers to agree not to work unless these curbs are done away with.

Then it goes on to say, of course:

No king on their part is purely voluntary, and it is my guess that their aid will be greatly needed during the coming harvest season. If the sugar-beet interests need helpers bad enough, they will see to it that local community pressure is suppressed, just as they suppressed even the agitation of your Government when he demanded that all Japs be placed in camps.

Now, that indicates as the time came for the harvest and they needed extra labor, you would bring about effective pressure in order to enforce these terms in connection with all evacuee labor located in labor camps, on these farms, wherever they might be, as well as those relocated in the relocation centers.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, that is simply a question of interpretation.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think that is a pretty definite statement there as to exactly what you meant.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, the witness was apparently attempting to lift the curfews upon both the Japanese-Americans and citizens who had not been checked by the F. B. I. or any other agency. There

might have been a number of Japanese among that group who were disloyal.

You were attempting to use the organization to lift any restrictions from them?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. This group was never evacuated. The Department of Justice has already imposed travel and curfew restrictions. These were additional restrictions imposed by local authorities, local sheriffs.

Mr. STRIPLING. Upon the Japanese in these communities.

Mr. MASAOKA. Which were not justified.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your opinion they were not justified?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; which were not justified; and therefore we proceeded with that procedure.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Masaoka, have you any idea of the percentage of Japanese in the relocation centers who may be classed disloyal?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that is a War Department prerogative.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You would not care to express an opinion as to what percentage may be disloyal?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I would not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You do believe, however, that the present method of operation of these relocation centers is contaminating some of the good Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Contaminating them in what respect?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, the first and most dangerous thing of all is that the idea of concentration camps itself is repugnant to the American way of thinking, and children raised in relocation centers have a tendency to think of America in terms of barbed wire fences, and so on, and that is not good for the future.

Then also, of course, are pro-Japanese factions in these centers. Certainly, some method ought to be taken to move the people out. I would much rather see the pro-Japanese element left in the centers to rot, if necessary, and the W. R. A. move and expedite this program to move out the loyal people.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, you believe that some of these Japanese who are loyal may become weak loyal to the United States or may become weakened in their Americanism and their belief in the democratic processes by association with Japanese who still retain the Japanese ideology?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, human nature would indicate that, I think. No man can live in bondage without questioning the reasons for that bondage. And then there are those who take advantage of the fact that as American citizens they have been treated this way, you see.

Mr. COSTELLO. You believe that the moral life of the people confined in these relocation centers, the moral fiber, is being weakened?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have a copy of the oath that was taken by the members of J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir. I have nothing on me which pertains to the Japanese American Citizens League. I am no longer connected with that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you remember the oath in its entirety? Could you repeat it?

Mr. STRIPLING. We have it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MASAOKA. I can find it in there. Here is the oath. By-laws, article 1, section 1 [reading]:

Active and associate members of this organization shall sign the following pledge, which shall be properly notarized and witnessed and recorded before receiving their membership cards.

I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear or affirm that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I do hereby forswear and repudiate any other allegiance which I knowingly or unknowingly may have held heretofore, and that I take these obligations freely, without any mental reservations whatsoever or purposes of evasion, so help me God.

Mr. COSTELLO. Now, as national secretary of the organization, you really do believe that there are some of your members who took this oath with mental reservations?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is quite possible.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, would you say there was a fair percentage of them or just a very small minority, or rather, exceptions, rare exceptions?

Mr. MASAOKA. I personally would like to think it was rare exceptions.

Mr. COSTELLO. But you do not have much confidence that it was only rare exceptions?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have confidence that the great majority, vast majority, almost every one of them, are loyal, and took the oath without any mental reservation.

Mr. COSTELLO. Sometimes a majority, Mr. Masaoka, a great majority, is 60 percent; sometimes it can be considered 65 or 70 percent or even an overwhelming majority.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; we can play on words, I understand that.

Mr. COSTELLO. What would be a great majority in your mind, 90 percent?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would say over 90 percent.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel 90 percent took that oath without any mental reservation?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you any idea, Mr. Masaoka, as to the members of Kibei who became members of your organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not a good many. We were not popular with the Kibei.

Mr. MUNDT. You were not popular with the Kibei?

Mr. MASAOKA. Definitely not.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they popular with you?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; in fact, they were going to string me up a number of times.

Mr. MUNDT. More or less mutual distrust?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, mutual distrust and dislike and everything else. By that I don't mean to infer that all Kibei are bad. We have some outstanding examples. Some have come back from Japan with a terrific loathing with the Japanese way of life.

Mr. MUNDT. As a student of Japanese psychology and philosophy and Japanese thinking, what is your opinion of the practice of sending young Japanese back to Japan to get their schooling?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am not quite a student, but my personal observation again would be that many of them were sent back when they were too young—that is, to know anything about it. They were sent back because their parents realized that their best opportunity was the international field of commerce, and so on, and that the knowledge of the language would be helpful.

Mr. MUNDT. You think it was a good practice?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think it is being done by almost every nationality group. The Irishmen do it, and all of them, you know, but because we are Japanese, because we are under suspicion, and so on, at the present time, no.

I might recite, however, that back in the palmy days of the twenties, American educators—the greater ones, men high in the field of Government in the United States—suggested that America and Japan might serve as a bridge of understanding, if you please, between the Americans and the orientals, and that they ought to take special efforts to study the Japanese language. That was one of the old concepts which was thrown out, of course.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In your constitution, do you have set forth briefly the purposes of the organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How lengthy is it, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, we have a long one and then we have some short ones, too. In other words, as any sort of a group of this sort, we play up to membership and that sort of thing, but I can read you a very short one, if you wish.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I do not know whether it would be fair to just put in one short declaration of principles or creed and not include the whole thing. If it is a lengthy document, I do not want to burden the record.

Mr. MASAOKA. I will say this, the very fact that we kept these records would seem to indicate that we have nothing to be ashamed of in our record. Furthermore, if you had asked for the records, they would have been made available to you.

Mr. EBERHARTER. How many pages does your constitution take?

Mr. MASAOKA. May I read the policies and the objects?

Mr. EBERHARTER. How many pages does the whole constitution take?

Mr. MASAOKA. Twelve pages, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, then, your purposes and objects are rather lengthy. What is your heading there, "Policies"?

Mr. MASAOKA. We have the policy and then we have the object, and then we have a statement of policy, declaration of policy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, I would like to have briefly what the purpose of the organization is, and briefly what the policy of the organization is.

Mr. MASAOKA. May I read them to you then?

## ARTICLE II

SECTION 1. The policy of this organization shall be nonpartisan and nonsectarian in nature. This organization shall not be used for the purposes or officially endorsing candidates for public offices; or shall it engage in any other political activity whatsoever, including recommendations on legislative bills, except when the welfare and civil rights of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry shall be directly affected or influenced.



## ARTICLE III

SECTION 1. The sole object of this organization shall be to promote, sponsor, and encourage any and all programs, projects, and activities which shall be designed to further the two national slogans of this league: "For Better Americans in a Greater America" and "Security Through Unity."

SECTION 2. This organization shall encourage every member to perform faithfully his duties and obligations and to participate actively in sharing the common life and lot of all Americans as an American citizen and as a member of the State and the community in which he may reside.

Now, for the declaration of policy. This is the declaration of policy of the Japanese American Citizens League.

In these critical days when the policies of many organizations representing various nationality groups may be viewed with suspicion and even alarm by certain individuals who are not intimately acquainted with the aims, ideals, and leadership of such associations, it becomes necessary and proper, in the public interest, that such fraternal and educational orders as the Japanese American Citizens League do unequivocally and sincerely announce their policies and objectives:

Now, therefore, in order to clarify any misconceptions, misunderstandings, and misapprehensions concerning the functions and activities of this body, the national board of the Japanese American Citizens League issues the following statement and declaration of policy:

"We, the members of the national board of the Japanese American Citizens League of the United States of America, believe that the policies which govern this organization and our activities as its official representatives are fourfold in nature and are best illustrated by an explanation of the alphabetical sequence of the letters J-A-C-L.

"J" stands for justice. We believe that all peoples, regardless of race, color, or creed are entitled to enjoy those principles of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' which are presumed to be the birthright of every individual; to the fair and equal treatment of all, socially, legislatively, judicially, and economically; to the rights, privileges, and obligations of citizenship. To this end, this organization is dedicated.

"A" stands for Americanism. We believe that in order to prove ourselves worthy of the justice which we seek, we must prove ourselves to be, first of all, good Americans—in thought, in words, in deeds. We believe that we must personify 'The Japanese American Creed'; that we must acquaint ourselves with those traditions, ideals, and institutions which have made and kept this Nation the foremost in the world. We believe that we must live for America—and, if need be, to die for America. To this end, this organization is consecrated.

"C" stands for citizenship. We believe that we must be exemplary citizens in addition to being good Americans, for, as in the case of our parents, one may be a good American and yet be denied the privilege of citizenship. We believe that we must accept and even seek out opportunities in which to serve our country and to assume the obligations and duties as well as the rights and privileges of citizenship. To this end, this organization is committed.

"L" stands for leadership. We believe that the Japanese American Citizens League, as the only national organization established to serve the American citizens of Japanese ancestry, is in a position to lead actively the Japanese people residing in the United States. We believe that we have the inspired leadership and the membership necessary to carry into living effect the principles of justice, Americanism, and citizenship for which our league was founded. We offer co-operation and support to all groups and individuals sincerely and legitimately interested in these same aims, but we propose to retain our independent and separate status as the Japanese American Citizens League. To this end, this organization is pledged."

Summing up, briefly, the Japanese American Citizens League is devoted to those tasks which are calculated to win for ourselves and our posterity the status outlined by our two national slogans: "For Better Americans in a Greater America" and "Security Through Unity."

That, gentlemen, I believe summarizes it.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the fact that there is a quorum call in the House, the committee will stand in recess until 2:30. You will be available this afternoon at 2:30?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. We may call you again on Monday.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., the committee was in recess until 2:30 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to the recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Mr. Slocum, will you please resume the stand?

TESTIMONY OF TOKUTARO NISHIMURA SLOCUM—Recalled

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Slocum, I had a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that there was a comment in the newspapers regarding some of the testimony which you gave before the committee in regard to Mr. Kurusu, and his statement in relation to the fact that he knew or anticipated war between Japan and the United States in the near future, and you are quoted there as having sent that information to the F. B. I. I understand that that is not a correct statement.

Mr. SLOCUM. That is right. It is not correct, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The information that you had regarding Kurusu was sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Mr. SLOCUM. Very true, sir. It was to the Naval Intelligence that I reported at that time, sir. However, I did not want to quote the Naval Intelligence, so I made the statements on the minutes of your record that you will find that it was to the duly constituted Federal authority. That was the words I used for it, and I am very grateful to make the correction as to the matter, in all fairness to the great office of the F. B. I., and I thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. All right.

Mr. SLOCUM. It is also stated in the paper somewhere that I am a Federal agent. I am not, sir. All my services have been gratuitously done, voluntary service, as a duty of a citizen, and I have never said at any time anything that I am a Federal F. B. I. agent, or anything of the kind, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You never received any salary or anything of the kind from them?

Mr. SLOCUM. No, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did receive some salary to cover some expenses, you say?

Mr. SLOCUM. Very little, sir. I only received \$9.60 from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in all my life, and that was in rounding up all the Japanese war veterans on the west coast, and that was my expense, and I had a heck of a time collecting that.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is always difficult to collect money from the Federal Government.

Mr. SLOCUM. Thank you, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. All right, Mr. Masaoka. Will you please resume the stand?

## TESTIMONY OF MIKE MASAOKA—Resumed

Mr. MATTHEWS Mr. Masaoka, just before the recess you were asked some questions about your proposal for strikes against the curfew and other restrictions on the part of Americans of Japanese ancestry and also Japanese nationals. When you made that proposal, were you not apprehensive that disloyal elements would certainly attempt to use the strike weapon to carry out their disloyal purposes?

Mr. MASAOKA. May I ask one question? Do you consider it to be un-American to strike?

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not think it is the purpose of the witness to interrogate counsel for the committee. We are simply trying to get the information from the witness himself.

Mr. MASAOKA. As I contended, and I still contend, the intent of that letter was not that they strike in relocation centers or anything else of the sort. In addition to that, the letter was addressed to a person in which I have the utmost confidence. That matter was taken up. I don't know whether it was taken up or not. The letter was at least addressed to him and we heard nothing further on the whole matter.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Perhaps the witness will understand my question better if I give him an illustration which is accepted generally.

At the North American Aviation Plant in California back in the spring of 1941, there was a strike which was generally attributed by the President of the United States himself and by various Federal authorities to disloyal elements using the strike weapon to sabotage this country's preparedness. Did you happen to note that incident at the time?

Mr. MASAOKA. I recall something about the strike, that is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I mean you read that the Communists, in pursuing their policy against this country's preparedness, used the strike weapon to tie up the production of airplanes?

Mr. MASAOKA. I had not heard that; no.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, do you know enough about the history of strikes to know that on occasions, at least, strikes have been so used by disloyal elements?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know too much about the history, but that is easily conceivable.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I wonder if it did not occur to you that with a significant proportion of disloyal elements certainly among Japanese nationals to say nothing of Japanese-American citizens, that these strikes would certainly be easily available to those elements to do harm in this country.

Mr. MASAOKA. In the first place, I would challenge your statement that a significant number were disloyal; secondly, I would say that the Japanese have never used the strike weapon and, therefore, they didn't even consider my suggestions.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You say that you conferred with Mr. Monroe Sweetland of the C. I. O.?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I always thought that the C. I. O. was quite a responsible and recognized organization of labor.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you call on any high official in the American Federation of Labor on the same business?

Mr. MASAOKA. An approach was made; that is all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make a visit to anyone?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you try to make a visit to anyone?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. To whom?

Mr. MASAOKA. Let me say a number of names were suggested to us.

Mr. MATTHEWS. By whom?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you refused an audience?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I wrote them some letters and I asked other people as to what their reaction might be, and invariably the answer was that now was not the appropriate time to make such an approach.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But you were advised that it was the time to approach the C. I. O.? You so stated this morning.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, it was suggested that I go to see the C. I. O. I called them up. They were willing to see me, so I went to see them.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But you were advised against approaching the American Federation of Labor?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, not advised against. They merely said it was not the applicable time; they probably were not interested anyway.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When you were a student of the University of Utah were you a member of the American Students Union?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't believe we ever had a chapter.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you ever hear of the American Students Union?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not until I came here.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you know that Mr. Monroe Sweetland, with whom you conferred at C. I. O. headquarters, was a high official of the American Students Union before he went with the C. I. O.?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know. After all, I don't have the available facilities or the resources to make such investigations.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, taking up the matter of your relations with the W. R. A. and Mr. Dillon Myer, I want to read from your report to your national headquarters, which has already been identified by you, the report being dated September 19, 1942, as follows:

Mr. Myer is afraid that certain guys in Congress would jump down their collective throats if they could only imagine a part of the opportunity which we play in forming War Relocation Authority policies.

You wrote that to national headquarters.

Mr. MASAOKA. That again, I would say, would pass off as some of my exaggeration to impress the local office.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This section is headed "Strictly confidential," underscored, in capital letters.

Mr. MASAOKA. A favorite technique of mine, if you observe all the reports: nothing unusual.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You start off with these words:

Myer put this up to me directly and pointedly.

Now, I will put it up to you directly and pointedly.

Mr. MASAOKA. It is rather difficult to recall that far back.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, what it was that he put up to you was that he was afraid that certain guys in Congress would jump down their, that is, the W. R. A.'s collective throats if they could only imagine a



part of the part which you, that is, the Japanese American Citizens League, I take it, played in forming W. R. A. policy. Did Mr. Myer put anything like that up to you?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is probably my own interpretation of what he said.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Further, you say [reading]:

He has given us the directives and instructions of his department.

Mr. MASAOKA. That should be qualified.

Mr. MATTHEWS (reading):

They are to be held in the strictest confidence and are not to be announced to anyone. They are merely to serve as a hint to us of their policy—nothing more.

Mr. MASAOKA. As I said this morning, those directives and that are matters of public record. They were given to us after they were issued to their regular personnel and, I also note, they might have been made available to other groups.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Following up your statement that you had received these strictly confidential directives and instructions—

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, you have the directives here. Are they listed as strictly confidential?

Mr. MATTHEWS. You stated further:

Our working relationships with Myer are now on a better plane than with Eisenhower.

What did you mean by that?

Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Myer, I believe, is better suited to the task of administering the War Relocation Authority than was Mr. Eisenhower, along certain specific lines.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This refers not to the administration of the centers, but to your relationships with the two men.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, my relationships with Mr. Eisenhower were, of course, drastically and abruptly, more or less, cut off when he became Associate Director of the O. W. I. I had longer association, naturally, with Mr. Myer because he was the Director for a much longer period.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is not the plain inference of this statement, though, in its context, that Mr. Myer was willing to trust you with the most strictly confidential documents, from his agency—

Mr. MASAOKA. No. The point is that he did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And that Mr. Eisenhower did not?

Mr. MASAOKA. The point is that he did not. Regardless of what the inferences are that may be drawn or show, the facts are clear. You have all the records here. You know what we received. There was nothing in them which is of such confidential nature that it would be dangerous to be shown publicly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you write at such great length to the effect that they were so strictly confidential?

Mr. MASAOKA. I move to write.

Mr. COSTELLO. Why did you specifically use the word "confidential"?

Mr. MASAOKA. I do that often. If you read my present letters, I use that term often.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is not natural to put at the top of the page "confidential" unless you really mean that the matter contained in that paper is of a private character; is that not correct?

Mr. MASAOKA. It was of a private character as far as our national headquarters were concerned.

Mr. COSTELLO. Not only do you use the word "confidential" in there, but you say "Strictly confidential."

Mr. MASAOKA. I use "strictly confidential."

Mr. COSTELLO. Meaning that this must be kept on the q. t.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Expressions of that kind run all the way through in relation to those matters.

Mr. MASAOKA. And in relation to many other matters, too, if you will note in the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. All matters in which it is used are in connection with dealings of the W. R. A.

Mr. MASAOKA. I wrote the letters. I knew what I wrote. I wrote them as confidential because I wanted to impress the local headquarters.

Mr. COSTELLO. You were trying to impress the local headquarters that you got these directives ahead of schedule and before they were released to the public, so that the centers would be impressed by what you were accomplishing.

Mr. MASAOKA. They had never been relayed on to the centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say you put in the word "confidential" in this report merely to impress the leaders of the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, the local office.

Mr. COSTELLO. You wanted to impress them that you were getting these directives secretly before they were released to other officials in W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. They knew it was not secretly and they knew it was not before it was received by other groups, because I received them in bunches after the dates were possibly a week or two behind times.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it not a fact that you actually received some directives before they were released to the W. R. A. authorities?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not that I know of.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then that statement contained in this letter is absolutely false.

Mr. MASAOKA. Will you repeat again the statement?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, there are a great many of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. The one regarding the directives.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you state that you have been given the directives and instructions of his department; that they are to be held in the strictest confidence and are not so be announced to anyone; that they are merely to serve to indicate to you their policy and nothing more. That is one of the statements.

Mr. MASAOKA. There is nothing there to say that we received it before; is that correct?

Mr. COSTELLO. The statement is that they are to be held in strictest confidence.

Mr. MASAOKA. But nothing to say that we received them before.

Mr. COSTELLO. It does not indicate in that particular statement that you received them ahead of time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In the early part of this document you state about the directives, "All are most confidential and we were lucky to get them ourselves."

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, everyone like to pat himself on the back. It is human nature.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let us be frank. This is not a case of complimenting yourself or patting yourself on the back. There are certain definite English words used for expressing your thoughts typed out here. They were typed out after you had been to see Mr. Myer and apparently before the report was sent out to other groups of the J. A. C. L.

Mr. MASAOKA. Only to the local headquarters and the people listed there.

Mr. COSTELLO. Undoubtedly you intended to have the people out there get the same meaning out of it that we are getting right now. It was not a case of exaggerating or patting yourself on the back, but your frank idea was that you were telling them that the directives you received were confidential; that the directives you were sending out to the J. A. C. L. local were confidential, and that they were not to release the information contained therein; that it was given to them so that they would have some idea what W. R. A. was doing and which W. R. A., apparently, was not at the time prepared to announce publicly it was doing, or they were not prepared to announce those directives were to be released at that time.

Mr. MASAOKA. All the directives were released to the project directors and the others before we received them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Maybe the project director had them, but the public did not know about them. They were not of a public nature at the time they were given to you. They were not published in the Federal Register at the time you received them.

Mr. MASAOKA. No; but I presume that some other organizations may also have received them; groups interested in the problem.

Mr. COSTELLO. The directives might have been sent to the War Department or to the Navy Department or to the White House or maybe even down to the Congress, but they were all labeled "Confidential," and not for public release at that time.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe you have some of the directives here.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Kanazawa, the eastern representative of your organization, testified here yesterday under oath that he, himself, had received confidential documents and directives from Mr. Myer.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I have not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, do you know whether Mr. Kanazawa did?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I don't.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You so stated, did you not, on one occasion, that it was Joe who had actually, in person, received these?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, Joe had received them, but I never sent on any of the directives. And, I believe you have some copies of them here which state on the directives that they are strictly confidential. Perhaps any copies of the directives which we made, we may have done the same thing, but on the mimeographed sheet delivered to us by the W. R. A., the word "confidential" is not written.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You call particular attention to the use which Kido in Poston might make of these confidential documents, and you said "Be careful," and that refers especially to Kido in Poston, for Ed Wade—who I take it is Mr. Head.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS (continuing). Decided to get sore, if he discovered that you had copies, God Bless America.

Mr. MASAOKA. I might state we discovered later through conversation with Mr. Kido that through the project attorney there, because he was a member of the project attorney's staff, he saw all of the directives before we sent them to him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do I understand you to say that in order to pat yourself on the back, you were willing to compromise Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. What do you mean by that statement?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, in effect, you are attributing to Mr. Myer what I think some of the committee members have expressed as misconduct in the administration of his office.

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And in order to pat yourself on the back you are willing to compromise him.

Mr. MASAOKA. That was not my intent. I believe Mr. Myer has done an excellent job.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Quite apart from whether or not you think Mr. Myer has done an excellent job, do you not consider that he would have been guilty of improperly using the confidential documents of his office if he had used them as you describe here?

Mr. MASAOKA. They were not confidential. I believe the directives themselves—and you should have some here in your records—none of them indicate that they are confidential on their face.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Continuing from this section which is marked "Strictly confidential," I read as follows:

This last week has been an extremely encouraging one. It seems that Myer has returned from his west-coast trip imbued with a new spirit and fight on the whole matter. He sees the problem now in three stages and not in two: Movement to assembly centers; movement to relocation centers; movement out of relocation centers to private employment. He believes that if the opportunity is granted to everyone, Nisei, Kibei and Issie alike to leave if they want to, it will not only relieve the tensions developed in camp but make it that much easier to develop their own program. Frankly, he is ready to fight the Army itself on this matter of final authority. He has said that he has told the Secretary of War that as far as he is concerned that all persons may leave relocation centers and settle in the Western Defense Command if they can meet his requirements so long as they stay out of the prohibited areas themselves. He has laid down the same principle for Drum and the Eastern Defense Command. He has gone so far as to say that it is up to him to say what's what in those relocation centers which are in military area 1. If the Army won't let me run the complete show, they can take them over themselves and run it alone. No division of authority. He admitted it was a bluff, but he knows that DeWitt hates to think about this evacuee problem and that this may be the way for him to get away from the W. C. C. A. interference with his program. He is now having Holland work on a new and more liberal release policy to replace present directive No. 22. The general terms of it will be, as I understand it:

1. The applicant for release must either have a job in mind or promised or intends to open his own business;

2. The community to which he proposes to move will give him what is called "community acceptance" (up to now this has meant that the mayor or chief of police had to do it—their new thinking is that if some prominent citizen will say that in his opinion it's O. K., it'll be acceptable);

3. The applicant has no record against him in the F. B. I. files (up to now an investigation was called for; now the name will merely be checked against existing F. B. I. files and if there is no record against him it will serve as an O. K. to go out. Myer is even going one step further. If Hoover or the Justice Department will say that they will watch over all those who leave, even this requirement will be eliminated. It is now needed, he feels, in order to gain quicker "community acceptance";



4. The person will keep the W. R. A. informed as to changes in address. This is not compulsory but merely to aid in the final return of their property and belongings which remain on the west coast. The fiction of "protective custody" has been dropped; that was the one where the Director could order the return of anyone whom he thought was not gaining community good will or being a good citizen or threatened public uprisings seemed imminent because of his presence, etc. All this was such a liberalization that Tom Holland threw up his hands on his return from the West and said: "My God, Mike, what's happened to Myer?" Anyway, they are now working on the new directive and hope to get Army and Navy approval within the next 10 days or 2 weeks.

Now, are you describing the contents of a directive?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am describing a conversation, I believe. May I explain the procedure there? When the evacuation was first ordered, I believe it was the intent of the Government that they could move out and settle elsewhere, but because of the resistance of the Governors of the 12 Western States it crystallized in a conference in May, I believe, when Mr. Eisenhower and I believe the Assistant Secretary of War met with the Governors in Salt Lake City. It was thought that perhaps it would have to be evacuation from their normal communities into war relocation centers and then into these relocation centers for the duration. Mr. Myer took this trip and he came back with the idea that perhaps now they could resume their original intent.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, at that point I would like to ask you a question. You say you are not describing the contents of a directive but describing a conversation.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A conversation with Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And is this a correct description of your conversation with Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. So far as I can remember: yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And that is a correct description of your conversation with Mr. Holland?

Mr. MASAOKA. As far as I can remember.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He threw up his hands and said, "My God, Mike."

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, it was one of those things, you know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, was any of this published or released to the public?

Mr. MASAOKA. You mean, the general directive?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; the matter in there was released publicly; that they had to have a job; that they had to have community acceptance; that they had to be checked through the F. B. I. files and that they had to keep the W. R. A. informed. Yes; those are in public knowledge, released through the newspapers and elsewhere.

Mr. MATTHEWS. By whom?

Mr. MASAOKA. Through the W. R. A. I believe.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did they release information that there did not have to be a check against the F. B. I. files, as you state here at one point?

Mr. MASAOKA. There it says that after Hoover and the Justice Department would assume the responsibility, isn't that correct?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes; after they left the camp.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, the point is that they didn't assume that responsibility; therefore, presumably, the check went on.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But, at any rate, Mr. Myer did have a conversation of this character with you?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You were not exaggerating any point in this particular paragraph?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, those are common knowledge. It has been published now.

Mr. STRIPLING. If he did publish them, why did he state he was waiting authority and approval of the War and Navy Departments?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, at the time he described it to me was before it was published.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, then, it was not published; it was not public when he discussed it with you.

Mr. MASAOKA. Probably not.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, he had it 2 weeks before the Army and the Navy acted on it.

Mr. MASAOKA. Before the Army and the Navy acted on it, but they were cognizant of the proposed change.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you not consider that to be confidential?

Mr. MASAOKA. Confidential to our office; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, I mean confidential so far as W. R. A. was concerned.

Mr. MASAOKA. We didn't go shouting to the skies. After all, you know, as a part of democracy, as a taxpayer, I am entitled to sit down with the men who spend that money and to discuss with them certain programs, and so on. If he desires to tell me certain things, that is his business.

Mr. MATTHEWS. He told you that he had said to Secretary of War Stimson that regardless of the wishes of certain men in the Army, he was going to see to it that the W. R. A. was the sole boss?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, that would have to be taken up with the War Department now.

Mr. COSTELLO. Not now, but something that happened in the past; not as you are constituted now, but this is a comment prior to your entering into the service, and I do not think it would directly affect your military status at all.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It is just a question what Mr. Myer told you about his own intentions toward the Army. But, you have said that this is a correct report of the conversation, so that answers the question.

Mr. MASAOKA. As far as I can remember; yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. So that answers the question.

Mr. STRIPLING. On that point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the witness if he made frequent contacts with certain officials and officers of the War Department during this same period?

Mr. MASAOKA. That, I am sure, is a policy of the War Department to answer.

Mr. STRIPLING. This occurred before you were inducted into the special combat unit of the Army.

Mr. MASAOKA. Nevertheless, it still is the policy of the War Department. I would rather have them answer it.

Mr. STRIPLING. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will read this into the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe, Captain, you are representing the War Department here, are you not?

Captain HALL. Yes. I think it would be all right for Mr. Masaoka to answer that question, certainly.

Mr. COSTELLO. This question was simply put to him, whether he had contact with some officials of the War Department prior to his going into the Army, in this connection.

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. According to your report of April 26, 1943, to the national headquarters, on page 5 you said:

Joe and I called on Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and his executive assistants, Colonel Scobey and Captain Hall.

Did you, on various occasions, discuss the Japanese situation with Mr. McCloy and Colonel Scobey?

Mr. MASAOKA. And with his predecessor, Colonel—no; I don't recall the name.

Mr. MUNDT. Were these personal conferences you held or indirect conferences, about which you spoke this morning?

Mr. MASAOKA. Both.

Mr. STRIPLING. As a matter of fact, you had numerous personal conferences with Colonel Scobey; did you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Quite a few; not too many. Mr. Kanazawa handled most of those when I went away.

Mr. STRIPLING. I would like to submit this to the Chair also. Mr. Masaoka, I would like to have you identify this. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence a report dated April 19, 1943, from Mr. Masaoka to the national headquarters, attention of the staff members.

Will you identify this report as a copy of the original which you sent?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, this matter might deserve censure; I do not know. I would like to read it and have your judgment on it. On page 3 Mr. Masaoka wrote the following [reading]:

The notion that cleared Nisei ought to be permitted to return to the Pacific coast if they so desire seems to have caught on here. I understand that, from highly confidential and reliable sources. Dillon Myer is now convinced that unless the Nisei are permitted to return to California the general War Relocation Authority resettlement program is doomed to failure. In line with this thinking, he has presented a memorandum to the President. Biddle and Elmer Davis have agreed with Myer's thinking and Davis has assigned a number of his boys the job of working out an acceptable Office of War Information release system which will prevent the vicious California press from making too great an issue of it. Within the War Department there is a break between the civilian and military heads on this subject. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy after a written confidential opinion from Biddle himself, has written the President to the effect that he now believes that the military aspects of this problem have passed and that the civilians ought to take over along the lines suggested above. I understand that Secretary Stimson has gone so far as to orally agree that this phase of the problem is beyond that of the military. As you can well guess, the General Staff and General DeWitt both oppose this thinking. They insist that as long as the Japanese have any toehold in Alaska the west coast is in imminent danger of invasion and that therefore this problem is still primarily one for the military. Just how this behind-the-scenes argument will progress can't be predicted at this time but I am encouraged that there is a strong opinion in favor of such a program. It's my personal guess that DeWitt's un-American attacks were aimed more at stopping this growing attitude on Capitol Hill than in attempting to influence the Supreme Court judges. You may be interested to know that both the

Secretary of War and the Office of War Information were incensed at DeWitt's statement and that they have taken steps to "slap" him for them.

Could I question the witness on that, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you write that?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did that, but I believe that the answer is with the War Department on that.

Mr. STRIPLING. You would care to divulge where you obtained such highly confidential information dealing with a rift within the War Department between the high command and the civilian authorities?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. It is your position that you cannot divulge the information. You do, however, admit that such a situation existed?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was told that it existed.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is that sufficient?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Along the same line, at the conclusion of this strictly confidential section in your report, you said "Myer spent about 10 minutes cussing the Army on problems of this nature," referring to what has gone before already, that we discussed.

Mr. MASAOKA. That was just good natured ribbing, I suppose.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The matters referred to in that particular document read by Mr. Stripling go far beyond good natured ribbing; do they not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Is there a connection between the two here?

Mr. MATTHEWS. That Mr. Myer is concerned about the Army here and General DeWitt and General Drum.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; there seems to be a connection.

Mr. STRIPLING. The Justice Department, apparently, Mr. Chairman, is not involved in this confidential category.

Did you ever have any contacts in the Department of Justice, personal contacts, or any conferences?

Mr. MASAOKA. Some.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know Mr. Ennis?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. I would like to read, Mr. Chairman, an excerpt from Mr. Masaoka's report of April 26, 1943.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask a few questions regarding this matter you read previously.

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You said that Biddle and Elmer Davis have agreed on Myer's thinking. Did you talk with either Mr. Biddle or Mr. Davis about that?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I was told by the person who gave me the general information.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did not receive this information from any of the parties named herein?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the person from whom you received that connected with the military? Is he connected in any way with the War Department?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't remember.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do remember from whom you received the information; do you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have an idea, yes.



Mr. COSTELLO. You say you do not remember who gave you the information. Was it just one person?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I think it was a number of people. I just added them together.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you contact Mr. Myer concerning this and get some of this information from him?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have.

Mr. COSTELLO. You state here that in line with this thinking; namely, the release of Nisei to California, that he, Mr. Myer, has presented a memorandum to the President.

Mr. MASAOKA. He didn't tell me he did. Somebody else told me that.

Mr. MUNDT. You say you checked on this to get a story for the P. C., the Pacific Citizen?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you ever write a story for them?

Mr. MASAOKA. In relation to this matter here?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. You further say:

It is also believed that Myer and Glick took a special plane to San Francisco to repudiate DeWitt's statement on behalf of the Government and to testify favorably in our behalf.

Did they make such a trip?

Mr. MASAOKA. I was told that they did.

Mr. MUNDT. From sources that you believe reliable?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. But you do not feel at liberty to disclose the source?

Mr. MASAOKA. I can't remember who told me. I believe it was someone within the W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. Someone within the W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe, to the best of my memory.

Mr. MUNDT. Of your own knowledge, have you followed through to see whether that trip was made?

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is one other sentence in here I would like to inquire about. I do not know whether it was read or not. [Reading:]

One of these, I understand, is an order from Stimson himself to General DeWitt that Nisei in uniform can come and go as they please on the same basis as others on furlough in the Western Defense Command.

Mr. MASAOKA. That memorandum or report is dated April 19, 1943.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you know at that time that General DeWitt had issued an order dated April 18 permitting Japanese Americans, who were serving with the Army, to enter the Pacific coast area that had been restricted?

Mr. MASAOKA. Let me see now. Did I know at the time of this writing that General DeWitt—

Mr. COSTELLO (continuing). Had issued that order?

Mr. MASAOKA. That they could go back?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe it was in the New York newspapers.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was issued before the date of this?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I believe it was in the New York papers and possibly the local papers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you willing to state from whom you got your information that it was from Stimson himself to General DeWitt, directing General DeWitt to make that order?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I am not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The name of Glick was mentioned. Who is he?

Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Glick is the solicitor for the W. R. A.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Here in Washington?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. His actual title is "counsel" is it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I think they use the term "solicitor."

Mr. EBERHARTER. Solicitor for the W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Thank you.

Mr. STRIPLING. You stated a few minutes ago, Mr. Masaoka, that you knew Mr. Ennis.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read an excerpt from the report of April 26.

I have just completed making one of my best contacts here, Edward J. Ennis, Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice. Up to this time, I have avoided him because I did not want us to be connected with enemy aliens in any way whatsoever, but as I had some questions to ask regarding internees, I called upon him after having Roger Baldwin make the contact for me. Ennis, as you know, represented the Government in San Francisco in the evacuation cases.

Ennis permitted me to sit in on a conference of Government officers who were discussing the Government brief in the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases. From all indications, they will try to be very fair in their analysis—

Mr. MUNDT. Did you actually sit in on their conference?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I was told about the conference.

Mr. STRIPLING (reading):

for most of them felt that the Government overstepped its bounds in evacuating American citizens. What bothers me though is that the Supreme Court has so little background in this field that the Justice Department is supplying most of it with the aggressive cooperation of Bendetsen and the Western Defense Command. It appears that the Government case will be based upon the same sort of arguments as presented in San Francisco only greatly reinforced.

Mr. MASAOKA. That point—

Mr. STRIPLING. I have not completed.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am sorry.

Mr. STRIPLING (reading):

Ennis assures me that the Justice Department will not try to argue on technicalities but rather as to the constitutionality of the whole procedure. Privately, and off the record, he feels that we have an excellent chance of winning, especially if the question of detention comes up.

Did Mr. Ennis tell you that?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe he did.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did have a conference then regarding this matter?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, but the Government brief was prepared at that time anyway.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you state here [reading]:

Ennis permitted me to sit in on a conference of Government officers who were discussing the Government brief in the Hirabayashi and Yasui cases.

Is that true? Did you sit in on a conference?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I didn't sit in the conference.

Mr. STRIPLING. But he did tell you privately and off the record that he felt that you had an excellent chance of winning the case?

Mr. MASAOKA. If detention came up. Detention did not come up.

Mr. COSTELLO. Just a moment. Now, we are trying to get information. In the opening sentence you say that you did sit in on a conference with Ennis.

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not sit in a conference with Ennis.

Mr. COSTELLO. And further down now you say that Ennis told you that you had an excellent chance of winning the case.

Mr. MASAOKA. If detention came up.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he did not tell you that at the time of the conference?

Mr. MASAOKA. It was not at the conference. He told me about the conference.

Mr. COSTELLO. He told you about the conference. You did not sit in on it?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he also told you about these other things; that you had an excellent chance of winning the case?

Mr. MASAOKA. The point of that is clear. Mr. Ennis has stated, I believe, to some other people, too, that detention is a weak point. In other words, that evacuation and that might be upheld as a military necessity and be held constitutional, but that to detain them afterward had the best chance for us to win.

Now, when the Supreme Court sat in on the cases recently, they did not determine evacuation or detention; they merely passed on the curfew policy. I think that is correct, is it not?

Mr. MATTHEWS. I would like to know if Mr. Ennis invited you to sit in on that conference.

Mr. MASAOKA. No; he did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What did you mean by the word "permitted"?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think I was merely trying to impress the Salt Lake City office.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In other words, that statement was false, was it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On page 4 of the report dated September 19th—

Mr. MASAOKA. Of last year?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes, naturally—you say [reading]:

I'm afraid that we can't do much about the gas rationing restrictions. After all, though the War Relocation Authority might like us, they can't single us out for special favors which might bring investigations upon them regarding the Jap pressure group which dictates their policies.

Now, who was the Jap pressure group which dictated the policies of the W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall having written that, but I must have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well!

Mr. MASAOKA. As I say, I must have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Oh!

Mr. MASAOKA. I would like to know, as a matter of form, just what we are all driving at so that I can answer it in terms of that nature

instead of one question here and there. I have so many people here asking me questions at random that it is difficult for me to keep a clear thought on it, and I request you gentlemen, if at all possible, to tell me what you are driving at, what you are seeking for, and try to make it as logical and follow-up as possible. I think that is only fair to me.

Mr. COSTELLO. We are trying to determine what your relationship with the W. R. A. was as the representative of the J. A. C. L.; to what extent, possibly, J. A. C. L. might have dictated, as was indicated in your statement, the policies of W. R. A., if they were dictated to by any outside groups.

Mr. MASAOKA. They were not dictated to.

Mr. COSTELLO. There are numerous statements in here in the various documents which have been shown to you, all of them written by yourself, that indicate that you had access to a great deal of information.

A number of times you used the word "confidential" in regard to directives of W. R. A. The indications seem to be that you were given secret information that was not being divulged to anyone else; statements regarding the relationships within the War Department, relations between the W. R. A., and various agencies of the Government. You seem to have a great deal of knowledge concerning those things; I think far more than any member of Congress might acquire.

Now comes this indication that the W. R. A. is being dictated to by pressure groups. We are trying to find out by presenting these documents—and they are all your own statements, typed up by you—whether they are true or not, and to what extent you actually did have access to this confidential information, had knowledge of rifts between the departments, if it was going on, or as to policy, and who was going to win, and how it was going to be done and, finally, whether or not you were exerting pressure on W. R. A. as to their program.

Mr. MASAOKA. I can make a general statement, if you wish.

Mr. COSTELLO. The reason we are asking you these specific questions one by one is to determine the exact answer to each item, to determine to what extent you really had these influences that are indicated.

Mr. MASAOKA. As far as gas rationing is concerned, some of our workers in Salt Lake City, in going out investigating sugar beets and reserves and that, desired additional gas, and they requested that we talk to the W. R. A. about the possibility of getting gas rationing privileges, but that was never taken up with the W. R. A.

Mr. MATTHEWS. My question did not have so much to do with the gas-rationing item in here as it did with identifying what you describe as the Jap pressure group which dictates the policy of the W. R. A. Did you have any such group in mind?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You meant the J. A. C. L., did you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. We like to think that we had considerable influence. We like to think that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently, at the time you wrote that, you thought you did have influence over W. R. A.

Mr. MASAOKA. Not an undue influence.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, there the statement is used "Dictates the policy." I think that is pretty definite and rather strong language.



Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I often use strong language; in fact, I think if you look at any group which cooperates or attempts to work with almost any agency of the Government, you will find such strong statements.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think in a particular instance of this kind, the furthest you would dare to go would be that "We are endeavoring to exert our influence on W. R. A. to have them approve our program." Here the language used is "Dictates the policy of." Now, "dictates" can only be interpreted by the language in which it is used. Unlike the word "confidential," I do not think you can disclaim that it means "exaggeration." You use the word "dictates" in relation to an altogether new program, so the word "dictates" is a very strong word, and I think it only has one connotation, that Jap pressure groups are employed to dictate the program of W. R. A. I do not know how you can put any other interpretation on that language.

Mr. MASAOKA. If we were actually dictating the program of W. R. A., there would be many things done which they are not now doing. Now, originally the statements, the attitudes, and our principles regarding the entire resettlement and any other evacuation program were submitted to the Government. That was during the days that General DeWitt first established his exclusion orders. If we actually dictated the policies of the W. R. A., then those policies would have been carried out. In most instances they were not carried out. I think that should be a sufficient answer.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Masaoka, did you attend a conference sometime about the middle of September 1942, which was also attended by Mr. Myer and Mr. Glick and Roger Baldwin and Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn?

Mr. MASAOKA. Where was the conference held?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, did you attend such a conference where those persons were present?

Mr. MASAOKA. I recall there was such a person.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you know where it was held then, or do you recall?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think it was held there, but I don't know for sure. It may have been held in New York.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On page 14 of your report dated September 19, 1942, I read as follows:

An interesting side light of week end and one which must be kept on the q. t. is the meeting attended by Myer and Glick, the two top men in the War Relocation Authority, a special representative of the Justice Department, Roger Baldwin and Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn of the A. C. L. U., and me.

Who was the special representative of the Justice Department who was with you on that occasion?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall the name. I think he was a friend of Mr. Meiklejohn.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You do not know whether that would have been Mr. Ennis or not?

Mr. MATTHEWS. It was not Mr. Ennis.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, did Mr. McWilliams?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. At whose behest was this conference called?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Why did you advise keeping this meeting on the q. t.?

Mr. MASAOKA. What was the meeting about? There were a number of conferences.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Oh, you had a number of conferences with those same individuals?

Mr. MASAOKA. Perhaps not, but we had a number of conferences with Mr. Baldwin and others.

Mr. MATTHEWS. With Mr. Glick and Mr. Myer and Mr. Meiklejohn?

Mr. MASAOKA. They may have been at some of those.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you have a number of conferences at which those same persons were present?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe so; I am not quite sure.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, Mr. Myer, Mr. Meiklejohn, Mr. Glick, and yourself conferred on more than one occasion regarding W. R. A. policies?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is quite possible.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not care whether it was possible, but did you have more than one meeting with those same persons?

Mr. MASAOKA. To my knowledge.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you call the conference?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Who invited you to attend?

Mr. MASAOKA. Charlie, I was there. I asked if I could go in.

Mr. COSTELLO. You requested that you might go in?

Mr. MASAOKA. Generally; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. How did you hear about the conferences?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I contacted Mr. Baldwin and the others. When Mr. Baldwin comes into town from New York he calls on me and I ask him what he is doing. If he is going to see Mr. Myer or somebody else, I ask him if I can go along with him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. At this conference did Mr. Myer and Mr. Baldwin both agree that you were the key man in the United States on this question of Japanese Centers?

Mr. MASAOKA. They may be a little boasting.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A little boasting. You did write that though; did you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Further, in describing this conference, you wrote—referring to Roger Baldwin now [reading]:

He came over hot and bothered from a tangle with the Post Office Department about a cancelation of a small newspaper's mailing privileges, and went right to work on the Government boys. Was I on the spot? Both parties concerned knew who had put those questions in Roger's mouth.

What was this small newspaper whose mailing privileges had been canceled?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall the name at all. I think that was the time of the Justice Department—or, rather, the Post Office Department denying mailing privileges, you know, to some of these smaller magazines.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Japanese magazines?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. It had no connection with the Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. Axis magazines?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I don't believe they were Axis. I don't recall.

Mr. STRIPLING. The Police Gazette and others.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that is it; Police Gazette and some of these showy French magazines.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then you say [reading]:

Roger wondered how come the War Relocation Authority knew so much about some of their proposed moves. Glick and Myer wondered how Baldwin had such a grasp of the War Relocation Authority internal policies. The Justice guy just had a lot of fun refereeing the legal jousts between Baldwin and Glick and expressing the Justice Department's views. Myer enjoyed most of it. I felt badly all the way through. But, the new spirit of the War Relocation Authority was explained in quite some detail to the American Civil Liberties Union—

Mr. MASAOKA. That was the Civil Liberties.

Mr. MATTHEWS [reading]:

boys so the War Relocation Authority can't renig on them. That's one consolation in spite of my embarrassment. Another curious thing was that both the War Relocation Authority and the American Civil Liberties Union thought that the other was abusing me and each was determined to sell to the other the idea that I was probably the keyman on this situation in this country just now and that all efforts should be made to save me from embarrassment. The upshot of it all was that everyone left with considerably greater respect for each other and strangely enough, no one held me too much to blame for the confusion. The next day, both Myer and Baldwin congratulated me on the work which I was doing.

Now, what did all of that refer to?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am confused, too, frankly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did it have anything to do with this newspaper's mailing privileges?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. We had all sorts of bull sessions, you know; just ribbing about things. I am definitely confused about that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall when this meeting took place?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I don't.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was it during the day some time, in a Government office?

Mr. MASAOKA. That I couldn't tell you.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Or did you have a meeting at night, of this character?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; no. We often met over dinner tables and kidded each other about everything.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you mean by "We," you and Dillon Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; Roger Baldwin, particularly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, there was a special representative of the Department of Justice there, though?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, he just happened to be invited or came along with Dr. Meiklejohn, I suppose. Is there any reference to that that might help unconfuse me?

Mr. MATTHEWS. I wonder what it was that so impressed you on this occasion. Here were both Mr. Baldwin, representing the Civil Liberties, and Mr. Myer, representing W. R. A.—

Mr. MASAOKA. That was not the first time I was impressed.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And both, apparently, arguing with you and abusing you, at least in each other's minds abusing you. You seem to have been the center of some controversy.

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall it, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, here is a point that might enlighten the committee on the importance of Mr. Masaoka. Who is George Inagaki?

Mr. MASAOKA. George Inagaki was a man who came out with me in the very beginning.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was he impressed with your importance and contacts here in Washington?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think he was.

Mr. STRIPLING. On September 30, 1942, he wrote you:

DEAR MIKE: Received your wire concerning new War Relocation Authority directive. Sounds good. However, I'm wondering how it actually works. Will it mean that very many more will be able to get out? They still must obtain the O. K. of the W. R. A. which requires a number of qualifications, practically the same as before \* \* \* Or are the qualifications to be relaxed a great deal? No doubt, if I wait a day or so the explanations will be announced. At this moment those are the thoughts that come to my mind.

Is Mrs. Roosevelt's hand in the back of this latest move on the part of the W. R. A.? Or did Myer figure it out by himself?

Mr. MASAOKA. After all, gentlemen, you have the records. I can't remember as well as the records. Now, draw your own conclusion.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that the reason why you typed so much of this information; that you forgot it and, therefore, you put it in typing so that you would have the information available for future use?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not necessarily.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or was it a lapse of memory that caused you to type down in detail so much of this?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, I used to love to write.

Captain HALL. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion at this point?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes, Captain.

Captain HALL. There have appeared before this committee this afternoon several references to a rift within the War Department, between the civilian and military. It appears, I think, in a letter that Mr. Masaoka wrote.

I was in a position throughout this period to become familiar with this entire picture, and so far as I was concerned—and I was in a position to know—no such rift ever did arise.

For the benefit of the press, and for the benefit of this committee, I thought I should bring that to your attention at this time, with the suggestion that if you wish testimony from somebody in authority in the War Department, it might be a good idea to procure such testimony in order to correct any misunderstanding or wrong impression that might arise from what appeared in Mr. Masaoka's letter.

Mr. MASAOKA. You recall on that particular thing, I said that I had heard.

Mr. COSTELLO. For the purpose of the record, you might give your full name and your position so that the record will be clear.

Captain HALL. Capt. John M. Hall, in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War.

Mr. COSTELLO. You suggest, Captain, if we desire to have some witness from the War Department in this connection, we might contact the Under Secretary of War?

Captain HALL. Or the Assistant Secretary. I want to point out also in that connection that at a press conference some 2 weeks ago



the Secretary of War said that any rumors in connection with such a rift as has been portrayed here was, and I think I am quoting him accurately, complete nonsense.

Mr. MUNDT. May I ask, Captain, whether, to your knowledge and through your observation, Mr. Masaoka has ever called on Assistant Secretary of War McCloy?

Captain HALL. He has.

Mr. MUNDT. He has?

Captain HALL. Right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There was discussion, of course, between the War Department and the W. R. A. officials; discussion in relation to the handling of the Japanese relocation centers and the release of these Japanese, was there not?

Captain HALL. There were innumerable discussions on that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They did not always agree, in the first instance, as to how the problem should be solved?

Captain HALL. Well, there were innumerable conferences on the whole question. It is a part that affects the military security of the country. That part is the War Department's interest in the country.

Mr. MUNDT. Certainly. If a definite policy had been decided upon at the very beginning, there would not have been need for innumerable discussions.

Captain HALL. No; I won't say that was correct. I think the innumerable discussions were very important and very necessary, as the progress of life in these relocation centers was constantly changed. It requires constant attention. There were always new problems arising.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you very much, Captain.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Masaoka, did you have frequent conferences with Roger Baldwin?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How often would you say you met Mr. Baldwin?

Mr. MASAOKA. When I was in the East, at least twice a month.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did those meetings take place in Washington or in New York or in both places?

Mr. MASAOKA. Both places.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you make any special trips to New York to see Mr. Baldwin?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he make special trips to Washington to see you?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't believe I was that important in his scheme of things, but if he came down here he usually told me about his trip here.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Baldwin is the director of the American Civil Liberties Union?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Could you describe the interest of the American Civil Liberties Union in your particular organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. The American Civil Liberties Union, as I see it, is dedicated to preserving as near as possible the civil liberties of all groups, regardless of their racial ancestry, in time of war as

in time of peace. They are dedicated to protect, as much as possible, the legitimate civil rights of every individual within the United States. They felt that the evacuation was unconstitutional. They felt that the treatment which we were receiving was not as good as it should be. They felt that they had an interest, as Americans, in doing everything possible to correct the conditions within the centers and, if possible, to seek their relations on the outside and back into normal communities. I believe that will state their interest in the case although Mr. Roger Baldwin, of course, would be in a better position to officially and efficiently express the interest of the association.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has the American Civil Liberties Union today volunteered their services and help to you as the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did they volunteer to you?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You did not go to them and contact them?

Mr. MASAOKA. It was a case of both of them; in other words, we had some contacts with them on the Pacific coast, and when I came here, naturally, I called upon them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had the Japanese American Citizens League had contact with the American Civil Liberties Union prior to the evacuation period?

Mr. MASAOKA. Only with local officers situated on the Pacific coast.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the time of the evacuation, and from then on, the American Civil Liberties Union took an active part and interest in what was being done to the Japanese group?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was it Mr. Wirin, the representative of the American Civil Liberties Union on the Pacific coast, that you dealt with?

Mr. MASAOKA. He is one of them; yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Abraham Lincoln Wirin?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. He, at the present time, happens to be our counsel.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Whose counsel?

Mr. MASAOKA. The Japanese American Citizens League counsel.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Wirin is now counsel for the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir. He represented us in the *Reagan case* and the cases before the Supreme Court.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In this letter which you sent to national headquarters staff on September 11, 1942—

Mr. MASAOKA. That was before we had contacted Wirin or known him so well personally.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You wrote as follows:

I have just seen Roger Baldwin and he showed me a number of confidential letters.

Did he show you some confidential letters?

Mr. MASAOKA. He may have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The letter further states:

One of them was from Dr. Lamb of the Tolan committee which expressed great concern over the Fascist elements in the relocation centers—

What was the nature of those Fascist elements in the relocation centers?

Mr. MASAOKA. I really don't recall.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were they Japanese Fascist elements?

Mr. MASAOKA. I presume so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is that what you were referring to?

Mr. MASAOKA. I presume that was what he was referring to.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you wrote the letter, did you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; but that was, after all, in September of last year, I can't remember everything.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Masaoka, was it a part of the policy of the Japanese American Citizens League, or of you personally, that the communities into which evacuees were distributed, should not be notified that these evacuees were going into them?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, we had no policy on the matter. Generally, it was left up to the W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether it was the W. R. A. policy to withhold such information?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know. It was understood that it was considered before a person was released that he had some sort of community acceptance.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; I know that. I was just wondering whether they were trying to withhold from these communities that these evacuees were entering the community.

Mr. MASAOKA. Not that I know of.

Mr. MUNDT. On October 9, 1942, Joe—and I imagine that is Joe Kanazawa—wrote you a letter. I will quote one paragraph of it.

Here is something rather serious. It seems that one of the center papers printed the fact that Mrs. Ickes is looking for Nisei help, and the news got out. Mr. Ickes didn't like that, and Mr. Holland said it put him in an embarrassing spot the other day when he met the Secretary. Naturally, Mr. Holland was displeased and asked us to be more careful. Of course, he knows that we weren't responsible, but asked that we try and do something about keeping a better blanket over such matters that are best not publicized.

That would appear to indicate that the W. R. A. felt it best not to publicize the fact that these evacuees were going into private employment in specific localities.

Mr. MASAOKA. I think Mr. Myer or someone from the W. R. A. can answer that, as to their policy.

Mr. MUNDT. You do not know what their policy was, then?

Mr. MASAOKA. As I say, I presume in accordance with their regulations, that some sort of community acceptance was required. On the other hand, I believe and I think that it is a wise move not to publish to everybody that persons of Japanese ancestry are coming into a community, for the simple reason that the great majority of American people still have a wrong impression concerning the Japanese people. We still have race baiters; we still have people who take advantage of it.

Mr. MUNDT. You think it would help the Japanese themselves if it were publicized along with the statement that these Japanese were investigated and that their loyalty was unquestioned and should be accepted the same as any other racial group?

Mr. MASAOKA. That may have helped.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, do you not feel that this matter of secrecy, regarding the fact that Japanese were brought into a community, might be detrimental; the community suddenly realizing that they had some Japanese people living in their midsts somewhere and wondering where they might have originated? Do you not think they would be more inclined to stir up that antagonism or feeling if they did that secretly?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't believe there was that secrecy that certain people have attributed to the program. In one or two instances in the case of secrecy, I guess, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you see any reason for secrecy as to Japanese people working for Mr. Ickes rather than for anybody else?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir; I can't.

Mr. MUNDT. Neither can I.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive a letter from Washington headquarters addressed to you in New York on October 13, 1942?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that letter from Joe Kanazawa, as far as you can tell?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I would believe so. Let me see; what date is that? Yes; it probably was.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I read you from this letter the third paragraph of the first page:

Re Ickes: It was not Ickes at all, but Wickard who was irked by undue publicity. Japanese American Citizens League is absolutely clear on this matter, as it seems that the War Relocation Authority regional office let the news slip out, just as reported in Pacific Citizen. San Francisco Chronicle headline read something like "Wickard seeks to employ Japs," or words to that effect. This was one of those things and unfortunate, and I am sure Myer and Rowalt are doing something about it on the west coast. Holland, of course, wants such news soft-pedalled and the less publicity the better, as far as he is concerned. That was all he said about my leading remark about a voluntary censorship. When I mentioned the latter to Provinse, he opposed it on the ground that if the newspapers outside and the anti-Japanese groups learned of such voluntary censorship, they would want to know what was being censored. Catch? That is, if we ran editorials or urged the center papers to censor themselves voluntarily.

Of course, if we can do it in an indirect way without breaking into print, that would be all right. Anyway, it is necessary that for the sake of public relations the newspapers and publicity departments of the centers take a long-range view and censor such matter as would bring criticism upon the War Relocation Authority program. Such as the Wickard publicity, which was so unfortunate. Don't know just what Wickard plans but I am told that he sort of laughed it off and he may hire Nisei for his farm after all. I hope he does.

Do you recall having received that from Joe Kanazawa?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I recall that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, with respect to that——

Mr. MASAOKA. Is there a point to that?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, the point has to do with the questioning by Congressman Mundt concerning the policy of suppression of news in regard to those who were resettled. Your position here was that there should be secrecy, or a voluntary censorship.

Mr. MASAOKA. May I explain this voluntary censorship? This may seem very trivial to the committee, but many of the newspapermen in the centers forget that the center papers are distributed on the outside as well as in the centers.

To cite one example. In one case, I believe it was in one of the Idaho centers, the chief of police requested that the young men and young



women do not use the latrines for such and such an art, for their rendezvous, which is natural. You know, after all, they are in centers. He requested that, and the center paper played it over the headlines, you see.

Now, certain groups on the outside got the paper, misunderstood that, and began the ball rolling that we had illegitimacy in the centers and it all happened in these latrines.

Mr. MUNDT. I appreciate the situation. Sometimes even legitimate papers make a mistake.

Mr. MASAOKA. So nothing was done in connection with the voluntary censorship. It was just an idea that he had.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But there were individuals, you say, who were irked over undue publicity.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is, individuals; yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Regarding their application for Japanese to come to them out of the relocation centers.

Mr. MASAOKA. In other words, certain people felt it was their own private business whether they hired Americans of Japanese ancestry or not. After all, they would be paid by the individual, but the individual himself was responsible for his actions. He did not want it paraded to the high skies of publicizing it.

Now, I can appreciate it, as I think of it—well, I don't know Secretary Ickes' viewpoint, but people might say if he publicized it, that he was trying to show off, or something of that sort, and therefore he wanted to do it quietly.

Mr. MATTHEWS. With respect to the employment of Japanese from the relocation centers, do you have any apprehension lest those persons be induced to accept employment at an exploitation wage, in order to get out of the relocation centers?

Mr. MASAOKA. We have made representations from time to time that under no circumstances should persons of Japanese ancestry be exploited. After all, exploitation of any group is bad, not only for the war effort, but for the country's long-time thinking. Once we crush any group, whether they be Japanese, Mexicans, or anyone else, we render that group valueless to the unity which America needs to win the war. If persons of Japanese ancestry are going out to be resettled and given exploitation wages, or work they can neither do or replace other persons, that is a dangerous program and one which we never advocated.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you feel that the persons employed by Secretaries Ickes and Wickard were being underpaid?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that I made some statement to that effect in connection with one of them.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You thought they were being exploited?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not that they were being exploited, but I said "That is a heck of a wage for a Cabinet officer to pay," or some such remark.

Mr. MUNDT. What wage did he pay?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know. Here is the difficulty, gentlemen. With all due respect to Congressman Costello, California does pay pretty fine wages, especially in comparison with the Midwest and the far East.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In reference to Secretary Ickes, you stated he was paying them far below what they would receive on the Pacific coast.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe I did make some such remark.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you did, did you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I made some remark of that nature. I believe that has been adjusted now. It is my understanding that the W. R. A. through the Release Division, checks upon the wage which they are to receive, and if that wage is below the minimum wage set by the employment office, that they are not released. That is my understanding.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I think that this section of the report should go in at that point, in connection with the matter of the report of October 7, 1942, page 12.

Holland has been able to interest a number of Cabinet officials and their wives in employing Japanese Americans. Secretary of Agriculture Wickard has just hired two Nisei farmers. Mrs. Ickes, wife of Secretary of the Interior, wants three farm workers and one general house worker. In every case like this, it is important that only excellent representative people who can sell themselves be hired. That is why I wired national headquarters in Salt Lake City to suggest three people who might be acceptable to Mrs. Ickes. Although the pay is not great, usually being far below what they may have received on the Pacific coast, it seems to me that each of these are wonderful opportunities for our girls and fellows to make important contacts. If these preliminary workers turn out well, other Cabinet officers will follow suit. This is one of the best chances that we have ever had to do some real public relations work in a vital, personal way so I am counting on the Salt Lake City group to come through on this as well as other such requests as we may telegraph in to them.

Did you discuss such a program with Mr. Holland of interesting his Government officials in obtaining Japanese evacuees?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that was his own idea.

May I say this for the record? We believe in a program of dispersal for American citizens of Japanese ancestry. We do not believe that they should be concentrated as they were on the Pacific coast area. We believe that is dangerous, especially for a small minority group which, because of certain physical characteristics, can be easily distinguished, and which is the subject of race prejudice. I believe when the American people get to know these Americans of Japanese ancestry, know who they really are and what they really want, that we will be able to get along and become more assimilated. We believe if we can get to know the American people and when the American people can get to know us, this Japanese-American problem, so-called, will solve itself. As the first generation passes away and as the second generation come and are segregated and scattered around the United States, they cannot constitute a dangerous menace, because of segregation or concentration of any part; therefore, we have always stood for a program of dispersal. I believe that is the American way to handle that problem.

Mr. MATTHEWS. A moment ago I was asking Mr. Masaoka about confidential letters shown him by Roger Baldwin. I asked him about one of them, as he described it, a letter of Dr. Lamb of the Tolan committee

Then, you said another confidential letter was from the Justice Department which suggested that neither the F. B. I. nor the Army nor Naval Intelligence desired the evacuation, but that some powerful west coast elements relayed the matter. Did Roger Baldwin show you such confidential communication from the Justice Department?

Mr. MASAOKA. He may have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you surely would recall it if he had.

Mr. MASAOKA. I have seen numerous letters to that effect.

Mr. MATTHEWS. From the Justice Department?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not from the Justice Department; from various groups.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall who signed this particular memorandum from the Justice Department?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. May I ask that all these reports and letters referred to today be received as exhibits for the record?

Mr. COSTELLO. They will be received as exhibits and made a part of the record.

Mr. STRIPLING. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee is going to stand in recess at this time, and I might state, Mr. Masaoka, that you will be subject to appearance before the committee and I will ask that you return here on Tuesday morning under the same subpoena. The committee, in all likelihood, will meet Monday morning at 10:30.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., July 3, 1943, an adjournment was taken to Tuesday, July 6, 1943, at 10:30 a. m.)





# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, JULY 6, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a. m. in room 1301, House Office Building, the Honorable John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, and Hon. Herman P. Eberharter.

Also present: Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator, and J. B. Matthews, director of research for the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Mr. Stripling, will you proceed with the witness?

## TESTIMONY OF MIKE MASAOKA—Recalled

Mr. MASAOKA. May I apologize for being late, which is due to the trains these days?

Mr. COSTELLO. Schedules no doubt are being disarranged. It is not necessary for you to be sworn again. You were sworn on Saturday, and you are still under oath.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, when the committee was last in session you were asked if you ever received from the War Relocation Authority its directives and administrative orders. As I recall your testimony, you stated that you had not.

Mr. MASAOKA. I had. I think Mr. Kanazawa received most of them, however.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you ever personally receive any of them yourself?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have, through the mails.

Mr. STRIPLING. You are familiar with the directives which Mr. Kanazawa obtained; are you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. With most of them; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Speak a little louder so that we can hear up here.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am sorry, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, here are two folders which contain administrative instructions of the War Relocation Authority and which were in the files of the Japanese American Citizens League when the subpoena duces tecum was served on the custodian of those records. It appears that it is a complete file of all of the administra-

tive instructions, even instructions, which I am sure, the Japanese American Citizens League or no outsider would be interested in.

For instance, Administrative Instruction No. 15, supplement 1, dated February 4, 1943, deals with the handling and safekeeping of restricted and confidential and secret documents within the W. R. A.

The next Administrative Instruction No. 21, supplement 1, deals with the purchases from Army depot and market centers.

Now, Mr. Masaoka, naturally the J. A. C. L. would not be interested in those types of directives. Did you receive copies of all directives from the W. R. A. which they issued to their staff?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I wouldn't know whether we received them all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did the J. A. C. L. buy this folder, or was this furnished to you also?

Mr. MASAOKA. That is the first time I have seen the folder.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, in the other folder, under the heading of "War Relocation Authority No. 31," it states: "For the use of the W. R. A. staff only. Not for publication." This particular one is dated January 9, 1943, and in the corner is the notation, in pencil "Joe K." I assume that refers to Mr. Joe Kanazawa.

Also, the next directive, No. 33, states: "For the use of the W. R. A. staff only."

Can you explain to the committee, Mr. Masaoka, how Mr. Kanazawa or you came into possession of interoffice communications which were apparently confidential in their nature?

Mr. MASAOKA. You see, I left Washington in the middle of November and I did not return until May, I believe is correct. The interim period was taken care of by Mr. Kanazawa.

Mr. MUNDT. When did you leave, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. I left about the middle of November, I believe, for Salt Lake City, and I remained there—I got married, in fact, and I remained there until the fore part of May of this year.

Mr. MUNDT. From about November?

Mr. MASAOKA. If my memory serves me correctly.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should be cleared up in this regard, because Joe Kanazawa testified, you will recall, that the W. R. A. was providing him and the J. A. C. L. with strictly confidential office files, at which time I said, in my opinion, that was the most amazing testimony we had before this committee as yet; utterly unjustified and indefensible, not only as to the J. A. C. L., but any other group for Government offices to broadcast the information to this organization and it being denied to the newspapers.

Then we ask Mr. Masaoka, and he states to his knowledge no such confidential files had been received, and he says he left there in November. I notice that these confidential reports, which are confidential and are marked "Not for publication" and were so marked by the Office of War Relocation Authority, came in the early part of 1943, so there is a conflict in the testimony between Mr. Masaoka, who says they did not arrive while he was there, and Mr. Kanazawa, who says that they did. Mrs. Kanazawa says she was greatly disturbed that any governmental agency should give that highly confidential information out for their files. The files are here and the records so show.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you return to Washington subsequently?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; the fore part of May, I believe.

Mr. COSTELLO. How long did you remain here then?

Mr. MASAOKA. Until I was called into the Army. That would be the latter part of May.

Mr. MATTHEWS. After your return to Washington, you wrote reports to the national headquarters of the J. A. C. L. stating that you were receiving these confidential directives from the W. R. A., and Mr. Kanazawa testified that he had written those reports at your dictation.

Mr. MASAOKA. After.

Mr. MATTHEWS. After your return. Yes; there is a late one.

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not personally receive any of the reports.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And what you wrote in your report to national headquarters fits in with what happened while you were gone.

Mr. MASAOKA. May I make this statement for the record? These reports were not written day by day. These reports were lumped, or a summary of what I remembered. I did not keep accurate specific dates and notes and everything else at the end of the week, or whenever I happened to write them. Much of it comes from memory.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, did you ever submit to Mr. Dillon Myer, the Director of the War Relocation Authority, a memorandum on segregation?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the essence of your memorandum?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall it technically. I recall that I did send him one on segregation.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your letter of January 14, 1943, you said:

I have just sent air mail, special delivery, a confidential memorandum to Myer regarding segregation. It is somewhat late, but in view of the circumstances it could not be helped.

Does that refresh your memory as to what you might have written to Mr. Myer on the question of segregation, and why you say it was confidential?

Mr. MASAOKA. Why it was necessary or desirable, of course, I think is readily understood. We have always stood for some sort of segregation, provided it was not done on an arbitrary, mechanical basis; on an individual basis, where suitable hearings and investigations are taken, I think segregation is possible and desirable. I think it was along something of that line.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Myer request the memorandum?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am not sure.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, did you personally conduct a so-called lobby against the Stewart bill, which was introduced by Senator Stewart?

Mr. MASAOKA. "Lobby" is not quite the word. I would have, quite naturally, liked to see its defeat.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was it a campaign?

Mr. MASAOKA. Campaign or drive.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is the status of the Stewart bill?

Mr. MASAOKA. I do not know at the present time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did it ever pass?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, sir. I think it was defeated last year and then reintroduced this year and it was referred to the committee, so far as I know.

Mr. STRIPLING. During the course of your campaign did you receive the assistance of any Government officials in defeating the bill?

Mr. MASAOKA. Naturally we took it up with a number of Government officials.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you recall who they were?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I do not.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to Mr. Masaoka's report of June 27, 1942, which states:

Re Stewart bill: Confidentially, and not for publication as yet, but I think that we've either defeated the bill outright or have caused its postponement sufficiently long for our friends to marshal their forces for its ultimate defeat. Frankly, I'm quite proud of the speed with which we were able to whip up enough sentiment to bring about this change in attitude, for when Senator Murdock called me on the matter, he and many others were conceding its passage within the week. Because I think you're interested in the programs which we carried out, I'll take the time to outline it briefly, but this is not for print, as it may get us into a lot of trouble, for many persons involved did so as individuals and not as officials of the Government.

Do you recall who you referred to there as "individuals"?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I do not. However, I would like to make this statement. I have never heard it said that it was un-American or undemocratic to attempt through legitimate means to defeat or to cause to be defeated, any bill, particularly bills such as the Stewart bill, which I believe is un-American.

Mr. STRIPLING. The committee is simply seeking to identify people; Government officials, Mr. Masaoka.

Mr. MASAOKA. I wish to say for the record, however, that we do not concede that it is un-American or anything of the sort.

Mr. COSTELLO. Why all the reference to this particular statement as to keeping it quiet and not letting it get out, if there was nothing harmful in the activities than the J. A. C. L. was conducting?

Mr. MASAOKA. It was not keeping it quiet and not letting it get out. It was simply for the home office.

Mr. COSTELLO. You were keeping your activities quiet as far as the public was concerned; that there should be no notification as far as the J. A. C. L. was concerned and as to what they were doing in their effort to defeat this legislation.

Mr. MASAOKA. In this particular bill and particular bills of this sort, when persons of Japanese ancestry are, shall we say, on the spot, it is more effective if we can get others to carry the ball for us, so to speak.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is true, and the best way for Communists to get legislation through is not for them to do it themselves, but to get others to do it for them.

Mr. MASAOKA. You are not indicting us for being Communists?

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I just say that is the method used by the Communists; the method you have used.

Mr. MASAOKA. It is the method used by all groups and any colleges and elsewhere; in fact, that was the procedure, if I may use the American technique.



Mr. COSTELLO. If there is nothing secretive about it, then there should be no fear on your part about bringing your efforts out in the open as to how you felt about the legislation.

Mr. MASAOKA. We told the public about it and exactly as we told the newspapers about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your statement that was read to you indicated the very opposite. You did not want to let the public know what was going on. Proceed.

Mr. STRIPLING. The report further states, Mr. Chairman [reading]:

I remained in Washington to see Roger Baldwin, national director of the American Civil Liberties Union, about this matter. Fortunately, he had two of his national committee with him, Dr. Arthur Garfield Hayes, grandson of President Hayes, and Alexander Meiklejohn, the famous author and writer of political thought and trends. We discussed this matter at great length and then went up in a body to see Mr. Victor Rotnem, Chief of the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice. After considerable discussion, Rotnem agreed to make a plea to Attorney General Biddle to personally intervene. Next, I called on Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Harlan F. Stone and presented the matter to him informally and unofficially. Because of his position, he could not do anything officially but he did say that he would send someone over to discuss this matter with the Department of Justice and Stewart. He seemed quite interested in the entire question of citizenship and civil rights for the Japanese Americans, but more on this later. I then went to confer with Clarence W. Pickett, of the American Friends Service Committee, and mapped out with him a campaign which his group might carry on to defeat this bill. Then, up to Senator Thomas' office, but as the good Senator was busy on the Work Projects Administration bill, I spent the time with the office secretaries. Next, over to see Glick, solicitor, and Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority, to arouse them as to what might happen in the centers if this bill should go through and what would happen to their program. They became very interested and agreed to see the President, the Attorney General, the Secretaries of War and Agriculture, and try to get them to personally oppose its passage.

Did you see Mr. Glick and Mr. Myer?

Mr. MASAOKA. To the best of my remembrance; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did they go to see the President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Agriculture?

Mr. MASAOKA. That I don't know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Arthur Garfield Hays identify himself to you as the grandson of President Rutherford B. Hayes?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; that was my own guess. I believe someone else mentioned it to me.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You know that Arthur Garfield Hays spells his name Hays and the President's name was not spelled that way.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is the first time it has been called to my attention.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Ennis of the Department of Justice ever tell you that he had written a letter for the Attorney General's signature protesting to the Senate committee on Immigration and Naturalization the Stewart bill?

Mr. MASAOKA. He may have.

Mr. STRIPLING. What features of the Stewart bill were there that aroused Mr. Myer and Mr. Glick as they affected the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MASAOKA. The general features of the thing. The spirit of the Stewart bill, I think, is contradictory to the best tenets of American faith and the doctrines of democracy.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, is the program of the Japanese American Citizens League limited, in general, to the welfare and interests of the Nisei?

Mr. MASAOKA. In general, yes; but we have gone outside of that scope. For example, we have intervened on behalf of our parents from time to time. Generally, I think those two are the considerations.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, have you ever drawn up a program of J. A. C. L. objectives for the Issei?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. The Japanese nationals.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, how would that fit in with your program of being interested only in Japanese Americans?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would like to state, as I stated Saturday, I believe it was, that the Japanese and the Japanese Americans in this country form a peculiar segment of our population, as is well known by Congressman Costello.

Our first generation parent group, through no fault of their own but because of a naturalization law in this country, are not permitted to become citizens of the United States. Many of our parents, in fact, the great majority of them, have been here 30 or 40 years. They resided here as good citizens and contributed much to the welfare of this country. We believe that they are good citizens.

Now, because of the peculiar circumstances of immigration, we, the American citizens of Japanese ancestry, are a particularly young group, whereas our parents average around approximately 59 or 60 years of age. We, the American citizens, average only about 21, which means that the great majority of us are still dependent upon our parents for many things.

Now, our parents stayed here when they could have gone back to Japan. Our parents raised us here in the United States; had us attend American schools, American churches, make American friends, because they intended that we remain here as Americans.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you talking now of all of the Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; the great majority, I am saying.

Mr. STRIPLING. You are not speaking of the Kibei, are you?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you state in about 10 or 15 words what the Stewart bill is?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think the witness ought to be permitted to finish his statement. He was making a statement and I think he should be permitted to finish.

Mr. MASAOKA. I said, I believe, we should be tied up with our parents in this particular case. In wartime it seems rather unusual that loyal Americans shall try to help, shall we say, enemy aliens. The fact is that these people are our people. If they are willing to have their sons, for example, join in the armed forces of the United States and to fight against their own country, then I believe parents of that nature should be granted the right to become citizens. I think that is really fair and I think that is really right.

Along other lines I feel that if it can be shown that our parents are entitled to the status of friendly aliens, well, certainly, they should

be given that privilege for the simple reason that they are under greater pressure today than almost any other group. Why? They cannot like the Germans and Italians and other enemy aliens become citizens of the United States, by no overt acts of their own. They are prevented by an act of law, the law of the United States. Now, if they are willing to sacrifice again, as I said, their lives and blood, their own flesh and blood, I think they are entitled to the privileges of good citizens. If they can pass the examination, naturalization examinations, which are nowadays based upon the record and their own knowledge, then certainly if they can demonstrate they are good Americans, I feel they should be granted the privileges of Americanism.

Now, take my own particular family, for example. They loathe Japan. They escaped from Japan because of political difficulties. They came here seeking political asylum. They raised their families here. Four of us are now in the armed forces of the United States—pardon me, five of us.

My father has long since passed away, but mother has always insisted that we be good Americans. None of us has ever gone to a Japanese school. We have all been educated the American way and all of us are willing to stake our lives on the American way of living.

Now, for such people as my mother and there are thousands of them, I believe that citizenship or, at least, a friendly alien status, ought to be granted, and I say that very sincerely, because I know my mother and I know others like her.

Now, the Congressman had a question on the Stewart bill.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; since Mr. Stripling brought that question up.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any idea as to how many Japanese born in this country were sent back to Japan for their education; how many Nisei there would be in that group?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have heard many conflicting figures on that. Personally I have none of my own. I have made estimates from time to time, but I don't know how accurate they are.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is not the custom to send Japanese girls back to Japan to secure their education, is it?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is more customary to send men.

Mr. COSTELLO. More customary to send men?

Mr. MASAOKA. In most families it is considered that the men have a better chance for making a livelihood. They will support the family afterward. The wife gets married, and that is about all, unless they were interested in commerce or for other reasons.

Mr. MUNDT. What would be your best estimate as to the number of Kibei in this country now?

Mr. MASAOKA. In this country now? About between five and ten thousand, I would say. But, of course, we have a question of the definition of "Kibei" too. If a person simply goes and visits Japan, I don't think he would be classified as a Kibei, you see.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many Japanese in this country, Japanese Americans, Mr. Masaoka, do you think have attended Japanese language schools?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, I think the great majority of them have.

Mr. STRIPLING. The great majority?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; for this simple reason, as a matter of communication, the same thing that other groups did. I think the older the



citizens of American Japanese ancestry, the fewer will become the schools. With the passing of the first generation, the great need for them, I think, will go.

Another thing I wish to call to your attention is the fact that back in the twenties, an attempt was made to have Japanese included in the curriculum of the high schools and colleges of California. I believe, Mr. Congressman, you recall that, but I believe that it failed.

The tragedy now seems to be that there are not enough people who speak Japanese; I believe our Military and Naval Intelligence have difficulty recruiting sufficient numbers.

Those latter might have gone to Japanese schools after attending American schools. They only attended 1 or 2 hours as against 8 hours. They really do not learn too much; they are too tired. They do not learn enough to be qualified as language instructors or even to carry on a decent conversation. I, for example, have been accused of speaking Japanese worse than the Chinese, and that is the worst thing you can say about a Japanese, because I throw possibly two Japanese words together and six English words; in fact, my masterpiece was when I was able to carry on a conversation for about 10 minutes, and at that time I really used 7 minutes of English words.

Now, I am not typical, I grant you that, but you take the average person who has gone through the Japanese language school, he doesn't know enough to qualify in the field of language.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, last week when you appeared before the committee, you testified that you felt that the F. B. I check was necessary—

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Against the evacuees who are being released for resettlement. Did you at any time attempt to prevail upon the War Relocation Authority to eliminate the F. B. I check?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall that we ever attempted to prevail upon them. I do recall that many times we told the W. R. A., and we still insist that the whole procedure should be speeded up, if possible, because the longer the loyal ones stay in, the more difficult it becomes for them to resettle themselves later on.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, the report dated October 7, 1942, addressed to national headquarters, signed "Mike", on page 11 states [reading]:

Fifth, for the biggest story since evacuation, the latest War Relocation Authority directive on furloughs. Larry and Hito must forgive me for sending the long instructions by telegraph. I suppose it must have cost a fortune and yet, because of the importance of the story, I feel justified in doing so.

I don't know whether you realize it or not, but that directive culminates our work to make these relocation centers' refuges and not prisons. This is our first goal achieved, and while it does not mean that we have no further work to do, it does mean that we have made our first step back. It should have been carried in large type in the Pacific Citizen and its implications editorialized, but because we were afraid of what Congressmen like Ford and others might say, I asked Larry to soft-pedal the whole thing. \* \* \*

In the discussions leading up to this latest order, I argued that even the Federal Bureau of Investigation clearance should be eliminated, but this was impossible both from the public relations and the congressional aspects. As it is, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will not investigate them as such. If they do not have any record against them, it is sufficient for the clearance. I think that this item is a victory for us even if we couldn't win all the battles. This last item may prove to be the bottleneck in the whole program, however, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation is very busy with other jobs and doesn't



seem to concentrate on clearing prospective applicants. I am now pushing for the Federal Bureau of Investigation to turn their lists of those whom they suspect over to the War Relocation Authority and let the War Relocation Authority check off the nonsuspect names.

Now, back to your language, Mr. Masaoka, in which you stated:

In the discussions leading up to this latest order, I argued that even the Federal Bureau of Investigation clearance should be eliminated——

Mr. MASAOKA. Now that you call it to my attention, I remember it. But, you will note, you see, the whole procedure, we feel, is slow.

Mr. STRIPLING. In other words, in order to speed up the procedure you would be willing for the F. B. I. check to be lifted also?

Mr. MASAOKA. Some check should be made.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, what check did you propose here?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, the F. B. I. was the only check that was being made and that was only a check against the existing records and not an investigation, and you expressed disappointment that you were not successful in lifting that check. So, as early as 1942, October, you were personally willing for the evacuees to be released, to go anywhere in the United States, without any check whatsoever.

Mr. MASAOKA. No, no.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, there was no check being made.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am quite sure that in the segregation, a matter of some type of check was brought up. To the best of my knowledge, we have always asked for some type of check, but we have insisted, as we still do, that the present method of check is a bottleneck; it is too slow; it is too cumbersome.

Mr. STRIPLING. Further, in this memorandum on the same subject, you state:

Thus far there has been no loud squawk from the Congressmen or anti-Japs on this new leave regulations. There have been a number of requests for explanations and implications but no loud or dangerous kicks. We have our fingers crossed. I guess the boys on Capitol Hill are too busy with the war legislation now to look at this new order, although I'm afraid of what will happen when they do. That is why we must not publicize the regulations as something which puts a real question up to the West coast delegation as to our possible dangerousness as individual persons.

Mr. MASAOKA. The particular reference made is listed in the Federal Register for October; yes, I think October.

Mr. STRIPLING. What did you mean Mr. Masaoka, by the statement you were keeping your fingers crossed; that you were afraid what would happen if certain Congressmen learned about it?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I think, to be very honest and very frank, we feel that there are certain Congressmen who are prejudiced against us; very definitely so. We feel that there are certain interests that are prejudiced against us. They will use every tactic at their command to see that we are not released. Now, it is against that particular group that we have always been opposed, and we are afraid of them.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Masaoka, I think I should ask this question, because I asked it of all previous witnesses of Japanese ancestry, and I would like to put it to you direct. Will you outline for the committee at this point just what you would consider to be a sound and adequate check to be made before an evacuee is released from these camps?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, that is a rather difficult job, because there are so many factors involved.

Mr. MUNDT. We want to determine what kind of a check is to be made. I would like to have your recommendations so that we can put them side by side with those of Mr. Slocum and other witnesses and see what your position is.

Mr. MASAOKA. All right. Now, without knowing the latest trend in the relocation centers and the W. R. A.—

Mr. MUNDT. Just assume there is no trend at all. Just begin with the evacuation centers and we will start from there.

Mr. MASAOKA. There is confusion and remains throughout, but we will see what we can do with that. In the first place, I think that persons who have expressed a desire to return to Japan, should be segregated. I think there can be no question there.

Secondly, I believe the people who have caused trouble, and by that I mean real trouble over and over again on the subject of being pro-Japanese, should also be segregated with the people who have asked for that.

In the matter of Kibei and their parents and the matter of Nisei and that, I believe a system of individual check which can go back long beyond the period of evacuation should be carried out, to analyze the type of organization they belonged to, the type of activity they participated in, such as the Boy Scouts or some pro-Japanese group, that I think should be taken into consideration; in other words, long before that, and then what they did after war was declared and what they did within the relocation centers. All that should be weighed.

Now, this may seem a little awkward, but I believe if a person has received clearance, or is proposed for segregation on that basis, I believe he should have a chance for rehearing, because it is very possible that someone may have been prejudiced in making out a report, or there may have been some mistake along the line.

Now, while I am not too familiar with the alien hearing boards of the Department of Justice, I do feel that some body of that sort, possibly composed of one representative of the Department of Justice, one representative of the Military Intelligence, one of the Naval Intelligence, and one of the War Relocation Authority, and possibly one civilian should sit as a hearing board.

Mr. MUNDT. Would it not be well to add to such a board one well-known loyal Japanese in the group?

Mr. MASAOKA. The difficulty with that, Congressman, would be this, and I think you can understand it this way. I, for example, may know one Japanese very well, or think I do, but only know a part of the aspect of his life. The very fact that I know him well may prejudice me for him.

Now, I think, as you say, we have to be absolutely safe on this proposition, and I think that it would be a fairer trial, you see, if you didn't have a person of Japanese ancestry on that particular tribunal. I don't know whether that is sound thinking or not.

I, for example, am not a trained investigator. They ask me about my friend John Jones. Well, I knew him well a certain part of his life, but I don't know any other aspects of his life, and if he was subversive I would probably be the last to recognize it. Now, for

that reason, I don't believe a person of Japanese ancestry should be on that board.

Mr. MUNDT. Go ahead.

Mr. MASAOKA. The difficulty, I think, in the whole procedure, arises from the fact that certain people that you are dealing with are American citizens, and I just don't know how to overcome that particular difficulty. But, I do know that the majority of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry want the dangerous elements eliminated, because it is for their own interest as well as for their own future interest. The great majority are willing to die; either volunteered or drafted for this country's war. Now, that group is going to serve a worthy purpose in the America to come. I think they have a contribution to offer, and I think everything ought to be done to keep that group American in spirit and attitude and everything else.

Now, the mechanics of segregation, of course, are rather difficult. I don't know just how they would go about it, but generally I think the thoughts I have expressed suggest something.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, I think that is quite an interesting point. I would like to ask you in connection with point 3, individual checks, where you suggest checking into the background, the activities of the organizations, and so forth. Would you include in that check a check of the earlier employers, the pre-war employers of the Japanese?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Or the business associates?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. You agree with me that it is unfortunate that the W. R. A. does not make that employer check at this time?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think they do, do they not?

Mr. MUNDT. No; unfortunately they do not. We were advised by the mayor of Los Angeles and the chief of police of Los Angeles of some 10 or 15, I have forgotten the number, citizens of Japanese ancestry, employees of the city administration, who were put in evacuation camps, and some of them released with no check of any kind made by any of the officials. It was as surprising to the committee as it is with you. You will agree with me that it is an unfortunate precedent at the present time?

Mr. MASAOKA. As I understand the program, before that applied, the people of Los Angeles could have moved before the W. R. A. took over, but as I understand the procedure they had to write down the employment record, did they not, for W. R. A.?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. And I assumed that it was checked from that.

Mr. MUNDT. We assumed so, too, but unfortunately that was not the case.

Mr. COSTELLO. The information further seemed to be that there appeared one or two individuals on the list to be contacted in regard to his previous record; that some of the individuals on the list were consulted regarding the person's status, but that the employers were not consulted.

Mr. MASAOKA. I see. I would like to make this observation, however, that in no investigation should there be a witch hunt; in other words, simply because a person happened to belong to one society, just belonged, and he didn't pay any attention to it.



Mr. MUNDT. Like the Black Dragon Society, for instance?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I don't know much about the Black Dragon Society. But, for example, a case of pro-American Nisei or maybe listed on the rolls of some Japanese organization or association. They may never have gone there. I think you must take into balance and weigh their association against other associations, and I think that you can get sincere people, sincere school teachers and religious folk and those who really know the individual, including the employer, and that you would get a more satisfactory check than simply weighing arbitrarily the fact that they belonged to certain organizations.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do all Japanese organizations put names on the rolls whether they belong to them or not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that happens. I was embarrassed at one time when that was done.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it the custom of Japanese organizations to show a relatively large number in order to build up a membership list?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would like to qualify that. The more I think about that the more I can see where you were confused about that issue. All the membership in that indicated that it comes up to about July or so, doesn't it—the membership list; isn't that right, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. April.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, a lot of the fees in that were paid, you say, late the previous year; maybe as late as September. They never would carry over for the full year.

I would like to make this statement, and the records will show it, as people leave the relocation centers, in leaving the relocation centers they generally don't have sufficient funds to purchase membership. After all, living on \$12 a month is difficult, and it is something like the Army. The Government, I suppose, would pay everything, but there are a lot of incidentals. But the people who go out, many of them have joined after leaving the relocation centers, after they become resettled. Once they have a job, once they have a home, they do become members.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I think padding membership rolls is an indication of good Americanism. It is done generally.

Mr. MASAOKA. Mostly.

Mr. MUNDT. Including the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce possibly. Now, you worked through the J. A. C. L., you have told us, for the best interests of citizens of Japanese ancestry in this country and the best interests of America. That is the thing that you have claimed is the purpose of the organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, on the other side is your ledger. There are others of Japanese ancestry pulling away.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. That is, other organizations.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you state for the record as many of those organizations and give us the names of them?

Mr. MASAOKA. At the present time I don't know of any officially, because presumably they have disbanded.



Mr. MUNDT. Take the pre-Pearl Harbor period.

Mr. MASAOKA. Again I am in a difficult spot, because the records will show I went to the Pacific coast late in 1941, in September, you see. As for those in the intermountain area, I probably could, you see.

Now, I do think that there were definitely certain pro-Japanese elements. I think Mr. Slocum and others are better qualified in that field than I am because they worked among those people. The same thing goes on. In order to paint the lily white, if I don't know about them, I should not mention it. I don't speak Japanese well enough to get along with the average or first generation.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know any of your own knowledge? Could you not name a single pro-Japanese pre-Pearl Harbor organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. Oh, yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, name them, to your personal knowledge.

Mr. MASAOKA. I think there was the Black Dragon Society and the Tokyo Club. I think there was some alinement between the two, but I don't know.

Mr. MUNDT. In this country you mean it was called the Tokyo Club?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am not quite sure. The big difficulty was over the gambling part of it, or the controlling part of it, or something. There was some connection, as I understand it. Then there were a number of military men's groups or groups that were raising funds for the military end or something of that sort. I think they were called Hemushekai.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, on that point, last Saturday Mr. Masaoka testified or intimated that the reason he was not evacuated along with the other Japanese on the west coast was the fact that apparently he was assisting the Army or the intelligence agencies in giving them information.

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I was assisting the groups in the evacuation process, yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, did not Mr. Slocum also assist in that work?

Mr. MASAOKA. Mr. Slocum was in the southern part. He was in southern California. I was in San Francisco. I couldn't say.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were subject to evacuation like the other residents of San Francisco, were you not? You said for military reasons you could not answer why you were not evacuated along with the others and had never been in a concentration center.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, only on visits. Well, it was something like this: At the time of evacuation, when the orders were first issued, the people were notified to leave if they so desired within a certain period. Is that correct?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. Now, at that time the national office of the J. A. C. L. felt that I should leave, you see, but certain Government people requested that I, for example, remain behind for a certain time to help them, and I received permission from the Army that I stay, and after a certain date I left. I left before the entire San Francisco area was clear; but I did stay there until the portion in which I resided had been evacuated. Is that clear?

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to have you develop something. Mr. Masaoka, you first testified before this committee on last Saturday. On what day last week did you arrive in Washington?

Mr. MASAOKA. I arrived Friday afternoon.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Friday afternoon?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir. Let me check now. I left Wednesday. Yes; I arrived Friday.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And before you appeared before the committee here, did you have any conversation with any military authorities with respect to the type of testimony that you were permitted to give here?

Mr. MASAOKA. I only reported to the commanding officer that I was supposed to report to, and he merely told me that I was not to discuss things dealing with military policy or military practices.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What commanding officer did you report to here? I do not think that is a military secret.

Mr. MASAOKA. Major Rumsey of the Military District of Washington.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is Major Rumsey connected with the military security aspect of the District of Columbia?

Mr. MASAOKA. That I don't know. I was merely ordered to report to him. I merely followed instructions.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And the only instructions you got from him were not to discuss or testify as to what?

Mr. MASAOKA. Anything to do with the military; their practices; their policies, or their programs.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Since your arrival in Washington, did you discuss with any person connected with the W. R. A. the type of testimony you were going to give here?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have not seen any member of the W. R. A.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have you talked over the telephone or in any other manner or had any communication in any way whatsoever with any person connected with the W. R. A. since you became aware of the fact that you were to testify before this committee?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. The first time that I heard that I was to testify was the reading in the New Orleans Times-Picayune, or something of that sort, that I was to be called, and then I was ordered to report here. Since coming here I have only contacted my colleague, Mr. Tajiri. I am staying at the Dodge Hotel; that is all.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you discuss with any person, either the military or personnel of the W. R. A. since you saw that item in the newspaper in regard to the nature or the type of testimony that you might be asked to give here?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I have not.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Just one other little line of questioning I would like to complete, because I have to leave a little earlier. Is it your opinion, Mr. Masaoka, that Japanese as a whole are a type of people that have respect for firm discipline?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is rather difficult to answer. They are used to discipline within the family, yes; but they are also a very sensitive group of people. I don't believe I could answer that either "yes" or "no."

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you not say that the Japanese people as a whole have less respect for an administration that is rather lax in its discipline—one that lacks firmness?

Mr. MASAOKA. That, of course, is a mooted point. On many things I feel that possibly W. R. A. should have taken a firmer step as, for example, on segregation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. As for example which?

Mr. MASAOKA. As, for example, on segregation. I think they might have acted much more swiftly than they did and are doing. On the other hand, I think they have understood or they realize and appreciate the tremendous difficulty that they are trying to change over from a normal life, you see, into an arbitrary, artificial one. I think that they have appreciated that to a remarkable degree.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You mean, the officials?

Mr. MASAOKA. The W. R. A. officials. So, I think that there is a question there. Many people in the centers, while they think many conditions are wrong and ought to be improved, nevertheless feel that it certainly has been done in a humane way, and many people have come to expect more and more because they have been treated in that generous manner and understanding manner. So, I think it works both ways.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, if the Japanese people are accustomed to strict discipline through their parents—

Mr. MASAOKA. Let us say more strict discipline than the average Caucasian. It is not a rigid thing like military life, you know. By that I mean some people have the impression that a Japanese-American, for example, lives a sort of military spartan life. That is not true.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But it is true that the children are generally under the domination, practically absolute domination, of their parents.

Mr. MASAOKA. Up until recently.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Particularly their fathers.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, some of the biggest complications in the families have come up because of the Americanization of the youngsters. They just can't take it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And they seem to want to break away from that absolute control that had heretofore been exercised by the father.

Mr. MASAOKA. More or less absolute; yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, do you not think, as a matter of fact, that having been used to this absolute control, that it sort of is in their psychology, that they can only have respect for authority which exercises a firm discipline and a firm control?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not necessarily. This may seem paradoxical, but I am just going to express a theory of mine. In America people learn or are taught to think pretty much for themselves, to work out their own salvation; to be, as it were, the master of his own soul. Now, if you want to inculcate within the people of the centers the spirit of Americanism of learning for themselves, and so on, you cannot impose a dictatorial type of action or administration upon them.

Now, with Japanese, as any other people, they will resent tyranny or anything else of the sort, especially after what they have gone through. Therefore, I think that actually the W. R. A. rule, while it has appeared to be lax in many cases has, for long-time thinking, done a tremendous good in building up confidence in American democratic ways; in other words, had you forced these people—let us put it specifically, let us take a certain group of Japanese, and you have taken these people and forced them behind these barbed-wire environments, if you had dictated to them exactly everything they had to do, that would have broke him. You would have had much more difficulty in the centers because of that.



Mr. EBERHARTER. Then, following that, you feel if the evacuees had been placed under the control of the military, that they would have resented it and that there would have been much more difficulty than there has been?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; because persons who were evacuees were not prisoners of war. To put them under the Army would have indicated that. They would have resented it. I am afraid they would have done something about it. That is my personal opinion, now you understand.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They could not have done much about it if they had been under the military, could they?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I think that you can do a lot even under the military. For example, here again I am just talking out loud. If the Japanese—

Mr. EBERHARTER. You mean, thinking out loud.

Mr. MASAOKA. Thinking out loud, yes; and talking out loud. It is quite conceivable that there might have been more bloodshed had it been under Army rule. And, another thing, even if you didn't have trouble under Army rule, you may have made a cringing, cowardly people, and that would have been bad. Self-reliance of Japanese-Americans is to be respected. Their ability to stay off the relief rolls, their ability to be law-abiding citizens, all of these things demonstrate that they are good Americans.

Now, if you had to evacuate them because of military necessity, you ought to give them as normal a life as possible and not add to their embarrassment and chagrin by imposing upon them strict military rules. I think that would have been dangerous.

Mr. EBERHARTER. On the other hand, if any of these evacuees in the relocation centers are guilty of any infractions of the regulations or the laws do you not believe that they should be sternly dealt with?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, yes. Now, there is a difference there. I think we should make a sharp distinction between a nonstrict administration over the whole. I think there should be an understanding, an appreciative administration, and an administration who appreciates the difficulties that the Japanese evacuees are laboring under.

Now, within that appreciative administration I think that there should be, shall we say, a greater control over that sort of thing that you mentioned; the dangerous difficulties that people are constantly causing trouble, and so on. They should be dealt with summarily, because if you don't deal with them immediately and summarily they are going to get away with it and cause others to do the same, and it becomes a rolling ball.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The mere fact that they are not dealt with summarily causes the other Japanese to have less respect for the administration; you feel that?

Mr. MASAOKA. Along certain lines that may be true. You see, what I am trying to contend for is this, that for the over-all general administration you have to have liberal policies. You have got to have an understanding policy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes, but where there are infractions or disobediences of the rules and regulations, of the law: You believe that those who are guilty should be sternly dealt with?



Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. I think that same thing applies to normal society on the outside. If a person violates a law, he should be dealt with severely.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, I believe even more so is that true because of the peculiar Japanese psychology; in other words, it is necessary to deal rather sternly with them because they have such respect for authority and power. What do you think about that?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that one of the great legends concerning us is the fact that we are so different from other people. I disagree. I think that we are subject to the same passions, same emotions, as any other person in America, because we have been trained like Americans; I really do.

Mr. EBERHARTER. To become a little more specific now, in some of the relocation centers the authorities had very good reason to know or seemed to have good reason to know who was responsible for the disturbances or riots or strikes, or whatever you may call them. You think because no punishment has been meted out to those responsible is an indication of too lax a policy?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't believe you can answer that generally; but I do say that the records will show, or our records will show, I think, Mr. Stripling, that we have always wanted the people who caused the trouble, the troublemakers, and so on, to be routed summarily; isn't that true?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, if we assume, Mr. Masaoka, that the administrative authority at these relocation centers where the trouble occurred knew who was responsible for it, and they took no measures to mete out any punishment whatsoever to those responsible, would you not say, according to your opinion, that the administration was at fault?

Mr. MASAOKA. In that particular regard, yes; in other words, they were at fault in not dealing with that particular situation. Isn't that what you were driving at, Congressman?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. In other words, I feel that as Americans we ought to always remember that we have the "four freedoms"; that we ought to keep them here at home, as well as abroad, and that to these people who have been evacuated those same "four freedoms" should be extended to every degree possible, you see.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Masaoka, you said since you arrived in Washington you were rooming with somebody. I did not get the name.

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I am not rooming with anybody. I am staying at the Dodge Hotel.

Mr. MUNDT. Tajiri, was it?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I have talked to him. He is staying at the same place.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he the man who succeeded you as secretary?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know. I don't know if anyone has been officially appointed to act since me or not. I do know he is representing the organization here.

Mr. MUNDT. Is he the gentleman sitting back in the room there?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Has he relayed to you any conversation or advice from the W. R. A. during your testimony?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I will be very honest about that. We anticipated such questions, from you regarding the military or W. R. A. and the others and therefore we studiously avoided that.

Mr. MUNDT. You made one statement that rather startled me. I want you to amplify it a little bit. You said in answer to question by Mr. Eberharter if the Army had been in charge of these camps instead of the W. R. A., that you thought there would have been more bloodshed under Army rules.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you feel that the Army would have been inclined to shoot first and then ask questions or that the Japanese would be inclined to shoot the Army? What did you mean by that?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; the Japanese would not be inclined to shoot the Army because they would not have guns and all that. As to the other, what the treatment would be, I am not in a position to say at the present time.

Mr. MUNDT. Speaking for the Japanese, what would they do to shed blood? They could not shoot, but they had a lot of cleavers.

Mr. MASAOKA. No; they are not as bloodthirsty as all that.

Mr. MUNDT. What do you mean by "bloodshed"?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that Army life would be—I better appeal to the Army now. I believe that Army life would be a pretty much regimented life more so than now. Such regimentation imposed upon little children, old men and old women would not set very well. Somewhere along the line they will have nervous disorders, nervous troubles within the individuals. They may start climbing over fences and everything else, and that sort of thing. I don't feel that there should be an Army, for one thing; in other words, I feel the Japanese people, particularly the Japanese-Americans, value life pretty highly. I, for example, would not just throw my life away just to prove something one way or another.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You feel that if the Army would have been in charge, it would have been more repressive and again lead to more disorders?

Mr. MASAOKA. It is a little difficult to say "Yes" in the present situation.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Your disillusion in the Army may disillusion you along that line.

Mr. MASAOKA. It may.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the questions of Mr. Eberharter, I would like to ask the witness if he knows one Carl G. Yoneda.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I met him in San Francisco. He is not a member of our organization.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know him to be a block leader at Manzanar, Calif., or was he a block leader?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think he was.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. MASAOKA. Camp Savage.

Mr. STRIPLING. A military intelligence school?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you assume then that he was a person of reliability?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would assume so.

Mr. STRIPLING. On July 11, 1942, Mr. Yoneda wrote to Mr. E. R. Fryer, regional director of the War Relocation Authority in San Francisco, Calif., a letter, more in the nature of a report, and he sent a copy of it to Mr. Nash, who was director of Manzanar, Calif.; also a copy to Mr. Dillon Myer, Washington, D. C., and also, apparently, he sent a copy to Mr. Masaoka, because it was found in the files of the J. A. C. L. here.

On page 3 of this report, in which Mr. Yoneda is describing conditions in Manzanar camp, he states [reading]:

On March 23 aboard train to Manzanar, one Kibei—Hawaiian-born Juichi Uyemoto—loudly talked in Japanese that “we ought to have enough guts to kill Roosevelt. The President is a damn fool, etc.” I was sitting three seats behind him and told him, “Shut up or you’ll go to Montana concentration camp.”

Again, apparently after August 8, 1942, Mr. Yoneda sent you a copy of a report entitled “Notes and Observations of Kibei meeting held August 8, 1942 at Kitchen 15—only Japanese spoken.”

He gives a verbal statement here of what was said, and he states that Juichi Uyemoto, who had made the threat on the train, said [reading]:

I was born in Hawaii, been in Japan and Manchuria for 30 years. Come to the United States of America 1 year ago. Surprised to see that Japanese here are not united spiritually like in Japan. Trouble with Japanese here is that there are too many Reds among you. This is the man who said on the way to Manzanar, aboard the train on March 23, that Nisei ought to have guts and kill President.

On receipt of either one of these documents, Mr. Masaoka, did you take this matter up with Mr. Myer or with the F. B. I. or any of the authorities?

Mr. MASAOKA. To the best of my knowledge, I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did. Do you know what action was taken?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I do not.

Mr. STRIPLING. There is a 5-month lapse from the time he made the statement on the train until he made the statement at the Kibei meeting at the Manzanar relocation center, so apparently no action has been taken for a period of 5 months.

Mr. MASAOKA. Not that I know of. But some investigation. I presume, was made. I might state that the reason Mr. Yoneda was not admitted to membership in the J. A. C. L. is that he said he was a member of the Communist Party, and we have restrictions against that.

Mr. STRIPLING. He is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. And you say he is at the Camp Savage Military Intelligence School?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. I show you a letter dated September 14, 1942, addressed “Dear Mike” on the letterhead of the J. A. C. L. from the director, signed Director Inagaki. Will you explain to the committee who Mr. Inagaki is?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, George Inagaki was my colleague during my first visit to the East. He is now also at Camp Savage Military

Intelligence School. He was director at that time of our associate members division.

Mr. STRIPLING. I call your attention to page 2 of this letter in which Mr. Inagaki states the following [reading]:

The situation in Manzanar seems to be easing up with the announcement that only citizens can take office. Also the fact that Nisei may leave if jobs are definite provided they can pass the Federal Bureau of Investigation exam. Of course this means that they will have to be good Americans and that got the fellows thinking.

Will you read that and explain to the committee what you think Mr. Inagaki meant when he said that they had to be good Americans and that got the fellows thinking?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think they began to wonder what was meant by the term "good Americans." Wouldn't that be the natural conclusion?

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, it simply states this means that they will have to be good Americans, that is, providing they pass the F. B. I. And, he further states [reading]:

and that got the fellows thinking.

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. You do not know what he meant there?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where is Mr. Inagaki at the present time, did you say?

Mr. MASAOKA. He is at Camp Savage, Military Intelligence.

Mr. COSTELLO. In the Army?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. You may be interested to know, out of the original eight workers, six are either in the military or at Camp Savage. One is not eligible and the other has very bad eyes. We may have made very many mistakes in the organization, but I don't think we made mistakes in joining the Army.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know where that party is that made the disturbance on the train? Do you know where he is at the present time?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe he is at a special concentration camp, but I don't know for certain. I believe he has been segregated and is at Leupp, Ariz. Now, that is purely conjecture.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do the committee records show where he is?

Mr. STRIPLING. No, sir; they do not. Mr. Masaoka, Mr. Mundt, or Mr. Costello called your attention to the exaggeration of membership of the J. A. C. L. Have you also exaggerated the subscription list of the Pacific Citizen, which is the official organ of the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. What did I give the subscription list as?

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, have you from time to time exaggerated the subscription list?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your report of July 11, 1942, addressed to the national headquarters, signed "Mike," you state that the editorials of the Pacific Citizen carry great weight. What is the actual subscription list of the Pacific Citizen?

Mr. MASAOKA. You got me.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, do you have any idea?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I have not.



Mr. STRIPLING. It is not 10,000, is it?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I think it would be closer to a third of that, or half of that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, do you have any figure?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. One-third; 3,000?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I think it is better than 3,000. You see, as with all newspapers, particularly the Pacific Citizen, when it goes to a center it has a larger subscription than its actual subscription list, because it is passed on and around and around, so that it can be justified.

Mr. STRIPLING. In this same report, Mr. Masaoka, you mention a Mr. Shields as having had certain dealings with you. Do you know who Mr. Shields is?

Mr. MASAOKA. What do I say?

Mr. STRIPLING (reading):

As you know, he has often begged the local Federal Bureau of Investigation in our behalf.

Mr. MASAOKA. That is the United States attorney, district of Idaho.

Mr. STRIPLING. What do you mean when you say he has begged the F. B. I. in your behalf?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well the particular incident that I had in mind, I think, some of the people went swimming at Great Salt Lake, which is about 18 miles out. There was some misunderstanding and so they came home late and they went through a prohibited zone; the railroad strip that they crossed. The F. B. I. picked up these people and Mr. Shields decided, I believe, that they should not be prosecuted. I believe that is the reference.

Mr. STRIPLING. Is the Japanese American Citizens League affiliated in any way with the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I would like to explain that. Let me see, sometime in May 1942, I was invited to address their national conference in Cleveland, I believe. At the time, not knowing their background, I did so. I gave a prepared address. About 3 or 4 months later I suddenly discovered that I was a director of this American Committee for the Protection of Foreign-Born, which was amazing to me. In the files somewhere, and I am sure you gentlemen have it, is a letter of my resignation, also pointing out that as far as I knew I had never become a member of the group. I had never been appointed a director and therefore it came as a shock to me to find that I had been invited to their meeting.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you consider it a Communist organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know what to consider it, but I didn't just like it. In other words, I don't know what a Communist organization is, really. Certain people have told me that it is a Communist organization, and I said, "No." I said, "No; they are just liberal." And, frankly, gentlemen, I don't know what a Communist organization is.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your memorandum of July 11 to your national headquarters you also make mention of the fact of having been appointed director of the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born.

Mr. MASAOKA. Now, let me correct that. I was invited, yes, then I was appointed director before I had accepted; isn't that correct, or something of that sort? Anyway, it was a very embarrassing part of my life when I discovered that I was a director.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, were you ever in favor of having contraband articles returned to the evacuees?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. In other words, I think that such things as flashlights and that in relocation centers——

Mr. STRIPLING. How about cameras?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think they should be returned, but I think it would be inadvisable for Japanese to be carrying them. In other words, there is a matter of principle and expediency involved there.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your report of April 19, 1943, you state [reading]:

While it may not be the best public relations, still I believe that we ought to seek a revocation of the contraband articles regulations of the Western Defense Command as they apply to cameras, flashlights, and knives, as a matter of principle and of being consistent.

Is that correct?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. I would like to make a statement there about knives. For a long time the people in the centers could not have knives of any sort. And, of course, they could not even cook, and had a little difficulty with that. Later on, well, recently, I think they have been permitted to have cooking knives; you know, small paring knives, and so on.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, in connection with the cases which were recently decided by the Supreme Court on evacuation——

Mr. MASAOKA. On curfew.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your report of April 19, you state:

The inside story as to why these cases were certified directly to the Supreme Court, which is an unusual procedure, is that Biddle himself requested that the judges unanimously certify them to the Supreme Court without comment. He is particularly grieved at the judge who dissented and issued his opinion on the procedure. It seems that Biddle did not desire to have too much publicity on the cases, especially in the California press, which might unduly and unconsciously influence the judges. Briefly, he wanted a fair decision and one which would not be discussed in the coast papers which might renew the campaign against Japanese. In order to get as little publicity as possible, and to prevent a possible revival of the campaign to smear the Japanese, he requested this unusual procedure. I understand from sources close to the Justice Department that both Biddle and Ennis, who will represent the Government in these cases, have expressed the private opinion that it might be just as well if the Government lost these cases. It seems that DeWitt has gotten wind of their private sentiments and will in all probability send a special representative, generally thought to be Benedsen, to argue his side of the question before the Supreme Court. Ennis has said that the Government will probably win on the matter of evacuation, especially since in wartime the courts do not usually challenge the military, but that they will probably lose if the question of detention is brought up.

Will you explain to the committee where you received that information?

Mr. MASAOKA. I do not recall exactly.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you explain to the committee, Mr. Masaoka, your campaign against the motion picture Air Force and the basis for your objections to that picture?

Mr. MASAOKA. The Government, I believe, of all organizations, should be accurate. Motion pictures have a great ability to influence

and sway public opinion. The motion picture Air Force, while it is an amazingly graphic picture of a particular flying fortress, does contain a repetition of the vicious rumors concerning the opportunity which Japanese-Americans allegedly played at Pearl Harbor, such as blocking the air fields and that sort of thing, all of which have been disproved by the Tolan committee report and subsequent investigations. Now, these are contained in the picture Air Force. If it is the object of the W. R. A. and this Government to resettle loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry, to have a picture of this nature going around throughout the country may have a disturbing effect on local public opinion, so that they will not accept Japanese-Americans, and therefore we wanted to see it removed, if possible, or that particular section deleted.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did I understand you to make the statement that the Government should be accurate?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. The motion picture Air Force is not a Government picture.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am sorry. I stand corrected. My understanding was that the O. W. I. checks pictures to be selected.

Mr. STRIPLING. This is by Warner Bros.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is a Warner Bros. production, and I think it was simply reviewed down here by the War Department before it was released.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am sorry.

Mr. COSTELLO. Any O. W. I. censorship over a Warner production of that character, I imagine, would be extremely limited.

Mr. MASAOKA. I am sorry.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you get in touch with Authoress Pearl Buck in regard to this campaign?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you also contacted Miss Buck with reference to other matters of the J. A. C. L.?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you take up with her the matter of soliciting the assistance of Madam Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was Madam Chiang Kai-shek's advice to you?

Mr. MASAOKA. I would rather not have that made in public.

Mr. STRIPLING. You would rather not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I will be glad to discuss that with you gentlemen privately.

Mr. STRIPLING. It appears in this report of Mr. Masaoka's, Mr. Chairman. You might read it and determine if it is a proper question.

Mr. MASAOKA. I would be glad to discuss it with you gentlemen in executive session.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will discuss that matter in executive session with you rather than in open session, if you desire. You might proceed, Mr. Stripling, with other questions.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, will you explain to the committee the formation and purposes of the organization known as the Student Relocation Council?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. At the time of evacuation there were approximately 2,000 or 3,000 persons of Japanese ancestry attending the west-coast colleges. With their disruption of education caused by the evacuation, the educators and others concerned, individuals on the west coast, thought that some system ought to be worked out whereby the young men and young women could continue their education.

They appealed to the Government; Mr. Eisenhower, who was then the head of the War Relocation Authority, invited Mr. Clarence Pickett, who is executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, to form a committee, a private organization, to cooperate with the W. R. A.

They held a meeting first, I believe, in May 1942, in Chicago, at which time a great number of educators from all parts of the country met and they created the Students Relocation Council.

Since that time this National Students Relocation Council has been working to open up colleges and universities as well as to provide scholarships and other means of financing eligible persons of Japanese ancestry. This committee worked in two separate fields; one, interviewing people within the centers who desired to go out to college, and, secondly, opening up the colleges and making opportunities for those young people. This committee's headquarters is located in Philadelphia.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many students have been released under this program that you know of?

Mr. MASAOKA. I can't recall the figure. I think they were given somewhere.

Mr. STRIPLING. Has it been a thousand or a hundred?

Mr. MASAOKA. Pretty close to a thousand, I think.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, in the report of April 26, on page 3, Mr. Masaoka stated [reading]:

Glick has given us a copy of his opinion on dual citizenship. This is not for publication.

Was that opinion later released, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you recall receiving it?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did receive it prior to the time it was made public, if it has been made public?

Mr. MASAOKA. I received it long after it was released to other War Relocation Authority directors, that is all I know. I don't know whether it was released for publication or not. You see, I came after it had been worked out, and I simply received it for my own information.

Mr. STRIPLING. In this same report, you state [reading]:

In Chicago, before the University of Chicago seminar on social problems, Myer and Glick hinted that the War Relocation Authority could be liquidated by 1944.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I was given to believe that by a person who told me about the meeting.

Mr. STRIPLING. You said Myer and Glick hinted it to you. You did not say they hinted it to somebody else.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I was not at the Chicago meeting.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were not there

Mr. MASAOKA. No.



Mr. STRIPLING [reading]:

In Chicago, too, Myer told of plans to return some evacuees to the coast in the form of a token return to prove to California that they cannot dictate to the rest of the Nation.

Mr. MASAOKA. I was not at the Chicago meeting. This was hearsay.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, who furnished you this information, Mr. Masaoko? Was it Mr. McWilliams, Carey McWilliams?

Mr. MASAOKA. Probably.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who was Carey McWilliams?

Mr. MASAOKA. As far as I know, he is or was the former commissioner of labor and immigration for the State of California and considered an authority on our subject. I only met him once when he came through this way and he gave me this information.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know whether he has any Communist affiliations or not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have heard that he has had.

Mr. STRIPLING. You state here in your conversation with Cary McWilliams [reading]:

Asked whether I thought it better for the Japanese to attempt to return, even with the possibility of some bloodshed, I replied in the affirmative.

Is that your opinion?

Mr. MASAOKA. Now?

Mr. STRIPLING. Now; yes.

Mr. MASAOKA. The more I think about the situation, the more confused I become. Possibly it poses a rather difficult question as to whether it is better to have bloodshed in seeking a principle or just wait until things run out their course. I have no answer to that.

Mr. STRIPLING. In this same memorandum you report concerning your conference with Colonel Scobey, Mr. McCloy, and Captain Hall. You state [reading]:

In spite of all this, though, he feels that persons who answer no-no to questions 27 and 28 ought to be segregated as disloyal. I tried to argue with him at some length on this point, but he remains adamant.

That was the loyalty question, was it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. And which was circulated by the Army among the Japanese-Americans who were eligible for selective service?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. You said here that you argued with Colonel Scobey that even though an evacuee had signed a statement, that he was not loyal to the United States Government. What was your position, exactly?

Mr. MASAOKA. I wanted a rehearing for some of the cases. I felt that there was too much influence from other sources on some of these people.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, is it not true that some of the War Relocation Authority officials called in a number of these boys who had answered "no" to this question and asked them to change their minds?

Mr. MASAOKA. I had heard about that, but I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. And offered them inducements to change their mind?

Mr. Chairman, has not the committee received testimony on that point?

Mr. COSTELLO. Regarding the change of opinion?

Mr. STRIPLING. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not recall.

Mr. MUNDT. We received testimony in Los Angeles to the effect that the question was changed; modified.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that had reference to the aliens, did it not? In other words, the original question, as I recall—

Mr. MUNDT. I think that is right. It dealt with the aliens and it made it easier for them to answer "Yes."

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Masaoka, were you often called in by the officials of the War Relocation Authority and invited to make suggestions concerning the policy of that organization?

Mr. MASAOKA. Maybe "invited" is not the exact term. I used to go in for appointments and then make suggestions regarding their policy. I made suggestions; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you ever been invited to make suggestions?

Mr. MASAOKA. I may have been from time to time on present policies.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you recall on which particular policy you were called in?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, I don't.

Mr. STRIPLING. As a consultant, so to speak?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, I don't.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you have a question, Doctor?

Mr. MATTHEWS. In your testimony earlier today, Mr. Masaoka, you stated that you went to Salt Lake City at one time?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think in November, to attend a conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you return to Washington in May?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think that is about right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How is it that this report written by you to the national headquarters is dated "Washington," in April? Are you not a little mixed up on the date when you came back?

Mr. MASAOKA. Let me see, I got married in February. I went back for a conference in November. As I said, I thought it was the forepart of May.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you are sure you were here in April, though, are you not, from this report?

Mr. MASAOKA. It must be. That is the last part of April, though, you see.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you do not want your testimony to show May when it was April, do you?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I am sorry. I said I thought it was about May. I can't remember exact details and dates.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In your letter of September 17 to Mr. Mamora Wakusagi of Weiser, Idaho, on page 4 you state [reading]:

I have just returned to Washington and am being kept very busy. Confidentially, we are working on a complete liberalization of the War Relocation Authority program and I am rather pleased with the progress which we seem to be making. Keep your fingers crossed and maybe we will be able to swing it.

Did you swing it, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. I am not quite sure what we had in mind at that time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, will you examine it?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think this is just a typical letter to a member.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the word "confidential" used now in the same light that you used it previously; that you wanted it publicized?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I am quite sure that the gentleman did publicize it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That he did?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that you were working on this liberalization program?

Mr. MASAOKA. Probably.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did you publicize that?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know whether he emphasized it or not, but I am quite sure he publicized the fact that I was working in Washington.

Mr. COSTELLO. Without stating what you were doing in Washington?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I wouldn't know. I don't know what he publicized.

Mr. STRIPLING. Your attention was called to a letter written by Mr. Kanazawa, the eastern representative, concerning the W. R. A. staff directives which you received. Here is a letter dated September 3, which is signed "Joe" and addressed to you. Is that from Mr. Kanazawa?

Mr. MASAOKA. It appears to be.

Mr. STRIPLING. I think this paragraph has probably been read into the record, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to read it over again. It says:

Received a 2-inch stack of War Relocation Authority staff directives for our confidential use, including those giving policies resulting from the San Francisco conference. Mr. Myer and Mr. Rowalt feel that, in order to avoid any unfavorable public reaction that might result from misunderstanding of the policies, that the less publicity given them the better. If there are facts and information here which you feel might be best released for publication in Pacific Citizen, then they are best left up to your discretion. So I will not do anything with them, but keep them here for your perusal. Mr. Rowalt has placed us on the mailing list for future directives coming out of the San Francisco conference.

Mr. MASAOKA, do you of your own knowledge know of cases where evacuees, who have been released for employment on certain work corps, such as in the beet fields, and so forth, have, so-called, run away from the corps and not reported back and been the subject of F. B. I. search?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have heard stories about that, but I do not know of any specific individual's name.

Mr. STRIPLING. On August 12, 1942, you wrote a letter to Mr. Franklin L. Chino, in which you stated:

DEAR FRANK: This is to ask if you know of the whereabouts of Tito U. Okamoto. He was last heard of from Chicago, when he sent a post card home.

He is an evacuee from one of the centers, who was working with a work corps in the Montana beet fields when he disappeared.

Mr. MASAOKA. I recall the incident; yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know of any similar cases of that kind?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I imagine there might have been some. After all, they released several thousands at that time.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were you successful in locating Mr. Okamoto?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not through sources. I don't recall the final disposition of that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know a gentleman by the name of E. Roos Wright?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have heard of him.

Mr. STRIPLING. Eleven hundred and fifty South Flower Street, Los Angeles, Calif.

Mr. MASAOKA. I never met the gentleman, I don't believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Do you know who the gentleman is?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have heard of him; possibly through my brother.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your files there is a letter from Mr. Wright, dated July 2, 1942, addressed to Joe Masaoka, Manzanar, Calif., in which he states [reading]:

Some time late in July, or early August, I get my vacation. At that time my plans are made to visit the Governor of New Mexico, the Governor of Colorado, and the Governor of Idaho, with the thought in mind that perhaps it might be possible to make a deal with one of them to offer the proper guaranties—they being politicians, I expect the offer that will be necessary to make will be an unwritten guaranty to deliver the vote of the group in case we can get his cooperation.

Are you familiar with that subject?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think I read that in one of the papers; yes. I would like to state that at the time of evacuation, and thereafter, we received many types of proposals.

Mr. STRIPLING. You never gave this proposal any consideration?

Mr. MASAOKA. No, no. In the first place, we didn't have 70,000 voters. That is about all the American citizens we have, and most of them would be under age. In the second place, we haven't been too concerned with large group resettlements. We have been more concerned with individual W. R. A. resettlement programs. In the third place, that was not addressed to me and as far as I know I didn't take any action directly with Mr. Wright regarding it one way or the other.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the Japanese American Citizens League interest itself in whether or not the persons in the relocation centers voted?

Mr. MASAOKA. Voted?

Mr. MATTHEWS. As a part of that activity.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes. We wanted them to vote, but we never told them to vote in bloc because, being a minority group, as you politicians know, it would be dangerous to put all your eggs in one basket.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What activities did you carry out in inducing the persons residing in these relocation centers to vote?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, merely an editorial a day or two in the Pacific Citizen, suggesting that they write to their clerk of the county in which they resided before evacuation, asking for an absentee ballot. I don't believe it was too successful; I am not quite sure.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the J. A. C. L. distribute thousands of forms to be filled in at the relocation centers?

Mr. MASAOKA. Some of the chapters may have done so.



Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you think they did?

Mr. MASAOKA. They may have done so. I can't recall that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In the Gila News Courier for October 17, 1942, there is a news item which states that the national office of the J. A. C. L. has distributed more than 25,000 printed application forms to voters in the various relocation and assembly centers.

Mr. MASAOKA. The national office may have done it, but it was never at my direction and I don't recall too much about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. You were active in Washington at the time that was sent out, were you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. What is the date?

Mr. STRIPLING. The date is October 17, 1942.

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe I was here then.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know whether many of the Japanese in the centers actually did apply for absentee ballots or not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know. In some centers, of course, political interest was greater than in other centers.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did the J. A. C. L. open offices in any of the centers to assist the residents of those centers in filling out these absentee ballot forms?

Mr. MASAOKA. The national organization did not. Perhaps some of the J. A. C. L. people in the different centers might have done so.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This new item states:

In order to aid the voters in this election, the J. A. C. L. will open an office in block 42 next week.

Mr. MASAOKA. When the term "J. A. C. L." is used, it can be used in many forms, you see. So far as I know, the national office, at least I personally, did not arrange for any of that sort of procedure.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you examine this document and identify it for the committee, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. This appears to be a documentation from Manzanar, Calif., dated the 1st of July, 1942.

Mr. STRIPLING. It has at the top, Mr. Chairman, War Relocation Authority, Historical Documentation, Manzanar, Report No. 16, compiled for Joe Masaoka and Togo Tanaka. Was this a Government project? It says project report No. 16.

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know.

Mr. STRIPLING. And there is a complete file of this in the records which were subpoenaed by the committee.

Mr. MASAOKA. It is not complete, is it? If it is, it is an amazing revelation to me, because I thought they were rather incomplete.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, there are at least 30 or 40 of these reports. I want the witness to advise the committee whether or not this was prepared for the use of the War Relocation Authority, and if it was prepared from funds supplied by the W. R. A.

Mr. MASAOKA. I presume it was.

Mr. STRIPLING. How then did you have copies of these reports?

Mr. MASAOKA. I just—my brother just sent them to me.

Mr. STRIPLING. You mean he was employed by the W. R. A. to compile them?

Mr. MASAOKA. For the munificent sum of \$12 a month, something like that.

Mr. STRIPLING. But they were Government reports and you were supplied with copies of them; is that right?

Mr. MATTHEWS. You better answer audibly so that the reporter can get it.

Mr. MASAOKA. It would appear to be so.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did these reports deal with the internal conditions within the camps?

Mr. MASAOKA. I thought it was supposed to be an historical documentation of what happened there; at least, the impression of these two young interviewers. They would have almost everything in there, as you well know.

Mr. STRIPLING. And they were intended primarily for the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, for documentation for the future, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. They were W. R. A. documents; that is right, is it not, and you were given copies of them?

Mr. MASAOKA. Something like that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, what do you mean by "something like that"? Is not that the situation?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, let us say copies were sent to me.

Mr. STRIPLING. All right. Have you ever communicated with any officials of the Civil Service Commission or of any other Government agencies regarding a program to obtain civil-service jobs for a number of evacuees?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Whom did you contact with reference to that program?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall. It was not very satisfactory. The indirect reports were more satisfactory than any personal approaches.

Mr. STRIPLING. In your report of September 19 you state [reading]:

I've suggested the items on this which we discussed in Salt Lake; namely, that our eligible people be permitted to take the regular civil-service exams and be permitted to come to Washington or elsewhere to take jobs in the not-too-essential jobs. I don't like granting this point, but it seems to me that our bigger job is to get people out. Later on perhaps we can work on the angle of discrimination. Fleming of the Commission is in accord with us and is awaiting the new procedure for releases before going to bat with the rest of the Commission on this matter. This looks pretty good to me.

Mr. MASAOKA. I did not contact Fleming personally.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Who did?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't remember.

Mr. STRIPLING. Well, you were very definite about it.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I remember the name, Fleming.

Mr. STRIPLING. Then you said:

Manpower Commission and Paul McNutt is something else. They aren't so enthusiastic in boosting Nisei for jobs on the outside, but the need for workers is being used to change his mind.

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did you ever contact Mr. Wendell Willkie?

Mr. MASAOKA. Only by letter.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, that completes my examination of the witness.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you ever been in touch with Roger Baldwin during the past week?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I have been in camp, that is, the Army camp.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, I mean, going back 5 or 6 days; have you been in touch with Roger Baldwin?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether or not Mr. Kanazawa consulted with Roger Baldwin?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You said that you had consulted with Larry Tijiri since your coming to Washington.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did not Tijiri tell you that Kanazawa had consulted with Baldwin?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know whether or not Saburo Kido got in touch with Kanazawa concerning his relationships with this committee?

Mr. MASAOKA. I do not know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did not Tijiri tell you anything about that?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you receive any communication from Kido with respect to your appearance here?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. There was some confusion as to exactly where I was, because of the mix-up in my shifting around.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Tijiri tell you what advice he had given Kanazawa concerning his testimony, that is, concerning Kanazawa's testimony?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. I think he told me what Kanazawa had done, but I don't recall. I do not recall whether he did or not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you not think that it would have been in the ordinary course of things normal for Tijiri to have told you about a telegram that Kanazawa received just before his appearance before this committee from Kido?

Mr. MASAOKA. You see, I got in Friday morning and I waited at the station, at the U. S. O., to be taken to my point where I was ordered to report. I remained here that afternoon. I didn't get in until late at night and I didn't know Mr. Tijiri was at the Dodge Hotel until late that night.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How long did you discuss this matter with Tijiri?

Mr. MASAOKA. Not very long, because it was late at night and we were both sleepy. I just arrived from a long trip.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Has he since told you about Kido's telegram to Kanazawa?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't think he did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Would it refresh your recollection if I read you the telegram from Kido to Kanazawa? [Reading]:

Nothing would be gained by seeing investigator before hostile committee. Advise against interview. No obligation see anyone advance hearing. Consult Baldwin at this time instead.

Did you know about that telegram?

Mr. MASAOKA. I never heard about the telegram; no, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What steps concerning the work of the Japanese American Citizens League did you discuss with Mrs. Roosevelt?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't think we discussed anything concerning the Japanese American Citizens League specifically. I think we discussed the general resettlement program.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you offer her advice or vice versa?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. We simply got her impressions of the visit to the Gila River relocation center. It was a very short one.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In one of the communications read into the record there is an implication that Myer was not formulating his own program but was doing so at the behest of Mrs. Roosevelt. Do you know whether that is a fact or not?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I don't think that was a fact.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You recall the telegram to which I refer; do you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It was in the form of a telegram, I believe.

Mr. STRIPLING. Letter.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Lettergram.

Mr. MASAOKA. From whom? From me?

Mr. STRIPLING. From Inagaki.

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't recall.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you say Mrs. Roosevelt visited the Gila center?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think she visited the Gila center. She visited one.

Mr. MUNDT. You say she made a very short visit. How long was she there?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe it was a day.

Mr. MUNDT. A day?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think so. That was quite recently; in May, I believe. It was in the papers at the time. She wrote a couple of accounts of it in her My Day.

Mr. MUNDT. That was before she kind of took an aversion to her publicity, as you say.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who introduced you to Mrs. Roosevelt?

Mr. MASAOKA. I have been introduced to her a number of times.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You mean, you met her a number of times since you were first introduced to her.

Mr. MASAOKA. I met her away back in Utah, in the days before I was connected with the J. A. C. L. I was interested in Democratic politics, I met her there for the first time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is that while you were a student?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The letter is addressed to you from Inagaki. It reads, in part:

Is Mrs. Roosevelt's hand in the back of this latest move on the part of the War Relocation Authority or did Myer figure it out by himself?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know what he means.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You don't recall that at all?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You can identify the letter; can you not?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; I can identify the letter. I don't know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, is not the plain implication to your mind there that Myer was not acting independently?



Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In formulating the policy?

Mr. MASAOKA. I don't know what Mr. Inagaki had in mind. So far as I know, Mr. Myer was performing his own operation and doing a darn good job, I should say.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But Mr. Inagaki had some reason for thinking he was not; is that not right?

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, that is up to Mr. Inagaki.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did Mr. Myer address the Special Emergency National Conference of the J. A. C. L. which was held in Salt Lake City November 17-24, 1942?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did the J. A. C. L. pay his expenses out there?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; he was on his way out to the west coast anyway.

Mr. STRIPLING. You did not pay his expenses?

Mr. MASAOKA. No.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was that an off-the-record speech that was printed in your confidential minutes?

Mr. MASAOKA. He made two speeches.

Mr. STRIPLING. Were they off the record?

Mr. MASAOKA. One was not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you mean that one was?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you saying that he made one speech off the record? You mean to say he made one speech to the membership of your organization to which the press was excluded; is that what you mean?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; that is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Something like the Food Conference.

Mr. MASAOKA. Well, I wish ours were as big as the Food Conference. But, it was a small meeting.

Mr. MUNDT. It was fully as secret; was it not?

Mr. MASAOKA. I believe that a representative of the Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence were there at all of our meetings, at our invitation, I think.

Mr. STRIPLING. Are you responsible for having crates of celery sent to a number of Government officials?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes; we have been doing that for years. We think we have the best celery in the world in Salt Lake City, Utah, and we have been doing that since 1932.

Mr. STRIPLING. Was that in connection with your public relations?

Mr. MASAOKA. We have been doing it for years from the Salt Lake Chapter; yes. It is great celery.

Mr. STRIPLING. Would you care to name the people whom you sent it to?

Mr. MASAOKA. No. We sent it to the President, of course; then to the Secretary of State, I believe; Secretaries of Navy and War, I think, plus Mr. Myer, Mr. Baldwin, Mr. John Thomas, Mr. Clarence Pickett, and Senator Thomas. I think that was about the list.

Mr. EBERHARTER. No Congressmen?

Mr. MASAOKA. Pardon me?

Mr. EBERHARTER. No Congressmen?

Mr. MASAOKA. At that time I didn't have the pleasure of knowing you gentlemen.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Nickerson, who was reported in this report, this particular memorandum, to have gone out to Manzanar?

Mr. MASAOKA. I know of him.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was a missionary in Japan for about 25 years or so, I understand.

Mr. MASAOKA. I only know of him.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know where he might be at the present time, do you?

Mr. MASAOKA. No; I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there anything further that you care to say to the committee, Mr. Masaoka?

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the interrogation is finished.

Mr. MASAOKA. Gentlemen, I would like to say this. We Americans of Japanese ancestry, as I stated Saturday, are sincerely interested in this country. We are interested in it not only for our own sake, but for the sake of our children yet to come. We are interested in it not only because we just happen to be Japanese but because we think we are part of the larger scene, a scene which has got to make America go and has got to make the world grow. We think we are a part of that scene.

We believe that the solution to our problem lies, in many respects, in the minority problem of the United States as well as the world, because I cannot feel that the rest of the world can sit at a peace table and discuss terms of peace where America cannot settle her own minority problems. That is one point.

Secondly, and I wish to make this most emphatic, I believe, in the main, the War Relocation Authority has done a highly creditable job. I believe that in the main they are pursuing their proper course. I believe that they ought to have the applause of all good Americans. Mr. Myer and his Authority are struggling against great difficulties, against great odds, against great misunderstanding, and some, I am afraid, difficulties caused by various vested interests.

As good Americans I think we ought to be interested in all phases, because, after all, the American flag is not just one color. It is red, white, and blue. It takes all three to make America. It takes every nationality. It takes every individual to make America grow.

We who happen to have oriental features have a part to play in that. We only ask that we be given that equal opportunity to do what we feel and know to be right, and that is to be a better American in a greater America.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. COSTELLO. You made mention of some vested interests that the War Relocation Authority has to oppose. To what did you have reference?

Mr. MASAOKA. To just general groups.

Mr. COSTELLO. Groups that are trying to thwart the activities of W. R. A.?

Mr. MASAOKA. I think so.

Mr. COSTELLO. I appreciate your having come here, and I trust the necessity for your appearing here has not so impeded your military

program as to set you back too far, so that you will be able to get along all right. I suppose your next destination, then, will be back to Camp Shelby.

Mr. MASAOKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock, at which time Mr. Myer will be the next witness before the committee.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee was in recess until 2 p. m. this day.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., pursuant to the recess.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order. Mr. Stripling, will you call the first witness?

Mr. STRIPLING. The first witness is Mr. Dillon Myer.

#### TESTIMONY OF DILLON S. MYER, DIRECTOR, WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

(The witness was duly sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. COSTELLO. State your full name and title to the reporter.

Mr. MYER. Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed, Mr. Stripling.

Mr. STRIPLING. When were you born?

Mr. MYER. September 4, 1891.

Mr. STRIPLING. What place?

Mr. MYER. Hebron, Ohio.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you give the committee a résumé of your educational background?

Mr. MYER. I went to country school throughout the grade-school period. I went to high school in Hebron, Ohio. I took a 4-year high-school course; graduated from the Ohio State University with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Agriculture in 1914. I have a Master of Arts degree from Columbia University in 1926.

I am sorry; did you ask for my education, or did you ask also for my general training?

Mr. STRIPLING. I asked for your educational background and anything that relates to it directly.

Mr. MYER. That completes my statement as to the formal training I have had.

Mr. STRIPLING. I see.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In what field did you major in taking your master's degree at Columbia?

Mr. MYER. In the field of education and economics.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was that degree from Teachers College?

Mr. MYERS. Teachers College; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Now, will you state your occupational background, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. My first 2 years out of college I served as instructor and assistant instructor in agronomy at the Agricultural Experiment Station at the University of Kentucky.

The next 2 years I served as county agricultural agent for Vanderburgh County at Evansville, Ind.

During the period of the latter part of 1917 and 1920, I was assistant county agent located at Purdue University, at West Lafayette, Ind.

From 1920 to 1922 I was county agricultural agent to Franklin County, Ohio; the county seat, Columbus, Ohio.

From 1922 to 1933 I was district supervisor of extension work in 22 counties in northwestern Ohio; agricultural extension service, Ohio State University.

From 1933 until April 1934 I was in charge of the agricultural adjustment programs in the State of Ohio.

From 1934 to—I do not remember the exact dates, but throughout the rest of 1934 I served as Chief of the Compliance Division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration—Compliance Section, pardon me, of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Washington, D. C.

For the period of the next year and a quarter or thereabouts, or year and a half, I served as assistant director of the Program Planning Division of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

In September 1935 I joined the Soil Conservation Service in the U. S. Department of Agriculture as Chief of the Division of Cooperative Relations and Planning.

In 1936 I was made Assistant Chief of the Soil Conservation Service. I will have to recheck that, too. I am not sure of the exact date. It was either 1936 or 1937 when I served until December 15, 1942, at which time I was made Assistant Administrator, Agricultural Administrator of the Agricultural Conservation and Adjustment Administration in the Department of Agriculture, which position I held until June 17, 1942, at which time I became Director of the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. STRIPLING. You have held the position as Director from June 17 up until today?

Mr. MYER. June 17, 1942, until this date.

Mr. STRIPLING. Have you ever traveled abroad?

Mr. MYER. No; with the exception of two or three short trips to Canada.

Mr. STRIPLING. During your college career, did you ever major or specialize in any particular languages?

Mr. MYER. I did not. The only language I had in college was 1 year of German, during my sophomore year, I believe, other than the English language.

Mr. STRIPLING. Had you ever had any special training in matters pertaining to the Japanese language or Japanese culture or customs and habits?

Mr. MYER. Excepting the training that I have had in a rather extensive degree during the last 12 months.

Mr. STRIPLING. You were appointed to the position as Director of the War Relocation Authority by the President?

Mr. MYER. By the President of the United States; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. You succeeded Mr. Milton Eisenhower?

Mr. MYER. I did.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Eisenhower went with the O. W. I., I believe.

Mr. MYER. As Associate Director, I believe, of the Office of War Information.

Mr. STRIPLING. Dr. Matthews.



Mr. COSTELLO. Did you have occasion at all, when you were at college, to study Japanese history or Japanese customs?

Mr. MYER. I do not remember that I had any occasion to study Japanese customs or history during my college career.

Mr. COSTELLO. You never had any contact with Japanese people prior to your assuming this position with the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MYER. Excepting those I made during my college career and as I made in my business relationships throughout the years. There were a few people I knew quite well who were of Japanese ancestry.

Mr. COSTELLO. But prior to that you made no particular study of Japanese history or customs?

Mr. MYER. No; I had not.

Mr. COSTELLO. Since you have had this position, have you made any study of the history of the Japanese people or of their customs, apart from what information might have come to you from handling the position itself?

Mr. MYER. Naturally, Mr. Chairman, I have read a great many things that I felt would be of value as background material for my work as Director of the War Relocation Authority. I have read a good many pamphlets and booklets, as well as information which was brought to my attention that gave background training, and an insight of the culture of the Japanese race, and particularly the people we're dealing with as evacuees in the relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. In the course of that did you make any particular effort to learn anything about the methods of espionage that the Japanese had conducted in this country prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MYER. I have gone into that very extensively with all of the intelligence agencies with whom we have had very close contact throughout the period of the last year; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have made a study of the Japanese subversive organizations and their methods of carrying on espionage?

Mr. MYER. We have; yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed.

Mr. MYER. Insofar as that was possible.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was your finding with respect to the identity of the principal pro-Japanese organizations among the Japanese in this country?

Mr. MYER. I would much prefer that you ask the intelligence agencies about that. In spite of the fact that I have gone into the matter, I do not consider myself an expert in that field, in view of the fact that most of the activities relating to the incarceration of aliens and others connected with those organizations was carried out previous to the time that I became Director of the War Relocation Authority, so I would not like to pose as an expert in that field, even though I have gone into the matter in some detail.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have someone on your staff who is charged or was charged with the function of knowing these organizations that operated in the United States before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MYER. We have depended upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Army Intelligence to supply us that information relating to those particular activities, because that is the field in which they operate. We have maintained

very close liaison with all of those agencies, through members of my staff.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have those agencies furnished you with a list of organizations by name, considered by them to be subversive Japanese organizations, or even suspect organizations?

Mr. MYER. They have supplied us with such lists from time to time and given us the information regarding the organizations, as we have requested that information; yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have on file in the office of War Relocation Authority a list of organizations that you accept as suspects on the basis of reports furnished you by Federal investigative agencies?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have any approximate recollection as to how many such organizations there would be in that file?

Mr. MYER. No; I would not want to try to give that information offhand. I could not give it to you offhand.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that list contain the names of individuals as well as organizations?

Mr. MYER. We have from time to time been supplied with names of individuals from the agencies. Just how many, I could not tell you offhand, Mr. Chairman. I might add that we have had excellent collaboration on the part of the intelligence agencies in checking information and supplying to us information when requested by the War Relocation Authority, as to any records that they may have in the files regarding individuals.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you please give the committee a statement of the set-up of the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, how it operates, where its main headquarters are, how it reaches out in the centers, and something of your own duties with respect to administration.

Mr. MYER. The main headquarters of the War Relocation Authority is at the present time in Washington, D. C. Our budget for this coming fiscal year calls for approximately 250 employees at the national headquarters.

In addition to the Washington office, we have three small field offices. In charge of each we have a field assistant director; one at Little Rock, Ark., one at Denver, Colo., and one at San Francisco, Calif.

These offices are very small offices and serve as staff offices in the Director's office, representing the Authority within the general areas where they are located and assisting in the general supervision of projects and other activities within their scope of activity.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is the total personnel in those staff offices?

Mr. MYER. I think the personnel will average about six per office for each of the branch offices. I can supply you that in detail. I do not have the chart with me.

In addition to those offices, we have 10 major relocation centers that were established during the spring and summer of 1942, and one isolation center.

The 10 relocation centers are located as follows:

Tule Lake, Calif., in Modoc County, near the Oregon line, 35 miles from Klamath Falls, Oreg.

Manzanar, Calif., in the Owens Valley, about 200 miles from Los Angeles.

Colorado River center, which is located in the Colorado River Indian Reservation near the California line, 17 miles south of Parker, Calif.

Gila River relocation center on the Pima Indian Reservation, about 40 miles from Phoenix, Ariz.

Minidoka, about 18 miles from Twin Falls, Idaho.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is that M-i-n-i-n-d-o-k-a?

Mr. MYER. That is right. I believe that is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. It is misspelled here, then.

Mr. MYER. Well, I am not sure about the spelling. I always have to ask my secretary. I always have to turn around and ask her. It is an Indian name and I cannot remember it, but we will correct it for the record.

Central Utah, near Delta, Utah, about 125 miles, I believe, south of Salt Lake City.

Heart Mountain, Wyo., about 70 miles from Cody, Wyo.

Granada, in southeastern Colorado, about 7 miles from Lamar, Colo.

Rohrer, Ark., near McGehee, Ark.

Jerome, Ark., near the little town of Jerome, or perhaps Lake Village would come nearer designating the area. Both of those Arkansas projects are in the Arkansas delta near the Mississippi River.

Those are the major centers. The isolation center is located at Leupp. I am not sure I can spell this; L-e-u-p-p or L-u-p-p, I am not sure which, which is about 25 miles north and west of Winslow, Ariz., in the Navajo Indian Reservation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Why do you distinguish between that center and the others?

Mr. MYER. That center was established as a center where we might locate troublemakers who had caused difficulties within the centers, because they were interfering with the administration of the centers, and they are cases where we did not feel that we could establish enough evidence to put them through the civil courts, particularly in the case of United States citizens. We could not send them to internment camps as we could aliens.

We have an agreement with the Justice Department whereby if we can develop a ticket on aliens that indicates that they are entering into subversive activities or in any way carrying out agitation, that we may send them a ticket and they will take them to internment camps.

That is not true of citizens, because that would require court procedure, and it is not always possible to get the evidence necessary.

That center, I might say, was established first at Mojave, Utah, which was an old C. C. A. camp, following the incident referred to at Manzanar, and which has been referred to in the press a good many times. The first people in the group were the leaders in the so-called Manzanar riot, and we have now approximately 60 people at Leupp who are, most of them, citizens of the United States; a large majority of them Kibei, who had most of their education in Japan.

I might say there have been approximately also a hundred aliens, in addition to those who were interned previous to the time the relocation centers came into existence, that either were taken out of the centers on Presidential warrant or taken into internment camps now



under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department. At one time they were under the jurisdiction of the War Department.

Mr. STRIPLING. How many of those 60 are from Manzanar?

Mr. MYER. I believe there were 16 out of the Manzanar group. I would have to check the figures on that, but that is approximately correct. I beg your pardon. There were 16 in the first group and later on there were 10 more; 26. May I continue?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. MYER. In addition to the field offices mentioned and the relocation centers, and the isolation center, we have, since January 1, established approximately 50 field offices throughout the country, whose function is to assist in the relocation of evacuees in the normal communities.

Our major and key offices in charge of that work are located at Salt Lake City; Denver, Colo.; Kansas City, Mo.; Chicago; Cleveland, Ohio; and New York City.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Approximately how many persons are employed in those 50 field offices whose salary is obtained from the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MYER. I would have to check the figure officially for the record, but as I remember the figures, it is approximately—let me figure just a moment. I would say approximately 150 people.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You did not give an estimate of the number of employees of W. R. A. in the relocation centers. Are you in a position to do that?

Mr. MYER. I would rather give you that figure later, but as I remember it, we are authorized to employ, I believe, 2,013 for this coming year.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In the 10 centers?

Mr. MYER. Within the 10 centers. That is appointed personnel, not evacuees. Most of our work is done in the relocation centers by evacuees and the key people, the heads of the divisions, are appointed personnel, and about 50 percent of our school teachers are appointed personnel. The rest of the work is done by evacuees, for the most part.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In a given center, what ratio is there between appointed personnel and evacuees?

Mr. MYER. Well, we have, of appointed personnel, approximately 2,000 in 10 centers, with approximately 100,000 people. About 2 percent, I would say, was about the approximate figure we have.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What I mean is this: You have approximately an average of 200 personnel—

Mr. MYER. An average of 200 appointed personnel.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In each of the centers?

Mr. MYER. In each of the centers. The centers will average about 10,000 in size.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That will be the average then of the evacuees employed in each center?

Mr. MYER. I beg your pardon?

Mr. MATTHEWS. That ratio compared with the other group.

Mr. MYER. The evacuees employed at each of the centers would probably average about between four and five thousand. However, that does not mean that those are all employed in administrative



work. They are employed in agriculture, raising crops, in public works, such as irrigation, drainage, clearing, land clearing and, of course, they are employed in maintenance, road construction, and all of the other activities, including firemen and the normal activities that are carried on in any city.

I would like the opportunity later to re-check these figures more accurately as we correct the record, but I am giving you offhand information as I remember it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Then you have approximately 2,500 administrative personnel in the entire W. R. A. set-up?

Mr. MYER. Thereabouts, yes; approximately that many.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Including the assistant personnel in the field offices and the regional offices?

Mr. MYER. I don't think we have quite that many, but we were authorized to employ that many by our budget. It has been hard to employ people with the necessary qualifications during the war, but I do not think the figure ever ran that high.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What is your budget for the fiscal year?

Mr. MYER. 1944?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes; the total budget for the year.

Mr. MYER. \$48,170,000. That is the figure that was sent to the Congress by the Bureau of the Budget and the one which has been passed by the Congress—not passed, I beg your pardon, which has been agreed on by both the Senate and the House following the conference. But the bill had not been passed last night. It is in the war agencies bill. That is approximately \$27,000,000 less than the funds available to the War Relocation Authority last year, and approximately \$5,000,000 less than the expenditures we will make through 1943.

We had made available to us something over \$75,000,000 during this fiscal year, and the indications are that we will expend approximately \$53,000,000 of that amount.

Mr. EBERHARTER. That is, the year that has just passed?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was that estimate, \$53,000,000?

Mr. MYER. Approximately. We won't have that figure finally until we get the books checked in about another 2 weeks.

Mr. MATTHEWS. With an authorization of \$75,000,000?

Mr. MYER. \$75,469,000.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What has been the proportionate reduction in the number of those in the centers in these two corresponding periods.

Mr. MYER. Of course, we are just starting the new fiscal year. Our estimates for this fiscal year are based on 100,000 population; total centers. We hope we will have much less than that. We already have some less. The figure last Saturday night was 96,237. The largest figure at any one time that we had in relocation centers was 107,616, I believe. That is very close. I want to recheck that figure again.

There are more people for whom we have been responsible at different times, but never at any time was there any more than 107,616 in the centers.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Does that indicate that approximately 10,000 or a little more than 10,000 have never been released from the camps, as of last Saturday night?

Mr. MYER. As of last Saturday night, there have been approximately 15,306. As a matter of fact, it was exactly 15,305 who were on seasonal leave and indefinite leave. Of that group, 9,359 are on indefinite leave. The rest of them are on seasonal leave, working largely in the agricultural fields of the irrigated areas of the mid-Mountain States and Western States, outside of Washington, Oregon, and southern California.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In selecting the personnel of the Washington office of W. R. A., to what extent have you employed persons with an extensive background of knowledge of Japanese affairs?

Mr. MYER. Not to a very large extent. We have a few people who are specialists in that field who have devoted a great deal of their lives to the study of the cultural background of the Japanese, both within Japan and the Hawaiian Islands and on the west coast.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What particular positions do they occupy? What type of positions do they occupy in the W. R. A. headquarters in Washington?

Mr. MYER. Mr. John M. Empie is the key specialist in that field. He occupies the position as chief economic analyst, or chief analyst, I believe they call it. I would have to get the exact title. I can't remember the title of all my employees.

In the Washington office, in the Division of Community Services, he has attached to his staff one assistant, I believe, and we have one field assistant established for each of the projects, working directly with his office.

We have a number of other people who have lived and worked closely with the Japanese on the west coast, who occupy a number of different positions throughout the Authority.

Our chief steward, for example, has been very closely associated with the evacuees in California. The man who heads up our important leave section, Mr. Robertson, has been very closely associated with them in southern California, and a number of other people throughout the Authority.

I would not attempt, off-hand, Mr. Matthews, to give you the exact number of people who have been experienced. I might say that the majority of the Washington staff were selected before I came into the W. R. A. as its director. You must remember that 3 months had passed. They key set-up in the organization was pretty well established by Mr. Eisenhower. However, in our realignment of our organization last December, when we brought in a large number of people from the San Francisco office, there were a number of people attached to the staff in Washington at that time who had had a very close relationship with the people on the west coast previous to evacuation.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What are Mr. Robertson's initials?

Mr. MYER. I can't tell you his initials. Bill is his first name.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is his middle name Guy, or do you recall?

Mr. MYER. I do not recall.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But his first name is Bill?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Can you mention the name of the chief steward?

Mr. MYER. His name is Harding. Previous to evacuation, I think, he was the steward of the Empire Hotel in San Francisco, which is now owned by the Treasury Department.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How many persons of Japanese ancestry are employed among these 250?

Mr. MYER. Twenty-five.

Mr. MATTHEWS. In the Washington office?

Mr. MYER. Twenty-five.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do they do any particular type of work or are they segregated through your administrative set-up?

Mr. MYER. Most of them are employed as clerks and stenographers and statistical clerks.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is any one of the 25 in a position that might be called a policy-making position?

Mr. MYER. No; none of them are.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you recall offhand what the highest salary paid to any one of the 25 would be?

Mr. MYER. No. I would have to check that. I have not gone into that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How many of the 25 are persons who have been in the relocation centers and have received indefinite leave?

Mr. MYER. I am not quite sure about my answer on that, but I think all of them. There may be one or two exceptions to that.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you have a list of those 25 persons with you today?

Mr. MYER. I do not have it with me, although I do have a list of them. I will be glad to supply that for the record.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I wonder if you would please be good enough to make a note so that we could have the names.

Mr. MYER. I have somebody making notes for me.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The names of the 25 persons of Japanese ancestry who are now employed in the War Relocation Authority in Washington. Are there any persons of Japanese ancestry who are employed in the regional offices?

Mr. MYER. Not in the Washington field director's office, that I know of. There are some employed, however, in the field relocation offices.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is, in the 50 field relocation offices?

Mr. MYER. That is right, particularly in the key offices. I know, at least, there are one or two employed in Chicago. I am not sure about the other offices. However, there has been authorization given to employ one or two people from among the evacuees in each of those offices; of the key offices.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In submitting the list of names, it would be very easy to add the salary of each and the positions they hold.

Mr. MYER. I would be glad to.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, what are the functions of the three regional offices located at Little Rock, Ark., Denver, and San Francisco?

Mr. MYER. The functions are, one, that they have been supervising the work at the project; to see that the policies are being properly carried out. We have report after report, rumor after rumor, that we have to investigate. They assist in investigating these rumors and are kept busy nowadays about three-quarters of the time gathering facts relating to rumors that appear in public print. They serve the public within the area by supplying information, attend-



ing meetings upon request, by working with the press, and supplying information regarding policy. They carry out particular assignments that may be made by the director on special jobs on which they are authorized to go into the matter, and to take action, when certain issues come up that require action quickly. I would say, in general, those are the major functions of the three offices.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do they have any work to do in handling the property of the evacuees in the coastal area?

Mr. MYER. No. I am glad you brought that up. They do not. I overlooked that function of the field officers in my statement regarding the organization. We have property offices on the west coast. Our major property office is at San Francisco. We have an office at Los Angeles, one at Seattle, which are suboffices of the San Francisco office. I think there are approximately 82 people employed in the property offices.

Their function is to look after the property of the evacuees, in the sense of rendering a service to the evacuees who cannot return to the west coast. In a great many cases where they had property leased, they have assisted in collecting the lease money or rental money. In a great many cases we have to check into property that has been broken into or property has been stolen.

I might say that we do not operate any property that belongs to the evacuees, but we do render them a service in trying to maintain their property in sound shape and to assist them in carrying out their business, by serving as their agents.

We have a large number of warehouses that are full of evacuees' personal property that has been stored, which we look after and which we ship to them if they ask for it to be shipped to them after they relocate on indefinite leave. And, if they request it, we ship it to them at the relocation centers. However, our policy is that we ship property only once at our expense.

Mr. COSTELLO. I presume the property of alien evacuees is under the control of the Treasury Department, is it?

Mr. MYER. Any of the so-called blocked aliens, yes. They designate the aliens whose property they felt should be under their supervision, and in that case that is entirely under the Alien Property Division of the Treasury Department. And, of course, we collaborate with them in trying to—not in trying to, but in locating people for them and keeping in touch with the aliens.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Alien Property Custodian has not seized all of the property of all of these Japanese aliens as yet?

Mr. MYER. No. They have simply designated particular cases where they have taken over the property, and those aliens are called blocked aliens, I believe.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do have charge, however, of all the property belonging to those evacuees where the property is left on the west coast?

Mr. MYER. Well, yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have supervision of it?

Mr. MYER. It depends on what you call "supervision of." We assist them with their property problems if they request us to do so, yes; otherwise, we let them handle their own business, which many of them are doing through attorneys and through giving friends power of attorney. They have not bothered us about that, but in those cases



where they have requested assistance, we have given assistance to them.

Mr. COSTELLO. Are you familiar with the legislation passed out in California authorizing the State to exercise the right of eminent domain in acquiring title to farm machinery?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I am.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has your agency in any way cooperated with the State out there to obtain control of any such machinery?

Mr. MYER. We have taken no action as yet. We have told the State agencies that we would cooperate with them in connection with assisting in recovering that property. It has taken some months to get an inventory of the large amount of property that was scattered up and down the coast; and, we believe, scattered to 10 relocation centers, and some of that in other parts of the country.

I might say there has been a great deal of misinformation given out regarding the amount of property, particularly the agricultural machinery that was available. I remember one case where we made a survey. It was reported by telegram to some of you folks here that there were 500 pieces of equipment in the Salinas Valley. The chamber of commerce was a party to that report. We asked the chamber of commerce to assign somebody to work with our men as a committee to check it, and we found 5 pieces instead of 500. So, there has been a great deal of rumor and misinformation about that.

There is not a very large amount of agricultural machinery that has not either been sold or leased or is not in operation. There is some, but a very much smaller amount than has been indicated by many of the rumors and the reports that have come out of the different areas.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know anything of the attitude of the evacuees regarding the surrendering of their farm machinery?

Mr. MYER. That is about as variable as you will find human nature any place. Most of them, as I have already indicated, either disposed of their equipment by sale or by lease or by loan to friends before they left, or after they left the area. There are a small number who are trying to retain their equipment, as I think you will find in any group of people. Some of them have sold their equipment recently and others have leased their equipment recently, so that it is quite variable.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was indicated to me before I left California, in an effort to put this new law into operation, where notice had been served upon the Japanese owners with intent to acquire title to their farm equipment, that during the period in which they received the notice, at the time when they might exercise control over it, in most cases the machinery was disposed of, either sold or title transferred, and it was removed from the State.

Do you have any information regarding that?

Mr. MYER. No; I do not. I do know that there has been some machinery moved from the State, on the part of the evacuees who have established farming operations in certain of the other States, and have asked that their machinery be shipped to them.

I know of one case in Illinois that got a great deal of publicity back 2 or 3 months ago, where they had their machinery shipped. I think 13 people were involved. Their machinery was shipped from Sacramento to them. I do not know how many cases there have

been. I will be glad to check into that. I think I can get the facts if you are interested in it.

Mr. COSTELLO. But your property custodians out there have never attempted to make any inventory of the available farm machinery?

Mr. MYER. Oh, yes. We have attempted to make the inventory and I think we have a pretty accurate inventory at the present time. It took some time, however, to get that inventory. We asked the local war boards and local chambers of commerce, in most cases, to assist us in making that inventory in the areas where the machinery was stored, and we have also taken the inventory at the relocation centers as a double check against the facts that we had at the other end of the line. Just like any kind of a census, you are not quite sure you have the last piece, but I think we have a pretty adequate inventory now.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that inventory available here in Washington?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would you produce that for us, please?

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to supply the information for the record. (The material referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. COSTELLO. There has been no representation made to you that the Japanese were attempting to remove this machinery or disposing of it in order to avoid the operation of the California law, has there?

Mr. MYER. I have heard no such cases. There may be, but I have not heard of them.

Mr. COSTELLO. You would not know whether some of the machinery, or the title to it, had been transferred from the existing owners to others over in an adjoining State?

Mr. MYER. No; I have not heard about that. During the past 3 weeks the man who has charge of the property work here in Washington, and who keeps contact with that, has been in the field and has just returned. He is ill at the moment, so I have not had a chance to talk with him since he returned from the field. He came back and immediately went to bed, and I do not know how soon he will be available, but I hope in the next 2 or 3 days.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You spoke a moment ago of the evacuees disposing of their property to friends prior to evacuation. Did you have reports of any wholesale disposing of such properties to strangers who were imposing upon the Japanese, because they were about to be evacuated?

Mr. MYER. We had a good many reports, and some of them have been authenticated, of course, where people tried to take advantage of the situation at the time they evacuated; and, some of them, I think, did take advantage of them.

Mr. MATTHEWS. There have been reports, for example, of Japanese business institutions being put under the pressure of the moment to dispose of their business at 5 cents or 10 cents on the dollar. Have your offices out there gone into that question?

Mr. MYER. We have, where we have been requested to by the evacuees, to assist them in collection cases, and that type of thing.

I might say that we did not handle the property problem until after the evacuation was pretty well completed. The Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank, you may remember, were designated by the War Department to assist the evacuees during the

early period of the evacuation with their property problems, to assist them in disposing of property if they cared to or in storing the property and any other service. We did not take over the property work until about mid-August of 1942.

The early part of that work was carried forward by those agencies, and there were about 750 cases where the Farm Security Administration had made loans to people who were leasing property from evacuees and others, that they continued to supervise for some time. I think most of those are probably cleaned up at the present time; so that we were not as close in touch with the movement at the time when most of the sales were taking place.

Our experience has been limited to the period from August, 1942, up to the present time; and, of course, we have come in contact with cases where fraud was charged, and where you get all kinds of charges made as regards dealings between evacuees and others who had purchased or leased their properties.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know to what extent the evacuees in the relocation centers feel that they were the victims of fraud in such property transactions? Is that a widespread feeling?

Mr. MYER. I have heard there were a great many cases where people feel very much embittered and feel that was true because of the hurried situation, that they felt they were called upon to dispose of their property in a hurry, and in doing so they sacrificed their property. How many feel that way, I would not know, but I do know that there are people who do feel that way.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have your investigations of the cases of such fraud indicated that their feeling was justified; that there had been wholesale fraud?

Mr. MYER. I would not want to make a statement on it as to the wholesale fraud. I have heard of cases where our property officers felt there had been fraud or attempted fraud.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was this in an endeavor to cooperate with the evacuees?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Not merely to bring actual suits against the persons accused?

Mr. MYER. That is right. And, there have been some suits in some cases brought in the courts already.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Now, you mentioned the figure of 2,013 on the administrative staffs of the relocation centers. Are any of those individuals persons of Japanese ancestry?

Mr. MYER. I don't know. There are no evacuees or no people of Japanese ancestry on the War Relocation Authority pay roll in relocation centers at a salary above \$19 a month.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is the salary ceiling a limitation enacted by Congress?

Mr. MYER. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who placed that regulation there?

Mr. MYER. That was probably established jointly with Congress in connection with the first budget that was established for the operation of the War Relocation Authority a year ago. That figure was given as the top figure that would be utilized for wages or salary, or whatever you want to call it, and has been adhered to throughout the period of 1943.



Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, that \$19 salary could be raised or lowered by your direction?

Mr. MYER. I don't think it could now. It could legally, yes, but actually I think it would be very impractical thing for the Director of the War Relocation Authority to do, when he has just made representation to the Appropriations Committees in both the House and the Senate that that is what we propose to pay, and to do it without at least taking it up with the committee members and having agreement on their part. That is sound procedure to do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel that the \$19 limitation is a satisfactory wage scale?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, we have in these centers people of all economic levels as you would among any 100,000 people. There are many, many people that feel that that is a very, very meager and low wage.

There are people in the centers that in my judgment are doing better, perhaps, than they were doing on the outside. I should say that it is not a satisfactory wage and, certainly, as wages go, during this wartime period. But, I do think that when you consider the fact that food is supplied, even though the top figure is 45 cents a day, with housing, and even though I think you will agree it is not very good when you have an apartment 20 by 25 feet each way for a family of five, with no partitioning, in a theater operation type of barracks, and with medical care and schools, of course, being supplied, it presents a somewhat different situation.

There are certain people with large families that are doing reasonably well, if they have three or four people in the family, working at the center. There are a lot of other people that are living off of their savings so long as they stay in the centers, in addition to what they are getting. We have tried to strike at a minimum figure that would provide a basic minimum living for the people who, for one reason or another, have to stay in the centers for the duration.

Certainly, I would not consider it a good salary for professional people like doctors, of which we have many in the centers, who have spent a great amount of money in getting their education and who are, some of them, spending as much as most of their salary in keeping up with the current literature in their field.

I might add that prisoners of war are paid, when they are paid, 80 cents per day. Twenty-five days a month would make \$20 a month, so that prisoners of war, if they work 25 days a month, are paid more than the doctors in our relocation centers, and get better food.

Mr. COSTELLO. The evacuees are not considered prisoners of war; are they?

Mr. MYER. They are not. I distinguish between them. If they were, they would get better food and better pay than they are now getting.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of course, in your centers, all the evacuees, whether they work or not, receive equally the housing, their food, and medical treatment?

Mr. MYER. And schooling; that is correct. The minimum of our policy is to provide food, housing, schools through the grades and high school, and medical care for everyone, regardless of whether they work or not.



Mr. COSTELLO. The result is then that the \$19 a month payment——

Mr. MYER. That is spending money.

Mr. COSTELLO (continuing). Is not really an incentive to them to engage in any great amount of work.

Mr. MYER. No. No; it simply provides a wage for people to have some money to buy tooth paste and other necessities that they feel are essential, and to get away from out and out grants of funds and to encourage the people to work, if they care to do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you found that many of the evacuees have refused to work because of the fact that the wage scale was not sufficient to justify their going out and performing labor?

Mr. MYER. Not many. There are some that refuse to work, but I think the percentage that refuse to work is something less than 4 percent on the average. I would like to correct that figure, because I don't remember the exact figure. It is a very small figure that have refused to work.

As a matter of fact, a larger proportion, I think, of your population have been working in the centers than do on the outside. I won't put it that way, because the whole family worked, if they were in agriculture. But, most of those above 14 years of age, when they were out of school, including many of the wives, are working if they can find work that they can do in the centers, in order to keep busy, be occupied, as well as to assist in the center operations.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the evacuees have to provide their own clothing; do they not?

Mr. MYER. Those who work get a clothing allowance in addition to their other pay, and the highest figure on that is \$45 a year; that is, in the northern centers, where they require heavier clothing, and for those who are doing heavy work, they get a little larger amount. As somebody put it recently, the men get more than the women in that case, which is not unusual, but we are not providing any party dresses out of \$45 a year.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the minimum age at the camps for which you pay \$12 to \$19?

Mr. MYER. We follow the general labor standards regarding child labor as are followed throughout the rest of the country. We follow the same laws that are followed generally.

Mr. MUNDT. On the subject of wages, Mr. Myer, what is the policy of the W. R. A.? What is the policy of the War Relocation Authority relocation program from the standpoint of wages paid to Japanese evacuees going into private employment? Are they made available at prevailing rates in that locality or considered as farm labor?

Mr. MYER. When people leave the relocation centers, they conduct their own business. Our advice to evacuees going out is simply this: "Do not ask for more nor take less than other people are getting." We have no policies on it excepting just that.

We present all offers that people insist on. We present them. We are sometimes told that they want only good people at that price. Well, we do not try to police the wage scale of evacuees going out on relocation. We do not consider that our business. We have been asked to make loans to evacuees, and we told them we didn't want a mortgage on anybody. We are not interested in institution-

alizing ourselves in business, neither do we want to be paternalistic in following them up and seeing what kind of wages they receive.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there some tendency on the part of private employers to try to get these Japanese evacuees at less than the prevailing wage scale?

Mr. MYER. Yes; we found some of them, the same as anyone else.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is there a tendency on the part of the internee, the Japanese internee, because of his eagerness to get out—

Mr. MYER. The evacuee.

Mr. COSTELLO. To get back into private life, to accept these sub-standard wages?

Mr. MYER. That varies in some cases, yes, in this respect: We had very well trained people who were willing to become domestics for the time being, in order that they might relocate in an area where they could, by having a frank arrangement with their employer, look around and try to establish themselves in their professional field, in the field of their skill.

One of the best newspaper girls I know came to Chicago as a domestic. She wrote some of the best editorials in our Los Angeles Free Press before she left the center following the incident we had, and she has been living in Chicago for some time with an arrangement with the people she is living with that if she finds a position to her liking, she may leave at any time. So, we have had cases of that type.

Generally speaking, however, there has been no tendency to break the labor market on the part of the employer. I would say there has been the other tendency.

If I might pay tribute to the high wage scale of the State of California, the home State of the chairman, the wages are generally higher in California than in many of the areas where these people are trying to locate, particularly the Midwest. And, we have had a real problem getting them to understand that, in many cases. They want the same wage scale and the same standards generally that they have been used to. That is perfectly natural. Consequently, we have had a problem of getting evacuees to accept wages that were offered which were considered prevailing wages in other communities.

Mr. COSTELLO. By and large, would you say that the agricultural workers and the domestic workers, those doing menial tasks, are getting approximately the prevailing wages?

Mr. MYER. I would say so; yes, sir. There is, as you know, an opportunity to secure pretty good wages in those fields nowadays, because there are not many people available for it, and consequently they are getting, I think, prevailing wages, generally speaking.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How does that wage compare with this \$19 a month wage in the centers?

Mr. MYER. Well, of course, wages vary, depending on the contract made between the employer and the employee, in this case. But, of course, it is a great deal higher than it is in the relocation centers, a great deal higher.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I know that varies. I thought you might have some approximate average as a basis for comparison.

Mr. MYER. No; I do not, because the people who have gone out from the centers have gone out in all kinds of activities and, consequently,

the wages have varied, depending on the contract, as I say, between the employer and the employee. I do not have any average figure. As a matter of fact, in view of the fact that we take no responsibility for wages, we do not even keep records of the wages that are secured on the outside, so we have no way of knowing what the average would be.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You stated that you had made representations to committees of both Houses of Congress on the \$19-a-month wage.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Is that policy of yours, of the Authority, based in part on the idea that keeping it at that figure will serve as an inducement for persons to apply for leave; indefinite leave?

Mr. MYER. It was not at the time that the figure was set, to begin with. That figure was set before I came into the Authority. However, I would say that that is a good reason for keeping it there, Mr. Matthews, in my judgment.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Your policy is to get as many persons out as rapidly as they can be suitably placed in the relocation?

Mr. MYER. It is our policy to get as many people relocated in normal communities, that are eligible on our rolls, as we can possibly get out in as short a time as possible. We believe that is sound from the United States Government standpoint, and we are pushing that program as our major effort at the moment.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This figure of \$19 is sort of an economic inducement to expedite that movement—

Mr. MYERS. In reverse.

Mr. MATTHEWS. To expedite that movement away from the centers?

Mr. MYER. It was not set up in the first place with that in mind, however.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But you adhered to that, in part at least, for that purpose?

Mr. MYER. Well, I suggested no change in it, because I felt that the figure was high enough, as long as we were making relocation centers.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to have you give the committee as clear an explanation as you can for the reasons behind the setting of this particular sum of \$16 and \$19. To some people that may seem like just an arbitrary figure arrived at. What I think the committee would like to know is how that figure came to be agreed upon? What were the reasons, the considerations? What were the reasons and considerations for adopting those particular figures?

Mr. MYER. I am sorry. I cannot give you the detailed considerations that were kept in mind at the time that figure was arrived at, because I was not present when that first budget was prepared.

Mr. Eisenhower and other members of his staff worked on that problem and worked with the Members of Congress on it, and in the hearings, the first hearing before the House committee, on the first appropriations which were held, I think, in May of 1942, I think, that figure was established, and it was established before I came into the Authority, in mid-June; so, I could not go back and give you the historical background.

I might say this: That I have heard one of the considerations at the time was that the top figure was less than the American private



was getting in the American Army. That is about the only thing that I did hear about it. At that time, you see, the Army pay had not been raised to \$52 from \$21, and that was one of the considerations that I am sure was in the minds of some of the people that helped establish it. But, I think it was arrived at by making certain computations as to the cost of certain minimum necessities that people would need to have, a minimum reasonable living compared with standards of living within the centers; those little necessities that you and I feel we have to have every day, that were not supplied in our basic subsistence had to be purchased. They not only had to be purchased for the individuals who were the adults in the family, but they had to be purchased for the youngsters and, consequently, they tried to arrive at the figures.

Now, the figures are \$12 and \$16 and \$19. The bulk of these evacuees are working for \$16. The \$12 figure was more or less an apprentice figure; people breaking in on new jobs and learning new types of work. Those that had never done new types of work before, they received \$12 until they became skilled at it and then they moved into the \$16 class, and it meant some differential between that skilled group and common labor and other types of labor.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In other words, the maximum amount that would be paid these evacuees now being employed was arrived at by figuring what perhaps the minimum would be for the necessities they required.

Mr. MYER. Yes. That figure was set up in order to provide some compensation for work done, and at the same time to try to provide some of those little necessities that have to be purchased with cash and were not supplied by the Government. Soap is one of the very common things and they use a lot of it, because they are very cleanly people, and one of the biggest problems we had to begin with was the insistence that we supply soap. Somebody there started supplying it. We had a terrible time breaking off of that little trick.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The maximum, in other words, has been made to comply with the minimum necessities?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, do you really feel, though, that \$19 a month is adequate, an adequate wage for a person running a bulldozer out in that section of Parker?

Mr. MYER. Of course I don't.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you been able to get sufficient workers out there to do that heavy type of work under those climatic conditions?

Mr. MYER. Well, they tell me that they have not down there, and that has varied from time to time. I would say this, that any change in the wage scale, to put them on a private wage scale basis, would certainly interfere and interrupt the relocation program.

Mr. COSTELLO. You feel the wage scale should be maintained at that level in order to definitely induce the evacuees to leave the centers and seek outside relocation?

Mr. MYER. That is one of the reasons I think it should be maintained there, as long as we have the relocation centers. There are other reasons why it did not seem desirable to change it. When you begin to change your wage scale, you have the matter to work out with Congress again, as to your reasons for it. You have the old



problem of changing your whole administrative set-up which is geared to that wage scale. It may be, however, that the war won't last too many years and that we won't have to meet that problem over too long a period.

Mr. COSTELLO. If it is the desire to encourage the release of evacuees from the centers, explain the reason for their not putting in more land in cultivation in the Poston center?

Mr. MYER. That is part of it; yes. I might say, at the Poston center, they are not up as yet to the amount of ground that they are authorized to put into cultivation, and they won't reach that for some time to come. There are 5,000 acres to put in cultivation and it will be some time yet when they will be ready for that amount of acreage.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is my understanding that there are about 300 acres actually in operation at this time.

Mr. MYER. That is right, because that is all they have been able to get cleared and ready for operation. There will be, I think, 1,400 acres under cultivation by this fall, when they put in their winter vegetables. They are authorized to clear 5,000 acres, which will take some time.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understood it was five or six thousand acres that was in the process of being cleared and leveled, and so on.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is an approximate figure.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that they may have difficulty to actually put any individual unit into cultivation?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. But, of course, they are picking their best land, naturally.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is my understanding that ultimately they intend to put about 20,000 acres more under cultivation in the Poston area.

Mr. MYER. The Indian Service would like to put in 20,000 acres and pay private wages to do it. I am not too familiar with their plan, however. They have had a plan for some time, though. On the other hand, we believe that is contrary to the policy of the War Relocation Authority, with its people, and where they can pay the men more than the relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. The W. R. A. envisages the utilization of these Japanese people in the centers, on the other hand?

Mr. MYER. Excepting for subsistence and excepting on jobs that are supplemental subsistence jobs, if we cannot get them relocated on the outside. Now, we will try to provide work in the way of development of land and other types of work if it is impossible for them to go out. And there is plenty of work at Poston yet for those that are still there today, as well as there is at most of the other centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. There is no desire, then, on the part of the W. R. A. to make each center self-sustaining in the way of producing farm products and commodity items.

Mr. MYER. We are making each center self-sustaining. That is our program. We are providing the basic subsistence that is necessary for each of those centers wherever we have land enough to do it, both as to crops and livestock, wherever it is feasible. But we are not planning to produce crops for the market at these centers. We think that these people can make a better contribution by going on the out-

side and helping to grow crops, working with farmers who are already in the business, than to try to develop temporarily a new business on land where it would probably take 5 years to develop 20,000 acres of land. They are not making any very definite contribution then to the food supply by going ahead with land development that won't get under cultivation for some time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Could not the land-utilization program at Poston be speeded up, if land could have been put in cultivation, say, by this fall; a thousand or two thousand acres or more?

Mr. MYER. It will become 1,400 acres, as I understand it, and it might be speeded up a little more. Had you had the incentive of \$10 a day instead of 75 cents a day or 60 cents a day, I think it could have been speeded up quite a bit. However, I don't believe the W. R. A. could have stood the pressure of having paid wages on the normal scale; to have land developed over in Poston at that wage scale.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the adequate equipment and machinery available in order to put this land in cultivation?

Mr. MYER. Well, Poston probably had more equipment than probably most of the other centers had had that far. I won't say it was adequate, because there has been great difficulty on the part of anyone in getting adequate equipment, as you men know; farmers and everyone else.

If you had heard the furore about the equipment that we did take down there, which was purchased for the Salt River Valley project along about May or June of last year, you would have said that they must have had about all the equipment in Arizona at Poston, because we spent weeks getting the facts together on that and explaining to the public that we were not ruining all of the cultivated land in the Salt River Valley, because one or two commercial operators did sell us their equipment and it went to Poston, most of it. So, I won't say it was adequate, no.

There isn't any engineer that ever has adequate equipment, but I would say it was fairly adequate, and they have been doing a good job and getting results. They have built a large ditch down there, and I think they built it faster than they would have in normal times. They have had pretty good support in getting the job done.

Mr. COSTELLO. Under the problem you have outlined for W. R. A., the policy, you have issued regulations prohibiting the internees selling any of their farm products; have you not?

Mr. MYER. No; we have not. We have simply stated it is not the policy to go into commercial production; that it is the policy to estimate our own needs, to put in the acreage that is necessary for the subsistence of the centers, and if we, in so doing, miscalculate and have additional supplies that cannot be utilized by the centers, within season, they will be sold on the market, as would anyone else. However, we have not dictated the policy of going into commercial production.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was my understanding that at the Gila River project an excessive supply was produced there at the center, more than they could use, and they were unable to send it out to other centers and could not even ship any of it to the State prisons or any other source.

Mr. MYER. They had a problem like that for a time, largely because they could not get shooks, crates, packing, which were required for

shipment. We could not get those because the commercial growers turned on so much heat against the Japanese having anything of that sort, that they just would not sell them to us.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not feel that a more extensive agricultural program on the part of these centers would be in order in view of the attempt on the part of the Government to increase farm production throughout the country?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, last fall we had 9,800 people helping to harvest sugar beets through the harvest season. This fall I hope we will have twice that many, if they are available.

Now, it is a question whether or not we are going to produce vegetables by the Government by bringing in new land, which will take time, or whether we will cooperate with the people who are already in the farming business and get these people shifted into normal communities, where it will not cost the Government money to maintain them. I will admit that that is a matter of policy that you might argue either way. We have adopted the policy of maintaining our agricultural program on a subsistence basis at the center and urging the folks who were skilled in agriculture, beyond what we need there, to move out in the normal communities and to work with other farmers in producing crops where we have a great need for labor.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has there been any representation made to you through labor organizations prohibiting the selling of your products from the internment camps in the open market?

Mr. MYER. Yes; we have had representations made through Congressmen and by labor organizations. We have had representations made by farmers objecting to developing the agricultural business. We have had objections made by industrialists against developing any industry at the center. They all have been represented, as you might remember; human nature reactions.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have those representations helped you to formulate your program as to policy?

Mr. MYER. I presume they have. Usually you are affected by your environment, generally speaking. We are in a position which we try to get along with people as best we can, because everybody likes to shoot at the Japanese.

Mr. COSTELLO. In view of the fact that these Japanese had all been gainfully employed prior to their evacuation, do you think there is any merit to these objections on the part of the organizations or industrialists?

Mr. MYER. In some cases there was no merit whatsoever. In some cases there was probably merit; I mean, at least, they felt there was merit.

I might say that we have very little of it because of the fact that we, as we developed our policy during last summer and fall, and as we made our determinations, felt that our major job was relocation and not establishing an institutionalizing industry at the center. We do not have many arguments with industry or with labor about that policy.

We are producing at relocation centers, in addition to our agricultural products, many other products in the industrial field which we can utilize at the centers for subsistence purposes, such as furniture for schools, clothing for use in the hospitals, uniforms, and dif-



ferent types of clothing that are needed in centers of that type that are essential to the everyday workday program in your large cities. There are a number of other activities of that type that have been helpful.

In addition to that, we have had certain other types of industrial activity. For example, at Poston and at Gila, during recent months, we have completed about 150,000,000 square feet of camouflage net for the Army. At the present time we are making silk screen posters for the Navy at one of the centers. At another place we are making small ship models to be used in instructional work, in the battleship construction program, for the training of their personnel; for use by the Navy in their instructional program. There are certain activities of that type going on that require special skills.

However, I want to repeat that we are trying to establish our program in such a way so as to encourage every person who is eligible to relocate outside of the centers. We think that that is essential from the standpoint of the evacuees themselves. We think it is essential from the standpoint of the United States Government. We think that they can become better Americanized in normal communities than they can in relocation centers. We think they can make a better contribution to the manpower program today, which is badly needed.

We think, furthermore, that bringing up twenty-five or thirty thousand youngsters in relocation centers is a bad thing. Your family controls are lacking as compared with what you have in the normal home. They are being fed in mess halls. There are no family ties. Youngsters who normally worked with the family, in their every-day pursuits, or in farming, have nothing to do now except to go to school if they are below 14 years of age. And, some of those above 14 years of age do not work full time.

We are developing a delinquency problem, as you would expect under such conditions. I don't think serious damage has been done this year but it will be done if it goes on there year after year. There are opportunities for more Japanization when you have all Japanese living together than, you do if you have the normal cross section of the public and the relationships with the normal public.

I do not think the United States wants Indian reservations after this war is over where we keep Japanese. I think we have a better opportunity to establish these people in normal pursuits when the manpower situation is such that their skill should be utilized anyhow than we will after the war when the boys come back.

And, I think, furthermore, that the United States is fighting for what we call democracy and for citizenship, wherever you find it, in regard to racial ancestry, and I think we ought to help the eligible citizens and the law-abiding aliens who have not maintained their contacts with Japan to realize that this country is what they thought it was, a place for freedom of speech, freedom of activity, and reasonably equal treatment.

Gentlemen, that is what we are basing our program on.

Mr. MUNDT. What arrangements have you made with the Indian River Service for the use of this reservation?

Mr. MYER. That arrangement was made previous to the time W. R. A. came into existence, by the Army. They are serving as agents of the War Relocation Authority in that particular center.



That is the only center where we have that arrangement. They are handling the administration. They are allotted the funds and operate the program under our policies. They follow our policy.

Mr. MUNDT. What compensation do the Indians get for the use of this reservation?

Mr. MYER. I couldn't tell you offhand. There is a contract between the Indian Service and ourselves regarding the use of that land. I would have to get you the figure on that later.

Mr. MUNDT. There was something said in Los Angeles about that.

Mr. MYER. Well, we have the agreement on file.

Mr. MUNDT. They said they thought they would be compensated because the land was all to be reclaimed. Now, if your program is not to reclaim the land, I am afraid that those poor Indians will not be properly paid.

Mr. MYER. Well, I think they are pretty well paid already. If you take a look at the big ditch and the structures that were put in to irrigate the land from the river down there, that in itself was quite a bit of work. That has been done within the last 12 months. It is practically completed now.

The fact that they will have at least 5,000 acres, with the sagebrush cleared and leveled, is pretty good compensation for 2 or 3 years' use of the desert land of the type they had there, and I do not believe they are going to be beaten very badly by having had the center there. And, I do not believe you do either.

Mr. MUNDT. The Indians think so.

Mr. MYER. Sure. Indians are like everybody else.

Mr. MUNDT. Being a member of the Indian Affairs Committee, I can anticipate the Indian agents coming in with claims against the United States some day, so I wish you would include in the record whatever contract you have with the Indian Service.

Mr. MYER. There is nothing in the contract that indicates that we will develop a particular amount of land; I mean, there is no set policy. It simply indicates that we will pay wages for land development when other work is not available to help get that job done and in order to provide subsistence for the center.

Mr. MUNDT. There is no stipulated figure?

Mr. MYER. There is no stipulated figure. There is no stipulated figure on any of that land we have leased for development, because we didn't know whether this program would be in effect for 6 months or a year or 6 years; consequently, there was no such agreement.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know whether the city of Los Angeles is receiving any remuneration for the use of their land abandonment?

Mr. MYER. Indeed, they are.

Mr. MUNDT. Tell us about that.

Mr. MYER. Up to now it is about \$32 an acre, but I will have to check that figure. It is a very high figure for land and water, and I think that we are reducing that figure.

Mr. MUNDT. Is that land, in your opinion, worth \$32 an acre more than the land at Poston?

Mr. MYER. No; it is not worth as much as the land at Poston, but the contract had been entered into previous to the time that we took over. We are now realining the contract there, and I think, perhaps, an adjustment will be made.

Mr. MUNDT. You see, I am going along with your theory of trying to make the relocation centers self-sustaining.

Mr. MYER. Well, we are in the process of realining our Manzanar agreement also.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to have Mr. Myer put into the record the contract at Poston and the contract at Manzanar.

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, when was this program of resettlement adopted by the W. R. A. as a part of their policy?

Mr. MYER. July 20, 1942, was the first administrative instruction which was issued. However, previous to that time, I believe in May, a policy was established which provided that some of the young people who had been in college in the West might relocate in other colleges throughout the country, and a college relocation committee was established sometime during May. I think that was the first step.

Previous to that time, however, or about the same time, in May, by agreement between the War Department and the W. R. A. which was worked out with a score of companies and with the farmers in the areas, we started recruiting, mostly in assembly centers which were under the supervision of the War Department, people to go into the irrigated areas of the mid-Mountain States and in the Midwest, to do crop work in the spring of 1942. About 1,700 went out, mostly from the assembly centers during the spring and early summer of 1942.

That was the first step of a really major relocation program.

Mr. COSTELLO. Those that went out then did not go to relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. They did not. Some are still working in the same areas; working right where they were a year ago in May.

Mr. COSTELLO. When you speak of the War Department, do you mean the military heads of the War Department or the civilian end of it, which is under the Secretary's office, and so on?

Mr. MYER. No; I am talking about the War Department, the Western Defense Command, which had charge of all the assembly centers from the period of about March or April—well, up until varying times; from June on until November. They supervised the people in the assembly centers. We did not secure even 50 percent of these people until after the middle of August 1942. They were under the supervision of the Army in assembly centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was the W. C. C. A.

Mr. MYER. Colonel Bendetzen was in charge of that program. Most of those people went out in assembly centers, because we didn't have many people in relocation centers.

Now, during the same fall the biggest pressure we had in W. R. A. was the pressure from Congressmen and Senators from the West to get labor in sugar-beet fields, in spite of the fact that on April 7, 1942, the western Governors, with one exception, said that they could not come into the States without military guard. We had this pressure about the middle of August, which was terrific.

The whole sentiment changed because of the need for wartime production and because of the need for help. And, as I say, by the time the harvest season reached its peak, we had nearly 50,000 people relocated outside of the assembly centers, relocation centers, doing

work in the agricultural areas of the mid-Mountain States and of the West. That was the first big step in the relocation program.

Mr. MUNDT. When did the influx of these evacuees into these camps stop?

Mr. MYER. November 2.

Mr. MUNDT. November 2?

Mr. MYER. As far as the west-coast group was concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. You secured all the evacuees you could get by that time?

Mr. MYER. We received a few from Hawaii following that, but the west coast stopped November 2; and, Jerome, Ark.

Mr. MUNDT. What was the date of starting the relocation program out of the centers into private life?

Mr. MYER. Well, I think about the last 10 days of May the first people went out on seasonal leave from the Army centers, and about 1,700 went out during the latter part of May and June.

Mr. MUNDT. Then for 6 months you operated without releasing any evacuees from the camps at all?

Mr. MYER. Then on July 20 we set up our first administrative instruction that provided for release on indefinite leave. That was pretty limited. We have been very conservative on that.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you have the facilities then, after you had really crystallized your policy, before you started the program of indefinite leave?

Mr. MYER. Yes. This was July 20, 1942, a year ago this month, that we started our leave program.

Mr. MUNDT. You started that when?

Mr. MYER. July 20, 1942. Then our revised leave regulations—when we really started to push this program—went into effect October 1. I believe in the Federal Register of October 1 a complete and detailed set of leave regulations was announced, which established the policy on a widespread basis, and we did not get our field offices established, because we did not see the need for them at that time. We found later we were going to have to have them, and about the first week of January they began to be established. Our largest number of evacuees who have left on indefinite leave have gone out since about April 1 of this year. Some have gone before, but not a large number.

Now, I would like to go back. I think there is something that is misunderstood by the public generally, and I will tell you why we have been conservative, awfully conservative. The first evacuation from the west coast was ordered on March 2, 1942. There were no provisions for relocation centers at that time. The W. R. A. was not even in existence. People were asked to move out from the coastal areas and find homes wherever they cared to. About 8,000 people moved during the month of March 1942. Some of them moved just across the line in California and settled down again, but about 5,000 moved clear out of California and out of the west coast and found homes of their own.

In addition to that, there were about fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen thousand people that did not live on the west coast, so that there have been some 20,000 evacuees that have never been under the War Relocation Authority at any time. We have never been responsible for



that group of people. They have gone about their business as other people have.

Mr. MUNDT. What are the boundaries of the restricted territory?

Mr. MYER. I can show you on the map, if you wish to see it. The boundaries of the first restricted area ran right down through here [indicating], including a portion of southern Arizona. There was a second line drawn later that came right down about through the middle of California, a little to the west of the middle of Washington and Oregon, including southern Arizona. Later on, and I do not remember the exact date, all of California was evacuated.

Mr. COSTELLO. Originally it was just a coastal strip.

Mr. MYER. It was just a coastal strip, to begin with. The point I want to make clear, however, is that there was no insistence on the part of the War Department to put these people in anything resembling relocation centers if they could find homes otherwise, to begin with. All they asked them to do was to move back from the coast, so that many of the people are surprised that we are not running internment camps.

Internment camps were never intended in relation to this program. The only reason for the relocation centers at all—well, there are two reasons. One is that those people, as they began to move out, during those first months, began to get into trouble, and as any 100,000 people would if they moved out en masse, in new communities, and where they contacted, so to speak, enemies in the new communities. And, it soon became evident that you could not move that many people by voluntary action, so the freeze order was put into effect on the 2d of March, and the relocation centers were started as temporary homes until we could find time to develop a relocation program or until we could get them established in other parts of the country. Now that is background of the program that is very often misunderstood.

Mr. MUNDT. Out of the 8,000 that were moved out, have you had any cases where they came to the relocation centers voluntarily, after these relocation centers were established?

Mr. MYER. There were a few. We adopted the policy that anyone who might be evacuated could live in relocation centers if they could not establish themselves otherwise. We had a few cases that moved out in the spring and fall of last year who did come into the center and joined their families or friends at relocation centers; not a large number, however. Most of them continued to live on the outside.

Mr. MUNDT. Unless they previously had their homes in the restricted areas, they would not be permitted to come into the center; would they?

Mr. MYER. That is right. We have had cases come up recently where they wanted to leave the center and join their friends. If they have not been there, we said "No." We do not want to become specialists in that sense.

Now, if I might go back to the leave program, because it is important. October 1, then, was the date when we published in the Federal Register our leave regulations. That information became available to anyone that was interested in it. We started pushing the program.

Shortly after those went into effect I took a trip. I met with the eight western centers at Salt Lake City in November. I announced



at that time that we were really going to make relocation a major part of our program. We were getting centers established; personnel trained; we were getting over the hump as far as getting the establishment set up, and we began to realine our industrial policy referred to a moment ago, which we thought might be necessary at the centers in order to help facilitate the relocation program.

We realined our field organization in the latter part of November and early December to discuss our new program, because that was set up in order to get our centers established and to get the program started off.

Beginning then in January we started the establishment of these 50 field offices, and right now we are in the midst of an intensive program of resettlement, or what we call relocation.

Mr. MUNDT. What has been the average weekly release since April?

Mr. MYER. I don't know. I do remember it was running about 500 a week on seasonal leave—most of whom were going out to certain counties to do agricultural work—and about 500 on indefinite leave. That figure was running pretty consistently during April and May. It is tapering off a little bit at the moment.

I think last week there were 356 went out on indefinite leave. I am not sure whether that has been the result of some of the publicity that came out from this committee or whether it is just simply tapering off.

Mr. COSTELLO. There has not been any increase in the last couple of weeks of those who have been put out on indefinite leave?

Mr. MYER. No; there has been a decrease, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Which you regret.

Mr. MYER. Which I regret very strongly.

Mr. STRIPLING. What was the figure set by the W. R. A. on the release of evacuees for resettlement?

Mr. MYER. Well, there have been several figures set. You mean the total figure?

Mr. STRIPLING. Per week. What rate per week did the W. R. A. establish in its new program?

Mr. MYER. Oh, we never established any goal; I mean, weekly goal. We just simply tried to get geared up so that we could get everybody out we could in the spring season down at the different relocation centers. About 45 percent of the people in the relocation centers were in agricultural work previous to the time they were evacuated. The big demand in agricultural work comes during the spring and fall, in the harvest season; so that many of these who were at hand in April and May went out as they did a year ago, to work in extensive crop areas, such as the irrigated areas.

Now, most of those were on seasonal leave, though some were on indefinite leave. So we did try to get geared up on that work, and we hope to have another push in the fall season to get people relocated in agricultural work. The other work has developed throughout that period.

Mr. MUNDT. I think "indefinite leave" is pretty clear. It means out, for good.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the situation in regard to seasonal leave?

Mr. MYER. Seasonal? We called it "group leave" last year, because they went out in groups and were recruited, in most part, by the

sugar beet companies, who sent in their field agents to help in the recruitment, for beet thinning, beet topping, beet harvesting, and that type of intensive work. However, they did work with other crops, such as tomatoes, celery, and potatoes.

We changed it to seasonal leave this year, because we find that the people who go out in agricultural work very often can't find housing to establish themselves throughout the whole year. They go out in April or May and probably come back about the middle of December to the center.

Mr. MUNDT. Do some of the evacuees going out on seasonal leave make any arrangements with the employers that they stay out indefinitely then?

Mr. MYER. That is right. Seasonal leave is a good feeder for indefinite leave, and that is one of the reasons we maintain the seasonal leave program. I tried to differentiate it a while back, because I did not want to complicate the terminology, but we found that seasonal leave was helpful in our program; and, furthermore, the employers like it very much, for the most part, to have people come out and try out. Many of those people who have gone out on seasonal leave later on have requested indefinite leave and, if eligible, their application was granted.

Mr. MUNDT. What differences are there in the eligibility of a man that goes out on indefinite leave as against one going out on seasonal leave?

Mr. MYER. There are no differences at the present time. During the period of a year ago and all through 1942, there were no provisions for checking those who went out on seasonal leave. The only requirement was that they went to a certain, designated area. They could not move from that area without permission, and it was a limited area. Restrictions in the Western Defense Command were established by a proclamation of the War Department.

Mr. MUNDT. You mean, they went to a sugar-beet operator?

Mr. MYER. Yes; in a certain county in Montana, for instance. And, they would have to maintain themselves in that county and not move out of the county, unless they came back to the center.

Mr. MUNDT. They could not go across the county line?

Mr. MYER. That is right; so that there was no investigation of any of those people that left the assembly centers who were under the War Department for seasonal or group leave last year; neither was any other on group leave investigated from the relocation centers.

I might add that up to date, with our 10,000 on seasonal leave last fall, with more than 15,000 on leave today, we haven't had one incident so far reported of any disloyal activity of any type. I am not indicating that it could not happen, but it has not happened yet.

Mr. MUNDT. But you have had quite a few cases where they wandered beyond the county lines?

Mr. MYER. Yes; we have had cases of that kind, just like you would have with any 10,000 people breaking over, and we have to guard against that fact.

Mr. MUNDT. In Denver they had some men in jail, I remember.

Mr. MYER. Yes. They went back to Poston. We occasionally have to gather some boys up who get the wanderlust.

Mr. COSTELLO. Apparently some wandered into Seattle, according to yesterday's paper.

Mr. MYER. Occasionally that has happened. There were two youngsters that wandered into San Francisco a while back, that came from the center, I might say.

Mr. COSTELLO. The three at Seattle had been sworn into the Army and were directed to appear at Camp Shelby, and they wound up in Seattle hunting for their cameras, which they had buried up there. They were sworn in and given 15 days leave to report to Camp Shelby. They went back to Seattle, to the old homestead, to the garage, and dug up an old camera and were then apprehended and turned over to the military authorities, according to the news story in yesterday morning's paper.

Mr. MYER. If they had a proper furlough, they were, of course, privileged to travel within the area.

Mr. COSTELLO. Having been in the area, I guess they were entitled to go into that area, according to General DeWitt's order.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But they were not entitled to have cameras unless the soldiers were allowed cameras.

Mr. MYER. I think you will find soldiers are allowed cameras any place they go.

Mr. COSTELLO. At any rate, they did not surrender the cameras a year or so ago, prior to evacuation.

Mr. MUNDT. Are there any restrictions on the movements of men or women released on indefinite leave?

Mr. MYER. No; excepting they cannot go back into the evacuated area. There are certain military areas that they can't go into, as there are military areas that I can't go into without a special pass. Those on indefinite leave are free to go as they wish, as long as they obey the laws.

Mr. MUNDT. If they just obey the laws?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. And they work until they decide that they want to quit, but they are still free.

Mr. MYER. They are still free. When they change jobs, however, they are required to notify us as to their change of jobs and addresses, so that we can keep track of them. That is essential, in view of the practical problems, in following with mail and property problems, and so on.

Mr. MUNDT. What is the penalty for forgetfulness on the part of the Japanese if they do not do that?

Mr. MYER. Being reported to the F. B. I., of which I don't think there is anything worse for a Japanese.

Mr. MUNDT. Or anybody else.

Mr. MYER. Or anyone else.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say on July 27 this resettlement program was adopted. Was it determined upon by W. R. A. itself, or was it determined by W. R. A. in consultation with other agencies?

Mr. MYER. That was determined in consultation with other agencies. That was a very limited program at that time. We did not allow anyone to go within the Western Defense Command. It was limited to citizens for the period from July to October, and I believe there were one or two other exceptions, or limitations. I don't remember the details. I can supply them for the record.



Mr. COSTELLO. Was it to be a permanent resettlement program?

Mr. MYER. Yes; indefinitely. Now, the October issue, which went into the Federal Register, administrative instruction, was cleared with the Attorney General and with the Director of the F. B. I. before we put it into effect. I have a letter to that effect dated September 25. The whole matter was discussed completely and thoroughly with the War Department before we proceeded with the program, and it was discussed with a number of other people in Government, including the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, that I was consulting at that time on policy, and a number of other people.

Mr. COSTELLO. I assume it was not taken up with the Indian Bureau.

Mr. MYER. No; excepting the Indian Bureau was urging the policy before we put it into effect.

Mr. COSTELLO. This policy, then, was announced in November?

Mr. MYER. October 1.

Mr. COSTELLO. October 1?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then you had the meeting in November of the regional directors?

Mr. MYER. No. This policy had been in effect for some time at that time. The only thing that was announced in November that I heard referred to a number of times was that this was going to become a major effort and, because of that, that we were not going to go ahead with some plans that had been in the air to have industry in relocation centers, with prevailing wages paid, which was under consideration for a good many months. There were several reasons why that policy was not carried forward.

One of them was, we found, or the administrator found it was impossible to work out a program with people working 2 or 3 days and then off. But our major reason for that was, it was inconsistent with the relocation policy that was announced at that time.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was indicated to the committee in California that approximately the night of November 9 a Mr. Collier visited the center at Poston, near Parker, and indicated to the evacuees there, in addressing them, that that was their home, and that the Indian Bureau was happy to have them on the reservation and appreciated the work they were going to do in the way of development and cultivation of the land, and that subsequently, on or about the 17th of November, you appeared and addressed the evacuees likewise at a meeting or, at least, the announcement was made to them that the program was one of resettlement outside of the relocation centers and the evacuees were to be scattered throughout the country, and the result of these two conflicting statements created a great deal of confusion in the minds of the evacuees in that particular center.

Mr. MYER. I would see no reason why Mr. Collier would indicate that kind of a policy on the 9th of November when the regulation had been published in the Federal Register at least 5 weeks by that time, and it had been discussed with him in detail.

Mr. COSTELLO. Maybe, like some of the members of Congress, he might not read the Register.

Mr. MYER. Perhaps so. He did know about it, though, because, I might say, Mr. Collier and his staff receive copies of every administrative instruction put out by W. R. A., as do other of our staff members, and I am real sure about that.



Mr. COSTELLO. Do the administrators in each of the centers receive copies of your instructions?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And they did subsequent to October 1st?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, in order to develop this resettlement policy as accurately as possible, I would like to ask the witness if he refers to Administrative Instruction No. 22?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Issued July 20, 1942.

Mr. MYER. That was when it was first issued. Aren't these all October 1st?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was this not dated or published in the Federal Register September 29?

Mr. MYER. I thought it was actually dated October 1. You say it was September 29?

Mr. MATTHEWS. September 29, title 22, chapter 1, part 5.

Mr. MYER. Perhaps so. I was thinking it was October 1st.

Mr. MATTHEWS. On October 6 the War Relocation Authority published a revised version of Administrative Instruction No. 22 which, I understand, from the text did not alter the terms, but simply elaborated, for administrative purposes, the original text; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. We have a copy of the revised November 6 Administrative Instruction No. 22, if you would like to have that at the present time.

Now, I would like to ask Mr. Myer if the present resettlement policy of W. R. A. is fully embodied in the regulations of April 7, 1943? I show you a copy of the document.

Mr. MYER. If you show me a copy of the document, I think maybe I can tell you.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Does this document fully embody the present policies, so far as regulations have been issued.

Mr. MYER. You don't have the first page of this, do you?

Mr. MATTHEWS. It is on the other side.

Mr. MYER. I see. This is a good summary of our policy. This statement was prepared not as an administrative instruction, but as a statement of general policy that could be utilized by people who are interested in the general statement, and I would say it was a good statement of the policy.

Mr. MATTHEWS. This was published by the War Relocation Authority, was it not?

Mr. MYER. Yes; by the War Relocation Authority, but our administrative instructions are either numbered, as 22 is, or numbered as a supplement to that. This is simply an interpretation put out.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Has Administrative Instruction No. 22, as revised October 6, 1942, been further revised?

Mr. MYER. Yes; there have been revisions from time to time, including one supplement of April 2 of this year, which I happened to look up recently. I am not positive there were others, but I am sure there were.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But the provisions as summarized in the regulation of April 7 have not been superseded since April 7, have they?

Mr. MYER. I would have to check that. Without a check I would hate to be definite about it, but I don't think that they have been.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Going back to the subject that was discussed sometime ago, the matter of wages of those who are resettled, one paragraph on the second page of this document deals with that. I believe you stated in your testimony that you made no attempt whatever to police the wages of those who have been resettled.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The sentence which refers to that is as follows:

It is expected that evacuees will be employed at prevailing wages.

I take it, from your testimony, that that is in the nature of a homology.

Mr. MYER. That simply is a statement of our general policy, rather than saying what I said here in a longer statement: We don't think you should ask for more or for less. We simply say that prevailing wages is what we think should be the accepted figure for any evacuee. But, we do not attempt to police the wages of any evacuees who have left the center and who are on indefinite leave.

Mr. MATTHEWS. "Expected" does not quite come under the category of "regulation," then.

Mr. MYER. No, no. That is not an administrative regulation. That is simply a statement of the general policy.

Mr. MATTHEWS. You do not know whether this language appears in the administrative regulation or not?

Mr. MYER. I am sure it does not.

Mr. COSTELLO. I notice in this regulation, the copy of which we have been referring to, this language [reading]:

Officials of the W. R. A. in Washington review the application, the project director's findings, letters from persons given as references, and check the applicant's name against the records of F. B. I. and other Federal intelligence agencies.

Is that the process through which each person who is evacuated is allowed to leave the evacuation center?

Mr. MYER. Up until April 2 all cases were checked here. As of April 2 we issued Supplement 22 allowing the project directors to make their own determination, with certain limitations on leave.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you read the copy of that supplement?

Mr. MYER. I think I have a copy of the supplement right here. Here is a copy of the supplement of April 2, which reads as follows:

#### SUPPLEMENT 9

Subject: Issuance of leave for departure from a relocation area.

Section 3 of Administrative Instruction No. 22 (revised) is hereby amended by inserting the following new paragraph after paragraph C-1:

C-2. Issuance of indefinite leave under specified circumstances where leave clearance has not been granted. In cases where the applicant has not received leave clearance, but—

1. He registered for leave clearance either on DSS form 304-a and Form WRA-126-a, or on Form WRA-126-rev., during the special military registration in February and March—

I will say that those were the registered forms used in connection with the registration we had in February and March in all centers when we asked everyone of 17 years of age or over to fill out complete

forms that were made up in cooperation with the intelligence agencies and with the Army, and that provided us the first real basic records that we had, and included the questions on allegiance. [Continues reading:]

2. His answer to question 28 (with respect to allegiance) on DSS Form 304-A or Form WRA-126 (rev.) was unqualified affirmative:—

In other words, that was necessary before they were allowed to go.

3. He has not applied for repatriation or expatriation;

4. He is not a paroled alien;

5. He is not a Shinto priest;

6. His application for leave clearance has neither been denied nor suspended by the director;

7. The project director believes, upon the basis of his investigation at the project, the application for leave clearance and all other pertinent information that there is no reasonable ground to believe the issuance of indefinite leave would interfere with the war program or otherwise endanger the public peace and security; and

8. His proposed place of employment or residence is not within the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. COSTELLO. Prior to the adoption of this regulation, all of the applications were checked here in Washington?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Now, what did that check consist of here in Washington?

Mr. MYER. Up until that time we had a complete—or, we had a check against the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We wrote normally to five or six people back on the coast who knew these people previously to evacuation to get their recommendation.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were people who knew the individuals—

Mr. MYER. Who knew the individuals involved and knew their background or history.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where were the names of those persons obtained from; from the application itself?

Mr. MYER. From the application, generally speaking; people living in the neighborhood that we had a chance to talk with.

Mr. COSTELLO. Where they were employed?

Mr. MYER. If they were employed, we requested the name of the employer, and we referred to the employer. Of course, many of them were not employed.

Mr. COSTELLO. Indications were made to us that in most instances the employers were not contacted, but other people who might have known the evacuee were contacted.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, in the one case I know of where that was stated in the press, I would like to make a statement. Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles indicated that a chap by the name of Okuro, who was an employee of the civil service of the city of Los Angeles, was released by the War Relocation Authority without checking with him. That statement is untrue. Okuro was never under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority at any time. He was released by the War Department from the Santa Anita assembly center to go to Boys Town in Nebraska before he was ever located in a relocation center.

Mr. COSTELLO. Your information was commented upon the next day by Mayor Bowron.

Mr. MYER. Well, I want to be sure that was corrected in the papers.



Mr. MUNDT. However, Mayor Bowron also said this, and this is true of all the Japanese that they had employed in the city, that they never received a letter from anybody checking back on them before they were released; not only Okuro, but that was the general situation.

Mr. MYER. I am sorry I don't have the figures before me. I think most of them are still in relocation centers. I think there are probably four that have relocated. I am not sure about the record, but I can check the facts in regard to that and state it for the record.

Mr. MUNDT. He made that very positive statement the first time, and we questioned it, and he came back the second time and he alleged he checked it with the departmental heads and it was the truth.

Mr. MYER. Well, I will be glad to check the record on that. I do have those names. I will have it checked and I will supply the information to you as to how those records were kept.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you have the names of all those employed by the city of Los Angeles?

Mr. MYER. The only names I have are those listed in the report put out by the Dies committee, a printed report, giving the names of so-called very dangerous people, which I doubt, that were members of the staff of the water department of Los Angeles. I doubt that all were dangerous, because we have checked the records of some here, and that is the list I have. Now, if there are additional ones to be added, we would be glad to have the names for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. The actual process then was merely to submit the names to the F. B. I. so that they might check it against their records.

Mr. MYER. That is right. The F. B. I. have never, at any time, made recommendations regarding the loyalty of any person. They adopt the policy of not doing it, but they have made, at all times, available to us, the records that they may have regarding individuals as the basis for our checking the records and as to whether or not they should be released.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, the F. B. I. did not make a full investigation.

Mr. MYER. That is right; they never have. The W. R. A. has never claimed they have, except in one case, which was a mistake, and I would like to make a statement for the record here regarding that case.

Unfortunately, through pure inadvertence, in a letter of October 27 last year, one of our staff members wrote to Mr. Homer Chaillaux of Indianapolis, director of the Americanization committee of the American Legion, in relation to those who were going out to college, and did make the statement that they were investigated by the F. B. I.

That was called to our attention on the 19th of December by Mr. Hoover. I checked it. We notified all of our staff at the time about the mistake by a staff notice that was sent out. I have sent out other notices in the meantime, and on four different occasions we have written Mr. Chaillaux to correct the record on that, so that I think the record is clear.

There have been statements made, unfortunately, from time to time, by inadvertence on the part of people, that they were cleared by the F. B. I. or investigated by the F. B. I. That never has been



true. They have supplied the records to us for our information. They do not, at any time guarantee loyalty; neither would I, although we think we are doing a pretty sound job. I would not guarantee anybody's loyalty forever; anybody might go berserk; neither have they made special investigations regarding those on leave.

Now, the F. B. I. has made investigations at our request time after time, within relocation centers. They have been in every center; sometimes on their own and sometimes on our request, and they have collaborated with us in many, many ways. But, as regarding the leave program, they have not made a special investigation for us. I want to make that perfectly clear so that there will be no misunderstanding about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. That impression was very general, because we had one or two ministers appear before our committee in Los Angeles, and even though we tried to point out the difference of checking the individual against the records and the individual being checked by the F. B. I., there was still confusion.

Mr. MYER. That has been very unfortunate. I assure you it has not been a part of any advertising of W. R. A. to that effect, as long as we could help it.

Mr. COSTELLO. The ministers insisted that they understood it was a thorough investigation of each individual which, it was our understanding, was not actually made.

Mr. MYER. We asked the F. B. I. if they would not do that for us early in the game. They told us because of the pressure of war work generally, they were just not in a position to do it.

However, I want to repeat, that the F. B. I. did approve the policy in relation to our leave program. I discussed it for an hour with the Director before we put it in the Federal Register in October, in detail, when we finally moved over to the more general leave provisions. It was approved by letter by the Attorney General, so if there is any question about our not discussing it with other people, I would be glad to supply for the record the correspondence regarding that.

Mr. MUNDT. Did the F. B. I. also approve your program of seasonal leave, where you simply left them out without any check whatsoever?

Mr. MYER. I am not so sure about that, because that was established before I came into the Authority. I don't know whether it was checked with them. I might say, however, that the military did approve and were a party to it. It was a part of the agreement with the War Department in the Western Defense Command.

Mr. MUNDT. In the military zone?

Mr. MYER. As I say, at the present time, those who go out on seasonal leave have the same kind of check now that the indefinite leave have. We have only put that in operation recently.

Mr. MUNDT. When was that policy put into effect?

Mr. MYER. Within the last 30, 60 days. I can check that for you.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you supply the record with that date?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, if I interpret the purport of this supplement 9 correctly, about the only change that it involves over your earlier instruction is that it eliminates the home check of the Japanese and the F. B. I.

Mr. MYER. That is right. That is about the only change. However, I would like to say that it does not eliminate the F. B. I. check ultimately.

What is happening there is that following this registration in February and March, that we supplied all the records, I mean, all the names, and all this means is for everyone of 17 years and over, to F. B. I., and they are checking the records on everyone for us. And, up to the present time, we have a case check on 63,500 individuals. There are still about 10,000 to be checked. But, the minute that we get those records, we make the check against the individuals who had leave clearance, and if there is any record we get in touch with them right off the bat; I mean, if it is a bad record.

We haven't had any cases yet, excepting two. There was one case where they had never been in a relocation center, where they did not swear allegiance to the United States, that we took them back to the relocation center, although that had not been done heretofore.

There is another case, I understand, within the last week, where a person had gone out on leave and has been recalled—after we checked the records of the F. B. I., and found a case that we thought was adequate, that he should be taken back to the center.

Now, all of those cases are being checked and rechecked, with not only the F. B. I., but with the naval machinery resources and the other military agencies.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say those are being checked against the military record?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. What were the 63,000 checked against?

Mr. MYER. They were checked against all intelligence agencies. I might say there was not a very large number of names in the Military Intelligence record until this evacuation came on. Most of the records were either in the F. B. I. or Naval Intelligence, because they were the ones keeping contact with them, with the Japanese communities generally, and are specialists in it.

Mr. COSTELLO. This program of having these 63,000 Japanese checked by the various intelligence services has only been adopted since April?

Mr. MYER. No; that started about January. But, what we did was to use these forms as they came in from the various sections, that we continued during February and March.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was that joint board that you referred to out there?

Mr. MYER. That is right, the joint board, but the forms were made up before the joint board was organized, as a basis of induction into the military, of the male citizens, and the other forms were used which had the same information on it, for Japanese citizens as well as for aliens.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who are the members of this joint board?

Mr. MYER. A representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence, a representative of Military Intelligence; a representative of the Provost Marshal's office, and a representative from the War Relocation Authority. I think there is a representative from the F. B. I. sitting in, but not officially, as a member of the board. They sit with the board.

Mr. COSTELLO. They have an auditor and not an actual member of the board?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does this board then officially pass upon the requests for resettlement?

Mr. MYER. No. Well, I would say no. They do in certain cases. The joint board was set up at the time that the combat team was announced, with the idea of checking and clearing cases of people that were interested in working in defense plants; American citizens of Japanese ancestry.

In the meantime we had a gentlemen's agreement with the War Department that we would not relocate people within the Eastern Defense Command without checking with the War Department.

Well, that function was turned over to the joint board, so that they are passing on indefinite leave cases in rather large numbers, which gives us a category of people that can move into the Eastern Defense Command at the present time, so that the joint board has somewhat moved over from the other function. They have checked several thousand cases, but they are just beginning to get well under way with the indefinite leave checks.

In case they find cases that they can not recommend to us for leave they simply pass them back to us with the suggestion that they not be relocated for the present until further investigations are made or until further investigations develop.

However, there is an understanding between the joint board and ourselves that we are the responsible agency on leave as far as indefinite leave is concerned.

They are the responsible agency in collaboration with the Provost Marshal's office, in defense plant work, in asking them to check on the Eastern Defense Command cases.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you suppose that under this new Supplement 9 the War Department has asked that those evacuees do not come into the Eastern Defense Command?

Mr. MYER. Because General Drum decided he would not like to have too many in the Eastern Defense Command until they were checked.

Mr. MUNDT. You have kept them out of the Western Defense Command and out of the Eastern Defense Command which means you concentrate them in the Middle West.

Mr. MYER. There are a lot of them in the Eastern Defense Command. I don't know how many cases there are, but there are six or seven thousand cases already cleared by the joint board, eligible for the Eastern Defense Command. And, of course, these people working for us in that category have been cleared and checked, so that there are a large number of cases that are eligible for the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. COSTELLO. And based on an application of that sort, the members of the board merely check the name against the existing record in the Department to see if they have a record against the individual.

Mr. MYER. It is checked against all three of the intelligence records. They have established certain criteria that have been set up by the board regarding the past history of individuals. They will not be cleared without further investigation, at least, back in the Western Defense Command, by the Provost office out there, so that it is only in very clean, clear cases where they have no intelligence records, and where they have had no serious records of contacts with the Japanese



Government, or back to Japan, that they will clear without a special investigation. The investigations, if they are conducted before the joint board, are conducted by the Provost Marshal's office and back to the Western Defense Command, who know these people, and checking their records that they have out there.

Mr. COSTELLO. The provost marshal in these cases then is, in fact, acting as a representative of the Western Defense Command?

Mr. MYER. Well, the Provost Marshal's office, of course, as I think everyone knows, is responsible for the proper surveillance of war plant activities. That is the way they came into the picture, but they are using the Provost Marshal's segment of the Western Defense Command for their investigative agency on the coast, as I understand it.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me see if we can get this down to cases. Take the case of John Smithoko.

Mr. MYER. Tonoko is easier.

Mr. MUNDT. Let us assume he is released from the center under regulation supplement 9. He can locate any place in the United States where he has a job except the Eastern and Western Defense Commands.

Mr. MYER. Yes; and if he is cleared by the joint board, he can locate in the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, we start him off at Omaha. He gets a job at Omaha and he finds out he can get a better job in Baltimore, so he applies for clearance; is that the procedure?

Mr. MYER. Yes; he usually does. Some of them do not wait to apply, but—

Mr. MUNDT. Well, it is assumed that he will apply.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Assume his application is rejected; then what happens to him?

Mr. MYER. Well, he is supposed to stay where he is, because if he does come into the Eastern Defense Command without clearance, he would be classified a suspect.

Mr. MUNDT. And if he were rejected for clearance, he would not automatically reconvert to the Poston center?

Mr. MYER. No; if his record is otherwise good.

Mr. MUNDT. He would be too bad for Baltimore, but good enough for Omaha; is that it?

Mr. MYER. I think that is due to the numerous defense jobs and the contacts.

Now, let me repeat, there is no regulation on that. It is simply a gentlemen's agreement with the War Department, at the insistence of General Drum, and we have lived up to it. We have worked with him since away last summer and it has been worked out in that manner, and it makes him feel happier. He feels responsible for the Eastern Defense area, so we have gone along with that.

Mr. MUNDT. It would seem to me if there was reason to believe that a Japanese, or citizen of Japanese ancestry, is going to disrupt national defense if he moved into the Eastern Defense center, or Eastern Defense Command, that that would be reason enough to put him back into a camp some place rather than have him stay at Omaha, for example, where they make almost as many bombers as they do in Baltimore.



Mr. MYER. Well, in view of the fact that there have been no cases of sabotage, maybe the record will continue on that basis.

Mr. MUNDT. What is that?

Mr. MYER. I say, in view of the fact that there have been no cases of sabotage by people of Japanese ancestry, maybe the record will continue on that basis. I think he has been pretty well checked and that you need not have much concern about him in Omaha.

Mr. MUNDT. I am worried about the fellow trying to get into the Eastern Defense Command when they say he is not good enough to remain in Baltimore.

Mr. MYERS. As far as I know——

Mr. MUNDT. (interposing). That is the fellow I am worried about.

Mr. MYER. Well, ultimately, as these cases move through the board, we hope they will all be checked by the board; by the joint board.

Mr. MUNDT. If there is an adverse finding by the board, it means that they can stick along the Mississippi River. That will not make my folks much happier up there, I am sure. There must be some reason, in other words, why they pick out Joe Smithoko and say he cannot remain in Baltimore. It is not prejudice. It is not the situation that you have in the Western States, where there are many other interests, we all agree, besides just the national defense to consider.

But, here is a case of a citizen of Japanese ancestry who has been released from camp. He has moved into Omaha. He wants to take a better job in the Eastern Defense Command and he applies for clearance, and the War Department and the board steps in and says: "There is something in your record which makes you a hazard. I believe you should stay in Omaha."

I believe they should go further than that. If there is something dangerous about him or something subversive about him, he should not get out. If there is something against him, he ought to be sent back to Poston or back to Leupp which, I believe, you call the isolation camp.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. It seems to me there are two things that do not look too good in the program.

Mr. MYER. He would have to be pretty bad if we sent him back to Leupp. Well, he is just among 20,000 other people that have not been in relocation centers and have never been checked.

Mr. MUNDT. The eastern coast is more heavily populated than out West, and he would be a small proportion here than out there.

Mr. MYER. I agree, but he would be easier to see out there, though.

Mr. MUNDT. But it does not look to me to be a very satisfactory program to have this segment of American democracy set up and say, "Here is a fellow good enough to live in one section but too bad to live somewhere else," because if he is dangerous, he is dangerous in Omaha or Minneapolis or Chicago just as he would be dangerous in Baltimore. If he is not dangerous, I cannot conceive that this board would reject his application.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Congressman, I might give you another little bit of information that I suppose you all have. There is a program for individual exclusion of other people besides Japanese people, who are

being moved back from both coasts of the United States. They are not being put in relocation centers or internment camps; they are simply asked to move out of the coastal areas. Many of them are people who are recently naturalized Germans and Italians. I don't know whether any of them went to Omaha or not. Some of them have gone to other places in the Midwest. And, that is the general policy followed by the War Department, and I have no criticism of it. They feel that it is unsound to have them on the coast, but not unsound to have them in the Midwest country.

Mr. MUNDT. The number involved is very small, is it not?

Mr. MYER. Well, it is comparatively small in this group, but—

Mr. MUNDT. But if you are asked to resettle the country now by Japanese, you will rapidly change God's country into something satanical, and we simply can't grant that privilege to people considered subversive in other sections of America.

Mr. MYER. We find, as time goes on and the people have forgotten, the number of people that can go gradually becomes less and less. And, if you insist long and loud enough, we will probably have internment camps for about 70,000 American citizens, about 72 percent of whom have never seen Japan in their lives. A lot of them, kids, yes; a lot of them are not kids, however. But, it just depends on whose ox is gored.

Mr. MUNDT. This is something different than the relocation program. We have been picking out fellows who have been investigated and found deficient or found lacking in patriotism or found some subversive background, which the board pronounced dangerous.

Mr. MYER. No; he can't have a subversive background, but he may have something in his history or relationship, family history or relationship, that they feel might be against him. In many cases, or most of these cases, there is nothing subversive, particularly. If they were, they would be in internment camps.

Another fact that I would like to bring out here, which I am not sure that the public understands or knows. There are in internment camps something over 2,000 aliens of Japanese ancestry who have never been in relocation centers. These people were picked up either before or after Pearl Harbor. Under Presidential warrant they are supposed to be the leaders of organizations and other groups. I might say there were between four and five thousand of them picked up.

After going through the hearing board process, something more than 2,000 were finally incarcerated in internment camps for the duration. Those camps were under the jurisdiction of the Army until recently, but now under the Justice Department. Those are very often mixed up with our centers. Even one of the members of this committee got mixed up some weeks ago when he talked about the good food and the wine that some Japanese used at Camp Livingston in Louisiana. Camp Livingston is not a relocation center. It is an internment camp. That is the way rumors and misunderstandings get started, because people do not differentiate too definitely. Many people do not understand that people who have been aliens, who have been particularly subversive, are not in relocation centers; they are in internment camps. They may be people that do not have too good a history that are maintained there for the time being.

For example, we are not allowing people who have requested repatriation, who want to go back to Japan, to go out on leave, in spite of the fact that most of these people are old people and simply disillusioned about their possibility of getting relocated in this country after the war, and they have decided they might just as well go back to the country of their birth.

I might say that the Japanese, in asking for repatriation, have turned down most of those people. They have their own list, and those we did check at the request of the State agency, only about 10 percent want to go back to Japan, that were on the Japanese list, so there are all kinds of different reasons as to why people do things. And, in this alien group, among the men averaging 60 years of age, there are many, many people that are living quietly, calmly, causing no trouble at relocation centers that say they want to go back to Japan.

Now, attached to those families are youngsters who have never been any place but the United States and have gone through the schools. It is going to cause a real problem with some of those boys.

Mr. MUNDT. Does not the success of your whole relocation program depend, in large part, on ready community acceptance?

Mr. MYER. Right. We have very little difficulty with that. We have had more acceptance on the part of the community than on the part of some organizations, for the reason that with misinformation floating around the country, with the prejudices that have developed by the type of investigations carried on, by investigations of this committee in the last 6 or 8 weeks which, in my judgment, has done more damage to the relocation program, has invited more disunity among the people of the United States and has developed racial antipathy that may cause difficulty, and it even may cause trouble, or it will cause reaction against our war prisoners on the other side. If some of this kind of thing winds up—

Mr. MUNDT. As a matter of fact, is not the best way to pacify this sentiment, to keep this community acceptance that we all desire to operate, the establishment of stringent enough regulations before evacuees are permitted to operate in private life, so that those in the communities will know they are operating with good, loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Congressman, may I make a statement? I agree with you that is correct, and I believe we have established that. But I would like to say—

Mr. MUNDT. Before you give your statement, I would like to interrogate you a little further on that point. You have listed eight points now operating as a basis for your examination of the loyalty and background of these evacuees.

Mr. MYER. There are more points than that. Those points have to be gone into by the directors and in—

Mr. MUNDT. Well, there are eight points to be checked. And it contains this prohibitive clause: He has been mistrusted; that after this explanation an examination should be made, because General Drum does not feel that it is complete enough to give him indefinite leave in the East; that the Japanese cannot locate in the Eastern Defense Command, is that not correct? I think you will agree General Drum does that in the interest of national defense.



Mr. MYER. General Drum thought all those cleared by the joint board may locate in the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. MUNDT. So that before they can locate in the Eastern Defense Command, they have to have additional investigations by the joint board.

Mr. MYER. The Japanese American joint board.

Mr. MUNDT. They have to have that additional check before they can locate here; that is correct.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, do you not really feel, Mr. Myer, that in promoting this community acceptance, in which we are all interested, the Japanese who fail to get a clean bill of health by that board should be returned to the relocation centers?

Mr. MYER. No; I do not feel it is necessary to do that. I feel if it is feasible to have people within the inner part of the country who are selected from areas, Germans or Italians, it may be feasible to have people doing work in certain areas in the West or Midwest, that maybe you would not have along your coastal areas, so I don't think it is feasible. I think it would depend on the case. If they are bad, they are rejected and they are taken back. But we know that.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I interrupt you?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mentioned the fact that there has been no case of sabotage. Do you not think, from the statements that have been made by General Drum and General DeWitt, that they fear espionage far more than sabotage?

Mr. MYER. Perhaps so. But I think you will find very little espionage if you check with the Japanese ancestry. There have been very few cases, and those have been English or white Americans rather than Japanese. However, I am not saying that there have not been cases of espionage, because there have. There have been in all classes espionage. And, sure, they fear espionage nothing less than sabotage. So do I. That is why we are being conservative in these rules.

Let me point out again, gentlemen, that these people were allowed to go as they wished across the country for the whole month of March 1942 without feeling that there was any danger.

Now, the minute we develop a careful, sound program, where we are checking the records, where we are checking the background of their history and leaning over backward to protect the internal security of the United States, we have been criticized for releasing so-called known saboteurs and espionage agents throughout the country, with no justification whatsoever.

Some of you may have read Mr. Stripling's statement in the Washington Star on Saturday, May 29, again on Sunday morning. There was absolutely no basis in fact, or if there was Mr. Stripling has never supplied to me as yet one name of a known saboteur, who he says was released throughout the country, willy-nilly.

Now, gentlemen, may I read a statement?

Mr. MUNDT. Before you get to your statement, you do not deny, however, that you are releasing willy-nilly to the Middle West Japanese whom the joint board, the Japanese American joint board, has said are not entitled to a clean bill of health?



Mr. MYER. No; I won't say willy-nilly. We are releasing some to the Middle West that have not been cleared by the joint board.

Mr. MUNDT. Who have been rejected.

Mr. MYER. No; I don't think there have been any rejections for these releases. I will check that and give you the facts regarding it. I don't know of any cases where they were released for the Middle West that have been reversed here, but I will check the facts.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think you said that Mr. Hoover, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, personally approved your latest resettlement program.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Now, one other question. Did he approve that by letter?

Mr. MYER. No. The Attorney General, in whose Department Mr. Hoover is located, after my conference with Mr. Hoover and the Attorney General, wrote me a letter approving the policy.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you be kind enough to supply that to the committee?

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to put it in the record. I don't believe I have a copy with me, but I will put a copy in the record.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I ask that this be placed in the record; Mr. Chairman.

(The letter referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Do you have any approval of your latest resettlement program from the military authorities or from the War Department?

Mr. MYER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. EBERHARTER. By letter?

Mr. MYER. Not by letter. I discussed it with them verbally and over the telephone and sent them a confirming memorandum again just recently, to be sure that there was no misunderstanding about it, which is on record, and I will be glad to supply a copy of that statement; the confirmation that was made by the War Department at that time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Did you consider that you did have the approval by the War Department of the latest resettlement program?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, I will ask that that be placed in the record at this point also.

Did you have any approval, Mr. Myer, by the Navy Department, of your latest resettlement program?

Mr. MYER. No; excepting by their general participation giving approval. The Navy have never entered into our problem except as we work with the Office of Naval Intelligence on clearance cases. They have never been a party to the evacuation directly. It has been done by the War Department. So, our work has been almost entirely in cooperation with the War Department as far as the general policy and problems are concerned. However, we have worked with the Naval Intelligence very closely. They have supplied us with records and assisted us in many areas with our program.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think the Navy Department might be willing to give you a letter approving your latest resettlement program?

Mr. MYER. I have no doubt that they will. I have not raised the question.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Will you be able to get us such a letter?

Mr. MYER. If you feel it is desirable, I should be glad to do so.

Mr. EBERHARTER. If you can get it, I will ask that it be placed in the record at this time.

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. This joint board is not functioning now, is it, Mr. Myer?

Mr. MYER. Yes; it is functioning now; meeting two or three times a week, right along.

Mr. COSTELLO. Has it functioned prior to the period of April 7, when these new instructions were issued?

Mr. MYER. It was established in January and started functioning, I think, perhaps in February or March. But, it has taken time for us to get the records together and get them under way.

Mr. COSTELLO. And since the new instructions went out on April 7, that we referred to herein—

Mr. MYER. That was April 2 instead of the 7th, Mr. Chairman. Yes; they have been functioning right along. The joint board, however, does not take the responsibility for the indefinite leave procedure. That is our responsibility. They simply collaborate with us in making suggestions, providing information, and in relation to the Eastern Defense Command they do make the clearances that are necessary.

Mr. MUNDT. The only place they come into the picture is in giving this additional clearance for Japanese to come into the Eastern Defense Command.

Mr. MYER. Yes; all defense plant work the Provost Marshal's Office is responsible for.

Mr. MUNDT. On the theory that a bad Jap in Baltimore is a good Jap in Omaha; that is their job.

Mr. EBERHARTER. On defense plant work, does not that include defense plant work all over?

Mr. MYER. All over the United States; that is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Which includes all the eastern border?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, that seems to be different than we have been under the impression. We thought it was only the Eastern Defense Command, but you say defense plants in any part of the country.

Mr. MYER. That is right. We held up the other day on the employment of a man by Swift & Co. in Omaha, because it was designated as a defense plant. I don't know whether they allowed him to work.

Mr. MUNDT. I knew that the board passed on all defense plants, but the question was whether they could live in the Eastern Defense Command or away from there.

Mr. COSTELLO. At the present time, the director of the center can release evacuees located there without going through the Washington office at all, can he?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. But, as fast as we get these various checks on evacuees, he goes into it very fully. Most of those are already filed, so he has that information, together with the other information he has. He has the basic knowledge on the registration blank and the record in the center of about 6 months. But, of course, he is in touch with many additional questions about the individual.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, the individual names of those not to be allowed to be released have been separated, have they?

Mr. MYER. Yes; and a stop order has been put on their names in those files.

Mr. COSTELLO. That becomes a part of the stop list that they have created out there?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Now, any names appearing on there are not allowed to be released?

Mr. MYER. Are not allowed to be released, at least until further investigation or until the Director here approves it.

May I make a short statement?

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it very long?

Mr. MYER. I would like to read it, if you don't mind.

Mr. COSTELLO. My only thought was, we might interrupt you a bit while reading it, and it is rather late this afternoon, and it would be better to have you do that in the morning.

Mr. MYER. If you gentlemen will bear with me just a few minutes, please—

Mr. COSTELLO. The question is, how long will it take?

Mr. MYER. It won't take very long. It will take just a few minutes [reading]:

The manner in which the War Relocation Authority conducts its program is of concern to all the people in the United States, and it has a significance which goes far beyond the geographic boundaries of this country. Undoubtedly the W. R. A. program is being watched in Japan, where thousands of American soldiers and civilians are held as prisoners or internees; in China, India, Thailand, Burma, and many other countries whose collaboration we need if we are to defeat our enemies with a minimum loss of life.

The manner in which the problem is treated has a direct bearing on relations with our allies in winning the war and on the position of this Nation in establishing the terms of peace.

The grave international implications of this program demand that it be approached thoughtfully, soberly, and with maturity, and that public statements concerning it be made only after thorough understanding of the facts.

The program of the War Relocation Authority has been under investigation for the past 8 weeks in such a manner as to achieve maximum publicity of sensational statements based on half-truth, exaggerations, and falsehood; statements of witnesses have been released to the public without verification of their accuracy, thus giving Nation-wide currency to many distortions and downright untruths.

This practice has fostered a public feeling of mistrust, suspicion, and hatred that has had the effect of:

Providing the enemy with material which can be used to convince the peoples of the Orient that the United States is undemocratic and is fighting a racial war.

Undermining the unity of the American people.

Betraying the democratic objectives which this Nation and its allies are fighting to preserve.

It may lead to further maltreatment of our citizens who are prisoners or who are interned.

International News Service dispatch from Parker, Ariz., dated June 19 [reading]:

The Dies subcommittee investigating Japanese war relocation centers Saturday had before it testimony disclosing the theft of 350 pounds of dynamite—enough to blow up Parker Dam and menace the water supply for the Los Angeles area. The dynamite was stolen recently from a tunnel 3 miles from Parker, according to the testimony, and was followed shortly afterward by theft of 100 fulminate of mercury caps from a Government magazine.

The disclosures were related by Ralph F. Stringfellow, chief special agent of the metropolitan water district of southern California.

"For 9 years Japanese engineers had access to all our maps and everything else, right up to Pearl Harbor."



He also testified that he was informed by the Poston procurement officer Japanese leave camp "from 3 to 7 days at a time, and they don't know how many men are in the camp, because they depend upon a check made by the Japanese."

Stringfellow's information admittedly was second-hand. There is no evidence whatever to indicate that Japanese evacuees had any connection with the theft of dynamite, and the only evidence in connection with the theft of the dynamite caps points to two unidentified Caucasians. There is no way of establishing how much dynamite was stolen. The dynamite was 3 years old and was so deteriorated that it was regarded as unsuitable for blasting, and the remaining supply was ordered destroyed. The dynamite caps were stolen approximately 50 days after the theft of the dynamite became known.

Linking the theft of an unknown amount of dynamite to the theft of dynamite caps at least 50 days later and attributing either of them, without a shred of supporting evidence, to evacuees is either near-hysterical or malicious.

In a signed statement dated June 21, Stringfellow said:

The quoted statements attributed to me in accounts I have read are not complete statements, and these statements, as well as the inferences and implications of the statements, lead to a false and garbled picture of the testimony I gave before the subcommittee.

Mr. MUNDT. Did Mr. Stringfellow deny this statement?

Mr. MYER. He signed a statement to investigators who went from the Interior Department to investigate the whole affair following this statement of the subcommittee. I will be very glad to supply to the committee a full copy of the investigation report.

Gentlemen, the only reason I bring that fact out is that since those facts were published, since Stringfellow came into the picture, we have had more hysterical letters on the part of people who believe everything that is said in the public press. And, in my judgment, that sort of thing is going to lead to difficulties which may react against our war prisoners over there if somebody becomes violent enough to kill a Japanese because they think he is a saboteur.

Mr. COSTELLO. Was the statement of Mr. Stringfellow to the investigators of the Interior Department under oath?

Mr. MYER. I am sure it was. I will supply it for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. The statements he made before this committee were under oath at the time they were made.

Mr. MYER. All I am doing is quoting from the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only question is whether he denied that the theft of the 350 pounds of dynamite was——

Mr. MYER. All I am saying is, there is no positive evidence that there was a theft of 350 pounds of dynamite by Japanese evacuees.

Mr. COSTELLO. But then you also make the hearsay statement that the dynamite that was stolen was at least 2 or 3 years old.

Mr. MYER. Well, alleged to have been stolen, I should have said.

Mr. COSTELLO. Or 3 years old.

Mr. MYER. Yes; about 3 years old. The mine in which it is alleged—well, the Bureau of Mines people ordered it destroyed, because they said it was unsafe to handle. It was probably between 2 and 3 years old. And, the theft of the caps was some 50 days after the report of the alleged theft of the dynamite, so that there doesn't seem to be any connection.



Mr. MUNDT. Before you proceed, Mr. Myer, you have been very eloquent and demonstrative in the criticism of the way in which the committee has held its hearings. As a public official, I believe in the fine art of criticism. The implication of your remarks is that you are also criticizing the committee that we did not exclude the press from these hearings.

Mr. MYER. There is no implication.

Mr. MUNDT. We thought the public was entitled to have the benefit of their testimony, whether they had been dismissed by you temporarily, resigned, or whether they were allegedly reputable citizens whom you charged with telling untruths, like the mayor of Los Angeles or the employees of the Metropolitan Water District people who, presumably, were responsible for its guardianship, and we thought the best way to find out was to have the witnesses present, and if they did make a misstatement, that the same agency would be available to them, that is, those who wished to corroborate the statement or deny the statement. If you have a brief statement, I wish you would advise the committee.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Congressman. Let me say, first, that I did not say that the mayor was telling knowingly an untruth. I think he thought he was truthful. The facts that he gave were untrue about Mr. Kuru. I am stating that he was misinformed. I am not charging anybody with malicious untruths.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only error in the testimony of the mayor regarding Kuru was, he made the statement that Kuru had been released from the war relocation camp, or center, when, in fact—

Mr. MYER. He had been released by the W. C. C. A.

Mr. COSTELLO. From the Santa Anita center by the W. C. C. A.

Mr. MYER. Those releases were not allowed without the special approval, you will find, of General DeWitt himself.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not know what the details were. But, Kuru was released from the Santa Anita center directly and he, as an individual, had not been assigned to any relocation center.

Mr. MYER. That is correct, but that is an important fact in connection with the testimony.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, he testified before us—

Mr. MYER. That was not publicized in the paper, and I simply wanted the facts gotten before the public in the proper way.

Mr. COSTELLO. He testified on Thursday, and I think you wired on Friday. He subsequently testified and corrected that error.

Mr. MUNDT. There was a correction in the paper.

Mr. MYER. Oh, it was? I am sorry, I didn't read it.

I want to go back to that statement. I have no criticism or any criticism that will allow the full facts to be checked. At no time have I ever tried to censure the press. I believe in the principles of this country, including a free press. I did, in a letter to Chairman Dies of this committee, offer our collaboration after Mr. Stripling's statement of May 27, and again in the papers the following morning, to check the policy statements regarding this Authority before the statements were released by the press or by representatives of the committee. I have not yet had an answer to that letter, and that was over a month ago.

I wired Mr. Costello on June 8, before the hearings were started in Los Angeles, and offered him the services of our field assistant

director to check the testimony of these witnesses, regarding the policy of the W. R. A., before it was released to the press. The only statement I ever heard regarding that was a statement in the press that seemed to imply that I was trying to censor the press, and I want to say to you, ladies and gentlemen of the press, I am not trying to censor the press.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you happen to have a copy of that particular telegram with you?

Mr. MYER. I think I do. I will be very glad to read it and put it into the record. This telegram is dated June 7. I made a mistake on the date [reading]:

Congressman JOHN M. COSTELLO,

*Care of Dies Committee, Los Angeles, Calif.:*

I am informed that a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activity under your chairmanship is opening hearings today in Los Angeles to investigate activities of Japanese and Japanese Americans in this country. The War Relocation Authority will welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the committee by supplying information on those phases of the problem for which this agency is responsible.

Because of recent statements in the press attributed to members and representatives of your committee, in which facts have been garbled, I suggest it may be helpful to have statements concerning policies and procedures of the War Relocation Authority checked before statements are released to the press. To this end, while you are on the coast, I am glad to offer you the services of Mr. R. B. Cozzens, field assistant director of this agency, whose headquarters are in the Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco. Mr. Cozzens is thoroughly conversant with the War Relocation Authority program, and he will be at your disposal to assist in any way by supplying or checking information.

DILLON S. MYER, *Director.*

Mr. COSTELLO. Before you proceed, let us take a look at this telegram you have here. You use the expression here:

Because of recent statements in the press attributed to members and representatives of your committee in which facts have been garbled, I suggest it may be helpful to have statements concerning policies and procedures of the War Relocation Authority checked before statements are released to the press.

In other words, was it not your intention then that this committee, at the time of their hearings, should call upon Mr. Cozzens and have him go over any releases that might be made to the press and have him directly censor those releases before they were given out?

Mr. MYER. Let me give you an example of what I had in mind. This is the best way I can get it before you.

On May 26, 1942—note the date—testimony was taken by representatives of this committee from Harold H. Townsend, a former employee at the Colorado River relocation center. This testimony was not released until June 10, after the acting project director and the administrative officer of the project had testified. The Townsend testimony included 39 known falsehoods. In his very first statement, Townsend falsely claimed that he served in the armed forces of the United States during the last war. The records show that he was chief of guards of the Carter Oil Co. in Oklahoma all during the war and was employed by the Y. M. C. A. as hut superintendent 3 months after the war was over.

This is the same man who deserted his post of duty during the November strike at Poston, took a Government car, and left the project in a fit of terror.

Townsend made many false statements regarding waste of food, food policies, number of warehouses, activities during the strike at Poston in November, and other matters. All of this testimony might have been checked against the facts between May 26 and June 10 had the committee investigators been interested in securing the facts. The War Relocation Authority offered to collaborate and cooperate in any way in checking information of this type before it was released to the public, but we were not afforded this opportunity.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I ask a question at this point? You say he left the project in a fit of terror.

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did he not ask permission to leave the project before he left?

Mr. MYER. He did not, according to my understanding.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony before this committee indicates that he did ask his superior for permission to take his wife from the center, and was granted that permission to leave and to take his wife home. And, the testimony was that they believed his home was in Los Angeles, when it turned out that he was taking his wife to her mother's place in Oklahoma. But, he did not leave the center without first requesting that permission from one of his superiors, and was granted permission to leave.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to have Mr. Head or Mr. Evans check that.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think your own testimony should be just as accurate as the testimony you are criticizing.

Mr. MYER. I am trying to make them accurate, and I am basing it on facts supplied me from Poston.

Mr. MUNDT. We were supplied our facts from Mr. Gelvin and Mr. Empie.

Mr. MYER. We will have to get those facts together.

Mr. COSTELLO. That was sworn testimony before our own committee.

Mr. MYER. Now, gentlemen, I have another memorandum I would like to present, but—

Mr. COSTELLO. I may state at this point the testimony of Mr. Townsend was received prior to the arrival in Los Angeles of the other two members of the committee. The testimony was under oath and it was not made in the presence of the press. At the original conference, it was the understanding that possibly the hearings might be executive hearings on the Pacific coast, and it was determined subsequently that they should not be executive but that they should be public hearings and the members of the press permitted to sit in on those hearings, and the testimony of Mr. Townsend was not released until it was generally substantiated by subsequent witnesses who appeared before the committee and it was not until the general facts contained in his testimony had been fully substantiated that the testimony taken from Mr. Townsend was released as a part of the hearings of the full committee.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I have a complete analysis of Mr. Townsend's testimony with me in mimeographed form that I will be glad to supply you for the record and the members of the press, which I think will indicate that it was not generally valid testimony. And, it came from Poston, from affidavits, from individuals at Poston



who were responsible for the different operations of the program there, following the securing of the testimony from this committee after it was announced on June 10. I still insist that there was ample opportunity between May 26 and June 10 to have had a chance to corroborate this testimony and to check it completely before it was released to the press. I believe you will agree——

Mr. COSTELLO. The idea of this committee is to get down to the solid facts in regard to the matters, and it is our desire to have nothing but the facts revealed. If there has been any distortion of facts, we are just as anxious to correct them as you are.

Mr. MYER. I am quite sure of that.

Mr. COSTELLO. And I am quite sure the members of the committee will be glad to take that matter up with you tomorrow morning and we can go over the matters of falsehood that are contained, that you allege, in Mr. Townsend's statement. But, I think that the facts will show that the testimony that was received on the Pacific coast by the various witnesses, in the main, substantiates the statements contained in Mr. Townsend's testimony.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to have you read the rebuttal.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will go into that specifically tomorrow morning.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I was just going to call attention to page 235 of the typed transcript of Mr. Empie's testimony. Mr. Empie testified that Mr. Townsend left with a regular leave card; left the camp.

Mr. MYER. I might say, Mr. Chairman, that no one can leave a relocation center without a leave card. However, my information may be wrong.

Mr. MUNDT. He may be returning.

Mr. MYER. Then the military police would stop him. He would have to have a pass out of the center. My information is that he left the center without the approval of the project director in charge. He could have gotten a leave card to pass out of the center, I suppose, from other people.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean, the project director?

Mr. MYER. The acting director, Mr. Evans.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Head at the time was not in charge?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Evans was in charge as acting director.

Mr. COSTELLO. And he did not get his leave card from Mr. Evans, but he did get a leave card from Mr. Empie or from someone else?

Mr. MYER. No one can leave relocation centers, if the orders are followed by the secretary, without a pass; neither can they get in without a pass, because those items are checked by the military police.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would he have the right to draw up his own pass?

Mr. MYER. I am not sure. He was in charge, at that time, of transportation and supplies and he may have had authority from the acting director to draw up his own pass, because there were people working under him, going in and out at times, and he may have been authorized to do so.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the testimony will show further that it was not merely a leave card that he presented——

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to be corrected if I am wrong.

Mr. COSTELLO. He specifically inquired of one of his superiors, asking whether or not he might not take his wife from the center and take her home, and the testimony went right on at some length——



Mr. MYER. I am willing to grant, Mr. Chairman, I may not have that exactly accurate. I think the facts generally, though, will stand up under the test of scrutiny.

Mr. MUNDT. Back to this telegram, Mr. Myer, in which you severely take the committee to task——

Mr. MYER. No; I don't take the committee severely to task. I just want it on the record, knowing that we offered to cooperate in every way and I have tried to get facts into the record for the last 6 or 7 weeks.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to help you get on the record very clearly what you had in mind for this committee to do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I can give you the exact testimony when you want it, from Mr. Empie.

Mr. COSTELLO. You might clear that point up.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The questioner said [reading]:

But, you did give him permission to take his wife home?

Answer:

I gave him permisison to leave the project on leave. He told me that he wanted to take his wife home.

That is page 239.

Mr. COSTELLO. Who was answering the question?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Empie.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Empie was the witness at that time.

Mr. MYER. I stand corrected.

Mr. COSTELLO. What is Mr. Empie's position at the center; are you aware of that?

Mr. MYER. I believe administrative officer, was his title.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was one of the assistants to Mr. Head; is that not correct?

Mr. MYER. He was charged generally with administrative services, and Mr. Townsend was under his immediate supervision at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, I think you have a perfect right to go on record to say how these hearings should be held, because we might have to hold further hearings. You know how we hold them. We put the witness under oath. We invite the press. We hear both sides of the story.

We did not in any way attempt to censor or call attention to any particular phase and the committee made no statement of policy whatsoever until the hearings were completed, at which time ten points were listed, which you have not as yet criticized.

Now, in your telegram to Mr. Costello you say that [reading]:

Because of recent statements in the press attributed to members and representatives of your committee in which facts have been garbled I suggest it may be helpful to have statements concerning policies and procedures of the War Relocation Authority checked before statements are released to the press.

In the paper you read from, you went further and suggested that it was inadvisable to have these witnesses project their testimony through the press in the manner in which they did. Just how would you have handled it?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, we offered, let me repeat, before the hearings were ever held in Los Angeles, to supply the committee with the facts regarding the policy of this Authority; in relation to food; in relation to all the other policies.

There had not until that time, or there had not up until last Saturday afternoon, been any member of the committee or any representative of this committee, any investigator, ever contact me on anything until Mr. Stripling called me in the middle of the afternoon last Saturday and asked me to appear here at 10 o'clock today. We have offered and we wanted to supply the facts.

Now I want to present an example of what I am talking about.

In spite of the fact that the committee investigators secured the full facts regarding the food policies of the W. R. A. at the first center visited on May 12, 1942, including facts about rationing costs and other limitations, five different misleading statements were released by members of the committee, by representatives of the committee or by witnesses before the committee between May 19 and June 17, 1943.

Then there followed an article on May 19 about Camp Livingston, which is an internment camp. It has no reference to relocation centers at all.

Secondly, I want to refer to the story in the Times-Herald May 28, which story was to the effect that no rationing was in effect and that they were being well fed. Then there followed the A. P. dispatch attributed to investigators.

Let me read just three or four pages to show you what happened. I am not saying that all of this was a matter of investigative procedure by the Congress. I am saying though, while this all was going on, statements were coming out from investigators which were misleading to the public. Let me give you an example, will you?

Mr. MUNDT. Answer the question first in your own way, and don't get off the beam.

Mr. MYER. I will come back.

Mr. MUNDT. O. K.

Mr. MYER [reading]:

In a dispatch from Los Angeles on May 19, the Associated Press reported that Representative Thomas had telegraphed President Roosevelt urging that War Relocation Authority stop release of evacuees from relocation centers. The Congressman was also reported to have commented on the case of a wealthy Japanese from Los Angeles who had been apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and sent to Camp Livingston, La. The following statement was attributed to Representative Thomas as a direct quote.

Mr. MUNDT. In fairness to Mr. Thomas, who is a member of this subcommittee, but who was not present at any of the hearings out there, maybe you should limit your criticism to the hearings that we actually held.

Mr. MYER. I am simply trying to correct a statement or statements that were attributed to members of the committee so that the committee members may know.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Thomas had no part in these hearings.

Mr. MYER. Well, I think it is important so that the facts will be clear as to what are relocation camps and what are internment camps.

"It has been reliably reported that he [the interned Japanese] has stated the food and wine at his camp are excellent and that he is concerned only with his expanding waistline. Are we to release this fat-waisted Jap while our American boys on Guadalcanal are barely receiving enough food with which to keep alive?"

Comment: The clear implication of the remark allegedly made by Representative Thomas is that the interned Japanese may well be released from Camp Livingston under the leave procedures of the War Relocation Authority. Camp

Livingston is an internment camp administered by the Department of Justice. Its inmates are in no way eligible to apply for leave under the program of the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you finished?

Mr. COSTELLO. May I ask a question there? I notice he is quoted as having said "interned Japanese," indicating that he knew it was an internment camp, and he was referring to them as interned Japanese.

Mr. MYER. May I read it again?

Are we to release this fat-waisted Jap while our American boys on Guadalcanal are barely receiving enough food with which to keep alive?

Now, the implication is that W. R. A. is doing the releasing.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, are any of these internees at Livingston ever released by immigration boards or anybody else?

Mr. MYER. Yes; there have been a few cases of release. Most of them are paroled and many of them are in our relocation centers as parolees, under definite instructions.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Thomas' question was not entirely rhetorical then, was it?

Mr. MYER. My point was that the implication in this story and many others was to stir up people to lead them to think——

Mr. MUNDT. He was in California at the time; was he not?

Mr. MYER. I know he was, supposedly conducting an investigation of W. R. A. in Los Angeles, preliminary to your trip out there.

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact is that many of these interned Japanese in camps or in internment are being released from those internment camps and many of them have been returned to relocation camps under your authority; is that not correct?

Mr. MYER. As parolees.

Mr. COSTELLO. That is right.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. But the fact is that many who have been interned by the F. B. I. are subsequently released from camps of internment.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, there are two implications in that statement that I think are bad. One of them is that we are supplying wine and too much food to evacuees, which has been an old trick of all the people who have been shooting at the W. R. A. program from the start. The second implication is that we are doing the releasing of these interned people and mixing it up with the relocation centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me call your attention to one fact regarding the food situation. I do not know what others may have done, or those sniping at W. R. A., and so on. Such is not our function. But I think it can be definitely shown by testimony at our hearings in Los Angeles that very definitely pointed out the fact that as far as food was concerned, the Japanese in the relocation centers were receiving approximately the same amount of food as civilians in civilian life.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that the coupon value of the food for Japanese evacuees was equivalent to the coupon value of the food per civilian on the outside, and I think our committee during the course of these hearings brought that point out very definitely and very clearly.

Mr. MYER. I give you credit, Mr. Chairman; you did.

Mr. COSTELLO. We did criticize the excess supplies of food, particularly stored at Heart Mountain.



Mr. MYER. So did I.

Mr. COSTELLO. And some other locations.

Mr. MYER. Yes. Well, I do not know the details, but I think these newspaper folks will agree with me that that did not make as good headlines as Mr. Townsend's story and, we will say, that food was being cached all over the desert and cached under buildings. I don't believe you found any when you were out there.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was a little warm that day.

Mr. MYER. I simply want to say that I do give you credit, and I appreciate the fact that the committee did make that statement. But I had to hunt for it.

Mr. COSTELLO. The statement was also made that bread was being stolen and dried and buried out in the desert. I think anybody who has any knowledge of bread at all would realize that dried-out bread, lying out in the desert sands for months, would not be of much use for Japanese paratroopers.

Mr. MYER. But you will find many people believe that is the case. A lot of people never saw that Arizona desert out there, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUNDT. This might also be recorded, Mr. Myer. As far as Mr. Townsend, we also questioned him, and I do not think any of the committee members accepted his testimony in any instance except where it was corroborated by other witnesses, particularly those in your employ, but Mr. Townsend did not start all these rumors about food in these relocation centers. There were a lot of them going up and down the coast before the committee went into the hearings.

Mr. MYER. I agree with that. I appreciate what the hearing was up against.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, then, you said you objected to the press being present at the hearing that day.

Mr. MYER. I am not objecting to have the press represented. I am delighted to have the press represented. The only thing I am sorry about is that we were not invited to be there, too, so that we could check some of these facts before the press published them. That was my only suggestion of criticism against the way you held your hearing.

Let me point this out. I am not criticizing the hearings, necessarily. I am criticizing, and I am very frank about it, some of the releases put out by your investigators while the hearings were going on or before they were going on. Let me read one.

Mr. MUNDT. The plain intent of the telegram which you sent to the chairman of the subcommittee was definitely to censor any news releases that might be put out.

Mr. MYER. No; not censor. I wanted to have the opportunity to have our statements made at the same time as some of these witnesses who had been fired from the centers, and who were disgruntled, so that the press could have the information on both sides.

Mr. COSTELLO. It would not be physically possible for you to have sat in one chair and the witness in another, and every time the witness made a statement, you made a counterstatement.

Mr. MYER. They could have been available, had you invited Mr. Cozzens to be down there. But, I do appreciate having my day here, where I can talk about it.



Mr. COSTELLO. Frankly, our intention from the very beginning was to consult with you at the start.

Mr. MYER. I am sure of that.

Mr. COSTELLO. But, it would have been futile for us to call you in here, at a Washington hearing, as a witness and ask you a few questions about matters which we knew practically nothing of.

Mr. MYER. I am sorry you did not call me before you went to California.

Mr. COSTELLO. We most probably would not have had a question to ask you. We would have listened to a statement from you and that would have been the end of the story. The only thing that this committee could do was to go out and get the facts. That is why they investigated the centers before hearings were held, to obtain some information regarding the situation. Then, after the investigation was made, we called in the witnesses, because the witnesses were more available in that locality and then, to conclude those hearings, we moved to Washington to take up the other end of the story, where it is more convenient for yourself to appear as a witness and other members of your staff. It would have been utterly futile to call you as the first witness until we had obtained the facts and information from the various witnesses regarding the situation.

Mr. MYER. The only things I criticize, Mr. Chairman, are two things. One was the fact that your investigators, before any hearing was ever held, were releasing statements to the press, many of which were untrue: secondly, that witnesses who had been discredited, because of the fact that they were incompetent and could not carry on the program of the W. R. A., were brought before the committee before we had a chance to present facts at the same time. That is the only criticism I have.

I appreciate, and I want you to know I appreciate the privilege of coming before this committee, and in support of what I have just stated here, I would like to read one more statement and then I am through, Mr. Chairman, if you care to stop for this evening.

This statement was attributed to investigators of the committee in an A. P. dispatch dated May 31:

A week's shipment to Manzanar from the quartermaster depot at Mira Loma, Calif., included 22,500 pounds of white potatoes, 1,330 pounds of coffee, 12,000 pounds of hard wheat flour, 12,000 pounds of soft-wheat flour, 12,000 pounds of pancake flour, more than 5,700 jars of marmalades and jams, 14,400 cans of evaporated milk, 180,000 pounds of rice, 7,200 pounds of spaghetti, 21,500 pounds of sugar, 2,500 pounds of bananas, 120 boxes of grapefruit containing 300 grapefruit per box, 240 boxes of oranges containing 200 oranges per box, 240 boxes of apples and 26,000 pounds of fresh vegetables, 10,000 pounds of beef, 5,000 pounds of pork, 2,800 pounds of mutton, 1,200 pounds of salt pork, 2,200 pounds of frankfurters, 2,000 pounds of pork livers, 4,000 pounds of corned beef, 2,800 pounds of fresh pork sausage, and 2,200 pounds of bologna.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that all, bologna?

Mr. MYER. Yes. It looks to me there was more bologna in there than that, but they say only 2,200 pounds.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What are you quoting from?

Mr. MYER. I am quoting from a news item given out by the investigators, presumably of this committee. It further says—

Mr. COSTELLO. What was the date of that release?

Mr. MYER. The A. P. dispatch is dated May 31, quoting an investigation of the committee.

Mr. EBERHARTER. We ought to have for the record the newspaper clipping.

Mr. MYER. I will supply for the record a copy of the clipping. This is our copy. Our statement on it is this:

(a) The statement that evacuees at relocation centers are "among the best-fed civilians in the world" is highly dubious and definitely misleading. In March 1943 when point rationing of food became effective, the War Relocation Authority registered with the Office of Price Administration as an "institutional user" of rationed foods and became subject to all rationing restrictions applicable to such users. The Authority has gone beyond Office of Price Administration requirements for institutional users and has established food-consumption quotas for relocation centers on exactly the same per capita basis as those applicable to the civilian population of the United States as a whole. Even before point rationing went into effect the Authority practiced voluntary rationing in accordance with quotas suggested by the Office of Price Administration. The cost of food served to evacuees at the centers has never exceeded 46 cents per person per day and it has been the constant policy of the Authority to avoid purchase of foods which are not available to the public generally or which are locally in short supply.

(b) The statement that canned pork and beans have been purchased and stocked at relocation centers is wholly untrue. The phrase "chocolate bars," conveying the impression that evacuees are being provided with candy bars, is misleading. The Authority has occasionally purchased baking chocolate as a substitute for cocoa when the latter commodity was not available. Candy bars, however, have never been furnished to evacuees in the mess halls at relocation centers.

(c) Whether intentionally or not, this paragraph clearly conveys the implication that the quantities indicated were intended for 1 week's use at Manzanar. The fact is that only coffee, meats, fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, dairy products, and lard are received weekly. Other foods are received monthly. As previously noted, consumption of all rationed foods is strictly limited to civilian quotas, and the per capita cost is also strictly limited.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think that is indicative of my concern of the procedures. I have not objection—and I want to have this clear—to having the press present. I am delighted. I have no objection to having you folks hear witnesses that you feel have a contribution to make.

I do have an objection, during the interim period until the full facts are brought before this committee, of having representatives of this committee continually releasing statements to the press which can be misquoted or which can be misinterpreted, and some of which are untrue, because I don't think that that is fair to the United States of America in these wartimes, when we need unity worse than we need anything else in the world. That is my feeling about the matter.

Mr. COSTELLO. Regarding your last statement about the foodstuffs, is it not a fact that the foodstuffs for the War Relocation Authority are procured through the Army Quartermaster?

Mr. MYER. That is a fact. That has been true right from the start in the case of all those things that have been supplied there. We occasionally go into the open market. As you undoubtedly recall—

Mr. COSTELLO. And, on the matter of food, as I understand it, the Army Quartermaster buys almost exclusively grade A food.

Mr. MYER. The beef at Manzanar, where this was being quoted, was quoted as prime beef. It was definitely fourth-grade beef. The Army military police at that center will not utilize the food as they do at some of the other centers, from that warehouse, from our food supply, because it is not good enough for them.

Mr. COSTELLO. I, myself, as I recall reading over some of those lists, saw the notation for grade A as Prime No. 1, and so on. I did see in one instance, as I recall, a No. 3 grade of beef.

Mr. MYER. No. 3 grade of beef is what we order generally.

Mr. COSTELLO. The testimony that was presented to the committee indicated that all during that period, in southern California particularly, and I might say in all of California, starting in last December and lasting for some 2 or 3 months in fact, even up until April, there was a very definite shortage of beef in California. There was no shortage at any time in any of the relocation centers.

Mr. MEYER. I beg to differ with you.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not think there should be a shortage there, but the fact is the testimony showed that the Japanese in the relocation centers were getting actually at that time a better supply of meat than was available to civilians in California.

Mr. MYER. Are you sure that that is true of all centers or did you just check Poston in relation to that, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. We did not check all the centers, but my understanding was that the meat being purchased through the Army Quartermaster was available to the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MYER. There were many, many times that we were short of meat in centers. It has not always been at the same time, but we have been short and there have been times when they have gone for days at a time with no meat to serve. That is all right; that is what I do every once in a while. I have no criticism of that. I simply want the facts made clear that that has been true.

I would like to make one other statement about that. We have in effect and have had for some time a ruling that there shall be two meatless days at the projects, which is not required of the people on the outside, in addition to the other rationing restrictions.

Mr. COSTELLO. You say the fact that the shortage stories have gone out and that the evacuees have been getting the best food, are misleading. Do you not think propaganda going back to the Orient, that the Japanese evacuees are being so well treated, might have a beneficial effect rather than a harmful one?

Mr. MYER. I don't think it will have any harmful effect on our prisoners, but it is doing a lot of damage in this country to the program, and it is taking up a great deal of manpower, Mr. Chairman, to answer the letters that come in regarding such statements, and I think it might be used better for some other purpose.

Mr. COSTELLO. I can sympathize with you, because that is always a problem, but you do make the statement that it is providing the enemy with material concerning this country that might have a beneficial effect on them in the Orient.

Mr. MYER. I am not referring particularly to the fact statements. I am talking about the general statements that have been developed and which, at least, develop in the minds of the public and which may lead to overt acts on the part of the public which could very drastically result in violence.

Now, I am not thinking only of the Japanese. I am thinking of the Chinese and the Hindus and the other far eastern people who are orientals, when we developed an attitude of what seems to be developing here, of racial reaction generally, and they are our allies, so that



the whole problem, I think, is intermingled not only with the problem of war prisoners, but internally with our allies.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the sentiment is such on the Pacific coast, as well as in Arizona and other locations, from the letters we received, that the indiscriminate release of evacuees to those areas would bring about some complications that would be far more serious than anything we could dream of.

Mr. MYER. Perhaps so. There are none to be released to the Pacific coast, as you know.

Mr. COSTELLO. But that was the intention of W. R. A., to have the evacuees released to the Pacific coast.

Mr. MYER. That policy has never been controlled by the War Relocation Authority at any time. Our authority is subject to Executive Order 9066, which puts that in the hands of the military and has been determined by them from the start. It still is the policy that they determine. We abide by it to the letter.

Mr. COSTELLO. But, was it not the desire of W. R. A. to have that policy altered.

Mr. MYER. I won't say that we have not suggested the possibility at different stages of the game. We have made some suggestions. However, we have talked of a number of policies that have been under consideration. We considered or suggested, among other things, that perhaps veterans of the last war, who were made citizens of the United States, because they served in the Army, some of whom have the Croix de Guerre and the Purple Heart, might be allowed to go back to their homes, and perhaps certain other cases checked up by the Provost Marshal's office and the Joint Board might ultimately be allowed to go back and perhaps others of the armed forces, with otherwise good records.

We also recommended that selective service be established for the Nisei group generally. I am still recommending that. I have recommended it publicly a good many times and I recommend it now, because I think it is essential; not only to the problems we are carrying out, but I think it is essential from the standpoint of treatment of citizens generally.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think that through the misguidance of some of these individuals, if any one of these evacuees were to be murdered, let us say, by reason of some of them being hot-headed, that that sort of a story going back to Japan would do this country far greater damage and far greater harm than any other single thing?

Mr. MYER. I think it would do damage. I am not so sure that it will do greater damage than some of the other stories, particularly when you put them together and wrap them in a package. I think the culminating effects of the tramp, tramp of the racial antagonism which are developing, may have more effect on the attitude of our allies in the Far East and cause more trouble than perhaps the death of some one individual.

However, I am greatly concerned, Mr. Chairman, about the possibility of overt acts. That is one reason that I am greatly concerned about misinformation and wrong information going out to the public, because it simply sears the emotions more deeply, not only in California but in other parts of the country.



Mr. COSTELLO. You spoke of misinformation and you also mentioned 37 known false releases. Do you have a copy of that that you can leave with the committee?

Mr. MYER. Yes, I will be very glad to supply that for the record. (The material referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. COSTELLO. That contains all of the particular falsehoods which you could enumerate?

Mr. MYER. That contains the premise, I think, regarding the Townsend testimony, because a copy of the testimony was supplied to Poston, and they provided the facts that refer to the testimony.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have any other false statements other than these?

Mr. MYER. I have other statements I can supply for the record. Do you mean tomorrow?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MYER. I will be available, and I will supply statements from time to time.

Mr. COSTELLO. We will, in all probability, meet at 10:30.

Mr. MYER. Fine.

Mr. MUNDT. You brought up the subject here of food and what the committee investigators should not say. As you know, the subject of food is not one of particular concern with this committee.

Mr. MYER. I realize that.

Mr. MUNDT. The committee has not made any recommendation on the matter of food or any criticism that the Japanese in the camps are being fed too well or inadequate. We have been, naturally, concerned, as a part of the Congress, that there be no waste, or that extravagance of any kind should not be allowed in the use of food.

Now, here is a chance for you to clear up tomorrow morning, if you can, a news story that has spread all over the west coast after our visit to Poston. When we were out there we saw trucks at the Poston camp dumping, in truck loads, spinach, boxes and all, out on the desert sands. We asked Mr. Head and the project authorities that evening how in the world they happened to be dumping that spinach in the desert. And they told us that the spinach had arrived, from wherever they ordered it, and there was spoilage, and they hauled it away and dumped it.

We raised the point, in so doing, whether they would not jeopardize their opportunity to collect from the railroads. And, they said "No." It is kind of wasteful to throw the boxes away. They said they did not realize that.

I wish you would find out from Poston, or your records, and let us know about that in the morning.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to check the facts, if I can. I am not sure I can supply the facts, because we probably will have to telephone Poston for the information.

Mr. MUNDT. I am interested to know whether they got any return from the railroad company.

Mr. MYER. What date were you there, Mr. Mundt? Well, I will find out. You want to know whether or not they did collect from the railroad?

Mr. MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. I believe it might be possible to have one of your staff check this list of names. There are about 600 names. We would particularly like to know whether any of the persons listed here have been released from evacuation centers and, wherever it is possible, endeavor to give the address, so as to identify the individual; otherwise maybe the name will be sufficient.

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to check that. I am not sure I can get this done by tomorrow morning, because it takes quite a while to check it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Tomorrow morning or tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. MYER. Yes; as soon as I can get the list checked.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Myer, you have made some criticisms here of the publicity which attended the hearings and made some criticism of the statements that were released. Of course, I do not have any intention of trying to defend the newspapers or reporters for whatever they want to report concerning our hearings. It is up to them to decide what they think to be of interest.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So I do not think this committee should be grouped together and blamed for whatever the newspapers have published unless it was a specific statement given out. I want to say this; when this committee arrived on the coast, before these hearings were opened and this investigation really got under way by the members of the committee, it was decided to hold hearings in the nature of public hearings so that the members of the press could be present.

Mr. MYER. Was it public for everyone or just for the press? Was it open to the public?

Mr. EBERHARTER. And we decided to hold public hearings, because we felt it would be in the best interests, not only of Congress but of the War Relocation Authority. We did not want to hold executive hearings, or so-called star-chamber sessions, because there has been a great deal of criticism of that method of procedure; therefore, we proceeded on that basis.

I also want to say that this committee has come to no final conclusion with respect to the matters under investigation, and it has been so stated by members of the committee.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And with further respect to your criticism, in any hearing or any court trial, you know yourself, from experience, that the complainants are always heard first and then those accused are given an opportunity to present their defense. I see no other way in which to fairly conduct an investigation.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Congressman, may I make this comment? I, in no way, have criticized the members having the press available. I think you will agree with that. It was perfectly all right with me having the press available. I only made two comments that seem to be critical, and I want to be clear. One is that I did not know that other people were allowed in, excepting the press and the witnesses and the investigators and the committee. I did not know that it was an open hearing. That had never been announced, so far as I know, excepting that I found out after several days that it was. I thought it was a closed hearing except for the press and the members of the committee.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, that is partially true.

Mr. MYER. Partially?

Mr. COSTELLO. We did not have the public there as an audience.

Mr. MYER. I wanted my representative there.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were one or two other persons there.

Mr. MYER. But I was not given that opportunity. That is one of the criticisms that I have to make of your hearing in Los Angeles. My major criticism is not the way the hearings were conducted in Los Angeles. My major criticism is the fact that representatives of this committee, in the interim period, began to give out statements and information to the press, presumably gleaned by investigators, that were not true in some cases. They were only partially true in others, and in other cases they were perfectly absurd.

In one case information was provided by someone and they quoted Representative Starnes as saying we were providing 5 gallons of whisky to each evacuee. That was so silly. Naturally, the people would not believe it, but at the same time there were about four other statements made.

Now, that information, I understand, came out of the Dies committee office here in Washington, not from the Members of Congress.

I happen to know Joe Starnes. I called him up the minute I read the story. I asked him to come up. He denied ever having made any of the statements. He wrote a letter to the newspapers and denied that he made the statement. I asked him to repeat it and send me a copy of the letter.

I don't know where they got the information. I am told they got it from Mr. Stripling. That, I criticize. I don't think it is cricket. I don't think it is fair to the American public. I don't think it is good procedure, and I don't think you do either, gentlemen.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I just want you to have it clear that you are not indiscriminately grouping together everybody that is responsible.

Mr. MYER. You are right now.

Mr. EBERHARTER. So that the public does not have clearly in mind whom you are criticizing.

Mr. MYER. I agree. I get your point. My major criticism is of the representatives of this committee who have released information to the press, not during hearings but information which has been untrue even before the hearings started, particularly the committee's investigators who have been quoted in some cases. In other cases, they simply quote a spokesman.

The only other criticism I have I believe was the criticism of the fact that we were not entitled to sit in at the Los Angeles hearing so that we would know what was going on at the time; so that we would have had an even break with the press.

I recall one other story about that. Congressman Thomas made some statement that I checked him on. I have written him about it. It has been an open letter to the press, and that is one of the reasons I referred to it here today.

So far as I know, at the moment, I do not recall other statements by members of the committee, and certainly there are some members of the committee that have never made any statement that I know of, and I appreciate the fact that they are trying to hold hearings of this type, and I appreciate the fact that you are giving me what I con-

sider a fair and open, square break to get the facts before the public today. I appreciate it.

Mr. COSTELLO. Had your telegram to me been worded differently, I think it might have accomplished its purpose.

Mr. MYER. I am sorry.

Mr. COSTELLO. If your theory was to have Mr. Cozzens sit down as auditor, to listen to the hearing, and so forth, I am sure that a wire would have come back to you inviting him to do so.

Mr. MYER. I am sorry. I was irked, that is all.

Mr. COSTELLO. The implication was that his being brought down was simply for the purpose of checking any news releases or other releases that might come out of the hearing, was it not?

Mr. MYER. I had no such intent.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee would have liked to have you there as the representative of W. R. A. and to hear what was going on.

Mr. MYER. Naturally, I am not interested in censoring the press, and I want to make that perfectly clear for about the third time today, and I am glad that the question came up so that we can clear the air on that particular fact, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think, in view of the lateness of the hour, we had better adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10:30.

Mr. MYER. Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10:30 a. m., Wednesday, July 7, 1943.)



# INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1943

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE,  
TO INVESTIGATE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,  
*Washington, D. C.*

The subcommittee met at 10:20 a. m. in room 1301, House Office Building, the Honorable John M. Costello, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Hon. John M. Costello, Hon. Noah M. Mason, Hon. Karl E. Mundt, Hon. Herman P. Eberharter, Hon. Wirt Courtney, and Hon. J. Parnell Thomas.

Also present: Robert E. Stripling, chief investigator, and J. B. Matthews, director of research, for the committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will please come to order.

We still have Mr. Myer on the stand this morning.

Mr. Stripling, you may proceed.

## STATEMENT OF DILLON S. MYER—Recalled

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Myer, you are familiar with an organization known as the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir; I am very familiar with it.

Mr. STRIPLING. On June 11 the committee obtained the records of the Japanese American Citizens League from its headquarters in Washington, D. C., by service of a subpoena duces tecum.

In these records are numerous references to you in the form of reports which were made by a man by the name of Mike Masaoka to his national headquarters.

How many times have you met Mr. Masaoka personally, that you know of?

Mr. MYER. Well, I would not attempt to keep track of the times.

I met Masaoka first, I think, in July of 1942, or thereabouts; shortly after I became Director of the War Relocation Authority. During the time that he spent in Washington intermittently during the past year I suppose I saw him on an average of once a week.

Masaoka, as was true with Kanazawa, not only served the Japanese American Citizens League as their representative here but they served as reporters for their paper, The Pacific Citizen, at Salt Lake City, and they came in rather regularly to see whether there was news of the program in which they were very interested, that they might send to their paper at Salt Lake.

Mr. STRIPLING. What is your understanding as to the size of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MYER. I have no information as to the membership in the citizens league, other than what I have seen in Masaoka's reports, but his information is much better than mine on that.

I have made no investigation as to the actual membership of the league. I had no reason for doing so.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did he ever represent to you the size of the organization?

Mr. MYER. I don't remember that he ever made a statement to me as to the size of the organization.

Mr. MATTHEWS. To what do you refer when you say "in Masaoka's reports"?

Mr. MYER. The reports that he is referring to here.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have you seen the reports?

Mr. MYER. I have seen copies of some of these reports.

Mr. STRIPLING. You spoke of Joe Kanazawa. You have reference to Mr. Kanazawa who was the eastern representative of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did Masaoka turn these reports over to you himself?

Mr. MYER. No, he did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How did you obtain these reports?

Mr. MYER. Is it essential that I answer that question?

Mr. STRIPLING. I think it is very pertinent, Mr. Chairman, that the witness advise the committee how he obtained copies of these reports.

Mr. MYER. I requested copies of these reports from the office of the Japanese American Citizens League at Salt Lake City so that I might know what was in the files, and they supplied them to me in view of the fact that there were statements being made in the press as to what was reported.

And I have read the reports rather completely. I am not sure that I read all of them because I am not sure that I have everything that you folks have in the files here.

Mr. STRIPLING. In view of that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a paragraph of one of the reports dated September 19, 1942, from Mr. Masaoka to the national headquarters under the heading "Strictly confidential." [Reading]:

Myer put this up to me directly and pointedly. He said that he and his staff deals with us on the same basis of confidence and mutual trust as they do among themselves. Up to now, I have been permitted to sit down and discuss every major policy before it was finally passed on. Up to now, no confidence has been betrayed. Up to now, we have worked and cooperated with them to a fine degree. The War Relocation Authority desires to continue that fine relationship and will continue to do so as long as confidential matters are kept in confidence and as we sincerely try to cooperate with them on the improvement of conditions. He is afraid that certain guys in Congress would jump down their collective throats if they could only imagine a part of the part which we play in forming War Relocation Authority policy; too, he desires that nothing is made public except through his office and at the proper time. He is a great believer in proper timing as the keystone to successful announcements and their general acceptance. He has given us the directives and instructions of his department. They are to be held in the strictest confidence and are not to be announced to anyone. They are merely to serve as a hint to us of their policy—nothing more. If, in order to answer a letter, it is necessary to quote all or part of an administrative instructive, please contact me before so doing.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. STRIPLING. Just a moment. I have not finished.

Mr. MYER. I beg your pardon.

Mr. STRIPLING. Further in this paragraph the following is quoted:

Be careful, and that refers especially to Kido in Poston—for if Wade decided to get sore if he discovered that you had copies, God bless America. As a member of the legal staff, I supposed you see all of them, though, don't you sab?

The reference to Wade there is Mr. Wade Head, who is the director of Poston Camp?

Mr. MYER. That is correct, I presume.

Mr. STRIPLING. First, Mr. Myer, I would like to ask whether or not you have furnished to Mr. Masaoka or to Mr. Kanazawa the directives of the War Relocation Authority?

Mr. MYER. We have supplied to the Japanese American Citizens League, I think, all of the administrative instructions which have been mimeographed and available to anyone that wished them. They have not been confidential. They are public property, and they have been available to anyone that has asked for them, and I don't think we have ever turned anyone down who has requested them.

Mr. STRIPLING. I show you in that connection, Mr. Myer, a folder which was obtained from their files, which are filled with W. R. A. directives.

This one is numbered 33, War Relocation Authority, Information Digest, and sets forth "For the use of the W. R. A. staff only; not for publication." That is dated January 23, 1943.

There are several other reports here which have the same notation, that they are not intended for public use.

This one says, "For the use of W. R. A. staff only; not for publication." In the corner there is a pencil notation, "Joe K.," which I presume is Joe Kanazawa.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, the statement referred to here is not a W. R. A. directive. It is "Information Digest No. 31, of January 9, 1943," which is our mimeograph house organ, if you want to call it that.

Mr. MUNDT. How is that?

Mr. MYER. Our mimeographed house organ. It is simply a mimeographed sheet supplying information to members of our staff throughout the field; a boiled-down digest of things going on within the organization that staff members need to know.

It is not confidential in any respect, but it was not put out as a press release and was simply put out as information to the staff generally regarding the general progress of the program; nothing confidential about that.

It is not marked "confidential."

Mr. THOMAS. But it was put out by your authority?

Mr. MYER. Put out by my authority to members of our staff, and evidently copies were secured, and I see no objection to W. R. A. having copies made——

Mr. THOMAS (interposing). Do you see these before they are sent out?

Mr. MYER. I do.

Mr. THOMAS. So every one has your approval?

Mr. MYER. Well, every one up to recently has had my approval. I am not sure that I approved every one, because there have been times when I was out of town, and whoever was acting director approved it.

Mr. THOMAS. Is not that statement of yours just a play on words, though?

When you come right down to it, after all, whether you call it a house organ or whatever you may wish to call it, it was put out by the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MYER. These are news items; not directives.

That is the first point I would like to make clear. That is referred to here—

Mr. STRIPLING (interposing). And here is another folder which was obtained.

Mr. MYER. I would like to repeat, Mr. Chairman, that there is nothing confidential about these.

If you would like copies, we will supply them to you.

Mr. MUNDT. They are news items?

Mr. MYER. They are news items to our own staff on information that they would be interested in, but which the newspapers generally would not be interested in.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you explain this, Mr. Myer, and tell the committee whether or not that is a complete set of administration instructions—administrative instructions and directives?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I can tell by taking one look at it that that is not a complete set of administrative instructions, because this [indicating] is a complete set of administrative instructions, and this [indicating] is only a portion of the administrative instructions.

This instruction is dated February 17, 1943, Administrative Instruction No. 8, Revised Supplement 1, and has to do with the Japanese language.

Mr. STRIPLING. What has this one reference to?

Mr. MYER. This is Administration Instruction 15, Supplement 1, No. 5, relating to the handling and safeguarding of restricted and confidential and secret documents. There is nothing secret about that. It is simply a statement as to how to handle intelligence matters and other secret documents by the staff, and simply is instruction on that basis.

There is nothing confidential about this instruction.

Mr. STRIPLING. Why, then, would it be necessary to give copies of such interoffice communications to officials of a purely independent organization not connected with the Government.

Mr. MYER. It was not necessary; they requested it. It was public property and we supplied them.

Mr. THOMAS. Who else requested them besides this Japanese organization?

Mr. MYER. I don't have a list of those who requested them, but I will say we have had requests and supplied them.

Among others, we have supplied them to the Military Affairs Committee of the United States Senate in relation to the hearings developed there during January up to the present time. I think probably full sets.

Mr. STRIPLING. Will you submit to this committee a list of the individuals or organizations that have asked for such information?



Mr. MYER. I will be glad to, if we can find it. I am not sure that we have a list of individuals. I want to repeat, gentlemen, that we have supplied copies of these instructions to anyone who has requested them because we consider them public documents. They are pretty dull reading for most people, so there are not many that have requested them, I don't believe.

Mr. MUNDT. Were they supplied to the newspapers?

Mr. MYER. Not unless they requested them.

And I want to repeat, they are not the type of thing that would make good press releases.

Mr. MUNDT. I was wondering whether there was any special reason why you should supply them to the Pacific Citizen and not the other papers?

Mr. MYER. Because they requested them; that is the reason.

Mr. THOMAS. Who else requested them, outside of those two, now?

Mr. MYER. I can't offhand tell you who else requested them, Mr. Thomas.

Mr. THOMAS. You cannot name one of them?

Mr. MYER. The authorization—

Mr. THOMAS (interposing). Wait a minute; I have asked you a question.

Mr. MYER. My executive officer tells me that the question regarding whether it was a public document first came up last summer when the Catholic superintendent of education of Arkansas asked for them. I ruled at that time that any one that requested them might have them.

They were public documents, so that there was no reason why any request made should ever be submitted to me again.

They were supplied, as a matter of routine, to anyone who requested them.

Mr. THOMAS. Outside of those, can you name any others?

Mr. MYER. Not offhand; no.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Will you please identify the executive officer?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Leland Barrows, who just stepped up here and gave me the information.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You judge that the material which was obtained by the committee on subpoena, which contains copies of directives and instructions, is about one-third or one-fourth the number of instructions and directives that were actually issued by the W. R. A.?

Mr. MYER. I am saying, if this book is supposed to be the complete file of directives, it is not the complete file, because what I have just showed you here would be the complete file.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I want the record to show about what percentage of the directives the J. A. C. L. has.

Mr. MYER. Well, we can check that for you; if this is all that they have had, we can check it against our files and give it to you, exactly, but it would take some time to do that because there are a long list of so-called directives or administrative instructions there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Therefore, Mr. Myer, there appears to be in the record about one-fourth of the size of the official binder that you have. Would you say that was a fair statement?

Mr. MYER. I would guess that that was about correct.

And I might say that we supplied any administrative instructions which they requested.

The chances are they did not request all of them.

Mr. MUNDT. I do not see how an outside organization would know how to request administrative orders unless you had advised them each time you made an order.

How would anybody know what to request?

Mr. MYER. The request was made to supply them with administrative instructions as they came along, and I assume that they got all that they requested. I authorized them to have copies at any time that they came out in final form.

Now, I would like to go back to another statement that was made:

Masaoka talked about confidential information. These were times when Masaoka and Kanazawa came in that directives, so-called administrative instructions were in process of preparation.

It would take several days for them to get to the field.

I did provide information that they were under way and that they were signed and out. But we did not want them supplied to the evacuees through the Pacific Citizen before they were supplied to our regular forces. Their line of communication was sometimes faster than ours, because we sent them out usually through the mail, or air mail, and they could send them by wire.

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that the administration instruction referred to yesterday which was submitted to the Federal Register on September 29 and became effective as of October 1, I understand was wired completely—in its complete form, to the Pacific Citizen, because it was published in the Federal Register.

That went to the projects before our copies got out, also, and I happened to be in the field at the time, and I had a great many project directors complaining about the fact that they get information through the Pacific Citizen faster than they get it from us.

In that case, they did, because it was wired to the paper and put in the press.

Mr. MUNDT. Then, Mr. Myer, when these instructions, administration instructions and directives, were marked "Confidential" did that mean—

Mr. MYER (interposing). They were not marked "Confidential." They are not marked "Confidential." If you take a look at them you will find they are not.

Mr. THOMAS. They were not for publication?

Mr. MYER. But they were not marked "Confidential." They were simply marked that way in order to differentiate them from the general press release.

Mr. MUNDT. Then do you mean by "Not for publication" that they were not for publication until the time that they had reached—

Mr. MYER (interposing). No. What you are talking about here is not a directive. It is simply a news organ within the W. R. A. that was gotten out for a time in order to keep our own staff up to date with items.

Now, one of the reasons they were marked "For W. R. A. staff only" was that we did not want them published in the public newspapers for the information of evacuees because there were many things in there that might lead to rumors and speculation that was not desirable.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, we have had two publics to deal with, and it has made a rather complex public-relation problem.

We have had the public who were, on the outside of relocation centers, scattered throughout the United States generally, in the normal public.

We have had about 100,000 people who read and write, most of them, living within relocation centers, who are the evacuee public. Anything that we set out to be carefully thought through, from the standpoint of the rumors that would start, was not released to the evacuee press, and consequently we have been very cautious and very careful as to what we allow to be published in the press within the centers, and this was marked so that it would not be published without having a chance to check it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Myer, will you please clear up this point?

A moment ago you said that the information digest was marked "Not for publication" because the newspapers would not be interested in publishing it.

Mr. MYER. I think, generally, they would not be interested in most of it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And now you say it was marked "Not for publication" because you did not want it published.

Mr. MYER. I said one reason it was marked "Not for publication" I didn't think it was the kind of material—and if I said it wrong, I will say it again—the kind of material that the newspapers would be interested in.

I might say that our office—and I will say this to the press about the past and it is still true—is open at all times to the press.

We would be delighted if you want to read all these administrative instructions, to give you the opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, we have always had the policy of supplying information to the press at any time they requested it.

Mr. MATTHEWS. When did you get these reports of Masaoka from the Salt Lake City headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MYER. I don't remember exactly; I believe it was a week ago Monday. It happened that we were having a meeting of our relocation officers here and I got in touch with our man who was located at Salt Lake and asked him if he would not bring them in with him, which he did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And did you get in touch with Masaoka?

Mr. MYER. I did not. I have not been in touch with Masaoka at any time since these hearings started, that I can remember.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you get in touch with Kanazawa?

Mr. MYER. I did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. The contract was solely through the W. R. A. representative in Salt Lake City?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who, in turn, approached the office?

Mr. MYER. Later I have had two or three chats with Larry Tajiri, who is the editor of the Pacific Citizen and closely connected with the Japanese American Citizens League.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Have those conversations with Larry Tajiri been here in Washington during the past week?



Mr. MYER. They have, just as they have been with certain other newspaper people.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did I understand you to say, Mr. Myer, that you have not contacted Joe Kanazawa in the last 2 weeks?

Mr. MYER. No; I didn't say that.

Mr. STRIPLING. Did he contact you?

Mr. MYER. Joe Kanazawa dropped into my office on two occasions. He said, "Hello," and he asked how things were going, but I said I couldn't discuss anything with him, knowing he had been a witness, and he bid me good-bye and he left.

That was after he had had his hearing here.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did he suggest that you get copies of these from the Salt Lake City office?

Mr. MYER. He did not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do you know how many reports were supplied you from the Salt Lake City office of the Japanese American Citizens League?

Mr. MYER. I do not.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Was there more than one?

Mr. MYER. Oh, yes. I think probably most of the reports going from here were supplied. There was quite a group of them, ranging all the way from a year ago last June up until recently.

Mr. MATTHEWS. From your reading of these reports, did you form any new opinion or did you review your former opinion of Masaoka?

Mr. MYER. Well, I might say from the reading of the reports, I felt there were a good many places where Mike was rather expansive in his reports.

He allowed his imagination to run wild, occasionally, on how much influence he had on W. R. A. policy.

There were times when he was reasonably factual.

I might say, generally speaking, that I suppose that that would be true of most any man if he were promoting certain policies, and a policy was finally adopted, he is absolutely sure that he is responsible for the adoption of the policy.

I assume also, after having heard of some of the policies, he thought it was a good idea, or maybe thought that he was the one that proposed it.

Now, I would say that, generally speaking, there were many statements in the reports that were exaggerations; statements that I don't think were malicious statements, but were simply imaginative statements that anybody could make.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you discuss W. R. A. policy with him?

Mr. MYER. Many times.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Approximately once a week during the past year?

Mr. MYER. No. I discussed it with him approximately once a week during the periods when he was in Washington or in the East and was available and dropped into my office.

As a matter of fact, there were long periods of time that Masaoka was not in Washington. He was not in Washington, for example, from the period of about mid-November, I believe, until up into mid-April.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How did you happen to know that?

How did you happen to know where he was?



Mr. MYER. Because I met with the J. A. C. L. in Salt Lake City about mid-November, or shortly after mid-November. I think that Masaoka didn't come back to Washington until after he volunteered for the Army; within the last 6 weeks or 2 months I don't remember of seeing him here.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that at the time that Mr. Masaoka said you gave an off-the-record speech in Salt Lake City?

Mr. MYER. I presume it was. I did give a speech to the group in Salt Lake City and I also gave an on-the-record speech to the group in Salt Lake City at which the press was there, and I had also with the press here, on our leave policy, on our leave program.

Mr. MUNDT. Any particular reason why you should have given an off-the-record speech?

Mr. MYER. Excepting the fact that they were having an executive session there about their problems and wanted to discuss policy with me; that is the reason.

And I authorized that part, or discussed it with him, as I would with anyone interested in the policy, and had a right to discuss policy.

Mr. MATTHEWS. I do not think I got an answer to the question as to how you knew that Mike Masaoka was not in Washington from sometime in November until this spring.

How did you happen to know that he was not here?

You said you were in Salt Lake City in November, but that would not answer the question.

Mr. MYER. I said I know that he did not come back here until after he was inducted into the Army in April.

Mr. MATTHEWS. How do you know he did not come back?

Mr. MYER. Because Kanazawa was representing the League here during that whole period.

Mr. MATTHEWS. And he told you Masaoka was not here?

Mr. MYER. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, then, you had weekly conferences?

Mr. MYER. Not necessarily.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Well, you said approximately once a week.

Mr. MYER. Approximately; yes.

Mr. MATTHEWS. With either Masaoka or Kanazawa during the past year; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. That is correct; when I was in Washington. There were times when I was in the field as long as a month at a time and did not see either one of them, of course; but the reason I say "once a week" is that they usually came in in time to pick up any news that might be of interest to the Pacific Citizen before the Citizen went to press, so that they could wire the Citizen in time to get the news in the press, if we had any news to give.

They are one group that had a definite interest in the news of W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. Were those conferences always at the instigation of either Mr. Kanazawa or Mr. Masaoka, or would you call them up sometimes?

Mr. MYER. No; they were always at their request.

Mr. MUNDT. Always at their request?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go into detail on this particular paragraph which I just read:

He said that he and his staff deals with us on the same basis of confidence and mutual trust as they do among themselves.

Is that statement correct?

Mr. MYER. I don't think that statement is correct.

Mr. STRIPLING [reading]:

Up to now I have been permitted to sit down and discuss every major policy before it was finally passed on.

Is that correct?

Mr. MYER. That is not correct.

Mr. STRIPLING [reading]:

Up to now no confidence has been betrayed.

Mr. MYER. So far as I know, there was no confidence betrayed regarding those items which I mentioned, which were discussed with them previous to the time they were received in the field, which was our major concern in making this statement.

I want to repeat that the only reason that that statement was made—and I remember distinctly making it—was that we did not want reports going to our staff and to evacuees by the J. A. C. L. on policies that were in the making and which had been approved before the mail and the telegrams could carry them to the field, and we would have it go directly.

Mr. STRIPLING. I will read further:

Up to now we have worked and cooperated with them to a fine degree.

Is that correct?

Mr. MYER. We have had a very good relationship with the Japanese American Citizens League generally; yes, sir.

Mr. STRIPLING (reading):

He is afraid that certain guys in Congress would jump down their collective throats if they could only imagine a part of the part which we play in forming War Relocation Authority policy.

Mr. MYER. That is pure imagination on Masaoka's part, I would say. I made no such statement.

Mr. STRIPLING (reading):

He has given us the directives and instructions of his department.

Is that correct?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. I have already stated that I have provided to anyone who requested them, including the Japanese American Citizens League, administrative instructions which have been mimeographed and sent out all over the country as fast as they were available, and if they wished them.

Mr. STRIPLING. Why would he make this statement? [Reading:]

Be careful, and that refers especially to Kido in Poston—for if Wade decided to get sore if he discovered that you had copies, God bless America.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Myer, all of these instructions and directions were interoffice communications, intended only for the officials of W. R. A.; is that not correct?

Mr. MYER. No; that is not correct.

To go back to your first question regarding Kido, the only interpretation I could make of that, and I would not try to interpret Masaoka's statement excepting you request me to guess at it, would be the same thing that I have already mentioned; that Masaoka was warning Kido, who was president of the league, who was then located in Poston, not to be releasing information to the evacuees that should come from the front office, from the director's office.

That is the only explanation I could make of that.

Mr. MUNDT. When it states "for the use of the W. R. A. staff only," that is sort of a Masaoka type of exaggeration, then?

Mr. MYER. The report you are reading there is not a directive. It is a mimeographed news, weekly news digest, that was submitted to the directors in the field.

Mr. MUNDT. That is correct; call it an information digest.

Mr. MYER. That is right; it is not a directive.

Mr. MUNDT. It also says, "For the use of the W. R. A. staff only."

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. That is an exaggeration, is it?

Mr. MYER. Well, it was designed for the use of the W. R. A. only. There was nothing particularly secret about it excepting as I have already stated, it was not put out as a news release and it was not put out for the use of the evacuees.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did other private organizations or individuals obtain copies of that particular document?

Mr. MYER. I would have to check that. I think there were one or two other people who did request copies; Mr. Rundquist, for example—

Mr. MATTHEWS. Who is he?

Mr. MYER (continuing). Who was then serving as representative of the Federal Council of Churches and done work on the problem of relocation of evacuees with that organization, and has received copies, my reports officer tells me.

Mr. MATTHEWS. If I may conclude this, you stated that you did have this particular type of confidential relationship with Masaoka, namely, that you let him have some of these instructions or directives on the condition that he would not release them in the Pacific Citizen before your own officers had a chance to release them.

Mr. MYER. That happened in some cases because they were mimeographed here and he could get them more quickly than you could mail them to the field.

Mr. MATTHEWS. But were there other private individuals or organizations that obtained these administrative instructions and directives in advance?

Mr. MYER. I am sorry; I didn't get your question.

Will you repeat it, please, Mr. Matthews?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Masaoka got the instructions and directives, in some cases, you say, before your staff was able to get them by mail in the relocation centers.

Were there other private individuals or organizations who were in possession of them on the same terms?

Mr. MYER. I am not sure that there were; there are other organizations or individuals who could have been, though, had they requested them on the same terms.

Mr. MATTHEWS. That is all.

Mr. STRIPLING. Further in this memorandum, Mr. Myer, it states [reading]:

This last week has been an extremely encouraging one. It seems that Myer has returned from his west coast trip imbued with a new spirit and fight on the whole matter. He sees the problem now in three stages and not in two; Movement to assembly centers; movement to relocation centers; movement out of relocation centers to private employment. He believes that if the opportunity is granted to everyone, Nisei, Kibei, and Issei alike to leave if they want to, it will not only relieve the tensions developed in camp but make it that much easier to develop their own program. Frankly, he is ready to fight the Army itself on this matter of final authority.

Mr. MYER. I would say that that was another bit of expansiveness and pure imagination—the last statement about fighting the Army.

I want to say, gentlemen, that our relationship with the Army has been excellent throughout. I won't say that we always agreed, we haven't, but we have always kept our disagreements on a high plane. There has been no fighting. We have had an excellent relationship with the War Department here and a very good relationship with the Western Defense Command throughout this period.

Now, as regards the rest of the statement, I did come back—what is the date of this, Mr. Stripling?

Mr. STRIPLING. September 19.

Mr. MYER. I don't remember the date of the trip.

I would like to say, though, that we were not in a position to formulate our first major policies until about the middle of August, in relation to the relocation centers.

We had a meeting of our key staff members, including project directors, who were then project directors, and had experience with the evacuees in our west coast offices, and these people on the Washington staff, at which time we formulated a number of the earlier policies which are in this big book.

Those were issued during the latter part of August and up until through September. It was quite a relief to have many of these policies formulated.

For the first time, about that period, we were giving thought to the next step in the relocation program.

It is possible that I made such a statement as I am quoted in making here, as far as that portion which relates to the three major steps, because as I indicated to the committee yesterday, we started our relocation program with the group leave or seasonal leave in May.

It was speeded up during the summer, as far as seasonal leave was concerned.

We established our first indefinite leave policy in July.

We were at that time almost ready to issue the revised leave policies, which were published in the Federal Register as of September 29, but effective October 1, which was discussed in some detail yesterday; so the chances are we did have some discussion about that general policy at that time.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Do the policies, as outlined in Masaoka's report involving these three steps, appear essentially in that Federal Register?

Mr. MYER. Will you read that question, please, again?

Mr. MATTHEWS. Of September 29?

Mr. MYER. Pardon me?



Mr. MATTHEWS. I say, do the policies outlined in Masaoka's report appear in that Federal Register?

Mr. MYER. The sequence is about right.

The movement from the assembly centers to the relocation centers occupied the period from about the last of May until November 2.

The peak of the movement was during midsummer, August and September in particular. We had a very heavy movement, and that period, of course, was very much taken up, to begin with, with recruitment of the staff, training of the staff, and we were putting our relocation centers in order to receive people, to get them established, and getting our policies set up.

The next step, of course, following the assembly centers was the relocation centers, and the next step was attention to the relocation program outside of the centers.

Now, as to the reference with relation to Issei, Kibei, and Nisei, I would like to make the statement that that refers to the fact that in our July 20 directive, so-called directive—we never called them that—administrative instruction, the indefinite leave was limited to citizens of the United States who had not returned to Japan.

The leave instructions which were issued in the Federal Register the 29th of September, effective October 1, did provide opportunity for anyone to make application for leave, regardless of status.

That did not mean that every one was able to secure leave, but did, I believe, give the opportunity for application for leave.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to ask a question at this point.

Mr. MYER. All right.

Mr. MUNDT. Because it was about this time when you were returning from the West Coast trip.

I have here a copy of the Poston Chronicle, Sunday newspaper, published in the Poston project, dated September 6, 1943.

Mr. MYER. Did you say September or June?

Mr. MUNDT. June 6, 1943. I beg your pardon. I will read the heading:

Research Bureau Survey of English-speaking residents reveals 63 percent to leave center; 66 percent to leave within 6 months.

It is a long news story, but in part it says this:

The desire to return evacuees to American life, however, is not a new policy of War Relocation Authority.

This is one of the papers we picked up, Mr. Myer, when we were at the Poston center last month.

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. (reading).

As early as September 24, 1942, when only half the relocation centers had been filled, Director Myer stated in a letter to the Attorney General—

I will ask you first, did you write to the Attorney General on September 24, 1942?

Mr. MYER. September 20th, yes; and the reply came back September 25. That was the letter I referred to and which I am to put in the record today.

Mr. MUNDT. I will read a part of the letter to you.

From the beginning of the evacuation program, we have regarded the relocation centers as places of temporary residence where the evacuees would stay

until arrangements could be made for their permanent relocation<sup>a</sup> in accordance with a carefully prepared plan designed to accomplish two primary results: (1) The relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry throughout the United States under circumstances that will enable them to become integral parts of the communities into which they go, with the least possible disturbance; and (2) the delayed relocation—with residence continuing in the relocation centers in the meantime—of those evacuees whose individual records indicate that our war program would be endangered unnecessarily if they were to be relocated at the present time.

Now, I wonder just what you meant by that; that you were going to release at a later date those evacuees whose requests indicated that the National Defense was going to be endangered unnecessarily.

Mr. MYER. I meant just this? That we have taken great care throughout this whole period not to release people who we felt would endanger either the national defense or the war effort.

The military effort and the military situation of course changes from time to time.

We have consulted continually with the War Department and with the Justice Department regarding military security and the internal security of the country, because those are the two agencies responsible for those two things; one, the military security, and the other, the internal security.

We have asked their advice at every major step regarding our program. Since no one could tell when the war would end and since no one can tell whether the war will end first in the Pacific theater or in the Atlantic theater, I simply made a general statement until such time that it would seem sound to release these evacuees.

Mr. MUNDT. This is very definitely of course contemplating the release from these centers of Japanese whose individual records, to use your own language, indicated that our war program would be endangered unnecessarily.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, I would like to make a more detailed statement on that and tell you why.

I have been sort of holding back all the statements from the Solicitor's office regarding the legality of holding citizens in internment in the United States, that I would like to read into the record, because it has a very definite bearing on our whole leave policy.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Myer should be called upon to answer the question.

Mr. MYER. This is an answer to the question.

Mr. THOMAS. And before he makes any other comment.

Mr. MYER. This is an answer to the question.

Mr. THOMAS. How long is it?

Mr. MYER. About three pages, double spaced.

Mr. THOMAS. I think he should answer questions without making statements.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to answer it if I am allowed to read this statement so that the press may hear it before this hearing is over.

Mr. THOMAS. Now, Congressman Mundt asked a question, and I suggest that you answer it.

Mr. MYER. This is an answer to Mr. Mundt's question.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is definitely an answer to this statement—

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. That you intended to release individuals whose records indicated that they would endanger the war?

Mr. MYER. This is an answer to the reasons why I worked that in the way I did.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may proceed.

Mr. THOMAS. Any other material in that statement of yours other than an answer to this question?

Mr. MYER. You may judge that after I read it.

Mr. THOMAS. I want an answer to that right now.

Mr. MYER. I am not sure; I would have to read it through first.

Mr. THOMAS. Then you do not know what is in the statement?

Mr. MYER. I do know what is in the statement.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, then, if you do, you can answer the question.

Mr. MYER. I don't know whether your judgment and mine would be the same as to whether it is germane, but let us read the statement and save time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Proceed with the statement.

Mr. MYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This statement is entitled "Constitutional Principles Involved in the Relocation Program."

It was written by our legal staff. [Reading:]

The evacuation and relocation program raise important questions of constitutionality. This is so because two-thirds of the persons of Japanese ancestry evacuated from west coast military areas are citizens of the United States, and the great majority of the remainder are law-abiding aliens.

It is the position of the War Relocation Authority that its leave regulations are essential to the legal validity of the evacuation and relocation program.

Mr. THOMAS. Are you reading this statement to the press or to the committee?

Mr. MYER. I am addressing it to whoever may wish to listen; both the press and the committee.

Mr. THOMAS. You are looking at the press, and I was wondering whether you were making the statement for the press or for the committee.

Mr. MYER. I am trying to read so that the folks back here can hear and you can hear. If you prefer, I will turn this way.

Mr. THOMAS. I think you should face the chairman.

Mr. MYER. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. May I repeat that last sentence? So that it will not be missed?

It is the position of the War Relocation Authority that its leave regulations are essential to the legal validity of the evacuation and relocation program. These leave regulations establish a procedure under which the loyal citizens and law-abiding aliens may leave a relocation center to become reestablished in normal life.

We believe, in the first place, that the evacuation was within the constitutional power of the National Government. The concentration of the Japanese-Americans along the west coast, the danger of invasion of that coast by Japan, the possibility that an unknown and unrecognizable minority of them might have greater allegiance to Japan than to the United States, the fact that the Japanese-Americans were not wholly assimilated in the general life of communities on the west coast, and the danger of civil disturbance due to fear and misunderstanding—all these facts, and related facts—created a situation which the National Government could, we believe, deal with by extraordinary measures in the interest of military security.

The need for speed created the unfortunate necessity for evacuating the whole group instead of attempting to determine who were dangerous among them, so that only those might be evacuated.

That same need made it impossible to hold adequate investigations or to grant hearings to the evacuees before evacuation.

When the evacuation was originally determined upon, it was contemplated that the evacuees would be free immediately to go anywhere they wanted within the United States, so long as they remained outside of the evacuated area.

Approximately 8,000 evacuees left the evacuated area voluntarily at that time, and 5,000 of these have never lived in relocation centers. The decision to provide relocation centers for the evacuees was not made until some 6 weeks after evacuation was decided upon, and was made largely because of a recognition of the danger that the hasty and unplanned resettlement of 110,000 people might create civil disorder.

I read 110,000; it is 112,000 here. That was the figure we had at that time.

Detention within a relocation center is not, therefore, a necessary part of the evacuation process. It is not intended to be more than a temporary stage in the process of relocating the eligible evacuees into new homes and jobs.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, right at that point, does that not in itself disqualify a Japanese from being released, whereas your statement here says [reading]:

delayed relocation—

not detention, but—

delayed relocation, with residence continuing in the relocation centers in the meantime—of those evacuees whose individual records indicate that our war program would be endangered unnecessarily if they were to be relocated at the present time.

Are those the evacuees whose individual records indicate our war program would be delayed unnecessarily if they were to be relocated?

Mr. MYER. This statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read again, and it is simply a statement of the W. R. A. policy; that we must be satisfied from its investigation that there is no reason to believe that issuance of leave to the particular evacuee will interfere with the war program or endanger the public peace and security.

Now, that takes time. We have been in the process.

As I mentioned yesterday, we have been spending weeks and months getting these records together, and getting a background of information.

Last September we did not have all of those facts together. We did not have all of the evacuees in relocation centers as yet where we could get the facts. It was impossible to get all of them during the assembly center period.

So we went carefully, as indicated by our July 20 leave—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). Perhaps the rest of the statement will cover that.

Mr. MYER. To continue [reading]:

The individual must have a job or means of support.

The community to which the individual wishes to go must be one in which evacuees can relocate without public disturbance.

The evacuee must agree to keep War Relocation Authority notified of any change of address.

Mr. MUNDT. Are those the only four?

Mr. MYER. Those are the general conditions of leave.

Mr. MUNDT. You set up the machinery in those four conditions of determining—and it will take time, — grant—over a long period of time whether there is anything in the record of an American of



Japanese ancestry which would indicate that he is dangerous to the war program.

Mr. MYER. That is our program; yes.

Mr. MUNDT. After this machinery is set up, this letter indicates that you contemplate releasing him, whether he is qualified under your machinery or not, because it says this, and this is your own language, because it says:

The delayed relocation—  
not “the detention”—

the delayed relocation with residence continuing in relocation centers in the meantime—of those evacuees whose individual records indicate that our war program would be endangered unnecessarily if they were to be relocated at the present time—

indicating very clearly, it would seem to me, that you intended to release everybody.

Mr. MYER. That may be after the war, Mr. Mundt, if necessary.

I want to repeat that your—we are changing the policy at every major step with the Justice Department and with the War Department regarding the military security and the internal security of the country.

We are asking them to advise us at different stages as to what is safe now as compared to what was safe a year ago.

I think you will agree with our fleet back in operation, a lot of which was knocked out at Pearl Harbor, that we are in a slightly different position today. We are getting on the offensive now.

But it is up to the War Department and the Justice Department, as I see it, to advise us whether or not the internal security or the military security changes, so I have left that open, to advise with them from time to time.

Mr. MUNDT. Then the War Department and the Justice Department actually determine your release policies; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. They determine it in part. We consult with them in relation to that policy, as I have already indicated, and we consult from time to time as the different stages of the program develop.

I have left that question open so that we could take it up.

I will say this, from the standpoint of the United States, as a whole, if it is safe for people to go about their business in the meantime, I think it will save the Government money and a great deal of trouble and maybe a more intensive race problem, after the war, if we could be assured by the military and by the Justice Department it would be safe to relocate all these people after the war is over and after the military effort is such that it is indicated that we do not need to concern ourselves about it.

But that will be a matter for them to determine with us, Mr. Mundt.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, I would like to know whether it is your policy or the War Department policy, or the Department of Justice policy, which developed this rather unique theory which you were discussing yesterday, which you say now operates to the effect that a bad Japanese in Baltimore or Boston is a good Japanese in Chicago or Omaha.

Is that a policy of the War Department or a policy of the Department of Justice, would you say?

Mr. MYER. I thought I explained that pretty thoroughly yesterday.

Mr. MUNDT. But not very clearly.

Mr. MYER. I explained that we deferred to General Drum's wishes, without any proclamation on his part whatsoever, to have all cases of people who wanted to relocate within the Eastern Defense Command referred to the Joint Japanese-American Board, before we released them directly to come in here, except in special cases by agreement.

Now, let me say that that is simply deferment to General Drum's wishes under a gentlemen's agreement. It was made away last summer; we have stayed with it without any legal provision involved in it and without any regulation being issued in relation to it.

Mr. MUNDT. That part is very clear.

Mr. MYER. That is the only reason that there is that difference.

Mr. MUNDT. That is a very happy relationship insofar as General Drum is concerned and the Eastern Defense Command, but I wonder whose idea it is that after a man has been rejected by this Japanese-American Board, that he is still eligible for Chicago, Omaha, or the Middle West.

Mr. MYER. I made it very clear yesterday, Mr. Congressman, and I will make it clear again.

We have accepted full responsibility, after having the facts from the Intelligence Agency, and all the other information we can get for who goes out on indefinite leave throughout the country.

Mr. MUNDT. And for permitting those who have been released by this Board to remain?

Mr. MYER. Correct.

Mr. MUNDT. All right.

Mr. MYER. I thought I had made that clear yesterday; I am sorry.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I just want to ask a question with respect to the policy as provided in this document.

You say here "delayed relocation." That means, in effect, delayed resettlement.

Mr. MYER. Outside of the centers.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Outside of the centers?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. EBERHARTER. By "delayed" you mean that they are not going to be released immediately; is that what you mean?

Mr. MYER. We have hesitated, gentleman, to ever say, up to this time, that we have denied leave to anyone for the reason that I am reading here, that we feel we are on shaky legal grounds in relation to habeas corpus cases, and we have talked about "delay" rather than "deny."

That helps to answer your question, I think.

Now, I would like to finish this general statement because it does have a bearing on the whole situation. [Reading]:

The War Relocation Authority is denying indefinite leave to those evacuees who request repatriation or expatriation to Japan or who have answered in the negative, or refused to answer at all, a direct question as to their loyalty to the United States, or against whom the Intelligence agencies or War Relocation Authority records supply direct evidence of disloyalty or subversiveness.

The great majority of the evacuees fall into none of these classes, and are thus eligible to leave under the Authority's regulations.

On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in the case of *Gordon Hirabayashi v. United States*. Hirabayashi had

been convicted of violating both the curfew orders and the evacuation orders applicable to Japanese Americans.

The Court held that the curfew was a valid exercise of the war power. Although the question of the validity of the evacuation orders was directly presented to the Court in that case, the Court did not decide that question.

There is evidence in the majority and concurring opinions of the Court in the *Hirabayashi* case that, although it found the curfew to be valid, it believed the evacuation orders present difficult questions of constitutional power, and detention within a relocation center even more difficult questions.

Mr. Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion, said concerning the curfew orders: "In my opinion this goes to the very brink of constitutional power."

Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, said: "Detention for reasonable cause is one thing. Detention on account of ancestry is another. \* \* \* Obedience to the military orders is one thing. Whether an individual member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that, being loyal, he should be reclassified is a wholly different question. \* \* \* But if it were plain that no machinery was available whereby the individual could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified, questions of a more serious character would be presented. The United States, however, takes no such position."

The Chief Justice, in the majority opinion, was careful to point out that the Court was limiting its decision to the curfew orders and was not considering the evacuation orders or confinement in a relocation center.

More than a year has passed since evacuation was begun. During this year we have, of course, had time to make necessary investigations and to begin the process of considering the evacuees on an individual basis.

The leave regulations are intended to provide the due process and hearing which fair dealing, democratic procedures, and the American Constitution all require.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Have you any additional copies of that statement?

Mr. MYER. Yes. I have additional copies. We will be glad to supply you with all you want.

Mr. Chairman, while we are on that particular point, and since it was requested yesterday that I supply for the record Attorney General Biddle's statement, I would like to supply at this moment two or three items on this particular phase—

Mr. THOMAS (interposing). Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MYER. May I finish just this statement?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Mr. MYER. I was requested to supply a letter to Mr. McCloy with attached memorandum which, incidentally, was sent to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House on June 15, reviewing the policies in relation to leave, which I am not going to read now, but I want to note in this—well, I would like to read a portion of it, which was read to Mr. McCloy over the phone, and which he has approved and which is indicated by my file, if I can find the exact item.

I am sorry. Anyhow, the statement is this, that the War Department has approved the program from the standpoint of the military security of the country, and it is a part of the record, and you may read it, if you wish, and if you want me to take the time I will do it.

My letter to Mr. McCloy is this:

Attached is a copy of my letter of June 15 to Representative Clarence Cannon, which I read to you over the telephone this morning, and which you approved in line with the facts. This copy is for your files.

This is a copy of my letter to Mr. McCloy of June 16, and a copy of a memorandum to the Honorable Clarence Cannon of June 15, review-



ing the leave program and pointing out that it had been approved by the War Department, the Justice Department, and other agencies.

(The letters referred to are contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is there a letter from the War Department saying that they approved it?

Mr. MYER. No. This is simply a confirming statement that he did approve my memorandum, which has in it the statement that the War Department had approved it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. The statement was made by Mr. McCloy?

Mr. MYER. I believe I told you yesterday that this is what I had: I had no letter from Mr. McCloy, but I did have his approval over the telephone confirming it, with a copy sent to him.

Now, if you wish, I will be glad to supply a statement from him that it was in light of the facts.

Mr. EBERHARTER. And that he approved it.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I would like to have that in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUNDT. Are you a lawyer?

Mr. MYER. I am not; no, sir.

That was drawn up by our solicitor.

Mr. MUNDT. I thought it was. It is a pretty impressive legal argument.

Mr. MYER. It was drawn by the Solicitor of the War Department.

Mr. MUNDT. Between you and me, now, as a couple of curbstone laymen, do you not feel that these same legal arguments should hold equally well in Massachusetts as they do in Minnesota, for instance?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. I think so myself.

Mr. MEYER. We have no argument on that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. When was this statement prepared; it has no date on it. When was it made?

Mr. MYER. I don't know. The summary of an earlier statement of policy was made within the last 2 or 3 weeks.

Mr. THOMAS. What is the name of your solicitor?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Phillip Glick.

Under date of September 25, 1942, I received this letter and I would like to read it, before I present it for the record. It is from Attorney General Francis Biddle.

DEAR MR. MYER: I have your letter of September 24, 1942, enclosing a copy of your proposed leave regulations. Your letter requests this Department to check the names of Japanese who are released against the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Army and Navy Intelligence, and to make any further investigation this Department thinks desirable. Your letter also requests advice as to whether the proposed leave policy is sound from the internal security standpoint.

It is believed that the program outlined by you, if administered with the utmost care, is sound from the internal security standpoint. This Department, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would undertake to check the names of such persons against the investigation record.

Mr. THOMAS. What is the date of that?

Mr. MYER. September 25, 1942.

May I read that over again and get the connection?

It is believed that the program outlined by you, if administered with the utmost care, is sound from the internal security standpoint. This Department,



through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would undertake to check the names of such persons against the investigation records. Of course you have in mind that the information contained in our records relates in practically all instances to subversive activities and the like. Many of the persons involved in this program will not have records of such activity but may, on the other hand, be involved in other illegal or improper conduct which would bear careful investigation. Consequently provisions will have to be made by you to cover that aspect of the matter.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question at that point.

You say the letter was dated in 1942?

Mr. MYER. September 25, 1942.

And it is previous to the time that these regulations were submitted to the Federal Register for publication.

Mr. THOMAS. I have in my hand a mimeographed sheet that one of our investigators picked up in the Gila River relocation project, dated May 15, 1943.

Have you ever seen that before?

Mr. MYER. I don't remember seeing it; no.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I will read it to you.

(The letter referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, the Attorney General, I believe, did call our office. He said he had a letter from his cousin who was interested in securing an evacuee. That offer was submitted to Gila, as it was to our other offices, as would any other offer be.

It was not for Attorney General Biddle himself; it was on the personal request from a cousin of his from Bryn Mawr, Pa., as indicated in that statement.

Mr. THOMAS. That may be true, but why did not the cousin submit the request and not the Attorney General?

Mr. MYER. I thought she assumed he was very close in touch with things and that he knew better than she did whom to contact.

That is the only explanation I have to offer, Mr. Thomas. If you have any other questions, I will be glad to call the Attorney General and get the background.

Mr. THOMAS. I was wondering whether there was any connection between that request dated May, 1943, and the letter which he submitted to you dated September, 1942.

Mr. MYER. I think I can say, without fear of contradiction, there was absolutely no connection, excepting that we did have leave regulations that provided the opportunity for evacuees to leave the center.

Mr. THOMAS. Do you happen to know whether all of the other members of the Cabinet are going to make requests for those Japs?

Mr. MYER. No. I have not had any other requests excepting one from Secretary Ickes which has been well publicized. I think that is well understood, and I would say, for every free citizen of the United States, if they wished to make a request, we will do our best as we have, for anyone else, to fill the bill.

Mr. COSTELLO. The investigation made by the Justice Department was, you might say, a cursory one.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to read the letter again.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes; read it again, please.

Mr. COSTELLO. As to the check against their files.

Mr. MYER. I think I made that perfectly clear yesterday.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually there was no investigation of any kind made into the real background of the prior activities of any Japanese released.

Mr. MYER. First, I would like to point out that they agreed to be responsible for supplying the records that might be available, not only in the F. B. I. but the Army Intelligence and the Naval Intelligence, and that they reserve the right to make any further investigations that they felt were desirable.

Now, what they have done in all cases, I am not sure that I know. They have made investigations, as I indicated yesterday.

Now, for the last paragraph [reading]:

It is believed that the program outlined by you, if administered with the utmost care, is sound from the internal security standpoint. This department, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would undertake to check the names of such persons against the investigative records. Of course, you have in mind that the information contained in our records relates in practically all instances to subversive activities and the like. Many of the persons involved in this program will not have records of such activity but may, on the other hand, be involved in other illegal or improper conduct which would bear careful investigation. Consequently, provision will have to be made by you to cover that aspect of the matter.

I might say that I have discussed that aspect very much with Mr. Hoover, himself, in detail. We, with their suggestions and assistances, have set up records in our relocation centers.

Those records are checked in all cases before we make releases, regarding their activities that may have developed within the centers, and, where we can secure it, we get the background of whatever criminal tendencies they may have developed.

Mr. MUNDT. They have put a pretty definite mandate on you when they said "further investigations will have to be made."

Mr. MYER. That is correct, and we made it, and so far we have not had any indication from them that we are doing a poor job. They reserve the right to make additional investigations.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you enumerate the 1, 2, 3, and 4 different steps you have taken in response to that very definite mandate by the Department of Justice, that you make further investigation?

Mr. MYER. Before I do that, may I just give the indication what these letters are and submit them for the record, and then pass on?

The next letter is a letter dated November 27, 1942, signed by Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower Commission, endorsing, in general, the leave program.

(The letter referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. MYER. The next letter is dated May 28, 1943, signed by Chester Davis, now no longer War Food Administrator, but at that time he was Food Administrator, asking that every assistance be given in the recruiting of people for agricultural work, who could be released.

(The letter referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. MUNDT. Now, will the reporter please read my question?

Mr. MYER. May I refer to some notes here, Mr. Chairman?

While I am looking for those, I think I can be talking.

Our process in checking leave, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). Before you start talking, I would like to have the reporter read my question, so that you will get it specifically.

(Question read by the reporter.)

Mr. MYER. First, I would like to read a few questions in the basic data that we secure from each individual and submit a copy for the record, from a form that was utilized in connection with registrations in February and March that I referred to yesterday.

I will not read all of these, and I will try not to bore you with it, but I think it is necessary to understand the background.

(The letter referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. MUNDT. This is the questionnaire?

Mr. MYER. This is the questionnaire that every one of 17 years of age, and older, was required to fill out.

There are two forms, but the questions are about the same, so I will simply review the one.

To begin with, of course, we have the applicant's name, age, dependents, date of birth, citizenship, last two addresses at which you lived 3 months or more, sex, height, weight, and so on.

"Are you a registered voter?"

Marital status, father's name and mother's name, and their birth-places and their occupations, a list of relatives in the United States, and, if in military service, indicate whether selective or volunteer.

"Relatives in Japan." We ask for that in detail.

Education, through from kindergarten to college, and as to where their education was secured, whether here or Japan.

Foreign travel; give dates, where, how, for whom, with whom, and reasons therefor. That was pretty essential from the standpoint of business connections and generally connections with the Japanese Government.

Employment throughout the years.

Religion, membership in religious groups, membership in organizations, clubs, societies, associations, and so forth.

Give name, kind of organization, and dates of membership.

Knowledge of foreign languages. We have asked for a checkmark on reading, writing, and speaking Japanese: whether good, fair, or poor.

Sports and hobbies: types—

Mr. THOMAS (interposing). What has hobbies got to do with it?

Mr. MYER. Well, some of the folks think that sports and certain types of hobbies, if they happen to be of the Japanese culture, has a great deal to do with it, and we have utilized that as one basis for determining whether they are maintaining contact with Japanese sports rather than American sports.

Mr. THOMAS. If he is a baseball player, is he considered a good Jap?

Mr. MYER. Well, we have some people who think that a judo player is a bad Jap. That is not always true. Judo is a Japanese type of self-defense. We used to call it jujitsu.

There are other games that have been mentioned a good many times as being successful.

Mr. MUNDT. On the subject of judo, how much money is spent per month by the W. R. A. teaching the Japanese judo?



Mr. MYER. I think I can give you the estimate pretty quickly.

Mr. MUNDT. Just roughly.

Mr. MYER. I would say two or three hundred dollars, perhaps.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is that the total?

Mr. MYER. Under present policy. There have been times when more than that was spent but I believe that it has been less than that.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I believe it was one of your men, Mr. Townsend, whom you did not want to substantiate.

Mr. MYER. Not very well.

Mr. EBERHARTER. But I think there was somebody told us that there were 90 instructors at Poston at one time alone.

Mr. MYER. I think that is true.

Mr. EBERHARTER. They were getting \$19 a month?

Mr. MYER. That is true; that was a long time ago. That was a great deal more than we have approved in recent months, and I think very much different than now. I do not approve having that many instructors of judo.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you say it was about two or three hundred dollars a month at the present time?

Mr. MYER. Two or three hundred dollars a month, but I would like to recheck that for the record, because I figured it very quickly.

Mr. EBERHARTER. We would like to have you do that and put that in the record.

Mr. MYER. I will.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Why do you feel it is good policy to spend that much money in teaching the Japanese a form of military tactics, sir?

Mr. MYER. The people who are being taught are not Japanese. They are Americans, some of whom have become members of the American Army, and I understand we are teaching the same thing to the American Army.

Mr. COSTELLO. Americans of Japanese ancestry?

Mr. MYER. Yes; they are Americans of Japanese ancestry. Everybody in the relocation centers, except the administrative staff, are all of Japanese ancestry, except a few mixed marriages—married people that are allowed to be there.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you give your rifle practice on the same theory?

Mr. MYER. No; we don't. We think that opportunities for avocations of that type including baseball, and which ought not to affect the morale of people in the centers—they should have some of the same opportunities for sports and play that you have in supervised playgrounds in the cities generally throughout the country.

Now, generally speaking, they are paying for their own recreation. They are paying for their own equipment. We did provide, early in the game, some equipment to start them off, with certain types of equipment such a baseball bats, and this, that, and the other. We have a policy of not replacing those.

Mr. MUNDT. How much are you spending per month teaching the Japanese to play baseball?

Mr. MYER. I don't know. I would have to check that up.

Mr. MUNDT. Check that, because it would be interesting to see whether there is money being spent to teach them to play baseball.



Mr. MYER. I will be glad to supply a statement for the record, regarding the whole communities' activities program, as to the number of people employed, as it affects baseball and judo, and any other activity that might be tied in with the program.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not only interested in baseball and judo, Mr. Myer.

Mr. MYER. I doubt whether—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). I have a feeling that these camps could be well utilized to Americanize these citizens of Japanese ancestry, and that one step in the process is to sever the ties of old Japanese customs and ideas.

I do not believe in teaching them anything which has to do with Japanese customs and ideas, and to teach them at the American taxpayers' expense, such as a form of judo, which is very indicative of their Japanese culture and customs.

Mr. MYER. Would you suggest a law that they not be taught in the American Army, too?

Mr. MUNDT. No.

Mr. COSTELLO. I think the type of judo taught in the American Army differs very widely from that taught in the Japanese schools, and so on.

Mr. MYER. May be. I will not argue about that, but I think it should be.

Mr. COSTELLO. The Japanese game of judo carries with it certain definite ceremonials, which are eliminated in our own Army training.

Our system of Army training is confined more to jujitsu and the practices that go along with it, but the Japanese form of judo carries with it these ceremonials that are definitely linked up with Japanese culture and customs.

Mr. MYER. Not necessarily does it carry with it, the way it is being taught in the centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I do not know specifically how it is being taught in the centers.

Mr. MYER. It is being taught in Japan that way. I agree.

Mr. COSTELLO. It should be noted that the Japanese ceremonials consist of bowing to the Emperor and to each other and with definite instructions that have a peculiar significance, and closely associated with Japan, as a Japanese custom, and not American in any sense of the word.

Mr. MYER. All of that does not necessarily follow in relocation centers.

Now, as to whether or not there are any ceremonials, I am not absolutely certain, but it does not necessarily follow.

May I proceed with this?

Mr. MUNDT. I want to explore this judo a little bit, because to me it is one thing on which I think you will frankly agree with the committee.

I hope you agree that these centers, insofar as they inculcate anything, should inculcate Americanism.

Mr. MYER. I agree. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. I simply cannot see how you can inculcate Americanism by fanning the flames, teaching racial games; by going back and picking up some racial game like judo, and spending money to teach

people who probably do not even know it. You do not have to teach it to those who understand it.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). I can see how that mistake would be made in policy and you would want to correct it, but you apparently want to defend it.

Mr. MYER. I do not see where that is necessarily true that certain types of wrestling, even though it does tie back to Japan, might be considered subversive or un-American, if properly handled.

I think it might be turned to the proper use. I have checked that with certain experts in the field of intelligence, including one of the key members of the Naval Intelligence, because I became concerned about it myself, and he indicated to me that it was not necessarily bad. If properly handled, it could be good.

So there is a great deal more Americanization going on in the centers than there is Japanization, as far as our activities are concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, let us stop with judo for a moment.

Mr. MYER. You are intimating, Mr. Mundt, I believe, there is no Americanization process going on.

Mr. MUNDT. Oh, no.

Mr. MYER. O. K.; all right.

Then we will come back to that.

Mr. MUNDT. I read this paper and I think it is a very fine American program.

Mr. MYER. Fine.

Mr. MUNDT. But I think it is impeded and handicapped and circumvented, in part, by teaching them things which are definitely Japanese.

For example, you are also spending taxpayers' money in those centers to teach them goh which is a form of Japanese checkers, which we do not teach in the American Army.

Why do you do that?

Mr. MYER. I think there has been same money spent in community activities, in sports and games, of different types, including goh, but the——

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). But this is definitely Japanese.

Mr. MYER. Would you cut out Chinese checkers, too?

That originated in China. I don't think that games of that type are necessarily subversive.

Mr. MUNDT. Not necessarily subversive at all, but you are teaching them things which are part of the culture and the customs of Japan. There is a difference between that, Mr. Myer, and being subversive. You are perpetuating the tie with the old country, which we do not do in forming Americanism in any other game or in any other place I know anything about.

Mr. MYER. And we have no other game or place like the relocation centers in the world, that I know anything about.

Mr. THOMAS. I will say not.

Mr. MYER. There is no basis for comparison.

Mr. MUNDT. That does not justify the program, however.

Mr. MYER. No; it does not justify the program. Except to say that we have—if I may make this statement—we have allowed certain games

and certain types of activity that tie back to Japanese culture, because we have a mixed group of people ranging from aliens who, as I said yesterday, among the men, average 60 years of age, down to third-generation kids, most of whom are just as American as my kids, and I think they are pretty American.

Mr. MUNDT. Allowing them to learn Japanese customs and to spend that money to teach games are two different things. I have no objection to your allowing them to play goh, but I am objecting to you spending the taxpayers' money on it.

Why do you not teach them an American game like cribbage, or something else?

Mr. MYER. I don't believe any money is being expended in teaching those games at the present time. I admitted a while ago there was some being expended earlier.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you put in the record a statement whether or not there is any being spent?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you not agree that it is an unwise policy to continue it?

Mr. MYER. Sure.

Mr. MUNDT. Thank you. I have no objection to the fact that they publish part of these papers in Japanese. Why? Because some people cannot read English.

But I do object to this: In your paper we picked up in the camp down there, under date of June 17, the Poston Chronicle, which comes out in mimeographed form weekdays and in print on Sundays, there is this, to me, rather astounding announcement:

Adult education to hold pen class: A beginners Japanese penmanship class for those without any knowledge of Japanese will begin soon. Those interested are asked to register at the adult education office 210-13-A. Advance classes will be held at 309 mess on Tuesday and 326-2-A on Thursday, from 8 p. m.

I cannot conceive why we should teach Americans of Japanese ancestry the Japanese language if we are trying to make them American citizens or to Americanize them.

Mr. MYER. Here is one reason I can think of, Mr. Mundt, and that is that we have been requested by the intelligence agencies, in some cases to do just that, as a basis for developing people with a better knowledge of the language, so that they might be used in the Military Intelligence or instruction work; people who are working in Military Intelligence.

That is one reason that I would know, and I would agree with you on the policy, if that is being done without this other thing in mind.

I am in perfect agreement with you; I am glad to know about this. I will check into the case. I don't think we should be teaching that in centers unless we are doing it under that kind of a request.

Mr. MUNDT. I am familiar with your program, whereby we are trying to teach some loyal citizens of Japanese ancestry so that we can use them as interpreters; I quite agree with that, but to broadcast an announcement by anybody who does not know Japanese should be taught it seems to me to be a very unwise spending of the taxpayers' money.

Mr. MYER. I agree with you.

Mr. MUNDT. And also un-American.

Mr. MYER. I agree with you.

This is the first time it has come to my attention, and I will check into the matter.

Mr. MUNDT. All right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you know whether or not these teachers are being paid by the funds of the Government to permit these ceremonies that are connected with the ancient game of jujutsu, or judo?

Mr. MYER. No; there are no funds at the present time being expended by the Government to develop that kind of procedure, and so far as I know, there are no funds being spent to either supervise or teach ancient ceremonies of the type that you mentioned.

I will check the matter, as I have indicated to Mr. Mundt and make a statement for the record in relation to that, to be sure. I sometimes find that when I check into the matter, that policy is not being followed, and I would not want to be picked up on it without checking in some detail.

But I will check it and supply a statement for the record.

Now, to come back to this questionnaire for a moment:

The next question is—

List five references, other than relatives or former employers, preferably persons resident in areas where you formerly resided, giving address, occupation, and number of years known.

The next one is—

Have you ever been before an Alien Enemy Hearing Board? If so, give date and disposition of case.

Have you ever been arrested or similarly detained? If so, state offense, date, court, and disposition of case.

Have you ever been subjected to any disciplinary action since your evacuation? If so, state the circumstances and the disposition of your case.

Give details on any foreign investments.

Then it lists a long indication of type; bank, investment in foreign companies, safety-deposit box in a foreign country, contents, and so on.

List contributions you have made to any society, organization, or club.

List magazines and newspapers to which you have subscribed or have customarily read.

To the best of your knowledge, was your birth ever registered with any Japanese governmental agency for the purpose of establishing a claim to Japanese citizenship?

Have you ever applied for repatriation to Japan?

The next two are famous questions 27 and 28.

If the opportunity presents itself and you are found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the Army Nurse Corps or the Women's Auxilliary Army Corps?

This one happened to be the one with reference to female citizens. The other one says "Army" for the male citizens.

The next one:

Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?

Now, that question, I might say, in relation to allegiance, was changed shortly after the registration started, because by swearing to such a statement, those who could not become citizens of the United States, would become a man without a country, so we changed it.



I think the question was—and I will be glad to supply it correctly for the record; but as I remember it, it was—

Do you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and do nothing that would interfere with the war effort of the United States?

Mr. MUNDT. We have that.

Mr. MYER. All right.

Have you ever worked for or volunteered your services to the Japanese or Spanish Governments?

Have you ever registered any of your children with a Japanese or Spanish consul?

Mr. COSTELLO. When was that questionnaire submitted to the evacuees?

Mr. MYER. This questionnaire was submitted to the evacuees in most centers beginning on February 10.

Mr. COSTELLO. Of this year?

Mr. MYER. Yes. Previous to that time we used another form for our basic information.

We had much the same type of information in making our investigation for this known as W. R. A. 26, which I will be glad to put in the record, which supplied generally the same facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is that the one that was issued to carry out the provisions of the letter of September 25 of the Attorney General?

Mr. MYER. No. I simply give that as the starting point, to give us the basic records from which to start. This information does provide the opportunity for us to check against any facts we have in the record as to trips to Japan, the tie-back to other relationships, type of occupation, type of business relationships. That is all very basic as far as part of the pattern that is necessary.

In addition to that—

Mr. THOMAS (interposing). Before you go on, I would like to ask another question.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. You probably received anywhere from 107,000 answers to those questionnaires.

Mr. MYER. Seventy-three thousand, approximately.

Mr. THOMAS. Seventy-three thousand?

Mr. MYER. Yes. You see, we only asked for 17 years old and over, so it would be smaller than the total number we have in the centers.

Mr. THOMAS. Of course you cannot check on many of the questions, naturally, but there are some things that you can check on and one is the five references.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. THOMAS. Have you checked on those references?

Mr. MYER. No; not in all cases. We have, when we have any question, but I never utilized those as a basis for a check. Up until the time that these were filled out, and until we had this basic data, and until we began to get our intelligence reports cleared through for us, we did send to all of the references a letter.

I might say we have some 70,000 letters that we have not been able to get filed because of lack of file clerks. We used them at the time, but we have not got them finally filed; that is, those that came in in relation to references, so we did use them until the registration was complete.

The last 2 or 3 months we have not been writing to all the references. We only use references now where we want to follow up more in detail, but we have used them in that case.

Mr. THOMAS. I suppose you have investigators that check on some of the other angles; do you not?

Mr. MYER. Well, we check these answers, of course, against the Intelligence files, where there is any question whatsoever.

As a matter of fact, we check to see whether there is an Intelligence file.

Mr. THOMAS. Do you have investigators that can do that kind of work?

Mr. MYER. Well, we have field investigators in our relocation offices whose main job, I might say, is to follow up. The project is given the responsibility for investigation.

Mr. THOMAS. How many investigators do you have, all told?

Mr. MYER. Well, people that do different types of investigation work, that might involve some investigation—I think I gave a figure yesterday of 150 in our field offices, that might be utilized in that respect.

Mr. MUNDT. How many of the 73,000 people who answered the questionnaires answered "No" to question No. 27?

Mr. MYER. I cannot give you 27; let us take 28. About 10 percent. Let us settle on that.

Mr. MUNDT. All right.

Mr. MYER. That is female citizens. Now, there was a larger group of male citizens; about 25 percent of the Army-age group, close to right around that figure, that answered "No."

And I might say one reason that the percentage is higher, is because of the rather large group of Kibei. You know what that is, when people have been back to Japan; many of whom have come back here in rather recent years; that enlarged that group somewhat.

There is a rather sizable group of Kibei whose parents are back in Japan. They are one of the troublesome situations in the centers. Many of them become Japanized and don't talk English very well.

Some of them came back as late as 1940, I might say. Some of them are in Leuppe.

Mr. MUNDT. How many are there in Leupp?

Mr. MYER. I don't know how many Kebei, but the most of them are Kibei.

Mr. MUNDT. I mean altogether.

Mr. MYER. About 60.

Mr. MUNDT. About 60?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. And that is just a small camp; is it?

Mr. MYER. Yes. We figure that Leupp will accommodate 300 people. We have no families there. We utilize Leupp simply as a center for troublemakers who are not aliens, who are entirely within the administration of the center, or who we definitely find are interested in the agitation of subversive activities and who we need to put away from the other folks.

I mentioned yesterday, I think, that we maintain Leupp largely for our citizen cases, because we do not always have evidence enough to put them through the civil courts and prove to the courts that they

have been subversive, but we are having to take care of them on that kind of a basis, because there is no other alternative.

Mr. MUNDT. You have no other place where you can put allegedly subversive or disloyal citizens of Japanese ancestry except at Leupp?

Mr. MYER. We will have soon. We have had a segregation policy under way for several weeks now.

Mr. MUNDT. But you do not have at this time anybody else detained except Japanese aliens at Leupp, is that right?

Mr. MYER. Well, Japanese aliens, as I mentioned yesterday, and I want to repeat—Japanese aliens under our laws may be interned with no difficulty under Presidential warrant by the Justice Department, so that we have an agreement and have had, for some months, with the Justice Department, where we have aliens in the center, where we have secured reasonable evidence that they are agitators and are causing difficulty, and if we can get reasonable documentation on them, all we need to do is to supply that to them and they take them to the internment camp and we do not need to take care of those.

Mr. MUNDT. How many of those are there?

Mr. MYER. About 100, since the centers were set up.

Previous to that there were about 2,000 interned in war camps now in the hands of the Justice Department.

Mr. MUNDT. And you have about 160 who are detailed and segregated because of the suspicion of disloyalty?

Mr. MYER. Yes; and because of activities that interfere with the administration of and the peace and quiet of the camp and are trouble-makers. All those people in the Leupp group have gone into that center since January.

Mr. MUNDT. And the remainder of those 7,500 who entered "No" to this question are still scattered around the camps?

Mr. MYER. That is right. Those people, we hope, will be moved September 1 if we can get transportation to one center; expatriates, patriates, those who are processed through that procedure.

As I started to say—and I would like to repeat—that policy was determined on sometime ago. It is a rather complex matter. It involves checking with the military and the O. D. T. on transportation. We have not picked our time when it is feasible to do it.

It involves many other complexities, but we have definitely determined on a segregation program which will move first the expatriates and next those who have answered "No" to the loyalty question, and any other people we feel that are dangerous to the national security, to a separate center.

Mr. MUNDT. That will start September 1?

Mr. MYER. That is the plan at the present time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I wish you would have prepared this afternoon, to give us in detail, a full and comprehensive statement of any policy that you have determined upon, and any program that you have determined upon with respect to segregation.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Eberharter, I shall be very glad to even go into that now, into drawn schedules, if you wish, but I want to say—

Mr. EBERHARTER (interposing). I want to digress—I would like to digress right now until we have the answer to Mr. Mundt's question there, for you to set forth the various measures that you take with respect to investigations, before releasing these evacuees.



You started out with the basis in the questionnaire.

Mr. MYER. We did get off the track, didn't we?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Yes.

Mr. MYER. All right. Let us come back to it.

The second point I started to mention was that the internal security files are checked in every case as to the relation to our police records in the center, and any other police record that we can secure from the background; if he does have a police history in the center.

Our employment records are checked, the general record of the individual, throughout the weeks and the months that he has been in the center have been checked as to his cooperation with the administration, and his attitude as to whether or not he has ever said anything that would indicate subversive activities.

I want to repeat, in cases where we have question, we do refer back to the people where they have been living previously. We check the Intelligence records against all three of the records, through the F. B. I. and any other information we can secure from any source.

And, I want to say to this committee again, as I said yesterday, if there are any files of this committee, as Mr. Stripling indicated, of any dangerous saboteurs, we would like to have them so designated and put into our records so that we can put the stop on them at the projects and see that they are not released.

I would like to have that as soon as possible, with an indication as to why they are dangerous saboteurs, so that when we do put a stop on them, we won't be charged with having stopped someone who might want to bring habeas corpus under our rather shaky legal basis.

Mr. THOMAS. Why have you not asked that question of this committee before?

Mr. MYER. I have asked that question of this committee before, in a letter directed to Mr. Dies on June 2, 2 or 3 days after the charge was made, and copy was sent to you, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Costello. Mr. Eberharter, Mr. Mundt, and every other member of the committee.

Mr. THOMAS. The Dies committee has been in existence a much longer time than that, and it has only been recently that you asked that question.

Mr. MYER. It was not until that time that anybody on the Dies committee indicated that they had information of that type, and it was only when Mr. Stripling was quoted in the newspapers Saturday and Sunday previous to Decoration Day that that was brought to my attention.

And I think it was on Tuesday; I had an appropriation hearing on Monday—that I wrote the letter to Mr. Dies.

And I would be glad to supply a copy of Mr. Dies' letter for the record.

And I want to repeat that a copy came to you along with everyone else.

Mr. THOMAS. I admit that; but did you not think the Dies committee might have had something in their files just the same as the F. B. I.?

Mr. MYER. I didn't know.

Mr. THOMAS. Or the Military Intelligence?



Mr. MYER. If they have, I have not received it.

Mr. THOMAS. I cannot understand that. Why did you not get in touch with the committee to find out?

You did not get in touch with the committee until you read some adverse criticism concerning the War Relocation Authority.

Mr. MYER. I did not know at that time that the Dies committee considered themselves specialists or that they felt they had the names of saboteurs that they felt needed concentration——

Mr. THOMAS (interposing). You heard of the Dies committee, did you not?

Mr. MYER. Oh, yes; I heard of the Dies committee.

Mr. THOMAS. I know you heard about the Dies committee, the same as any other person.

But a New Dealer would not want to get in touch with the committee.

Mr. MYER. We won't argue about that point at the moment.

May I read the letter of June 2 for the record, and then put it in the record? This was addressed to Mr. Dies, as chairman of the committee.

I may add, too, that it was sent to all members of the committee.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you completed your list? We are getting away from this list now.

Mr. MYER. Since we are off on a rabbit trail, let me read it.

Mr. THOMAS. We have that also.

Mr. MYER. I want the press to hear it.

Mr. THOMAS. This letter is dated June 2, and a few days later you released it to the press.

Mr. MYER. The press?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Mr. MYER. No; this letter was not released by me to the press. I think Warren Francis did give it some publicity and published a little excerpt in the Los Angeles Times.

I didn't release it to the press.

Mr. THOMAS. I saw the press release later.

Mr. MYER. O. K.

May I read the letter, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. THOMAS. I think you are wasting time.

Mr. COSTELLO. If you want to read it, all right; but I do not see that it serves any particular purpose.

Mr. MYER. Thank you. [Reading:]

DEAR MR. DIES: I have noted in the press recently a number of statements by representatives of the Committee on Un-American Activities which have a direct bearing on the work of the War Relocation Authority, and have the effect of seriously interfering with the program which this agency has been instructed by the President and the Congress to carry out.

The statements have been so misleading to the public, and so fraught with errors and half truths that I am impelled to record my comments for your information.

Several of the statements have dwelt upon the presence of organized and dangerous pro-Japanese elements in the west coast population prior to the outbreak of war. No mention is made of the fact that the Federal Intelligence agencies apprehended several thousand suspects immediately after Pearl Harbor, and that those found guilty upon hearings have been incarcerated in internment camps. Instead the implication is strongly made that all such subversive individuals are to be found in the population of the relocation centers.

On May 29, Mr. Robert E. Stripling, identified as chief investigator of your

committee, was quoted in the press as saying that spies and saboteurs are being released from the relocation centers.

The charges were not supported, but nevertheless they unquestionably would have the effect of arousing mistrust of all persons of Japanese ancestry who are seeking to relocate.

Since the War Relocation Authority grants leave from its centers with the provision that an individual may be called back at any time for sufficient reason, I am only discharging my responsibilities when I request that I be supplied with the names of any persons released from relocation centers who are spies or saboteurs, or who have been trained in saboteur schools.

I suggest also that the names and evidence be made available immediately to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

In a statement to the press on May 31, which I understand also was made by Mr. Stripling, it was charged that evacuees in relocation centers are provided with foods of kinds and quantities not available to the general public. Except for the amounts of food on hand at the Manzanar relocation center which presumably were accurately reported, the statement was erroneous and misleading. The statement was made that "prime" beef was provided for the evacuees. The beef ordered for relocation centers is third grade.

The committee spokesman completely ignored the fact that all food rationing restrictions of the Office of Price Administration are in force at relocation centers, that the actual cost of food is approximately 40 cents a day per person, and the War Relocation Authority has deliberately refrained from purchasing certain kinds of food known to be scarce.

These facts were made known to the committee's investigators who visited the Manzanar relocation center and could have been quickly and readily confirmed by a telephone call to this office.

The Office of the President has just referred to me the telegram of May 19 from Representative J. Parnell Thomas, a member of your committee, urging Presidential action in stopping further release of people of Japanese ancestry until section II of your committee's report on Axis activities can be issued, and the committee's investigation of the relocation centers can be completed. In the absence of any supporting facts, we must regard Mr. Thomas' request as purely personal, and insufficient to warrant a change in the policies of this agency.

We have our own records on all persons above 17 years of age in the relocation centers, and we also have available to us information from the records of the Federal investigative agencies.

In the interest of national security we do not release any evacuee if his record indicates any reason why it would not be advisable for him to live outside a relocation center.

On the other hand, the manpower situation plus the constitutional guaranties demand that loyal American citizens and law-abiding aliens be given every opportunity to contribute to the war effort by productive work in normal communities.

Investigators for your committee have visited a number of the relocation centers, and have received complete collaboration of the staff there. We in the national office will be glad to cooperate fully in providing facts which your committee may desire concerning the policies and procedures of this agency. To date no member or representative of the committee has asked me for any information or has been in touch with any member of the Washington staff.

In the meantime, I hope it will be possible for representatives of your committee to refrain from making public statements concerning the War Relocation Authority on the basis of incomplete information. Continuance of this practice of issuing irresponsible statements can only lead to the conclusion that the committee has abandoned its assignment of fact finding and in this instance is devoting itself to the oppression of a minority. Such a course can contribute only to national disunity and hinder the war effort.

Mr. MYER. I submit that for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Now, will you conclude these points that Mr. Mundt raised before as to the investigation you were making?

Mr. MYER. I think I have concluded.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mentioned four points, I believe.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; four points:

1. This questionnaire which was submitted for the record;
2. The check of the police records of the Japanese in the centers;
3. The check of the employment record in the camps of the Japanese; and
4. The check of the employment record of the Japanese before evacuation.

Mr. MYER. That is correct, and any other source of information that can be secured from any place, I might say, gentlemen, the Dies Committee included, if you have anything to supply.

Mr. MUNDT. Those four are your total responses to the Attorney General's letter of May 25, 1942?

Mr. MYER. Those are the general principles that are followed in this investigation.

Now, I would like to add——

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). Wait a minute, now.

You have, since that time, in your supplemental statement No. 9, issued April 2, eliminated two of those checks.

You have eliminated the home check and the F. B. I. check, according to your testimony of yesterday.

Mr. MYER. In the meantime, we have——

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). That is correct, is it not?

Mr. MYER. Well, with certain qualifications.

Mr. MUNDT. Which?

Mr. MYER. I have stated before, and I will state again, we have not eliminated the F. B. I. checks where there is any question at all in relation to the record.

I think I read in the record yesterday supplement No. 9, which has been referred to, that involved eight points on which the project director must satisfy himself, including the number of stops of certain people that had a certain history, and we do have the provision where there is any question at all about the individual it shall be submitted here and we will check the Intelligence records and make the other checks, if necessary, before they are allowed to go out.

Mr. MUNDT. You also testified yesterday that the local project directors could release these evacuees.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Then if you subsequently, by some other check, found something wrong with them, you would pull them back.

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. So, so far as checks are concerned, you would eliminate the home front?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

However, I want to add that we have checked through the records now of the F. B. I. over 63,000 of these cases, and we have the checks on practically all of them at the moment; so that there is not much question about it, and those are supplied to the projects.

If there is any bad history there at all, a stop is put up.

Mr. MUNDT. Yesterday you were going to look up a certain matter for us; you were not exactly sure whether the home check had been made in the city of Los Angeles; of its employees.

Have you made that check?

Mr. MYER. I have not had a chance to do that, Mr. Mundt. Part of that is involved in some of those letters that we have not filed yet.



Mr. MUNDT. Let me read again the last two sentences of the Attorney General's letter, dated September 25, 1942, signed by Francis Biddle.

Many of the persons involved in this program will not have records of such activity but may, on the other hand, be involved in other illegal or improper conduct which would bear careful investigation. Consequently provision will have to be made by you to cover this aspect of the matter.

In response to that mandate, you instigated four additional checks, each of which was a matter of checking the record.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). The Attorney General says that does not suffice because the files may not have any record of that activity.

You check the records of F. B. I. He says that would not suffice. So you ask him to answer the questionnaire.

Then you say you check the police record of the camp, which the Attorney General says will not disclose even subversive activities.

And the fourth is checking the records of these gentlemen, and you are going to find out about that with the home employer.

Now, it is my feeling, Mr. Myer, with the Attorney General making that statement and with the general attitude of the people around the country, and our general knowledge of the fact, that simply looking at a record, you are not going to find the dangerous saboteur or espionage agent.

I think you will admit that some additional check would not only contribute to the national security but also to the protection of the loyal Japanese, for none of us are interested in the disloyal element. We want to protect the loyal men in the camps from violence and abuse and oppression.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, if you were so concerned, so deeply concerned about that, why didn't you ask Mr. Stripling to supply those who he says are known saboteurs, or their records, for our files so that we can check them up if they are out.

Mr. MUNDT. I think we submitted a list of names to you yesterday.

Mr. MYER. You submitted a list of names yesterday with no information; nothing excepting a list of names and their addresses, and asked us to check them against our files.

There was no indication in that list of names as to whether they were dangerous or anything else, except the addresses, and in some cases there were no addresses.

I have not yet—and I want to repeat—had submitted by this committee any indication of any kind, except through the newspapers; that they have information that is of any value to us and I will not have until it is submitted with the facts.

So I repeat, if you are so concerned about the policy that we are following, and our procedure, why don't you insist that representatives of your committee who are on the pay roll of this committee produce what they say they have in the way of evidence, instead of talking about it to the newspapers?

Mr. MUNDT. Even Mr. Stripling's list, Mr. Myer, is not going to include all of the potential saboteurs.

Mr. MYER. Does it include any of them?

Mr. MUNDT. Now, by your statement—

Mr. MYER (interposing). He did not say "potential." He said "there are many."



Mr. MUNDT. Actual.

Mr. MYER. Dangerous saboteurs.

Mr. MUNDT. But even his list does not include them all.

Mr. MYER. Does it include any?

Mr. MUNDT. I presume so.

Mr. MYER. How many?

Mr. MUNDT. I do not know. I do not know whether they are actual saboteurs.

Mr. MYER. Well, it seems to me that you, as a member of the committee, Mr. Mundt, might look into the matter and ask that we be supplied with those lists, with designations as to which ones are saboteurs, so that we can carry out our responsibility.

Mr. MUNDT. We have on our staff four or five investigators, and you say you have 150—

Mr. MYER (interposing). But Mr. Stripling was the only one quoted on that particular hearing.

Mr. MUNDT. What is that?

Mr. MYER. Except that his quote was picked up and requoted many times.

Mr. MUNDT. That does not answer the question whether or not you believe that something in addition to a record check should have been made in answer to the very definite mandate of the Attorney General under date of September 25, that he felt was insufficient.

Mr. MYER. I am simply pointing out in all other places we have secured information, except the Dies committee information, who said they had information, and who have not yet supplied it, and I think if they have it they have been remiss in not supplying it.

Mr. MUNDT. Have you checked up with the F. B. I.?

Mr. MYER. We have.

Mr. MUNDT. Well, we have checked it with the F. B. I. because the F. B. I. investigators have access to those files.

We are constantly in contact with them. So whether or not you know it, you have the information.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I called Mr. Hoover's office and asked them whether they had been supplied with a list.

They asked me to ask the Dies committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. The fact is that the committee is not taking their records out of the files and sending them around town, but the files have been available to the F. B. I. and their representatives have come down and obtained whatever information they wished to obtain, and I am quite certain any information concerning activities of dangerous Japanese that may be contained in the files of the committee's office have been available to the F. B. I.

Mr. MYER. Well, I am very delighted to hear that. That relieves my mind very greatly, because I have been concerned about the statement of Mr. Stripling since we had not been supplied with that information.

Mr. THOMAS. That is not the only statement you will be delighted to hear. You are going to be concerned with a lot more before you get through.

Mr. MYER. Go right ahead.

Mr. THOMAS. It is just a silly social experiment you are conducting.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Mundt, may I go back to your question?

We feel that up to this time we have done a reasonably good job in the administration of the relocation centers, in the administration of the leave program.

We have no apologies to make. We have made mistakes which we have admitted freely, when the opportunity presented itself. If this committee has recommendations to make as to how we can better our checks and still get the job done, in light with what you think is sound policy, we would be glad to have it.

I would like to have the committee keep in mind the statement I read this morning about the legal situation. I would like to have the committee keep in mind, in submitting names of people that you feel should go back to the centers, if it is decided that they should go back, that we want evidence, if they are real dangerous, because of the possibility of habeas corpus proceedings that might develop under those conditions.

Now, Congressman Thomas has a perfect right to his opinion about this being a silly social experiment. I have no issue with a man who wants to hold that kind of an opinion.

I want to point out that even though it was implied, that Congressman Thomas has not visited any of the relocation centers to our knowledge up to this moment, and all the information he has is what he has obtained here this morning and what he has gained from the newspapers or from investigations of this committee.

Mr. THOMAS. I have a recommendation to make, and that recommendation is made as the result of investigations conducted by members of the Dies committee in practically all of the camps.

This is just my own personal recommendation, and I would like to hear from you, though, what you think of it.

That recommendation is that we take the administration of these camps out of your hands and place them in the hands of the Army; what do you think about that?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Congressman, that is a matter for the Executive and the Congress to decide. I am perfectly willing to stand on our record. It will do no good for me to argue with you here, I believe, about the soundness of our procedure.

You seem to have your mind made up before this hearing was even started, and it certainly has been made up before it is concluded and before the facts are all brought before the committee.

Under those conditions, I see no reason why I should personally argue with you about your recommendation.

I want to repeat, gentlemen, that the matter of administration is a matter that should be determined by the Congress of the United States, or the Executive, or jointly, and I am not the one to determine that.

As long as I am Director of this Authority I am going to carry out the program as I honestly feel that it should be done in the interests of the United States of America, not only from the standpoint of the present program, but from the standpoint of the future problem that it may cause.

Mr. COSTELLO. Have you had any chance, Mr. Myer, to take that list of names and check it; the evacuees released from the centers?

Mr. MYER. No; I have not had a chance to get all of that informa-

tion together, Mr. Costello. I am sorry. There was a lot of information to be gathered up, and I will try and supply it later in the day, but it takes time to get it. When I got back to the office last night it was late and the staff was gone, and it was only a short time this morning after the office opened that I had any opportunity, so I will attempt to get some of that information together as soon as possible.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will stand in recess at this time until 2:30.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed from 1:30 to 2:30 p. m.)

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.

#### TESTIMONY OF DILLON S. MYER—Resumed

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, before we start the meeting, I would like to explain for the benefit of the record and the press that after the meeting this noon I had a conference with Mr. Myer and I had understood him to say that Mr. Hoover had stated that the Dies committee would not make available information in their possession.

He assured me that he had not said that; that I misunderstood him.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. And that the record, therefore, should show that the F. B. I. has always had, and has constantly had access to the complete files of the Dies committee, and keeps from two to three liaison officers over there all the time and consequently the information which the Dies committee has on the Japanese, and other subversive groups, is available to the F. B. I. and through the F. B. I. to the W. R. A.

And it is entirely conceivable that some of the highly commendable F. B. I. activities in the camps of the W. R. A. have emanated from the information which they have so acquired.

I think Mr. Myer and all of us are equally interested in having the record correct on that point.

Mr. MYER. I am very glad to have that statement, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add, if it had been made available to the F. B. I., in line with the statement of Attorney General Biddle, and there are any records indicating subversive activities on the part of these people, it would be the responsibility of F. B. I. to supply that to us as the basis for check against our files, and I presume that it is being taken care of in that manner.

This was the first time that I was informed that the F. B. I. had the records. I assume you were not just supplying names. I assume you were supplying the facts regarding the known saboteurs and espionage agents, as was indicated in the press, and I shall inquire of Mr. Hoover, by letter, asking if he has not supplied the names, that he supply those names supplied to him by the committee and by Mr. Stripling, in line with what was indicated in the press May 29.

I appreciate that very much.



Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Myer, I believe at the close yesterday, you presented a statement regarding the testimony of Mr. Townsend. I believe at that time you said there were about 39 points that you particularly took exception to in his testimony. There are 37 listed in your statement.

Mr. MYER. Well, I stated very frankly, Mr. Chairman, that I did not count them myself. I took somebody else's word for it. If I have been mistaken on the basis of two, I would be glad to have the record corrected on the basis of your statement. I think 37 is enough, and we will not concern ourselves about the other two.

While we are on Mr. Townsend's statement, however, I would like to clear up the matter that you mentioned yesterday. It was my opinion at the time that I gave this information yesterday, that Mr. Townsend did leave the project without permission of the acting project director.

On further check, I telephoned last night to Mr. Empie and he states it is true that Mr. Townsend left the project with his permission on Mr. Townsend's request for a 2-day leave to take his wife home from the hospital.

Mr. Empie said that Mr. Townsend, he thought, was going to Los Angeles, because that was listed as his home, and in another statement by Mr. Townsend made on December 1, he told Mr. Head that he had gone to Los Angeles. He had taken a car to Parker and gotten a ride to Los Angeles, which was my basis for the statement for the record.

I might have known better than to accept Mr. Townsend's statement. I am sorry for it.

As to the further statement that Mr. Townsend was not authorized to take a Government car to drive to Oklahoma, which he did, it was not known that this was done until the bills began to come in which he had sent back for gasoline and oil for that trip which he took on personal business, in a Government car.

I think that pretty well clears up this phase of the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understood that had been made a matter of testimony before the committee in Los Angeles.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have a copy of that statement before you; of the 37 points?

Mr. MYER. I supplied it for the record yesterday.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have a copy in your own files?

Mr. MYER. Let me see; I think I have a copy. I may have laid it aside, because I thought we had supplied it for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Referring to the first page there, in the second paragraph, you make the statement:

There is scarcely a page of this testimony that does not contain one or more false, misleading, or exaggerated statements.

When you made that statement, did you mean on every page of the testimony there was something false and also something misleading and also something exaggerated?

Mr. MYER. It means that—it means what it says. There were very few pages, if any, that did not have some exaggeration, some misinformation, or some false statements.



Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, every page contains all three of those items?

Mr. MYER. No. I think if you will read it again, it says "or," "one or more false, misleading, or exaggerated statements," Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. The whole testimony, for example, could be 80 pages without a single falsehood in it and your statement still be correct?

Mr. MYER. Yes; but you will recall there were 37 in the statement, according to our testimony.

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I thought I would like to check that up with you briefly here.

Also on the front page, you make the comment as you do later on regarding his testimony, as to being in the war. That also was cleared up in our hearing in Los Angeles, as to his activities, and it was indicated that he was a Y. M. C. A. secretary and not a member of the military forces.

Mr. MYER. The facts are that he was not a Y. M. C. A. secretary during the war.

Mr. COSTELLO. But he was over in France at that time.

Mr. MYER. Not until 1926; after the war, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not recall just what the hearing specifically showed on that, but the matter was cleared up by the various witnesses that appeared there.

Mr. MYER. I might say that we have documentary facts on that from every source possible, and we have complete documentation on it.

Mr. COSTELLO. On page 2 the statement is made:

On June 18, 1943, when the subcommittee visited the Poston center, the project director, having reviewed Townsend's testimony, asked for the privilege of making a statement on it for the record. The subcommittee refused to hear him.

I might state that at the time we started hearings in Los Angeles, a request was made for Mr. Head to appear and Mr. Head was not present at the center at that time; I believe he would not return until Friday of the first week of our hearings.

When we were down to the center he requested at that time the possibility of being heard. We only heard one or two witnesses there at that moment and had in mind the possibility of hearing Mr. Head back here in Washington. As a matter of fact, we wired to Mr. Head a couple of days ago, inquiring whether he might be able to be back here for our hearings tomorrow and make himself available on Thursday.

He said it would not be possible for him to be here, so I merely wanted to point out for the purposes of the record that it was not our intention not to hear Mr. Head, but we did want to make it possible for him to appear, if he so desired.

I would like to go through these different items with you now.

The first question was regarding the Army. I think we have cleared that up pretty well, with the statement that he was in the Army actually was false; but, as I stated, it was corrected before the committee out there.

The second one was in regard to his statement—in answer to the question, "Do they have a hospital in Poston?"

He said:

They have a very fine hospital, a very large hospital, modern in every respect, large enough to handle approximately 600 people and it is usually filled.

Your comment is:

The official rated capacity of Poston General Hospital is 250 beds with 120 beds available for occupancy.

I might state that the committee made a personal visit to the center and visited the hospital and went through it rather thoroughly; in fact, I think we spent more time in the hospital than any other single unit, so that the committee was not misinformed by his statement as to the size of the hospital.

We realize, of course, all through his testimony, that when he was testifying regarding matters that did not come under his jurisdiction, that he was not the proper man to give us correct information on it, but, rather, to get that from the head of the particular activity, the person who had direct charge of that particular activity.

As to how much food they had, he said:

We, by actual count, supplied 58 tons of subsistence a day.

Your comment there is that—

During the month of December 1942—the last month when Mr. Townsend was on duty at the project—the average quantity of food delivered to evacuee mess halls was 27 tons per day. The evacuee population in the center at that time was approximately 18,000.

Mr. MYER. Just half the amount.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is interesting all through the testimony that we had in Los Angeles, in interrogating the other project directors, for instance, almost invariably they made the statement that Mr. Townsend was inclined to exaggerate, but they also commented on the fact that he was reliable and, if I remember, they also made the statement that he was a good worker; that as far as his work was concerned, there had not been great complaint.

And I think you will find all through here, in the various statements, that almost without exception, the fundamental facts are substantially correct, even though he might have exaggerated regarding specific details.

Mr. MYER. Excepting for 37 misstatements, according to your record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. These are the 37 which you selected.

On page 2, item 4, he was asked this question:

The amount of the food and the type of food was determined by the W. R. A. in Washington; is that correct?

Answer. Largely so; yes, sir.

Your comment is:

During the period when Mr. Townsend was on duty at the Poston relocation center, supervision over the requisitioning of food by the center was exercised by the regional office of the War Relocation Authority in San Francisco, Calif. Since January 1943, similar supervision has been exercised by the Washington office.

It is quite evident there that Mr. Townsend was neither exaggerating nor falsifying, nor was he misleading, because at the time he testified his statement was absolutely correct by your own comment, that since January the W. R. A. office in Washington was exercising that supervision.

At the time he was at the center that supervision was not exercised in the center.

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. But through the San Francisco office.

Mr. MYER. But not by the Washington office.

Mr. COSTELLO. But in the main, the statement is very definitely accurate.

Mr. MYER. It depends on what you call "accurate", Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUNDT. I did not hear what you said.

Mr. MYER. I say, it depends on what you call accurate. It was not exercised in the Washington office of the W. R. A.

Mr. MUNDT. Who is in control of the San Francisco office?

Mr. MYER. At that time, Mr. E. P. Fryer, who was regional director.

Mr. MUNDT. Was that under your supervision?

Mr. MYER. It was a regional office. We had direct responsibility for the six areas at that time. It was not a staff office as in existence now.

Mr. MUNDT. They did not create their own policy, did they?

Mr. MYER. They did, up to a certain point; yes. During the time these centers were developing, in relation to these matters, and had the authority to do so in relation to some matters until the policy was decided here and taken over by the Washington office.

As a matter of fact, it was our major operating office up until December, as far as projects were concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. Then it is your position that Mr. Townsend was falsifying because he alleged that the San Francisco office was under the control of the Washington office?

Mr. MYER. No; that is not my position.

Mr. MUNDT. What is your position?

Mr. MYER. My position is that he made a misstatement when he said that it was controlled by Washington. It was controlled by San Francisco.

Mr. COSTELLO. But at the time he made the statement before the committee he was correct?

Mr. MYER. That is right, but he was referring to his regime at Poston, and at that time it was not correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. But it was not controlled at the center, and that is the information we were trying to get.

Mr. MYER. Well, the general policy was controlled there.

I might add that the rationing provisions which were put into effect in that area of the O. P. A. were in effect from November on, and if there was a waste of tons of food as charged by Mr. Townsend, it was because he was not following the policy, and because he was not reliable in handling his job.

Mr. COSTELLO. As a matter of fact, that was one of the things we brought out; if there was a waste of food, it probably lay at Mr. Townsend's own door.

Mr. MYER. I should think you would agree, though, you would not consider him reliable if that was going on under his supervision.

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes. The fifth item here refers to the placement of—

emergency food in secret cellars, under the mess halls for the invasion armies and parachute troopers.

I think we will concede that that was not a correct statement; at least, we did not find any food in the desert; maybe because we did not make a search for it.

Mr. MYER. It made a good news story.

Mr. COSTELLO. You also find this statement in item 6:

At numerous times we had these thieves caught, and produced evidence and information about the process of the entire thieving ring. The matter was placed before Mr. Empie and Mr. Head and Mr. Gelvin and the military-police authorities, and it was always stopped, because there was no way that they could see that we would be benefited by trying to prosecute them.

You make the comment there:

Records of the Poston internal security office indicate that Mr. Townsend made only three complaints about what he considered illegal activities within the project area.

I presume that the comment, therefore, is correct regarding that.

No. 7 refers to the quality of the food. I think we went into that very thoroughly out there on the coast, so that any statement he may have made, right or wrong, from all the evidence presented, unquestionably gave the committee definite information, and I think gave the public too, in view of the various news releases, a rather accurate picture as to what was done in the centers regarding food. No. 8:

Were the Japanese served ice cream at Poston?

Answer. Yes, sir; we had ice cream brought to us every day from the Golden State Creamery Co.

Then you have a comment submitted from the steward at Poston:

No ice cream has ever been purchased with Government funds for evacuees. Ice cream received at Poston is paid for in one of the following ways:

1. It is purchased by the community stores, using evacuee funds, for resale to evacuees.

2. Small quantities were purchased occasionally for the personnel mess during the summer of 1942. The personnel mess is operated as a Government mess, and its expenses are paid by employees.

This matter of ice cream was mentioned in our hearings. No particular importance was laid on it, because it seemed a very indifferent matter.

Item No. 9 reads:

Question. And milk?

Answer. Milk orders ran from 8,000 to 12,000 quarts of milk, homogenized milk, every day.

The statement unquestionably was reasonably accurate when he said there were between 8,000 to 12,000 quarts of milk used there every day, in view of the fact that they at least ran up to 9,000, and the average was around 6,000 quarts.

As a matter of fact, even if there were a total of 12,000, it would not be an excessive amount of milk.

The tenth item:

Question. And butter?

Answer. We had the finest grade of Challenge butter and other high-grade butter that we could buy.

At the time that Townsend was at the center, his reply to that question then was correct, was it not?

Mr. MYER. That is something that was not supplied to us by the Poston center. I presume they all buy butter; yes.



Mr. COSTELLO. The statement is that up to January 1943 they continued to purchase butter.

Mr. MYER. Well, that seems to be correct; that is right.

The implication is, though, that they are continuing to purchase the finest butter; but I was simply stating what the policy has been since January.

Mr. COSTELLO. In item No. 10, the inference was that they were continuing to do it, even though they had not done it after January.

You see, Mr. Townsend was testifying regarding the time he was at the center; so you criticize the statement in one place, because he is testifying to something that was subsequent to his being there, and now you are criticizing him for something that was done while he was there.

Mr. MYER. We reserve the same right as some other people, Mr. Chairman, to be inconsistent, and I am sorry.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then he goes into some knowledge, in No. 11, in regard to the meat situation, where he referred to the finest cuts to be bought on the open market.

I think we have gone into that rather thoroughly, that the meat supply in the centers, generally, seemed to be quite adequate, and the food supplies that were furnished the people were appropriate, and that the meat, as you have testified, was third grade beef rather than No. 1.

No. 12 again refers to the disposition of the garbage, and he went into quite some extensive statement regarding the fact that up until January 30 there was nothing done at all regarding the idea of obtaining hogs for the purpose of disposing of the garbage in that manner.

As to what was done with that, he made this answer:

It was taken—we would load it on to equipment and dig ditches and throw it into the ditches and cover it up.

Question. What happened with reference to the idea of feeding it to the hogs?

And his answer was:

Up until January 30 there was nothing done at all. About January 30 Washington wrote the director and asked him how many hogs they had to use the 9 or 10 tons of garbage that we had in the camp, and we had been out trying to buy hogs, but we had every hog in Southern California—through this same group that was building this \$25,000,000 corporation, we had every hog farm and every cattle farm tabulated, and we knew all the hogs available, so he had this hog man check the hogs, and at the time the letter was received there wasn't a hog in the camp. They then, without any knowledge on the part of the supply department, ordered in 200 200-pound hogs, and they answered Washington by telling them that we had 200 hogs.

I would like to enlarge a little bit upon that. If you know anything about hogs, you know you wouldn't want to start feeding 200-pound hogs. They are ready for market. They bought 200-pound hogs and paid 25 cents a pound for them. The same herd of hogs, as listed in the market, could have been bought for 17 cents a pound, and they were hogs that we were considering buying for butchering for pork. They were too old to be handled for feeders, and that order should have been for hogs that would have cost \$10 to \$15, to feed the garbage to, instead of paying 25 cents a pound. Now they have this number of hogs down there, weighing 300 to 400 pounds, and they are not fit for anything except lard.

Then your comment:

During December 1942, pursuant to a general policy adopted by the War Relocation Authority on December 3, 1942, steps were taken to establish a swine

project at the Poston center. Three hundred pigs were purchased January 13, 1943, in accordance with standard Government procurement procedure. The pigs averaged 145 pounds each; since then 325 more pigs, averaging 115 pounds each, have been purchased. All were garbage broke, double vaccinated feeder pigs.

The statement there of Mr. Townsend there was, in the main, quite correct, was it not, as to the disposition of the garbage?

Mr. MYER. It looks as if it were.

Mr. COSTELLO. There was some question as to the weight of the pigs at the time of purchase, as well as the price.

The indication was that 25 cents a pound was paid for the pigs at the time of purchase, although the committee was unable to get the actual facts from any other witness as to a specific price or the specific weights of the pigs.

However, prior to the purchase of those hogs, namely, from April until January 13, the disposition of the garbage was in the manner designated by Mr. Townsend, namely that ditches were dug and it was buried; is that not correct?

Mr. MYER. As far as I know, that was correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. The thirteenth item has to do with warehouses.

Mr. Townsend testified there were 180 warehouses.

Your comment is:

There were 90 warehouses on the entire project including 6 at the Parker railroad.

And then, the fourteenth item is:

Question. How many Japanese were employed in the warehouses?

Answer. Two thousand seven hundred, believe, in the—now, wait a minute. In the warehouses; no. I think there were—

Question. An approximation will be all right.

Answer. There were 680 Japanese and 4 white supervisors in the warehouses.

And your account is:

The maximum number of Japanese ever to be employed in the warehouses was 300.

Those employees were the only ones employed in the warehouses; those 300?

Mr. MYER. That is the statement that we have from Poston by the folks.

Mr. COSTELLO. That does not include any persons handling trucking back and forth from Parker?

Mr. MYER. All I know is what it says here, Mr. Chairman. We got this information from the administration folks at Poston, and are simply passing it on as we received it.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know whether that 300 included the employees who were employed in handling and unloading freight cars?

Mr. MYER. I do not.

Mr. COSTELLO. And putting it in the warehouses?

Mr. MYER. I think it does, but I could not be sure about that without checking the facts.

Mr. COSTELLO. Item No. 15 refers to furniture.

Mr. Townsend made the statement:

Now, as for the furniture, of course, the Poston development includes a very marvelous Caucasian personnel center. The plan showed 54 modern bungalows, and two dormitories, three stories, one for women and one for men, and the administration homes which would cost somewhere between 15 and 20 thousand dollars. There were to be four of them, and a beautiful park area with swim-

ming pools and so forth. And this furniture was purchased for that purpose, to furnish those. It was all bought from Barker Bros., and the prices on it were not reasonable. They were very, very high in consideration of the many, many carloads. We must have had, oh, at least 20 carloads of that type of furniture.

The comment is:

Quarters provided for the administrative staff at Poston include 8 four-room cottages built during the initial construction period by the Army; 24 house-keeping apartments of from two to six rooms in one-story barracks-type buildings of temporary construction, similar to the theater-of-operations construction found throughout the center; and 158 rooms size 7 by 14 feet in barracks-type dormitories. Each barracks dormitory contains a bathroom and from 10 to 12 rooms.

Was it the plan to build individual homes for the personnel in charge of the camp, at the center?

Mr. MYER. It was not the plan; it was proposed by the administrative group at Poston but never approved by the War Relocation Authority or by W. P. B.

There were, I believe, six buildings built by the Army at the time the center was constructed, but there never was a plan to build additional buildings.

Mr. COSTELLO. There were plans to put in better quarters than the temporary ones originally built; is that not correct?

Mr. MYER. Oh, yes; that is right.

Mr. COSTELLO. And that is what Mr. Townsend had reference to, because he said the plans showed 54 bungalows, and so on.

Mr. MYER. It is a little hard to believe what Mr. Townsend did have reference to, but we never had plans that showed 54 bungalows, so far as the War Relocation Authority was concerned.

Mr. COSTELLO. The comment goes on:

In accordance with the customary practice in public or private projects in such isolated locations as Poston, staff quarters are fitted with essential furniture. Furniture for the quarters at Poston was not all purchased from Barker Bros., but in fact was secured from a number of vendors, chiefly in Los Angeles where the purchases were made by the Office for Emergency Management.

You do admit that furniture was purchased from Barker Bros.?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then you end up by saying:

All staff members pay rent to the Government based upon the size and character of accommodations furnished.

Do you know exactly what was purchased from Barker Bros.?

Mr. MYER. No; but I think we could supply that if it is germane to the record. We would be very happy to take the time to get it. We would have to go back into the records to check it, though, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. It was our understanding that there was a considerable amount of furniture purchased that was not actually used and was in the warehouse there and was not able to be put to use.

Mr. MYER. I will be glad to check into that because we have been short of furniture in some other projects, and do what we can in getting it.

If you have any information to that effect, I wish you would let us know.

Mr. COSTELLO. Item No. 16 deals with matters stored in the warehouses, other than food.



Mr. Townsend gave this answer:

There were supplies and equipment of every conceivable type in the numerous warehouses. The Civilian Conservation Corps had sent in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment. We had warehouses that we moved the stuff into and locked up, and they hadn't been opened for months because it was just miscellaneous equipment. We didn't know what it was.

Your comment was:

The Civilian Conservation Corps has not shipped in hundreds of carloads of miscellaneous equipment. It is estimated that 2 miscellaneous carloads (100,000 pounds) would hold all the surplus items, such as tools. The Civilian Conservation Corps automotive equipment that had been received did not exceed, at the most, 10 carloads.

Mr. MYER. That is correct, according to our information.

Mr. COSTELLO. I do not know whether it is necessary to go through all these on down the line or not. There is not much variation to them.

There is apparently quite some question as to the trucks purchased in Los Angeles and we had a great deal of testimony from the various heads concerning that matter.

Now, you criticize his comment of the Kibei or the police force and the size of the force.

You went on to state that it was made up of Nisei, and then you wound up by saying:

A few Kibei were taken in to each of the police departments as patrolmen, particularly because of their ability to speak Japanese and to deal with some of the older evacuees who had difficulty understanding English. These men were picked very carefully and there has never been any indication that any of them were involved in trouble-making or subversive activities.

All the way through, as I read the comment you make on his testimony, it is very seldom that you actually have a falsehood set forth here.

At the most, there is exaggeration and it seems to me that instead of pointing out 37 glaring defects in his testimony, you have simply selected 37 items on which to expound your attitude regarding the center rather than to criticize Townsend's testimony.

Mr. MYER. That is exactly what we tried to do in those portions which you have criticized, Mr. Chairman, in trying to get the statement of policy into the record, as to what is being done at the center.

Mr. COSTELLO. In other words, your purpose, then, in submitting this memorandum was not really for the purpose of criticizing Townsend's testimony, but for the purpose of propagandizing and getting material into the record?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I thought this hearing was being conducted in order to find out what the facts were in relation to the administration of the war relocation program.

On that basis we submit this information for two reasons: One, to supply information regarding the policy, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to discredit the testimony of a man who told at least 37 exaggerations, according to your statement, if not 37 falsehoods.

Those are the two reasons why it was prepared; yes, sir.

Mr. COSTELLO. My purpose in going through this was simply to show, one by one, that actually they are not falsehoods; that fundamentally, the Townsend testimony is correct as to the facts contained therein.



As to the particular details, or the declaration he may have put on the facts, this he may have exaggerated, or may have dramatized it in his own way, but fundamentally, the statement that he made was verified by the testimony of subsequent witnesses.

He commented at some length regarding the police force at the center, and he was rather critical in his testimony regarding the police force.

As a matter of fact, how are the police equipped at the centers?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. COSTELLO (interposing). You might answer the question. How are the police equipped at each of the centers?

Mr. MYER. The police are equipped with badges, arm bands, night sticks, usually, and in most cases, helmets marked "Police."

They are not allowed to have guns. There are ample guns in the hands of the military police who are guarding generally the outside areas of the centers during the daytime, and are guarding the important living quarters in the area in which they live at night.

Mr. COSTELLO. You mean the troops enter the center at night?

Mr. MYER. They get into the area immediately around the center at night, according to the plan and agreement with the military.

Mr. COSTELLO. Actually, in view of the fact that they have an all-Japanese police force at each of the centers, in time of strike or riot or other trouble, your police force is totally inadequate and of no value at all; is that not correct?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a statement for the record as to what our arrangements are in regard to the military.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would like to have you answer the question rather than make a statement.

Mr. MYER. I will answer the question rather than what?

Mr. COSTELLO. I would like to have you directly answer the question itself rather than make a statement.

Mr. MYER. It is the responsibility of the military to guard the exterior boundaries of the area of the projects during the daytime; to guard the exterior of the important living quarters during the night, both as to people who go in and come out of the center.

It is also their responsibility when called upon by the War Relocation Authority, when trouble arises, to come into the center, and when they do, they take charge.

The rest of the responsibility for the internal security of the program is a War Relocation Authority responsibility.

We have a policy in effect that provides that there shall be, if available, five appointed personnel supervising the police force at the Centers, whose responsibilities are to train, supervise, and to handle the relationships with the outside agencies—pardon me—train, supervise, and generally handle the policies on internal security——

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me interrupt——

Mr. MYER. Supervising evacuee police, that is, internal policy.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you mind if I interrupt to ask you to answer my question?

Mr. MYER. I am answering your question.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am sorry.

The question I asked, I believe, was, Of what value is the police force in case of strike, riot, or very serious trouble? And so far your re-

marks have been directed to the press or the audience, and you have not answered the question, so I assume you are not intending to.

Mr. MYER. I feel the police force has an effect, depending on what the considerations are.

We have had an evacuee police force that was not very valuable during the strike riots, in the one serious riot we had in Manzanar. The military police were called in.

In the Poston riot, so-called, which we called a strike, the military police were not called in.

Mr. Chairman, if that answers your question, I would like to make a statement for the record in relation to Mr. Townsend's testimony, if you please. May I?

Mr. COSTELLO. You might make that after we conclude the 37 points here.

Mr. MYER. All right. I hope there will be time for this statement when we get through, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTELLO. The next is item 22 on page 11-A.

Question by the chairman:

Was there any produce raised around the camp and used there?

And the answer by the witness was:

There wasn't when I left there. If there was, it was put in there since.

And then your comment:

In addition to products harvested and used from 75 acres farmed within the residential blocks between the barracks, there were 89,720 pounds of vegetables harvested on the acreage farmed by the agricultural division up to January 1, 1943.

That, I presume, was up to the time that Townsend was at the project?

Mr. MYER. Townsend left, I believe, on December 26.

Mr. COSTELLO. Therefore that is the only part of the comment that is directed to Mr. Townsend's testimony.

Mr. MYER. Well, let me say this—

Mr. COSTELLO (interposing). Which works out to 40 tons of vegetables, and I believe the rate of consumption of food in your comment was 27 tons per day. Therefore, the 40 tons is not a considerable amount of produce and, hence, I think his statement is quite accurate that there was not any produce raised there.

Materially, there wasn't anything in quantity.

The statement then goes on:

Since that time, agricultural production has been increased so that on June 1, 1943, there was a total of 228 acres being farmed in addition to the acreage in the blocks. The June 1 report shows a total of 901,896 pounds of 16 different types of vegetables harvested by the Agricultural Department.

That, of course, works out to around 450 tons and is not a great amount of produce, as far as the consumption there is concerned.

The twenty-third item refers to Mr. Townsend's description of the strike at Poston.

I notice in your comment you make the statement:

However, it should be pointed out that there was no riot at Poston, no violence or destruction of Government property, and no harm to Caucasian employees or their families.

You were very careful, always, to refer to it as a strike whenever the camp superiors made any reference to it.

At the bottom of the page, your comment is:

Immediate cause of the strike and demonstration was the arrest of two evacuees suspected of having beaten other evacuees. Leaders of the striking evacuees insisted that the two held were innocent, that they were held more than 72 hours without charges, and that they should be given a trial under the regulations of the community council.

Actually, in the judgment of competent observers who have investigated the strike thoroughly, the protest about the arrest of the two evacuees was merely the immediate cause of the disturbance which had its origin in many cases, among them bitterness resulting from evacuation, inability of the Authority to provide school buildings, heating stoves for the barracks, and other facilities which had been promised at the time of evacuation, frustration resulting from the discomforts of camp life, and other similar causes.

Agitation by actual pre-Japanese persons may have contributed, but there is no evidence that it was a particularly important factor in the incident.

You comment on the bitterness resulting from evacuation. Was it not true that at the original time of evacuation, there was not any bitterness on the part of the Japanese people generally because of the orders to evacuate their homes?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I was not present at that time and I do not feel that I am competent to give first-hand knowledge on that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you know what promises were made at the time of evacuation regarding facilities that were going to be furnished to the evacuees?

Mr. MYER. I know some of the promises that were made: yes.

One of the promises, of course, was that they would have minimum living quarters with heat, which had not at that time been supplied at Poston.

Mr. COSTELLO. You do not know who made those promises, do you?

Mr. MYER. The War Department. And then, later on, the W. R. A.

It was up to the War Department to supply the stoves and the basic equipment for the centers. I am not critical because they didn't do it. It was one of those times when it was hard to secure that type of equipment. We were late in getting much of our equipment; nevertheless, the evacuees did not know what the problem was and it did not enter into their attitude.

Mr. COSTELLO. On page 13, you have a statement signed by 61 employees and members of employees' families, who lived at Poston camp throughout the strike.

May I ask when that statement was obtained?

Mr. MYER. What page is that, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COSTELLO. It appears on page 13.

Mr. MYER. I can't give you the answer to that.

Most of this information was obtained by us from Poston following their procuring the testimony of Mr. Townsend from your investigator. We asked them to supply the facts on which this statement was built.

Mr. COSTELLO. So that the various employees, who are all employed by W. R. A., signed this statement?

Mr. MYER. No; they are not employed by W. R. A. June 14 is the exact date.

Mr. COSTELLO. You state [reading] :

The following statement was signed by 61 employees and members of employees' families who lived at Poston camp I throughout the strike.

Mr. MYER. These people are employed by the Indian Service, who were handling that project under the Indian Service supervision, but under W. R. A. policies.

Mr. COSTELLO. Technically, their pay comes from W. R. A. through the Indian Service?

Mr. MYER. Indirectly.

Mr. COSTELLO. So they are employees of the project.

Mr. MYER. Employees of the project; that is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. The statement refers to various other instances in here, such as the comment on the milk-truck incident, in which apparently, or at least a case or two of milk was seized by the Japanese and dumped.

And when it comes to the question of the fire, the great unit of the fire department, again we find that the fire chief was set upon by the Japanese there, showing that the fundamental facts of Mr. Townsend's testimony are correct.

Then there follows the item dealing with the Japanese flag, which we went into at quite some length at our hearings. Indication was that some of the banners used in the blocks to designate the blocks, were white flags, with the numerals of the block in red in the center.

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. COSTELLO. The numerals were put in the center of the flag in such a manner as to simulate the rising sun, the insignia of Japan, and, as the result, could have easily been confused by people at a distance, who would see them, into thinking that they were Japanese flags.

When we were at the project—you make the comment here that there were two flags in camp No. 1—I only recall having seen one.

Has there been any attempt made to use the flag as a part of the Americanization of Japanese at the centers?

Mr. MYER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure about Poston, but at practically every center the flag ceremony and the raising and the lowering of the flag is carried on, generally by the Boy Scouts, who take the responsibility for carrying out the flag ceremony.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let us take a look at item No. 30.

About 12 o'clock midnight on the third day of mob control about 200 of the mob advanced to the motor pool, where they reached the highway across from the pool. They were halted by the military police and advised they were not allowed to cross the highway. They started to move forward, and the military police fired over their heads. His orders were to fire over their heads, and then into them. He was at once supported by another military police with a machine gun. The mob had advanced in regular military wedge formation stopped, and in a few minutes the entire military police company was there in trucks with fixed bayonets ready for action. The Japs retreated.

\* \* \* Standing behind the military police, seeing the determined look and the immediate response of his buddies, all heavily armed, and the angry mob facing their first set-back, defiant and ugly, but still without a leader, make things look pretty near a crisis.

Your comment indicates that at least six or eight Japanese had gone out with the idea of getting the truck and the military police did stop them, and that they did fire some shots.



So, again, it indicates very definitely that the statements by Mr. Townsend are fundamentally correct, and the series of subsequent testimony received verifies those fundamental facts.

There is quite a little comment regarding the two persons who were injured and put in the hospital.

At the bottom of page 20 you make the comment :

The following information is taken from the records of the hospital concerning all patients submitted to the hospital as a result of the beatings in question.

Then you name seven persons.

Then you make the following comment : One laceration of the scalp, October 18; laceration of head, contusion of body, November 1; concussion of brain, multiple lacerations, November 15; laceration of hand, November 15; laceration of skull, November 15; neurosis due to fear, November 22; contusion of head and face, laceration of hand, January 31.

That indicates that at least seven persons were beaten up or received injuries of that character at the center.

What is the reason, or what reasons have you heard for these beatings taking place over in the center?

MR. MYER. I have heard all kinds of reasons put forward, Mr. Chairman, depending upon who did the speculating as to why beatings were continued or conducted. I might say that those beatings did continue throughout the period you mentioned until, with the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I think seven aliens, and I believe five citizens, were arrested for the beating of Saburo Kido, some time about the period that the last period was mentioned.

Since that time, so far as I know, there have been no beatings at Poston. There may have been, but they have not been reported to me.

MR. COSTELLO. So far as you know, all of those responsible have been apprehended?

MR. MYER. Well, at least it stopped following the apprehending of the group of people that I mentioned, about the period that is mentioned there.

MR. COSTELLO. You comment about the use of the gasoline and the trucks. That was his own responsibility, so anything he said about that was actually criticism of himself and his own administration.

MR. MYER. Yes.

MR. COSTELLO. Then, of course, your comment winds up regarding the use of equipment for trips and so forth by the evacuees. You comment that they are not allowed to use Government cards for any cars whatsoever unless there is special authorization and a Caucasian present to escort them for that purpose.

Again you take the opportunity to comment on Mr. Townsend's trip to Oklahoma without the knowledge or permission of the project director, as you have done before.

It seems to me that the whole purpose of your comment which you make here is not so much to discredit Mr. Townsend's testimony, not to point out faults in his testimony, but simply to give you an opportunity to comment entirely about the W. R. A. and its program; is that correct?

MR. MYER. I consider that a very legitimate objective, Mr. Chairman.

I thought that was what we were interested in having here, comments about the W. R. A. and its program, which we had not had an opportunity to comment on before yesterday before this committee.

Mr. COSTELLO. Would it not be better to make an out-and-out comment regarding the situation?

Mr. MYER. Had we had the opportunity to do so, we would have been delighted to do so, but in view of the fact—

Mr. COSTELLO. Rather than commenting about the W. R. A. and its program?

Mr. MYER. In view of the fact, Mr. Chairman, that these statements were released to the press on June 10, having been made on May 26, without an opportunity for either ourselves or the project director to comment on them, after he saw the record, we felt it was essential and we felt it was only fair to the public and to the United States to know what the facts are in relation to these policies as well as to the type of witnesses that were brought before the committee, in order to present supposedly the facts regarding W. R. A.

May I read my statement now?

Mr. COSTELLO. I merely want to comment that the witnesses in the main were persons who had been employed at the center, and the majority of them were actually employees at the center at the time they were interrogated as witnesses.

Mr. MYER. There were three of them that had been employed at the center who were not employed at the time for good reasons.

This statement is a conversation between W. Wade Head, project director, and H. H. Townsend, on December 1, 1942. This is a stenographic transcript. December 1 was just at the end of the disturbance at Poston I.

Mr. HEAD. Good morning, Mr. Townsend.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Good morning. I just got your memorandum and want to discuss it with you. Please let me apologize for my actions during the strike. I must have been so upset I didn't realize what I was doing. I was afraid that I and the other employees were going to be slaughtered by the Japs.

Mr. HEAD. Mr. Townsend, if you do not mind, I am going to have notes kept on this conversation, inasmuch as your actions of the last few days have been such that they cause me to doubt your honesty and reliability. Do you object?

Mr. TOWNSEND. And I don't blame you for wanting a record of everything I have to say.

Mr. HEAD. Now, Mr. Townsend, you said you were frightened; did you actually see, personally, any signs of violence on the part of the people or the destruction of any Government property?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Since having time to calm down I realize that there was no sign of violence, and now that the trouble has been settled and I have had time to look around, it is easy to see the crowd must have been peaceful all the time and there was no sign of any damage to any Government property.

Mr. HEAD. Do you consider that sufficient reason for leaving the project and failing your duties during the time of trouble?

Mr. TOWNSEND. I don't know what I meant. I lost my head, I guess. I would have done more harm than good in that condition.

Mr. HEAD. I think you have done more harm than good here ever since you came, and in the past few days it has been reported to me that you have been frightened ever since arriving, and that you have always carried a gun.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I think every employee here should be armed at all times.

Mr. HEAD. If you think that, you absolutely have no business working here. This is no place for cowards or unstable people. Besides, every Government employee who places more importance on his own safety than his duty to the Government is not fit to work for Uncle Sam. You were not only disloyal to your job, you were disloyal to John Evans, and disloyalty was displayed before all the project employees when he was in charge and was working under tremendous pressure. By the way, did you leave Poston in a Government car?

Mr. TOWNSEND. Yes; I went to Parket in a Government car and from there I caught a ride with a friend to Los Angeles.

Mr. HEAD. I am extremely disappointed to find we have had an employee working here like you. It is easy to understand why you might have become upset, but I cannot understand why you became frightened and fled.

You had a responsibility to the Government to look after its property. We have employed you in a responsible position and put our confidence in you to carry out that job, then you fail completely; and besides, look at the men here with their families who were not afraid. Ralph's wife was here alone. She had planned to go to Phoenix for the week end but when the sit-down strike started, she immediately saw that her duty was here, and she stayed. She is not a Government employee, but she is a loyal American. Other men and their wives stayed with their children. To me, just at a time when you were most needed, you absolutely failed.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I guess I can't blame you for feeling that way.

Mr. HEAD. I am sorry to say this, but never have I been so disappointed with a fellow employee as I have been with you. You insisted that the Army be called in, not because you thought that was best, but because you were afraid, "yellow" is a good word for it. That would have been an easy way to settle this thing. Thank God, John Evans was not a coward. He displayed real character when he refused to follow your and a few other crackpots' advice.

I want you and everyone else in the country to know that John Evans has my complete confidence and backing in every decision he made while here. If John had thought it was necessary to call the Army into Poston to protect Government property or human lives, he would have done so, but at no time did he feel it was necessary.

You can see now, from events, that it wasn't. If the Army had come in, no doubt there would have been some people shot. Our Government knew what it was doing when it put these people here, and you know yourself that the strike wasn't due to anybody in jail, but due to the fact we had failed to furnish some of the minimum necessities of life to them, such as heating stoves and many other items, and we would have been a bunch of cowards in taking advantage of them by marching the Army in and having defenseless people shot.

There are a lot of reasons he could not outline to you why the Army should not have been called in; I think it is unnecessary in your case to do it. I want to point out that the Japanese have many thousands of American prisoners, and if anything happened here in which the Japanese would be shot or otherwise hurt, retaliation would no doubt have been taken against the various Americans held as Japanese prisoners.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I see now that Evans was right; he was level-headed.

Mr. HEAD. After your actions during this disturbance, as far as I'm concerned, it is too late in the day for you to change. To be perfectly fair and frank with you, I want you to know you would not have been allowed to return to this project had not John Evans recommended it to me, but I am convinced in my own mind that it was a mistake.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Would you like to have me hand in my resignation?

Mr. HEAD. Personally, I think you should, but probably it will be better, inasmuch as you are working with Empie, that you discuss the matter with him. My personal feeling in this is that, although you might do a good job in some other position, you are too emotionally unstable to work on a project like this. Anyone who will carry a gun, and who will go around trying to frighten the employees by telling them they are not safe, has no business working here.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I wish you could have seen how upset and disturbed I was, and I think you could see my side.

Mr. HEAD. I have no more to say to you except this: You became emotionally upset and unstable at the time your services were most needed, so you have no business here. Mr. Townsend, in all the years I have worked, you are the first employee I have felt it was necessary to call a stenographer in to take notes on the conversation, and you realize as well as I, why I feel this is necessary.

Mr. Chairman, if you feel, as you say, that the Townsend evidence is fundamentally sound, I am really concerned about the rest of the testimony and the findings of this committee, if that is the way the committee feels about Mr. Townsend's evidence.



Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, in view of the last statement Mr. Myer made, may I have it read?

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

(Statement read by the reporter.)

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. Myer, we, of the committee, were inclined to feel that the people you employed at Poston had been carefully selected, and the assumption of reliability rested with them.

Now, I am frank to admit that at the time I first read Mr. Townsend's testimony, which was a long time after it was taken, and this committee was in Los Angeles at the time, that I shared considerable skepticism about some of the statements, and we interrogated the witnesses appearing before us at some length about Mr. Townsend.

Mr. Empie, who impressed this committee as a very fine employee, and who is presently employed at Poston, certainly gave every appearance and impression of being candid and seemed capable of doing a good job. He was among those interrogated.

At page 245 of the hearings which were held at Los Angeles, we asked Mr. Empie about his former associate, Mr. Townsend, and here are some of the questions and answers from that particular conversation:

Mr. STEEDMAN. I believe you stated Mr. Townsend was evasive in discussing his work with you?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Do you think that was due to the fact that he had difficulty expressing himself?

Mr. EMPIE. No, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. Was he evasive in the memorandums that he wrote to you?

Mr. EMPIE. No; he wrote some pretty good memorandums.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He was pretty direct and frank in writing to you in his memorandums, was he not?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir; he called my attention to many things that my attention should have been called to and together we tried to do something about it. I will say this for Mr. Townsend, I thought all along that he was a very conscientious employee and was trying to do the best job he could, but I have a feeling yet that he was, in many respects, very conscientious in his work.

Mr. STEEDMAN. He had been in private business and did not understand Government routine very well; isn't that a fact?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes; that is right.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And he wanted these Japanese to work?

Mr. EMPIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEEDMAN. And respect Government property and so on?

Mr. EMPIE. That is right; he did.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, that is in rather direct conflict with what Mr. Head said about Mr. Townsend.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I have some additional documents which I did not want to take the time of the committee on, nor the other folks to read.

I think the record will show that Mr. Townsend was a mistake, to begin with; was a mistake all the way through.

I think the second day after he came on the project Mr. Head outlined to Mr. Townsend in detail his duties and responsibilities and pointed out to him particular problems that he must face and take care of.

That was, I think, September 2.

On October 1, he wrote him another memorandum and said that he had personally made a check of the headquarters transportation facilities and that certain things that he had requested him to do had



not been carried out and pointed specifically to certain things that should be carried out, again.

Mr. Head again wrote another memorandum on, I believe, October 28—I would have to check my dates on this—again pointing out to Mr. Townsend, giving him every opportunity to get his job done properly, and indicating in this one, as I remember it, or at least in one case he allowed a Government car to go out without proper approval, which was the order that Mr. Townsend had, to make a trip to Phoenix, and certain other oversights.

That was, I think, the last one before the interview that I read.

That would indicate to me that Mr. Head very early in the game decided that Mr. Townsend probably was not carrying out his duties properly; but he was giving him every chance over that 3 or 4 months' period to make good by making suggestions to him, or pointing out specific places where his work should be bettered, and was trying to be of every assistance, at the same time being critical and being on the job himself.

That is all I have to say in answer to that question of yours.

Mr. MUNDT. It was not a question.

Mr. MYER. I don't want to detract at all from Mr. Empie. I have not seen the record relating to Mr. Empie's testimony. I would say that if Mr. Empie thinks Mr. Townsend is a good man; I do not agree with him.

Mr. MUNDT. He said, "I have a feeling even yet that he was in many respects very conscientious in his work."

Mr. MYER. I think that is perhaps true, but certainly not as regards the truth or regarding some other matters.

Mr. COSTELLO. One point, Mr. Myer, I want to make on this whole thing is that fundamentally the facts as contained in Mr. Townsend's statement were corroborated by the statements that were obtained from Mr. Empie, Mr. Gelvin, and other witnesses who appeared there.

The basic facts contained in there, the incidents to which he made reference, and so on, were accurate.

His declaration, or the glamour part that he put into it can be easily explained. Some of the witnesses, regarding Mr. Townsend, made the comment, I believe, that he was an alarmist, which was quite obvious from the conversation you yourself read. He was quite excited over the strike situation.

The facts he talked about are fundamentally accurate in their testimony.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to repeat that if you feel those facts are fundamentally correct, I am disturbed, because I do not agree with you.

When a man who is supposed to know how many warehouses he is looking after over a period of 4 months—who just definitely remembers the number and makes it 180 instead of 90; a man who has charge of the general feeding operations who says 58 tons of food when it was 27—I would not say that was fundamentally sound information or fundamentally sound facts.

I think you will agree with me when you think that he was—

Mr. COSTELLO (interposing). There is no question but what on many of these items he exaggerated or has not given accurate statements. The only thing I do refer to, when he speaks of the strike and conditions of that kind, his testimony is corroborated by other persons.

How long was Mr. Townsend an employee there at the center?  
Mr. MYER. I don't know the exact date, but it was approximately September 1 until December 26.

Mr. COSTELLO. He was only there a matter of 2 or 3 months?

Mr. MYER. About 4 months, I would guess.

Mr. MUNDT. It might ease your mind, Mr. Myer, to know that the committee has not accepted the recommendations or considered conclusions of any testimony testified to on the part of Mr. Townsend, which has not been corroborated by other witnesses.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate that.

Mr. MUNDT. I think we can maybe best summarize Mr. Townsend in the words of another former employee who appeared before us by the name of James—I had never seen Mr. Townsend—but he summarized the man rather accurately when he said he seemed to be a rather conscientious individual with a sincere desire to effect economies, and so forth, but emotionally he did not think he was suited to work in a campaign of that kind.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate that statement, Mr. Mundt. The thing that concerns me is Mr. Costello's definition of "fundamentally sound" and my definition of "fundamentally sound." We do not agree.

Mr. COSTELLO. I say the fundamental facts in there are correct.

Mr. MYER. Well, all right; I will change that; your interpretation of the fundamental facts, and mine; I am still disturbed about the fact that they are a good ways apart.

That is a matter of judgment. There is no use arguing about it.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might ask you about another employee of the W. R. A. For various reasons I prefer to withhold his name because it has been the policy of another committee, of which I happen to be a member, not to publicize names of individuals in this connection, but for your own information Mr. Stripling will give you the name of the individual I am referring to.

The question I want to bring up with you is the question of deferment from the draft of this individual, who is an attorney, age 33 years.

I ask offhand, what has been the policy of W. R. A. in regard to hiring personnel and making an effort not to hire people within the draft.

Mr. MYER. The policy generally, Mr. Chairman, since the draft has become a real problem, is to hire people above draft age if it is possible to secure them; qualified people.

We had some people when I came into the W. R. A. that were within the draft age, and we still have. The policy of W. R. A. regarding deferment has been a very conservative one. We did request deferment of the gentleman mentioned here for a period of time. It was not re-requested. That deferment ran out.

He was examined by his draft board. He was called up and he is now on deferment because of physical disability and not because of the request of the W. R. A.

Going back to your statement, I will simply say I don't remember the exact number. We have the figures and we will be glad to supply them to the committee as to the total number of individuals we requested deferment on. I think it was 10. I think it was 5 cases we did receive a deferment on; that was up to the time of the appropria-

tions hearing. I have not checked it recently. There may have been one or two additional cases, but I will be glad to check the records in relation to this individual or any individual that you might be interested in, because we are proud of our deferment record.

We are a war agency. We are not trying to keep them out of the Army.

Mr. COSTELLO. This particular individual does not originate with you, but for the purpose of the record I shall read off the data secured from the files of the local board concerning this particular individual.

On May 23, original classification, 1-A. This is 1941.

On September 24, 1941, classification 1-H.

On January 7, 1942, reclassified 1-A.

January 29, continued after physical examination in 1-A.

On February 7, induction postponed until April 7 at the request of the individual; personal reasons which justified their giving him a temporary deferment or postponement of induction.

On March 13 request for occupational deferment—he was employed by another Government department at the time—was made by the Director of Personnel of that Department, the Department of Agriculture, because—

Mr. MYER (interposing). Pardon me; what date was that?

Mr. COSTELLO. March 13, 1942.

It was pointed out that he was necessary to carry on the activities of the Department; that it was impossible to expand the staff of the office in which he was employed in order to employ and train men for replacement purposes, and his removal would impede the war production efforts of the Department.

It says that the present staff is fully occupied with the work of the Department; hence deferment of 2-A is requested in order to allow ample time to train someone to take over.

The date of that was March 13, 1942.

April 4, 1942, classified 2-B. Transfer request was filed by Mr. M. S. Eisenhower, Director of War Relocation Authority; in other words, this individual who was engaged in very essential war work, whose removal would impede the war production efforts of the Department, within 20 days is no longer in the Department, but is transferred over into the War Relocation Authority, and request then was made by the then director for the transfer of this gentleman from the Department of Agriculture.

I failed to state the type of work he was doing. On April 8 he was reclassified as 2-A until October 7 in order that he might do the work for W. R. A. for which he was assigned.

On October 6 request for deferment by W. R. A. was refused by the local board.

On October 7 he was reclassified 1-A.

On December 18, 1942, he was continued in classification 1-A after a physical examination; the second one.

On December 31, request for reclassification into occupational deferment, or 2-B, was filed by yourself as director of the War Relocation Authority.

On January 3, 1943, he was continued in 1-A by the local board.

May 4, 1943, he was continued in 1-A by the board of appeals, which denied request for occupational deferment.



On June 4 he was classified 4-F, after physical examination. He had had two physical examinations previously, indicating that he was 1-A and physically fit.

In his preinduction physical examination he was designated as a prepsychic personality, mentally disqualified for military service for that reason.

Now, the one question I raise is, If mentally he is not fit for the Army, I do not think he would be fit for W. R. A., and if he is fit for W. R. A. it would seem to me that he ought to be fit for the Army.

The record there indicates a definite attempt on the part of the individual to avoid military service and utilize practically every medium possible to escape the draft, and I am happy therefore to have your statement that the policy of W. R. A. has been to avoid employing persons of military age or who are likely to be called up under the draft.

Mr. MUNDT. You were rather rough on Townsend because he was psychic. You are not a specialist on this kind of employee, are you?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, this is the first time that I ever heard that this gentleman was psychic. Are you indicating by your statement, Mr. Chairman, that this gentleman apparently is psychic or that the 4-class classification happens to include psychicing as an element?

Mr. COSTELLO. The gentleman was found mentally disqualified for military service by reason of a prepsychic personality. That does not mean, necessarily, that he is psychopathic or insane, or anything else. It may mean that he has a great abhorrence for going into the Army, or being a part of Uncle Sam's Army to such an extent that mentally he is incapable of being a good soldier.

It just seemed to me from the whole record of this case, every step was being taken by him to avoid service, and it does not seem proper to me that a person of that character should be given any cooperation in so avoiding service.

Mr. MYER. I think I have made the record clear, Mr. Chairman, that he had been called up for induction.

He has been examined. He is not on deferment at our request at the present time and has not been for the past several weeks. I did request deferment for him for a short period of time at one time, however.

Mr. COSTELLO. May I ask you a question regarding these various Japanese out on indefinite leave?

Some of these include Kibei and Issei, as well as Nisei Japanese; is that correct?

Mr. MYER. That is right; they do.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you have the figures as to how many of those are aliens?

Mr. MYER. No; excepting that we took a sample recently for a period of time as to how many aliens were in that particular period, and I have not checked the whole group as yet. We have not had time to check that. But about 15 percent of those going out were aliens during that period checked, so I would say that was probably a pretty good sample.

Mr. COSTELLO. The aliens who are released are given the same type of check as given to anyone else being released from the center, or are they given a more rigid check?



Mr. MYER. Well, they are given the same type of check, of course, as the other people. We go more carefully into their background, of course, than we do with people who have never been to Japan, as to their contacts with the Japanese Government, if any, or the contacts with organizations.

I might say on that point again that most of the leaders who were the key leaders in Japanese organizations were incarcerated in internment centers at the beginning of the war and have been there throughout.

However, we do make about the same checks, Mr. Chairman, as we make of the others, except we do go more carefully into their history from the standpoint of Japanese relations than we do with citizens who had no contact at all.

Mr. COSTELLO. While in California I had one or two people phone me, and there were various items carried from time to time in the press, and the stories appeared very persistently that from time to time Japanese people are seen in and around southern California, specifically in Los Angeles. It is my understanding that Japanese are not at this time permitted to go into southern California unless they would actually be under orders from your center or with a Caucasian employee accompanying them.

Mr. MYER. The only Japanese allowed to go into California at this time go in with the permission of General DeWitt and will go with a Caucasian escort.

Mr. COSTELLO. Otherwise no persons of Japanese ancestry are allowed into that area unless they are actually in the Army service?

Mr. MYER. Or except allowed to go there by the War Department.

There are a few exceptions to that. That was taken care of by the War Department before we took over any of this matter. There were a few people who were a mixed marriage, who had children. They were allowed to return to the coast during the assembly center period of the Army, particularly wives of white men who had children. I don't remember exactly how many cases; I am not sure that we ever had that request, but I have the impression about 350 of such people were so released.

There have been individual cases, because of particular hardships, as I understand it, that have been released.

I think General DeWitt made the statement before the Naval Affairs Committee that he had six people working at Presidio in connection with their program, who were of Japanese ancestry. I think there have been special exceptions of that kind made where they are doing special Government work.

As far as our policy has been concerned, we have no authority, never have had, to allow anyone to return to California or to any part of the evacuated area, without the specific permission of the War Department, and in that case it is General DeWitt who gives that permission.

Mr. COSTELLO. Let us assume this situation, of a Japanese evacuee having been sent to Poston or to Manzanar and desired to return to Los Angeles, and he were to do so in company with a Caucasian employee of the W. R. A., he would still have to have written authorization from the Army itself before he could do so?

Mr. MYER. That is correct. He would, in all cases.

Mr. COSTELLO. No effort has been made, or no attempt made to remove those Japanese who have been confined to sanitariums for their health, or something of that character?

Mr. MYER. No; excepting for those who have become, in the meantime, well enough to be moved. Certain cases have moved out with escort at times during the last few months.

We have not tried to make provision for those people in our centers because they are being taken care of there.

In accordance with the policy established by the Army, we are paying for their subsistence and for the service rendered there, rather than bringing them into the centers.

I think there are approximately 550 cases on the coast of advanced tuberculosis cases, or similar cases, in institutions and hospitals, that were not evacuated at the time the Army carried out the Army evacuation program, and have not been since.

Mr. COSTELLO. And if such persons were allowed to leave the hospital for a day, or something of that kind, they also would have to have written authorization from the Army to do so?

Mr. MYER. Absolutely.

Mr. COSTELLO. No person should be allowed or found in that area unless he would actually have on his person a written authorization from the War Department?

Mr. MYER. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Yesterday, Mr. Myer, we had a somewhat lengthy and informal discussion about the manner in which the W. R. A. program of relocation was determined upon. I asked you whether you felt the element of community acceptance was very important and you said you did.

I would like to inquire now whether there have been any times when the element of community acceptance and the W. R. A. relocation program ever ran into conflict with each other?

Mr. MYER. Yes, Mr. Mundt. There have been a few cases where we have run into difficulties.

I mentioned one the other day that worked out all right eventually in Marengo, Ill. Plans were worked out some time this spring for a group of about, I believe, 13 people, 2 or 3 families, to relocate there on some lands belonging to the Curtiss Candy Co., in the farming business.

The matter had been checked with key businessmen of the town, the key people of the countryside, the sheriff and the local officers, but before the townspeople generally had the opportunity to be apprised of the situation, a couple of the advance members of the group appeared in the streets and somebody started a rumor and it caused quite a little furore and flare-up.

It took 2 or 3 weeks to get it straightened out.

Finally, the town council called an open meeting of all the citizens interested—I think they had 80 some people present—and having the full facts present and threshed out, I believe, they took an open vote on the subject, and as I remember the vote of the group present, it was around 63 to 21, something of that sort, that they should come on in.

Those people have gone ahead with their farming business, and it seems to be working along all right.

I use that case because I happen to remember the facts in detail. It was published in the papers.

We have had other places where we have had difficulties and the people have not gone in.

More recently we had a situation arise in the State of Arizona, which we have closed entirely for the time being to relocation, because of the sentiment that has been developed in that area, possibly due to the presence of these people, and because of the very, very emotional attitude of the many people in Arizona resulting partly from the stolen dynamite story; resulting partly from many other considerations.

I won't try to give all of them, but it has been a difficult problem there. There has been much misinformation; some information that was true, but that is one of the cases.

Mr. COSTELLO. Is it not partly due, this feeling that the people of Arizona have, that an insufficient check is made on the Japanese before they are released from camps?

Mr. MYER. I think not. I think in Arizona it is basically fear on the part of the people. The Governor stated time and again if they would resettle in the Salt River Valley, they would have more people engaging in business and driving out the local people already operating and that has been one of the objections from the State of Arizona.

Mr. MUNDT. They fear there will be a larger group?

Mr. MYER. They fear there will be a larger group, economically, yes; and that is the basic reason in Arizona.

Mr. COSTELLO. That situation existed long before the dynamite story?

Mr. MYER. Yes; 1934 and 1935; and some other problems they had at that time.

Mr. MUNDT. You recognize, then, that community acceptance is of fundamental importance in the handling of the Japanese problem.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, if we had not recognized that, we would not have spent the Government's money to set up regional offices in the country, which were to check up on the acceptability of these people, before we started relocation programs in these areas, and check up on cases where the difficulty did arise, in order to get at the facts and see what the trouble was.

We have gone to great care in that.

We did not plan a year ago, frankly, to do that. We hoped it would not be necessary. We hoped we could do it with local committees. It developed that that was not feasible or possible. They are collaborating or working with us very well, but we needed people responsible to the W. R. A. to do that job.

Mr. MUNDT. It is my opinion if an adequate program of checks upon these citizens of Japanese ancestry could be developed and announced and made available to the public, and to these 50 field offices, that you would contribute greatly to the general community acceptance. Out in my area for example, based on an entirely erroneous statement made inadvertently, as you told us yesterday, by somebody in your office at one time, that the F. B. I. was making a complete check, it did contribute to community acceptability of the evacuees.

Mr. MYER. That has been very true.



Mr. MUNDT. But apparently you have corrected the record in that regard.

Mr. MYER. Several times.

Mr. MUNDT. Unfortunately, the impact of your correction has been that they are not acceptable as they were.

Mr. MYER. Very true; I agree with you.. Every mistake we make bounces back into our laps, as it does with everybody else.

Mr. MUNDT. As the result of the colloquy we had in the last few days, in which you have stated that a program was under operation whereby Japanese, under certain circumstances, cannot locate in the East, yet in the Middle West, is also going to contribute to the uncertainty. The facts must speak for themselves and neither you nor I want to deceive the people in that situation.

Mr. MYER. Not for one moment.

I would like to make one other statement for the record on that.

Captain Hall, who is here, and who is chairman of the Joint Japanese-American Board, pointed out to me that the checks for indefinite leave generally, by the joint board, are the same ones as they are for the Eastern Defense Command, so there is no difference in the method of checking between those that they would recommend to us for indefinite leave any place as well as in the Eastern Defense Command.

There really isn't any difference in the check made.

The only reason, Mr. Mundt, that I was not willing to make the statement that there was anybody released from here that was not allowed some place else, was because you occasionally find exceptions to the rule, and sometimes they are thrown in your face, and I don't want to be in the position of having to explain the situation later on when, as a matter of fact, the general rule is thus and so.

I would like to make one further statement. I pointed out, I think, yesterday—and I want to repeat it—that we requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct the investigations, which were basic for leave centers back when we first started this program.

We would have been delighted to have had that service from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. They begged off at the time on the ground that they did not have the force; they were busy with many other things; they did not feel that they wanted to take on the work of doing the job within the centers, and urged us not to urge them to do so.

We would have been glad to have them do that checking if they were willing to do that. They were not at the time; not because they didn't want to be of assistance, but they felt they were burdened with too many of the war jobs; that they were taking that up generally—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). Do I understand that this long discussion that we had yesterday about the fact that there was a difference between the screening applied to evacuees in the Eastern Defense Command and in the Middle West is now all based on an erroneous assumption, and that they are not identical?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, one thing, I am afraid I have not gotten understood.

All people in the Eastern Defense Command have to be passed on by the Joint Defense Board.



All people that go generally throughout the country, other than the Eastern Defense Command, do not have to be passed on by the Joint Defense Board yet.

We take the responsibility and we check cases.

As far as the criteria of the Joint Defense Board, they are using more criteria, taking those for the Eastern Defense Command as those they recommend to us for indefinite leave. That is the only point. In other words, what they say about the Eastern Defense Command reinforces our demand and gives support to our check.

Where we may be beginning to have—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). Pardon me. Let us get back to our individual case and see if we can clarify this.

As I understand it now, Captain Hall places a different interpretation on this.

Mr. MYER. No; not a different interpretation. It was simply that I think I did not just make it clear, and I am trying to clarify the record.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, let us say Joe Smithoko leaves Poston and settles at Omaha again. We will start all over again. There is this indefinite leave program, or eight points, whereby he settles in Omaha without any screening from the F. B. I., or any screening on his former pre-Pearl Harbor occupation.

He is temporarily located there.

Then he decides to move to Philadelphia or Baltimore. To do that he has to submit an application to the Joint Board, of which Captain Hall has charge, and then the Joint Board passes on the application and says, "We are sorry, but we do not feel we can give you the green light to settle in Philadelphia."

Now, I would like to ask you specifically what happens to Joe Smithoko.

Mr. MYER. We have had no such case like that that I know of, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MUNDT. I am giving you a hypothetical case. I do not know Joe Smithoko.

Mr. MYER. If they have developed a record regarding that individual which is bad, and is very bad, bad enough to make us believe he should be recalled to the relocation center, he will be recalled to the relocation center.

Mr. MUNDT. Yesterday you put him back in Omaha; today he is back in the center.

Mr. MYER. No; I did not.

Mr. MUNDT. Which is where he belongs.

Mr. MYER. No; I did not. You asked me yesterday whether or not there were such cases, and I told you that I didn't know; I would have to check the matter. I have not been able to check it. So far as I know, there are no such cases.

Mr. MUNDT. Will you state now for the record, definitely, so that there won't be this confusion—and there should not be any confusion about this, Mr. Myer—

Mr. MYER (interposing). There should not; no. But there is a good deal of it.

Mr. MUNDT. We should get this clearly across.

Is it definitely the policy of the War Relocation Authority that if anybody has sought to secure the permission of Captain Hall's boys—we will call it—I cannot remember the other name—to settle in the Eastern Defense Command and been denied that permission, that he is automatically, without exception, returned to the War Relocation Authority center?

Mr. MYER. We have never had a case and we have never been faced with that issue. If they recommend that he be returned to the center, he will be returned to the center, but we have never had a case come up as yet.

Mr. MUNDT. As I understand it, Captain Hall recommends whether he is acceptable to this defense command or not.

They are not going to interfere with your regulations as to where you want to put him, are they?

Mr. MYER. They might want to make a recommendation.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, just who does settle this policy?

Mr. MYER. We decide finally. I thought I made that clear for the record, as far as the general United States is concerned.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not trying to criticize your policy. I am trying to find out, for the benefit of this country, what the policy is?

One time you tell me it is one thing, and another time you tell me it is another thing. Then you say the Board determines it. Would the Board determine?

Mr. MYER. I said if they were in a position to make a recommendation that the man be returned to the center, we would return him to the center.

What the Board actually does in those cases is to refer him back to us and say, "We do not at this time feel that this individual should be given leave within the Eastern Defense Command or given indefinite leave."

Mr. MUNDT. That is what the Board does?

Mr. MYER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Then what do you do?

Mr. MYER. We have not been faced with a case of the type that you mentioned that I know of.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you automatically, without exception, return him to the center?

Mr. MYER. We have not had any case to have an exception on.

Mr. MUNDT. But you admit such a case might arise?

Mr. MYER. I admit such a case might arise, and I am not ready to determine the policy on that until I hear the case, Mr. Mundt. I think it would depend on the facts that they presented to us as to whether I would return him to the center or not.

Mr. MUNDT. Has every applicant that has made an appeal to Captain Hall's board been acceptable to the Eastern Defense Command? There have been no rejections?

Mr. MYER. No; I don't think every applicant has.

But the people I know of as coming into the Eastern Defense Command—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). They have not come in defiance of the Board, have they?

Either they have all been rejected or not.

If something happened to them, what would be done about that?

Mr. MYER. That is what I will have to check on. I don't have the

information immediately on hand, and I have not had a chance to check in the interim period. I will be glad to check that and supply it for the record as best I can.

Mr. MUNDT. Did you not say no case had arisen as yet?

Mr. MYER. So far as I know, there have been no cases in the Eastern Defense Command, gentlemen, that asked to move out. That is why I said—

Mr. MUNDT (interposing). I am talking about evacuees outside trying to move in.

Mr. MYER. We are misunderstanding each other. I will check the record on that item. I don't know what the situation is regarding, whether there were any rejections, and if so, what happened to them. I will check the record on that for you.

Mr. MUNDT. Would you include in the record, then, this—I do not care about the names, but the number of applicants for entry into the Eastern Defense Command who have been rejected and the disposition in each case of that particular applicant.

Mr. MYER. I will be very glad to do that; yes, sir.

Mr. MUNDT. Because I think it is highly important to this committee, to the country, and to the community acceptance throughout the country to know whether the information which you and I both thought was correct yesterday, is correct, or whether something else is correct.

Mr. MYER. I think there is some misunderstanding, but we will check it further now and I will supply it for the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. I might follow Mr. Mundt's suggestion just one step further.

Under what authority would you be able to compel an evacuee to return to the relocation center, once he has been released to the mid-section of the country?

Mr. MYER. We have never had to test that as yet.

We would ask him to return, and we would bring suit and see what would happen in the courts, if he had a record, or have him arrested and ask him to return.

So far those who have been asked to return have done so, without difficulty.

Mr. COSTELLO. I am asking that question in view of the constitutional feature raised yesterday.

Mr. MYER. I am very much concerned about it, but that is something that we certainly would have to turn over to the Justice Department and F. B. I. to help us with in that connection.

Mr. COSTELLO. I understand at the center at Gila they have established there a cooperative. May I inquire as to the reason for setting up this cooperative in this particular center, or is it the policy of W. R. A. to establish cooperatives in all centers?

Mr. MYER. It is the policy of W. R. A. to recommend cooperatives where they have their own community enterprises at all centers for the reason that we have to deny the opportunity for individuals to carry on business within the centers under an artificial situation, which they would not do in the normal community in the way of running stores.

So shops, barber shops, beauty shops, all of the other services that you would get in a normal community were not available in any relo-



cation center and in view of our wage policy of \$12, \$16, and \$19 a month, which was uniform, there did not seem any way to work that out to allow people to set up business and begin business all over the center.

So we recommended (1) that they set up a cooperative to render these services under the State laws that we have in the different States, or any other proper organization of cooperatives, wherever they might want to incorporate.

I think that more than half of the centers have definitely established cooperatives under proper legal provisions.

In a few cases they are running on a trust fund basis, which is not quite a cooperative, but which provides that some of the funds are used in their own community activities.

We have followed the policy from the beginning, as fast as we could regulate it with employees, that they run their own business in the way of stores, barber shops, all the services I have mentioned, and many more.

We have felt that the Government should not go into business and handle that type of business. The cooperative seemed to be the logical and most practical way for them to have that business carried on, in view of the fact that they could not go freely back and forth outside of the centers generally and carry on their business.

Some of them are doing their shopping close by on temporary leave.

That, Mr. Chairman, summarizes briefly our reasons for it. I would be glad to file for this record a more detailed statement as to that.

Mr. COSTELLO. Does that apply to the mess halls or the warehouses, or anything of that type; net factories, or whatever they have at the projects?

Mr. MYER. No; it would have been too intricate. We would have had the evacuees absolutely refuse to handle it, similar to the way the Army handles their canteens. We prefer not to; we prefer not to handle the business. Our policy is that we do nothing except provide one man in each center to help supervise and work with them; help to maintain outside contacts.

And we do make an audit regularly to see that the business is carried on on a sound basis, in line with the policies of the W. R. A. and the Government, and that the evacuees may have the facts regarding the way the business is being handled, what funds are available, what the savings are, what the profits are, and so forth.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you also insist that they follow your project wage scales?

Mr. MYER. Oh, yes; they have to work to see that they follow out the policies; they follow out the project wage scale and other policy provisions.

I thought I made that clear. We have no wage scale other than the \$12, \$16, and \$19, regardless where they work.

Mr. COSTELLO. My understanding is that each person in the center is entitled to own one share of stock and no more.

Mr. MYER. That is the normal procedure—one share and one vote. And most of them are organized under the so-called Rosedale System of Consumer Cooperatives that has been generally utilized in this



country, in many portions of this country, both in rural and other areas.

Mr. COSTELLO. Their supervision then remains in the center authorities to operate the cooperative, and that is done by an assistant on your staff?

Mr. MYER. Yes; it is their business. I want to repeat that we do have one appointed personnel in each of the centers to give general supervision to the policy and to the program, to see that they are fulfilling and carrying out the policies of the War Relocation Authority, and give them assistance in getting their jobs done, and to advise with them, and give them technical advice in relation to their program, and assist them in their purchasing and buying and providing other services.

Mr. COSTELLO. It is my understanding from the hearing that we have had that in many instances the alien group or pro-Japanese group, I might say, are doing their utmost to direct the thinking of many of the loyal Japanese in the camps and trying to subvert them: to lean toward disloyal Japanese principles.

Do you not think if that group were controlled by the cooperatives, it would give them a very definite control over the persons located in the centers?

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I suppose it will have some effect on that. It has been traditional in Japanese families, as most of our families, that the elders of the families control the purse strings.

The elders of the families control the discipline; have the say about the business of the families until they establish families of their own.

And, of course, we have some of that going on in the centers as you would have on the outside. I think it is unavoidable.

I don't know what the details are regarding the make-up of these different boards of directors, but it may have some effect.

Whenever you put 100,000 people together, throw them out of the main stream of their economic occupations and begin a new realignment, you are going to have competition or positions of influence and power regardless of ancestry, I would say, and there has been something of that going on.

Mr. MUNDT. My understanding is the head of the Gila Cooperative is actually an alien Japanese; the president of the cooperative.

Mr. MYER. There probably is; there is no law against it, and no regulation against it. After all, those cooperatives are serving all the families and all the people in the center, and they are free to elect their own board of directors, people who they feel can most satisfactorily run the business, which is their business, under these regulations.

We have no regulations against it.

Let me point out, Mr. Chairman, that the most of these citizens, nonaliens, are below 35 years of age. Most of them, as a matter of fact, are 40 and below 25 years of age; the major group being between 10 and 25. There are some older than that, but not a very large group.

The population pattern is such that the most of the citizen group, or probably the largest bulk of them, are high school and college graduates, or just above, so many of that group had mature business training and experience.

I would like to point out further in connection with our relocation program, something over one-third of the United States citizens in these centers have relocated on the outside, either on seasonal leave or indefinite leave.

The figure I gave, about 85 percent of those relocating, are citizens of the United States, so out of the 15,000 that have gone out, something between twelve and thirteen thousand, perhaps—so far as the example is concerned—I have not checked the total figure—are American citizens, and with that proportion on the outside, the group who have gone out first are the best trained, the most aggressive, those that want to establish themselves, the best brains among your Nisei group, for the most part, your citizen group, and consequently, as time goes on, if that proportion continues, we are going to have left more nearly an alien population than citizenship, excepting for the Kidos and the old people.

We won't have many people make the citizen group of an age to do business or to serve on councils, and that creates an entirely different problem than it did in the beginning.

MR. COSTELLO. Are each of these cooperatives incorporated in the individual States they are operating?

MR. MYER. No; I think some of them even incorporate under the laws of the District of Columbia. That is my impression. I think they are all licensed.

One of the things that has caused difficulty is the State corporation commission deciding to have them take out a State license if it is a cooperative, which has caused quite a fight, and I presume you know about that.

It is not incorporated under the Arizona laws, but they have to be licensed under the Arizona laws.

MR. COSTELLO. The cooperative would have to be licensed before they would be allowed to operate.

MR. MYER. No; I think not. Excepting under an injunction, until they could get their license back.

MR. MUNDT. Did you get the information about the spinach?

MR. MYER. Yes, sir; I have the information about the spinach. I have a letter to supply for the record.

This is addressed to the chairman of the subcommittee and reads as follows:

HON. JOHN O. COSTELLO,

*Chairman, Subcommittee, House Committee on*

*Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. COSTELLO: Regarding the shipment of spinach which had been received at the Poston relocation center in a spoiled condition and being destroyed at the time your committee visited the center, we have secured the following information by telephone from the project director at Poston:

The spinach was shipped from the Granada, Colo., relocation center; it spoiled en route because of failure of the railroad to ice the cars. It was inspected by a railroad company representative before it was destroyed. Informal acknowledgment of the railroad's responsibility was secured at that time.

The center has prepared a claim for \$450 and will present it to the railroad in the course of settling the account for the shipment. No payment for freight charges has been made by the center.

The project director has assured me that all crates received in this shipment in good condition have been salvaged.

Sincerely,

D. S. MYER, *Director.*

Mr. MUNDT. The crates were thrown away?

Mr. MYER. No; all crates were salvaged that could be.

Mr. MUNDT. And the bad ones were thrown away?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT. Time has not lapsed, so you do not know about any recovery?

Mr. MYER. No; we do not have any information. However the freight has not been paid.

Someone asked for the record yesterday, also for the complete A. P. article of May 31, rather than the excerpts. I don't remember who asked it. I will supply that for the record here in relation to the food question. This was published in the Philadelphia Record of June 1, 1943. It was carried in a number of papers, and I think this is complete, if not, we will be glad to find one that is.

Mr. MYER. This is the property inventory, Mr. Chairman, that I will supply for the record, which was requested.

Mr. MYER. I have a two-paragraph statement which I received verbally, in order to check the records regarding Mr. Empie's statement on Mr. Townsend's leaving, which was requested and which I will supply for the record:

STATEMENT OF AUGUSTUS EMPIE, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, POSTON, COLO., REGARDING LEAVE GRANTED HAROLD H. TOWNSEND DURING THE STRIKE AT POSTON NOVEMBER 18-24

On the long distance telephone from Poston, Empie yesterday, July 6, stated that during the strike Townsend came to him and asked permission to leave the center on annual leave for the purpose of taking his wife home from the hospital. According to Townsend's application and employment record at the center, his home was in Los Angeles, Calif. Empie understood that he was granting annual leave for only a day or two to allow for a trip at personal expense to Los Angeles and back.

It later developed that Townsend left the center and drove in a Government car to Oklahoma City without authorization. Empie positively states that no authorization was given Townsend to use a Government car, either to go to Los Angeles or to Oklahoma City on personal business. As a matter of fact, both Empie and Townsend, by virtue of their positions, knew that no officer of the project could authorize the use of a Government car for such a personal trip as Townsend made.

I might say that I was not able to get this morning the Manzanar agreement, but I will supply that for the record just as soon as we can get that together. That agreement was worked out between the War Department and the Los Angeles people, and was carried over.

Mr. Rhodes, who just left town, who knew the background here, was not available this morning, and we may have to get them from the War Department files, but we will get them for the record.

I have here a list of names on our pay roll who were evacuees, which I will supply for the record.

I may say for the attention of the committee here, the highest salary is \$1,800, statistical clerk.

I was 2 off on the number of employees. The last figure I had was 25; we now have 23. I will supply those names and the titles of the positions or grades, and the salary.

(The material referred to is contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. MYER. I had also the leave policies for the record, but I think I supplied those in connection with a letter from Mr. McCloy, and the attorney general.



The other information requested, as I already mentioned, I have not gathered, but I will supply it as quickly as I can.

Mr. COSTELLO. You have not been able to get that list of names checked, have you?

Mr. MYER. No. As I told you, the people have been working on it, but we have not been able to get the facts together.

Mr. COSTELLO. Will you be able to get that for us by tomorrow?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I think the next few hours, or by tomorrow.

As for that shorter list of names, we can get that very quickly, I think.

Mr. MUNDT. Has there been any understanding arrived at, Mr. Myer, dealing with the evacuees or with the communities into which they resettle, as to whether or not they are going there just for the duration of the war, or whether, once they have left your camp, they are on their own, and that is something to be worked out in the course of events?

Mr. MYER. Those on indefinite leave are there presumably for the duration of the war. Those on seasonal leave, as I explained yesterday, most of them, or some of them—I won't say most of them because many of them request indefinite leave later—will probably come back to the center after they have completed the few months' work, or several months' work.

Mr. MUNDT. You say "for the duration of the war." You mean there is some understanding either with them or with the community that is for the duration of the war only?

Mr. MYER. No; we have never, at any time, made any understanding or agreement with anybody that it was only for the duration of the war. We cannot control, in our judgment, where people live during or after the war, excepting as regarding the excluded areas.

I certainly don't want to take the responsibility of policing people and chasing them out. Very frankly, I hope that many of these people who establish themselves throughout the country will stay in the areas where they are establishing themselves, and that they will not bulk off in any one spot again because, I think it will be a good thing for them and the United States, if they do not. Otherwise we may have some of the same difficulties we had because of the little Tokyos that existed on the coast when this started.

I think it is sound from their standpoint, and it is sound from the standpoint of the United States Government, and that is one of the basic considerations underlying the leave program.

I think it is good for California, Mr. Costello. I told your delegation that shortly after you left for California, and I told the rest of the country that that is good procedure.

As Mr. Costello knows, their people who lived in California seemed to like to get back, and when they again have the opportunity, I presume many of them will go back because it is home.

Mr. MUNDT. Undoubtedly that enters into the picture, which will have to be discussed later, after we find out how this program operates, but if they are gradually shortening the circle into which they are placing these evacuees to a little segment in the Dakotas and the Mississippi River, we may have quite an abundance of little Tokyos there some day.



Mr. MYER. I don't think you need have any apprehension about that.

In the total United States there are 130,000 souls of Japanese ancestry. That is one-tenth of 1 percent of the total population; a very small proportion of the total population, and I do not think that you need to be concerned.

I think you will find that as the population grows older, as we pass the third, fourth, and fifth generation, that you will not find the same cultures that you find among your alien group.

It is perfectly natural for people who do not speak English well, and for many other reasons, to seek solace in each other's company, and seek protection.

I think that is generally true of minority groups. I have talked to a great many of what I call experts on the subject. There are two or three of them who have indicated to me by the fifth generation you won't have this population we have here, if we can get over this hump and get them distributed, because they will be American kids.

All the aliens will be gone. The influence will be gone. There will be no ties back in Japan. They will be accepted into the community and there will be no reason for Tokyos.

I might make one observation. Commander Ringo, associated with the War Relocation Authority—I never met him because he left about 3 or 4 days ago to go to sea before I came in—he was with the Office of Naval Intelligence, and he made the statement once that probably there would have been no evacuation had the war come 15 or 20 years later. Most of your alien groups would have passed on.

Your citizen, second-generation group, would have become much more established as families; your third-generation group would be about where your second-generation group is now, and you would have passed on to that stage.

It happened to hit at the time when there were still a lot of people who maintained ties with Japan, which was unfortunate.

Mr. MUNDT. I agree with you thoroughly that the more you rely on concentration of the Japanese, now and after the war, the more you agitate any racial problem. I think your Authority has a wonderful opportunity in that regard to sort of separate these evacuees into communities so that they will not become centered either in my country or in any other part of the United States.

Mr. MYER. We hope to do that.

Mr. MUNDT. And I hope you will not, simply because the evacuees take more readily to the handling of sugar beets and so forth, set up a lot of little rural Tokyos. Keep that in mind when you distribute them around.

Mr. MYER. On the other hand, the pressure is very strong on the part of the rural districts, when they need labor, to get those people, to get them out and work, on a seasonal basis.

Mr. MUNDT. On a seasonal basis.

Mr. MYER. On a seasonal basis, and indefinite basis.

Many people have gone up through the Snake River Valley and other places, who have established themselves pretty well, and working on through the years, as evidenced by the fact that many who came out during the period of voluntary resettlement have not come back, and many of them in rural areas, I might say.

However, a very great many of these evacuees I mentioned, the citizen group, who are relocated, more than one-third who have gone, have not gone to the rural areas, but gone to the larger cities like Chicago and Cleveland and Cincinnati; some to Washington, as I have indicated in your last hearing, and all over the country.

Mr. MUNDT. Do you know Tokio Slocum?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I have seen Tokio here every day.

Mr. MUNDT. I have a letter here which I would like to read to you, which was sent to me by Mr. Slocum at my suggestion.

I suggested to Mr. Slocum, and also to Mike Masaoka, after their testimony, that I thought it would be interesting to the committee, and I am sure to you, to have the suggestions and clearly thought out recommendations of some loyal Japanese themselves as to what they felt would be the best manner in meeting the vital problem which confronts you and your administration, and that is a separation of the loyal from the disloyal Japanese.

All of the Japanese who testified before this committee, I think with the exception of one, said that the members of that race had a very personal and peculiar desire to see to it that no disloyal Japanese got out and committed an act of sabotage or espionage, because that would affect the loyal as well as the disloyal elements; that they were as much interested in that problem as you, the Administrator, or we, as members of the investigating committee.

I would like to read you this letter with these suggestions—it is written out number by number, and then ask you some questions about it as we go along.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Eberharter wondered whether you would like to make a statement first.

Mr. MYER. I want to repeat to the committee members that while we have stated before, and I stated, I think, in a press conference in the office on May 14, which some of these people attended, that we were going ahead with these segregation problems. We have not been specific about that; we have hesitated largely because of the effect upon our evacuee population in relation to the emotions that may develop when rumors begin to get started as to what is going to happen, how it is going to happen, and where it is going to happen.

Until we get all the facts worked out in the meantime, the other folks will be helpful to us in that program.

I made the statement this morning, which I don't retract, that plans are made to make the movement beginning about September 1. I am not ready to announce the segregation center as yet, for rather obvious reasons.

The main idea is you must get people packed up ready to move and we have to work that out as we go along.

There are just two or three things that I would like to say about that, in general.

The first people who will be moved will be those people who want definitely to be Japanese, repatriates, and those who request expatriation to Japan, just as fast as we can work it out.

And I want to say to the committee that I started in August 1942, trying to find a spot where I could move those people to, but I never found one available, because our centers have been full. They would have been moved long ago if we had had the place.

I want to repeat that the control of these people has not caused us difficulty, because many of those people were average people, disillusioned because of their environment.

We have proceeded with our relocation program now so that we can make a shift, but when our centers were full, that was not possible.

You see, we did not get people until November 1. First we had to have the records. We are trying to get the checks through the F. B. I., to get the facts. That was our first problem.

The next one was a place, and we are now arriving at the place where we think we can work out this place without building a new one, or without asking the Army to erect us or supply a new cantonment some place.

There will be a movement of repatriates, including men, women and children, and the figure is about 6,300 of those, families and all. That is the ones we have at the moment.

The people who are involved in the centers, the "No" answers to the eligibility question, those will all be processed through hearing boards, and records checked to be sure that there is no mistake; people with Intelligence records, F. B. I., and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

I mentioned the hearings. All except repatriates and expatriates will have hearings, if we determine to move them before they do move to the segregation centers.

Now, that includes the number that have refused to register, who gave "No," or a qualified answer to question No. 28 of the registration blank, plus their families, if the families care to go with them, nonaffirmative answers.

We hope to complete the major movement between September 1st and October 20.

As to transportation, it would require about 8 trains with engines and cars for a full period of 7 weeks, on the basis of our general estimate; 20 or about 25 trainloads in and about 20 trainloads out of the different segregation centers would be—well, it will cost approximately \$1,000,000; mostly transportation costs.

We are asking that the escort guards be supplied by the Army and I am hoping, if we make the movement on that short period and that large scale, that the War Department may handle the movement from this center to that one entirely, and turn them over to us when they get them there.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Myer, that statement of your policy there it seems to me is rather important. I am wondering whether or not, if that were put up to the various relocation centers, it might have a very bad tendency on the general effect of those centers, and whether or not you want that thing published.

Mr. MYER. I would prefer, Mr. Chairman, that it not be published. That is one reason I have no general statement until we have the details worked out. I think that we will have a tremendous emotional turmoil the minute that that is announced; when anybody has to move large numbers, as we have, I have been reluctant to make a statement—other than at sometime there would be one worked out—until we were ready to go.

Frankly—and off the record—I say off the record, but not this record, but I do not want to publicize it now, transportation is not avail-



able between now and that time to move that many people for reasons which you can surmise yourself.

So there are all kinds of problems involved in this sort of thing. We have definitely determined on the policy. We have been working with the War Department and the O. D. T. and the other agencies for quite some time.

Mr. COSTELLO. Did I understand you to say that an announcement of this character, regarding the general policy of segregation, was made on May 17?

Mr. MYER. I think it was May 12, at the time of the press conference. I made the statement that segregation would be carried out; just the general statement, but not as to type and in detail that we have here.

Mr. COSTELLO. The matter off the record here would be specific reference as to time.

Mr. MYER. The specific reference as to time, trainloads, and so on. As far as the statement that we are moving ahead and will carry on the segregation program, it is perfectly all right to make that.

Mr. COSTELLO. The only thing you want off the record is any reference to the specific date?

Mr. MYER. That is right. I think we better say or do that at the moment until we can get those facts worked out in the proper manner and prepare those people for it.

The types of people I would like to have off the record.

I do not know that there will be any exception in that case because it does involve families and relationships.

I made the statement a good many times that that is one group that I would not hesitate to move, because that is definite, and because if a person says he wants to go to Japan, that means he is a Japanese.

The other cases mean more careful check and analysis.

Mr. MUNDT. This letter is addressed from room 726, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D. C., July 6, 1943:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MUNDT: Confidential, and subject to your corrections and additions of your ideas:

I submit herewith following, roughly drawn suggestions in determining and segregating loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry from those who are not likely to be loyal to our country.

Roughly, the following points have been discussed with Messrs. Larry Tijari, editor of the Pacific Citizen, and Mike Masaoka.

We had Mike Masaoka before our committee and I feel he is a loyal citizen of Japanese ancestry.

Mr. MYER. I believe he is.

Mr. MUNDT. And I feel the same way about Mr. Slocum, due to his remarkable record in the last war. I do not know Mr. Tajari, but I presume if he is in the company of the other two boys, I would so place him.

Mr. MYER. So would I.

Mr. MUNDT. Now, I would like to know, as I read this, Mr. Myer, if you will designate in some way or other, this is now included in your questionnaire which I have not seen, or the policy, why, just say "Yes" or something of that kind, and I will read on, because the points that are not included I would like to discuss. [Reading:]

1. Check against Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and police records of applicants in their former place of residence.



Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

2. Close check and questioning into applicants' family history such as——

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

such as (a) Father or any member of the family now held by the United States Department of Justice in any internment camps for alien enemies.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(b) Brother or son in Japanese Army or Navy.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(c) Son or sons in the United States Army? What organization and where stationed.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(d) Sister or daughter or any family member worked for the semiofficial or official Japanese Government agencies, such as consulate, South-Manchurian Railway, Tourist Bureau, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yokohama Specie Bank, N. Y. K. Line.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(e) What is your religion? How long have you embraced such faith?

Mr. MYER. Yes; that item is checked.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(f) Have you made any trip to Japan? When? With whom? Whom did you visit and why?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

(g) If this trip was a Kengakudan (organized tour for educational and cultural purposes) who was the leader of the trip?

Mr. MYER. Of course, any trip, any type of trip to Japan will be checked and considered as part of their relationship.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(h) Are you married or single?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

If married, check both family histories.

Mr. MYER. Yes; that is right.

Mr. MUNDT. In parentheses they say this [reading] :

Often close Japanese relation with certain official connection is thus revealed as in the case of Consul Tomikazu Hori's marriage to George Shima's daughter. Hori is now the chief military spokesman for Japanese Army.

Mr. MYER. Family relations I consider important and they are checked.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(i) Ever file expatriation paper to renounce United States citizenship? If so, when? Where? And why?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(j) Have you ever renounced allegiance to Japan?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(k) Have you ever sworn unconditional allegiance to the United States of America?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(l) Have you ever been inducted into the United States Army but have been released? Do you know why? (This case deserves unbiased hearing. There have been many injustices done to boys who were in the service but who were given sort of conditional discharge. This makes them feel bitter and wonder why.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(m) What clubs and organizations do you belong to?

Mr. MYER. That is checked.

Mr. MUNDT. Then they have some questions that (reading) :

When did you last attend them?

Who is the president of the organization?

What were the organizational aim and policy? Does?

Were the meetings conducted in the Japanese language or in English?

Who were some of the guest speakers?

You might develop a reservoir of information which might be helpful in this screening you are going to give.

Mr. MYER. I am not sure that we will be able to go into that detail or not, but we will check the organizational policy, and so forth.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(n) After the war is over, where would you like to make your home? South Pacific Islands, where opportunities are greater?

Mr. MYER. That will be checked, not only after the war is over, but right now.

Mr. MUNDT. Here are some interesting thoughts which I think merit serious consideration. (Reading.)

Do you think Japanese will continue to control those islands?

Would you like to continue to live in America? If so, where? Why?

Mr. MYER. I would be very glad to have that list. It will be very helpful to us in connection with hearings, which we are setting up, where those questions can be asked and checked.

Mr. MUNDT. That is what the young fellows had in mind.

Mr. MYER. We would be delighted to have those. I think they would be very helpful.

Mr. MUNDT. You would have an equal obligation to keep some men, as well as leave others out.

Mr. MYER. We agree.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(o) Who do you think started this war? Japan? United States of America? China? England? Russia? Germany? Why?

(p) Who do you think will win this war? England? United States of America? Japan? China? Germany? Why?

You and I, not being members of the Japanese race, cannot, perhaps, interpret the minds of Japanese ancestry citizens, and it might

be that such questions would lead to some interesting line of information.

Mr. MYER. I repeat, we would be glad to have that.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(q) Don't you think Japan was justified in striking United States of America at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(r) Have you ever been intimidated or threatened by any Japanese for your pro-American views or activities? By whom?

They suggest this, that this question should be on a separate sheet of paper in order to obtain the names for the F. B. I. and the camp authorities, without having them identified with these people and subject them to possible future intimidation. Obviously, if you just get the names of one or two, that might be a matter of personal malice, but if the same name came up repeatedly it would open up a valuable clue to you, I believe.

Mr. MYER. We have used that method to some degree in recent months or so.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(s) Have you ever cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Navy Intelligence, or Military Intelligence? When? Where? What case?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

(t) Do you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and bear arms for America against Japan.

Mr. MYER. That is the No. 28 question.

Mr. MUNDT. Then they suggest the following other points:

Suggest that applicants' pre-Pearl Harbor activities and neighborhood opinions be checked by a mixed committee made up of local:

Draft board member, American Legion, chamber of commerce, church and school; for business, etc., bank, and business may be added.

It seems to me that before the Pearl Harbor activities and neighborhood opinion of applicant is more important than post-Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MYER. In many of these cases they are. I would like to point out, Mr. Mundt, that as the procedure goes forward, at one end segregation and at the other end relocation, the checks will be tougher and tougher; in other words, each case where there is any question at all in relation to history, will be checked thoroughly.

I pointed out yesterday that these joint board cases are being sent back to the west coast, many of them, for investigation, where there is any question in relation to the files they may have there, of individuals out there, as a basis for supplying the information for our records, so that, in general, I would say "Yes" to that, although I will not say that it will be done in all cases.

It will be done, I think, in cases where they are border-line cases; where they would not go this way or that way, and they would need to be checked.

Mr. MUNDT. The letter seems to be particularly interesting in view of the present program of checking. I just leave that for you for consideration.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

Divide the applicants into :

Loyal ;

Those whose status is not absolutely certain ;

Disloyal.

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. The next paragraph reads :

Have a hearing committee in each camp made up of such duly constituted authorities as the committee deem fit with an advisory board made up of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry, say half women and half men representatives and War Relocation Authority representatives to advise the board but not to pass judgment upon the applicant. To sit in merely to bring up points which the authorities do not quite understand or know. In this field, Japanese can be helpful.

Mr. MYER. I am sure there is not a project in existence but what uses an advisory committee of that type to check their judgments, in case where they have any question about it.

It is not usually announced, officially known, but it is being utilized right along, when they can.

Mr. MUNDT. You haven't got any segregation camps, though.

Mr. MYER. Not any segregation camps except in case where we are trying to ferret out situations in relations to Leupp or some other center. However, we have used it in connection with relocation at the other end of which is the best segregation program for the citizenship group.

Mr. MUNDT (reading) :

Plea is made for consideration of parents of soldiers now in the service and whose service has been satisfactory. Special questioning should be given to those whose applications show them to have had former newspaper connections :

Teaching (Japanese) ;

Organizational work ;

Former employees of big Japanese importing firms.

Mr. Slocum thinks especially, and I think, there is some merit to his position, that the young men in the service of the United States Army are presumed to be loyal.

Even with above questionnaire being answered, references returned to War Relocation Authority or Army or whatever body to handle this, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence, final recheck and questioning should be made before releasing them.

Suggest check-up on all those who do not come under the War Relocation Authority jurisdiction as well by the duly constituted authorities.

And when all this is done, I plea that released loyal citizens be permitted to carry on as any good citizen should to contribute as much as possible toward winning the war.

Respectfully submitted.

TOKIE SLOCUM.

Mr. MUNDT. I would like to have this incorporated as a part of the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Very well.

Mr. MYER. May we have a copy of that ?

Mr. COSTELLO. Yes.

Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, since we are talking about leave, Mr. Mundt raised the question yesterday, and I have checked our files in relation to the question he was asking about as of April 7, as to whether there was additional information that should be brought up to date on leave.



I have here two supplements that I think may not have been supplied. I am not going to read these, except just give the title.

The first one is, "Administrative Instruction No. 22, Revised. Supplement 10. Subject: Issuance of Leave or Departure from a Relocation Center."

The second and last one refers to "Issuance of Leave or Departure From a Relocation Area, Investigation for Leave Clearance in Doubtful Cases," which is about the same thing in relation to segregation cases, I might say.

This is Administrative Instruction No. 22, Revised, Supplement 12, dated June 5, 1943.

I think it does bring up to date the leave policy procedure outlined in line with the question Mr. Mundt or Mr. Matthews asked me yesterday about.

(Administrative Instruction No. 22, Supplements 10 and 12 are contained in the committee file as an exhibit.)

Mr. MUNDT. In question No. 27, which you now ask about the willingness of an evacuee to take up arms of the United States, I do not believe you ask the question, do you, as directly as Tokio Slocum suggests when he says, "Will you fight against Japan?"

That question was not answered.

Mr. MYER. Well; no. I don't think it is asked that way in our question. Furthermore, I might say that the question in the blank was misconstrued by some of the evacuees who presented the question. That was somewhat confusing.

That is why we are not putting as much emphasis on 27 and 28, for the reason that they are accepting volunteers. In some cases, it was construed to mean immediate volunteering. In some cases, it was generally misunderstood.

Mr. MUNDT. You feel now that that confusion has been somewhat abated?

Mr. MYER. Yes.

Mr. MUNDT. Tokio had a good suggestion.

Mr. MYER. Yes; I think that question is all right, in connection with any set of questions, because certainly if it is used with people that are likely to be pro-Japanese, that will be one question that will be worth while asking.

One other bit of information, Mr. Chairman, that I overlooked a minute ago.

Somebody raised the question about the amount or number of people, or the percentage of people that were not employed at the centers who were able-bodied, I believe.

I think it may have been Mr. Eberharter, and I think I gave the figure of 4 percent.

I want to correct that and say as of April 30, on a check we made of 6 projects—we did not have all 10 in at that time—there were 6 percent that had not registered for work of able-bodied people out of the total population.

There were 38 percent registered for work but not employed. In other words, there was the normal you would have in most communities if they registered, and no work for them, making a total of 9.8 percent in these centers at that time of able-bodied people that were not employed, either because they didn't want to be or because we

didn't have important work for them, and I wanted to clarify the record to that extent, and I would like to have you have the information.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Is Mr. Snelson still employed at the Colorado River relocation project?

Mr. MYER. Indeed, I can't tell you without checking the records. I don't keep up with the detail records, particularly Colorado River. I can check and find out for you, Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It is not so important, but I just would like to know. I would appreciate your giving us that information.

Mr. MYER. Well, we will check it for you. Mr. Burrows thinks he is, but we will check it and give you that information.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Myer, of course you were not with the War Relocation Authority when the various sites were selected for these relocation centers, but do you happen to know what the main factor taken into consideration was in selecting the particular sites that they did select?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I think I can tell you the important ones. The first one was that they be on Government land, generally speaking. The only one that was not on Government land was the one at Manzanar, which had already been leased from the Army, from the city of Los Angeles, and that was city land. That was No. 1.

No. 2. The War Department checked at each State when we located sites in relation to factories, installations, and so on, and some sites were eliminated because they felt they were too close to certain points, and felt they should not be established there.

No. 3. Trying to find land, enough land at least, that could be cultivated in the western area where we had water rights. That is not always easy to find nowadays; reasonable accessibility to railroads. Transportation is a real problem. One of the problems at Poston is that they are a long way from the railroad.

Those were some factors.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Generally speaking, the sites are pretty far away from the centers of population.

Mr. MYER. That is right. That is partly due to the fact that the Army, in advising us with relation to these sites, asked that they be not located too close by industrial areas.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Most of these sites are in areas where the population is scarce, mainly because of the poor climatic conditions, would you not say that?

Mr. MYER. Well, I suppose I had better say it in another way.

One of the major considerations which Mr. Burrows just mentioned to me, which I overlooked, was to try to avoid displacement of population through condemnation of land and moving people out who were already farming and carrying on their business and finding sites where you could build a new development and did not displace a lot of people. I would put it that way, rather than the other way around.

Now, climate varies. I would say at Poston it is perhaps the hottest place we have, and Heart Mountain is the coldest in the winter-time. And, of course, there are all types in between. Arkansas has a climate similar to what we have here in Washington, generally speaking, as far as humidity is concerned. All the rest of them are

in the semiarid or arid areas, and in irrigated country; some in the midcountry, some pretty far north, and some pretty far south.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am interested to know whether or not your staff, when they get an application from a person to take one of these evacuees into employment, makes any investigation or inquiry of any sort with respect to the type of employer, or present conditions of employment, and so forth.

Mr. MYER. Yes; we must do that in order to provide the offer to the evacuee. Most of these evacuees were people who were employed before they entered the centers, so we expect the employer to submit in as much detail as possible the factors of employment; the place they have for the people to live and describe it in some detail; the wages; the hours; and all the other conditions, as a basis for the evacuees themselves making up their minds whether or not they want to accept employment.

That is the only way we have in the majority of cases, having them describe that and getting it across to the evacuee, except in a few cases where they can meet face to face and talk about it.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am interested whether or not your staff endeavors to find out whether the person making a request is a responsible or irresponsible individual and that the evacuee will be practically guaranteed fair treatment in every respect.

Mr. MYER. No; I don't think we make any special investigation of that type, except the statements of the individuals themselves as to what they are offering in the way of wages and the conditions they have to offer which would, I think, reflect that, generally speaking.

If we have any indication that there has been misrepresentation being made, of course they would check into it and pass it along, but I don't think they would have time to check all of these offers.

We have a lot of offers come through these centers for many different types, so I don't think there is that investigation made that you talk about.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then, after the evacuee takes the position, the evacuee is practically on his own?

Mr. MYER. That is right.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, is there sort of a tacit understanding that the evacuee will stay in that employment which he accepted in order to get out of the relocation center?

Mr. MYER. No. We do, Mr. Eberharter, advise evacuees not to take employment with the idea of taking it for a short term, and then going on to some other employment, unless they have arrangements with the employer, because if they do that hurts our program.

We have had people take positions as maids, stay a week, and then take a job as a stenographer. I use that as a hypothetical case. That left a very disgruntled employer, and somebody was very mad at our program.

We have made every effort we can to discourage that type of action on the part of the evacuees and we have suggested that if they want to move out on temporary employment until they can get acquainted with the community, and their record is good otherwise, to make a frank agreement with their employer and work out that kind of a basis with the employer as I indicated in the case of the girl who was



a newspaper girl and is now serving as a maid, until she can secure other employment in the Chicago area.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Would you say there were not many cases where the evacuees stayed at their first place of employment?

Mr. MYER. I said there were not so very many cases where they came out and stayed for a short period and went on. We have had cases where they changed positions, quite a number of them, but we do not assume responsibility, Mr. Eberharter, of policing these people after they get out, as to whether they stay on this job or take another one.

We do require, under our rules, that if they change jobs, they notify us and give us their new address, so that we have a record of it.

There is a lag on that. It takes time to get caught up. In general, we have quite a good deal of success in getting those records in, so we ask for that information in every instance.

Aliens, of course, are required to do that, under the law, when they move from one address to another.

Mr. EBERHARTER. It is not the usual practice but rather, the exception, that an evacuee takes advantage of an offer of an employer and then only stays a very short time?

Mr. MYER. That is right; it is the exception now rather than the general practice. I would say there is less of it now than there was in the early portion of the leave program, because we have done everything we can to discourage that.

Mr. COSTELLO. An article appeared in the last Sunday edition of the Poston Chronicle, urging evacuees, if they accept the job, to remain there and not quit.

Mr. MYER. That is right. It has been one of the problems in relocation, as you no doubt realize. Some of these youngsters are not very old. They should be out. They may be 20 or 21 years of age; have not been away from their families before, and want to see the world, so they will take a job and the first thing you know, you will find some of them over here. But there have not been a large number of cases. That is one of the headaches that we have to put up with, of course.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Myer, would you care to express any opinion as to these suggestions that have been made in several quarters, that the War Relocation Authority program be in the control of the military?

Mr. MYER. No; other than that opinion that I expressed this morning. My opinion is that that is a determination to be made by the Congress of the United States, or the Executive, or jointly, and I do not think that it is quite proper for me to make a statement on that.

I naturally have some opinion about it but I don't care to state it, Mr. Eberharter.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Well, as one member of the committee, I certainly would like to know what your opinion of that suggestion is. I think it would be rather helpful to the committee.

If you do not care to express any opinion, of course I think I will request that some representative of the War Department express his opinion either in writing or by appearance before this committee as to that suggestion.

Mr. MYER. I think that is a perfectly good approach.



That has been done, I know, by the Military Affairs Committee, and I am sure that the representatives of the War Department will be glad to express theirs, but I don't think I should.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Has the War Department officially expressed its reaction to that suggestion?

Mr. MYER. Yes; they have.

Mr. EBERHARTER. To the Military Affairs Committee of the House or Senate?

Mr. MYER. Senate.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I think we can get that.

Mr. COSTELLO. The War Department was adverse to the suggestion.

Mr. MYER. The War Department was adverse to the suggestion each time it has been raised.

Mr. EBERHARTER. There is an opinion held by many people, Mr. Myer, that the administration in many of the relocation centers is very weak, and that they do not take a firm stand in the control of the Japanese with those who are troublemakers, those who advocate the Japanese ideology, and commit various other acts which I feel you do not approve of and I do not feel that American people would approve of.

What about that? Do you think there is laxity and weakness in the control exercised by the various administrators on the staff?

Mr. MYER. No; not generally. I would say this, Mr. Eberharter, there have been a great many mistakes made during the last 14 months, or during the life of the War Relocation Authority; part of them due to normal human mistakes that anyone will make; part of them due to inexperience; part of them due to inability to do everything at once; part of them due to the incompatible things that will happen in any population at certain times and you wonder why.

I might name the zoot suit riot in Los Angeles, where they had a disturbance, almost the same proportion we had in Manzanar, if not more so, and the riots in Denver and other places.

We have had difficulty of that type.

I do think that there were cases of inexperience and poor management in the early portion of this program in some of the centers. I think, generally, that has been remedied as time has gone on, through (1) experience and through (2) changes in personnel, where we found people that were not particularly adapted, as has been indicated in some of the cases here where we made changes.

I think today that we have as good a staff on the War Relocation Authority as you will find in any Government agency.

I make no bones about that. I like to brag about it because I think they are good. They are becoming veterans. Some of them may be better, of course, but I would say, generally speaking, the situation today is under good control. It is being handled well. I make no apologies for them.

I won't say that all of the policies are in complete order because there are times you change your program, and as plans develop, you are not able to always follow through each week and do the job.

I might say we have been pretty busy for the past 6 months with our key personnel, involving investigations, about which I make no criticism, but it does take time of our key staff to gather the facts and present them and to be involved in them.

To that extent we have not been devoting our full energies to some of the attention of the program.

I want to repeat: We are glad to have had the opportunity to present the facts.

On the other hand, I think at the moment—and let me repeat—that things generally are in good order. Some of the mistakes we made last summer and last fall will live with us forever; some of the stories that have been played over and over half a dozen times, including the one about the Poston incident, displayed last fall, with lurid recitals, played again.

We expect that, when you get new lurid recitals with different slants. I have no criticism of the press for playing that up, but it does help to keep old problems in mind.

People assume, people naturally assume that that situation still exists today that existed last November or existed last August. It does not exist in that manner any more.

I have made the statement to my staff a good many times that 1 month in W. R. A. is about 1 year in normal experience, in normal times, from the standpoint of making your next move, the complexities of the problem, and everything considered.

I think we have gained a good deal of experience in the last year or 14 months. I think things are in pretty good order. We are glad to have anyone look into any of the centers and check them. I don't expect everybody to agree with everything we do. Human nature is not built that way.

We have tried to conduct an open, sound administration, which anybody can look at. I take a great deal of pride in the fact that I think our house is in good order.

And, Mr. Chairman, I think that we are running a pretty good program. I don't want to be egotistical about it, but—

Mr. EBERHARTER (interposing). Do you agree with the opinion of many people that the Japanese psychology is different from the American psychology, in that the Japanese really like to have imposed on them a rather rigid control and discipline?

Mr. MYER. Well, of course, Japanese psychology as applied to relocation centers varies with your three generations and with the situation, depending on what the experiences of the individuals are.

I would like to point out again that 72 percent of the American citizens who have been in these centers, or thereabouts, have never seen Japan. They are brought up and educated in our American schools, which I think is a pretty good Americanization process. Their psychology, generally speaking, is American.

Sure, they have been subjected to some Japanese psychology, so that talking about one group of these people as compared with the aliens who were born and reared in Japan is another thing.

Yes; I would say yes; but I don't think it is limited to the Japanese. I think anybody respects a hard, firm, honest administration.

It does not need to be unkindly, but it does need to be honest and firm and definite. That is the kind of administration we have tried to run. We haven't always had it. I think we are getting it, however, and I agree that they like that, but I don't think it is limited to the Japanese.

I think other people in the same boat would like the same kind of administration.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Do you not think that the Japanese really like it better than the American people; a little bit?

Mr. MYER. Yes; I suppose that is true, if you were speaking strictly of Japanese.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Then, would you say that your control over the activities of the population in the relocation centers was more firm now than it was a year ago, or 6 months ago?

Mr. MYER. There isn't any question about that, in either case—a year ago or 6 months ago; more definite and more firm. We have established our policy which operates to strengthen the administration all along the line, and we have eliminated people in many cases who could not live with this policy, and did not like it.

Now, they are not as tough as some people would like to see them, and they are tougher than other people would like to see them. But it is the policy of this organization to conduct a firm, honest, and sound administration.

We have certain responsibilities within the War Relocation Authority, and we are trying to provide a certain responsibility for the evacuees themselves.

I happen to be one of these people that believe you cannot govern any people without the consent of the governed over a very long period, so that I do think that these people should be consulted on some way or other in relation to their problems and their programs.

Mr. EBERHARTER. You think one of the weaknesses of the War Relocation Authority in the early days was that they did not have this firm control or authority which they are exercising now?

Mr. MYER. In some of the centers; yes. Not in all of them. In some of them we have had it consistently throughout, but in some we haven't.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In some of the centers the block managers, so-called, are almost exclusively Kibei, or Issei, according to some testimony that has been given to this committee.

Mr. MYER. Yes. The block managers, in that sense, of course, are appointed personnel, who are carrying out certain duties in relation to maintenance; I mean, the facilities within the center, the maintenance of buildings, or maintenance of the service centers, and so on. They are on the pay roll and carrying out their duties, and if they are not carrying out their duties they are changed by the administration, as anybody else would be.

It is true in some cases most of them are Issei.

Mr. EBERHARTER. Are not some of these block managers elected by the residents?

Mr. MYER. Not the block managers; no. Not in any case that I know of.

There is, as differentiated from the block managers, a community council elected, but those are not the block managers.

Mr. EBERHARTER. In those cases of the council, they are always elected by the residents in the particular block?

Mr. MYER. By the residents of the particular block, or in some particular centers they have established wards, and maybe four blocks to a ward, or something like that.



Mr. EBERHARTER. Are, in most instances, these community council Issei or Kibei?

Mr. MYER. Up until about 60 days ago they were required to be Nisei and citizens of the United States under our rulings.

We have changed that policy recently, basically for the reason I gave awhile ago. There are very few, in some of these centers, mature citizens left to serve on those councils, so we have made provision whereby Issei can be elected to the council now as well as Nisei. I have forgotten the exact date, but we have done it only within the last 60 or 90 days.

Since last August citizens had to hold office; in fact, it was one of our troubles that led to conflict. We had many inexperienced people trying to represent the evacuees in the centers, and some of the older people resented it, and we finally came to the conclusion that it was true, in addition to the fact that we did not have the proper number of mature United States citizens to fill the offices.

If we had had a population where we had had a large number of the middle-aged group, second generation, or citizens of the United States, I think we would have had a different problem, but it did cause one of our difficulties because we maintained that policy.

We thought it was a sound policy, and we stayed with it for a long time.

Mr. EBERHARTER. A cooperative had been in existence at the Colorado relocation center.

Is that operating now?

Mr. MYER. How is that?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Or is the cooperative at Poston operating now?

Mr. MYER. As far as I know, it is. I have not checked the Poston situation recently, but I understand that it is operating. It is operating at Gila, I know, and at Manzanar. I could check all of those for you.

Mr. EBERHARTER. I am particularly interested in the center in Arizona—the camps in the centers in Arizona, the one at Gila and the one at Parker. Do you know about those?

Mr. MYER. Yes; they are both operating Cooperatives at the Centers at the present time.

The one at Poston operated on a different basis for a time but I think they have recently switched over to the straight cooperative procedure. They are simply in the process now of switching over from the so-called Rosedale approach, in connection with community enterprises, to the cooperative process.

Mr. EBERHARTER. What effect will this denial of the Public Utility Commission of Arizona to license them to operate have?

Mr. MYER. Well, I hope it will have no effect, because I think the licenses will be granted ultimately.

They have been operating, as you see, and are still operating under a trust agreement, which is not strictly a cooperative agreement, but they do want to switch over to the cooperative basis, and I hope we can get an agreement to do that.

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in recess for 5 minutes at this time.

(Brief recess taken.)

Mr. COSTELLO. The committee will be in order.



Mr. MYER. Mr. Chairman, I have a half page statement I would like to supply for the record, and then I have a more detailed statement I would like to supply for the record, but I would like to read the one-page statement if you don't mind. It was referred to when I talked to Mr. Mundt this morning.

It was in regard to the Americanization situation, this program, that I think ought to go into the record.

I do not want to go into it in detail, but if anybody is interested in a longer statement, I will give it.

In view of the fact that the Japanese side of Japanese-American life has been so strongly emphasized during recent weeks, I believe that, in the interest of fairness and accuracy, some attention should be drawn to evidence of Americanism among the Japanese-American people.

Of the 110,000 people of Japanese descent who were evacuated last year from the Pacific coast military area, approximately 70,000 were born in the United States and are American citizens. Roughly, 72 percent of this group have never seen Japan. They have attended American schools, public schools, and have been subjected to all the other Americanizing influence that operate constantly in any American community.

More than 8,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry—approximately half of them volunteers—are now serving in the United States Army. Some are in service overseas and three have already been cited for bravery in action. One is serving as a turret gunner in Liberators engaged in bombing operations over the continent of Europe.

Over 1,200 of these soldiers volunteered for service from behind the wire enclosures of relocation centers. As a result, the centers today contain large numbers of service flags and other evidences of ties with the Army. Men in uniform are frequent visitors at the centers and arrangements for entertaining them are part of the regular community activities program.

At one of these centers last month an official U. S. O. has been established, and I think they will be established elsewhere.

There are many other evidences of Americanism among these people both in the relocation centers and in normal communities throughout the country.

At all centers, training in American ideals and American institutions is part of the regular school program just as it is in public schools outside. Formal flag-raising and the pledge of allegiance are a regular ceremony in most of the center schools.

Practically all national organizations for young people, such as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, 4-H Clubs, Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., and Junior Red Cross, have active programs at the centers, and many thousands of members. Boy Scouts alone number several thousand.

I do not have the exact figures now and if the committee is interested, I will get that figure later.

I will close with this remark: Outside the relocation centers, the thousands of Japanese Americans, including both those who have left the centers on leave and those who were never evacuated, are displaying their patriotism in the same ways as other civilian Americans. They are buying war bonds and stamps, donating money and blood to the Red Cross, and participating in salvage campaigns.

Several hundred are serving effectively in the Intelligence Branch of the United States Army. Others are serving as language instructors, helping to train intelligence officers for the Army and Navy.

Still others are working as translators with the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. Many are employed as carpenters, machinists, welders, and in other jobs essential to war production.

I will supply for the record, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind, about a 7-page statement giving the details of this organization, a summary statement.

("Evidences of Americanism Among Japanese Americans" follows:)

#### EVIDENCES OF AMERICANISM AMONG JAPANESE-AMERICANS

(Statement submitted to the Committee on Un-American Activities by Dillon S. Myer, Director of the War Relocation Authority)

The War Relocation Authority realizes that the Committee on Un-American Activities is primarily interested in evidences of un-Americanism. Statements appearing in the press recently and attributed to members or representatives of the committee have served to point up the essentially Japanese sympathies of many people now in relocation centers. The Japanese side of Japanese-American life has been brought to the attention of the American people abundantly and in detail.

But there is another side to Japanese-American life—the side represented by the word lying to the right of the hyphen. And even though it is not the fundamental business of the committee to investigate such matters, we believe that the committee—in the interest of presenting a fully rounded picture—may wish to incorporate some evidences of Americanism among Japanese-Americans into the record of its investigations. This statement has been prepared to supply the committee with such evidence.

#### BACKGROUND

Approximately two-thirds of the persons of Japanese extraction now in the United States were born on American soil and are, by virtue of that fact, American citizens under the Constitution. And their citizenship is by no means a mere constitutional technicality. An examination of the forces that have operated to mold their personalities from birth through adolescence serves to illustrate the essential human wisdom of the constitutional provision which makes them citizens.

Approximately 72 percent of the American citizens in relocation centers have never even seen Japan. These second-generation Americans have spent all their formative years in the United States. They have been educated—along with children of English, German, Irish, Italian, and almost every other extraction—in American public schools. They have played the typical American childhood games with children of other immigrants and children whose ancestors have been in this country for generations. They have been weaned on our comic strips, our movies, and our breakfast-food radio programs. They have joined organizations like the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, and the Camp-fire Girls.

To deny the influence of these forces which have been brought to bear on the minds of Japanese-Americans almost since birth is to imply that American institutions have no real strength or cogency and are less potent than the transplanted institutions of the Orient. This is an implication which the War Relocation Authority ardently rejects. We believe that American institutions are strong, that their strength is abundantly illustrated by the whole "melting pot" history of our Nation, and that they will inevitably influence—to a greater or less degree—any personality exposed to them during the formative years of youth. The fact is that most of the second-generation Japanese are, in the words of one writer, "almost painfully American." The typical Nisei—or American of Japanese descent—uses the breeziest American slang, wears the latest-

style American clothes, and indulges in nearly all the pastimes that are peculiarly associated with this country. As one naval intelligence officer who has studied the Nisei over a period of years points out, these youngsters have absorbed Americanism as naturally as the air they breathe.

#### AMERICANISM WITHIN THE RELOCATION CENTERS

The influences that make for Americanization are still operating on the minds and hearts of the Japanese-Americans, both in the relocation centers and in normal communities throughout the country. While these forces are inevitably less potent within the confines of the centers than on the outside, the War Relocation Authority is making positive efforts to continue the Americanization process among the evacuees. Striking evidences of Americanism have been appearing at the centers almost constantly since the arrival of the first evacuee contingents. A few facts gathered from the centers will serve to illustrate the point.

1. Although schools at relocation centers have been held in barracks classrooms, the course of study at all centers has emphasized American ideals and institutions. Both in the classroom and in extra-curricular activities, the children of school age at the centers are being constantly exposed to the same training for responsible citizenship that is provided in public schools throughout the country. Formal flag raising and the pledge of allegiance are part of the daily school program at most relocation centers.

2. Adult education courses for the residents beyond school age are being given at all the centers. According to the latest report, approximately 25 percent of the adult population at the centers is now enrolled in these classes. Two of the most popular subjects are English and American history.

3. Practically all important national organizations for young people—Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Campfire Girls, Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association, and Junior Red Cross—have units at the relocation centers. Boy Scouts alone number several thousands. National representatives of these organizations who have visited the centers have been highly impressed with the programs being carried on.

4. Like ordinary communities, the relocation centers are decorated these days with many service flags, and men in uniform returning to see their relatives are among the most frequent visitors. At most centers, servicemen's headquarters have been established for the entertainment of visiting soldiers.

5. A substantial majority of the American citizens of Japanese descent at relocation centers are Christians and practice their religious beliefs with the same freedom that prevails throughout the United States. Many national church organizations have taken a keen interest in the religious activities at the centers and have sent in representatives to help in the formulation of community religious programs.

6. In line with the best traditions of democracy, evacuees have established community governments at nearly all relocation centers. Typically, these governmental organizations consist of an elected community council or ordinance-making body, a judicial commission which functions after the manner of a criminal court, and an arbitration commission for the settlement of civil disputes. Through the operation of these governments, many evacuees have had an opportunity to gain first-hand experience with democracy in action.

7. Although most evacuees at the centers are earning only \$16 a month, they have already made significant financial contributions to the war effort. At Minidoka Center in Idaho, for example, the residents dug into their meager resources and donated more than \$2,500 to the Red Cross emergency war fund drive. Comparable showings were made at the other centers.

8. On the production front, citizen evacuees at the centers have contributed manufactured articles to both the Army and the Navy. At the two centers in Arizona, approximately 1,000 evacuees garnished approximately 150,000,000 square feet of camouflage nets over a 5-month period ending in May. At other centers, shops are being operated to turn out ship models and silk-screen posters for instruction work in the Navy.

#### AMERICANISM OUTSIDE THE CENTERS

As this is written, more than one-fourth of all people of Japanese descent in the United States are living outside relocation centers. Nearly 17,000 were living outside the west coast military area at the time of evacuation and never



have been moved from their homes. Another 5,000 or so left the western military zone before the "freeze" order of March 29, 1942, and thus were never confined in Government centers. And nearly 14,000 who have been through the evacuation experience have now left the relocation centers under the leave procedures of the War Relocation Authority.

These people live in normal communities and enjoy the same rights and privileges as other Americans. They are subject to the Americanizing influences that operate with full effectiveness only in such an environment and that never can be completely effective in the abnormal environment of relocation centers. Over the past year or more they have produced striking evidence of their essential Americanism and their devotion to the principles for which this country is fighting.

1. Some 8,000 American citizens of Japanese extraction are now serving in the United States Army. Approximately half of them are volunteers, and nearly 1,200 offered their services from behind the wire enclosures of relocation centers. One of the best-known Japanese-American units in the Army is the One hundredth Infantry Battalion, formerly stationed at Camp McCoy, Wis. This outfit, composed mainly of National Guardsmen from the Hawaiian Islands, has achieved an excellent record both under fire at the time of Pearl Harbor and in training on the mainland. While the battalion was stationed at Camp McCoy the commanding officer, Lt. Col. Farrant L. Turner, paid the following tribute to his men in a report to headquarters: "I have never had more wholehearted, serious-minded cooperation from any troops than I receive from my present command."

The member of this organization, together with the 1,200 volunteers from relocation centers and several thousand from Hawaii, are now in training as a special combat team at Camp Shelby, Miss.

2. In addition to the Japanese-American soldiers in training at Camp Shelby, a number are serving with the United States Army overseas. Some are serving in the intelligence branch performing services involving a knowledge of the Japanese language. Three have already been cited for bravery in action, and one is serving as a turret gunner on a Liberator bomber engaged in operations over the continent of Europe.

3. Several hundred Japanese-Americans—most of them from relocation centers—are now serving as instructors in the Japanese language at schools maintained by the Army and Navy intelligence services. Hand picked by officers from both services who visited the relocation centers, these instructors are maintaining a rigorous schedule of teaching to prepare scores of intelligence officers for active service in the Pacific theater. Commenting on the efforts of the Japanese-American instructors at one of the schools, the naval officer in charge stated, "No greater work could be done by any individual citizen than is being done by the members in our Japanese language school faculty to bring an early victory to the American people."

4. During the summer and fall of 1942, nearly 10,000 evacuees of Japanese descent were released from assembly and relocation centers to work in the sugar-beet fields of the West. Altogether they have harvested enough beets to produce a year's sugar ration for approximately 10,000,000 people.

5. Evacuees who have left the relocation centers on indefinite leave are contributing to the war effort in many ways. They are working as welders, machinists, carpenters, farmers, doctors, nurses, and in a variety of other capacities that are especially vital during the wartime period.

7. Several American citizens of Japanese ancestry with ability in both languages are working with the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information in translation work and in the preparation of material for broadcasts beamed to Japan. Some have actually participated in these broadcasts, speaking on American war aims to the people under the yoke of the Japanese military caste.

#### AMERICANIZATION IN HAWAII

In the Hawaiian Islands, there are nearly 160,000 people of Japanese descent representing approximately one-third of the total population. Although Hawaii lies much closer to the theater of operations than the west coast, these people have never undergone mass evacuation or mass detention in Government centers. They have been subject to the same military restrictions as all other residents of the Territory—no more and no less. And they have achieved an excellent record of participation in the war effort.

Rumors of sabotage committed by these people at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack have been categorically denied by every responsible official who



has had occasion to comment on the matter—by the Honolulu chief of police, the president of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The loyalty of the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, on the other hand, has received high praise from a man in an excellent position to know the facts—Col. Kendall J. Fielder, chief of military intelligence in the Honolulu sector. Speaking before a forum at the University of Hawaii in March of this year, Colonel Fielder had this to say:

"Without revealing secret military information, I can say truthfully that members of the Japanese race have themselves constituted our chief liaison with the Japanese community and our most reliable check on its morale, its needs, and its activities.

"How differently a Himmler or a Rosenberg would have handled this delicate situation. Does anyone believe for a moment that any of the Axis crowd would give one of enemy race a fair chance to prove himself? Yet that's what was done in Hawaii—and so far it has proved militarily sound. That the situation is working out well is a tribute not only to wise administration, but to tolerance on the part of the rest of our good Americans here. We have lived up to President Roosevelt's description of democratic peoples as meen of good will.

"It would take much too long to tell you of the many concrete ways in which many of these people who were put on the spot have proved their love for America and have helped solve an otherwise ticklish military problem here. For the information of all who might be misled there is none among us who has been led into this policy out of a mawkish sentimentality or gullibility. To us Japan and her people are a race of stubborn, hardy, despicable warrior zealots, who would stop at nothing to snuff out our lives and our way of life. Her army and navy must definitely be crushed. The question of Americans of Japanese blood is far different. They are Americans—and until they prove (or show themselves dangerously capable of proving)—traitorous, they should be treated as Americans."

The War Relocation Authority subscribes wholeheartedly to the position taken by Colonel Fielder, particularly as stated in the final paragraph. We believe the United States is fighting for principles of democracy which include rights of citizenship regardless of racial ancestry. We believe the future of the people of Japanese ancestry evacuated from the west coast is a matter of concern not to the War Relocation Authority alone, but to the Nation as a whole. And we believe, finally, that this problem should be handled not as Hitler or Tojo would handle it, but in the American way.

Mr. COSTELLO. I appreciate having that because of the question of Americanization in the centers having been raised. People have been very much concerned about the fact that there was not any great evidence of too much effort being attempted toward that particular end.

They felt that a splendid opportunity for Americanization among the interned Japanese might be afforded by the Government now better than any time in the future, and it would be a shame not to allow that opportunity to be used.

Mr. MYER. I would like to say that it is difficult to maintain and carry on an Americanization program where the population is all of one racial group, with the cultural background of the older people, and with the complications which go on, which makes it more difficult than under normal conditions. That is one reason we pushed the program so hard in getting the young people out.

I think we have made a good showing in getting those that were old enough to be on their own to move out into communities. I hope we can get a much larger number out in the next 2 or 3 months, which is the most positive type; those that are leading in the right direction.

Unfortunately, many of the citizen group are too young to launch out on their own: probably 35,000 of them under 18 or 20 years of age, attached to families, and that does create a problem, I think, with the segregation program now carried out in connection with our

relocation, but I think we can make much progress with them in the different centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. You stated you would not have that list of names ready before Monday?

Mr. MYER. I am afraid not. I haven't had a chance to check with my office. It takes quite a while to check the list, because some of the names are close cases; because, I mean the first names are misspelled, and you have to check and recheck.

Mr. COSTELLO. I would appreciate, as soon as the list is ready, if you would send it down to the committee.

Mr. MYER. I will do that.

Mr. MUNDT. One of the things, Mr. Myer, that disturbed me personally in visiting Poston was the manner in which I felt the Japanese families were being inadequately housed in the centers.

We went through several of the barracks that house as many as eight or nine people, living in a comparatively small room, without adequate partitioning, and so forth, and I am very much in the hope that as you get this segregation program under way, you will make available to the Japanese more livable quarters in which they can have decent family privacy, compatible with American standards, which I feel would also help in this Americanization program, which we all hope to see accelerated in these camps.

I wonder if you have been moved at all in the direction of providing better living quarters in these centers.

Mr. MYER. First, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, you do not hope that more than I do.

There was a commitment made a year ago that partitioning materials would be provided so that they could construct their own partitions. None of us anticipated at that time the difficult problems we were going to have in securing materials of any type, by August. It came to the point that priorities that we had then were worth practically nothing. We had a very difficult time getting the priorities, to begin with, and then we secured materials to provide school facilities that they were more interested in than housing.

So it is true that they do not have adequate facilities.

Unit I at Poston is more crowded than the other because that is the first center filled. They were packed in, and it has been difficult to get people, unless they are institutionalized, to move over to the other centers. They are more crowded in Poston I than they need to be, in many cases. That is, I think, a human characteristic.

If we find the materials to supply the partitioning, as time goes on, I hope we can do so. It was stated as a policy, and it has been provided in some cases.

I would say Tule Lake was probably the best-housed group as far as that goes, because it was one of the older centers. They got in a little earlier on getting some of the material in, and it made a little better housing.

Manzanar and Poston are two of the worst, from the standpoint of crowding.

I appreciate your statement and I am very strong with your point of view.

Mr. MUNDT. You would consider Poston, however, a relatively well-run camp, would you not, from the standpoint of housing?

Mr. MYER. I am speaking now about the type of barracks.

The fact that it was crowded, we did not get the materials there for the partitioning that you are talking about that we did at Tule Lake or some of the other centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. Do you not think that the facts we developed at one center applied pretty much to the other centers; that the general set of facts would apply pretty well to all the centers?

Mr. MYER. I think that is true, with this exception, Mr. Costello, that any one of the four oldest centers have had more problems, more bad history in the nature of things, I think, not because they have been in all cases badly run, but because they were the guinea pigs. They had to go through the first experience which led the basis for some of the policies that were developed last August. Tule Lake, Manzanar, Poston, and particularly Gila, were the earliest centers that received the evacuees.

Poston and Tule Lake both began to receive theirs in the latter part of May. It ran on through the summer. And, as I say, it was mid-August or the first of September before we began to get our policy system in order that gave these people guidance.

They made mistakes, and in making mistakes, they indicated where we needed to have certain policies tightened up, and as the result of the inadequacy at some of those centers, it caused the difficulties which were referred to here today, in many of those older centers, that we did not have at some of the later centers after we gained more experience.

In that connection there was not quite the same history, but I want to repeat, in most cases, it is not because of difference in administrative ability; it is because of the difference in experience, and they supplied the experience as the basic background for some of the other centers.

Mr. COSTELLO. I want to announce for the benefit of the press that the committee will not meet tomorrow.

Of course, Mr. Myer, you might hold yourself available and we will notify you should we desire to have additional hearings on Friday. We will call you in the event we do.

We thank you for having appeared here today and the testimony you have given to us.

Mr. MYER. I appreciate the fair opportunity you have given me in allowing me to make a statement here, and I want to say furthermore, if we are not able to convene again Friday, and have the time to do so, I would like the opportunity to present for the record a rather summary statement of the W. R. A. policies, in relation to those matters that have not been covered; policies in relation to relocation centers and so on, so that it will help to complete the record in that respect; in other words, I would like to supply additional material.

Mr. COSTELLO. You may supply that to either counsel or the committee.

Mr. MYER. Thank you.

Mr. COSTELLO. Then the hearing will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 6 p. m., the hearing adjourned.)







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